Kosovo Final Status and Its Implications for the Security of the Balkans

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CRANFIELD UNIVERSITY

DEFENCE COLLEGE OF MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

MSc IN GLOBAL SECURITY DISSERTATION

Academic Year 2004/2005

Commander Adriatik Meta

Kosovo final status and its implications for the security of the Balkans

Supervisor: Dr. Laura Cleary

10 August 2005

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of

Masters of Science in Global Security

(21,900 words)

© Cranfield University, 2005. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may

be reproduced without written permission of the copyright holder.



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ABSTRACT

Ethnic conflict has become one of the most significant threats to global peace and

international order since the end of the Cold War in the Balkans. This is because

nationalist secessionist movements especially in Former Yugoslavia brought

destruction and new uncertainties.

The NATO military campaign of 1999 against Serbian army put an end to ethnic

cleansing and gave new hopes for Kosovo people to live in freedom. Since the end of

hostilities and the entrance of international Kosovo protection force the province is

governed by United Nations Administration. Although all the NATO powers had

genuinely supported the objective of keeping rump Yugoslavia together, the military

campaign of 1999 to drive Yugoslav forces out of Kosovo was hardly conducive to

that goal. Nor was the operation by the regime of President Slobodan Milosevic to

expel nearly one million of the province‟s Albanian citizens. Serbia ‟s dictatorial

regime failed gamble, more than anything else, created the moral and practical

political conditions that will probably require the international powers, as well as the

states of the region, to accommodate Kosovo‟s permanent separation from Ser bia.

While the United States and its European allies are hesitating about what to do in

relation to the Kosovo‟s final status, there is an urgent need to determine that status as

soon as possible. The Albanian majority expects the international community to begin

delivering this year on its independence aspirations. Without such moves it may act

unilaterally. In such circumstances, given the dismal record of Kosovo Albanians with

regard to minorities, Kosovo's Serbs may call upon Serbia's armed forces to protect



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them, and the region could be plunged into new turmoil. It is certainly possible that

Russia and China will veto Security Council decisions. Such positions would mean

that Serbia would formally retain a claim to sovereignty over Kosovo.

The legal basis for discussing Kosovo's future status is UN Security Council

Resolution 1244, which explicitly mandates "a political process designed to determine

Kosovo's future status", thus indicating that the present de jure sovereignty of Serbia

and Montenegro over Kosovo is not necessarily permanent.

Some policy makers have expressed concerns that any movement toward granting

sovereignty to Kosovo would be seized on by secessionists, irredentists and their

supporters elsewhere as a precedent for their cause. On the other hand trying to keep

Kosovo within Serbia is not a wise solution taking into account the history of Serb-

Kosovo Albanian bloody relations. The fear is that nationalist conflicts could become

a challenge to the territorial or political status quo in the region.



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the Minister of Defence, the Chief of General Staff and the Director

of the Defence Planning Directorate of Albania for giving me the opportunity to

attend the 6 th Global Security course. I owe many debts to the Her Majesty‟s

Government of the United Kingdom that sponsored my studies and living here

together with my family for one year. I sincerely thank Doctor Laura Cleary, for her

sound advice and guidance in the course of this dissertation. Her encouragement

helped me overcome difficulties and keep the speed and the momentum. I commend

the efforts of the all Security Studies Institute staff in their contribution to the

knowledge I gained from the course. Special thanks to Professors Richard Holmes,

Christopher Bellamy, Ian Davis, Dr. Steven Haines, Mr Tom Maley. Many thanks to

Lieutenant Colonel Graem Olley and Steph Muir, the Course Administrator, for their

kind support throughout the course. I thank all my colleagues who in one or another

way contributed to making the course interesting for me.

Special thanks to my family, my wife Tefta and my lively daughters, Joana and

Klaudia, for their support and encouragement throughout the course.





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CHAPTER 3 - ALTERNATIVES OF KOSOVO FINAL STATUS_____________ 35

3.1- Historical background on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs__ 35

3.2- Kosovo‟s final status_______________________________ _____________38

3.3- International key players and their position to Kosovo final status________ 47

CHAPTER 4 - KOSOVO FINAL STATUS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS__57

4.1- Current security situation in the Balkan region________________________57

4.2- Security implications of Kosovo final status__________________________61

CHAPTER 5 – OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES______________________78

5.1- Confronting the past working to build the future______________________ 78

5.2- NATO and EU integration – a Balkan without borders_________________ 87

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS______________100

6.1- Conclusion___________________________________________________100

6.2- Recommendations_____________________________________________104

6.3- Recommendations for further study_______________________________105

BIBLIOGRAPHY___________________________________________________107



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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Partners of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe_________________89



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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Map of Kosovo_______________________________________________43

Figure 2 Macedonia scenario___________________________________________ 69

Figure 3 Albanian four vilayets under the Ottoman Empire____________________72

Figure 4 New Borders _________________________________________________86

Figure 5 European Integration – the present vision for 2006___________________ 93



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GLOSSARY/LIST OF ACRONYMS

EU European Union

FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

IPA Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance

KFOR NATO-led international peace-keeping mission in Kosovo

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

LDK Democratic League of Kosovo

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NLA National Liberation Army

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PDK Democratic Party of Kosovo

PfP Partnership for Peace

PISG Provisional Institutions of Self-Government

SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement

SiCG Serbia and Montenegro

SRS Serbian Radical Party (Serbian political party)

SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General

UCPMB Presheve-Medvegja Liberation Army

UN United Nations

UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

USA United States of America



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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

1.1- Background

On June 28, 1914, Serbian nationalists assassinated Austrian Archduke Francis

Ferdinand and his wife during their visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was this event

in Sarajevo in the summer of 1914 that sparked one of the most destructive world

wars. Eighty years later, in the early days of the siege of Sarajevo in the mid-1990s, a

photo of a half-ruined post office with three items of graffiti written on its wall

captured the imagination of the world. The first graffito read "Thi s is Serbia!” the

second stated "This is Bosnia". And someone scrawled underneath, "No, you idiots,

it's a post office!" But a European historian of the present added a line of his own,

"This is Europe"; 1 for all of the destruction in the Yugoslav wars has been done by

Europeans to other Europeans in Europe. 2 The fundamental causes of World War I,

however, were rooted deeply in the European history of the previous century,

particularly in the political and economic policies that prevailed on the Continent after

1871, the year that marked the emergence of Germany as a great world power. The

Balkans were not the powder keg, as is so often believed: the metaphor is inaccurate.

They were merely the powder trail that the great powers themselves had laid. The

powder keg was Europe. 3

Although the conflict between Serbs and Albanians has its origins in rising

nationalism or human rights abuses in the 1980s and 1990s, the tendency by both

groups to contest their rights to Kosovo is clear evidence of the long-term origins of

the conflict. Thus it is not simple hatred of one group for another; instead the meaning



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of „ethnicity‟, „nation‟, „national identity‟ and so forth all need to be taken into

account in order for those living in the twenty-first century to be able to appreciate the

origins and the consequences of the war in Kosovo. 4 Both ethnic groups have strong

emotional attachments to Kosovo and maintain irreconcilable positions on the

disputed territory. 5

One of the basic characteristics of Kosovo‟s social reali ty is a complete division of the

Albanian and Serbian public opinions, resulting in different perceptions of the

situational conflict. The Albanian collective consciousness, as well as, the Serbian

one, sees itself as a total victim, antagonized by the opposite side. The greatest

divergence are contained in views dealing with the far off past, best illustrated in both

groups‟ selective memory of Kosovo as „holy land‟. Albanians claim that ethnic

cleansing has long been present in Serbian tradition. They also claim that Kosovo has

always been merely Serbia‟s colony. The Serbs in turn point to the forced migrations

from Kosovo from 1960s to the 1990s. For Serbs the dominant argument for

oppression of Albanians in Kosovo was the need to protect the remaining Serbs

there. 6 Both Serbs and Albanians have constructed their own „myths‟ around the

historical importance of Kosovo for the origins of their nations and their national

identity. The battle of Kosovo of 1389 is a case in point. So much myth, symbolism

and legend are associated with this battle it is difficult even to this day to separate fact

from fiction. The Serbs argue that they have been in Kosovo since the seventh

century, that their medieval kings were crowned there and but for the defeat by the

Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389 Serbs would have retained

control in Kosovo; while the Albanians suggest that they arrived in Kosovo prior to

the Serbs and that they are the direct descendants of the region‟s earliest inhabitants.7



3

Perhaps the most damaging myth as far as the Albanians are concerned, is that

Kosovo is historically Serbian land and that the Albanians are newcomers to the

region. The site of the 1389 crushing defeat by the Turks of the Serbian medieval

kingdom, Kosovo is considered by most Serbs as sacred ground, although at the

Kosovo Battle the Albanians fought together with the Serbs against the invading

Turks. 8 During her travels, at a time when Kosovo was still part of the Ottoman

Empire, [Edith] Durham wrote that she found that the Serbs there, „regardless of the

fact that in most places they are much in the minority, still had visions of expulsion of

all Moslems, and the reconstruction of the great Serbian Empire. 9

The myth of Kosovo is so strong that from childhood Serbs are taught that the region

was the cradle of Serbia which was liberated in 1912 after centuries of Turkish-

Albanian occupation. The Serbs h ave developed a „Kosovo complex‟ and find it

difficult to liberate themselves from the dreadful burden of the Kosovo Battle. 10 The

Albanians are no less attached to Kosovo than the Serbs. It was in Kosovo‟s Prizren

that the Albanian League was formed in 1878, which waged a two-fronted struggle

for autonomy from Turkey and for the protection of the territorial integrity of

Albanian- inhabited areas from foreign encroachment. The major battle for Albania‟s

independence was fought in Kosovo and some of Albania‟s most prominent national

figures were Kosovars. 11 Besides contested historical claims to Kosovo, there are

other major differences between Serbs and Albanians. They speak different languages

and have different religion. Most Albanians are Muslim, with a small proportion

being Orthodox or Catholic. 12



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Kosovo Albanians do not define their national identity through religion, but through

language and have a relatively relaxed approach towards the observance of the forms

of the Islamic religion. Neither Islamic leaders nor Islamic theology played a

significant role in either the eight-year campaign of non-violent resistance to the Serb

occupation regime or the armed resistance of 1998-99. 13 Most Kosovo Serbs, even

those who are not active religious believers, consider Orthodoxy to be an important

component of their national identity. Nevertheless, despite this essential division of

religious activities along ethnic lines, it cannot be said that religion per se was an

important contributing factor in the conflict between Serbs and Albanians in

Kosovo. 14

From the time Kosovo was included into the Serbian state Kosovo Albanians were

considered as undesirable foreigners. The Albanians displayed a deep commitment to

national values and a strong resistance to Serbian rule. 15 When Milosevic came to

power in the 1980s his policy toward Kosovo aimed at breaking the will of ethnic

Albanians to resist Serbian domination. It blended elements of Serbian ultra-

nationalism, the widespread use of coercion, fear and intimidation, and general

disenfranchisement and the use of propaganda to demonise the Albanians. Having

restored Serbia‟s control over Kosovo, Milosevic embarked upon a policy of

Serbianising the province through a campaign of deliberate economic and social

marginalisation of Albanians. 16 After the failure of the Rambouillet peace talks in

January 1999, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), as the sponsors

of the talks between the two sides, finally decided to take sides and North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) military intervention against Serbia followed on 25

March 1999. It lasted less then three months and ended in complete withdrawal of



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Serbian government forces from Kosovo. The United Nations (UN) established its

interim government and gave Kosovo Albanians the control of the province. The

international community entered Kosovo in June 1999 without an exit strategy and has

taken only a few uncertain steps toward defining one. Security Council Resolution (SCR)

1244, which mandates an international administration, is ambiguous on the duration of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)'s sovereignty over Kosovo.

Continuing international ambiguity and delay over the final status of Kosovo is

increasingly untenable. Confusion and obfuscation over whether the territory becomes

a long- term UN or EU protectorate, is unilaterally handed over to Belgrade‟s control,

or is finally launched on a trajectory for statehood erodes the effectiveness of the UN

Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), fuels the misplaced hopes for some in Serbia that all or

part of Kosovo will again come under the authority of Belgrade, postpones stability in

Southeast Europe, and most disturbingly, contributes to increased tensions, political

and economic stagnation, and an unhealthy culture of depende nce among Kosovo‟s

ambitious, youthful, and growing population. 17 Ambiguity over the status comes from

UN Resolution 1244 which requires that Kosovo society and institutions must

demonstrate that they are ready to govern responsibly before discussions of final

status.

From the report of the International Commission on the Balkans the situation in the

region is described as close to failure as it is to success. For the moment, the wars are

over, but the smell of violence still hangs heavy in the air. The region's profile is

bleak - a mixture of weak states and international protectorates, where Europe has

stationed almost half of its deployable forces.18

But despite the scale of the assistance



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effort in the Balkans, the international community has failed to offer a convincing

political perspective to the societies in the region. The future of Kosovo is undecided,

the future of Macedonia is uncertain, and the future of Serbia is unclear. We run the

real risk of an explosion of Kosovo, an implosion of Serbia and new fractures in the

foundations of Bosnia and Macedonia. There is an urgent need to solve the

outstanding status and constitutional issues in the Balkans and to move the region as a

whole from the stage of protectorates and weak states to the stage of EU accession.

This is the only way to prevent the Western Balkans from turning into the black hole

of Europe. 19

1.2- Aim

The aim of this dissertation is to explore security implications for the Balkan region of

the possible solutions on the Kosovo final status.

1.3- Objectives

The objectives of the study are:

To analyse how nationalism and self-determination have contributed to the

increase of insecurity in Balkans.

To assess the security implications for the Balkan region in the light of

Kosovo‟s final status.



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To identify areas of international responsibility for the increase/decrease of

security in Balkans.

To recommend ways of fostering security and cooperation in the region.

1.4- Justification for undertaking the study

The debates within academia, among legal practitioners, politicians, international

institutions and governments in relation to the fate of Kosovo and the future of

Balkans has increased since Yugoslav wars of 1990s and especially after 1999 NATO

intervention in Kosovo. Many annalists and security institutions warn that the

situation in Kosovo is explosive and Kosovo Albanians are frustrated with the

international community that has been unable to deliver the final status. This

dissertation does not suggest that Kosovo final status should be independence from

Serbia; instead it provides an opportunity to analyse the security implications for the

Balkans in relation to Kosovo final status.

The examination of current literature in relation to the security situation in the

Balkans suggests that Kosovo final status is an impediment for the development and

integration of the poorest region of Europe and finally there is not an exit strategy

from Kosovo. Therefore the study of possible Kosovo status is related to the role of

nationalism and international super/regional powers to the security of the Balkans.

Some policy makers have expressed concerns that any movement toward granting

sovereignty to Kosovo would be seized on by secessionists, irredentists and their



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supporters elsewhere as a precedent for their cause. But in fact the circumstances of

the Kosovo case are rather unusual and unlikely to be matched by any other case

currently troubling policy-makers.

Many authors describe the Balkans as a powder keg and warn that granting Kosovo

independence may ignite other ethnic conflicts in the region and fear also the creation

of a greater Albania. Being from Balkans was one of the reasons for undertaking this

research.

1.5- Research methodology

Primary and secondary sources were used for writing this dissertation. The primary

sources include documents from the UN, UNMIK, and institutions relevant to the

study. Discussions with Doctor Laura Cleary gave me useful insights that formed part

of primary sources for the dissertation.

Secondary sources of information for the dissertation were primarily from books,

journals, the print and electronic news media and the internet. Other secondary

sources used were presentations and reports of conference proceedings. The field trip

to Northern Ireland gave me some insights into various aspects of ethnic conflict

situation and its implications for the security of United Kingdom.



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1.6- Study structure

Chapter one gives an overview of historical ethnic conflict between Serbs and Kosovo

Albanians and how it has contributed to the ongoing instability and insecurity in

Balkans. It also highlights the involvement of international actors in fuelling wars of

ethnic nature in the Balkans and their current involvement to resolve the Kosovo final

status.

Chapter two is a theoretical framework regarding nationalism and ethnicity as a

source of conflict. It reviews the theory of nationalism, self-determination and

highlights the linkage between nationalism, the rights of self-determination and its

ambiguity in international legal system to the security. Analysis of theory provides the

basis for a working definition for analysing the security dimension of people‟s self -

determination in a given international situation.

Chapter three gives an account of alternatives of Kosovo final status, analysing

primarily the independent Kosovo, a Kosovo within Serbia-Montenegro. The role of

key international players and their position to final status and their fears surrounding

ethnic composition of Balkan states is subsequently discussed.

Chapter four is devoted to the security implications of the possible Kosovo final status

alternatives discussed in Chapter three. Main focus is concentrated on the domino

effect and the creation of the Greater Albania as result of Kosovo‟s independence.



10

Chapter five identifies the major challenges that the international community is facing

in order to foster security in the Balkan region. Attention is placed on European

integration of the region and challenges of Kosovo and Serbia and Montenegro to

confront the past and the future.

Chapter six brings about the main conclusions reached throughout the dissertation and

makes recommendations.

1.7- Review of the literature

The existing literature on nationalism and movements of self-determination can be

subdivided into three types. These were books and journal articles which assessed

nationalism and self-determination movements as a potential source of conflict, those

dealing with critical reviews and facts, and others investigating the future. Analysis of

the relevant publications consulted provided the theoretical framework in Chapter two

in particular and for the realization of the objectives of the study in general.

Going through the literature, three main themes were identified. First, there appears to

be no consensus as to what extent nationalism as an ideology and desire for self-

determination generates conflict within a multiethnic state and between states.

However, there seems to be broad agreement as to the severity of the problem and the

inability of state structures to accommodate minorities. Second, there is a wide divide

between the critics and proponents of the rights of self-determination; while critics

point to the domino effect of the recognition, proponents of independence defend the

democratic right of people to govern themselves. Third, on the case of Kosovo the



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literature indicates that there is a divide between US and EU on a one hand and Russia

and China as UN Security Council permanent members that have kept Kosovo final

status unresolved. Despite disagreements all agree that the current status quo is not

contributing to security and development for the peoples of the Balkan countries.

Finally, despite the new colonial role that EU and Euro-Atlantic structures are taking

in the region it seems that Kosovo will remain a black hole in the European map

unless its status is decided. The international formula „standards before status‟ it is not

working and probably will plunge the region into new turmoil.

Deciding on the future of Kosovo status is becoming a nightmare not only for Kosovo

Albanians and Serbs. The international community which appears divided in this issue

fears security implications that all possible outcomes of Kosovo final status might

have for the Balkans and more broadly.



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1 Timothy Garton Ash, Bosnia in Europe‟ Future, New York Review of Boods, December 21, 1995

quated in „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans ,

Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.6, at http://www.balkan-

commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 2 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre for

Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.6, at http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 3 Glenny, Misha, The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers , (Granta Books,

London, 1999), p.2434 Williams, Christopher, „Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting‟, in Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley,

(editors), The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Europe ?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London

2001), p.175 Biberaj, Elez, „Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg‟, Conflict Studies 258, February 1993, p.2

6 Nikolic, Lazar, „Ethnic Prejudices and Discrimination: The Case of Kosovo‟, in Bieber, Florian,

Daskalovski, Zidas (editors), Understanding the War in Kosovo , (Frank Cass London, Portland, OR,

2003), p.547 Williams, Christopher, „Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting‟, in Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley,


2001), p.178 Biberaj, Elez, „Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg‟, Conflict Studies 258, February 1993, p.39 Judah, Tim, Kosovo: War and Revenge , (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2000), p.xix10 Biberaj, Elez, „Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg‟, Conflict Studies 258, February 1993, p.311 Ibid, p.312 Williams, C hristopher, „Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting‟, in Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley,


2001), p.1713 „Religion in Kosovo‟, International Crisis Group -Balkans Report, Nr 155, Pristine/Brussels, 31January 2001, p.ii, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400226_31012001.pdf 14 Ibid, p.115 Biber aj, Elez, „Kosova: The Balkan Powder Keg‟, Conflict Studies 258, February 1993, p.3-416

Ibid, p.6-717 Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

Kosovo, Center for Strategic and Inernational Studies, Washington, 2003, p.2, at

http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf 18 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.7, at http://www.balkan-

commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 19 Ibid, p.8

http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf







http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400226_31012001.pdf


http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf















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CHAPTER 2 – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Most writers agree that security is a „contested concept‟. For much of the Cold War

period most writing on the subject was dominated by the idea of national security,

which was largely defined in militarized terms. 1 However, since the end of the Cold

War, policy makers and scholars have increasingly begun to think about security as

something more than military defence of the state interests, which includes political,

economic, societal, environmental as well as military aspects and which is also

defined in broader international terms.

This Chapter starts with the definition of the nation as a prerequisite of nationalist

movements that lead to ethnic conflicts. Nationalism and ethnic conflict have leaped

onto the centre stage after the Cold War in many parts of the world, and have become

the most significant threats to global peace. The following will develop the issue of

self-determination as a right of communities to decide on their fate and to establish an

independent state as well as assess the implications for international relations. The

right of self-determination goes against the principle of territorial integrity, so it

should be balanced by other principles of international relations, such as international

peace and security. Along with security implications of self-determination the focus

of this chapter are also the challenges of state building and its relations with

democracy.



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2.1 Security in the Post-Cold era

The end of the Cold War brought about the demise of the superpower competition, the

freeing of Eastern Europe from Communism and a reinvigoration of the UN as an

important global actor. States no longer appear preoccupied by preparation for war.

Yet, since the end of the Cold War Europe has witnessed a resurgence of armed

conflict. 2 Ethnic conflict has leapt onto centre stage due to the structural changes

brought about by the end of the Cold War international system and the European

colonial system that predated it. These structural changes have promoted, or

highlighted, ethnic conflict by challenging the personal identity of the masses, the

men and women in the street and encouraging them to act forcefully on the basis of

ethnicity. These changes have also given rise to career opportunities for the would-be

leaders of all kinds of new political movements, including ethnically based ones. 3

Ethnic conflicts are also likely to have at their core secessionist movements or to

mutate into wars of ethnic and religious separatism. 4

The dual processes of integration and fragmentation which characterizes the

contemporary w orld means that much more attention should be given to „societal

security‟. According to this view, growing integration in a region like Europe is

undermining the classical political order based on nation-states, leaving nations

exposed within larger political frameworks (like the EU). At the same time the

fragmentation of various states, like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, has created

new problems of boundaries, minorities, and organizing ideologies which are causing

increasing regional instability. This has led to the argument that ethno-national

groups, rather than states, should become the centre of attention for security analysts.5



15

Thomas Homer-Dixon hypothesizes that one frequent characteristic of societies

vulnerable to internal conflict is scarcities of critical natural resources. 6 Unequal

economic opportunities, unequal access to resources such as land and capital, and vast

differences in standards of living are all signs of economic systems that may be

viewed as unfair and illegitimate 7, by the more disadvantaged members; thus in turn

providing a focus for ethnic groups in opposition to the state.

Demographic factors can also lead to conflict in ethnically mixed states. This is

particularly true in areas where ethnic groups are integrated rather than segregated

into well-defined areas, where one or more of the groups have a nationalist history,

where the groups have different growth rates, and where the central government is

relatively weak. Bosnia in the early 1990s, as the Yugoslav central government was

weakening, is an example of an ethnic conflict in which demographic factors played a

role. Between 1961 and 1991, the Serbian percentage of the population in Bosnia

declined from 43 percent to 31 percent, while the Muslim percentage of the

population increased from 26 percent to 44 percent. This population shift

accompanied the waning of Serbian dominance, and the increasing influence of

Bosnian Muslims, in Bosnian politics. 8 Although population growth and population

density do not generally predict political risk, unequal population growth rates

between different ethnic groups, do increase the risk of violent internal political and

ethnic conflicts. 9

Violent ethnic conflict has become one of the most significant threats to global peace.

Ethnic conflict should be understood as a conflict between two or more ethnic groups,



16

one of which possesses the actual state power. The state is the actor who possesses the

legitimate monopoly of violence in the society. This legitimate monopoly is contested

by ethnic groups. 10 The prospects for violence are great, if ethnic groups have

ambitious objectives, strong sense of identity, and confrontational strategies. Conflict

is especially likely if objectives are incompatible, groups are strong and determined,

action is feasible, success is possible, and if inter-group comparisons lead to

competition, anxiety, and fears of being dominated. 11

Religion as a basis for conflict or discriminatory violence is, of course, as old as

religion itself. 12 Since some nationalities are defined in religious terms, the presence

of individuals of other religions is often portrayed as a threat to national cohesion and

hence, they can become the victims of state or societal repression. This was starkly

illustrated by the phenomenon of so- called „ethnic cleansing‟ in Bosnia -Herzegovina

in the 1990s. The Bosnian Moslems, natives of the region whose ancestors had

converted to Islam in the fifteenth century and who were no more religiously devout

than the Catholic Croats or Orthodox Serbs, suddenly came to be seen as outsiders in

their own country because of a societal security struggle between the other two

nationalities. Serbian nationalism was reawakened by the break up of the multi-

national state they had dominated and rallied to its traditional cause of Islamophobia,

fuelled by historic memories of centuries of domination by the Ottoman Turks. 13

Where ethnicity does define the nation, minority ethnic groups are not likely to be

accommodated by or assimilated into the dominant, indigenous national group and

risk becoming marginalized. At the lesser end of the scale this might be in the form of



17

being denied the rights of citizenship in their country of residence and in extremis

manifest itself in the horrors of genocide and „ethnic cleansing‟. 14

According to the ideal of one nation-one state, states engage in active nation-building:

they try to implement the idea of one nation-one state. In the process of nation-

building states try to coerce ethnic groups. They do not allow existence of educational

and other institutions based on other ethnic groups' languages and values. This is,

however, the least violent policy among a state's options. It is identified as the

assimilationist policy. 15 If this policy does not succeed in either assimilating ethnic

groups or making them invisible on the societal surface, other, more violent policies

are used. Assimilation can be a result of deliberate state policy as well as a result of

structural inequality in the positions between the dominant and marginalized ethnic

groups. 16

The perception that a minority nationality is a human security threat to the majority

nationality may be perceived as a threat to the economic well-being of the dominant

group. Minority nationalities may even be perceived as threats to state security, as in

the Nazi and neo-Nazi portrayal of Jews formerly as Communists and latterly as part

of a global conspiracy to control economic life. 17 The minority nationality may also

perceive threats to their human or societal security from the state or dominant

nationality. When two or more national groups each perceive that another threatens

their li ves or identities, a „societal security dilemma‟, can be the cause of conflict. 18 If

the ethnic groups realize the danger in time, they confront the state attempts, and a

civil war starts. If the genocide eventually succeeds, the residues of the crucified



18

ethnic group, its generations and international community engage in attempts to

achieve retribution. 19

2.1.1 Nationalism

Nationalism like many other terms in social science is used to describe a set of

political principles that movements and individuals espouse, and a social and political

movement, a tendency that has affected all societies and transformed their politics. 20

To arrive at a definition of the nation Smith proposes the examination of the

„individuality‟ component of the nationalist‟ „independence ideal‟. 21 He defines the

nation as a large, vertically integrated and territorially mobile group featuring

common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (or more)

common characteristic(s) which differentiate its members of similar groups with

whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict. 22 A sense of legal and political

community in which members enjoy civil, legal and political rights, and incur legal

duties and obligations, together with a sense of equality before the law among

members of the community, in short, the notion of citizenship – these are vital

elements in the western, civic model of a nation. 23 Within the ethnic model that

emerged in Eastern Europe after the Cold War, the nation is construed as a

diachronically extended family whose members enjoy a common ancestry. 24

The terrible experiences of the 1930s and World War II seem to have implanted in us

a tendency to think that nationalism must inevitably degenerate into fascism. 25

Operating on the axiom that a perceived domestic or foreign threat helps to unite a

community, aggressive nationalist leaders promote discrimination against other



19

nationalities and hostility toward neighbouring states. Xenophobic nationalism is

more likely to be manifested among groups that live with larger and potentially more

threatening minorities, especially where there are deep-rooted historical grievances

and seemingly irreconcilable cultural or religious differences. Numerous issues can

provoke hostility and confrontation, including questions of land ownership, language

policy, and the allocation of power and resources. 26

There are close ideological relatives to nationalism as Smith calls them, such as

imperialism, fascism and racism. Imperialism as an ideology is carried by an ethnie or

a nation, which believes, it has a mission to endow other ethnie or nations with the

blessings of its civilisations. Fascism is a further development away from nationalism.

Its mainsprings are worship of the State as a corporate entity, belief in the Leader and

the elite whose will is infallible, and a sense of what is often described as vitalistic

nihilism. Racism holds the doctrine that the world is divided into races, some superior

physically and intellectually to others, and therefore endowed with the right to

dominate. 27

2.1.2 Nationalism and international relations

A consequence of nationalism for the international system is that it has been a source

of conflict, and often of war. The hostility to nationalism is all the greater because, as

in the German and Japanese cases, ferocious nationalism abroad is often combined

with dictatorial and racist policies at home: nationalism is used by dictatorial regimes

to crush dissent at home, even as it is deployed to mobilize support for aggression



20

abroad. 28 Even in developed, stable democracies of Western civilization national

identity is at little risk of disappearing from Europe. 29

Nationalism was seen as a thing of the past, a cause of wars in Europe up to 1945, a

relic of colonialism in the Third World, an irrational if necessary feature of

international relations. It was generally assumed that states would resort less and less

to nationalism in dealings with each other and would, instead, use the new institutions

of international order, be they the UN or EU, to promote greater cooperation. 30 On the

positive side, ethnic nationalism may be a cohesive and motivating force in helping a

group to assert its cultural identity, regain its national sovereignty, or limit the

influence of unwelcome outside powers in domestic affairs. Nationalism may instil a

sense of patriotism, community loyalty, and cultural pride. 31

The international legal system provides little clarity about what actions the

international community will support in relation to self-determination movements of

the people and the territorial integrity of the state or about the actions that minority

groups and central governments should take. As a result, the contending parties often

end up focusing on the principles that would lead each to their most favoured

outcomes: secession in the case of minority groups and a centralized state in the case

of central governments, because these outcomes are at opposite and irreconcilable

extremes, their separate pursuit is likely to generate conflict. 32



21

2.2 Nationalism and self-determination

Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the

national unit should be congruent. 33 Nationalism is above all a moral principle, which

claims that nations do exist, that they should coincide with, i.e. cover the same people

as, political communities and that they should be self-ruling. 34

Traditional European nationalism tried to formulate objective marks of nationhood

that would enable any given unit of people to provide a rational justification of its

demand for „self -determination‟. These could include language, common origin,

historical tradition of statehood, or the like, and could – or so it was hoped – place the

democratic edifice on a completely rational foundation. There would exist universally

valid objective criteria defining a „fair‟ distribution of territory among peoples; groups

or individuals with doubts about their membership in a given nation could find just

and impartial standards for resolving them. 35

World War I was the occasion on which the principle of national self-determination,

hitherto confined to Europe and the white elites of the Americas, was now proclaimed

as a universal principle. 36During World War I, self-determination became a tool of

allied psychological warfare. Then in 1917, to facilitate the Bolshevik cause, Lenin

advocated the principles of non-annexation and self-determination for all peoples.

Finally, it was legitimized in President Woodrow Wilson‟s Fourteen Points and the

subsequent Treaty of Versailles. 37



22

Self-determination managed to be included in the UN Charter, although in the Charter

language it is couched not as a right, but as a principle. The 1960 General Assembly

Resolution transformed self-determination into a foremost human right, with its far-

reaching effects. 38 It stipulates that „all peoples have the right to self -determination:

by virtue of the right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their

economic, social, and cultural development. This characterization set a precedent for

future human rights documents on the question of self-determination. 39

In Western Europe and the USA from 1960s onwards new demands for national self-

determination, or the recognition of ethnic diversity and rights within states, began to

emerge: among the Basques in Spain, among the Catholic population in Northern

Ireland, in Scotland, in Belgium, in Corsica. In Canada the French – speaking

population of Quebec began to demand greater autonomy and, in many cases,

independence. This revival of national and ethnic politics in Western Europe and

North America was, for all its implications, contained: in no case did states

fragment. 40

One of promises of self-determination was that, within the free atmosphere of

politically independent units, individuals would find fulfilment in their enjoyment of

human rights, including self-respect. But the arrival of postcolonial states, following

their tortuous anti-colonial fight, shows that the fate of the individual in international

law has not improved. 41 It seems that what ultimately determines which minority

group has the right to self-determination, and where, still depends – unlike in the

decolonization case – on the power of the gun, in the Maoist sense. 42



23

2.2.1 Self-determination as a right to choose political status

Some scholars understand self-determination to be the central issue in the

globalisation of democracy. For this group, self-determination means liberty and free

development for all peoples. They argue that the principle of self-determination of

peoples as expressed in Article 1(2) of UN Charter is an absolute legal principle and,

hence, a „right‟ whose purpose is to strengthen international peace. Moreover, the

right of peoples to self-determination means the right to establish an independent state

or the right of a people to select the state to which they wish to belong as well as to

choose their own form of government. 43 The second catalyst for self-determination,

and perhaps the most important one, is the fears and insecurities created by the

collapse of multi-ethnic states. These insecurities are exacerbated when the historical

background of inter-ethnic relations is one of conflict and hostility. 44 Self-

determination has come to be a universally accepted principle, and the supposed basis

of the current international order. 45

Demands for autonomy or „self -determination‟ can range from modest to campaigns

for linguistic rights to calls for outright self-rule within a federal or loose confederal

structure, or even a separate and sovereign state. Campaigns for secession are more

likely to develop when previously acquired privileges are under threat or when

underprivileged groups seize an opportunity to redress their grievances and push for

separate statehood. 46 Nationalist movements of self-determination are linked to two

extreme ideological and political movements ‘Irredentism’ and ‘Pan’. Both division

and „incorporation‟ characterise the situation of irredentism. Many movements have,

in addition to their separatist aims, the opposite drive to unification of all co-nationals



24

in one state. Members of the projected „group‟ live within the boundaries of other

political units than that in which the main body of the „nationals‟ reside. But

„irredentist‟ movements do not stop at advocating the in -gathering of co-nationals into

the main area; they also desire to add the territory on which their severed kinsmen

reside, especially since it is usually adjacent to the „base‟ area, e.g. Epirus to Greece,

Alsace to France and Germany. 47The „Pan‟ nationalist de mands the unification of

separate political units contained within the larger culture area. The line between

„Pan‟ and „Irredentist‟ movements is not always strict in a given case. 48

2.2.2 Self-determination versus sovereignty

Opposed interests of minority groups and central governments derive from their

distinctive interpretations of the principle of self-determination and territorial integrity

of the state as well as from ambiguity in international policy. Most commonly,

minority groups construe the legal principle of self-determination of peoples to mean

that they possess the right of secession from the state to which they are part – an

understanding that clearly threatens the territorial integrity of the state. In contrast,

central governments typically view the principle of the territorial integrity of the state

as prohibiting the implementation of an understanding of self-determination that

would permit sub-national groups to declare their own separate, sovereign, and

independent political units. Hence, the disparate implications of the principles of

territorial integrity and self-determination may promote and even legalise internal

armed conflict and violence. 49



25

As long as the pursuit of self-determination does not imply secession or any

adjustment of the borders of a state, then its pursuit does not come directly into

conflict with the protection of the territorial integrity of the state. The behaviour of the

United Nations and other international bodies tends to follow these maxims except in

some rare and selective instances when outrageous conduct shocks the conscience of

mankind and when the geopolitical significance of a region is highly salient to key

players. 50

The international legal principle of self-determination of peoples, its various

interpretations, and the manner in which the principle is put into practice can best be

understood against the backdrop of international law that protects the territorial

integrity of states. International law pertaining to self-determination of peoples and

territorial integrity of the states is expressed primarily in the United Nations Charter

and related documents of the United Nations. 51

There are two distinct – yet not mutually exclusive – approaches to self-determination

each based on a different form of nationalism: the territorial and the ethnic. Territorial

self-determination seeks to achieve a particular political status for a defined territory

and for all the people who resides in it. Territorial self-determination is consummated

when the territorial unit achieves independence or unites with another independent

state. This approach remains the basis of a presumed international consensus of self-

determination built around the UN. Communal groups which have exercised self-

government or enjoyed a degree of autonomy in modern history tend to aspire to

independent statehood. 52



26

2.3 The implications of self-determination

The principle of self-determination has to be balanced by other principles of

international relations, such as international peace and security, state sovereignty,

territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. 53 Self-determination

conflicts defy the civil/international war categorisation. Although they almost always

start as conflicts within borders of a state, they inevitably acquire an international

dimension. 54

Protecting the territorial integrity of states is accomplished through legal statements

that prohibit any coercive intervention that might violate the territorial sovereignty of

any member state and through a more general prohibition of the use of force that is

necessary for preserving international peace and friendly relations among states.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter protects the territorial integrity and political

independence of any state from the threat or use of force 55 as a matter of an absolute

and general principle of international law. The logic of this prohibition follows from

the idea that all states are sovereign equals. 56

The proliferation of self-determination conflicts challenges some of the international

legal principles which provide the basis for the existing international order. The most

important of these principles is state sovereignty, a „basic rule of coexistence‟. In

reality, however, state sovereignty is never absolute: states often viol ate each other‟s

sovereignty; and sovereignty is undermined by the increasing economic,

informational and environmental interdependence of states. States have often

supported self-determination movements in other states in pursuit of some national



27

interest, but have traditionally shied away from supporting secession when this was an

option. 57

Once self-determination conflicts reach the stage where the adversaries have

consolidated their control over various parts of the country, and if those seeking

secession have the backing of one or more regional powers, then border changes

become a possibility. The more vicious and pervasive the prosecution of one group by

another, the greater the conviction that the groups should live separately. Armenians

and Azeris, and Serbs and Croats seem to have reached the conclusion that they

cannot live together. 58

In the cases of secessionist movements border changes may be considered only when

the new borders are likely to be stable. They have to be accepted as legitimate by the

populations of the states concerned. No state will be ever ethnically homogenous and

the criteria for recognition have to specify high standards of democratic governance

and human rights, and the protection of national minorities to secure their legitimacy.

The new borders also have to be defensible and not vulnerable to external

aggression. 59 It has become exceedingly hard, given the power and logic of

globalization, for state leaders to convince their societies, and even other officials in

the state, that those state borders are their social boundaries as well and really worth

defending through tremendous self-sacrifice. 60



28

2.3.1 State-building and democracy

The 20th century witnessed three waves of state creation, each involving the collapse

of empires and each generating a distinct set of issues involving the integrity and

viability of the often-fragile new states. After the First World War, the disintegration

of the Russian, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, framed by Woodrow

Wilson's rallying cry for self-determination, sparked the century's first wave of new

states. Then, following the Second World War was accompanied by a new round of

state creation, which included the radical redrawing of the world political map

through the independence of multiple new states in Asia and Africa, tripling the total

number of states within a generation. Finally, the fall of the Soviet Union, set off the

third surge of state creation, centered mostly in Eastern and South-eastern Europe. 61

The existence of ethnic or cultural minorities resistant to assimilation can become a

serious obstacle to nation-building or state integration, especially if such minorities

claim some form of political autonomy. This can arouse the ire of the majority,

fuelling inter-communal conflict and possibly generating repression in the form of

forced assimilation or explosion of minority groups. Such developments can in turn

transform moderate minority autonomists into radical separatists. 62

Democracy is about inclusion and exclusion, about access to power, about the

privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany exclusion. In

severely divided societies, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will

be included and who will be excluded. In ethnic politics, inclusion may affect the

distribution of important material and nonmaterial goods, including the prestige of the



29

various ethnic groups and the identity of the state as belonging more to one group

than another. 63 The withholding of political and economic resources from minority

leaders can aggravate anti centrist feelings, strengthen the cohesion of ethnic

minorities against the adversarial state, undermine the legitimacy of the government,

and lead to ever more radical demands. Pressures for ethnic autonomy may then

evolve beyond the protection of cultural identity and accelerate toward demands for

outright separation. 64

The challenges for new states in the first decade of the 21st century, including those

stemming from vulnerable borders and increasing global connections through and

across state borders leading to weakening norms of sovereignty, put a premium on the

ability of state leaders to mobilize their populations while simultaneously

undermining their ability to do so. 65 Most of the new states do show the same

inclination as in the United States and Israel in their early state building to harden the

boundary between the dominant nation and "dangerous populations." Leaders in

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia, for example, have managed to

define minorities making up relatively large segments of the population as outside the

nation and dangerous. The new states of the 1990s are not all of a cloth and will

fortify, negotiate and transform their social lines in a variety of ways. 66

Conclusion

Since the end of the Cold War, policy makers and scholars have increasingly begun to

think about security as something more than military defence of the state interests,



30

which includes political, economic, societal, environmental as well as military aspects

and which is also defined in broader international terms.

Nationalism and ethnic conflict have leaped onto the centre stage after the Cold War

in many parts of the world. Violent conflict has become one of the most significant

threats to global peace. One of the consequences of nationalism for the international

arena is that it has been a source of conflict and war. Self-determination as a right of

communities to decide on their fate and to establish an independent state is a

contested issue in international relations, because it goes against the principle of

territorial integrity. So, self-determination should be balanced by other principles of

international relations, such as international peace and security and cooperation.

When conflicts of self-determination reach the point where the ethnic groups have

irreconcilable positions and one of them has the backing of one ore more regional

powers separation is the only viable solution. The new state that results from the

border changes is challenged by its ability to mobilize its population, accommodate its

minorities, and defend its borders. Minority groups within the new independent state

may also demand secession from it and undermine its security.



31

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Jones, Sean M, and Miller, Steven E, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict , (The Mit Press, Cambridge,

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Conflict Studies Research Centre , June 1998, G48, p.424 Waters, Trevor, „Language and National Identity: A Source of Conflict in Post -Communist Europe‟,

Conflict Studies Research Centre , June 1998, G48, p.5-625 Fukuyama, Francis, Avineri, Shlomo, Comments on Nationalism and Democracy, in Diamond,

Larry, and Plattner, Marc F., (editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, (The Johns

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An Introduction to International Relations , Second Edition(Oxford University Press, 2001), p.44629 Fukuyama, Francis, Avineri, Shlomo, Comments on Nationalism and Democracy, in Diamond,

Larry, and Plattner, Marc F., (editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, (The Johns

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p.188-18933 Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism , (Basil Blackwell Publisher, 1983), p.134 Halliday, Fred, Nationalism, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, The Globalization of World Politics:

An Introduction to International Relations , Second Edition(Oxford University Press, 2001), p.44335 Nodia, Ghia, Nationalism and Democracy, in Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc F., (editors),

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36 Halliday, Fred, Nationalism, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, The Globalization of World Politics:

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(Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London, 1997), p.13038 Hsiung, James C, Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations ,

(Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London, 1997), p.13139 Hsiung, James C, Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations ,

(Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London, 1997), p.13340 Halliday, Fred, Nationalism, in Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, The Globalization of World Politics:

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(Lynne Rienner Publisher, Boulder London, 1997), p.140

42 Hsiung, James C, Anarchy and Order: The Interplay of Politics and Law in International Relations ,

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34

53 Shehadi, Kamal S, Ethnic Self-determination and Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper , 283, December

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p.18957 Shehadi, Kamal S, Ethnic Self-determination and Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper , 283, December

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1993, p.75-7660 Migdal, Joel S, „State building and the non -nation- state‟, Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2004,

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vol.58, no.1, pp17-46, p.40



35

CHAPTER 3 – ALTERNATIVES OF KOSOVO FINAL STATUS

In order to maintain international order and peace in every case it is preferable to

reconcile claims for autonomy and self-government within the existing order of nation

states. Accordingly, when conflicts arise, intervening states must always seek to assist

parties to find solutions that first seek to reconcile state sovereignty with minority

rights and self-government. Minorities can only claim the right of secession when

such forms of compromise are clearly shown to be impossible. NATO intervention in

Kosovo in 1999 although controversial showed that states can lose their sovereign

rights over national minorities when their treatment of these minorities rises to the

level of persistent and brutal suppression of both individual rights and collective

rights of self-government. 1

To better understand the future of Kosovo final status an account of historical

relationship between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs is analysed. The discussion of

Kosovo final status is related to UNSCR 1244 which either determine the general

framework of the future status or leaves it open. In this respect final status of Kosovo

is discussed in full, ranging from an autonomous region of Serbia to an independent

state. This assessment takes into account the role of international actors who have

been reluctant to confront it openly.

3.1 Historical background on relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs

Relations between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians have been strained for many

centuries. During the rise of the Ottoman Empire, each side accused the other of



36

supporting the Turkish enemy. After World War I, Serbs in Yugoslavia suppressed

the Albanians, closing their schools in the 1920s and 1930s and seizing their land.

Although some Albanians left, this repressive stance did not entirely remove the

Albanian presence in Kosovo. 2 During the course of the 20th century, the Albanian

population of Kosovo gradually rose in proportion to the Serbian population, until

Kosovo was granted the status of an autonomous province with voting powers in

Tito's Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

After Tito's death in 1980, the complicated 1974 constitution that had maintained the

balance of power between the separate republics and provinces was open to

exploitation by cynical politicians campaigning on nationalist platforms. In March

1981 Albanian students started their protests at Pristine University. This disturbance

spread through many parts of Kosovo and assumed an openly political character. The

call for a Kosovo republic set alarm bells ringing, particularly in Serbia and in

Macedonia, where there was also a large Albanian minority. Granting Kosovo

republican status would mean detaching it from Serbia and conceding that it had the

right to secede from the federation.

Milosevic‟s rise to power from 1988, first as head o f the Serbian Communist Party,

then as President of Serbia, marked a return to a tougher policy on Kosovo. 3 Slobodan

Milosevic in particular played the nationalist card to consolidate his power within

Serbia, making inflammatory speeches to Kosovar Serbs and abolishing Kosovo's

autonomous status. As life for Albanians became increasingly difficult during the 90s,

they established a parallel state structure in the territory providing schools, hospitals

and tax collection outside the jurisdiction of the Serbian state authorities. Led by



37

Ibrahim Rugova, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) carried out a strategy of

passive resistance in the face of Serbian hegemony. 4 Despite the pressure and

discrimination, Kosovo Albanians still demanded the right to secede from Serbia but

not from Yugoslavia in 1990.

As Yugoslavia collapsed and fighting broke out, initially with Slovenia, then Croatia

and later in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo also made moves towards independence. In

September 1991, ethnic Albanians organised a clandestine referendum and on the

results declared the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state. Elections were held

in May 1992 for a parliament and Rugova declared that the LDK would seek its

objectives peacefully. However, in 1995 it became clear to the Albanian political

leadership that the Dayton and Paris peace accords were ignoring the issue of Kosovo.

This undermined the moderates including Rugova. Incidents of organised violence

increased during 1996 and as a result the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged.

In mid-1998, Serb tactics forced the international community to act. An OSCE force

was put in place, and talks were held between the two sides. The Rambouillet peace

talks collapsed in March 1999, amid Serbia's refusal to accept the terms of an

international agreement based on joint administrative structures. NATO launched an

air campaign mainly against Serbian industrial, military and infrastructure targets

which lasted for 77 days before the Federal government accepted the terms of

NATO's demands. Serb forces were withdrawn from Kosovo and a NATO peace

keeping force (KFOR) despatched. 5



38

3.2 Kosovo's Final Status

Any reflections on the future status of Kosovo have to start from the existing legal

framework established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 on 10

June 1999, the day the air strikes against Yugoslavia ended. Of particular importance

are those parts of the Resolution which either determine the general framework of the

future status of Kosovo or on the contrary leave it open. In fact, Resolution 1244

confirms in very general terms that, all member states of the United Nations reaffirm

their commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia (and other states of their region), as set out in the Helsinki Final Act

and Annex 2 of this resolution. 6

UNSC Resolution 1244, as well as those parts of the Rambouillet agreement which

concern the future status of Kosovo – of which there is repeated reference in

Resolution 1244 – do not set a clearly defined framework within which the final

solution of the status for Kosovo must be found. Therefore, in principle, two possible

interpretations can be assumed. The first, a Serbian one, relies primarily on the fact

that Kosovo belongs to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the inviolability of the

territorial unity of the FRY by arguing that this has been repeatedly stressed in the

Rambouillet agreement as well as in Resolution 1244. 7

Resolution 1244 establishes the main responsibilities of the international civil

presence: Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial

autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the

Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);



39

Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking

into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648). 8 Whereas Annex 2 requires:

Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international

civil presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy

within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of

the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration

while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-

governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all

inhabitants in Kosovo. 9

Within this framework we will see all possible options of Kosovo final status.

3.2.1 A Kosovo within Serbian-Montenegrin state

Kosovo as an autonomous region of Serbia

This option must be seen as the restitution of the limited autonomy of Kosovo with

the legal and executive subordination of Kosovo as a province under the power of the

Serbian government in Belgrade. This was the situation which led to the increased

tensions between Kosovo Albanians and the Serb government and finally ended in a

state of war. 10

UNSC Resolution 1244, as well as those parts of the Rambouillet agreement which

concern the future status of Kosovo – of which there is repeated reference in

Resolution 1244 – do not set a clearly defined framework within which the final



40

solution of the status for Kosovo must be found. However, neither the Rambouillet

agreement nor Resolution 1244 confirms that Kosovo belongs to Serbia! 11

Serbia has long substituted rhetoric for policy on Kosovo, repeating the mantra that it

can never be independent, while ignoring the political and demographic reality on the

ground and the international mood. At the same time, Serbia's failure to confront the

past – particularly its ethnic cleansing in the province during 1998-1999 -- has cost it

any moral credibility on the issue. 12 In 2000 Tim Judah a journalist and writer

explained that since 5 October [2000, the fall of Milosevic] there have been a number

of influential people now in government [of Serbia] who believe that Kosovo is a

millstone around Serbia‟s neck, that it will never be possible for Serbs and Albanians

to live together again, and that Serbia should get rid of Kosovo. 13 Belgrade politicians

want a face-saving solution that would permit them to say they were not the ones to

lose Kosovo. They have little desire to return Serbian rule to Albanian-majority areas;

their main concern is to find a territorial solution for the three northern, Serbian-

majority municipalities and the northern part of the divided city of Mitrovica.

Belgrade's politicians desperately want an international conference on Kosovo's final

status that will give them the necessary political coverage back home to claim that

they had no choice in whatever settlement was reached. 14

Kosovo as an autonomous province in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

This corresponds to the status before 1989 under the 1974 Constitution of the

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Whereas, such a status is categorically

rebuffed by the Albanians, it remains for the Serb population in Kosovo a possible,



41

acceptable solution because it provides a security guarantee for its survival in

Kosovo. 15 This is a status that international community has rejected as an option for

the future status of Kosovo.

Kosovo as third republic in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Until 1995-6 there were still some Kosovo Albanian leaders who were willing to

contemplate some fo rm of compromise, such as a „Third Republic‟ solution by which

Kosovo would achieve equal status in Yugoslavia with Serbia and Montenegro. The

emergence of KLA and Serbian military campaign of ethnic cleansing removed

forever this option from the table of negotiations between two sides.

This option is supported by a number of countries in the West and corresponds to the

restitution of „substantial autonomy‟ under Resolution 1244 while simultaneously

preserving the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As a

republic within the FRY, Kosovo could in most areas enjoy complete autonomous

legal and executive power and freedom. It would only be subject to federal

regulations in areas like defence, foreign relation, customs and some taxation. 16 Most

international lawyers agree that if a new constitution of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia were to grant Kosovo the status of republic, it would obtain the right of

eventually leaving the Federation if the majority of its population so wished. 17

The Kosovo Serbs fear that a Kosovo republic would become an Albanian republic

because the new Constitutional Framework does not provide veto rights by minorities

in the future parliament. For the Kosovo Albanians this option is still unimaginable



42

considering the fact that a population, half of whom were driven out of their country

in spring 1999 by the Yugoslav authorities, could one day consider themselves

„citizens‟ of that country. 18

Partition of Kosovo

The idea of dividing Kosovo into two or more parts has been on the table since

September 1998 inspired by the Swiss model, thereby separating two cultural

traditions with different languages, religion and cultures. The second way of dividing

Kosovo is its partition into two parts. Like cantonisation, this option is also favoured

by the Serbs, but completely rejected by the Albanians. It would see the river Ibar

(figure 1), which already divides Kosovska-Mitrovica, as the frontier carving out

north-west Kosovo for the Serb population. This would allow the possible attachment

of this part of Kosovo to the Republic of Serbia. 19

A sustainable solution for Kosovo cannot be based upon the Lausanne principle: the

negotiated exchange of territory and population common in post-conflict settlements

in the Balkans in the early 20 th century. Serb communities in Kosovo will only be

viable if the territory remains unified and Serbs are able to participate as full citizens

in multiethnic institutions. The stakes are extremely high, both for Kosovo Serbs and

for the international community, whose entire strategy in the region over the past

decade has been based on a commitment to multiethnic society. 20



43

Figure1 Map of Kosovo

Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/kosovo_pol98.jpg

3.2.2 An independent Kosovo

Kosovo‟s irrevocable separation from Serbia was probably determined in the early

spring of 1999. Well before then, it had become difficult to imagine a viable political

solution in which the province remained part of Yugoslavia. By 1996, seven years of

intensified Serb repression, and the inability of Western powers to do much about it,

had significantly discredited Ibrahim Rugova‟s strategy of non -violent resistance. The

events of the subsequent three years – the emergence of the KLA, the Drenica

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/kosovo_pol98.jpg

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/kosovo_pol98.jpg



44

massacre in 1998 that transformed it from a limited guerrilla campaign into a Kosovo

wide insurrection and the scorched-earth campaign by Serb security forces to quell it

– undermined this moderate possibility. 21

According to numerous polls conducted in Kosovo, 85% of Albanians favour an

independent Kosovo. The remaining 15 percent prefer unification with Albania. None

want autonomy within Serbia. Among Kosovo Serbs, all want Kosovo to remain part

of Serbia. 22

Although all the NATO powers had genuinely supported the objective of keeping

rump Yugoslavia together, a military campaign to drive Yugoslav forces out of the

province was hardly conducive to that goal. Nor was the operation by the regime of

then Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to expel nearly one million of the

province‟s Albanian ci tizens – unless, of course, Milosevic‟s cruel and reckless

gamble had succeeded. Happily, it did not. But that failed gamble, more than anything

else, created the moral and practical political conditions that will probably require the

international powers, as well as the states of the region, to accommodate Kosovo‟s

permanent separation from Serbia. 23

Regulation number 1 of 25 July 1999, the first legislative act of United Nations

Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), determined that all legislative

and executive power in Kosovo, including jurisdiction, is exerted by UNMIK under

the Chairmanship of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG).

De facto Yugoslavia‟s sovereignty over Kosovo was thus suspended. 24



45

Resolution 1244 of United Nations Security Council of 10 June 1999 ; Authorizes the

Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to

establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim

administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial

autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide

transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of

provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful

and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo. 25 This point emphasises that Kosovo

does not belong to the Republic of Serbia and furthermore states that the formulation

of Kosovo‟s association to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the territorial

integrity of FRY is temporarily limited to the duration of the interim administration

by the international community. The reference to a final solution to the question of

status does not imply that Kosovo must forever remain part of the Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia. On the contrary, the wording in the Rambouillet agreement on the basis

of the will of the people allows for the holding of a referendum on independence. 26

The International Commission on the Balkans 27 in its April 2005 Report proposes that

negotiations on the status of Kosovo should be concentrating on offering real

incentives to Belgrade so that Serbia may find acceptable the prospect of an

independent Kosovo as a future member of the EU. 28 Within this context, they

propose that the independence of Kosovo be achieved in four stages as follow:

The first stage would see the de facto separation of Kosovo from Serbia. In their view

this stage is implicit in Resolution 1244, which transformed Kosovo into a UN



46

protectorate. The UNSCR 1244 deals with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and not

with Serbia.

The second stage (independence without full sovereignty) Kosovo should be treated

as independent but not as a sovereign state at this stage, allowing it to develop a

capacity for self-government. The international community should reserve its power

to intervene in those essential areas such as human rights and minority protection.

The third stage (guided sovereignty) would coincide with Kosovo's recognition as a

candidate for EU membership and the opening of negotiations with Brussels.

The fourth stage (full and shared sovereignty) will mark the absorption of Kosovo

into the EU and its adoption of the shared sovereignty to which all EU member states

are subject. 29

Independence is the declared aim of all the Albanian parties in Kosovo. They disagree

on the means and the time necessary to achieve it. The Albanians were promised a

referendum on independence at Rambouillet in February 1999 after three years on the

basis of the will of people.

Conditional independence

The concept of conditional independence attempts to take into account both the

realities of a de-facto detachment from FRY and the fears of Serbs and neighbouring

countries. It combines the principle of a transfer of power from the international



47

administration to new, democratically elected institutions in Kosovo and the idea of

international control and the implementation of conditions, of which the main ones

are:

Explicit renunciation of any modification of borders, and therefore of any idea

of a Greater Albania;

Respect for the human rights of all Kosovo citizens, in particular the rights of

Minorities (Serbs and others) to equal access to and treatment by the courts,

police and administration. Right to a separate culture must be respected in the

educational, system, and places of worship protected;

Rejection of the use of force in the settling of internal and external disputes in

a regional cooperative framework. 30

In the concept of „conditional independence‟, conditionality is as important as

independence, since it presupposes, for the Kosovar political elite, renunciation of the

classical concept of territorial sovereignty in favour of the twenty-first concept of

shared sovereignty. Absolute sovereignty in the Balkans means insecurity, whereas

security goes hand in hand with shared sovereignty. 31 No independent country is

actually free from external constraints, self-restraints or norms of behaviour: in

practice, no country in the world enjoys „unconditional‟ independence – except in the

political- legal or simplified presumption we call „sovereignty‟. 32

3.3 International key players and their position to Kosovo final status

The ethnic conflict in the Balkans has been caused in a significant measure, from the

imprecise and often arbitrary definition of borders, in association with the



48

identification of individual national groupings, at the time of the often artificial

creation of (nation)-states in the region during the collapse of the Ottoman, Austro-

Hungarian and Russian Empires. 33 The cutting and pasting of territories was not a

new idea but the steady fragmentation of the Balkans created ever more baffling

permutations. The only immutable principle of imperialist cartography was the

advancement of great-power interests. 34

When the Western Powers took military action in 1999, they claimed as their sole

justification the need to avert the forceful subjection of a people by the internationally

recognized government of an independent, sovereign state. Whatever views one takes

of the honesty or legitimacy of such a claim, it makes the war over Kosovo a unique

event in history. Is still the West with substantial interests in every region able to

affect the politics, economics, and security of every other civilization or region? 35

Whatever position one might take NATO and Western countries saved the Kosovo

Albanian people from the last cruellest dictator of the 20 th century that is now sitting

at the Hague Tribunal. While NATO has achieved an important part of its strategic

objective, namely the removal of Milosevic as Head of State, the other part – its

commitment to resolving the Kosovo entanglement, and the ramifications that this has

for the international community – remains. 36 The West, in NATO guise, intervened in

order to save a whole ethnic group of people from the repression of the Serbs, bent on

mass deportation and the indiscriminate killing of civilians.

According to Shehadi the international community must follow a three-pronged

strategy to meet the challenges of ethnic self-determination. First, it should try to

preserve the unity and territorial integrity of existing states by reducing the risks of



49

living together for „people who feel profoundly different‟. Second, it should increase

the benefits of living together for different ethnic groups. However, in extreme cases

where ethnic communal groups have „irreconcilable differences‟, it may be necessary

for them to live apart to end the fighting. The international community should then

assist secession and the creation of a new state, or the adjustment of borders between

states. 37

The international community entered Kosovo in June 1999 without an exit strategy

and has taken only a few uncertain steps toward defining one. But it did make clear

that Belgrade, having violently expelled more than 700,000 Kosovo Albanians in

1999, had lost the right to administer the province, and that following a period of

international administration, a political process would determine final status. 38

Now, the international community's room for manoeuvre is far more restricted than it

would have been if decisive steps had been taken earlier. Reintroduction of violence

into the equation has raised the very real possibility that the process may be decided

by brute force on the ground rather than peaceful negotiation. The prospects are not

encouraging for the local actors themselves to reach an accommodation which the UN

Security Council could endorse; still less so are the prospects for the Security Council

to reach an agreement which could then be imposed. Although diplomats from most

Contact Group countries now admit in private that the final status issue has to be

resolved, there is still insufficient political will to drive the agenda. 39



50

United States

In relation to Kosovo final status, no one has formulated a more realistic or

sustainable policy than that which the Clinton administration put forward in its last

year in office. That policy consisted of three simple statements:

First, Washington did not support Kosovo independence;

Second, nor did the Americans rule it out;

Third, Kosovo‟s final status when it is decided must take account of the views

of a majority of the territory‟s population.

Although aimed at ambiguity, it is clear enough where this policy leads, for the

majority of the territory‟s population is overwhelmingly in favour of independence. 40

United States has ruled out a return to the situation before March 1999 and made clear

that Kosovo‟s final status mus t enhance regional stability and contribute to the Euro-

Atlantic integration of the Balkans. Accordingly, Kosovo‟s final status must:

Be based on multi-ethnicity with full respect for human rights including the

right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety;

Offer effective constitutional guarantees to ensure the protection of minorities;

Promote effective mechanisms for fighting organized crime and terrorism;

and;

Include specific safeguards for the protection of cultural and religious

heritage. 41

United States have invested too much and have too important a stake in the region‟s

success in partnership with Europe. The U.S. has unique credibility in the region as



51

we led the effort to end the two wars of the 1990s. It recognizes that it responsibility

and will remain centrally involved. 42

European Community

Europe has demonstrated the will to take on a greater role in the region, recognizing

that the Balkan‟s stability is linked to a future within Europe. The International

Commission on the Balkans takes the view that Kosovo's independence should not be

imposed on Belgrade. The „imposition‟ of Kosovo's independence is not only

undesirable, it is also unlikely to happen, bearing in mind that some members of the

UN Security Council (Russia, China) are opposed to it. Moreover, if Belgrade

opposes the process, it will significantly increase the chances of trouble breaking out

elsewhere whether in Bosnia, Macedonia or Montenegro. 43

Russia and China

In their view [Russia and China], the recognition of the independence of Kosovo

would signify the ex post facto sanctioning of violent secessionist movements. Both

states are also afraid of a possible precedent which could jeopardise the stability and

integrity of their own large multinational and multiethnic states. 44 Russia is not really

interested in the fate of Kosovo but in that of Chechnya. Kosovo is pointed to as an

example of „humanitarian interference‟ that threatens national sovereignty. 45

It remains to be seen whether Russia's sc epticism on Kosovo‟s independence will

translate into blocking decisions in the Contact Group. Its stance appears to take little



52

account of realities on the ground; indeed, there almost seems to be a certain pride in

distance. 46

The 22 September Statement Consultations with Secretary-General Kofi Annan

during the General Assembly session in New York on 20-22 September 2004 enabled

the Contact Group to put out a promisingly realistic statement on the way forward.

The most important paragraph, with its crucial last sentence, was:

The basis of any settlement must include the promotion of security and stability in the

Balkans. As the "Standards for Kosovo" document states, the future for Kosovo must

be one in which all people, "regardless of ethnic background, race or religion, are

free to live, work and travel without fear, hostility or danger, and where there is

tolerance, justice and peace for everyone". 47

The inability of international community to decide on Kosovo final status is today

seen by Kosovo Albanians as having gone from opening the way to now standing in

the way. It is seen by Kosovo Serbs as having gone from securing the return of so

many to being unable to ensure the return of so few, reports to Kofi Annan the UN

Ambassador to Kosovo Kai Eide in the summer of 2004. 48

Conclusion

The Kosovo war of 1999 symbolized the apex of inimical relations between Kosovo

Albanians and Serbs. The peaceful campaign lead by Ibrahim Rugova showed that

only a violent struggle waged by Kosovo Liberation Army may end the long

oppression after NATO‟s air strikes.



53

The future status of Kosovo has to start from the UNSCR 1244 that reaffirms the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, and its reference to the Rambouillet

agreement which calls for the right of self-government of the people of Kosovo on the

basis of the will of the people. From this ambiguous framework are two

interpretations; first, the Serbian one that Kosovo belongs to FRY; and secondly, the

Kosovo Albanian one that the people should decide the future, which means that

Kosovo should be independent since 90% of the people are in favour. In this

framework the status of Kosovo ranges from a Serbian autonomous unit to the other

extreme an independent Kosovo.

International actors with an interest in the future of Kosovo seem to have different

opinions. While the United States and the EU take the position of granting a

conditional independence, China and Russia, as permanent members of the UNSC,

are reluctant to acknowledge the reality because of their minority problems at home.



54

1 Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm 2 Williams, Christopher, „Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting‟, in Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley,

(editors),The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Europe

?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London2001), p.183 Ibid, p.234 „Kosovo Liberation Army‟, at

http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=%Fcontent1%2Fjanesdata%2Fbinder%2Fjwit%2Fjwit

[email protected]_Name=JWIT.htm@current&Prod_Name=JWIT&@current&Prod_Name

=JWIT& 5 Ibid6 Altmann, Franz- Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19 -34, p.19

7 Ibid, p.218 Resolution 1244 (1999); Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011 th meeting, on 10 June 1999, at

http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm , 9 Ibid10 Altmann, Franz-Lotha r, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19 -34, p.2611 Ibid, p.2112 „Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39,

Belgrade/Brussels, 23 May 2005, p.4, at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf 13 Judah, Tim, „Kosovo and its Status‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.55 -68, p.6514 „Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39,

Belgrade/Brussels, 23 May 2005, p.5,

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf 15 Altmann, Franz- Lothar, „The Status of Knosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19 -34, p.26-

716 Ibid, p.2717 Ibid, p.2818

Rupnik, Jacques, „The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.69-84, p.8219 Altmann, Franz- Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19 -34,

p.28-2920 „The Lausanne Principle: Multiethnicity, Territory and the Future of Kosovo‟s Serbs‟, European

Stability Initiative, Berlin/Prishtine, 2004, p.2, at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_53.pdf 21 Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Ko sovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50 ,

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.722 Sullivan, Stacy, „Is Kosovo up to Standards?‟, at

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo1/2005/0401conditions.htm

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm


http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?K2DocKey=%Fcontent1%2Fjanesdata%2Fbinder%2Fjwit%[email protected]_Name=JWIT.htm@current&Prod_Name=JWIT&@current&Prod_Name=JWIT&




http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm


http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf




http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_53.pdf
















55

23 Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50,

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.724 Altmann, Franz- Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19 -34, p.2225

Resolution 1244 (1999); Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th

meeting, on 10 June 1999, athttp://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm , 26 Altmann, Franz- Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.2127 The International Commission on the Balkans has been founded in 1995 with support of European

and American foundations to help transform Balkans of the past into stable and peaceful countries.28 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.20, http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 29 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.22-23, at http://www.balkan-

commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 30 Rupnik, Jacques, „The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question‟, Challiot Papers 50, October

2001, pp.69-84, p.82-8331 Ibid, p.8332 Dassu, Marta, „Statehood and Sovereignty – Regional and Internati onal Dynamics in Kosovo‟s

Future‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.35 -54, p.5233 Waters, Trevor, „Language and National Identity: A Source of Conflict in Post -Communist Europe‟,

Conflict Studies Research Centre , June 1998, G48, p.734 Glenny, Misha, The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers , (Granta Books,

London, 1999), p.14435 Huntington, Samuel P, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order , (Simon &

Schuster, New York, 1996), p.8136 Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley, (editors), The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in

Europe ?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London 2001), p.12-1337 Shehadi, Kamal S, „Ethnic Self -determination and Break- up of States‟, Adelphi Paper , 283,

December 1993, p.5938 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.2, athttp://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf 39 Ibid, p.140 Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50,

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.1341 Burns, Nicholas R, Under Secretary of State for Political Aff airs United States, „Ten Years after

Dayton: Winning the Peace in the Balkans‟, speech given at the Wilson Center, Washington 19 May

2005, at http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/May/20-375965.html 42 Ibid










http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf


http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/May/20-375965.html











56

43 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.20, http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 44 Altmann, Franz- Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19 -34,

p.30-3145 Rupnik, Jacques, „The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question‟, Challiot Papers 50, October

2001, pp.69-84, p.7846 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.4, at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf 47 Contact Group Statement, quoted in „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group,

Europe Report Nr 161, Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.3, at


48 Jordan, Michael J, „Even in Eager Kosovo, Nation Building Stalls‟, in

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kosovo1/2004/0922stalls.htm
















57

CHAPTER 4 - KOSOVO FINAL STATUS AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

While in the third chapter we discussed the options of Kosovo status in this chapter

the focus will be on the security implications that Kosovo status will have in the

Balkans. As seen in the previous chapter Kosovo status takes into account the role and

the fear of international community that the future of Kosovo will have for the

security of the region. This chapter will assess firstly the current situation in the

Balkans and then the security implications of Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia and then

Kosovo as an independent state. One part of this chapter discuses the issue of the

domino effect that the independent Kosovo may have in the region and concludes

with the issue of the Greater Albania, an outcome that is feared that an independent

Kosovo might trigger as a result.

4.1 Current security situation in Balkan region

Since June 1999, and in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244,

Kosovo has been under an international administration (UNMIK). In theory it might

be desirable to perpetuate this situation in order to freeze the situation and gain time.

But has time really been gained? Heightened paramilitary activities in early 2003

along the Serbian border and in southern Serbia, continued killings of ethnic Serbs,

and the riots of 17-18 March 2004 that killed 19 suggest that some armed factions of

Kosovar and Serb Albanians remain. 1 The speed with which the March 2004 disorder

spread and similarities between incidents imply a degree of organisation on the part of

some of the rioting Albanians, frustrated at the lack of progress on the question of



58

Kosovo's status. In reaction, street violence broke out in Belgrade and other Serbian

cities, with mobs setting fire to several mosques. 2

The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SiCG) is what remains of Yugoslavia

after the wars of secession in the first half of the 1990s. After President Slobodan

Milosevic was ousted from power in October 2000, and subsequently handed over to

the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, the

federation entered a shaky period of reform and rehabilitation in the international

community, galvanised in March 2003 by the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran

Djindjic. The union is extremely fragile and held together by pressure from the

European Union; political parties, especially in Montenegro campaign openly for its

dissolution. Political will is low in the entities of Montenegro and Serbia for

continued union with each other; there is a general consensus that the union is

unlikely to survive beyond its legal minimum of 2005.

In Montenegro, while many dislike the union with Serbia, an increasing number are

calling themselves "Serb" rather than "Montenegrin", proving that the prestige of

Serbia endures at a grass-roots level. 3 Related to instability in Kosovo is the

precarious security situation in southern Serbia, populated mainly by ethnic

Albanians, some of whom are becoming radicalised by perceived poor treatment by

the security services, high unemployment and the prospect of independent statehood

for their kin in Kosovo.

Macedonia, a small state of 2 million people founded in 1991 as Yugoslavia

disintegrated is beset by questions of identity, most importantly over the ethnically



59

divided population. The Albanians who make up more than 25 per cent of the

population staged a six-month armed uprising in 2001 demanding equal treatment in

Macedonia. The Ohrid Framework Agreement brokered by the international

community has prevented a large-scale return to violence. As long as the majority

population on both sides remains supportive of the Ohrid Agreement, there is little

chance of a return to widespread civil conflict.

In Albania despite the immediate prospects of organised armed revolts on the scale of

1997 and 1998 looking unlikely, the mass armament of the population has contributed

to a rise in violent crimes in some cities. In July 2001, the authorities estimated that

only 32 per cent of the up to 600,000 4 looted small arms had been recovered.

The Balkans are seen as corrupt and inefficient, a region where governments only

nominally control sizable parts of their territories, and where organized crime is an

indicator of state weakness and also a factor for weakening the state. The region

presents a strange mixture of weak states, former failed states, and present

protectorates. In this regard the Centre for Policy Studies in Budapest gives the

following classification of political regimes in the Balkans:

Countries in an apparently sustainable process of democratization: Croatia;

Countries in post crisis process of democratization: Albania;

Countries starting the process of democratization: Serbia and Montenegro;

Countries recovering from a severe political crisis: Macedonia;

Countries with a significant international security and political presence:

Bosnia and Herzegovina;

Territories beginning the democratization process: Montenegro;



60

Territories that are de facto international protectorates: Kosovo;

Political entities within quasi-protectorates: the Federation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina and the Republic Srpska. 5

The ambiguity and delay over the final status of Kosovo is increasingly contributing

to the unstable situation in the Western Balkans. Confusion and obfuscation over

whether the territory becomes a long-term United Nations or European Union

protectorate, is unilaterally handed over to Belgrade‟s control, or is finally launched

on a trajectory for statehood erodes the effectiveness of the UN Mission in Kosovo,

fuels the misplaced hopes for some in Serbia that all or part of Kosovo will again

come under the authority of Belgrade, postpones stability in Southeast Europe, and

most disturbingly, contributes to increased tensions, political and economic

stagnation, and an unhe althy culture of dependence among Kosovo‟s ambitious,

youthful, and growing population. 6 The region is as close to failure as it is to success.

For the moment, the wars are over, but the smell of violence still hangs heavy in the

air. The region's profile is bleak - a mixture of weak states and international

protectorates, where Europe has stationed almost half of its deployable forces. 7

There is an apparent tension between the rhetoric of the international community,

which emphasises the desirability of multi-ethnicity, and its practice, which tends to

place the emphasis on accommodating various group interests in the interests of

security. In the past decade, the general legal and political environment for the

harmonious development of interethnic relations has improved substantially in most

parts of the Balkans. However, the reality of interethnic relations and minority rights

varies greatly. War and ethnic cleansing have resulted in significant demographic



61

shifts. While all countries of the Balkans still contain multiethnic areas, most

countries are now nation states with a majority amounting to 80 % or more of the

population. Albania, Croatia, Serbia (without Kosovo) and Kosovo (if considered a

separate entity) have strong majorities where most minorities live in a relatively

compact part of the country and account for 10 to 20% of the population. We can talk

perhaps about multiethnic regions but no longer so much about multiethnic countries.

Only Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro are countries that are

multiethnic as a whole but with no or no strong dominance by one community. 8 The

results of the survey done for the International Commission on the Balkans

powerfully confirm the thesis that interethnic relations are much better on the

municipal level than on the level of the country as a whole. 9

4.2 Security implications

4.2.1 Kosovo as part of Yugoslav federation

As seen in the previous chapter, one of the options for Kosovo final status is being

part of Yugoslav federation (be it an autonomous Serb, Yugoslav province or a third

republic in the federation). All of these options are rejected by Kosovo Albanians

whose sole objective is an independent Kosovo as an option to live free from Serb

oppression. It is suggested that should Kosovo remain a part of the Yugoslav

Federation then it is likely that armed conflict will re-ignite the province.

To better understand the security implications of Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia the

reader needs to keep in mind that all of the following atrocities that were committed



62

by Serbs in 1912-1913 had transpired previously and were repeated again in the 1980s

and 1990s.

Tens of thousands of defenseless people are being massacred, women

are being raped, old people and children strangled, hundreds of villages

burnt to the ground, priest slaughtered.

And Europe remains silent!

Countless villages have been razed to the ground, countless individuals

have been butchered. Where once the humble cottages of poor

Albanians stood, there is nothing left but smoke and ashes. A whole

people are perishing on Calvary cross, and Europe remains silent! 10

Albanians remain deeply scarred by the ten years of oppression and the year of war

between the Yugoslav military and the Kosovo Liberation Army. The vast majority

were displaced by the conflict. Many had their homes destroyed and livelihoods

ruined. They have no trust in post-Milosevic authorities in Belgrade and strongly

believe that their security can only be guaranteed by independence. Only in the period

March 24, 1999 to June 19, 1999, the Independent International Commission on

Kosovo estimates the number of killings in the neighbourhood of 10,000, with the

vast majority of the victims being Kosovo Albanians killed by FRY forces.

Approximately 863,000 civilians sought or were forced into refuge outside Kosovo

and an additional 590,000 were internally displaced. There is also evidence of

widespread rape and torture, as well as looting, pillaging and extortion. The pattern of

the logistical arrangements made for deportations and the coordination of actions by



63

the Yugoslav army, para-military groups and the police shows that this huge

expulsion of Kosovo-Albanians was systematic and deliberately organized. 11

Some will argue that after the fall of Milosevic‟s dictatorial regime probably the

democratization of Serbia may be the answer to Kosovo Albanians desire for freedom

and self-government. This comes from the suggestion that democracy unites and

dictatorship divides. After what they have suffered at Serb hands, Albanians will be

unwilling to submit even to the perfectly democratic domination of a Serb majority. 12

How could the Kosovo Albanians believe that the Serbs will forget crimes against

Albanians while their parliament has passed the "Law on the Rights of Indictees in the

Custody of the International Criminal Tribunal and Members of their Families" which

aims to protect the legacy of crimes carried under Milosevic by rewarding financially

the families of those who carried out the former president's crimes. 13 But

democratization can not be the answer to accommodation of Kosovo Albanians and

Serbs. As Horowitz argues democracy is about inclusion and exclusion, about access

to power, about the privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that accompany

exclusion. 14 In severely divided societies, as that of Kosovo Albanians and Serbs

stands, ethnic identity provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who

will be excluded.

Even the question of whether Kosovo as part of federal Yugoslavia is the most

desirable solution, is not very realistic. First, the idea of Yugoslav federalism may,

after a decade of war conducted under its flag, still be popular in Serbia, but it is seen

in Kosovo as an instrument of Serb domination. There is not much sense in the

Yugoslav idea itself. Yugoslavia was the state of the southern Slavs. Since all the



64

other Slavs have left it, how can it be expected that the only non-Slavs (the Albanians)

will remain in an unlikely cohabitation with the Serbs? 15 How can one imagine that a

population, half of whom were driven out of their country in spring 1999 by the

Yugoslav authorities (and whose identity cards were destroyed precisely to make sure

that all links with the country were thereafter severed), could one day consider

themselves „citizens‟ of that country and ask it for a new passport? 16 At its most basic,

both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians see Kosovo not as a political problem but as a

territorial one. That is to say as a zero-sum game in which winner takes all. 17

If even a marginally credible case is to be made for retaining Kosovo within the

Serbian state, a huge amount of social and institutional change will be necessary, on

which few if any Serbian politicians seem to have focused. Were Kosovo to be

reintegrated into Serbia, Albanians could hold up to 20 per cent of parliamentary seats

and (with their much younger age profile) would constitute a much higher proportion

of army recruits. They would need to be represented proportionately in all

government organs, including police. Most Serbs would be horrified at the prospect of

Kosovo Albanians heading government ministries or enjoying the right to buy Serbian

companies or properties on Belgrade's central street. But Serbia's treaty obligations to

the Council of Europe and EU accession conditions would oblige it to offer those

rights and more. Albanians may regain the option of demographic expansion out of

Kosovo into south Serbia, and lay claim to making Albanian Serbia's second official

language. 18

So the scenario of Kosovo as part of Serbia or even federal Yugoslavia will result in

more bloodshed and will worsen situation much more than it was prior to 1999. A



65

return to provincial status for Kosovo under Belgrade‟s authority cannot be seriously

contemplated, as it would almost certainly lead to armed resistance. The creation of a

tripartite union with Serbia and Montenegro is likewise a political chimera, as even

the current union between these two states is unlikely to survive. 19

4.2.2 Independence

The core of Kosovo Albanian demand for independence lies in aspirations for

security, dignity, and an escape from poverty: averting a return to Belgrade's

repression and avoiding humiliation in a state where they would be lowest in the

pecking order. 20 While independence is the desired aspiration for Albanians in

Kosovo Serb and Roma minorities within Kosovo are adamantly opposed to

independence on the grounds that it would be followed, sooner or later, by the forcible

expulsion of their entire communities. Independence for Kosovo, when seen through

the eyes of the minorities, looks like a recipe for ethnic majority tyranny. 21

Taking into account the record of violence of Kosovo Albanians toward Kosovo Serb

minority, they in turn, may call upon Serbian armed forces to protect them, and the

region may be plunged into new conflict. The current level of violence by Albanians

in Kosovo towards the Serbs and other minorities clearly suggests that the

independence of Kosovo can only come about under the protection of the

international community. Otherwise, constant discrimination and physical threats

would continue. A deliberate or even forced exodus of these minorities is thus

foreseeable. 22



66

The political constraints against easing conditions for Kosovo Serbs, of course, also

have other roots. Albanians who have usurped Serb property find it easy to wrap in

the flag their personal interests against Serb returns. In most urban areas the best

apartments belonged to Serbs; a significant group of usurpers has an interest in

maintaining a level of hostility that makes it impractical for the owners to return.

Municipal authorities, the police, and Kosovo Albanian society in general find it

difficult to resist such interest groups. Kosovo Albanians' need for spatial expansion,

driven by rapid population growth, is another factor of minority expulsion. 23 Kosovo

is by no means the first place to explode as population pressures increased. 50 years

ago the Kosovo Albanian birth-rate was staggeringly high, an average of nearly 8.5

children per woman. That has declined today but it is still twice that of the Serbian

population. The momentum for pushing out Serbs is most difficult to stop precisely in

newer urban environments, where communities are less established or coherent and

there has been significant recent migration from rural areas.

On the other hand, of all the options, only independence offers the prospect of a

promising future for Kosovo and its neighbours. The creation of an independent

Kosovo government, parliament, and judicial and other institutions is the only way to

develop a law-abiding society and an inclusive democracy in which all citizens,

regardless of ethnicity, are granted the full array of human and civil rights, including

the right to return of all legitimate Serb refugees to their homes. 24 There is little

prospect for economic development until Kosovo is independent and self-governing,

as any other status solution would lead to growing instability. Only statehood for

Kosovo would ensure a more durable regional security in the Balkans. With the

development of an internal police force and a credible military contingent, threats can



67

be diminished and deterred, and contributions can be made to the international

struggle against organized terrorism and criminality.

Conditional independence which is the proposal by the Independent International

Commission on Kosovo is the best solution for Kosovo final status because it refers to

the security of Kosovo and the region. Full, unlimited and unconditional

independence is impossible in the nature of things, because an independent Kosovo

state lacks the key property of statehood, the means to defend itself against external

attack. It remains dependent, and will continue to do so, on the foreign military

presence on the ground and on NATO air and sea power. Moreover, as the security

situation in Kosovo since 1999 has made abundantly clear, Kosovo lacks the other

capacities of statehood: the ability to guarantee internal order, domestic safety and

inter-ethnic peace. For these functions normally exercised by states, Kosovo will

remain dependent, for years to come, on some form of international security presence,

both police and military. Both its external security and internal human rights regimes

will have to be supervised by the international community and by a considerable

military presence. 25 This is also the position that the International Commission on the

Balkans in its April 2005 Report, proposes for the second stage (independence

without full sovereignty ) allowing Kosovo to develop the capacity for self-

government, with the international community reserving its rights to intervene in

areas such as human rights and minority protection.(see Chapter 3 p. 42)



68

4.2.3 Kosovo’s Independence and the Domino effect

Many countries in the west are reticent and fearful of the effects of Kosovo

independence on regional stability. It is feared that a sovereign Kosovo could prompt

further secessionist movements among the Albanian minorities in neighbouring

Macedonia, in the Presevo valley and even in Montenegro. Macedonia, in particular,

seems to be extremely endangered and the disintegration of Macedonia could

implicate neighbouring countries like Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bulgaria and

Greece. 26 Jacques Rupnik holds the position that Kosovo‟s independence would not

be a precedent that could affect Macedonia, because destabilisation there happened in

2001 without the question of Kosovo‟s final status being addressed (or precisely

because it was not being addressed). 27 Aldo Bumci suggests that political agendas of

Albanians in Kosovo and in Macedonia are quite different. The political wing of the

National Liberation Army that operated in Macedonia in the 2001 crisis, declared that

they respected the territorial integrity of Macedonia and were fighting for equal rights

of Albanians vis-à-vis Macedonians, and their demands were similar to those of

Albanian political parties in Macedonia that participated in state structures. 28 When it

comes to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia, the survey conducted

by International Commission on the Balkans shows that a great majority of Albanians

in Macedonia reject the idea of dividing the country (Figure 2). 77.5% of ethnic

Albanians (and 85% of ethnic Macedonians) support the territorial integrity of the

Macedonian state. 29



69

Figure 2 Macedonia Scenario

Source: The Balkans in Europe Future, Report of the International Commission on the

Balkans, at http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf

For Macedonia, the precedent of an independent Kosovo may be unwelcome; but the

aggravated conflict that would accompany any attempt to incorporate the province

back into Yugoslavia would be even more destabilising for Kosovo‟s neighbours –

Macedonia included. Even if no one expects tha t to happen, stoking Kosovars‟ fears

about the future would be unwise. 30

Many authors argue that the recognition of an independent Kosovo could not only

serve as a precedent for the Albanian population in Macedonia and Montenegro, and

maybe even also in northern Greece, but even more for the Bosnian Serbs in

Republika Srpska. They could be tempted to follow the example of Kosovo and





70

launch a referendum on unification with Serbia proper, in contravention of the Dayton

accords. Similarly, the Croats of Herzegovina could then insist on a referendum for

the unification with Croatia, leaving behind a rump Bosnia deprived of two- thirds of

its present territory. 31 The nightmare of the international community that Kosovo's

independence would automatically provoke the disintegration of Bosnia has no

foundation in reality. Independence per se is not the issue – the issue is how you get

there. 32

The acceptance at Dayton of a Bosnian „Republika Srpska‟ – an entity forged through

ethnic cleansing – was a terrible precedent. But it was arguably the price to be paid

for ending the war. 33 Maintaining the de facto integrity of Kosovo will send a strong

signal to extremists and ethnic agitators in Bosnia and Macedonia that partition is not

an attainable goal. Dividing Kosovo along ethnic lines would only serve to encourage

destabilizing elements throughout the region. 34

Greater Albania

Another argument against the independence of Kosovo is that a future unification of

Albania and Kosovo, maybe in the form of a federation, is extremely probable. 35 The

desire of the vast majority of Kosovo‟s population for independence is supported by

most Albanians elsewhere in the Balkans. An independent Kosovo, however, is quite

a different matter from a Greater Albania, but the wider policy questions remain. Is

there a real potential for further Balkan conflict, driven by a “Greater Albania” agenda

similar to the “Greater Serbia” and “Greater Croatia” agendas that fuelled the 1992 -95

Bosnian war? Or is the Albanian Question now definitively answered, with the



71

exception of the undetermined future status of Kosovo? And what policy measures

can and should be taken by the international community to ensure continued

stability? 36

In theory, now that the Serb threat has gone, there has never been a better time to try

to realize a Greater Albania. Yet no mainstream Albanian political party, whether in

Albania or Macedonia publicly espouses the idea. Tim Judah rightly points to the

disappointment of Kosovo Albanians towards Albanian Albanians during the Kosovo

war of 1999 when about 500,000 fled to Albania. 37 For the vast majority of them this

was their first experience of the motherland they had once idealized. Kosovo

Albanians were shocked by the poverty and corruption of Albania and, as many were

also robbed there, they were more than happy after the war to leave. Politically, the

result of this disappointment was to crystallize in the minds of many Kosovo

Albanians the idea that the future of the Albanians as a whole lay not in their

unification into one country, bur rather in cross-border solidarity and good-

neighbourliness.

Those who are concerned about pan-Albanianism have merely to point to the map.

Three and a half million Albanians live in Albani a; ninety per cent of Kosovo‟s two

million people are ethnic Albanians; there are more than 500,000 in Macedonia;

another 60,000 live in Montenegro, and slightly more in Presevo, Medvedja and

Bujanovac, three municipalities in southern Serbia, and in northern Greece. 38 Ethnic

Albania under Ottomans comprising of 4 vilayets, was penalized by the Great Powers

because it was considered part of the Ottoman Empire for almost five centuries. It

should also be noted that Albania's neighbours, especially Serbia and Greece, wanted



72

the total partitioning of Albania so that it would no longer exist as a separate entity

and nationality. 39

Figure 3 Map of Albanian four vilayets under the Ottoman Empire1878

Source: http://www.frosina.org/articles/default.asp?pf=1&id=89

Instead of referring to “pan -Albanianism”, Albanians themselves tend to use the

phrase “the Albanian National Question” which the controversial 1998 Albanian

Academy of Sciences‟ paper interpreted as the movement for the liberation of

Albanian lands and unification into one single national state 40. The mainstream

political parties in Kosovo are concentrated on independence for their province rather

http://www.frosina.org/articles/default.asp?pf=1&id=89




73

than union with Albania. In Macedonia‟s September 2001 elections, while parties

supporting some form of pan-Albanianism did score some successes, a clear majority

of ethnic Albanians rejected their policies in favour of an agenda of integration in the

context of the Ohrid peace agreement. 41

Within Albania, there is little support for ethnic Albanian separatist movements either

in southern Serbia or Macedonia. While public support exists for Kosovo‟s

independence, this is based more on general sympathy for the situation of Kosovo

Albanians rather than any aspirations for unification with Kosovo or Macedonia.

Albania is suffering from weak state institutions, rampant corruption, and serious

problems with law and order. These huge internal problems provide no room for

Albania to divert its attention to Kosovo. 42 Albania‟s commitment to regional stability

and its opposition to militant supporters of pan-Albanianism have been demonstrated

recently by its strong stance against the Albanian National Union Front led by Idajet

Beqiri and the Albanian National Army with which it is associated. 43

Conclusion

It is undoubtedly true that whatever the final status of Kosovo there will be security

implications for the Balkans. Moreover, the current security situation in the Balkans is

not healthy enough to accommodate the arrival of another weak state.

The security of the region in the case of Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia, be it an

autonomous unit or a third republic, will result in the same situation as prior to the

Kosovo war of spring 1999. Even a perfect democratic Serbia/Yugoslavia is going to



74

be seen by Kosovo Albanians as the historic continuation of Serb domination, and the

ethnic violence will continue.

In an independent Kosovo taken into account Serb expulsion from Kosovo after war

of 1999 and current level of hostility between two ethnicities the Serbian army may

take action to protect its community and further spread of war in the Balkans. This is

why the conditional independence or independence without full sovereignty will be

the best option for securing the independent Kosovo and a more secure Balkan.

Fears of a domino effect in the region have no basis as long as the countries of the

region have entered a period of democratization and the international military

presence continues. Finally, a Greater Albania is a dream of a handful of men without

backing from political and public communities in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia

and elsewhere.



75

1 „Collapse in Kosovo‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 155, Pristine/Brussels, 22

April 2004, p.1, at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/155_collapse_in_kosovo_revised.pdf 2

„Kosovo After Haradinaj‟, International Crisis Group

-Europe Report Nr 163, Pristine/Brussels, 26May 2005, p.1, at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/163_kosovo_after_haradinaj.pdf 3 „Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39, Belgrade/Brussels,

23 May 2005, p.4, at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf 4http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/BALK_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Albania&Prod_Name

=BALK&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/balksu/albas010.htm@current#section1 5 „In Search of Responsive Government: State Building and Economic Growth in the Balkans‟ , Policy

Studies Series , (Centre For Policy Studies, Central European University, Budapest, 2003),p.34, at

http://www.ceu.hu/cps/pub/pub_polstud_bluebird.pdf 6 Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

Kosovo ‟, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2003, p.2, at

http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf 7 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre for

Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.7, at http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 8 ibid, p.329 ibid, p.32-3310 Doucette, Serge Raymond, „In the Name of God: Serbian Faith -Atrocities‟, in

http://www.albanian.com/community/images/hot_spot/DoucetteonKosova.htm 11 Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm 12 Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50,

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.1013 „Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39,


http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf 14 Horowitz, Donald L, „Democracy in Divided Societies‟, in Diamond, Larry, and Plattner, Marc F.,

(editors), Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy, (The Johns Hopkins University Press,

Baltimore and London, 1994), p. 35-3615 Rupnik, Jacques, „The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question‟, Challiot Papers 50, October

2001, pp.69-84, p.8116 Ibid, p.8217 Judah, Tim, „Kosovo and its Status‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.55 -68, p.5618 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.19

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/155_collapse_in_kosovo_revised.pdf


http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/163_kosovo_after_haradinaj.pdf




http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/sentinel/BALK_doc_view.jsp?Sent_Country=Albania&Prod_Name=BALK&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/sent/balksu/albas010.htm@current#section1




http://www.ceu.hu/cps/pub/pub_polstud_bluebird.pdf







http://www.albanian.com/community/images/hot_spot/DoucetteonKosova.htm



















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19 Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

Kosovo‟, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2003, p.4, at

http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf 20

„Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,


http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf 21 Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm 22 Altmann, Franz- Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19 -34, p.3123 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,



24 Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for

Kosovo‟, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washin gton, 2003, p.5, at

http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf 25 Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm 26 Altmann, Franz- Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19 -34, p.3127 Rupnik, Jacqu es, „The postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question‟, Challiot Papers 50, October

2001, pp.69-84, p.7828 Bumci, Aldo, „Regional Perspectives for an Independent Kosovo – Albania and Macedonia‟, in

Bieber, Florian, Daskalovski, Zidas (editors), Understanding the War in Kosovo , (Frank Cass London,

Portland, OR, 2003), p.28729 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre


commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 30 Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50,

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.1631 Altmann, Franz- Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19-34, p.3132

„The Balkans in Europe‟s Future, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre forLiberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.17, at http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 33 Allin, Dana H, „Unintended Consequences – Managing Kosovo Independence‟, Challiot Papers 50,

October 2001, pp.7-18, p.1434 Bugajsk i, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for


http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf 35 Altmann, Franz- Lothar, „The Status of Kosovo‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.19 -34, p.31


































77

36 „Pan-Albanianism: How big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‟, Internation al Crisis Group, Europe

Report Nr. 153, 25 February 2004, p.ii, at

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN014972.pdf 37

Judah, Tim, „Greater

Albania?‟, Survival,

Volume 43, Number 2, Summer 2001, pp. 7-18, p.9-1038 „Pan-Albanianism: How big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‟, International Crisis Group, Europe

Report Nr. 153, 25 February 2004, p.ii, at

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN014972.pdf 39 Van Christo, „Perspective: Albania and Kosovo‟, at

http://www.frosina.org/articles/default.asp?pf=1&id=89 40 „Pan-Albanianism: How big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‟, International Crisis Group, Europe

Report Nr. 153, 25 February 2004, p.2, at

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN014972.pdf

41 Ibid, p.342 Bumci, Aldo, „Regional Perspectives for an Independent Kosovo – Albania and Macedonia‟, in


Portland, OR, 2003), p.29543 „Pan-Albanianism: How big a Threat to Balkan Stability?‟, International Crisis Group, Europe

Report Nr. 153, 25 February 2004, p.11, at



















78

CHAPTER 5- OBSTACLES AND POSSIBILITIES

A decade of war left the Balkans with a quarter million dead and millions of refugees.

Among the main casualties, however, were ideas of a multi-ethnic society and of

regional cooperation. The Yugoslav wars affected the entire Balkan region. Just as the

war in Kosovo cannot be understood in isolation from its broader regional context, so

will the success or failure of post-war recovery and reconstruction also depend on the

capacity of local actors and the international community to develop a coherent

regional approach.

As has been demonstrated throughout this paper there are two main pillars upon

which the future of the region rests. First, it is the people of the region that must be

responsible for their future, and secondly, Europe that should consider the Balkans

part of the European house. This Chapter develops the idea that Serbia and Kosovo

state and society should overcome their past difficulties and work diligently towards a

democratic and European future. The European Union has also a major role to play in

attracting weak states of the Balkans into European edifice.

5.1 Confronting the past; working to build the future

5.1.1 Serbian position

NATO military intervention of 1999 in Kosovo put an end to the Serbian strategy of

war crimes committed in Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia. 1 But, for the Serbs

the war of 1999 was personal. It was as much against them as it was against their



79

leader Milosevic and other senior government figures. 2 The loss of Kosovo has been

the most significant defeat of Serbia in the past decade. 3 Due to the traumas

associated with Milosevic's reign and the distortions of his propaganda machine,

many Serb citizens have a highly skewed picture of political reality in the Balkans

which affects their attitude toward Kosovo. They see themselves as victims of an

unjust NATO "aggression" and an Albanian Islamic fundamentalist terrorist

movement designed to create a Greater Albania. There is constant demonisation of

Albanians in the media as "terrorists", criminals, and Islamic fundamentalists. The

rhetoric of victimisation is transmitted by most leading politicians, including Premier

Vojislav Kostunica and President Boris Tadic, both of whom show unwillingness to

discuss the recent past realistically. 4

In the immediate aftermath of the lost wars and the fall of Milosevic, there was an

opportunity for the Serbian leadership in Belgrade to clarify the questions of Serbian

statehood. Kostunica and the democratic coalition that came to power in 2000 had the

opportunity to do so as part of the process of making a clear break with the Milosevic

legacy, but they had little inclination, and came under little international pressure to

do so. 5 Kostunica could put his nationalist credentials and his democratic mandate to

good use by making a clean break with Milosevic era and the myth of Serbian „re -

conquest of Kosovo‟. 6 If the difficult unresolved issue of a lost war is not tackled in

its immediate aftermath, while the new regime has strong legitimacy, it will come

back to haunt the process of reform later, but in much more adverse circumstances. 7

The way the Serbs have lost Kosovo means that tomorrow the Serbs will have no

chance to get it back. How could they while it is controlled[in 1999] by 55,000 NATO



80

and other troops? – asks Tim Judah. But what will happen in ten or twenty years?

Just over a decade ago no one could have predicted the shape of the world today. So

what if, in twenty or thirty years, America is locked in isolationism, Russia is rearmed

and strong, and Europe is weak and divided the spirit of revanchism may grow 8, and

Serbs may demand revenge. In this strategy may be seen the finances by Serbian state

of parallel civilian and military structures of Serbian community in Kosovo and its

work to undermine UNMIK's authority among them. There has been no effort to seek

constructive engagement with Kosovo Albanian politicians or the international

community 9 to resolve the future status of Kosovo as long as both sides have

irreconcilable positions.

Serbian opposition is not fundamentally different from Milosevic as far as the national

question is concerned. Serbia's nationalist delusions require a long "cure de

désintoxication." 10 The single largest parliamentary party is the ultranationalist

Serbian Radical Party (SRS), and 70 per cent of all deputies come from parties that

hold anti-Western views and are sceptical about reform in general and European

integration in particular. Security sector reforms have been largely nonexistent, with

neither police nor army subject to democratic civilian control. 11 The Serbian media

typically refers to them as the "hidden centres of power". In essence, each continues

to act as a state-within-a-state. 12 Crisis Group research indicates the Serbian army and

police commands were caught somewhat unprepared in March 2004 and planning for

such contingencies. The army and police could use renewed Albanian violence as an

excuse to secure the Serbian majority municipalities in north Kosovo and perhaps also

to intervene in support of a declaration by Serbs in north Kosovo of secession should

the international community signal agreement to an independent Kosovo.13



81

To many in the Serbian establishment, their best tactics appear to be to provoke

violence, undermine the credibility of the international guarantees to the Albanians on

Kosovo's unity, and tempt the Albanians into unilateral action. The readiness of

Russia to advocate postponement of the mid-summer 2005 standards review is

consistent with such tactics. 14 Although the March 2004 violence left Kosovo Serbs

feeling more insecure, the majority of them continue to live and work on their

traditional lands, side by side with the Albanian majority. 15

With the change of government in October 2000, the U.S. and EU perception of

Belgrade changed dramatically. The international community saw the new authorities

as the opposition to Milosevic, not those who oppressed and committed atrocities

against the Kosovo Albanians. Thus diplomats courted both the Federal Yugoslav and

Republic of Serbia governments, seeing a democratic and prosperous Serbia as key to

stability in the Balkans. The level of cooperation between Belgrade and UNMIK also

changed. The governments of Serbia and Yugoslavia jointly established a

Coordination Centre for Kosovo in August 2001, responsible for liaising with

UNMIK, overseeing the work of both governments in the province and lobbying to

ensure that the rights of Serbs are considered. The official in charge – Dr. Nebojsa

Covic, won praise for his role in resolving the crisis in the Presevo Valley in southern

Serbia in late 2000 and early 2001, and the international community hoped that he

would establish a constructive relationship with UNMIK. However, these hopes were

not completely realised. 16



82

The year 2003 began with a request from Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic to

review UNMIK‟s record in Kosovo and open dialogue with Kosovo politicians to

resolve the final status issue. Both Albanian and Serbian politicians reacted with

shock and sadness at the assassination of Djindjic. He was widely seen as a pragmatist

who would negotiate on Kosovo‟s future. 17

Despite the difficulties that Serbian government encounters because of the past there

are good signs that it is going to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal to bring war

criminals to justice. The compliance of governments of the region with the ICTY is

central to development of good relations between the international community and the

Balkans. The EU has defined compliance with ICTY as threshold conditionality when

it comes to the process of integration. The same holds for Partnership for Peace (PfP)

and NATO. 18 The Serbian government had actually pressured the highest-profile

indictees to turn themselves in late in 2004, but that approach failed. In January 2005,

however, prominent Serbian Orthodox Church clerics began to say that the country

was suffering because of a few individuals, whose duty it was to turn themselves in so

Serbia could move forward. The government also threatened that if they did not

surrender voluntarily, they would be arrested and forcibly transferred to The Hague,

in which case financial support for their families might not be made available. The

government also launched a media offensive. On February and March 2005, fruits of

this new policy became evident, when some generals surrendered themselves

„voluntarily‟ to the Tribunal due to also positive media coverage. 19



83

5.1.2 Kosovo position

The luxury of guaranteed state survival and unchanging boundaries must have quickly

turned into a cruel illusion for leaders of the new states of Croatia, Bosnia,

Macedonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Eritrea and others in the immediate post-

Cold War era. From the moment of their independence they had to secure their

borders and mobilize their populations to defend the new states from enemies inside

and out. 20 It is increasingly accepted that effective control of territory entails not

merely the ability to defend it, but also responsibility to protect its inhabitants. The

EU's approach to recognition of the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav republics in 1991

incorporated requirements for democracy, rule of law, human and minority rights, and

good neighbourliness, with additional emphasis on maintaining existing republic

borders to discourage irredentism and territorial conflict. 21

For Kosovo, and the overwhelming majority of its people, an independent state

recognized by the international community is the issue that eclipses all others. Only

such a state will be capable of voluntarily integrating into NATO, the EU, and other

international institutions. But the achievement of these goals requires a strategy and a

vision. 22 With no experience of running anything in government and in a society

which has long operated with parallel structures, it will be hard for any sort of modern

and efficient government to emerge which can administer the province‟s economy,

crush crime, and build credible state structures. In this case criminal gangs, in some

cases associated with political parties, will continue to flourish. 23



84

The lack of a wider vision of what a Kosovo state might be is partly a reflection of the

way the Kosovo Albanian parties have developed, as vehicles for patronage and

advancement of group interests, and partly bound up in Kosovo Albanians' difficulty

in distancing themselves from the posture of victim they settled into in the 1990s. 24

Kosovo's society has a residual addiction to the clandestine - a preference for focusing

on shadow rather than daylight and upon the hidden rather than the open agenda.

During March 2005, extremist elements attempted to destabilise the situation. The

latest in a string of post-war phantom armies announced itself with threatening

communiqués and calls for all the prior Albanian liberation armies to re-activate:

Kosovo's Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Macedonia's National Liberation Army

(NLA), and the Preshevo-Medvegja Liberation Army (UCPMB) of south Serbia's

Presevo Valley. 25 In any case, and as the security situation in Kosovo since 1999 has

made abundantly clear, Kosovo still lacks the key elements of statehood: the ability to

guarantee internal order, domestic safety and interethnic/inter-group peace. 26

Many Kosovo Albanians doubt their own capacity to handle independence well and

favour a continued international presence, albeit only in an advisory, monitoring

capacity. There is much cynicism about the venality and limited abilities of the

political class. Some intellectuals fear that lack of experience could lead to a failed

state and criminal haven, "Colombia in Europe … an El Dorado for organised

crime". 27 Reasons for the constant mobilisation and distortion of institutions into

resistance mode include the persistent fear of being pushed back into Belgrade's orbit,

but also a failure to imagine the contours of the putative state and so construct reliable

institutions to animate it. 28



85

Kosovo's politicians, institutions and media tend regularly to call up history to explain

events in a narrative which is both hermetic and circular. Thus, on 30 March 2004

Epoka e Re quoted by Crisis Group, led with the headline: "Arrests like in '81".

Assembly President Daci also compared the post-riot situation to 1981. The lack of

institutional orientation means that for some who are practised in armed resistance a

continuation of the methods of 1998-1999 is the only way forward and they see the

present situation through the lens of that war. 29 As evidenced by the deadly rioting in

March 2004, Kosovo Albanians are frustrated with their unresolved status, the

economic situation, and the problems of dealing with the past. If 2005 does not see

the start of a final status solution Kosovo may return to conflict and generate regional

instability. 30

Albanian hostility towards Serbs rests on the unresolved psychological effects of the

war, including, for some, guilt for failing to engage in it. For Kosovars, Serb guilt for

war crimes remains collective, not individual. The Democratic Party of Kosovo

(PDK), the larger KLA successor party, has been more pragmatic at both municipal

and central levels regarding Serb returns than Rugova's LDK. 31 The survey of

International Commission on the Balkans indicates that a majority of Kosovars are

keen on living in an "ethnically homogeneous Kosovo" (figure 2). 32

To strengthen the sense of unity and purpose, political leaders and opinion shapers in

Pristina will also need to define and promote a distinct Kosovar identity. There are at

least three possible definitions of Kosovars: as one subdivision of the Albanian

nation; as a separate and emerging nation; or as a territory-wide identity regardless of

ethnicity.33



86

Figure 4 New Borders

Source: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans, at


Most Kosovo Albanians blithely assume their ethnic identity is sufficient. Flag,

anthem, and Independence Day are borrowed from Albania. Kosovo Albanians

contributed much historical militancy to the Albanian national cause; many consider it

absurd that Albania alone should inherit the national symbols, including the double-

headed eagle which they were imprisoned for displaying under Milosevic. 34

Kosovars can be transformed into a separate nationality in a prolonged process of

ethnogenesis. This can also provide a focus for political unity, territorial stability, and

national development. It can also encourage coherence in dealing not only with

neighbouring Slavic populations but also with Tirana, other foreign governments, and

international institutions. Employing a definition of Kosovar that embraces a state





87

territorial identity and civic-based citizenship regardless of ethnicity can also

contribute to building cohesiveness. 35

5.2 NATO and EU integration – a Balkan without borders

Frontiers define the nation-state. They are the object of national defence, they mark

the boundaries of national resources, and they have excluded and included those

individuals who form the „patrie‟. 36 But national borders also mark the points of

absurdity, contradiction and danger in the national idea. They divide communities;

they are the flashpoints of expansive nationalism; and they are fault lines. The

patterns of settlement in Europe have never been geometrically convenient: ethnic

minorities are not just scattered, but often scattered village by village, street by street,

farmhouse by farmhouse. 37

For the distinguished Albanian writer Ismail Kadare the stability of the Balkan

Peninsula depends on two basic factors: first, the people who live there, and second,

Europe - more precisely Atlantic Europe. The Balkans can be considered as, at most,

a part of the European house, and at the very least its backyard. But even if it is the

latter, it must be taken seriously and therefore also the order and tranquillity of this

open space if the house demands those things for itself. 38 It is today natural that the

Balkan peoples need Europe. But on the other hand the question whether anyone

needs the Balkans, or rather whether the Balkans can be of any use to Europe, is

rarely posed. 39



88

5.2.1 NATO and EU integration

On 10 June 1999, the date NATO forces entered Kosovo, in Cologne forty countries

under the EU initiative, issued the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Latter on

30 July 1999 in Sarajevo the summit meeting reaffirmed the Pact. In the founding

document, more than 40 partner countries and organisations (Table 1) undertook to

strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace,

democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve

stability in the whole region. To all the countries of the region were promised Euro-

Atlantic integration.

The Stability Pact is the first serious attempt by the international community to

replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in South Eastern Europe with

a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy. The Stability Pact is a

political declaration of commitment and a framework agreement on international co-

operation to develop a shared strategy among all partners for stability and growth in

South Eastern Europe. The idea for the Stability Pact arose in late 1998 and thus

predates the Kosovo war. The NATO intervention acted as a catalyst in strengthening

international political will for co-ordinated and preventive action in the region.

The most important instrument of the Stability Pact is the Regional Table with three

working tables: Democratization and Human Rights; Economic Reconstruction, Co-

operation and Development, and; Security Issues. The EU, which has the leading role

in the Pact, undertakes to draw South Eastern Europe closer to the perspective of full



89

integration into its structures, including full membership. The European Union and its

Member States are collectively the most important donors in the region.

The countries of the region Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria,

Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova,

Romania and Serbia & Montenegro

The European Union Member States

and the European Commission

Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain,

Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, Portugal,

Sweden, Austria, Denmark,

Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Poland, Czech

Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania,

Latvia, Slovenia, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta

Other countries Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, Switzerland,

Turkey, USA

International organisations UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCR,

NATO, OECD

International financial institutions World Bank, International Monetary Fund

(IMF), European Bank for Reconstruction

and Development (EBRD), European

Investment Bank (EIB), Council of Europe

Development Bank (CEB)

Regional initiatives Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC),

Central European Initiative (CEI), South East

European Co-operative Initiative (SECI) and

South East Europe Co-operation Process

(SEECP)

Table 1 Partners of the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe



90

Countries wishing to be admitted must, however, first meet the conditions defined by

the EU Council in 1993 concerning democratic, economic and institutional reforms

known as Copenhagen criteria 40. As a contribution to the Stability Pact and an interim

step towards membership, the European Union has set up a new generation of

Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) aimed at the five South Eastern

European countries which didn‟t have contractual relationship with the EU (Albania,

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia and Serbia & Montenegro). In less

than a decade, the prospect of EU membership succeeded in consolidating democratic

and market reforms throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The accession process

profoundly transformed societies as diverse as the Polish and the Bulgarian, the

Romanian and the Slovenian. There is now a widespread consensus that it can do the

same for the Balkans. There is, however, one critical difference this time round - the

problem of weak states. The EU lacks experience in the integration of weak states and

territories like Kosovo. 41

As popular anxiety over further enlargement rises in the EU, the European

Commission has produced a draft regulation for an Instrument of Pre-Accession

Assistance (IPA) which sets down th e EU‟s present assumptions and planning for the

Western Balkans. It assumes that Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo, Albania and

Bosnia-Herzegovina will achieve candidate status around 2010 and membership

around 2020 – far behind the expectations of the region. 42 This passive approach risks

compromising the EU‟s influence in the region at a time when some of the most

difficult political steps – such as determining the status of Kosovo – will need to be

taken. Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania should

be given at least the same kind of support in 2007 as Bulgaria and Romania were



91

given in 1997. If member-state building were to begin in 2007, it may be possible for

countries of the region to achieve EU membership by 2014, in accordance with the

ambitious agenda set out by the International Commission for the Balkans. 43

The entire edifice of European Union strategy towards South Eastern Europe rests on

the eventual integration of the countries of the Western Balkans into the EU. The

promise of EU membership is the basis for all EU conditionality in the region, from

compliance with The Hague Tribunal to institutional reforms, from trade liberalisation

to the unresolved strategic issues, like implementation of the Ohrid Accords in

Macedonia or deciding on the final status of Kosovo. By 2007, with the next

enlargement, the region will be surrounded entirely by EU members. It is only the

prospect of following the countries of Central Europe and the Eastern Balkans

(Bulgaria and Romania) into the EU that gives the countries of the Western Balkans

any hope of avoiding becoming a ghetto of underdevelopment in the midst of

Europe. 44 There is a risk that, instead of catching up with the rest of the continent, the

Western Balkan countries will fall further behind, and the goal of integration – and

the promise of regional stabilisation it offers – will become even more distant. 45

Removing borders, by allowing a freer flow of goods, ideas, people and cultures,

would help to reduce clashes between states and erode the differences between states.

The Franco-German border today means less and less in economic terms. With the

creation of European passports, the need to stop people from flowing across the

border is removed. But this very ease of mobility has led to calls for tighter controls at

the edges of the emerging European superstate. As it becomes easier to move within

the countries of Europe, it is likely to become harder to move between Europe and the



92

outside world. 46 There is ample evidence suggesting that integration helps to stabilise

a region. But there is also evidence indicating that a partial integration has the

opposite effect - it can destabilise an area. A visa regime that builds walls between the

Western Balkans on the one hand and accession states such as Bulgaria, Romania and

Croatia on the other (see Map 3), acts as a strong disincentive to cooperation, leading

to a further deterioration in the social psychology of the already depressed western

Balkan region. 47 Among the most discouraging findings of the international

Commission on the Balkans is that the European generation of the Balkans, young

men and women under 30 who share the values of Europe are those who experience

the greatest difficulties in visiting the EU. A smart visa policy of the EU that opens its

borders to Balkan youth and Balkan businesses while closing them for criminals

should be at the very centre of policies that will mobilise popular support for building

EU member states in the Balkans. 48



93

Figure 5 European Integration – the present vision for 2006

Source: http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_56.pdf

NATO membership is the second important pillar of integration strategy as part of EU

integration. The Partnership for Peace that NATO has launched with countries that

aspire to join the alliance is designed to encourage practical cooperation with

individual partner countries. The programme has proven to be a vital instrument for

bringing partner countries closer to the Alliance and, paving the way for NATO

membership.

Two years ago Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia signed the Adriatic Charter with the

United States, pledging mutual support as they pursue the political, economic,

defence, and social reforms to achieve their eventual membership. The Adriatic

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Albania

Kosovo

Serbia-Montenegro





94

Charter has proven to be an especially useful forum for regional security and

cooperation. The Charter countries have also reached out to both Serbia and

Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, including them as observers at recent

meetings and promoting greater regional cooperation. 49 Sending a positive signal to

the Adriatic Charter countries would be of greater importance for the future of these

countries. This gesture will improve the security of Balkan countries still outside the

EU and will support reform in the security sector. NATO played the role of a fast

integration track for the Central and East European countries and it should do the

same for the Balkans. Paradoxically, membership in NATO is the only available

instrument for demilitarising this most militarised part of Europe. But in order for

NATO enlargement to fulfil its regional role, the Alliance should offer membership in

the Partnership for Peace program to Serbia and Montenegro and to Bosnia and

Herzegovina as soon as possible. 50

5.2.2 The integration challenge

Many will argue that the governments and the citizens of the region are responsible

for the future of their own societies, and should bring their own houses in order. In

view of the political and financial engagement since the beginning of the nineties and

the responsibility the international community has assumed, such arguments are

nothing short of cynical. 51

The EU provides the overarching political framework within which the difficult

unfinished business of the break-up of Yugoslavia can be dealt with. These nations

first had a common roof imposed on them by empires of the past; later, Yugoslavia



95

provided a common roof. Now they need a common European roof to complete their

nation-state building process. 52 But despite the scale of the assistance effort in the

Balkans, the international community has failed to offer a convincing political

perspective to the societies in the region. The future of Kosovo is undecided, the

future of Macedonia is uncertain, and the future of Serbia is unclear. 53 There is an

urgent need to solve the outstanding status and constitutional issues in the Balkans

and to move the region as a whole from the stage of protectorates and weak states to

the stage of EU accession. This is the only way to prevent the Western Balkans from

turning into the black hole of Europe. 54 The integration of the Balkans into the EU is

unimaginable in the current circumstances of constitutional uncertainty. 55

Conclusion

The Balkans will have a decent future in Europe as the eastern and central Europe

had. But it depends as much as to people and governments of the region as well as to

the Euro-Atlantic Europe. Current position of sticking with the past, complaining and

accusing each other is a big impediment for the future of Kosovo and Serbia and the

whole region. While the change of dictatorial regime in Serbia in 2000 was praised by

the USA and EU, still many Serbs see themselves as victims of an unjust NATO

aggression, designed to destroy Yugoslavia. Nationalism and anti-western views are

still very much part of Serbian politics. Despite these obstacles there are good sings of

democratic developments and cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. For Kosovo

Albanians the only option that they may agree is an independent Kosovo but they

have little experience at running a state which is a reflection of the way the Kosovo

Albanian politics has developed since the 1990s. Fear of returning under Yugoslavia



96

or Serbian roof continues to keep them hostage of the past due to also to the

psychological effects of the war. On the positive side independence may provide an

incentive for political unity, territorial stability, and national development.

The prospect of EU membership which succeeded in consolidating democratic and

market reforms throughout the Central and Eastern Europe can now do the same for

the countries of the Balkans. The EU and NATO can successfully use the promise of

membership as the basis for conditionality in the region to foster peace and security.

If the Balkans was successfully absorbed into the EU, it would finally banish the

possibility of the revival of conflict. The visa regime that builds walls between the

Western Balkans and other parts of Europe, acts as a strong disincentive to

cooperation, and leads to a further deterioration in the social psychology of the

already depressed region.



97

1 Gow, James, The Serbian Project and its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes , (Hurst & Company,

London, 2003), p.22 Williams, Christopher, „Kosovo: A fuse for the lighting‟, in Weymouth, Tony, & Heng, Stanley,

(editors),The Kosovo Crisis: The last American war in Europe

?, (Reuters, Pearson Education, London2001), p.233 Bieber, Florian, „Serbia After the Kosovo War: The Defeat of Nationalism and Change of Regime‟, in


Portland, OR, 2003), p.3254 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisi s Group, Europe Report Nr 161,


http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf 5 Rupnik, Jacques, „The demise of Balkan nationalism? A sceptical view‟, Challiot Papers 70, ,

October 2004, pp.99-110, p.1086 Rupnik, Jacques, „Yugoslavia After Milosevic‟, Survival , Volume 43, Number 2, Summer 2001,

pp19-29, p.267 Rupnik, Jacques, „The demise of Balkan nationalism? A sceptical view‟, Challiot Papers 70, ,

October 2004, pp.99-110, p1088 Judah, Tim, „A brief History of Serbia‟, in Buckley, William Joseph, (editor), Kosovo: Contending

Voices on Balkan Interventions , (William B. EErdmans Publishing Company Grand Rapids,

Michigan/Cambridge, U.K., 2000), p.959 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,


http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf 10 Report of Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at

http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm 11 „Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group – Europe Briefing Nr 39,


http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf 12 Ibid, p.713

„Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 21 January 2005, p.18, at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf 14 Ibid, p.1815 „The Lausanne Principle, Territory And the Future of Kosovo‟s Serbs‟, European Stability Initiative,

June 7, 2004, p.3-4, at http://www.esiweb.org/docs/showdocument.php?document_ID=53 16 „Kosovo‟s Ethnic Dilemma: The Need for a Civic Contract‟, International Crisis Group, Balkans

Report Nr 143, Pristina/Brussels, 23 May 2003, p.4-517 Ibid, p.6-7











http://www.esiweb.org/docs/showdocument.php?document_ID=53











98

18 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre


commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 19

19

„Serbia: Spinning its Wheels‟, International Crisis Group –

Europe Briefing Nr 39,Belgrade/Brussels, 23 May 2005, p.6, at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/b039_serbia__spinning_its_wheels.pdf 20 Migdal, Joel S, „State building and the non -nation- state‟, Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2004,

vol.58, no.1, pp17-46, p.2121 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,


http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf 22 Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for


http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf 23 Judah, Tim, „Kosovo and its Status‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.55-68, p.6224 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,


http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf 25 „Kosovo After Haradinaj‟, International Crisis Group -Europe Report Nr 163, Pristina/Brussels, 26

May 2005, p.4, at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/163_kosovo_after_haradinaj.pdf 26 Dassu, Marta, „Statehood and Sovereignty – Regional and International Dynamics in Kosov o‟s

Future‟, Challiot Papers 50, October 2001, pp.35-54, p.5027 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,


http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/161_kosovo_toward_final_status.pdf 28 Ibid, p.929 Ibid, p.1030 Ibid, p.131

Ibid, p.7-832 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre


commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 33 Bugajski, Janusz, Hitchner, Bruce R, Williams, Paul, „Achieving a Final Status Settlement for


http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/programs/balkans/kosovo/KosovoCover.pdf 34 „Kosovo: Toward Final Status‟, International Crisis Group, Europe Report Nr 161,









































99

35 Ibid, p.1836 Horsman, Mathew, Marshall, Andrew, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New

World Disorder, (HarperCollins Publishers, 1994), p.4437

Ibid, p.4538 Kadare, Ismail, The Balkans: Truths and Untruths, Challiot Papers 46 , April 2001, pp.5-16, p.539 Ibid, p.1340 „About the Stability Pact‟, at http://www.stabilitypact/aboutstabilitypact/ 41 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre for

Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.28-9, at http://www.balkan-

commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 42 „Breaking out the Balkan ghetto: Why IPA should be changed‟, European Stability Initiative, 1

January 2005, p.1-2, at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_66.pdf

43 Ibid, p.1-244 Ibid, p.1-245 Recommendations: Wilton Park Conference, 10 June 2004, European Stability Initiative, p.1

http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_56.pdf 46 Horsman, Mathew, Marshall, Andrew, After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New

World Disorder, (HarperCollins Publishers, 1994), p.57-847 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre

for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, April 2005, p.28-9, at http://www.balkan-

commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 48 Ibid, p.32-3349 Burns, Nicholas R, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs United States, „Ten Years after

Dayton: Winning the Peace in the Balkans‟, speech given at the Wilson Center, Washington 19 May

2005, at http://usinfo.state.gov/eur/Archive/2005/May/20-375965.html 50 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre


commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 51 Ibid, p.252

Rupnik, Jacques, „The demise of Balkan nationalism? A sceptical view‟, Challiot Papers 70 , October2004, pp.99-110 p.110, at http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai70.pdf 53 „The Balkans in Europe‟s Future‟, Report of the International Commission on the Balkans , Centre


commission.org/activities/Report.pdf 54 Ibid, p.855 Ibid, p.18

http://www.stabilitypact/aboutstabilitypact/























http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai70.pdf






















100

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 – Conclusion

Nationalism and ethnic conflict has become one of the most significant threats to

global peace and security after the end of the Cold War. One of consequences of

nationalism for the international system is that it has been a source of conflict and

war. Nationalist movements and the fight for self-determination and secession pose a

greater risk of internal wars, which in turn can widen to become international wars.

The appearance of new states creates a new, less mature regional international system

that lacks rules of the game defining the rights and obligations of its members towards

one another, and norms of international conduct. Self-determination as a right of

communities to decide on their fate and to establish an independent state is a

contested issue in international relations because it goes against the principle of

sovereignty and territorial integrity.

When conflicts of self-determination reach the point where the ethnic groups have

irreconcilable positions and one of them has the backing of one ore more regional

powers separation is the only viable solution.

The new state that results from the border changes is challenged by its ability to

mobilize its populations, accommodate its minorities, and defend its borders. Minority

groups within the new independent state backed by their kin state may in turn demand

secession from it and undermine its security and that of the region.



101

From the time Kosovo Albanians were incorporated in the Serbian state, they never

accepted this reality and have fought continuously for self-determination and

liberation from oppression. The unrest in Kosovo in the 1980s and 1990s on the other

hand led to a rapid and dramatic rise in Serbian nationalism. Complaining that Serbia

had not received a fair share in Tito‟s Yugosl avia, Serbian nationalists demanded the

restoration of control over Kosovo and advocated new arrangements to better reflect

the Serbian nation‟s „legitimate‟ interests in the federation. Kosovo‟s non -violent and

latter armed resistance reached its highest point in the war of 1999 when finally

NATO intervened to save Kosovo people from a state genocidal policy. Despite the

Yugoslav Army‟s agreement to withdraw in June 1999 the future status of Kosovo

and the Western Balkans remains still unclear.

The starting point for the future status of Kosovo is the UNSCR 1244 that reaffirms

the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, and its reference to the

Rambouillet agreement which calls for the right of self-government of the people of

Kosovo on the basis of the will of the people. From this ambiguous framework result

two interpretations; first, the Serbian one that Kosovo belongs to FRY; and secondly,

the Kosovo Albanian one that future status should be decided by the will of the

people, which means independence since the vast majority are in favour. In this

framework the status of Kosovo ranges from a Serbian autonomous unit to the other

extreme an independent Kosovo.

While international community condemned Serbian violence and ethnic cleansing and

finally NATO intervened to save a people from genocide there is no agreement on the

future of Kosovo. International actors differ in their positions on the future of Kosovo.



102

While the United States and the EU take the position of granting a conditional

independence to Kosovo, China and Russia as permanent members of the UNSC are

reluctant to acknowledge the reality because of their minority problems at home.

Whatever the final status of Kosovo would be it is undoubtedly true that there will be

security implications for the Balkans. The security of the region in the case of Kosovo

as part of Yugoslavia, be it an autonomous unit or a third republic, will result in the

same situation as prior to the Kosovo war of spring 1999. Even a perfect democratic

Serbia/Yugoslavia is going to be seen by Kosovo Albanians as the historic

continuation of Serb domination, and the ethnic violence will continue. An

independent Kosovo is considered by Serbia as a solution that undermines its

sovereignty and territorial integrity and a threat to its compatriots. Taken into account

the level of hostility between two ethnicities in Kosovo the Serbian army may take

action to protect its community and further spread the conflict into the Balkans. This

is why the conditional independence or independence without full sovereignty will be

the best option for securing the independent Kosovo and a more secure Balkan.

Moreover, the current security situation in the Balkans is not healthy enough to

accommodate the arrival of another weak state. Fears that an independent Kosovo

may trigger other secessionist movements in the region have no basis as long as the

countries of the region have entered a period of democratization and the international

community maintains a large military contingent. A Greater Albania or Kosovo has

not backing from political and public communities in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia

and elsewhere.



103

The security of the Balkans depends on its people and their governments as well as to

the prospect of joining Euro-Atlantic institutions. Current security and economic

situation in Western Balkans is not very promising. Serbs and Kosovo Albanians are

very much linked to the past. Many Serbs see themselves as victims of NATO

aggression and Albanian fundamentalist movement designed to create Greater

Albania. Nationalism and anti-western views are still very much part of Serbian

politics. The fall of Milosevic regime in late 2000 and lately in 2005 cooperation with

The Hague Tribunal are positive signs that the new democratic government in

Yugoslavia is moving slowly but in the right direction.

While for Kosovo Albanians the only option they may agree is an independent

Kosovo, they have little experience at running a state. This is also a reflection of their

dependence of the United Nations mission in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians tend to call

history to explain the events in Kosovo due to also to the psychological effects of the

war. The calamity which the Kosovo Albanians showed when their prime minister

surrendered to the Hague Tribunal is a good reflection of their ability for institution-

building.

The prospect of EU membership which succeeded in consolidating democratic and

market reforms throughout the Central and Eastern Europe can now do the some for

the countries of the Balkans. The promise of EU membership and NATO is the only

lever that EU and the US have for conditionality in the region. If the Balkans was

successfully absorbed into the EU, it would finally banish the possibility of the revival

of conflict. Europe in order to succeed in the Balkans must remove the visa regime

that builds walls between the Western Balkans and other parts of Europe. Moving



104

freely from the Balkans to other parts of Europe will act as a strong incentive for the

youth of the region that holds strong western views.

6.2 – Recommendations

As long as both Kosovo Albanians consider living with Serbs and within Serbian state

impossible, the international community should accommodate a form of independence

for Kosovo.

The independent Kosovo must be committed not to unify with Albania, or any other

neighbouring territory or state, and this commitment should be stated in the

constitution of the new Kosovo state.

International political and military presence should continue to be present in Kosovo

and other states of the Balkans in order to fade out the fears of renewed ethnic

violence.

Before deciding in the final status of Kosovo, both Serbia and Kosovo should

cooperate and discuss together on the issues of common interest.

Guaranty of democratic governance and human rights should be the first priority for

the Kosovo government. Serbia should be more cooperative in respect to Kosovo

Serbs in order to convince them to participate in Kosovo institutions. International

actors especially US and EU countries must pursue the policy of carrots and sticks

with Serbia if it doesn‟t cooperate in this area.



105

European community should take more decisive steps towards the Balkans in order to

assist in state-building capacities of the weak states of the Balkans. Waiting until

countries of the Balkans stand on their feet to join the Europe may be waste of time

and the Balkans may deteriorate at getting further not closer to European dream.

6.3 – Recommendations for further study

In the course of the research for this dissertation, the issue of state-building capacity

that in the case of Kosovo is called „standards before status‟ kept recurring. In relation

to standards before status policy that the international community has put as a

precondition for deciding in the future status of Kosovo the issue of guaranteeing the

rights and the protection of minorities is the most controversial. The guaranteeing of

minority rights is a precondition in order for the governments of the European

countries to democratic development and eliminating conditions for ethnic violence

and civil wars. While the Provisional government of Kosovo should fulfil this

requirement its decisions are ruled by the powers of Secretary General Special

Representative of the UN. Also Kosovo is still a country that depends on the

economic foreign assistance and has high level of unemployment.

Arising from these observations a question seems appropriate; how can the

provisional Kosovo government whose decisions are overseen by a ruling authority

develop itself and fulfil its standards requirement? This question merits further study

as the status quo is not contributing for the security of Kosovo and the Balkans.



106

Deciding on the future of Kosovo status is not a question of just how to fulfil

aspirations of Kosovo Albanians or otherwise those of Serbia and Serbs. The future of

Kosovo is a question of security and the future of the Balkans. A decade of Yugoslav

destruction war requires much more attention from international community. Fears of

domino effect and revival of nationalist feelings in the region in the case of granting

independence to Kosovo cannot justify continues ambiguity over the future of

Kosovo, Yugoslavia and the whole region.



107

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Documents

Kosovo Final Status and Its Implications for the Security of the Balkans