KONDA...KONDA JUNE’19 BAROMETER BALLOT BOX ANALYSIS OF THE 23 JUNE ISTANBUL ELECTION 3 / 71 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY We are sharing this report with the public following the re-run of

June’19

BALLOT BOX ANALYSIS OF THE 23 JUNE ISTANBUL ELECTIONAND VOTER PROFILES

KONDA

KONDA JUNE’19 BAROMETER BALLOT BOX ANALYSIS OF THE 23 JUNE ISTANBUL ELECTION 2 / 71

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................. 3

2. BALLOT BOX ANALYSIS OF 23 JUNE ISTANBUL MAYORSHIP ELECTION ...................... 6

2.1. General Result ................................................................................................................... 6

2.2. Districts Result .................................................................................................................. 6

2.3. Change in Districts ............................................................................................................ 8

2.4. Socioeconomic Situation of the Districts and Voting Distribution ................................. 9

2.5. Clusterings in the Political Geography of Districts ....................................................... 13

2.6. Vote Shifts ....................................................................................................................... 16

2.7. Vote Shifts Analysis ........................................................................................................ 18

2.8. Analysis on the Basis of Istanbul Neighborhoods ........................................................ 23

3. 23 JUNE VOTER PROFILES ......................................................................................... 39

3.1. Change in Preferences in Istanbul Based on Political Preferences ............................ 40

3.2. Change in Preferences in Istanbul According to Demographic Clusters .................... 42

3.3. Candidate Preference Based on Media and Social Media Preferences .................... 59

3.4. Basic Fİndings in Voter Profiles ..................................................................................... 62

4. EVALUATION ................................................................................................................ 63

5. RESEARCH ID .............................................................................................................. 69

5.1. The General Description of the Survey ......................................................................... 69

5.2. The Sample ..................................................................................................................... 69

6. GLOSSARY of TERMS .................................................................................................. 70

6.1. Questions and Response Options ................................................................................. 71


1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

We are sharing this report with the public following the re-run of the Istanbul Metropolitan

Mayoral election. It consists of two main parts and in the first part, "ballotbox analysis",

the results of the June 23rd election is compared, at the neighborhood and district levels,

with those of March 31st Local Elections and June 24th 2018 General Elections. Besides

the actual outcome, the "political profiles" part is based on three field surveys

representative of Istanbul and allows you to examine how candidate preferences have

changed in various social clusters.

The field survey forming the basis of our June’19 Barometer report, the 99th of the Barometer series,

has been conducted on June 15-16 only in Istanbul. Within the scope of the research, 3498

people were interviewed face to face in their households in 157 neighborhoods in Istanbul

representing Istanbul voter population.

After the Cumhur Alliance had submitted an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Election Council

(YSK) over the results of the Istanbul Metropolitan Mayoral election and the YSK decided to

repeat the elections, it has become the most important issue of the political agenda in Turkey.

Therefore, we made an exception for June’19 Barometer and did our fieldwork only in

Istanbul. We shared our election prediction based on this survey first with our subscribers

and then with the public. Based on our prediction, we had foreseen that Imamoğlu would

receive 54 percent and Binali Yıldırım 45 percent of the votes. According to unofficial results,

Imamoğlu received 54 percent and Yıldırım 45 percent of the votes and this confirmed our

measurement.

Ballot Box Analysis

When we compare the vote rates of E. İmamoğlu and B. Yıldırım considering the analysis results1 of

the income distribution in 2017 on the basis of neighborhoods and districts in İstanbul, which

is calculated and announced within the scope of al ‘My Neighborhood İstanbul Project’ by

İstanbul University Faculty of Economics;

✓ Although there is no special difference between E. İmamoğlu votes and opposing block votes

in the lowest and highest income districts, E. İmamoğlu votes has increased slightly in the

middle income districts compared to the opposition block votes.

✓ On the other hand, B. Yıldırım's vote rate decreased in all districts compared to the 24 June

votes of the incumbent bloc, but decreased slightly at a higher rate in the mid-income

districts.

-

In addition, when clustering analysis is conducted according to the distribution patterns of votes in

the districts of Istanbul in the elections, five different political behavior patterns emerged.

1 https://www.mahallemistanbul.com/MahallemSEGE_/

https://www.mahallemistanbul.com/MahallemSEGE_/


‘The Clusters in District Political Geography’ section, where these five clusters are described

in order to realize the basic voter movements, contains important clues.

When we compare it with 31 March IBB Mayorship votes, it is seen that the vote of Imamoğlu has

increased by 5.4 points and the vote of Yıldırım decreased by only 2.1 points. It can be said

that the increase of the vote for İmamoğlu did not have a single source but he increased his

votes from all clusters.

When we compare it with the distribution of Presidential votes on June 24, 2018, it is observed that

the votes of İmamoğlu increased by 8.7 points, of which 6.3 points were caused by Demirtaş

or HDP votes. It is assumed that 3.7 points of the 6.1 point decrease observed in the vote of

Yıldırım compared to Erdoğan is composed of the incumbent block voters who did not

participate in the election, while votes at a level of 2 points have shifted towards Imamoğlu.

Based on these two comparisons, it is possible to say that incumbent bloc voters at the rate of 1-2

points have shifted towards the opposition bloc, when Istanbul election was renewed on June

23. On the other hand, even in a period of deep economic and political turmoil, the transition

between the blocks is only at the level of 1-2 points, which indicates how strong the

polarization still is.

Analysis Based on Istanbul Neighborhoods

Considering the neighborhoods, we see that the neighborhoods with low participation rates are either

in the periphery districts or in the city center, in Fatih.

According to the previous election, the neighborhoods where participation increased at most were

the coastal districts of Beşiktaş, Kadıköy and Bakırköy, while participation in the periphery

districts decreased compared to 31 March.

While Imamoglu had high vote rates in the same regions in both elections, it was the first finding that

the number of neighborhoods, where he received more than 50 percent of votes on 23 June

has increased considerably.

Yıldırım seems to have lost votes in almost every neighborhood. In general, the protects his vote rate

in the districts such as Eyüpsultan, Arnavutköy, Çekmeköy, Sultanbeyli, Ümraniye, which can

be described as the second ring after the city center, whereas he experienced a higher rate

of loss of votes in the outermost districts and central districts.

In the analysis we made considering the average income level on the basis of districts, the votes of

İmamoğlu in the top 10 districts with the highest income level are between 71.1 percent and

49.3 percent and more than Yıldırım in all of them. On the other hand, there is a contentious

situation in the last 10 districts where the average household income is the lowest. It is

understood that the vote differences in the districts, which are in the middle of household

income ranking, are in favor of E.Imamoğlu.


Political Profiles

Considering the analysis of the voter profiles of the candidates and the candidate preference in

different profiles together, which we reveal by comparing the data of 3 different Istanbul-

specific surveys conducted during the 31 March local elections and the subsequent Istanbul

elections, we reach the following findings:

• Binali Yıldırım's vote seems to have remained at the same fixed point before March 31 and

June 23 process. It is necessary to interpret this situation considering that the rate of swing

voters decreased at every stage. If his vote remains fixed in any way, when the rate swing

voters decreases, it means that the vote for Yıldırım has decreased. This situation occurs in

almost all social clusters. There are very rare social clusters in which Yıldırım has increased

his vote in this process.

• Imamoğlu's vote, on the other hand, has increased in all components of Istanbul residents

both before and after 31 March. Imamoğlu shows a visible increase especially among the

youth, students, and unemployed and most importantly among the Kurds.

• Binali Yıldırım's vote is in line with the Ak Parti vote in the Barometer data in demographic

clusters. As the education level and income level increases, his vote rate decreases. As age

and the level of religiousness increase, his vote increases, too.

• The rate of the Ak Parti voters, who were undecided about the candidate, is slightly and

gradually increasing in three studies. Therefore, the rate of preferring Yıldırım falls from 95

to 90 percent. Based on these data, we can argue that in addition to the increase in votes of

Imamoğlu, a group of Ak Parti partisans did not go to the polls.

• HDP voters have clearly supported İmamoğlu since March. When we look at all the findings

together, we can say that HDP partisans played a critical role in the Istanbul elections.

• A significant number of MHP voters seem to have given up to cast a vote for Yıldırım at the

last stage. However, it is difficult to say that they all preferred Imamoğlu.


2. BALLOT BOX ANALYSIS OF 23 JUNE ISTANBUL METROPOLITAN

MUNICIPALITY MAYORSHIP ELECTION

2.1. General Result

Ekrem İmamoğlu was elected as the result of the distribution of votes in the Istanbul Metropolitan

Municipality elections through the emergence of a remarkable differentiation with 31 March

elections.

23 June Election Result

15-16June

KONDA

Barometer2

Voter 10.570.222 100.0

The votes cast 8.925.056 100.0

Valid vote 8.746.458

Non-voter 1.701.558 15.6

Invalid vote 172.112 1.7

B.Yıldırım 3.935.444 37.2 45.0 45.0

E.İmamoğlu 4.741.870 44.9 54.2 54.0

Other 76.569 0.7 0.9 1.0

The electoral turnout was 83.9 percent. Ekrem İmamoğlu received 54.2 percent of the valid votes,

while Binali Yıldırım received 45 percent and Ekrem İmamoğlu was elected as Istanbul

Metropolitan Municipality Mayor.

Examining the voter distribution on June 23 by considering the total voter as 100 including non-

voters and invalid votes, 44.9 percent of the voters casted a vote for İmamoğlu, 37.2 percent

for Yıldırım, and 0.7 percent for other candidates, while 15.6 per cent did not participate in

the election and 1.7 percent of the vote was considered invalid.

2.2. Districts Result

The districts where E. İmamoğlu reached the highest percentage of votes and reached more than

50 percent are the following: Beşiktaş (71.1%), Kadıköy (67.8%), Bakırköy (66.3%) Şişli

(59.7%), Adalar (58.5%), Maltepe (52.4%), Silivri (51.1%), Beylikdüzü (51.1%) and Çatalca

(50.6%).

On the other hand, the districts where Yıldırım reached the highest rate of votes are the following:

Sultanbeyli (53.5%), Esenler (50.1%), Arnavutköy (48.4%), Sultangazi (48.1%),Bağcılar (46%)

Pendik (43.6%), Ümraniye (43.2%), Gaziosmanpaşa (42.7%), Başakiehir (42.7%), Sile

(42.2%), Kağıthane (41.5%).

2 KONDA statement on June 19 shared with our subscribers and the public:

http://konda.com.tr/tr/duyuru/23-haziran-secimine-dair-kamuoyu-aciklamasi/

http://konda.com.tr/tr/duyuru/23-haziran-secimine-dair-kamuoyu-aciklamasi/


Voter Non-voter Invalid İmamoğlu Yıldırım Other

ADALAR 100.0 16.1 1.4 58.5 23.6 0.3

ARNAVUTKÖY 100.0 17.4 2.2 31.1 48.4 0.9

ATAŞEHİR 100.0 14.5 1.4 50.4 33.1 0.6

AVCILAR 100.0 16.8 1.7 50.6 30.5 0.5

BAĞCILAR 100.0 16.8 1.8 34.6 46.0 0.8

BAHÇELİEVLER 100.0 16.4 1.7 42.4 38.7 0.7

BAKIRKÖY 100.0 15.2 1.2 66.3 16.9 0.5

BAŞAKŞEHİR 100.0 15.0 1.8 39.6 42.7 1.0

BAYRAMPAŞA 100.0 14.4 1.7 42.5 40.7 0.7

BEŞİKTAŞ 100.0 14.1 1.0 71.1 13.4 0.5

BEYKOZ 100.0 15.3 1.6 41.3 40.9 0.8

BEYLİKDÜZÜ 100.0 15.7 1.5 51.1 31.2 0.6

BEYOĞLU 100.0 19.5 1.6 40.6 37.6 0.7

BÜYÜKÇEKMECE 100.0 16.6 1.6 48.1 33.3 0.4

ÇATALCA 100.0 13.0 2.0 50.6 33.9 0.5

ÇEKMEKÖY 100.0 13.6 1.7 42.9 41.1 0.6

ESENLER 100.0 16.1 1.8 31.1 50.1 0.8

ESENYURT 100.0 19.7 1.8 44.9 33.0 0.6

EYÜPSULTAN 100.0 14.2 1.6 45.4 38.1 0.7

FATİH 100.0 18.5 1.6 39.3 39.2 1.4

GAZİOSMANPAŞA 100.0 17.5 1.8 37.4 42.7 0.7

GÜNGÖREN 100.0 16.6 1.6 39.9 41.1 0.8

KADIKÖY 100.0 16.1 0.9 67.8 14.6 0.6

KAĞITHANE 100.0 16.3 1.6 39.9 41.5 0.7

KARTAL 100.0 14.3 1.5 49.3 34.3 0.7

KÜÇÜKÇEKMECE 100.0 16.4 1.8 48.7 32.5 0.7

MALTEPE 100.0 15.6 1.4 52.4 30.0 0.6

PENDİK 100.0 15.9 1,7 37.9 43.6 0.9

SANCAKTEPE 100.0 15.1 1.8 42.9 39.6 0.7

SARIYER 100.0 17.6 1.3 49.3 31.1 0.7

SİLİVRİ 100.0 15.5 1.9 51.1 31.0 0.5

SULTANBEYLİ 100.0 16.7 2.1 26.7 53.5 1.0

SULTANGAZİ 100.0 14.7 1.9 34.5 48.1 0.8

ŞİLE 100.0 12.7 1.8 42.5 42.2 0.8

ŞİŞLİ 100.0 17.2 1.3 59.7 21.1 0.6

TUZLA 100.0 15.1 1.6 44.3 38.3 0.7

ÜMRANİYE 100.0 14.6 1.6 39.8 43.2 0.7

ÜSKÜDAR 100.0 14.9 1.4 45.3 37.5 0.8

ZEYTİNBURNU 100.0 17.9 1.8 41.8 37.8 0.6

İSTANBUL 100.0 15.6 1.6 45.5 36.3 0.7


2.3. Change in Districts

Non-voter Invalid İmamoğlu Yıldırım Other

ADALAR -2.0 -1.5 10.5 -3.8 -3.1

ARNAVUTKÖY 2.1 -2.1 3.5 -1.6 -1.9

ATAŞEHİR 0.0 -1.2 5.2 -3.0 -1.1

AVCILAR -0.3 -1.0 5.9 -3.8 -0.8

BAĞCILAR 0.1 -1.5 4.5 -1.4 -1.7

BAHÇELİEVLER -0.9 -1.3 5.1 -1.5 -1.4

BAKIRKÖY -1.9 -0.6 7.2 -3.5 -1.2

BAŞAKŞEHİR -0.7 -1.3 4.5 -1.0 -1.5

BAYRAMPAŞA -0.3 -0.8 5.7 -2.9 -1.6

BEŞİKTAŞ -4.4 -0.5 7.8 -1.9 -0.9

BEYKOZ 1.5 -1.4 4.6 -3.1 -1.6

BEYLİKDÜZÜ 0.8 -0.9 3.5 -2.6 -0.8

BEYOĞLU 0.3 -1.5 4.8 -2.0 -1.6

BÜYÜKÇEKMECE 1.4 -1.2 5.1 -4.5 -0.8

ÇATALCA 1.7 -1.9 6.7 -5.7 -0.8

ÇEKMEKÖY 0.5 -2.2 5.9 -1.0 -3.2

ESENLER 0.7 -1.4 4.3 -1.7 -1.8

ESENYURT 1.7 -1.6 3.5 -2.7 -0.9

EYÜPSULTAN -0.9 -1.1 5.6 -2.2 -1.4

FATİH -1.4 -1.2 5.5 -2.0 -1.0

GAZİOSMANPAŞA 0.3 -1.5 5.0 -1.9 -2.0

GÜNGÖREN -0.7 -1.3 5.4 -2.0 -1.4

KADIKÖY -0.1 -0.6 4.0 -2.3 -0.9

KAĞITHANE -1.3 -1.4 6.1 -1.6 -1.8

KARTAL -0.2 -1.2 5.6 -3.0 -1.1

KÜÇÜKÇEKMECE 0.1 -1.2 5.7 -3.3 -1.3

MALTEPE -0.2 -1.5 5.6 -2.7 -1.2

PENDİK -0.1 -1.3 4.4 -1.7 -1.4

SANCAKTEPE 0.8 -2.1 3.9 -1.5 -1.0

SARIYER 2.1 -1.1 3.8 -3.9 -0.9

SİLİVRİ 6.1 -2.4 4.7 -6.5 -2.0

SULTANBEYLİ 1.6 -2.2 2.6 -0.2 -1.8

SULTANGAZİ -0.2 -1.6 3.3 0.0 -1.5

ŞİLE 2.3 -1.6 7.0 -6.6 -1.0

ŞİŞLİ -1.8 -1.9 8.2 -1.6 -2.9

TUZLA 0.3 -1.3 4.9 -2.6 -1.2

ÜMRANİYE -1.2 -1.3 5.1 -1.2 -1.5

ÜSKÜDAR -0.4 -1.0 5.5 -2.6 -1.5

ZEYTİNBURNU 0.0 -1.3 5.4 -2.6 -1.5

İSTANBUL 0.1 -1.4 5.3 -2.6 -1.5


The districts where İmamoğlu's votes increased the most were the following ones: Adalar (10.5

points), Şişli (8.2 points), Beşiktaş (7.8 points), Bakırköy (7.2 points), Şile (7 points), Çatalca

(6, 7 points), Kağıthane (6.1 points), Avcılar (5.9 points), Çekmeköy (5.9 points),

Küçükçekmece (5.7 points). The fact that the top five districts with the highest increase in

votes were the ones where the CHP is traditionally strong, could be as a result that the CHP

voters who had not gone to the polls on 31 March because they had no hope of winning or

they were resentful, went to the polls this time. On the other hand, besides the consolidation

of the opposition bloc in these districts, we can see on the table that there are shifts from 2

to 3 points from the incumbent bloc.

On the other hand, the districts where Yıldırım lost the highest percentage of votes, are the following

ones: Şile (6.6 points), Silivri (6.5 points), Çatalca (5.7 points), Büyükçekmece (4.5 points),

Sarıyer (3.9 points), Adalar (3.8 points), Avcılar (3.8 points), Bakirköy (3.5 points),

Küçükçekmece (3.3 points), Beykoz (3.1 points).

2.4. Socioeconomic Situation of the Districts and Voting Distribution

When we compare the vote rates of E. İmamoğlu and B. Yıldırım considering the analysis results of

the income distribution in 2017 on the basis of neighborhoods and districts in İstanbul, which

is calculated and announced within the scope of al ‘My Neighborhood İstanbul Project’ by

İstanbul University Faculty of Economics3; some remarkable points emerge.

In the analysis we made considering the average income level on the basis of districts, the votes of

İmamoğlu in the top 10 districts with the highest income level are between 71.1 percent and

49.3 percent and more than Yıldırım in all of them. On the other hand, there is a contentious

situation in the last 10 districts where the average household income is the lowest. In the

districts with the lowest income level, the vote of İmamoğlu varies between 37.4 percent and

49.7 percent, while the Yıldırım vote varies between 42.7 percent and 32.5 percent.

In the graph below, It is understood that the vote differences in the districts, which are in the middle

of household income ranking, are in favor of E.Imamoğlu.

3 http://www.mahallemistanbul.com/MahallemSEGE_/


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Istanbul districts' household incomes and 23 June vote preferences

Monthly Household income İmamoğlu Yıldırım

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Istanbul districts monthly household average income, 23 June E.

İmamoğlu, 24 June'18 opposition block vote rates

Monthly household income 23 June / İmamoğlu 24 June'18 / CHP+İyiParti+HDP


On the other hand, an interesting point draws attention when the results of the 24 June 2018 General

Elections and the power bloc (AkParti + MHP) - opposition bloc (CHP + Iyi Parti + HDP) vote

rates are analyzed together and visualized as shown in the two graphs above.

✓ Although there is no special difference between İmamoğlu votes and opposing block votes in

districts with the lowest income and highest income, İmamoğlu votes increased slightly

compared to the opposing block votes in the middle income districts.

✓ On the other hand, Yıldırım’s vote declined in all of them compared the 24 June votes of the

incumbent bloc, but decreased slightly more in the mid-income districts.

✓ It can be said that this observed relationship implies a potential for change in terms of

economic class positions in the party bases as well as in relation to the current economic

turmoil. In relatively middle-income districts, the incumbent bloc loses votes and the reason

may be due to the class position changes as well as due to the current politics. For this

reason, it may not be enough to analyze the dynamics that produce the results of June 23

through campaigns and discourses. However, we should note that this finding requires

analysis and confirmation by a special research.

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KÇ

EK

ME

CE

BE

YK

OZ

KA

RTA

L

KA

ĞIT

HA

NE

BE

YLİK

DÜ

ZÜ

BA

ŞA

KŞ

EH

İR

EY

ÜP

SU

LTA

N

BA

HÇ

ELİE

VLE

R

BE

YO

ĞLU

FA

TİH

MA

LTE

PE

ATA

ŞE

HİR

AD

ALA

R

ÜS

KÜ

DA

R

SA

RIY

ER

ŞİŞ

Lİ

BA

KIR

KÖ

Y

KA

DIK

ÖY

BE

ŞİK

TA

Ş

Istanbul districts monthly household average income, 23 June B.

Yıldırım, 24 June'18 power block vote rates

Monthly household income 23 June / Yıldırım 24 June'18 / AkParti+MHP


Monthly average household

income 2017 (TL) İmamoğlu Yıldırım

BEŞİKTAŞ 10560 71,1 13,4

KADIKÖY 9025 67,8 14,6

BAKIRKÖY 8845 66,3 16,9

ŞİŞLİ 7822 59,7 21,1

SARIYER 7308 49,3 31,1

ÜSKÜDAR 6987 45,3 37,5

ADALAR 6652 58,5 23,6

ATAŞEHİR 6577 50,4 33,1

MALTEPE 5772 52,4 30,0

FATİH 5281 39,3 39,2

BEYOĞLU 4773 40,6 37,6

BAHÇELİEVLER 4674 42,4 38,7

EYÜPSULTAN 4670 45,4 38,1

BAŞAKŞEHİR 4513 39,6 42,7

BEYLİKDÜZÜ 4327 51,1 31,2

KAĞITHANE 4188 39,9 41,5

KARTAL 4120 49,3 34,3

BEYKOZ 3693 41,3 40,9

BÜYÜKÇEKMECE 3671 48,1 33,3

AVCILAR 3662 50,6 30,5

ZEYTİNBURNU 3644 41,8 37,8

ÜMRANİYE 3637 39,8 43,2

KÜÇÜKÇEKMECE 3567 48,7 32,5

ÇEKMEKÖY 3503 42,9 41,1

BAYRAMPAŞA 3480 42,5 40,7

TUZLA 3407 44,3 38,3

GÜNGÖREN 3388 39,9 41,1

BAĞCILAR 3197 34,6 46,0

PENDİK 3055 37,9 43,6

ESENYURT 3024 44,9 33,0

GAZİOSMANPAŞA 3019 37,4 42,7

ESENLER 2847 31,1 50,1

SANCAKTEPE 2633 42,9 39,6

ŞİLE 2482 42,5 42,2

SİLİVRİ 2372 51,1 31,0

SULTANGAZİ 2187 34,5 48,1

SULTANBEYLİ 2172 26,7 53,5

ÇATALCA 2128 50,6 33,9

ARNAVUTKÖY 2030 31,1 48,4


2.5. Clusterings in the Political Geography of Districts

When clustering analysis is conducted according to the distribution patterns of votes in the elections

of Istanbul districts, five different political behavior patterns emerge. The analysis was based

on the distribution of votes of the Metropolitan Municipality in 2014 Local Elections, 2015

Presidential Election, 2017 Presidential System Referendum, 2018 Presidential Election, 31

March 2019 Local Election Metropolitan Municipality. The reason why these elections and

referendums were taken as the basis for the analysis was the opinion that the opposition

and the incumbent blocs were clearly formed in the before mentioned elections and the

referendum, and the assumption that it would shed a better light on the current situation.

Istanbul Districts Clustering Analysis


Clusters Number of

Voters

Monthly

average

house-

hold in-

come

İmamoğlu Yıldırım Characteristics

ADALAR

Cluster

1

888.903

(%8,4)

6652 58,5 23,6

✓ CHP dominates

✓ Economically strong

✓ Setleddness strong

BAKIRKÖY 8845 66,3 16,9

BEŞİKTAŞ 10560 71,1 13,4

KADIKÖY 9025 67,8 14,6

ŞİŞLİ 7822 59,7 21,1

ATAŞEHİR

Cluster

2

2.137.572

(%20,2)

6577 50,4 33,1

✓ Opposition and incum-

bent blocs are in com-

plete competition

✓ Centers which gets

stronger economically

✓ Places where zoning

movement and new mi-

gration are intensive

AVCILAR 3662 50,6 30,5

BEYLİKDÜZÜ 4327 51,1 31,2

BÜYÜKÇEKMECE 3671 48,1 33,3

ÇATALCA 2128 50,6 33,9

KARTAL 4120 49,3 34,3

MALTEPE 5772 52,4 30,0

SARIYER 7308 49,3 31,1

SİLİVRİ 2372 51,1 31,0

SULTANBEYLİ Cluster 3

213.941

(%2) 2172 26,7 53,5

✓ The Ak Parti and The

HDP competition is de-

cisive

✓ Economically weak ARNAVUTKÖY

Cluster 4

1.336.252

(%12,7)

2030 31,1 48,4 ✓ The Ak Parti dominates

✓ Districts emerged and

got stronger in the last

ten years

BAĞCILAR 3197 34,6 46,0

ESENLER 2847 31,1 50,1

SULTANGAZİ 2187 34,5 48,1

BAHÇELİEVLER

Cluster 5

5.983.018

(%56,7)

4674 42,4 38,7

✓ Even if the incumbent

bloc is strong, opposi-

tion bloc is existent

✓ Old and traditional Is-

tanbul districts where

setleddness is relatively

strong

✓ Places where urban

transformation is inten-

sive

BAŞAKŞEHİR 4513 39,6 42,7

BAYRAMPAŞA 3480 42,5 40,7

BEYKOZ 3693 41,3 40,9

BEYOĞLU 4773 40,6 37,6

ÇEKMEKÖY 3503 42,9 41,1

ESENYURT 3024 44,9 33,0

EYÜPSULTAN 4670 45,4 38,1

FATİH 5281 39,3 39,2

GAZİOSMANPAŞA 3019 37,4 42,7

GÜNGÖREN 3388 39,9 41,1

KAĞITHANE 4188 39,9 41,5

KÜÇÜKÇEKMECE 3567 48,7 32,5

PENDİK 3055 37,9 43,6

SANCAKTEPE 2633 42,9 39,6

ŞİLE 2482 42,5 42,2

TUZLA 3407 44,3 38,3

ÜMRANİYE 3637 39,8 43,2

ÜSKÜDAR 6987 45,3 37,5

ZEYTİNBURNU 3644 41,8 37,8


We should state that the economic and sociological notes that we put forward in order to explain

the clusters formed are statements of subjective effort rather than the data. However, our

political analysis is based on political data based on clusters.

In fact, as seen in the table below, while Imamoglu's vote was 65 percent on June 23 at the total of

districts in 1.cluster, 68 percent of the electorate in these districts had voted in the

referendum of 2017 Presidential system as ‘no’, while 58 percent had voted in the 2017

Presidential election for Muharrem İnce. In the 2nd cluster districts, İmamoğlu's vote was 50

percent on June 23, while 52 percent voted “no” in the 2017 Presidential system referendum

and 40 percent casted a vote for Muharrem İnce and 38 percent for Erdoğan in the 2018

Presidential election.

In Sultanbeyli, which constituted the 3rd cluster alone, the vote of Imamoglu is at 27 percent, while

Yıldırım's vote is at 53 percent, whereas Demirtaş had 13 percent of the votes in the 2018

Presidency elections and the HDP had 16 percent of the votes in the 24 June 2018 General

Elections.

In the districts in the 4th cluster, İmamoğlu's vote was 33 percent on 23 June and Yıldırım's vote was

48 percent, whereas in the 2017 Presidential system referendum 56 percent said “yes”, 31

percent said “no” and 55 percent casted a vote for Erdoğan in the 2018 Presidential election.

23 June’19 2017 Referandum 2018 Presidential election

Clusters İmamoğlu Yıldırım Yes No İnce Akşener Erdoğan Demirtaş

1 65 18 20 68 58 4 21 4

2 50 32 36 52 40 5 38 4

3 27 53 62 26 10 2 60 13

4 33 48 56 31 17 3 55 10

5 42 40 45 42 29 4 46 6

In the districts in the 5th cluster, we observe a full political competition. On June 23, Imamoğlu

received 42 percent of the votes, while Yıldırım received 40 percent of the votes. In the

referendum 45 percent said ‘yes’, and 42 percent said ‘no’.

The table analyzing the results of June 23 in Istanbul districts, which constitute these five different

clusters, again based on 5 clusters is given below. In the 3rd and 4th clusters dominated by

the Ak Parti, it is remarkable that both participation and invalid votes are relatively high.

23 June 2019 İBB Presidential Election

Districts Voter Non-voter Invalid vote B.Yıldırım E.İmamoğlu Other

1 100.0 15.8 1.1 16.5 66.1 0.5

2 100.0 15.6 1.5 31.9 50.4 0.6

3 100.0 16.7 2.1 53.5 26.7 1.0

4 100.0 16.2 1.9 47.8 33.3 0.8

5 100.0 16.3 1.7 39.1 42.2 0.8

İstanbul 100.0 15.6 1.7 37.2 44.9 0.7


2.6. Vote Shifts

2.6.1. Comparison of the results of 23 June with 31 March elections

When we compare the results of the June 23 elections with the results of the March 31 based on

vote shifts, there is a significant change in the vote of the opposition bloc candidate

İmamoğlu.

Vote distributions Non-voter Invalid

vote

Incum-

bent bloc

Opposi-

tion bloc HDP Other

Total

Voter

31 March Local Assem-

bly4

16.2 3.0 38,6 33.9 3.2 5.0 100.0

31 March İBB Mayorship 16.1 3.0 39,4 39.5

2.1 100.0

23 June İBB Mayorship 15.6 1.7 37,2 44.9

0.7 100.0

Differences compared to 23

June results Non-voter

Invalid

vote

Incum-

bent bloc

Opposi-

tion bloc HDP Other Total

31 March Local Assembly -0.6 -1.3 -1.3 10.9 -3.2 -4.4 0

31 March İBB Mayorship -0.5 -1.3 -2.1 5.4 0.0 -1.5 0

When we compare with 31 March IBB Presidential votes, it is observed that İmamoğlu’s vote has

increased by 5.4 points and Yıldırım’s vote has decreased by only 2.1 points. It can be

claimed that the most important source of the increase in the vote of Imamoğlu came from

all segments who voted for the incumbent bloc and other candidates on March 31st. The

increase in the participation in the elections together with the decrease in invalid votes is

one of the sources of the increase in İmamoğlu's vote.

On the other hand, when we compare the votes of June 23 with the votes of 31 March Municipal

Assembly votes, İmamoğlu’s votes have increased by 10.9 points and Yıldırım’s votes have

decreased by 1.3 points. It is observed that the first important source of the increase in

İmamoğlu’s vote is the 3.2-point HDP vote and similarly the 4.4-point vote of groups which

vote for other political parties.

Based on these numerical analyzes It is possible to claim the following: There is a 1-2-point shift to

İmamoğlu from the votes of the incumbent bloc on 31 March. However, it is not yet possible

to tell based on the results of the polls from our analysis up to now, how this shift divides

between Ak Parti and MHP voters.

4 The difference between the numbers in the poll analysis we published after the 31 March Local Elections and the two

thousandth level difference between these numbers is due to the differences between the provisional results (99 percent

opened) served by the Anatolian Agent to the media and the final results of the polls.


2.6.2. Comparison of 23 June results with 24 June 2018 general election results

If we continue from the previous sentence, it may be useful to compare the results of June 23 with

the results of the 24 June 2018 General Elections in order to answer the question of how

much of the 1-2 point voters shifted to İmamoğlu is strategic vote or how much of them is

really as a result of inter-block transition.

Vote distributions Non-voter Invalid vote Incumbent

bloc

Opposition

bloc HDP Other Total Voter

2018 General Election 11.6 1.4 44.3 30,0 11,0 1,7 100,0

2018 Presidential Elec-

tion

11.9 1.4 43.4 36,1 6,3 1,0 100,0

23 June İBB Mayorship 15.6 1.7 37.2 44,9

0,7 100,0

Differences compared to 23

June results Non-voter

Invalid

vote

Incumbent

bloc Opposition

bloc HDP Other Total

2018 General Election 4.0 0.3 -7.1 14.9 -11.0 -1.1 0


tion

3.7 0.3 -6.1 8.7 -6.3 -0.3 0

As you can see in the table above, when we compare the results of the General Elections with 23

June, the vote of İmamoğlu's opposition bloc increased by 14.9 points. The main source of

this increase is the vote of the HDP at the rate of 11 percent and of other parties at the rate

of 1.1 points. On the other hand, it is possible to say that 4-point portion of the 7.1-point

decrease of Yıldırım’s votes stems from those who did not participate in the election.

When we make the same comparison with the distribution of Presidential votes on 24 June 2018, it

is seen that İmamoğlu’s vote has increased by 8.7 points, of which 6.3 points were caused

by Demirtaş or HDP votes. It is assumed that 3.7 points of the 6.1 point decrease seen in the

Yıldırım’s vote compared to Erdoğan is composed of the power block voters who did not

participate in the election, but the vote which is at the level of 2 points is shifted towards

İmamoğlu.

Based on these two comparisons, it is possible to claim that while the Istanbul election was renewed

on 23 June, the voters of the incumbent block shifted towards the opposition bloc by 1-2

points. On the other hand, the fact that the transition between the blocks is only at the level

of1-2 points even in a period of deep economic and political turmoil indicates how strong the

polarization is.

Of course, since these calculations and findings are based on the total distribution of votes in

Istanbul, it may include some in globo and shortcut comments. Therefore, the analysis needs

to be reduced to the level of neighborhood and even to the level of ballot box.


2.7. Vote Shifts Analysis

Çilek Ağacı - http://cilekagaci.com/

2.7.1. Summary In this study, we present a numerical analysis of the results of 24 June 2018 General Elections and

31 March and 23 June 2019 Local Elections. In our study, we used the Istanbul election

results at the neighborhood level. The focus of the report is on (i) vote transitions in Istanbul

and (ii) election participation of party bases. We have strengthened the reliability of the

findings in the study with comparisons at the neighborhood.

Main findings:

• Imamoğlu received the support of the majority of the electorate who voted for the CHP, the

İyi Parti and the HDP in the March elections. This support has gained strength in the June

elections.

• A significant number of voters who voted for Binali Yıldırım in the March Elections voted for

Ekrem İmamoğlu in the repeated June elections.

• In March 2019 elections, less than half of MHP voters voted for Binali Yıldırım. In June, this

support was further weakened and only a third of MHP electorate voted for Binali Yıldırım.

The majority of MHP electorate voted in favor of Ekrem İmamoğlu in the second election.

• A significant portion of the electorate who voted for the Ak Parti (3,5% according to our vote

transition model) voted for İmamoğlu in June.

• According to the March elections, most of the valid votes increased in June were in favor of

Imamoglu and the majority of this electorate is consisted of the electorate who voted for the

HDP and İyi Parti in the 2018 General Elections.

• The Saadet Parti electorate, who supported their candidates in the March elections, voted in

favor of İmamoğlu in the June elections.

We applied the same methods that Çilek Ağacı used in the previous elections for the vote transition

analysis. You can find the data and code that we use in our study on our GitHub website.

http://cilekagaci.com/


2.7.2. Vote Exchanges Between Parties and Candidates


In both local elections, the majority of the votes received by Binali Yıldırım came from the voters who

voted in favor of the Ak Parti in the 2018 General Elections. In the March 2019 Local

Elections, Yıldırım received the support of only less than half of the voters who voted for the

MHP in 2018. This support further weakened in the June elections in Istanbul. In 2018, the

majority of voters who voted for the CHP, HDP and İyi Parti supported Ekrem İmamoğlu in the

March 2019 Local Elections. This support strengthened in June for these three parties and

reached almost all of the electorate. While the Saadet Parti voters supported their own

candidates in the March 2019 Local Elections, almost half of the same voters voted in favor

of İmamoğlu in the June elections. Imamoğlu managed to convince 3.5 percent of Ak Parti

voters in the second election.


2.7.3. Vote Change of Ekrem İmamoğlu at the Neighborhood Level


Even if we assume that all voters who did not vote in the Istanbul March elections but went to the

polls in June voted for Ekrem İmamoğlu and that all the votes lost by candidates other than

Binali Yıldırım were also casted for Ekrem İmamoğlu, it is not possible to explain the increase

in İmamoğlu's votes without passing of the votes from Yıldırım. Because almost all the dots

representing the neighborhoods are located above the dashed x = y line. This is an

observation that supports the findings in our vote transitions analysis.

2.7.4. Political Party Components of Ekrem İmamoğlu's Vote Increase

In light of the forecasts of the vote transitions between the 2018 General Elections and the March

2019 and June 2019 Local Elections, we calculated from which party voters the increased

support in favor of Ekrem İmamoğlu arises from March to June.5 According to the party

preferences in the 2018 General Elections, the biggest share of İmamoğlu's renewed election

success belongs to the İyi Parti and HDP voters who are better mobilized in the June elections

and whose rates of going to the ballot box have increased. In the renewed election, Imamoğlu

received form the Ak Part voters a considerable support. Finally, the 10 point difference

emerged due to the additional support from the SP, MHP, and CHP voters.

5 In order to make this account, we assumed that the voters who casted a vote for Ekrem İmamoğlu in the March elections

used the same vote in the June elections. The accuracy of our estimates will vary depending on the accuracy of

this assumption.


In the analysis, which we perform almost in every election, we observed such a clear voter shift

between the polarized blocs. We will observe in the forthcoming days, if these voter shifts,

which emerged in a relatively short time, will reveal a positive change in Turkish politics.

2.8. Analysis on the Basis of Istanbul Neighborhoods

Immediately after the election of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on 23 June, the public started

to share maps showing which alliances led in the districts. The big change between the two

maps gave the clue that the difference of votes between the two elections could have been

due to the shifting of voters' preference in different directions throughout the province rather

than in a few districts.

After our district-based analyzes, we wanted to look at the changes between the two elections at the

neighborhood level. Since the votes were not distributed homogeneously in the districts, we

prepared the distribution of votes, participation and other maps in the smallest

administrative unit possible on the basis of neighborhoods. At the same time, we created the

cartograms that we frequently used in our previous election analyzes based on the number

of neighborhood voters.

When we look at the same distribution on the basis of neighborhoods, we see that İmamoğlu and

Yıldırım, the candidates of the alliances, lead in some neighborhoods in the districts, where

they lost the election.

31 March 2019 23 June 2019


2.8.1. Vote Distribution of Municipal Assembly

We examined the distribution of the votes of the Municipal Assembly in the neighborhoods based on

the data of 31 March 2019 Local Elections.

In the metropolitan cities, the General Assembly is calculated with the d’Hondt system, after the 31

March elections, according to unofficial calculations, about 180 of the 312 members who

will take part in the assembly with the president will be members of the Cumhur Alliance and

around 130 of the Millet Alliance. Therefore, even if the Millet Alliance leads in the votes of

the Metropolitan Municipality, this situation will not be reflected in the number of members

of the Provincial Assembly.

In the Municipal Assembly vote distributions, the Ak Parti received 46 percent of the votes, while the

CHP received 39 percent. The other parties of the alliances, the MHP received 2 percent,

whereas the İyi Parti 3 percent of the votes.

Before going into detail in terms of the distribution of these votes and in which neighborhoods the

parties are strong, we share the map showing the first-ranked party in each neighborhood.

23 June 2019 İBB election

Candidate, who received the most votes in neighborhoods


When we look side by side to see the general picture of the parties' own distribution of votes, we see

that the CHP is strong in the central districts of Istanbul as well as the two periphery districts

like Silivri and Çatalca, on the coastal line of Bakırköy and the following, on the coastal parts

of the Anatolian side and Sarıyer.

Parties with the highest votes in the neighborhoods according to the Municipal

Assembly votes of the 31 March 2019 Local Election


The other party of the Millet Alliance, the İyi Parti, made its presence felt in the assembly votes in

districts on the Anatolian side, such as Şile and Beykoz, as well as in districts such as

Kağıthane and Arnavutköy, where the CHP couldn’t make its presence felt.

31 March 2019 Local Elections – Municipal Assembly votes - CHP

31 March 2019 Local Elections – Municipal Assembly votes – İyi Parti


While the Ak Parti did not nominate candidates in Silivri, Beşiktaş and Maltepe, we see the votes of

the MHP, the other component of the Cumhur Alliance, in these regions. While the Ak Parti

received a high percentage of votes throughout Istanbul, it is noteworthy that the most

powerful regions are the new districts of the city.

The MHP received its highest rate of votes in Maltepe’s neighboorhods above the E-5.

Finally, when we look at the HDP assembly vote distribution, we see that some neighborhoods of

Sultanbeyli and Arnavutköy, which form a separate cluster due to their unique structure in

31 March 2019 Local Elections – Municipal Assembly votes – Ak Parti

31 March 2019 Local Elections – Municipal Assembly Votes – MHP


our district cluster analysis, make up the regions where the HDP receives the highest

percentage of votes.

2.8.2. Participation and Invalid Votes

In the process after the March 31 election, invalid votes were discussed. In the informal results which

we got immediately after the June 23 elections do not include the information of ‘casted

votes’, it has only the information ‘valid votes.’ For this reason, we cannot compare invalid

votes directly on the basis of the neighborhood.

We calculated turnotu by proportioning the valid votes to the number of voters, so we found out a

lower rate than actual participation.

The rate of invalid votes across Istanbul seems to have decreased by 1.5 points compared to the

previous election. The presence of only one ballot paper may explain the low rate of invalid

votes in the 23 June elections. While the invalid votes were 3.6 percent on 31 March, this

rate was 2 percent on 23 June.

Although the turnout rate has not increased significantly (from 83.8 percent to 84.4 percent), the

fact that the total number of votes increased considerably is due to the change in the invalid

votes.

31 March 2019 Local Elections – Municipal Assembly votes – HDP


When we look on the basis of neighborhoods, we see that the neighborhoods with low turnout rates

are either in the districts or in the city center, in Fatih. Since the turnout rates are reflected

in this map as a percentage, that few people go/not go to the polls in neighborhoods where

there is a small number of voters (for example, Fatih - Sarıdemir Neighborhood 10 registered

voters) may cause to appear as if there is big changes in the percentage of neighborhood

turnout.

23 June 2019 Local Elections – Participation Rates

31 March- 23 June 2019 Local Elections – Turnout Difference


As we mentioned earlier, we calculated the percentage of turnout of the 23 June voter turnout from

the proportioning of the valid votes to the number of voters, we made the same account for

the 31 March elections and looked at the difference between the two.

According to the previous election, the neighborhoods where turnout increased the most were the

coastal districts of Beşiktaş, Kadıköy and Bakırköy, while turnout in the districts in the

periphery decreased compared to 31 March.

2.8.3. İBB Vote Distributions

Ekrem İmamoğlu

At the beginning of the chapter, we shared the neighborhood map showing the first ranked candidate

in each neighborhood. We will give a detailed analysis of both candidates in this section.

In the map prepared according to the rates of votes which Ekrem İmamoğlu received in the March

31 elections, we see that the regions where he has been the most successful are Kadıköy,

Beşiktaş and Bakırköy, which exist since the oldest macroforms, in other words since the

oldest settlement areas of Istanbul.

From the peripheries of the Anatolian side and from the historical peninsula to the north, as we g oto

the old industrial zones and the newly developing districts, his rates of vote are relatively low.

The reason why we put both maps up and down is to emphasize the difference between the two

maps, which are formed with the same refractions and the same color scale. While Imamoğlu

had high vote rates in the same regions in both elections, it was the first finding that the

number of neighborhoods, which he received more than 50 percent of votes on 23 June,

increased considerably. In other words, while the general table does not change in the

distribution of votes, the rate of votes, which he received, increases on 23 June.


23 June 2019 Local Elections – Distribution of votes of Ekrem İmamoğlu

31 March 2019 Local Elections – Distribution of votes of Ekrem İmamoğlu


Cartogram

We prepared two separate cartograms based on all the voters of Istanbul and Imamoğlu's own voters.

In this method, which reshapes the boundaries of the neighborhood according to the number

of voters, the center becomes visible by getting rid of the administrative borders of the small

but dense neighborhoods, whereas the large-area but low-populated neighborhoods occupy

much less space.

The small differences between these two maps are due to the fact that the neighborhoods such as

Kadıköy, Beşiktaş, Bakırköy, where İmamoğlu voters are more intense, grow and the area

occupied by the neighborhoods where İmamoğlu receives less votes shrinks.

You will see a similar example of cartograms for Binali Yıldırım and the reason that the cartograms

are not very different from each other is because both candidates do not get their votes from

a certain region and they are not stuck in certain districts and neighborhoods. Therefore,

their votes are distributed in the same proportions as all Istanbul voters.


23 June 2019 – Distribution of votes Of Ekrem İmamoğlu

Cartogram formed according to total number of voters

23 June 2019 – Distribution of votes of Ekrem İmamoğlu

Cartogram formed according to the vote number of İmamoğlu


Binali Yıldırım

When we draw the same maps for Binali Yıldırım, the candidate of the Cumhur Alliance, we can say

that the total loss of votes was observed in the comparative maps between the two elections.

Yıldırım receives in the neighborhoods of the districts of Fatih, Eyüpsultan, Beyoğlu and

Kağıthane at higher rates votes, while receives the other majority of his votes from the

neighborhoods in the new development areas of Istanbul.

31 March 2019 Local Elections –Distribution of votes of Binali Yıldırım


Cartogram

When we construct the cartograms based on the number of voters of Yıldırım, , unlike the cartography

of the İmamoğlu voters, we see that the center districts such as Kadıköy, Beşiktaş are smaller

than total voter carthogram, and that the regions where Yıldırım receives has high rate of

votes such as Arnavutköy, Bağcılar, Çekmeköy, Sultangazi is bigger.

23 June 2019 Local Election – Distribution of votes of Binali Yıldırım


23 June 2019 – Distribution of votes for Binali Yıldırım

Cartogram formed according to the total number of voters

Cartogram formed according to the vote number of Yıldırım


Finally, if we look at the change in their votes of both candidates from March 31 to June 23, we see

two very different tables.

While Yıldırım seems to have lost votes in almost every neighborhood, İmamoğlu has increased his

votes in almost every neighborhood. Imamoğlu's vote rates in central districts, which are

already high, rose slightly compared to the previous election, while in the districts in the

periphery, the vote rate increased around 20 percent.

Yıldırım maintained his vote rate in districts, which we can describe as the second rig after the city

center such as Eyüpsultan, Arnavutkoy, Çekmeköy, Sultanbeyli, Ümraniye, while he

experienced the vote loss in the outermost districts and central neighborhoods at a higher

rate.

31 March - 23 June 2019 Local Elections – Difference of Ekrem İmamoğlu’s votes


31 March - 23 June 2019 Local Elections – Difference of Binali Yıldırım’s votes


3. 23 JUNE VOTER PROFILES

We tried to present a voter profile based on the data that corresponds to the poll results of the

Istanbul-specific Barometer survey we conducted one week before the Istanbul Metropolitan

Municipality elections on 23 June. During and after the election process, it was evaluated on

the basis of estimation, from which clusters Imamoglu and Yıldırım received votes, or which

candidate increased its vote in which cluster. However, by looking at the data of the 3

different surveys we conducted prior to 23 June, we tried to examine how the candidates'

vote in different clusters have changed and whether the voter profiles have changed in time.

These surveys were conducted on January 19-20, when the candidates were certain yet, on

23-24 March, one week before the 31st March elections, and on 15-16 June one week before

the June 23rd election.

However, we will conduct this analysis of voter profiles based on general political preferences for the

first time. Based on the question ‘Who would you vote for if there were a GENERAL Election

today?’ we tried to reveal the relationship between the preferences for the IBB (Istanbul

Metropolitan Municipality) candidate and party preferences.


3.1. Change in Preferences in Istanbul Based on Political Preferences

The most obvious change is among MHP Partisans

Regarding this course, which is based on three different studies, the most important thing to draw

attention is related to MHP voters. Because, when we compare the fieldwork conducted

before 31 March with the study conducted before 23 June, we see that the rate of the votes

going from the MHP partisans to İmamoğlu has increased from 11 percent to 28 percent.

Even among Ak Parti voters, we see that the number of those who indicate that they are undecided

as the election approaches, increases. In all other voter groups, the rate of Ekrem İmamoğlu

increases visibly. On the other hand, Binali Yıldırım's vote remains at the same level in 3

different measurements. Even among those who say that they are undecided or non-voter,

there is a remarkable increase in the votes of the candidate of the Millet Alliance.

13

17

18

18

24

24

5

4

7

2

2

6

57

76

75

1

1

2

90

93

95

41

40

41

30

17

10

40

29

18

90

87

77

91

89

53

28

11

11

94

94

95

3

2

2

49

43

34

5

4

4

1

3

5

0

1

3

2

26

4

0

0

1

1

2

4

52

62

69

41

44

54

5

7

13

7

7

15

15

12

10

5

5

2

7

5

3

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

No

n-

vo

ter

Sw

ing

vo

ter

İyi P

art

iH

DP

MH

PC

HP

Ak

Pa

rti

İsta

nb

ul

IBB Candidate Preference According to the Political Preference

Binali Yıldırım Ekrem İmamoğlu Other No answer


The difference of HDP voters between January and March reveals a very striking picture. Before the

decision to support Imamoğlu, only 53 percent supported him, while this rate has increased

to 90 percent in the survey.

When we examine the candidate preferences according to the size of the party voters, it can be seen

below that the playmaker feature of the HDP electorate becomes evident.

The size of those who stated that they were undecided in their general political preference and that

they would cast a vote for İmamoğlu in the election of IBB was twice the size of those who

said that they would cast a vote for Yıldırım.

The most critical actor was the HDP

When we do the same analysis on the basis alliances, a picture like the one below appears. While

the cluster comprised of Millet alliance and the HDP cast a vote for their candidate

completely, we found out that those who did not vote for Yıldırım in the Cumhur Alliance were

quite visible.

2

1

36

4

1

9

1

31

1

1

4

1

2

3

0 10 20 30 40 50

Non-voter

Swing voter

Other parties

İyi Parti

HDP

MHP

CHP

Ak Parti

IBB Candidate Profile According to Political Preference


2

1

38

4

41

2

1

4

3

0 10 20 30 40 50

Non voter

Swing voter

Other parties

Millet Alliance + HDP

Cumhur Alliance

IBB Candidate Profile According to Basis Alliances

Binali Yıldırım Ekrem İmamoğlu Other Swing / Non voter / No answer


When we examine how the political preference changes according to the preference of the candidate,

we can see that Yıldırım has become stuck with his party's voters over time.

Increase of the Ak Parti partisans who voted for Yıldırım and Increase of Ak Parti partisans among

Swing voters

We can see a similar situation like the one of Yıldırım electorate among swing voters. Among those

who say they are undecided about the election of the IBB candidacy, the Ak Parti vote rate is

seen to have increased up to a quarter over time. While the indecision of all other voter

groups has diminished, a picture appears as if the hesitation of the Ak Parti regarding IBB

election has continued.

Through this graph, we can see once again that a significant portion of MHP voters t has given up

supporting Binali Yıldırım, especially at the last stage.

3.2. Change in Preferences in Istanbul According to Demographic Clusters

We tried to analyze how this course moves in different demographic clusters as well as the

preferences of Istanbul Mayor Candidate according to general political preferences. We

examined how the candidate preference in different clusters changed, and tried to

understand whether the profiles of candidate voter groups have changed in the past 6

months.

25

11

8

0

3

1

2

90

76

67

40

14

8

2

5

5

64

54

58

1

1

33

3

0

2

1

1

2

3

10

14

2

0

6

49

18

15

13

1

1

10

1

3

4

3

2

14

11

40

48

71

13

22

24

9

11

11

5

10

12

11

12

21

9

17

11

6

2

2

2

1

2

3

2

% 0 % 50 % 100

Haz.

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

İstanbul

Sw

ing

vo

ter

Oth

er

E.

İma

mo

ğlu

B.

Yıld

ırım

Political preference according to the IBB candidate preference

Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP İyi Parti Other parties Swing voter Non-voter


When we look at the different groups according to many different cleavages, it is necessary to point

out first the prevailing situation in general: Binali Yıldırım’s vote is not differentiated in the

three different studies in a significant part of the social clusters; however, we find that

İmamoğlu's vote has increased. In other words, Imamoglu did not only increase his votes in

certain clusters, but he put forth a widespread increase in general.

3.2.1. Gender

First of all, we can see the situation mentioned above in terms of gender. Yıldırım’s vote among both

women and men remained at the level of January. Imamoglu has increased his vote among

both men and women.

When we do this analysis in reverse, in other words, when we examine the gender distribution of the

voters supporting the candidates, we can say that there is no significant difference in the

voter profile of the two candidates.

40

37

42

41

43

41

41

40

41

49

46

35

49

41

33

49

43

34

1

2

5

1

1

3

1

2

4

9

14

18

9

15

22

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

Ma

les

Fe

ma

les

İsta

nb

ul

IBB Candidate Preference according to the Gender

Binali Yıldırım Ekrem İmamoğlu Other Swing/Nonvoter/No ans


3.2.2. Age Groups

Imamoğlu effect in young people

When we examine the change in candidate preferences in three different age groups, we can see

that İmamoğlu increased his vote in all three groups. Especially among young people, his vote

has increased from 37 percent to 58 percent. On the other hand, Binali Yiıldırım is equally

preferred in all clusters at the beginning of the year, while he can maintain the same rate

only among those who are 49 years and older. On the other hand, his vote among young

people in the 18-32 age group decreased from 36 percent to 30 percent.

51

53

60

38

39

38

51

48

48

53

54

49

50

49

47

40

63

61

62

49

52

52

47

46

51

50

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

İstanbul

Sw

ing

vote

rO

the

r

Ekre

m

İma

mo

ğlu

Bin

ali

Yıld

ırım

Gender according to the IBB candidate preference

Female Male


The age distribution differs among candidate voter groups. The voters of Imamoğlu seem a bit

younger than Istanbul’s average. Binali Yıldırım receives more votes in the cluster of old

people.

47

43

47

42

43

42

36

34

36

41

40

41

33

41

33

33

41

33

37

48

37

49

43

34

2

3

2

4

2

4

7

2

7

1

2

4

17

13

17

21

15

21

21

16

21

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

49

+ a

ge

s

33

- 4

8

age

s

18

- 3

2

age

sİs

tan

bu

l

IBB candidate preference according to age groups

Binali Yıldırım Ekrem İmamoğlu Other Swing voter

32

35

34

25

28

52

39

35

37

25

27

31

32

38

37

41

38

30

32

33

34

35

42

39

37

37

30

28

26

38

42

16

28

30

28

34

35

32

31

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

İstanbul

Sw

ing

vo

ter

Oth

er

E.

İma

mo

ğl

u

B.

Yıld

ırım

Age distribution according to the IBB candidate preference

18 - 32 ages 33 - 48 ages 49+ ages


3.2.3. Education Level

The change in these clusters, which are determined by the level of school they have recently

completed, is in line with the general political preference you follow from the Barometer

surveys.

The rate of those who prefer İmamoğlu is higher in the higher education group than lower education

groups just like the CHP voters, and has increased within 6 months. Among the university

graduates that constitute 24 percent of Istanbul's adult population, the rate of those who say

that they will vote for Ekrem İmamoğlu seems to have risen from 48 percent to 64 percent.

Yıldırım’s vote decreased in the cluster, in which he is strong

Yıldırım receives more votes from those who have an education level less than high school. However,

the situation that we mentioned at the beginning is also seen in the low educated people

where Yıldırım is strong; Yıldırım's vote remained the same or slightly changed in all education

groups within a 6-month period. On the other hand, Imamoğlu's vote increases in all 3

clusters with the decreasing rate of swing voters as the election approaches.

When we examine the profiles in terms of education level, we can say that Imamoğlu has a slightly

more educated voter profile compared to the general Istanbul population. On the other hand,

while 46 percent of Istanbul is consisting of those who have an education level less than high

school, we can say that 60 percent of those who say that they will vote for Yıldırım are in this

group.

23

26

26

38

38

36

49

48

52

41

40

41

64

56

48

50

48

36

39

35

26

49

43

34

1

2

6

0

2

5

1

2

3

1

2

4

11

16

19

11

13

22

11

15

19

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

Un

ive

rsit

y

Hig

h

sch

oo

l

Le

ss t

ha

n

hig

h

sch

oo

lİs

tan

bu

l

IBB candidate preference according to the education level

Binali Yıldırım Ekrem İmamoğlu Other Swing voter


The education profile of the swing voter is a bit more like the voter profile of Yıldırım. The reason for

this may be attributed to the fact that Ak Parti voters, who are likely to support Yıldırım in this

election, have continued their indecision.

3.2.4. Employment status

Another parameter where differentiation is observed is the employment status of the people. First of

all, we observe that Yıldırım's votes remained at a fixed point in all 3 researches and

Imamoğlu has increased his votes in all of them.

The housewives make up the cluster, from which Yıldırım received the most votes. We know from the

Barometer Survey that housewives, which account for more than a quarter of Istanbul's

population, support the Ak Parti and Erdoğan more than other clusters. However, when we

compare three researches, we see that even though Yıldırım has the superiority in the cluster

of housewives, İmamoğlu has increased his vote from 22 percent to 35 percent.

45

49

47

63

58

31

37

40

36

57

58

60

46

31

27

31

13

23

35

32

33

32

29

28

26

31

25

23

21

25

19

33

32

27

33

14

13

14

24

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

İstanbul

Sw

ing

vo

ter

Oth

er

E.

İma

mo

ğlu

B.

Yıld

ırım

Educationlevel according to the IBB candidate preference

Less than high school High school University


It should be noted that 6 months ago Yıldırım had superiority over Imamoglu in the clusters of workers

and retirees, but first as 31 March approaches and then as 23 June approaches he fell

behind his opponent in these clusters. These two groups can be defined as the social clusters

in which the Ak Parti is strong.

Imamoğlu made a difference among students

The cluster in which Imamoğlu has the highest presence is the cluster of white-collar employees,

including civil servants, private sector employees and self-employed. However, especially

after March, İmamoğlu had a strong dominance among the students who make up about 10

percent of the population of Istanbul. Especially undecided students stated that their

preferences were İmamoğlu when the election approached.

28

34

34

28

31

32

51

52

53

41

37

42

42

40

45

30

31

30

41

40

41

58

47

44

59

54

35

35

30

22

47

47

39

49

44

32

59

52

46

49

43

34

1

1

3

1

2

9

1

2

3

1

2

2

1

2

5

0

2

4

1

2

4

13

18

19

12

13

25

13

16

22

11

13

16

9

14

18

11

15

19

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

Un

em

plo

y

ed

Stu

de

nt

Ho

use

wif

eR

eti

ree

Wo

rke

r,

tra

de

sm

a

n, fa

rme

r

Wh

ite

co

lla

r

em

plo

yee

İsta

nb

ul

IBB candidate preference according to employment status



Another cluster in which İmamoğlu has increased his vote recently is the unemployed, whose rates

are between 6-8 percent in the adult population. Among the unemployed people, the

undecided ones have started to prefer İmamoğlu after 31 March.

3.2.5. Income level

In addition to employment status, when we examine household income groups, we see that as

education and income level increases and with good working conditions, the tendency to vote

for İmamoğlu increases. When we look at the top 3 income groups, we see that not only those

who prefer İmamoğlu are more, but also that İmamoğlu increases his vote within these

clusters within the 6-month frame.

20

21

22

8

25

22

26

25

30

16

16

16

21

21

22

20

25

20

29

26

24

22

27

23

25

26

12

12

10

17

13

7

12

14

15

13

12

13

13

33

31

32

29

28

19

20

20

17

36

37

33

28

8

8

11

8

9

18

9

11

10

5

7

7

7

6

6

5

8

3

4

7

6

8

4

4

5

6

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

İstanbul

Sw

ing v

ote

rO

the

rE

. İm

am

oğlu

B.

Yıld

ırım

Employment status according to the IBB candidate preference

High level Worker, tradesman, farmer Retired Housewife Student Unemployed


As income increases, İmamoğlu’s vote increases; however Imamoğlu’s vote increase in the low-

income cluster, too

Yıldırım's dominance in lower income groups in January seems to have decreased according to the

next two surveys. The analysis on the basis of the socio-economic status of the districts points

to a similar finding in our ballot box analysis section.

28

27

27

37

30

35

44

42

41

42

46

47

41

41

44

48

33

41

41

40

41

62

62

53

54

55

45

49

45

35

45

36

29

44

41

32

34

44

26

49

43

34

0

1

8

0

3

6

1

2

5

1

2

4

2

1

2

0

1

2

1

2

4

9

10

13

9

13

14

7

11

20

13

16

20

13

16

22

18

22

31

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

80

01

TL

an

d a

bo

ve

50

01

-

80

00

TL

30

01

-

50

00

TL

20

01

-

30

00

TL

12

01

-

20

00

TL

12

00

TL

an

d b

elo

wİs

tan

bu

l

IBB Candidate preference according to household income



3.2.6. Lifestyle Clusters

In addition to basic demographic cleavages such as education, employment status or income, we

observe much more significant changes when we look at the parameters that describe rater

the identity of people such as lifestyle, religiousness or ethnic identity.

First of all, when we look at the lifestyle clusters, with which people describe themselves, we can say

that Yıldırım increased its vote slightly in the last stage among the Religious Conservatives

where Yıldırım is the most powerful. However, it is possible to see that even among the

Religious Conservatives, where the Ak Parti, and therefore Yıldırım, is strong, İmamoğlu has

increased his votes.

There is a lifestyle differentiation; however, there are also common areas

When we look at the distribution of candidate voters to the lifestyle clusters, we can clearly see how

the two voter groups differentiate. Among the voters of Yıldırım, there is a high rate of those

who define themselves as Religious Conservatives, and among those of Imamoglu who

define themselves as Modern. However, based on this observation, it would be wrong to say

that the voter groups of the two candidates have completely different lifestyles. Over 10

percent of the Yıldırım voters identify themselves as Modern, while 10 percent of Imamoglu

voters identify themselves as Religious Conservative.

70

58

63

49

46

50

18

25

27

3

10

6

41

40

41

20

27

17

39

37

25

70

60

50

91

72

67

49

43

34

1

4

2

1

2

4

1

4

0

3

13

1

2

4

9

12

19

11

16

22

11

14

19

6

15

14

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

De

vou

tR

eligio

us

Be

lie

ve

r

No

n-

be

lie

ve

rİs

tan

bu

l

IBB Candidate Preference according to the lifestyle clusters



3.2.7. Religiousness

In addition to the lifestyle, we have included in our Istanbul research the question of the felt level of

religiousness that we ask people in every study. As the level of religiousness increases, we

can say that Yıldırım's vote increases clearly. As it can be seen in the following graph, the

cluster that we describe as ‘unbeliever’ as ‘they do not believe in the requirements of the

religion’, constitutes 6 percent of the population of Istanbul. Within this cluster, the rate of

those who state that they would vote for Yıldırım is 3 percent. On the other hand, the cluster

which fulfills all the requirements of religion and which we call ‘devout’ is above 10 percent.

However, unlike the non-believers' relationship with Yıldırım, one fifth of the devouts stated

that they would vote for İmamoğlu. In addition, in the cluster that describes itself as a

believer, Yıldırım's loss of votes can be observed clearly.

35

29

29

13

23

38

54

49

57

12

15

13

35

49

46

51

33

28

42

35

37

32

47

45

51

41

16

23

19

54

45

20

10

14

11

41

39

36

24

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

Janaury

June

March

January

June

March

January

İstanbul

Sw

ing

vo

ter

Oth

er

E.

İma

mo

ğl

u

B.

Yıld

ırım

Distribution of lifestyle clusters according to the preference of the IBB

Candidate

Modern Traditional Conservative Religious Conservative


70

58

63

49

46

50

18

25

27

3

10

6

41

40

41

20

27

17

39

37

25

70

60

50

91

72

67

49

43

34

1

4

2

1

2

4

0

1

4

0

3

13

1

2

4

9

12

19

11

16

22

11

14

19

6

15

14

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

De

vou

tR

eligio

us

Be

lie

ve

r

No

n-

be

lie

ve

rİs

tan

bu

l

IBB Candidate Preference according to the lifestyle clusters


7

4

3

9

21

11

9

14

1

1

6

27

23

26

4

9

29

37

34

42

12

15

19

26

58

62

61

83

55

45

46

48

38

70

64

63

57

9

11

9

13

25

4

4

8

6

19

19

17

11

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

İstanbul

Sw

ing

vo

ter

Oth

er

E.

İma

mo

ğl

u

B.

Yıld

ırım

Religiousness level according to the IBB candidate preference

Nonbeliever Believer Religious Devout


3.2.8. Ethnicity

The Ak Parti could not move Kurds’ votes

It would not be wrong to argue that one of the most decisive actors in the 31 March and 23 June

elections was Kurdish voters. It is possible to observe that the Cumhur Alliance, which has

tried to receive the vote of the Kurds, more than half of whom are HDP voters, did not get a

good result from this effort. Yıldırım could not increase his vote among Kurds in 6 months,

while unable to increase; there has been a significant increase in the vote to Imamoğlu.

Kurds’ support to Imamoğlu increased further after March 31

At the beginning of the election process for March 31, half of the Kurds, one third of whom had not

yet decided on one of the two candidates, said that just before March 31 they would vote for

İmamoğlu, while before 23 June 62 percent stated they would vote for Ekrem İmamoğlu. In

other words, after the decision to repeat the elections, the supporters of İmamoğlu among

Kurds increased. A similar observation can be drawn from the graph below showing the

ethnic distribution of the candidates' voters. As you can see, the rate of Kurds among those

who say that they will vote for İmamoğlu seems to have increased at every stage.

27

31

33

66

46

73

36

41

26

27

26

26

43

43

45

41

40

41

59

53

39

22

15

7

61

50

50

62

56

38

45

40

33

49

43

34

0

4

5

6

8

3

0

0

12

1

3

12

1

2

2

1

2

4

14

11

23

6

31

17

3

9

12

10

14

24

11

15

19

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

Januay

Oth

er

Ara

bZ

aza

Ku

rdis

hTu

rkis

hİs

tan

bu

l

IBB Candidate preference according to ethnicity



3.2.9. Religion / sect

In order to understand the preferences of Alevis, which make up 5 per cent of the society and which

are the other big minority in Turkey’s society, we look at candidate preferences on the basis

of religion/sect differentiation.

80

78

75

75

63

44

72

72

75

84

84

84

78

16

16

18

17

27

47

22

22

18

12

11

10

17

8

3

3

5

8

6

3

5

5

2

3

4

3

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

İstanbul

Sw

ing

vo

ter

Oth

er

E.

İma

mo

ğlu

B.

Yıld

ırım

Ethnic Identity distribution according to IBB candidates

Turkish Kurdish Zaza Arab Other


Barometer surveys show that Alevis are already largely CHP supporters. Within this framework, it is

predictable that they support İmamoğlu. However, even among the Alevis, the vote of

Imamoğlu has risen from 77 percent to 87 percent, revealing a striking picture.

Among Sunni Muslims, which make up the majority of Istanbul at 90 percent as is the case in Turkey,

Yıldırım has lost 4 points from January to June.

8

12

12

6

6

7

44

44

48

41

40

41

80

63

60

87

82

77

44

39

28

49

43

34

4

7

1

4

1

2

4

1

2

4

12

21

21

6

11

12

11

15

20

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

Diğ

er

Ale

vi

Mu

slim

Su

nn

i

Mu

slim

İsta

nb

ul

IBB Candidate Preference according to the religious sect



3.2.10. Place of birth

We should look at the change from March 31 to June 23 not only based on demographic structures

or identities of people, but also based on birthplaces because of their importance in terms of

situatedness and identity. In this context, we divided the place of birth of the interviewees

into regions and looked at how the votes of those, who were born in these regions, have

changed from January to June.

Firstly, when we look at the distribution of birth places, we see that 36 percent of those living in

Istanbul were born in Istanbul, 21 percent come from the East and West Black Sea, and 24

percent come from 3 Eastern regions.

In our analysis on the basis of the place of birth, we actually encounter a situation parallel to the

previous general finding. Among those who were born in 12 different regions, we do not

observe a region, in which Yıldırım has increased his vote significantly. Among those born in

Western and Central Anatolia, we can say that there is a slight increase in Yıldırım’s vote, but

Imamoglu has increased his vote as much as Yıldırım among those groups.

2

9

8

7

9

12

6

3

2

3

2

2

36

0 20 40

Abroad

Southeast Anatolian

Middleeast Anatolian

Northeast Anatolian

East Black Sea

West Black Sea

Central Anatolian

Mediterrenean

Western Anatolia

Easter Anatolia

Aegean

Western Marmara

İstanbul

Distribution of those who live in Istanbul according to regions


27

55

31

34

31

34

45

38

56

58

50

53

55

50

33

46

54

44

36

45

26

25

21

26

36

37

57

21

57

29

59

39

42

33

29

27

36

25

34

32

60

37

40

35

51

34

62

53

71

52

53

37

0

0

1

14

5

1

6

2

1

1

3

4

1

0

4

2

2

0

3

4

16

23

11

24

10

22

12

22

15

12

13

21

8

14

6

16

6

17

13

19

12

20

8

19

11

22

%0 %50 %100

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

June

Jan

Ab

roa

d

So

uth

e

ast

A.

Ce

ntr

al

ea

st

A.

No

rth

ea

st

A.

Ea

st

Bla

ck

Se

a

We

ste

r

n B

lack

Se

a

Ce

ntr

al

An

ato

li

a

Me

dit

er

ren

ea

n

We

ste

r

n

An

ato

li

a

Ea

ste

rn

Ma

rma

r

aA

ege

an

We

st

Ma

rma

r

aİs

tan

bu

l

IBB Candidate Preference According to the Place of Birth



3.3. Candidate Preference Based on Media and Social Media Preferences

3.3.1. News to follow on TV channel

We state in the different Barometer reports that the preferences of the people regarding the media,

especially the TV channel preferred for following the news, are highly determinative in terms

of political preferences. In this context, when we examine the candidate preference according

to the channels, we see a situation parallel to the general political preference.

Among those who prefer the pro-government TV channels such as A Haber, ATV, TRT, the tendency

to vote for Yıldırım is both much higher than the average and viewers of other channels.

The viewer cluster that İmamoğlu received more votes than Yıldırım is limited to Fox TV and Halk TV.

CNNTürk, for which we can claim that the audience profile changed after the transfer to the

Demirören group, had initially a much more opposing profile. In terms of preference for the

Istanbul elections, İmamoğlu has superiority among the viewers of this channel, although not

as much as in Fox TV and Halk TV, whose viewers are predominantly opposed. Those who do

not watch the news on television show a more opposing image than the average of Istanbul.

At this point, it is necessary to conduct this analysis together with the size of the audience of the

channels. Again, we know from the Barometer surveys that the rate of following the news

broadcasts other than Fox TV has experienced a significant decrease especially in the last

one year. As can be seen on the graph above, 35 percent of respondents say they watch the

news on Fox TV. Thirty one out of this 35 said that they would vote for Imamoglu.

1

5

20

37

44

47

49

60

63

72

81

90

94

88

61

52

41

34

39

23

27

11

8

4

1

3

2

2

1

1

1

1

5

7

16

11

14

17

10

16

9

17

10

5

%0 %50 %100

Halk TV

Fox TV

Don't…

CNN Türk

Star TV

NTV

Haber Türk

Show TV

Kanal D

TRT

ATV

A Haber

Candidate Preference according to the TV channel to follow the News



On the other hand, 32 percent of the Istanbul population states that they watch the news on TRT,

ATV and A Haber, although we have stated that the ratings have decreased. Twenty six

percent of the 41 percent (those who stated that they would vote for Yıldırım), are viewers of

these channels.

3.3.2. Social Media

Another parameter that manifests variability in political preferences is the use of social media. Before

examining the candidate preferences of social media users, it is useful to determine at what

rate these channels are followed in the country and by the population of Istanbul.

Internet penetration, which is 76 percent throughout the country, is above 80 percent in Istanbul.

More than half of those living in Istanbul use Instagram and more than a quarter use Twitter.

2

2

1

1

1

1

2

2

5

13

8

3

31

5

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

2

0 10 20 30 40

Halk TV

Fox TV

Don't watch

CNN Türk

Star TV

NTV

Haber Türk

Show TV

Kanal D

TRT

ATV

A Haber

Candidate Preference according to the TV channel to follow the News


24

5

19

31

44

41

61

14

7

26

35

50

52

63

0 20 40 60 80

Don't use internet

Don't use social media

Twitter

Youtube

Facebook

Instagram

Whatsapp

Social media usage rates in Istanbul

Istanbul

Turkey


Twitter users are one of the clusters that support İmamoğlu at most. In January, 53 per cent of the

Twitter users stated that they would vote for Imamoğlu and thiis support for the Millet Alliance

candidate increased up to 65 percent before June 23.

The cluster having the most parallel distribution with the general preference is comprised of

Facebook users. Among Instagram users, whose average age is younger, it is possible to see

İmamoğlu weight, even if not as much as Twitter.

Those who do not use the Internet are one of the rare clusters, in which Yıldırım’s vote increased

Among 14 percent of non-Internet users, Yıldırım receives much higher votes. Another feature of

those who do not use the Internet is the fact that it makes up one of the rare clusters where

the vote of Yıldırım increases in a 2-month frame. At this point, it should be noted that 26

percent of those who do not use the Internet are Fox TV viewer, while 45 percent follow the

news on the ATV, A News or TRT. In other words, we can argue that there is a relationship

between not using the internet and being pro-government or at least following news from pro-

government channels.

51

47

34

36

25

30

39

37

41

40

35

32

57

49

65

53

52

47

49

43

1

2

0

2

1

2

0

2

1

2

13

19

10

13

10

15

9

14

9

15

%0 %50 %100

June

March

June

March

June

March

June

March

June

March

Do

no

t

use

Inte

rne

t

Insta

gra

mTw

itte

r

Fa

ce

bo

o

kİs

tan

bu

lIBB Candidate preference according to the use of social media



3.4. Basic Fİndings in Voter Profiles

Considering the analysis of the voter profiles of the candidates and the candidate preference in

different profiles together, which we reveal by comparing the data of 3 different Istanbul-

specific surveys conducted during the 31 March local elections and the subsequent Istanbul

elections, we reach the following findings:

• Binali Yıldırım's vote seems to have remained at the same fixed point before March 31 and

June 23 process. It is necessary to interpret this situation considering that the rate of swing

voters decreased at every stage. If his vote remains fixed in any way, when the rate swing

voters decreases, it means that the vote for Yıldırım has decreased. This situation occurs in

almost all social clusters. There are very rare social clusters in which Yıldırım has increased

his vote in this process.

• Imamoğlu's vote, on the other hand, has increased in all components of Istanbul residents

both before and after 31 March. Imamoğlu shows a visible increase especially among the

youth, students, and unemployed and most importantly among the Kurds.

• Binali Yıldırım's vote is in line with the Ak Parti vote in the Barometer data in demographic

clusters. As the education level and income level increases, his vote rate decreases. As age

and the level of religiousness increase, his vote increases, too.

• The rate of the Ak Parti voters, who were undecided about the candidate, is slightly and

gradually increasing in three studies. Therefore, the rate of preferring Yıldırım falls from 95

to 90 percent. Based on these data, we can argue that in addition to the increase in votes of

Imamoğlu, a group of Ak Parti partisans did not go to the polls.

• HDP voters have clearly supported İmamoğlu since March. When we look at all the findings

together, we can say that HDP partisans played a critical role in the Istanbul elections.

• A significant number of MHP voters seem to have given up to cast a vote for Yıldırım at the

last stage. However, it is difficult to say that they all preferred Imamoğlu.


4. EVALUATION

We must evaluate and interpret the repeated 23 June Istanbul Mayoral election results first by

recalling our findings and evaluations of the March 31 Local Election results and adding

today. Let us summarize the points and dynamics that determine the main characteristics

that we have identified in the April’19 Barometer and in our poll analysis report, which we

later announced to the public:

1. ‘First, although there is a small difference between the numerical results and the numerical

results of the 24 June 2018 General Elections, the political results produced by those small

numerical differences have been and will be much greater. We will see and discuss these

impacts in the coming days.’ It was quickly understood that this evaluation was also very

appropriate. The political consequences of today's picture have the potential to further enhance

these effects geometrically.

2. ‘Secondly, and more importantly, the Ak Parti lost its moral superiority to the opposition bloc for

the first time at the end of the 7 election rally in the last five years. For the first time, the

opposition bloc voters saw and felt that they can win in the election, cause the Ak Parti to go

back with their votes and win.’ More importantly, the incumbent bloc voters felt that they could

be defeated for the first time in 17 years of the Ak Parti rule.

As a matter of fact, according to our findings of the June’19 Barometer, those who pointed out

to the ‘opposition’ to respond to the question ‘who will win’ got ahead for the first time in KONDA

research since 2005. This moral superiority produced energy to the opposition bloc, while it

caused loss of energy in the incumbent bloc.

3. The opposition block was first consolidated on 31 March at the Istanbul Metropolitan

Municipality Elections. This consolidation continued and gained strenght on 23 June.

41,5 56,0

0 25 50 75 100

In your opinion, who will win the 23 June Istanbul Metropolitan

Municipality election?

Binali Yıldırım Ekrem İmamoğlu Other


Non-voter Invalid İncum-

bent bloc

Opposition

bloc HDP Other

Total

Voter

31 March Local Assembly 16.2 3.0 38.6 33.9 3.2 5.0 100.0

31 March İBB Mayorship 16.1 3.0 39.4 39.5 2.1 100.0

23 June İBB Mayorship 15.6 1.7 37.2 44.9 0.7 100.0

The table shows that the voters of the other parties, especially the HDP, other than the voters of

the two parties of the Cumhur Alliance, were lined up behind Imamoğlu, the candidate of the

opposition bloc on March 31, and even more strongly on June 23.

4. While the election system of the country has been based on representation until now, the system

that aims to win 50 + 1 percent of the vote (simple majority) as a result of the Semi-Presidential

System called ‘Cumhurbaşkanlığı Sistemi’ will produce changes in both blocks and the positions

and structures of the parties. Either alliances or consolidation will be strengthened and the

political system will be transformed into a dual game (power x opposition axis) and the party

system will turn into a tripartite social structure (conservatives x secularists x Kurds). In this

respect, June 23 results can be considered as the first costume rehearsal.

5. The actual meaning of the results of the 31 March and 23 June elections comes out when we

compare it to the June 24 General Election numerical table. As can be seen in the table below,

it is estimated in the votes of Local Assembly, the Cumhur Alliance lost 5.1 points in total and

the HDP lost 5.4 points from the June 24 votes. However, it seems that these lost votes did not

turn to the Millet Alliance, and that the Millet Alliance increased its votes on June 24 by only 0.9

points. Nearly half of the lost votes are comprised of those who did not go to the polls, and the

other half was comprised by the votes of voters who shifted towards other parties.

When the same calculation is made by comparing the votes of the Mayors and the votes of 24

June General Election, we see that there is a decrease of 5.8 points in the Cumhur Alliance votes

and 7.2 points in the HDP votes. This time the vote of the Millet Alliances’ Presidential

candidates increased by 3.9 points compared to June 24.

TURKEY

2019

Local

Council votes

2019

Mayor election

votes

2018

General

Elec.votes

2019

Local Council-

2018 Gen. El.

difference

2019

Mayor.-

2018 Gen.El.

difference

Non-voter 15.5 15.7 11.5 4.0 4.2

Invalid vote 3.5 3.2 1.8 1.7 1.4

Cumhur Alliance 41.2 40.5 46.3 -5,.1 -5.8

Millet Alliance 29.1 32.1 28.2 0.9 3.9

HDP 4.7 2.9 10.1 -5.4 -7.2

Other 6.1 5.5 1.8 4.3 3.7

Total 100.0 99.9 100.0 0.0 0.0


The comparison of the March 31 Local Elections with the June 24 votes indicated three important

dynamics: First, the incumbent bloc was losing votes, but despite this loss, it was still far ahead

of the Millet's Alliance. On the other hand, we observed that the HDP and other parties were also

included in the opposition bloc, which is the second important dynamic. The third important

dynamic revealed that the electorate of the incumbent bloc was disturbed, started to question

their parties, showed their doubt by not going to the polls, but was hesitant to shift towards the

opposition bloc. In a way, it was possible to say that the transition between the two blocks was

still very small, and even nonexistent.

We can understand based the findings that we will mention a little later that the inconvenience of

the electorate of the incumbent bloc has increased during the period of 23 June. In spite of

all these disturbances, the fact that the shift between the two blocks is still 1-2 points shows

the depth and intensity of the polarization.

Vote distributions Non-voter Invalid

Vote

İncumbent

Bloc

Opposition

Bloc HDP Other Total Voter

2018 General Election 11.6 1.4 44.3 30.0 11.0 1.7 100.0


tion

11.9 1.4 43.4 36.1 6.3 1.0 100.0

23 June İBB Mayorship 15.6 1.7 37.2 44.9

0.7 100.0

Differences emerged compared

to 23 June results Non-voter Invalid vote

Incumbent

bloc Opposition

bloc HDP Other Total

2018 General Election 4.0 0.3 -7.1 14.9 -11,0 -1.1 0


tion

3.7 0.3 -6.1 8.7 -6,3 -0.3 0

This can be interpreted based on the most important finding of our November’18 Barometer

research, which we call ‘negative identification.’ According to Evren Balta, who evaluates our

findings in the November’18 Barometer, ‘the settled masses of political parties that have a

positive relationship with the party are much lower than those who have a negative relationship

with the political parties, both on a per-party basis and in general. Consequently, voter behavior

is determined by the negative relationship with other parties rather than the positive relationship

with one party.’

As a matter of fact, in our March’19 Barometer report, we wrote to our subscribers regarding the

expectations of March 31: ‘The parties are stuck in identities and polarizations and this

continues. The findings give the impression that there will be no major numerical changes other

than alliance blocks or changes of 1-2 points in the country's 50-50 percent political division

picture. Considering the findings of all Barometer surveys after June 24, the electorate’s

probability of movement within the poles is stronger than the probability of movement between

the poles. For this reason, the voters dissolved from the two major parties are more likely to turn

to other parties within the alliance than to the other parties in the opposite alliance.

‘In particular, the opposition bloc is consolidated and it is observed that almost all opposition

voters act together with the feeling and urge to stand against the power bloc, even if it is not an


institutional alliance. It is confirmed by the findings that the voters' negative feelings towards

the opposite pole rather than the loyalty to their parties gain weight and that the voters who

dissolve from their party cannot shift towards the opposite pole or alliance because of the

strengthening of negative identification.’

6. Polarization, political consolidation, othering discourse on political level, economic turmoil in

everyday life, series of tensions in international relations, all of which are very important caused

a complex and uncertain state, which gave the meaning of the votes on 23 June more than a

vote for Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality vote.

According to our findings, 68 percent of Istanbul voters said they voted for the country's progress

on 23 June. Among those who said that they would vote for İmamoğlu, this rate was 76 percent,

while it was 62 percent among those who would vote for Yıldırım.

To put it briefly, while on 31 March it was voted as if general elections were held on 31 March,

rather than local elections, this time it went one step further and it was voted for the country's

progress, not for the political preference or the Mayor.

7. It is understood that the Supreme Election Board's repetition decision and the cancellation of

the Istanbul elections affected the voters' feelings of justice and conscience. The fact that even

one-fifth of the voters of the incumbent bloc did not approve this decision was perhaps the

foremost among the reasons for the decline of the Yıldırım’s vote.

38

24

32

62

76

68

% 0 % 50 % 100

Binali Yıldırım

Ekrem İmamoğlu

İstanbul

In this election, will we vote to elect the IBB Mayor or for the course

of Turkey?

To elect the Mayor For the course of Turkey.


8. Another factor of the loss of the election by the incumbent bloc was the “loss of trueness’

experienced by the incumbent bloc. Before the 31st of March, three perceptions in three

different levels such as romantic slogans and films, very harsh and marginalizing rhetoric on the

stands and the fear of inflation and unemployment in daily life, triggered the feeling of protecting

the party of the incumbent bloc voters. While the incumbent bloc had difficulty in convincing its

voters, this loss of trueness and reaction to the established language consolidated the

opposition bloc.

9. Nevertheless, the analysis of the districts' on the basis of total household averages points out

to the fact that the districts in the middle of the income ranking have more impact on the loss

of votes of the incumbent block. This analysis shows that, under the influence of the economic

turmoil, some of the voters casted a vote according to their economic class positions.

10. Another factor affecting the election outcome was the preferences of young voters. Yıldırım's vote

among young voters remained constant, while Imamoğlu's vote rose every month and

increased over 9 points of the Istanbul average. Among young voters, those who will not vote

have fallen by half.

4

79

4

6

82

32

4

85

4

88

41

96

21

96

94

18

68

96

15

96

12

59

%0 %50 %100

Millet Alliance + HDP

Cumhur Alliance

HDP

Millet Alliance

Cumhur Alliance

No answer

Ekrem İmamoğlu

Binali Yıldırım

Ekrem İmamoğlu

Binali Yıldırım

İstanbul

31

Ma

rch

Lo

ca

l

ele

cti

on

vo

te

Ge

ne

ral p

art

y

pre

fere

nce

23

Ju

ne

ele

cti

on

ca

nd

ida

te

pre

fere

nce

(ba

llo

t p

ap

er)

23

Ju

ne

ele

cti

on

ca

nd

ida

t

e

pre

fere

n

ce

With the decision of the YSK, the Istanbul election is repeated, what

do you think about this decision?

The YSK made the right decision, I agree. The YSK's decision is wrong, I disagree.


11. Considering how these results will affect the political developments in the future, it is possible

to say that there are areas of opportunity for the country.

✓ For a government which has retained the government power at national and local level

for 17 years uninterrupted and has not lost any election during this period, power

disruption is a natural risk. The political balance created by the local opposition to this

deterioration may provide an opportunity to overcome the current political and social

polarizations.

✓ In the face of complex multi-dimensional, multi-actor issues facing the country, it may

be an opportunity for political reconciliation and an opportunity to expand the political

sphere.

✓ Second, if a new model of local service, development and citizen engagement model

can be produced where the opposition bloc won the elections, there may be an

opportunity for a reform of the local government and public administration, which is an

inevitable necessity of the country.

Of course, for all these, all political actors must rethink the needs and demands of society and

have a desire for change. What we note is ultimately what the rational mind produces regarding

the issues. We will see whether political actors will continue to do politics according to their

identities and polarization as they have done so far, or will their desire and efforts to change

these habits prevail.

47

43

47

42

43

42

36

34

36

41

40

41

33

41

33

33

41

33

37

48

37

49

43

34

2

3

2

4

2

4

7

2

7

1

2

4

17

13

17

21

15

21

21

16

21

9

15

20

%0 %50 %100

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

June

March

January

49

+ a

ge

s

33

- 4

8

age

s

18

- 3

2

age

sİs

tan

bu

l

IBB candidate preference according to age groups

Binali Yıldırım Ekrem İmamoğlu Other Swing-Non-No ans.


5. RESEARCH ID

5.1. The General Description of the Survey

The survey that this report is based on was conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy Limited

(KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık Ltd. Şti.).

The field survey was conducted on 15 – 16 June 2019. This report presents the political trends,

preferences and profiles of the adult population above the age of 18 in Turkey, as observed

on the dates of the field survey.

The survey is designed and conducted with the purpose to determine and to monitor trends and

changes in the preferences of respondents who represent the adult population above the

age of 18 in Turkey. The margin of error of the survey is +/- 1.7 at 95 percent confidence

level and +/- 2.3 at 99 percent confidence level.

5.2. The Sample

The sample was prepared by stratification of the data on population and educational level of

neighborhoods and villages based on Address-Based Population Registration System with

the neighborhood and village results of the general elections dated November 1, 2015.

Within the scope of the survey, face-to-face interviews were carried out with 3498 individuals in 157

neighborhoods in the border of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. Age and gender

quotas were applied for 24 questionnaires conducted in each neighborhood.


6. GLOSSARY of TERMS

All findings in Barometer reports are based on answers to the questions directed to respondents who

were interviewed face-to-face in field surveys. Some questions and response options are then

used in the rest of the report in short or simplified form. For example, the respondents who

respond to the question on how religious they see themselves as “a person who is a believer,

but does not fulfill religious requirements” are shortly identified as “believers” in the report.

This glossary is prepared for both the readers who receive the report for the first time and

the readers who need further clarification on the terms. The first table provides a list of the

terms and their explanations, and the following tables list the questions and response

options which establish the basis for these terms..

DEFINITION

ALEVI MUSLIM: A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Alevi Muslim

ARAB: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Arab

ATHEIST: A person with no religious belief

BELIEVER: A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but

does not fulfill them completely

CHADOR: A woman who wears chador or a man whose spouse wears a cha-

dor

HEADSCARF: A woman who does not cover her head or a man with a headscarf

or whose spouse does not cover her head with a headscarf

KURDISH: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Kurdish

LOWER CLASS: Households whose income per capita is in the lowest 20 percent

segment

LOWER MIDDLE CLASS: Households with an income per capita in the 60 percent segment

but which do not own a car

METROPOLITAN: Settlements which are located within the integrated boundaries of

the most crowded 15 cities (differs from the official definition)

MODERN: A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as modern

MULTIPLE CORRESPOND-

ENCE ANALYSIS

It is a data analysis technique for nominal categorical data, used

to detect and represent underlying structures in a data set. It is

used for applying Correspondence Analysis (CA) to large data sets

with more than two variables.

NEW MIDDLE CLASS: Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent seg-

ment and which own a car

NO COVER: A woman who does not cover her head or a man whose spouse

does not cover her head

NON-BELIEVER: A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion

PIOUS: A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely

RELIGIOUS: A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion

RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVE: A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as religious conservative

RURAL AREA: Settlements with a population of less than 4000 (differs from the

official definition)

SUNNI MUSLIM: A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Sunni Muslim

TURBAN: A woman who wears a turban or a man whose spouse wears a tur-

ban


TURKISH: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Turkish

TRADITIONAL CONSERVA-

TIVE:

A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as traditional conservative

URBAN AREA: Settlements with a population of more than 4000 (differs from the

official definition)

UPPER CLASS: Households whose income per capita is in the highest 20 percent

segment

ZAZA: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Zaza

6.1. Questions and Response Options

Which of the three lifestyle clusters below

do you feel yourself belonging to?

Modern

Traditional Conservative

Religious Conservative

We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic,

but we may have different ethnic origins;

which identity do you know/feel that you

belong to?

Turkish

Kurdish

Zaza

Arab

Other

Which religion or sect do you feel you belong

to?

Sunni Muslim

Alevi Muslim

Other

Settlement Code (Data obtained from the

sample)

Rural

Urban

Metropolitan

Do you cover your head or does your spouse

cover her head when going out of your

home? How do you cover your head?

No head cover

Headscarf

Turban

Chador

Bachelor male Which of the below describes you in terms

of piety?

A person who does not believe in the re-

quirements of the religion

A person who believes in the requirements

of the religion, but does not fulfill them com-

pletely

A person who tries to fulfill the requirements

of the religion

A person who fulfills the requirements of the

religion completely

Economic classes (determined by using

household size, household income and car

ownership)

Lower class

Lower middle class

New middle class

Upper class

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