KONDA · Doğu Perinçek 0.1 0.2 Swing voters - Non-voters / Non-voters - Invalid votes 12.4 13.8 Total 100.0 100.0 However, it is to be noted that the overlap of the KONDA measurements

KONDA JULY’18 BAROMETER

Political and Social Survey Series

Evaluation of the 24 June Election Results

Political Preferences

Current Politics: Post-Election Expectations

Social Mood

Morale Index

Barometer of the Agenda

KONDA EVALUATION OF THE RESULTS OF 24 JUNE 2018 GENERAL PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2 / 109

In accordance with the confidentiality provisions of the KONDA

Barometer subscription agreement, this report shall not be

distributed or circulated other than corporate use.


TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................. 5

Evaluation of the Results of 24 June‘18 Elections ......................................................... 5

2. ABOUT THE SURVEYS AND THE ANALYSES ................................................................ 14

The Note Sent to KONDA Subscribers .......................................................................... 14 About Election Surveys and Their Publication Before the Elections ........................... 16 About the Analyses ......................................................................................................... 17

3. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION .................................................................. 18

Number of Voters ........................................................................................................... 18 Voter Turnout .................................................................................................................. 19 Invalid Votes ................................................................................................................... 22 Election results ............................................................................................................... 23 Progress of Vote Rates Through the Years ................................................................... 23 Comparison of the Voting Rates of 2015 and 2018 ................................................... 24 Comparison of the Elections Based on the Number of Voters .................................... 25 Presidential Election Results ......................................................................................... 28

4. TRANSITIONS IN VOTING PREFERENCES ................................................................... 30

5. ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION VOTES .......................................................... 38

Social Analysis ................................................................................................................ 38

5.1.1. Social layout of the 24 June results ...................................................................... 38 5.1.2. Party electorate profiles ......................................................................................... 39

Analysis According To Electorate Size Clusters ............................................................ 42 5.2.1. Political Parties in the electorate size clusters..................................................... 42 5.2.2. Vote gain and loss in electorate size clusters ...................................................... 44

Analysis Based On Election Result Pattern Clusters .................................................... 46 5.3.1. Political Parties According to Election Result Pattern Clusters ........................... 46 5.3.2. Vote gain and loss in election result pattern clusters ......................................... 49

Regional Analysis ............................................................................................................ 51 5.4.1 Regional Performance of the Parties .................................................................... 51 5.4.2 Regional vote gain and loss ................................................................................... 56

District-Based Analysis ................................................................................................... 60 5.5.1 District-based election maps ................................................................................. 60 5.5.2 District-based election data ................................................................................... 77 5.5.3 Vote changes in those districts to the municipalities of which trustees have been

appointed ................................................................................................................................ 82 5.5.4 District-based clustering analysis.......................................................................... 87

6. POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION ...................................................................................... 88

Introduction..................................................................................................................... 88


Effective Number of Parties in the Parliamentary Elections ...................................... 88 Distribution of the Effective Number of Parties Across the Political Geography ...... 90 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 93

7. PROGRESS OF DIRECT PREFERENCES AND SELECTED FINDINGS ........................... 94

Progress of Direct Preferences Acoording to KONDA Findings ................................... 94 What Have the Election Process and Campaigns Changed? ...................................... 95 Electoral clusters .......................................................................................................... 101 Young people ................................................................................................................ 103 Kurds ............................................................................................................................. 104

8. GLOSSARY of TERMS ................................................................................................ 108

Questions and Response Options ............................................................................... 109


1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The survey which forms the basis of the July’18 Barometer report has been conducted on July 7-8,

2018 by face-to-face interviews with 2728 people in their homes in 156 neighborhoods and

villages of 98 districts including the central districts of 32 provinces. Further, the analysis of

the results of the 24 June 2018 General Parliamentary and Presidential Elections have been

made on the basis of the temporary results announced by the Anadolu News Agency.

Evaluation of the Results of 24 June ‘18 General Parliamentary and Presidential

Elections

We have used the district-based temporary results in our analysis on the 24 June election results,

and the invalid votes and non-voters have been included in the analysis for the aim of

understanding the preferences and behaviour of all voters, whereas the comparison of the

vote loss and gain has been made with reference to both the 7 June 2015 elections and 1

November 2015 elections.

The electoral turnout reached 88.5 percent in the 24 June elections, the highest rate encountered

since the 2002 elections. There were no significant differences in the electoral turnout or the

invalid ballot rates of the Presidential Election and the Parliamentary Election. It is observed

that the electoral turnout increased towards the western regions. Southeast, Central East

and Northeast Anatolia as well as the Eastern Black Sea regions show electoral turnout lower

than the national average. Still, the electoral turnout analysis based on districts shows that

in certain districts at the Southeast region, there has been a singificant decrease in the

electoral turnout compared to the 1 November elections.

This election has once again confirmed the polarization and the entrapment within identity politics.

It is observed that the final KONDA calculations dated 9-10 June declared to the public on June 21

correspond to the electoral outcome within the margin of error.

Parliamentary Election KONDA Election Result

Ak Parti 37.9 36.9

CHP 21.7 19.6

MHP 6.1 9.6

HDP 9.7 10.1

Iyi Parti 7.1 8.6

Other 0.9 1.8

Swing voters - Non-voters /

Non-voters - Invalid votes 16.6 13.3

Total 100 100.0


Presidential Election KONDA Election Result

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 45.4 45.2

Muharrem İnce 24.5 26.5

Selahattin Demirtaş 9.0 7.2

Meral Akşener 7.9 6.4

Temel Karamollaoğlu 0.6 0.8

Doğu Perinçek 0.1 0.2

Swing voters - Non-voters /

Non-voters - Invalid votes 12.4 13.8

Total 100.0 100.0

However, it is to be noted that the overlap of the KONDA measurements with the election results is

beyond the mere success of KONDA in that it shows the extreme intensity and permanence

of the political and social polarization Turkey has been going through.

Although the vote rates seem to be changing, the social base the political parties rest upon does not

really change.

In view of the results:

It is understood that taking into consideration the voting rates in the General and Local

Elections held since 2002, the maximum level the Ak Parti has reached is just below 50

percent and the minimum level is around 42 percent.

On the other hand, the CHP had carried the level of 20 percent which it had once been placed

in, to 25 percent in the past 4 elections preceding the final one whereas it is now observed

that it has reverted back to somewhere in the middle of these two but could not exceed the

25 percent mark.

Although it seems that the MHP has numerically maintained its voting rate and lost a

considerable part of its traditional voters to the Iyi Parti, it has managed to stay at the 11-12

percent level thanks to the votes received from the Ak Parti.

The HDP has been keeping the level of 11-12 percent it has reached over the electoral

threshold despite what its electoral base has gone through and what has happened in its

region and surroundings in the past two years.

The Iyi Parti has gained a voting rate of 10 percent which may be considered as success due

to its being a newly founded political party but which may also be considered as failure due

to its assertive attitude at the beginning and the role and weight attributed to it.

In comparison to the previous elections;

Those who have not participated in the balloting had regressed by 1 point in the 1 November

2015 elections compared to the 7 June elections, and now it has regressed a further 1 point

compared to 1 November. In short, the rate of the non-voters is 2 points lower than that of 7

June.

The invalid vote rate in 24 June 2018 has been 0.6 point lower than that of 1 November and

0.9 point higher than that of 7 June.

An analysis on the basis of the total electorate in combination with the previous elections shows that:

The Ak Parti has lost 5.9 points of its voting rate in 1 November but has added 2.8 points to

its voting rate in 7 June.


The CHP has lost 2.2 points of its voting rate in 1 November and has lost 1.5 points of its

voting rate in 7 June.

The MHP has lost 0.7 points of its voting rate in 1 November and has lost 4.2 points of its


The HDP has added 0.9 point to its voting rate in 1 November but has lost 0.7 point of its


A comparison since 2011 reveals the following:

Although the number of voters has increased by 10 percent and the number of valid votes

has increased by 15 percent since the 2011 General Elections, the number of votes of the

Ak Parti has been the same in both the 2011 and 2018 General Elections: In 2011 and also

in 2018, 21.3 percent of the voters cast votes in favor of the Ak Parti.

Even more interestingly, in both the 2011 and 2018 elections, a little more than 11 million

voters voted for the CHP and 5.5 million voters voted for the MHP.

This situation and the fact that the same number of voters have stayed with the three parties show

that although the rates seem to have been changing, these three parties have been stuck

within a frozen state in terms of the number and cluster of voters.

In the presidential elections, the opposition gambled for the hope for a runoff

The electoral turnout was 88.2 percent in the 24 June Presidential elections whereas the

non-voters were at a rate of 11.8 percent. The rate of the invalid votes was 2.2 percent within

the ballots cast and 2 percent within the total electorate.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received 52.4 percent of the votes cast validly which made 45.2

percent of the total electorate including the non-voters and invalid voters.

Muharrem İnce received the votes of 26.5 percent of the total electorate which corresponded

to 30.8 percent among the valid votes. S. Demirtaş and M. Akşener received voting rates

below the voting rates of their respective parties.

The differences between the voting rates of the presidential candidates and the respective

political parties supporting them show that Erdoğan received 1.3 points less votes than the

People’s Alliance.

M. İnce received 6.9 points more votes than the CHP, thus it is understood that he received

the votes of the electorates of all political parties in the opposition block.

The calculations show that a certain part of the opposition electorates voted for M. İnce in the hope

for a runoff in the presidential elections.

The pattern observed in the provincial election results as a sign of entrapment within identities

In the creation of the graph below in which the provinces have been placed, we have utilized the

correspondence analysis method by using the vote distribution patterns of the provinces in

the election results. The horizontal axis shows ethnic belonging whereas the vertical axis

shows the level of urbanization and socioeconomic development.

These axes show that the Ak Parti is intensified in those provinces that have lower level of

socioeconomic development whereas the situation is the opposite for the CHP. As is known,

the HPD is placed in those provinces with Kurdish intensity.


An interesting point is that the MHP and Iyi Parti are placed symmetrically on the provinces that are

at national average in terms of socioeconomic level. The Iyi Parti is placed on the upper

middle of the national average whereas the MHP is placed on the lower middle of the national

average.

Thus, the same finding is also apparent in the social topographic map below created through the

KONDA Data Warehouse that consists of the findings of the KONDA Barometer reports as

well as the electoral profiles and the 8-year mobility (or rather lack thereof) of the political

parties on this map.

24 June 2018 Election Results*

Correspondence Analysis

*Based on unofficial results



Although the analysis of the political party electoral profiles based on the KONDA findings shows

changing direct preference rates for the five parties, the situation in 24 June confirms that

they continue to be stuck within certain demographic, economic, sociological and cultural

clusters, namely within identities, as we have been observing in every survey we have

conducted in the past five years.

The Ak Parti is again and still a mass political party differently from the others

The analysis of the regional distribution of the general national voting rate of each party in

combination with electoral rates shows that the Ak Parti has received votes in all regions in

balance with the electorate rates thus exists in all regions, and despite slight differences the

combination of the electorates and the Ak Parti votes according to the regions is quite

parallel. Based on this analysis, it is to be emphasized that despite all political and social

polarizations, the Ak Parti is still a mass political party.

It is observed that the regional entrapment of the CHP as observed in the previous elections remains.

In western regions, the CHP receives votes more than its electorate weight but in eastern

regions, it receives quite lower rates compared to the electorate rates.

On the other hand, similar to the CHP, the HDP also experiences an ongoing regional entrapment in

that it receives 45 percent of its total votes from the Southeast, Middle East and Northeast

Anatolia. Again, Istanbul and the Mediterranean region bring 30 percent of the HDP votes as

these regions involve an intensified Kurdish population due to migration.

The MHP votes are higher than the electorate distribution in the Mediterranean, West Anatolian,

Middle Anatolian and Western Black Sea regions but lower in Istanbul, West Marmara,

Aegean and Southeast.

The Iyi Parti has received higher rate of votes in the Aegean, Mediterranean, East and Western

Marmara regions compared to the electorate distribution. The regional vote combination of

the MHP and the Iyi Parti shows that they have very low rates in the Southeast and Middle

East regions together but in other regions they complement each other or receive votes on

each other’s behalf.

Three different Turkeys in three different political geographies observed again

A clustering analysis based on the provincial distribution and pattern in the 24 June election results

reveals 6 different provincial clusters in which provinces with similar vote distribution

patterns come together and each cluster differentiates from the others in terms of pattern.

However, we can assume that there are in fact four different provincial clusters, since the

first three are mainly made up of those provinces that are almost solely dominated by the Ak

Parti. In cluster 4, the Ak Parti-CHP-MHP exist together. CHP votes are dominant in cluster 5,

whereas the HDP prevails in cluster 6.

The Ak Parti votes are quite higher than the national average in clusters 1 and 2, at national average

in clusters 3 and 4, lower in cluster 5 and the lowest in cluster 6. The MHP co-exists with the


Ak Parti in the first four clusters with a rate higher than its national average. The Iyi Parti has

exceeded its national performance in clusters 3 and 4.

The CHP has achieved quite higher (26.8 percent) than the national average (19.6 percent) in cluster

5 and reached a high rate (21.3 percent) in cluster 4. Still, it is to be noted that in this cluster

where the CHP relatively has its presence felt, the Ak Parti voting rate is 33.1 percent which

is higher than that of the CHP.

The HDP is the leading political party in cluster 6 and receives almost half of the votes in the

provinces of this cluster (47 percent) at a rate much higher than its national average (10.1

percent).

A mapping of these provinces reveals the most meaningful illustration of Turkey’s political geography.

The election results refer to three different political geographies once again as has been the

case in all elections and referendums held in the past 7 years.

These three different political geographies also overlap with economic and cultural differences. In

the first geography, the provinces in which the CHP has a presence are urbanized,

metropolized where urban daily practices and modern lifestyle prevail with an economic

development level above the national average. In the second geography, the Ak Parti

dominates or has stronger presence and the MHP and the Iyi Parti can also have an

existence. In this geography, there is a conservative lifestyle and the economic development

level is around the national average. The third region is where the HDP dominates with an

economic development level below the national average but also a predominant issue of

identity.


When the 24 June ‘18 voting rates are compared with those of 7 June’15 and 1 November ‘15 in the

aforementioned 6 political clusters, the following observations are made:

Compared to the 1 November ‘15 votes, the Ak Parti has experienced a quite significant loss of votes

in the first 2 clusters which it had previously dominated. It has regressed by 10.9 points in

cluster one, 8.9 points in cluster two and 6.9 and 6.5 points in clusters three and four,

respectively.

The HDP has lost 5.5 points compared to 1 November and 13.8 points compared to 7 June in the

cluster it dominates. On the other hand, the Ak Parti voting rate in the same region has

increased by 7.6 points compared to 7 June and decreased by 0.3 points compared to 1

November.

With regard to the common public debate involving the allegation that a certain part of those who

had voted for the HDP in the region have reverted back to the Ak Parti, no such transition

has been observed since 1 November to present day. However, with regard to 7 June voting

rates, it is recognized that the loss in the HDP voting rates are partially in favor of the Ak

Parti. Such mobilization within a cluster of 4.5 million voters corresponds to about 250

thousand people. In terms of electoral rates, this means a transition to the Ak Parti at a rate

of about 0.5 point.

Thus, an analysis based on districts has reveals a 0.3-point transition to the Ak Parti within the

national voting rates, even though the rates seem significant in especially those districts to

the municipalities of which trustees have been appointed.


The politics is determined at district level.

The number of districts in which the Ak Parti has received absolute majority is 417. In these

districts, 16 million 597 thousand members of the total electorate live which number

corresponds to 30 percent of the general number of voters.

The CHP has received absolute majority in 26 cities. The voters living in these districts

constitute 3 percent of the overall electorate.

The HDP has received absolute majority in 73 districts thanks to its being the dominant party

in especially sotheastern districts. The votes the HDP has received in these 73 districts

constitute one third of the overall votes the HDP has received across the country.

In more than half of the districts, no political party gained absolute majority.

Erdoğan has gained more than 50 percent of the votes in the majority of the districts (67

percent) in 278 of which his voting rate has been calculated as above 70 percent.

There are 87 districts in which Muharrem İnce has exceeded 50 percent. This rate is 67

percent for Selahattin Demirtaş who had run his campaign while he was in jail.

The total number of votes Erdoğan has received in 653 districts in which he obtained

absolute majority is 17 million 629 thousand. This rate alone corresponds to 36 percent of

the valid votes.

The total number of valid votes in the 87 districts in which Muharrem İnce managed to

receive more than 50 percent of the votes is 6 million 488 thousand. 3 million 870 thousand

out of about 6 million valid votes were cast for İnce in these 87 districts. This makes 7 percent

of overall valid votes.

One or two political parties dominate in certain geographies in Turkey

According to the “Effective political party analysis” conducted by Prof. Dr. Hasan Kirmanoğlu which

you will find in the report, in the majority of the political geography of Turkey, the voters make

a choice between two political parties among which the one that competes with the Ak Parti

varies according to the regions, provinces and districts.

The maps above show as to how many political parties the electorate had cast votes for at provincial

level. As is apparent in the maps, the politics has been increasingly consolidated and as of

2018, in an extensive part of Turkey, the number of political parties for which votes have

been cast has dropped down to two.


2. ABOUT THE SURVEYS AND THE ANALYSES

The Note Sent to KONDA Subscribers

As has been the case in the past 32 years, KONDA delivered the election survey to its subscribers on

the last Thursday before the elections, i.e. on Thursday, June 21, 2018 and then shared it

with the public.

Dear Subscribers,

We hereby submit this declaration to the subscribers of the KONDA Barometer Political and Social

Survey Series, which will also be published on our website www.konda.com.tr today on the basis of

the authority and right granted to us by our subscribers pursuant to a special provision in the subscrip-

tion agreement.

The survey which forms the basis of this declaration was conducted on June 9-10, 2018. It was con-

sidered that the weekend preceding the elections, being a religious holiday, would entail intense mo-

bility thereby constituting an inappropriate atmosphere for conducting a survey suitable for the sam-

pling. Thus, our findings reflect the tendencies and preferences pertaining to a period 14 days

before the elections.

Within the scope of the survey, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 2721 interviewees in

their homes in 153 neighborhoods and villages of 101 districts of 31 provinces, including the cen-

tral districts. Age and gender quotas were applied in the 18 surveys conducted in each neighborhood.

The survey reflects the political tendencies of the subjects representing the adult population above the

age of 18 in Turkey (domestic electorate) on the days when the field survey was held.

The sample was selected through the stratification of the data on population and educational level of

neighborhoods and villages based on the Address Based Population Registration System (ADNKS),

and the neighborhood and village results of the General Elections. First, the settlement units were

grouped as rural/urban/metropolitan, then the sample was determined based on 12 regions.

Provinces visited within the scope of the survey: Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Balıkesir, Bursa, Çanak-

kale, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Edirne, Elazığ, Erzurum, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul, Izmir, Kars,

Kayseri, Kocaeli, Konya, Kütahya, Malatya, Mardin, Mersin, Samsun, Sivas, Şanlıurfa, Tekirdağ,

Tokat, Trabzon, Van.

The margin of error of the survey is +/- 1.7 at 95 percent confidence level and +/- 2.3 at 99 per-

cent confidence level. Political preferences according to the last 3 surveys are as follows.

Political party

preference

1 November

General Elec-

tion

31 March - 1

April’18

12-13 May’18 9-10 June’18

Ak Parti 42.9 32.6 36.6 37.9

CHP 22.2 16.6 18.2 21.7

MHP 10.5 6.4 4.9 6.1

HDP 9.2 7 8.2 9.7

Iyi Parti - 4.7 7.6 7.1

Other 2.2 1.1 1.2 0.9

Swing voters 13.0* 23.9 20.5 14.2

Non-voters 7.7 2.7 2.4

Total 100 100 100 100 * The rate of those who did not cast votes in the 1 November elections. The voting rates of the parties have been obtained through

the re-calculation the official results by including those voters who did not participate in the elections.


The proportional distribution of the swing voters (14.2 percent) and non-voters (2.4 percent) re-

veals the following series.

* The voting rates of the other parties have not been shown in the series. The voting rate is 1 percent for the June 9, 2018 survey.

With regard to our findings about the presidential election, the situation that prevails after the dis-

tribution of the swing voters of 12.4 percent is as follows:

Swing voters and non-voters

distributed

12-13

May’18

9-10

June’18

R.T. Erdoğan 53.3 51.9

M. İnce 23.4 28.0

M. Akşener 11.1 10.2

S. Demirtaş 10.7 9.0

T. Karamollaoğlu 1.4 0.7

D. Perinçek 0.1 0.1

Total 100.0 100.0

It is understood from the aforementioned tendencies and preferences prevailing on June 10 that the

HDP will pass the electoral threshold, and thanks to the alliances, the Iyi Parti, MHP, SP and BBP

will also gain seats in the parliament, thereby creating a parliament in which 7 political parties will

be represented. According to these results, if a presidential election had been held on June 10,

Erdoğan would have been elected in the first round.

We would also like to note three dynamics that bear the capacity to change our findings of June 10

and affect the outcome of June 24: The first factor is the mobility and the changes we have been

observing in our graphs and tables for the last five weeks regarding which it has to be seen as to

what rate the momentum will continue and which direction the changes will take during the period

until the elections. The second factor is a voter turnout considerably below the rate of 85 percent.

Finally, the third factor is the distribution of the overseas votes.

Respectfully submitted for your information.

KONDA

ARAŞTIRMA VE DANIŞMANLIK A.Ş.


About Election Surveys and Their Publication Before the Elections

Election surveys have increasingly been becoming subject to public debate with each election

process with regard to political manipulation they may be causing. Due to the social

psychology created by intense social and political polarization as well as the recent election

processes held under the influence of suspicions and fears, it is only natural that election

surveys and the polling companies conducting them are subject to such pressure.

However, KONDA has been conducting election surveys since 1986 and has traditionally been

sharing the final outcomes with the public on the last Thursdays before the elections. Until

2007, these announcements had been made via published newspapers on Tarhan Erdem’s

columns, and since 2009, the KONDA website has been used as the announcement medium.

The paragraph annexed to Article 61 of Law on Basic Provisions on Elections and Voter Registers No.

298 on October 27, 1995 reads: “It is forbidden, in parliamentary elections, to make

statements, after the date of beginning of election, in favour of or against a political party or

candidate or in a manner to influence the votes of citizens in any way howsoever, through

written, verbal, visual press and media as well as various means of publication or to make

public polls, questionnaires, estimations, through information and communication

telephones, under any name, including mini referendums...”

Our opinion is that the critical definition in this article is the sentence about the purpose and intent

expressed as “in favour of or against a political party or candidate or in a manner to influence

the votes of citizens.” KONDA does not directly procure services to any political party or

candidate or join bids in any public institution or local administration. Again, in order to

remain exempt from such speculations, KONDA refrains from publishing any survey results

except for the Thursdays preceding elections.

As has been the case in previous years, KONDA data, methods and accounts are open to academic

studies as well as legal and civil audit. Thus, upon the call of the Turkish Researchers’

Association after the 2014 Presidential Elections, KONDA had been the only polling company

that had opened its data and methods to civil audit.

Therefore, as has been the case for the last 32 years, on June 21, 2008, i.e. the Thursday preceding

the 24 June elections, KONDA shared with the public the political results of the final

measurements sent to the subscribers. We shall continue with this principle in the election

processes to come. Because, more than anything, KONDA aims to conduct surveys that will

facilitate an understanding of the society in Turkey.

We hope to intervene in and contribute to the life in Turkey by generating information especially for

politics and also for opinion leaders, businesses and academics. Based on this hope, we

strive to conduct meaningful surveys on social and cultural matters.

We hope to intervene in and contribute to the life in Turkey by generating information especially for

politics and also for opinion leaders, businesses and academics. Based on this hope, we

strive to conduct meaningful surveys on social and cultural matters. We do not think that it


is suitable to use surveys for any evaluation or interpretation other than the determination

and monitoring of the tendencies and sensitivities prevailing in the society.

About the Analyses

We have to note certain aspects of our numerical analyses of the 24 June election results.

a) The analyses have been made on the temporary and unofficial results provided to the media by

the Anadolu News Agency. The neighborhood and ballot box-based final results published by the

Supreme Election Board are not yet available to us. Therefore, it will be necessary to repeat and

check certain analyses such as vote transitions on the basis of neighborhood-based data. Still,

it is to be acknowledged that the numerical differences in province-, region- and cluster-based

analyses will be insignificantly small.

b) We have been observing a discussion and pre-acceptance in the public as to which of the 7 June

2015 and 1 November 2015 election results shall be taken as the basis in the analyses on vote

loss and gain or vote comparisons. It is clear that each of these previous elections have unique

processes and conjectural dynamics. However, it is to be noted that the 1 November 2015

elections developed as a re-run of the 7 June elections due to the demand and pressure from

the government in rejection of the obligation for a coalition and were also conducted under the

specific psychological and mental environment generated by the terrorist actions that took place

in the meantime. Therefore, a considerable part of the voters were influenced by the dilemma

of chaos or order produced by the current events rather than their own opinions and preferences

about the political parties. Thus, it is indeed a significant discussion as to which elections should

be taken as the basis in the comparison to be made with the 24 June election results. As you

will see in the upcoming sections of the report, we took both elections as the basis in our

analyses.

c) The generally accepted method is to discuss and analyze election results on the basis of the

final and official results calculated over valid votes. Therefore, such analyses and interpretations

exclude and disregard non-voters and invalid votes. On the other hand, according to such

approach, within an electoral mass of 57 million, non-voters at the size of 5 or 7 million and

invalid votes of around 1-2 million which in combination make almost 10 million voters, are not

subject to any analysis or commentary. We consider that abstention from voting due to reasons

other than unavoidable circumstances such as illness, travel or duty, is a voluntary preference

and a deliberate attitude. Again, a considerable part of the invalid votes have been due to

conscious choices and behavior rather than lack of sufficient education or skill to mark the ballot

paper correctly. Naturally, all kinds of political, legal or official decisions based on election

results will be made on the basis of the valid votes, but still we find it a more accurate method

to include non-voters and invalid votes to the analysis and comments in order to understand the

society and interpret the elections. Therefore, as you will see in the following sections of the

report, we have made our analyses on the basis of calculations that include the entirety of a

total of 57 million votes including the non-voters and invalid votes.

d) The political results of the survey conducted by KONDA on 9-10 June and declared to the public

are in parallel to the election results within the margin of error. Thus, where necessary, we have

used the KONDA findings in addition to the election results in order to confirm or support our

interpretations on the electoral profiles of the parties or the numerical analysis of the election.


3. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION

Number of Voters

The number of voters has exceeded 56 million excluding overseas voters. Within the overall

population, the rate of those at voting age or in adulthood has reached 70 percent.

The table below shows the election years, changes in voting age amended by law through the years,

number of voters and their rate within the total population. It is to be noted that the table

shows an increase in the rate of voters within the overall population. This also

demographically pertains to the fact that the national population has been increasingly aging

or that average life term has been prolonging and that average age has been increasing.

Number of Voters and Their Rate Within the Overall Population

Election Years Voting Age Number of voters Voters / Popula-

tion (%)

1950 8,905,743 42.5

1954 23 10,262,063 44.2

1957 12,078,623 47.8

1961 12,925,395 45.8

1965 13,679,753 43.6

1969 22 14,788,552 42.9

1973 16,798,164 44.1

1977 21,207,303 50.8

1983 19,767,366 41.3

1987 26,328,106 50.1

1991 20 29,932,429 52.3

1995 34,068,304 55.2

1999 19 37,429,120 56.5

2002 41,291,568 59.2

2007 42,799,303 58.0

2009 48,007,000 67.0

2011 50,189,930 68.1

2014 52,695,850 68.7

2015 53,741,838 69.2

2018 56,322,634 70.0


Voter Turnout

The electoral turnout reached 88.5 percent in the 24 June elections, the highest rate encountered

since the 2002 elections.

As seen in the table below, in all the elections held after the transition into the multi-party system,

the voter turnout rates have always been quite high. Although, at first glance, it is probable

to consider that in the first two elections held after the 12 September Coup, non-voting had

been subject to penalty and thus influenced the high rate of electoral turnout, in fact it is

observed that the citizens of Turkey have always been highly interested in elections. The

enthusiasm about participating in the voting process may be attributed to the fact that due

to the limited mechanisms for taking part in the politics, people tend to use their opportunity

to intervene in the politics through elections.

General Elections Voter Turnout

Rates General Elections

Voter Turnout Ra-

tes

1950 89.3% 1991 83.9%

1954 88.6% 1995 85.2%

1957 76.6% 1999 87.1%

1961 81.0% 2002 79.1%

1965 71.3% 2007 84.3%

1969 64.3% 2011 84.2%

1973 66.8% 2015 86.5%

1977 72.4% 2015 87.6%

1983 92.3% 2018 88.5%

1987 93.3%

As expected, the Presidential Election and the General Election revealed similar rates of electoral

turnout and invalid votes due to the fact that the two elections had been held on the same

day by placing two different votes on the same envelope and into the same ballot box for the

first time in the history of Turkey upon an amendment to the related law.

12

12

88

88

02

02

0% 50% 100%

Presidential Election

Parliamentary Election

Turnout Rates of 2018 Parliamentary and Presidential elections

Non-voters Voter Turnout Invalid votes


The graph below shows the number of valid votes, invalid votes and non-voters in all general, local

and presidential elections held since 2002.

It is observed that in the period after the 2002 General Election and thereafter, the number of non-

voters has been around 7 million in all elections other than the 2014 Presidential Election.

Despite the increase in the number of voters and valid votes, the number of non-voters is

stable around 7 million which implies that other than those who cannot attend the elections

due to unavoidable circumstances such as illness, duty, travel, military service, etc. there

might be a cluster that protests the elections and the politics.

The graph below analyzes the electoral turnout in terms of regions for the 24 June elections as well

as the 2011, 7 June 2015 and 1 November 2015 General Elections.

It is observed that the electoral turnout increases towards the western regions. Southeast, Middle

East, Northeast Anatolia and Eastern Black Sea regions show electoral turnout rates lower

than the national average whereas in the West Marmara, East Marmara and Aegean regions,

the votelectoral turnout have been higher than the national average in almost every election.

50 million

48 million

46 million

41 million

45 million

43 million

40 million

35 million

32 million

31 million

7 million

7 million

7 million

12 million

6 million

6 million

7 million

7 million

10 million

9 million

2018 24 June Parliamentary Elec.

2015 1 November Parliamentary Elec.

2015 7 June Parliamentary Elec.

Presidential Election 2014

2014 General Provincial Council Elec.

2011 Parliamentary Elec.





Non-voters, valid votes and invalid votes in the elections over the past

16 years

Valid votes Invalid votes Non-voters

(79.1%)

(74.2%)

(75.9%)

(84.2%)

(86.6%)

(83.2%)

(84.2%)

(84.3%)

(86.4%)

(88.5%)


Still, the electoral turnout analysis based on districts show that certain districts at the Southeast

region reveal significant decrease in the electoral turnout rate compared to the 1 November

elections as shown in the map below prepared by the Çilek Ağacı team. On the other hand,

there have been significant increases in certain districts of the Middle East and East Black

Sea regions.

79

79

78

83

85

86

82

86

88

88

89

82

84

85

85

84

87

89

89

88

90

90

90

90

88

88

Southeast Anatolia

Middle East Anatolia

Northeast Anatolia

East Black Sea

West Black Sea

Central Anatolia

Mediterranean

West Anatolia

East Marmara

Aegean

West Marmara

Istanbul

Turkey

Voter turnout rates

24 June’18 1 November ‘15 7 June’15 12 June’11


*Changes in the electoral turnout Rates

1 November 2015 – 24 June 2018

http://cilekagaci.com/2018/06/30/June-2018-secim-analizi-ve-oy-gecisleri/

Invalid Votes

Our opinion is that just like the case has been about voluntary nonattendance to the elections except

for unavoidable circumstances, a considerable part of the invalid votes express a protesting

attitude against the politics and the political alternatives proposed in the elections. Thus,

when we look at the invalid vote rates in all general elections held throughout the multi-party

system as shown in the table below, we observe that despite significant increases in the

number of voters as well as the rise in the average education level of the national adult

population, the rate of invalid votes has been around 3-4 percent and has decreased below

3 percent in the past 16 years.

Election Invalid votes Election Invalid votes

1950 3.1% 1991 3.0%

1954 1.6% 1995 3.3%

1957 1.4% 1999 4.3%

1961 3.6% 2002 3.9%

1965 4.5% 2007 2.9%

1969 4.5% 2011 2.1%

1973 4.5% 2015 2.8%

1977 3.5% 2015 1.4%

1983 4.9% 2018 2.0%

1987 2.6%

*

http://cilekagaci.com/2018/06/30/haziran-2018-secim-analizi-ve-oy-gecisleri/

http://cilekagaci.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/24haziran_map3.jpg


Election results

The table below is a combination of the findings of KONDA’s final survey before the elections

conducted on 9-10 June and the 24 June election results.

Political party preference KONDA Election Result

Ak Parti 37.9 36.9

CHP 21.7 19.6

MHP 6.1 9.6

HDP 9.7 10.1

İyi Parti 7.1 8.6

Other 0.9 1.8

Swing voters / Non-voters

Non-voters / Invalid votes 16.6 13.3

Total 100 100.0

The table below shows the final distribution of the valid votes in the 24 June elections according to

the alliances and political parties as well as the final distribution of the KONDA findings after

the distribution of the swing voters and non-voters.

Parliamentary Election KONDA Election Result

People’s Alliance Ak Parti

52.8 45.5

53.7 42.6

MHP 7.3 11.1

Nation Alliance

CHP

35.4

26.1

33.9

22.5

İyi Parti 8.5 10.0

SP 0.8 1.4

HDP 11.6 11.6 11.7 11.7

Other 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.7

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

As the tables show, the KONDA measurements have been parallel to the election results within the

margin of error. Significant changes have been observed in relation to the replacements

within the alliances but the votes of the alliances have developed in parallel to the survey

calculations.

Progress of Vote Rates Through the Years

Progress of Vote Rates Through the Years. It is understood that in view of the voting rates in the

General and Local Elections held since 2002, the maximum level the Ak Parti has reached

has been just below 50 percent and the minimum level has been around 42 percent.


However, it may be considered that the Ak Parti has not lost its voters to the opposition block as

these voters seem to have preferred to continue with their indirect support to the government

through the MHP.

On the other hand, the CHP had carried the level of 20 percent which it had once been placed in, to

25 percent in the past 4 elections preceding the final one whereas it is now observed that it

has reverted back to somewhere in the middle of these two but cannot exceed the 25 percent

mark.

Although it seems that the MHP has maintained its voting rate numerically and has lost a

considerable part of its traditional voters to the Iyi Parti, it has managed to stay at the 11-12

percent level thanks to the votes received from the Ak Parti.

The HDP has been keeping at the level of 11-12 percent that it has reached over the electoral

threshold despite its electoral base has gone through and what has happened in its region

and surroundings in the past two years.

The Iyi Parti has reached a voting rate of 10 percent. This may be considered as success due to its

being a newly founded political party but which may also be considered as failure due to its

assertive attitude at the beginning and the role and weight attributed to it.

Comparison of the Voting Rates of 2015 and 2018

The public debate involves the comparison of the 24 June ‘15 election results with those of the 1

November’15 elections or 7 June ‘15 elections. The table below shows these three elections

together. The rates in the table are directed to the total electorate including the non-voters

and invalid votes.

Election results: 7 elections in 13 years

Other parties


Those who have not participated in the balloting had regressed by 1 point in the 1 November 2015

elections compared to the 7 June elections, and now it has regressed a further 1 point

compared to 1 November’15. In short, the rate of non-voters is 2 points lower than that of 7

June.

Political parties

Elections

24 June’18 1 November

‘15

24 June’18 - 1

November'15

difference

7 June’15

24 June’18 - 7

June'15 differ-

ence

Non-voters 11.5 12.4 -0.8 13.5 -2.0

Invalid votes 1.8 1.2 0.6 2.7 -0.9

Ak Parti 36.9 42.7 -5.9 34.1 2.8

MHP 9.6 10.3 -0.7 13.8 -4.2

İyi Parti 8.6 8.6 8.6

CHP 19.6 21.9 -2.2 21.1 -1.5

HDP 10.1 9.3 0.9 10.9 -0.7

Other 1.8 2.2 -0.4 3.9 -2.2

Total Number of

Voters 100.0 100.0

0.0 100.0

0.0

The invalid vote rate in 24 June 2018 is 0.6 point higher than 1 November’15 and 0.9 point higher

than 7 June’15.

In terms of the total electorate;

The Ak Parti has lost 5.9 points from its voting rate in 1 November but has added 2.8 points

to its voting rate in 7 June.

The CHP has lost 2.2 points from its voting rate in 1 November and has lost 1.5 points from


The MHP has lost 0.7 points from its voting rate in 1 November and has lost 4.2 points from


The HDP has added 0.9 point to its voting rate in 1 November but has lost 0.7 point from its


Comparison of the Elections Based on the Number of Voters

The final voting rates of the parties calculated on the basis of valid votes show a 7-8-point swing in

the Ak Parti votes. The CHP, MHP and HDP votes seem to remain the same in percentage,

but the table below prepared on the basis of the number of voters rather than the

percentages points to another interesting characteristic of the current political situation.

Since the 2011 General Elections, the number of voters has increased from 52.8 million to 57.8

million at a rate of 10 percent whereas the number of valid votes has increased from 42.9

million to 50.1 million at a rate of 15 percent. Despite these increases, the number of votes

cast for the Ak Parti has been the same in the 2011 and 2018 General Elections. In 2011

and also in 2018, 21.3 percent of the electorate voted in favor of the Ak Parti.


Even more interestingly, in both the 2011 and 2018 elections, a little more than 11 million voters

voted for the CHP and 5.5 million voters voted for the MHP.

This situation and the fact that the same number of voters stay with the three parties show that

although the rates seem to have been changing, these three parties have been stuck within

a frozen state in terms of the number and cluster of voters.

The graph below prepared by the Çilek Ağacı team for KONDA showing the vote transitions among

the 7 June 2015, 1 November 2015 and 24 June 2018 elections also shows the inter-party

vote transitions together with the increases and the decreases in the voting rates of the

parties. You will find other analyses of Çilek Ağacı conducted by ecological inference method

in the following pages of this report under title “Transitions in Vote Preferences at the

Parliamentary and Presidential Elections.”

Voters Number of votes cast in the elections (million)

2018 GE 24/06 2015 GE* 1/11 2015 GE

7/06 2014 LE 30/03 2011 GE 12/10

Voters 57.8 55.4 54.5 52.7 52.8

Votes cast 51.2 48.5 47.2 46.9 43.9

Valid votes 50.1 47.8 45.9 45.1 42.9

Ak Parti 21.3 23.7 18.7 20.5 21.3

CHP 11.3 12.1 11.4 12.5 11.1

MHP 5.6 5.7 7.5 6.9 5.5

HDP / BDP 5.9 5.1 6.0 2.7 2

İyi Parti 5.0

Other 1.0 1.2 2.1 2.4 2.4



Presidential Election Results

The electoral turnout was 88.2 percent in the 24 June Presidential elections whereas the non-voters

were at a rate of 11.8 percent. The rate of invalid votes was 2.2 percent within the ballots

cast and 2 percent within the total electorate.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received 52.4 percent of the votes cast validly which made 45.2 percent of

the total electorate including the non-voters and invalid voters.

Presidential Candidates KONDA Election Result

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 45.4 51.9 45.2 52.4

Muharrem İnce 24.5 28.0 26.5 30.8

Selahattin Demirtaş 9.0 9.0 7.2 8.3

Meral Akşener 7.9 10.2 6.4 7.4

Temel Karamollaoğlu 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

Doğu Perinçek 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2

Swing voters / Non-voters

Non-voters / Invalid votes 12.4 13.8

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

M. İnce received the votes of 26.5 percent of the total electorate the rate of which was 30.8 percent

within the valid votes. S. Demirtaş and M. Akşener received voting rates below the voting

rates of their respective parties.

In comparison to the 2014 Presidential Elections, the most significant difference is observed in the

electoral turnout which had been 26.2 percent in the 2014 Presidential Elections whereas it

has dropped down to 11.8 percent in 2018.

Candidates Presidential Election

2018

Presidential Election

2014 Candidates

Non-voters 11.8 26.2 Non-voters

Invalid votes 2.0 1.3 Invalid votes

R.T. Erdoğan 45.2 52.4 51.6 37.5 R.T. Erdoğan

M. İnce 26.5 30.8

-

M. Akşener 6.4 8.3 -

- 38.6 27.9 E. İhsanoğlu

S. Demirtaş 7.2 7.4 9.8 7.1 S. Demirtaş

T. Karamollaoğlu 0.8 0.9

-

D. Perinçek 0.2 0.2

-

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

R. T. Erdoğan seems to have received 52.4 percent of the valid votes in 2018 and 51.6 percent of

the valid votes in 2014, but his voting rate within the overall electorate has been 45.2 percent

in 2018 and 37.5 in 2014.


M. İnce received 30.8 percent of the valid votes and 26.5 percent of the overall votes.

Candidates

Elections

Political Party Presidential

Election PE – GE dif.

General Elec-

tion

R.T.Erdoğan 45.2 -1.3 36.9 Ak Parti

9.6 MHP

M. İnce 26.5 6.9 19.6 CHP

S. Demirtaş 7.2 -2.9 10.1 HDP

M. Akşener 6.4 -2.2 8.6 İyi Parti

T. Karamollaoğlu 0.8 -0.4 1.2 SP

D. Perinçek 0.2 0.0 0.2 VP

-0.4 0.4 Other

Non voters / Invalid

votes 13.8 0.5 13.3 Non voter / Invalid

Total 100.0 0.0 100.0

The differences between the voting rates of the presidential candidates and the political parties

supporting them show that Erdoğan received 1.3 points less votes than the People’s Alliance.

M. İnce received 6.9 points more votes than the CHP, thus it is understood that he received the votes

of the electorates of all political parties in the opposition block.


4. TRANSITIONS IN VOTING PREFERENCES IN THE

PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Analysis of Çilek Ağacı


This section pertains to the association of the votes in the parliamentary elections with the votes in

the 1 November’15 elections and the association of the votes in the parliamentary elections

with the presidential elections, and includes a broad citation of the calculation and analysis

of the Çilek Ağacı team. The calculation method of the Çilek Ağacı team as well as the report

on the findings and the comments about the analysis are available on the link above.

Vote transitions in the 2015 - 2018 parliamentary elections

According to our numerical analysis, only one third of those who had voted for the MHP in the

November 2015 Elections again voted for the MHP whereas more than half supported the Iyi Parti

in the 2018 elections. The reason for lack of decrease in the MHP voting rate in comparison to

November 2015 is that almost 15% of those who had voted for the Ak Parti in 2015 have voted for

the MHP in 2018.



The votes the Ak Parti has lost in the current elections in comparison to November 2015 can be

explained almost in their entirety by the voters who shifted towards the MHP in these elections. The

Ak Parti has managed to receive the votes of 80% of the voters who had voted for the Ak Parti in

2015.

The decreasing votes of the CHP in comparison to 2015 were due to those voters who have transited

to the Iyi Parti. According to our estimations, one in every ten voters who had voted for the CHP in

2015 have now voted for the Iyi Parti in 2018. Other than that, the CHP mainly maintained its voters

of 2015. No large clusters of voters are observed that have shifted from the CHP towards the HDP.

This is in line with the electoral behavior of the CHP supporters that we have observed in our previous

election analyses.

An assessment of the maps shown below reveals that the Iyi Parti has created a nationalistic and

secular electoral base which lives in the Aegean and Marmara coastline. This electoral base consists

of voters coming from both the CHP and the MHP. According to the analysis results, about 25% of

those who voted for the Iyi Parti in 2018 had voted for the CHP in November 2015 whereas 60%


had previously voted for the MHP. The remaining part of the Iyi Parti votes come from those voters

who had previously voted for other parties or had not cast votes before.

The HDP has become the party that has maintained its electoral mass at the highest rate: Nine out

of every ten voters who had voted for the HDP in 2015 have voted for the HDP again. On the other

hand, the HDP has also become the party with the largest cluster of voters who did not or could not

cast votes in the new elections: Almost 5% of the HDP voters in 2015 did/could not cast votes in

these elections. These two seemingly contrasting results may be partially attributed to the fact that

in 19 provinces where the HDP has a strong presence, the ballot boxes were united for security

reasons and that the voters have moved to other places far from their original places of residence.

As seen in Map 1, electoral turnout has increased nationwide compared to November 2015 whereas

it has decreased in the Southeastern districts.

Another observation about the HDP is that the HDP is the second most popular party among the new

voters after the Ak Parti. This signals the fact that the HDP can turn into a permanent political actor

in Turkey as the country has a young voter population.

* Changes in the Electoral Turnout Rates


*



*Changes in the voting rates


Voting preferences in the 2018 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections

When we focus on the 2018 elections and examine the relationship between the voters’ preferences

for political parties and presidential candidates, we observe two important aspects. Firstly, Recep

Tayyip Erdoğan won the elections in the first round by consolidating an overwhelming majority of

both the Ak Parti and MHP voters. One of the most significant factors that has created this outcome

is the fact that more than half of those who voted for the MHP in 2018 had voted for the Ak Parti in

the November 2015 elections. In other words, the electorate that voted for the MHP in the 2018

General Elections had probably belonged to the Ak Parti electoral base in the previous elections with

a voting preference history closer to Erdoğan.

*



The second notable aspect is the strong ascent Muharrem İnce has achieved at a voting rate of 30%

after a very short campaign period. This success may be attributed to the fact that Ince has received

the support of the electoral bases other than his own party. The CHP voters almost without

exceptions supported İnce and further, İnce collected votes from both the secular and nationalistic

Iyi Parti and the socialist and minority-supporting HDP.

We predict that the reason for Selahattin Demirtaş’ and Meral Akşener’s lower rate of votes than

their respective parties is that the voters, perhaps with the aim and hope of giving a strong message

to Erdoğan in a runoff, supported İnce. According to our deductions, in the Presidential Election, one

in every four HDP voters and one in every three Iyi Parti voters voted for Muharrem İnce.

The regional patterns observed in Map 2 verify the results we have obtained by our vote transition

analysis.


In the 2018 General Elections, the greatest difference in favor of Erdoğan between the votes of

Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance has been observed in the districts of Southeast Anatolia. The rest

of Turkey shows a very close rate of votes between Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance on district

basis. When we examine those districts in Southeast Anatolia where Erdoğan received votes even

more than the People’s Alliance did, we observe that in a certain part of these districts, independent

candidates or conservative Islamic parties such as the HÜDAPAR and SP also received votes. The

vote transition simulations in which we have utilized the votes of these parties as separate

categories only at the Southeast Anatolian districts verify our suspicions. We believe that a

significant part of the votes Erdoğan received beyond the People’s Alliance in the southeast come

from those voters who voted for the HÜDAPAR, SP and certain independent candidates. However,

the vote data on district level is insufficient to reach a definite answer in this regard.

On the other hand, the difference between İnce’s presidential votes and the CHP’s parliamentary

votes intensify in the metropolitan areas of the Aegean, Marmara and Mediterranean coastline. It is



understood that in this region, İnce managed to convince a certain part of those voters who voted

for the HDP and the Iyi Parti.

In almost all districts throughout Turkey, Demirtaş remained below the voting rate of the HDP. This

complies with our deduction through our vote transition analysis that one fourth of the HDP voters

voted for İnce. Remembering that among those voters who had voted for the CHP in November 2015,

there is a very limited vote transition towards the HDP and considering that even at the southeast,

İnce received voting rates much above those of the CHP, we conclude that among the voters of the

HDP in both the west and the southeast, there is a considerable mass of people who support İnce.

Another notable finding is that the HDP has maintained and even improved the vote increases it had

achieved throughout Turkey in November 2015. For instance, the number of districts in which the

HDP received a voting rate of 10% or above has increased from 192 in November 2015 to 230 in

2018. Another finding that shows that the HDP electoral base has expanded geographically is that

the rate of those districts which may be considered as the vote stocks of the HDP where it receives

the highest rate of votes has decreased within the total HDP votes. In 2015, the 20 districts in which

the HDP had received the highest voting rates constituted the source of 28.2% of the total votes,

whereas this rate has dropped down to 26.2% in 2018. This decrease may be interpreted positively

by attributing it to the geographical expansion of the HDP electoral base, yet the fact that it is merely

at 2% shows that such expansion is in fact quite limited.

In conclusion, the double ballot paper mechanism introduced by the new administrative system as

well as the electoral threshold alliances established by both the government and the opposition

enabled the voters to express their preferences in a more nuanced and effective way. thereby

facilitating the representation of different shades of Turkish nationalism in the parliament. It is clear

that the representation of those political parties relying on a nationalist ideology at a rate of 21

percent in total will lead the Ak Parti and the CHP to review their current political positions.



5. ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL ELECTION VOTES

Social Analysis

When the province-based 24 June election results are subjected to a correspondence analysis, the

graph below is obtained. The analysis model used places the provinces and the votes of the

political parties in each province on a Cartesian plane according to their correlation. In this

way, we obtain a map that looks like a star chart in outer space. In order to make sense of

this star chart, we use axes and marks.

It is clear that the element that defines the horizontal axis of this graph is ethnic belonging. The

provinces on the right are those in which the HDP achieves voting rates way above its national

average. The provinces on the right are also those in which the Kurdish electorate is intensely

populated.

The distribution of the provinces on the vertical axis enables the definition of various parameters.

The provinces on the upper side of the axis consist of those in which the CHP voting rates

progress above its national average and the same holds true for the Ak Parti in the provinces

on the lower side of the axis. The second parameter that forms the axis is the intensity of

urbanization and metropolitanization, and those on the upper side of the axis are more

24 June 2018 Election Results*

Correspondence Analysis

*Based on unofficial results


advanced in terms of urbanization and metropolitanization. The third parameter is the

educational level and even the socio-economic development level of the provinces.. The

fourth parameter is, according to KONDA findings, those provinces in which the religiousness

level intensifies from the bottom to the top.

Therefore, the horizontal axis pertains to ethnic belonging and the vertical axis pertains to

urbanization and socio-economic development level which together define this picture in

which the provinces are placed on vote distribution patterns. These axes show that the Ak

Parti is intensified on those provinces with lower level of development in terms of

socieconomical development ranking whereas the situation is the opposite for the CHP. As is

known, the HPD is placed in the provinces with Kurdish intensity.

An interesting point is that the MHP and Iyi Parti are placed symmetrically on the provinces that are

at national average in terms of socioeconomic level. The Iyi Parti is placed on the upper

middle of the national average whereas the MHP is placed on the lower middle of national

average.

In this section where we analyze the election results, it is necessary to handle the KONDA findings

as well due to the characteristics implied by this graph generated by the analysis. The political

party electoral profiles in terms of the findings of the final survey conducted on 9-10 June

2018 right before the elections reveal a significant characteristic that has been continuing

for a long time:

The Ak Parti receives a voting rate above the national average among women, older people,

those with an educational level below high school, religious conservative lifestyle, middle

income groups and middle class.

The CHP receives a voting rate above its national average among men, older people,

university graduates, modern lifestyle group, upper income groups and upper classes.

The MHP exceeds its average voting rate among men, young people, high school graduates

and those with traditional conservative lifestyle.

The Iyi Parti receives relatively more votes among young people, university graduates and

those with traditional lifestyle.

The HDP is mainly dominant among the Kurds.

Although the findings and the analysis of political party electoral profiles show fluctuating direct

preference rates for the four parties, they in fact confirm that these parties continue to be

stuck within certain demographic, economic, sociological and cultural clusters, namely within

identities, as we have been observing in every survey we have conducted in the past five

years. This finding results from not only this latest survey but also the overall findings of the

KONDA Barometer series of 8 years and overlaps with the correspondence analysis

conducted over the pattern of the 24 June provincial election results.


42

36

40

31

47

34

42

37

34

30

66

38

14

24

17

51

37

48

43

41

20

31

37

7

22

19

29

6

17

17

19

26

27

3

13

42

17

31

11

25

19

17

14

32

20

20

6

8

12

10

4

1

9

11

10

9

8

12

6

8

12

5

8

10

13

12

11

11

9

16

6

5

5

9

15

7

6

6

8

5

7

11

19

5

6

5

11

6

8

7

5

8

6

7

9

7

4

8

7

7

9

8

4

7

9

8

11

5

9

0

6

5

13

7

7

2

1

1

4

3

1

2

3

2

3

2

2

2

1

1

1

3

1

1

2

8

2

15

13

11

11

15

14

13

15

9

13

8

17

12

15

17

16

10

8

11

13

10

13

13

6

6

3

3

15

7

4

4

4

4

4

4

5

6

5

3

5

4

7

3

5

4

0% 50% 100%

Lower income

Lower middle class

New middle class

Upper income

TRY 700 or less

TRY 701 - 1200

TRY 1201 - 2000

TRY 2001 - 3000

TRY 3001 - 5000

TRY 5001 or more

Religious conservative

Traditional conservative

Modern

Unemployed

Student

Housewife

Retired

Farmer, agriculturer, stock breeder

Small retailer

Worker

Private sector

Public officer

Turkey

Eco

no

mic

cla

sse

sM

on

thly

ho

use

ho

ld in

co

me

Lif

esty

leE

mp

loym

en

t sta

tus

Political Party Partisanship Profiles

Ak Parti CHP MHP HDPIyi Parti O. Political parties Swing voters Non-voters


17

51

65

4

18

43

57

10

10

39

35

39

25

39

37

38

8

2

38

34

14

6

24

53

17

32

8

5

22

20

7

8

10

2

7

11

7

3

10

2

4

11

9

8

8

4

22

8

6

8

24

16

7

7

26

39

1

8

9

7

5

11

7

2

7

5

7

1

9

7

3

1

3

7

1

2

3

14

3

2

4

1

2

14

13

12

10

17

12

12

13

9

14

18

21

18

12

13

4

4

3

11

4

4

4

4

4

4

7

5

5

4

4

0% 50% 100%

No head cover

Head scarf

Hijab

Non-believer

Believer

Religious

Devout

Other

Alevi Muslim

Sunni Muslim

Arab

Zaza

Kurdish

Turkish

Turkey

He

ad

co

ve

rin

g

sta

tus

Re

ligio

usn

ess

Re

ligio

n/se

ct

Eth

nic

ity

Political Party Partisanship Profiles

Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP Iyi Parti O. Political parties Swing voters Non-voters


Analysis According To Electorate Size Clusters

Following the correspondence analysis, we will now analyze the election results through another

perspective by grouping the provinces according to the number of voters in four clusters and

analyzing the vote performances of the parties in each cluster. Such grouping enables us to

find clues as to the electoral behavior not only in terms of the number of voters but also the

stage these provinces and clusters are at in the urbanization and metropolitanization

process.

The four clusters we have generated according to this perspective are shown in the table below.

Cluster Electorate size

Total Number of

Voters in the Clus-

ter

Cluster

within total vo-

ters in Turkey %

2 Metropolises Voters > 4 million 14.8 milyon 25.7

8 Metropolises 1.2 million < voters < 4 million 14.2 milyon 24.7

17 Metropolises 0.6 million < voters < 1.2 million 14.3 milyon 24.7

54 Provinces Voters < 0.6 million 14.4 milyon 24.9

Turkey - 56.3 milyon 100

Cluster Provinces

2 Metropolises Ankara, İstanbul

8 Metropolises Antalya, Adana, Bursa, İzmir, Gaziantep, Konya, Kocaeli, Mersin

17 Metropolises Aydın, Balıkesir, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, Hatay, K.Maraş, Manisa,

Muğla, Sakarya, Samsun, Kayseri, Ordu, Şanlıurfa, Tekirdağ, Trabzon, Van

54 Provinces Other provinces

When the voters, non-voters and invalid votes are distributed among these 4 clusters formed by

electorate size, it is observed that invalid votes relatively intensify at those clusters consisting

of 17 metropolises and 51 provinces. On the other hand, the electoral turnout rates are in

parallel to the distribution of the voters.


The differences with regard to the party performances within these four clusters reveal some

interesting aspects.

Non-voters Invalid Ak Parti MHP İyi Parti CHP HDP Other Total

2 Metropolises 11.2 1.4 36.8 8.4 8.0 23.0 9.6 1.7 100.0

8 Metropolises 11.3 1.7 34.8 9.3 10.1 22.8 8.3 1.7 100.0

17 Metropolises 11.5 2.0 36.6 9.6 8.8 18.3 11.4 1.9 100.0

54 Provinces 12.1 2.1 39.4 11.3 7.7 14.2 11.3 1.9 100.0

TURKEY 11.5 1.8 36.9 9.6 8.6 19.6 10.1 1.8 100.0

In the final cluster consisting of 54 provinces, the Ak Parti received votes above its national average

whereas in the second cluster consisting of 8 metropolises, it has received votes below its

national average. In the 2 metropolises and 17 metropolises, the Ak Parti remains at national

average.

The CHP reaches its highest rate in the 2 large metropolises (23 percent) but towards the lower

clusters, i.e. as the electorate size decreases, its voting rate decreases. In a sense, it receives

a voting rate below its average in rural and urban areas whereas its voting rate is above

average in metropolises.

The situation is vice versa for the MHP as its voting rate increases in rural and urban areas and

decreases in metropolises. Similarly to the MHP, the HDP also receives relatively higher rate

of votes in rural and urban areas.

The Iyi Parti receives parallel voting rates in these four clusters with a slightly higher rate in the 8

metropolises.

25

25

25

26

26

25

24

25

30

28

23

19

00 10 20 30

54 provinces

17 Metropolises

8 Metropolises

2 Metropolises

Regional distribution of voters, non-voters and invalid votes

Invalid votes Non-voters T. Voters


The vote gain or loss according to 1 November’15 and 7 June’15 in the four clusters formed by

electorate size are as follows;

In comparison to 1 November, the Ak Parti has lost votes in parallel to the national average (5.9

points) in all four clusters. In comparison to 7 June’15, it has gained votes in parallel to

national average again (2.8 points).

As for the CHP, compared to 1 November’15, it has lost 2.2 points. The decrease has been slightly

higher in metropolises and slightly lower in the 17 metropolises and other provinces. The

vote loss has been similar in all four clusters in comparison to 7 June (1.5 points of decrease).

The MHP has experienced a vote loss compared to both 1 November’15 (0.7 point) and 7 June (4.2

points) the highest being in the second cluster consisting of 8 metropolises.

As for the HDP, compared to 1 November’15 (0.9 point of increase), it has gained votes at higher

rates in the metropolises and at slightly lower rates in the 17 metropolises and other

provinces. In comparison to 7 June (0.7 point of decrease) it has gained votes in the

metropolises and lost votes in the 17 metropolises.

Ak Parti; 37 35 37 39

MHP; 8 9 1011

Iyi Parti; 8 10 98

CHP; 23 23 18 14

HDP; 10 8 11 11

Non-voters; 11 11 11 12

2 METROPOLISES 8 METROPOLISES 17 METROPOLISES 54 provinces

Election results in electoral size clusters

Ak Parti MHP Iyi Parti CHP HDP Other Invalid votes Non-voters


Region Vote loss - gain Ak Parti MHP İyi Parti CHP HDP Other Invalid Non-vo-

ters Total

TU

RK

EY

According to

June 7, 2015 2.8 -4.2 8.6 -1.5 -0.7 -2.2 -0.9 -2.0 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -5.9 -0.7 8.6 -2.2 0.9 -0.4 0.6 -0.8 0.0

2 M

etr

op

oli-

se

s

According to

June 7, 2015 3.0 -2.3 8.0 -1.2 1.0 -3.4 -3.0 -2.0 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -6.2 -0.4 8.0 -3.4 1.9 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0

8 M

etr

op

oli-

se

s

According to

June 7, 2015 2.4 -6.1 10.1 -2.2 0.1 -1.9 -0.3 -2.1 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -5.5 -2.6 10.1 -2.7 1.4 -0.4 0.6 -0.8 0.0

17

Me

t-

rop

olise

s According to

June 7, 2015 2.6 -4.1 8.8 -1.8 -1.6 -1.7 -0.2 -2.0 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -6.0 -0.4 8.8 -2.0 0.4 -0.4 0.6 -1.0 0.0

54

pro

vin

-

ce

s

According to

June 7, 2015 -6.0 -0.4 8.8 -2.0 0.4 -0.4 0.6 -1.0 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -5.7 0.8 7.7 -0.8 -0.4 -0.7 0.6 -1.6 0.0


Analysis Based On Election Result Pattern Clusters

A clustering analysis based on the distribution and pattern in the 24 June election results of each

province reveals 6 different provincial clusters in which provinces with similar vote

distribution patterns come together and each cluster differentiates from the others in terms

of pattern. The six clusters we have generated according to this perspective are shown in the

table below. This analysis had also been made after the 1 November 2015 elections1. We

have repeated it in this month’s report as it clearly shows the correlation between the election

results and the economic and cultural differences in Turkey. This clustering analysis reveals

perhaps the most significant finding in terms of the opportunity to interpret the election

results.

Clus-

ter Nature of cluster

Total voters in

the cluster

Cluster

among total vo-

ters in Turkey %

1 The Ak Parti dominates 7.6 million 13.2

2 The Ak Parti dominates, also the MHP has a presence 7.3 million 12.5

3 The Ak Parti dominates, also the MHP and the Iyi Parti have a

presence 1.8 million 3.1

4 The Ak Parti dominates, also the MHP, the Iyi Parti and CHP

have a presence 10 million 17.4

5 High intensity within the CHP votes 26.6 million 46.0

6 The HDP dominates 4.5 million 7.7

Cluster Provinces

1 Afyon, Çankırı, Elazığ, Erzurum, Gümüşhane, Kayseri, Konya, Kütahya, Kahramanmaraş, Nevşehir,

Şanlıurfa, Yozgat, Aksaray, Bayburt, Kırıkkale, Kilis

2 Adıyaman, Bolu, Çorum, Gaziantep, Giresun, Malatya, Ordu, Rize, Sakarya, Samsun, Sivas, Trab-

zon, Karaman, Düzce

3 Burdur, Isparta, Kastamonu, Kırşehir, Niğde, Karabük, Osmaniye

4 Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Erzincan, Kocaeli, Sinop, Tokat, Bartın

5 Amasya, Antalya, Artvin, Aydın, Balıkesir, Bilecik, Çanakkale, Denizli, Edirne, Eskişehir, Hatay, Mer-

sin, İstanbul, İzmir, Kırklareli, Manisa, Muğla, Tekirdağ, Uşak, Zonguldak, Ardahan, Yalova

6 Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Kars, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Batman, Şırnak, Iğdır

The common feature of the first three clusters is that they are mainly made up of those provinces

that are almost solely dominated by the Ak Parti. In cluster 4, the Ak Parti-CHP-MHP exist

together. CHP votes are dominant in cluster 5, and the HDP dominates cluster 6. Due to the

similarity of the first three clusters, we can presume that there are in fact four different

provincial clusters.

1 http://konda.com.tr/en/rapor/analysis-of-the-results-of-the-november-1st-election-and-the-electorate/


In cluster 6, the electoral turnout is quite lower than the national average and the rate of invalid

votes is rather higher than the national average. This cluster involves those provinces where

the HDP is the dominating party having received almost half of the votes. In the other clusters,

the electoral turnout and invalid votes have been at the national average.

The Ak Parti votes are quite higher than the national average in clusters 1 and 2, at national average

in clusters 3 and 4, lower in cluster 5 and the lowest in cluster 6. The MHP co-exists with the

Ak Parti in the first four clusters with a rate higher than its national average. The Iyi Parti has

exceeded its national performance in clusters 3 and 4.

Cluster Non-voters Invalid Ak Parti MHP İyi Parti CHP HDP Other Total

1. Clus

ter 11.9 1.8 47.5 14.5 7.6 8.5 6.1 2.0 100.0

2. Clus

ter 11.6 1.9 46.6 12.5 7.3 14.1 4.1 1.9 100.0

3. Clus

ter 11.8 2.2 38.7 16.7 11.8 15.1 2.0 1.6 100.0

4. Clus

ter 10.6 1.6 37.5 10.8 10.1 21.3 6.2 1.8 100.0

5. Clus

ter 10.9 1.7 33.1 7.6 9.6 26.8 8.8 1.5 100.0

6. Clus

ter 16.3 2.7 23.2 2.8 2.0 2.8 47.0 3.1 100.0

TURKEY 11.5 1.8 36.9 9.6 8.6 19.6 10.1 1.8 100.0

The CHP has achieved a voting rate quite higher (26.8 percent) than the national average (19.6

percent) in cluster 5 and reached a high rate (21.3 percent) in cluster 4. Still, it is to be noted

that the Ak Parti voting rate is 33.1 percent in cluster 5 where the CHP relatively has its

presence felt, which is higher than that of the CHP’s.

08

46

17

03

13

13

11

44

16

03

13

14

12

43

15

04

13

13

00 10 20 30 40 50

Cluster 6

Cluster 5

Cluster 4

Cluster 3

Cluster 2

Cluster 1


Invalid votes

Non-voters

T. Voters


The HDP is the dominating political party in cluster 6 and receives almost half of the votes in the

provinces of this cluster (47 percent) at a rate much higher than its national average (10.1

percent).

The mapping of these provinces can be interpreted in view of different groupings and clusters, and

all in all, it provides the most meaningful political picture. The election results once again

refer to three different political geographies as has been the case in all the elections and

referendums held in the past 7 years.

These three different political geographies also overlap with economic and cultural differences. In

the first geography, the provinces in which the CHP has a presence are urbanized and

metropolitanized with established urban daily practices and modern lifestyle and an

economic development level above the national average. In the second geography, the Ak

Parti dominates or has a stronger presence and the MHP and the Iyi Parti can also exist, with

a conservative lifestyle and an economic development level around the national average. The

third geography is where the HDP dominates with an economic development level below the

national average but also having a predominant issue of identity.

Not only the lifestyles, cultural issues and economic development levels but also the needs and

demands of these three political geographies are different and that is why they generate

different political rates.

48 4739 38

3323

15 13

1711

8

3

87 12

10

10

2

9 14 15

21

27

3

6 4 2 6 9

47

12 12 12 11 1116

1 2 3 4 5 6

Election results in clusters

RegionNo Ak Parti MHP Iyi Parti CHP HDP Other Invalid votes Non-voters


Clusters Non-voters Invalid votes Erdoğan İnce Demirtaş Akşener Kara-

mollaoğlu Perinçek Total

1 12.2 2.2 61 12.5 4.4 6.6 1 0.1 100

2 11.9 2.2 58.1 18.9 2 5.8 1 0.2 100

3 12.2 2.7 52.3 20.4 0.9 10.4 0.8 0.2 100

4 10.9 1.8 46.5 29 3.2 7.5 0.9 0.2 100

5 11.2 1.7 39.1 35.6 4.8 6.7 0.6 0.2 100

6 16.6 2.5 27.3 5.8 45.8 1.2 0.6 0.1 100

TURKEY 11.8 2 45.2 26.5 7.2 6.4 0.8 0.2 100

Thus, in cluster 5 where the CHP dominates, in the presidential elections, R. T. Erdoğan had a voting

rate of 39.1 behind his national average and in the 16 April’17 referendum, the “yes” votes

had been behind the national average at 42.1 percent. In cluster 6 where the HDP

dominates, R. Erdoğan had a voting rate of 27.3 far behind his national average and in the

16 April’17 referendum, the “yes” votes had been behind the national average at 42.3

percent.

On the other hand, in cluster 1 where the Ak Parti dominates, the R. T. Erdoğan voting rate was 71.3

percent, in cluster 2 67.7 percent; in cluster 3, 61.5 percent and in cluster 4, 53.3 percent.

Again, in these four clusters, in the 16 April’17 referendum, the rate of the “yes” votes had

been 71.1 percent in cluster 1, 66.5 percent in cluster 2, 57.7 percent in cluster 3 and 54.7

percent in cluster 4.

When the 24 June ‘18 voting rates are compared with those of 7 June’15 and 1 November ‘15 in the

aforementioned 6 political clusters, the following observations are made;

Compared to the 1 November ‘15 votes, the Ak Parti has experienced a quite significant loss of votes

in the first 2 clusters which it had previously dominated. It lost 10.9 points in cluster 1 and


8.9 points in cluster 2 all of which were received by the MHP and the Iyi Parti. In clusters 3

and 4, it lost 6.9 points and 6.5 points, respectively, the majority of which were gained by the

Iyi Parti.

Cluster Vote loss -

gain Ak Parti MHP İyi Parti CHP HDP Other Invalid

Non-vo-

ters Total

TU

RK

EY

According to

June 7, 2015 2.8 -4.2 8.6 -1.5 -0.7 -2.2 -0.9 -2.0 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -5.9 -0.7 8.6 -2.2 0.9 -0.4 0.6 -0.8 0.0

1.C

luste

r According to

June 7, 2015 1.0 -3.2 7.6 0.8 -1.5 -1.6 -0.7 -2.4 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -10.9 3.1 7.6 0.7 0.3 -0.5 0.5 -0.9 0.0

2.

Clu

ste

r According to

June 7, 2015 1.7 -1.0 7.3 -1.4 -0.3 -2.1 -0.2 -4.0 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -8.9 3.5 7.3 -0.8 0.8 -0.5 0.6 -1.9 0.0

3.

Clu

ste

r According to

June 7, 2015 1.7 -8.3 11.8 -1.3 0.1 -1.8 -0.3 -2.0 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -6.9 -2.4 11.8 -0.5 0.4 -1.3 0.6 -1.7 0.0

4.

Clu

ste

r According to

June 7, 2015 2.1 -5.1 10.1 -2.6 0.5 -2.8 -0.4 -1.9 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -6.5 -1.3 10.1 -3.3 1.4 -0.4 0.5 -0.4 0.0

5.

Clu

ste

r According to

June 7, 2015 3.3 -5.5 9.6 -2.1 0.9 -2.5 -1.8 -2.0 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -4.2 -2.8 9.6 -3.6 1.8 -0.6 0.5 -0.8 0.0

6.

Clu

ste

r According to

June 7, 2015 7.6 0.2 2.0 1.3 -13.8 0.2 0.7 1.8 0.0

According to No-

vember 1, 2015 -0.3 1.2 2.0 0.5 -5.5 1.4 0.6 0.1 0.0

Compared to the voting rate of the Ak Parti on 7 June’15, in the first five clusters, there have been

increases around the national average (2.8-point increase). The region where it increased its

votes at a rate exceeding this average has been cluster 6 where the HDP dominates (7.6

points).

In terms of vote loss and gain, the vote loss of the Ak Parti in clusters it dominates has been towards

the MHP whereas the vote loss in those clusters which the Ak Parti does not dominate but

has its presence felt has been towards the MHP and the Iyi Parti.

The HDP has lost 5.5 points compared to 1 November and 13.8 points compared to 7 June in the

cluster it dominates. On the other hand, the Ak Parti voting rate in the same region has

increased by 7.6 points compared to 7 June and decreased by 0.3 points compared to 1

November.


With regard to the common public debate involving the allegation that a certain part of those who

had voted for the HDP in the region have reverted back to the Ak Parti, no such transition has

been observed since 1 November to present day. However, with regard to the 7 June voting

rates, it is possible to accept that the loss in the HDP voting rates have been partially towards

the Ak Parti. Such mobilization within a cluster of 4.5 million voters corresponds to about

250 thousand people. In terms of electoral rates, this means a transition to the Ak Parti at a

rate of about 0.5 point.

Regional Analysis

After our analysis of the election results on the basis of correspondence analysis and clustering

analysis, we shall now evaluate them according to 12 NUTS regions.

The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics

Based on 12 regions (including non-voters and invalid votes), the regional vote distribution is as

shown in the table and graph below.


Non-voters Invalid Ak Parti MHP İyi Parti CHP HDP Other Total

İstanbul 11.6 1.4 37.2 7.2 7.0 23.0 11.0 1.7 100.0

West Marmara 9.6 1.9 31.9 6.1 12.8 32.3 4.1 1.3 100.0

Aegean 9.8 1.9 31.3 7.8 11.4 29.4 7.0 1.3 100.0

East Marmara 9.9 1.7 42.4 10.2 9.9 19.4 4.6 2.0 100.0

West Anatolia 10.3 1.5 40.5 12.2 9.9 18.9 4.9 1.9 100.0

Mediterranean 11.8 1.7 32.2 11.7 11.2 21.3 8.6 1.4 100.0

Central Anatolia 10.7 1.7 44.4 18.3 8.7 12.7 1.9 1.6 100.0

West Black Sea 10.8 2.3 44.2 13.0 8.5 17.8 1.7 1.7 100.0

East Black Sea 12.8 2.1 45.7 11.9 8.7 15.5 1.4 1.9 100.0

Northeast Ana-

tolia. 15.6 2.0 35.2 11.7 4.8 7.4 21.7 1.6 100.0

Middle East

Anatolia 15.2 2.4 35.0 6.9 3.1 6.6 28.8 2.0 100.0

Southeast Ana-

tolia 15.3 2.2 33.0 5.8 2.9 5.7 31.9 3.2 100.0

TURKEY 11.5 1.8 36.9 9.6 8.6 19.6 10.1 1.8 100.0

The Southeast, Middle East and Northeast Anatolian regions come to the fore as the three regions

with rates above the national average with regard to non-voters at 15.2 to 15.6 percent and

invalid votes at 2.0 to 2.4 percent.

The Ak Parti votes are above the national average at East Black Sea (45.7), West Black Sea (44.4),

Central Anatolia (44.2), East Marmara (42.4) and West Anatolia (40.5). On the other hand,

3732 31

42 4132

44 44 46

35 35 33

7

6 8

10 12

12

1813 12

127

6

713 11

10 10

11

9

8 9

5

33

2332 29

19 19

21

1318 16

7

76

11

4 7 5 59

2 2 1

2229

32

12 10 10 10 10 12 11 11 13 16 15 15

Election results in the regions

Ak Parti MHP Iyi Parti CHP HDP Other Invalid votes Non-voters


the Ak Parti receives the lowest level of votes at the Aegean (31.3), West Marmara (31.9),

Mediterranean (32.2) and Southeast Anatolia (33).

The CHP votes are above the national average at West Marmara (32,3), Aegean (29,4), Istanbul (23)

and Mediterranean (21,3). Southeast, Middle East and Northeast Anatolia come to the fore

as those regions where the CHP voting rate falls under 10 percent.

The HDP votes are far beyond the national average in Southeast, Middle East and Northeast Anatolia

whereas they are at the level of national average in Istanbul.

The Iyi Parti is above its average in West Marmara, Aegean and the Mediterranean whereas the MHP

is above its average in Central Anatolia, West Black Sea, West Anatolia and East Black Sea.

It is observed that in the Southeast and Middle East regions, both the non-voters and invalid votes

are quite high in comparison to the regional electoral rate. This analysis also confirms the

following determination of the Çilek Ağacı team as put forward in their analysis about the vote

transitions, cited in the previous sections of the report: ““The HDP has become the party that

has maintained its electoral mass at the highest rate: Nine out of every ten voters who had

voted for the HDP in 2015 have voted for the HDP again. On the other hand, the HDP has

also become the party with the largest cluster of voters who did not or could not cast votes

in the new elections: Almost 5% of the HDP voters in 2015 did/could not cast votes in these

elections. These two seemingly contrasting results may be partially attributed to the fact that

in 19 provinces where the HDP has a strong presence, the ballot boxes were united for

security reasons and that the voters have moved to other places far from their original places

of residence.”

West Black Sea comprises relatively more of the invalid votes.

00 10 20

Southeast Anatolia


Northeast Anatolia

East Black Sea

West Black Sea

Central Anatolia

Mediterranean

West Anatolia

East Marmara

Aegean

West Marmara

Istanbul


Invalid votes

Non-voters

Voters


When the regional distribution of the general national voting rate of each party is analyzed in

combination with electoral rates, it is observed that the Ak Parti has received votes in all

regions in balance with the electorate rates, thus exists in all regions despite slight

differences the combination of the electorates.

Based on this graph, it is to be emphasized that despite all political and social polarizations, the Ak

Parti is still a mass political party.

When the same analysis is held for the CHP, it is observed that the regional entrapment of the CHP

as observed in the previous elections remains. In the western regions, the CHP receives votes

more than its electorate weight but in the eastern regions, it receives quite lower rates

compared to the electorate rates which constitute a very minor part of its votes.

9

4

2

3

6

5

13

10

10

14

5

19

8

4

2

4

7

6

11

11

12

12

4

19

00 10 20 30

Southeast Anatolia


Northeast Anatolia

East Black Sea

West Black Sea

Central Anatolia

Mediterranean

West Anatolia

East Marmara

Aegean

West Marmara

Istanbul

Regional distribution of voters and the Ak Parti votes

Ak Parti Voters


The MHP votes are higher than the electorate distribution in the Mediterranean, West Anatolian,

Middle Anatolian and Western Black Sea regions but lower in Istanbul, West Marmara,

Aegean and Southeast.

The Iyi Parti has received higher rate of votes in the Aegean, Mediterranean, East and Western

Marmara regions compared to the electorate distribution. The regional vote combination of

the MHP and the Iyi Parti shows that together they have very low rates in the Southeast and

Middle East, but in other regions they complement each other or receive votes on each

other’s behalf.

9

4

2

3

6

5

13

10

10

14

5

19

3

1

1

3

5

3

14

10

10

21

8

22

00 10 20 30

Southeast Anatolia


Northeast Anatolia

East Black Sea

West Black Sea

Central Anatolia

Mediterranean

West Anatolia

East Marmara

Aegean

West Marmara

Istanbul

Regional distribution of voters and the CHP votes

CHP Voters

9

4

2

3

6

5

13

10

10

14

5

19

5

3

3

4

8

9

15

13

11

11

3

14

00 10 20 30

Southeast Anatolia


Northeast Anatolia

East Black Sea

West Black Sea

Central Anatolia

Mediterranean

West Anatolia

East Marmara

Aegean

West Marmara

Istanbul

Regional distribution of voters and the MHP votes

MHP Voters


On the other hand, similar to the CHP, the HDP also remains within a regional entrapment in that it

receives 45 percent of its total votes from the Southeast, Middle East and Northeast Anatolia.

Again, Istanbul and the Mediterranean provide 30 percent of the HDP votes as these regions

involve an intensified Kurdish population due to migration.

The highest rate of vote loss in the Ak Parti compared to 1 November’15 has been in Central Anatolia

by 11 points and West Anatolia by 9.2 points. The second group of regions where the Ak Parti

has experienced loss in comparison to the 1 November votes involves East Black Sea by 8

points, East Marmara by 7 points and West Black Sea by 6.3 points. In the remaining regions,

the loss is around 5 points.

9

4

2

3

6

5

13

10

10

14

5

19

3

2

1

4

6

5

16

11

12

18

7

15

00 10 20 30

Southeast Anatolia


Northeast Anatolia

East Black Sea

West Black Sea

Central Anatolia

Mediterranean

West Anatolia

East Marmara

Aegean

West Marmara

Istanbul

Regional distribution of voters and the Iyi Parti votes

Iyi Parti Voters

9

4

2

3

6

5

13

10

10

14

5

19

28

12

5

0

1

1

11

5

5

10

2

20

00 10 20 30

Southeast Anatolia


Northeast Anatolia

East Black Sea

West Black Sea

Central Anatolia

Mediterranean

West Anatolia

East Marmara

Aegean

West Marmara

Istanbul

Regional distribution of voters and the HDP votes

HDP Voters


In comparison to the Ak Parti votes in the 7 June’15 elections, the vote gain has been around 2.8

points in nine regions which is its national average whereas the vote gain has been around

5 points in the Northeast, Middle East and Southeast regions.

As for the CHP, it has lost an average of 2.2 points in comparison to the 1 November’15 votes in

general, as the vote loss has been at 1.5 to 3.5 points in the nine regions other than the

three eastern regions whereas it has enjoyed a slight gain in the Northeast, Middle East and

Southeast regions. The pattern is almost the same for the CHP compared to the 7 June ‘15

election rates with slight numerical changes.

The MHP has lost 0.7 points from its voting rate in 1 November’15 and has lost 4.2 points from its

voting rate in 7 June’15. In comparison to the 7 June’15 elections, the MHP has lost 9.9

points in West Marmara, 8.2 points in the Aegean and 4.8 points in East Marmara. On the

other hand, in comparison to the 1 November’15 vote rates, the MHP has lost 5.1 points in

West Marmara and 4.5 points in the Aegean where the Iyi Parti has made a relatively strong

start.


Region Vote change Ak Parti MHP İyi Parti CHP HDP Other Invalid Non-v. Total TU

RK

EY

According to 7

June'15 2.8 -4.2 8.6 -1.5 -0.7 -2.2 -0.9 -2.0 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -5.9 -0.7 8.6 -2.2 0.9 -0.4 0.6 -0.8 0.0

Ista

nb

ul According to 7

June'15 4.0 -1.8 7.0 -0.8 1.0 -3.3 -3.9 -2.1 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -5.6 -0.3 7.0 -3.3 2.0 -0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0

We

st

Ma

r-

ma

ra

According to 7

June'15 3.6 -9.9 12.8 -3.8 1.1 -1.7 0.0 -2.0 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -2.1 -5.1 12.8 -4.8 1.4 -1.1 0.8 -1.8 0.0

Ae

ge

an

According to 7

June'15 2.8 -8.2 11.4 -2.7 0.9 -2.1 -0.4 -1.7 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -3.4 -4.5 11.4 -3.5 1.7 -1.0 0.6 -1.3 0.0

Ea

st

Ma

r-

ma

ra

According to 7

June'15 2.9 -4.8 9.9 -3.3 0.3 -2.6 -0.7 -1.6 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -7.0 -0.1 9.9 -3.0 1.0 -0.8 0.5 -0.5 0.0

We

st

An

a-

tolia

According to 7

June'15 -0.9 -3.1 9.9 -1.6 0.7 -2.9 -0.4 -1.8 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -9.2 0.4 9.9 -2.7 1.4 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 0.0

Me

dit

err

a-

ne

an

According to 7

June'15 2.0 -7.3 11.2 -1.9 0.5 -1.7 -0.2 -2.7 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -4.9 -3.9 11.2 -2.6 1.5 -0.6 0.5 -1.2 0.0

Ce

ntr

al

An

ato

lia

According to 7

June'15 -0.2 -4.2 8.7 1.3 0.2 -2.2 -1.4 -2.2 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -11.0 3.7 8.7 1.4 0.5 -1.9 0.5 -1.9 0.0

We

st

Bla

ck

Se

a

According to 7

June'15 3.2 -4.0 8.5 -2.7 0.7 -2.1 0.0 -3.6 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -6.3 1.2 8.5 -1.8 0.7 -1.1 0.9 -2.1 0.0

Ea

st

Bla

ck

Se

a

According to 7

June'15 1.7 -2.1 8.7 -2.0 0.5 -1.9 0.5 -5.5 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -8.0 2.2 8.7 -0.9 0.5 -0.7 0.9 -2.7 0.0

No

rth

ea

st

An

ato

lia

According to 7

June'15 5.7 -2.2 4.8 1.4 -7.8 -1.2 0.1 -0.8 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -5.3 2.9 4.8 0.4 -1.1 -0.3 0.7 -2.1 0.0

Mid

dle

Ea

st

An

ato

lia

According to 7

June'15 5.2 0.5 3.1 1.6 -9.5 -0.7 0.3 -0.4 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -4.1 2.5 3.1 1.2 -2.6 0.4 0.7 -1.1 0.0

So

uth

ea

st

An

ato

lia

According to 7

June'15 5.6 0.2 2.9 0.6 -8.5 -0.3 0.2 -0.7 0.0

According to 1

Nov.'15 -5.5 2.6 2.9 0.3 -2.8 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.0


The HDP has increased its voting rate by 0.9 point in comparison to the 1 November’15 elections

and lost 0.7 point in comparison to 7 June’15. It is necessary to closely examine certain

regions in order to shed light on the discussions about strategic vote transition from the HDP

to the CHP.

Throughout Turkey, in comparison to the 1 November’15 voting rates, the HDP has gained 0.9 point

whereas the CHP has lost 2.2 points. In Istanbul, the HDP has gained 2 points whereas the

CHP has lost 3.3 points. In East Marmara, the HDP has gained 1 point whereas the CHP has

lost 3 points. In the Aegean, the HDP has gained 1.7 points whereas the CHP has lost 3.5

points. In the Mediterranean, the HDP has gained 1.5 points whereas the CHP has lost 2.6

points.

The KONDA findings reveal that a considerable part of the CHP vote loss has been towards the Iyi

Parti. Therefore, it is not true that the entirety of the CHP loss has been towards the HDP. Of

course, a certain part of the HDP vote gain has been towards the CHP but two other

demographic data should also been taken into consideration in this discussion. Firstly, the

Kurdish population shows relatively the highest rate of addition to new voters in

consideration of the age distribution and the number of children in households. Secondly,

especially in the post-1 November period, terror and violence instigated a migration wave in

the region.

Therefore, the size of the strategic vote from the CHP to the HDP should be recognized as a maximum

of 0.9 point which is the rate of increase in the HDP votes, but probably it is lower than that.

Hence, this is confirmed by the Çilek Ağacı team in their emphasis below based on the calculations

made on the basis of the district-based electoral results as cited in detail above: According

to our estimations, one in every ten voters who had voted for the CHP in 2015 have now

voted for the Iyi Parti in 2018. Other than that, the CHP mainly maintained its voters of 2015.

No large clusters of voters are observed that have shifted from the CHP towards the HDP.


District-Based Analysis

We have tried to draft the political geography in Turkey through both clustering analysis and region-

and province-based party performances. We are now continuing with our analysis -that

involves only the domestic votes- with the district-based distribution of the political party

voting rates.

We are presenting the vote distributions and cartograms of the parties on the basis of districts rather

than provinces for the aim of submitting the political geography as detailedly as possible by

using the smallest unit available to us. As we have already mentioned in our election result

analysis above, the main pattern of the politics in Turkey is shaped by districts rather than

provinces.

Right next to the map showing the administrative borders of Turkey’s districts, we have added the

cartograms the first of which had been prepared after the 1’st of November 2015 General

Elections. Thanks to this mapping method that re-draws the district borders in proportion to

the number of voters, the actual weight of Istanbul where 5 percent of the population live

and other metropolises in terms of number of voters is now visible. Similarly, by constricting

the borders of those districts with relatively lower population in a large surface area, we come

up with a map in which the district borders get smaller from the west to the east in parallel

to the distribution of the population in Turkey.


The map above showing the winning party and the presidential candidate on a district basis reveals

clearly as to why we have added the cartograms. The coastline in which the CHP votes come

first seems like a very small region in the map of Turkey but when observed on the cartogram,

it is revealed that a significant part of the population live in that region. Similarly, the districts

of Istanbul with a relatively smaller square area, are quite visible on the cartogram because

they are heavily populated areas.

The political party and the presidential candidate that received the highest rate of

votes in each district in the 24 June 2018 elections


Electoral turnout and invalid votes

The electoral turnout in the 2018 parliamentary elections has been 88.5 which is a quite high rate

across the world and in Turkey whereas the rate of the invalid votes has been 2.0 percent.

Electoral turnout is lower in the eastern and southeastern regions than it is in the western regions.

However, compared to the previous election, the electoral turnout has increased nationwide

except for the Southeast Region.

*Changes in Electoral Turnout Rates

1 november 2015 – 24 June 2018

Electoral turnout

*



The distribution of the invalid votes reveals that they are lower than the national average in Central

Anatolia. On the other hand, it is significant that the rate of invalid votes is higher than the

national average in certain districts of West Black Sea, Middle East Anatolia and Southeast

Anatolia.

Before continuing with the voting rates of the parties, it is useful to have an overall look at the

changes in the voting rates from 1 November 2015 to June 2018. The highest rate of vote

loss is observed in the Ak Parti and the highest rate of vote gain has been achieved by the

MHP. (Source: Çilek Ağacı)

Invalid Votes


*Changes in Voting Rates


*



The Ak Parti electorate Despite the vote loss compared to the previous general elections, the Ak Parti has received a voting

rate of over 30 percent in 827 out of 972 districts. The Ak Parti received voting rates below

the general average in Southeast, West Marmara (Thrace), Aegean and Mediterranean

regions. What is specifically interesting in the cartogram is that in the majority of the

metropolises, the Ak Parti voting rates are lower than its own national average.

We can draw the map of the Ak Parti’s Turkey when we re-create the cartogram the rationale of which

we have explained above, based on the number of Ak Parti voters in each district rather than

the number of voters in each district. We have applied this method to all parties, and as you

will see in the other maps below, we have found that the Ak Parti electorate has been

distributed throughout Turkey in a much more balanced way than the other parties and that

there is no significant difference between the cartograms of Turkey and the Ak Parti.


The greatest difference between the Ak Parti electorate and the map consisting of the overall

electorate in Turkey is the constriction around Izmir and other Aegean districts and the slight

ineffectiveness than normal in the eastern and southeastern districts. Other than that, there

is no significant difference between the two maps. Thus, it is emphasized once again that

differently from the other parties, the Ak Parti has been able to gain similar voting rates in all

parts of Turkey, in a way confirming our determination in the previous sections that the Ak

Parti is a mass party.

The Ak Parti Electorate’s Turkey


The CHP electorate

The CHP receives a quite significant part of its votes from the western regions. These regions

geographically constitute a small area in Turkey but have the highest rate of voter population

as shown in the cartogram. The CHP is the most successful at Thrace followed by the central

districts of Izmir, Istanbul and Ankara. The CHP has a voting rate above 20 percent in 413 of

972 districts.

In the CHP electorate’s Turkey, the western districts expand whereas the East Anatolian,

Southeastern and Central Anatolian as well as Black Sea districts are gradually erased from

the map.


From the west towards the east of Turkey, the number of CHP voters decrease, thus in comparison

to the general national distribution, the CHP voters are completely intensified at the west of

Turkey.

The CHP electorate’s Turkey


The MHP electorate

The MHP votes intensify at the West Anatolian, Central Anatolian, Mediterranean and partially

Northeast Anatolian districts. The MHP has the lowest rate of presence in the Middle East

and Southeast followed by West Marmara. A look at the cartogram shows that the MHP has

received its votes not predominantly from the metropolises but rather from the districts of

Anatolia.

In the map of Turkey created on the basis of the MHP electorate, just like the case has been in the

CHP electorate’s Turkey, the Southeast is invisible whereas Erzurum, East Black Sea and

other East Anatolian districts are visible on the map. The distribution of the MHP electorate

in the Anatolian and East Mediterranean regions is different from both the Ak Parti and the

CHP in that it brings about a more bulging portrait of Central Anatolia.


The MHP electorate’s Turkey


The Iyi Parti Electorate

The Iyi Parti Electorate has a voting distribution in parallel to that of the CHP. The highest rate of

votes are observed in the Mediterranean, Aegean and West Marmara whereas the greatest

difference from the CHP is the relatively highest voting rate in the Central Aegean area. The

Iyi Parti doesn’t get votes in the Southeast whereas its voting rate is above its average along

the Black Sea coastline. The Iyi Parti seems to have received a higher voting rate in the

peripheral districts of the metropolises rather than the central ones.

The Iyi Parti Electorate’s Turkey resembles the cartograms of both the CHP and the MHP. In the Iyi

Parti electorate’s Turkey, the Central Anatolian districts are more visible than they are in the

map of CHP and the districts at the Aegean coast are represented at higher rates that they

are in the MHP electorate’s Turkey. None of these three parties have a significant presence

in the cartograms of the Southeast.


The Iyi Parti Electorate’s Turkey


The HDP electorate

On 24 June, the HDP received a voting rate above the electoral threshold in 235 districts and above

50 percent in 73 districts. As for the distribution of votes, completely differently from the

other parties, the HDP has received its votes both from the Middle East and Southeast and

from the districts of Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana.

The HDP electorate’s Turkey is very different from all the other parties. This map does not show the

Black Sea, Central Anatolia, West Marmara and the Aegean other than Izmir whereas the two

different poles which the HDP votes come from are apparent: 4 metropolises (Istanbul,

Ankara, Izmir, Adana) and Southeast districts. The districts in the Southeast are not shown

in any cartogram including Turkey due to the low number of voters but they turn out to be the

most striking region in the HDP electorate’s Turkey.


The HDP electorate’s Turkey


Finally, we submit below the district-based voting rates of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Muharrem İnce.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan - vote distribution


Muharrem İnce - vote distribution


In this section, we will evaluate the election results based on the districts spread across 81 provinces.

In Turkey, there are a total of 972 districts in 81 provinces. The average electorate population

in a district is about 57 thousand people. Of course, these 972 districts comprise all kinds of

districts from Yalıhüyük, Konya with only 1339 voters and Çankaya, Ankara with a population

over 675 thousand people. 163 out of these 972 districts have populations above 100

thousand people. Whereas 268 have populations below 10 thousand.

In Turkey in general, the number of voters per square kilometer is 71 people. In this regard, the most

intense district is Güngören, Istanbul with more than 30 thousand voters per square

kilometer. Whereas the least intense district is Pülümür, Tunceli. In this regard, in the 972

districts, the number of voters per square kilometer is 545 people.

A district-based analysis of the election results provides important clues for understanding the

expansiveness of the political parties and their leaders.

Firstly, we analyze those districts in which the presidential candidates achieved an absolute majority.

Erdoğan has gained more than 50 percent of the votes in the majority of the districts (67 percent) in

278 of which his voting rate has been calculated as above 70 percent.

There are no districts in which Meral Akşener, Temel Karamollaoğlu or Doğu Perinçek received an

absolute majority.


There are 87 districts in which Muharrem İnce has exceeded 50 percent. This rate is 67 percent for

Selahattin Demirtaş who had run his campaign while he was jailed. However, when we

increase the limit to 70 percent, we observe that there are more districts in which Demirtaş

received a voting rate above 70 percent than Muharrem İnce.

The number of votes Erdoğan has received in total in 653 districts in which he obtained an absolute

majority is 17 million 629 thousand. This rate alone corresponds to 36 percent of the valid

votes.

The total number of valid votes in the 87 districts in which Muharrem İnce managed to receive more

than 50 percent of the votes is 6 million 488 thousand people. 3 million 870 thousand out

of about 6 million valid votes were cast for İnce in these 87 districts which makes 7 percent

of the valid votes.

The number of votes is more than 14 million in 170 districts where none of the candidates received

a voting rate above 50 percent. In other words, in 170 different districts where a total of 14

million people live, none of the candidates received an absolute majority. These 170 districts

share no common features as they greatly vary in terms of regions, population intensity and

residential types.

An analysis of the districts where the parties achieved absolute majority reveals firstly that neither

the MHP nor the Iyi Parti have managed to receive more than 50 percent of the votes in any

district.


On the other hand, the number of districts in which the Ak Parti has received an absolute majority is

417. The Ak Parti has also received 42.6 of the general vote. In these districts, 16 million

597 thousand of the total electorate live which correspond to 30 percent of the general

number of voters.

The CHP has received an absolute majority in 26 cities. The voters living in these districts constitute

3 percent of the national population.

The HDP has received an absolute majority in 73 districts with the help of its being the dominant

party in especially southeast districts. The votes the HDP has received in these 73 districts

constitute one third of the overall votes the HDP has received across the country.

The number of districts in which no political party gained an absolute majority is more than half of

the total number of districts.

When the district-based distribution is analyzed in view of the alliances, the following points are

found.


The People’s Alliance that brought together the Ak Parti and the MHP has achieved an absolute

majority in 683 districts in total whereas the Nation Alliance consisting of the CHP, the Iyi

Parti and the Saadet Parti has gained more than 50 percent of the vote in 130 districts.

Despite these alliances, there are still 86 districts in which none of the formations have

received more than 50 percent of the votes. There are no distinct features differentiating

these 86 districts from the others. It may be considered that in such districts which cover

both intensely and scarcely populated ones and both rural and metropolitan ones, the voting

rates of the parties have almost equally been distributed.

A general view on the absolute majority rates of the parties and candidates in districts shows that

especially Erdoğan has a widespread performance.

We have also analyzed the voting rates of the candidates in districts together with the votes they

gathered as shown in the image below. We arrive at significant clues by analyzing the voting

rates Erdoğan and İnce received in the top 20 districts for each.

Five large districts (Yenimahalle, Ankara; Osmangazi, Bursa; Esenyurt, Istanbul; Ümraniye, Istanbul;

Küçükçekmece, Istanbul) are common in the lists of 20 districts in which each candidate

received the highest rate of votes. These districts have been shown in different colors in the

two graphs below. As the population and especially intensity increases in a district, the

probability to involve various political elements also increase.


34

0.0

98

31

6.3

80

29

1.1

29

27

9.7

83

26

7.2

53

24

9.9

85

24

4.8

47

24

3.0

93

24

2.2

88

23

6.2

11

22

0.3

63

21

9.3

93

21

5.2

72

20

8.6

06

19

2.2

54

19

0.6

86

18

8.5

28

18

8.4

86

18

0.6

27

17

7.1

96

5957

64

74

61

58

61

71

56

62

48

68

46

52

45

52

62

80

67

59

-

100.000

200.000

300.000

400.000

40

60

80

100

Voting rates of Erdoğan (top 20 districts)

RTE oy sayısı RTE oy oranı

38

5.5

19

23

0.9

58

18

2.7

96

18

1.7

32

17

8.1

13

17

6.9

40

17

0.0

60

16

7.2

28

16

4.0

29

16

2.8

66

15

5.8

02

15

4.5

25

15

4.0

74

15

0.0

53

14

4.8

78

14

3.1

72

13

7.6

14

13

7.4

64

13

5.6

10

13

4.1

37

64

72

43

74

38 39

3129

5451 50

54

49

38

31

41

32

39

49

56

-

100.000

200.000

300.000

400.000

20

40

60

80

100

Voting rates of İnce (top 20 districts)

İNCE oy sayısı İNCE oy oranıİNCE votes İNCE voting rates

RTE votes RTE voting rates


Through the powers granted to the government by the state of emergency declared after the 15 July

Coup Attempt, trustee administrations were declared in 69 out of a total of 972 districts in

Turkey. In other words, instead of elected administrators, people appointed by the central

government started to manage the municipalities. Within a framework of about 2 years, 65

out of these 69 districts were the HDP municipalities.

The HDP district municipalities to which trustees were appointed

Within the framework of our district-based election result analysis, we shall now examine these 65

districts where more than 3 million voters live. We are specifically attempting to understand

as to how the voting rates have changed since the 2015 parliamentary elections in these

places where the government made an intervention even for a brief period.

Firstly, the graph below shows the difference in the HDP voting rate between 1 November 2015 and

24 June 2018. For instance, in Beytüşşebap district of Şırnak province, since the last

elections held 2 years ago, the HDP voting rate seems to have decreased by 22 percent.


At first glance, this graph shows that in almost all of the districts with HDP municipalities to which

trustees were appointed, the HDP voting rates have dropped compared to the previous

general elections. On average, the rate has been around 7.5 percent.

Without dispute, this graph shows that the administration of trustees in a district and the HDP voting

rate are inversely proportional. It is quite difficult to explain the reason for this through a

single factor since it may be explained by the change in the social structure after the

administration of the HDP municipalities pass to trustees but on the other hand it may be

explained by the fact that the HDP voters have been affected by the services brought by the

trustees. However, whatever the reason might be, we observe that such intervention of the

governmental mechanism independently from local dynamics has one way or another

created this consequence in the social structure.

The two graphs below show how the votes of the governing party and its alliance partner MHP have

mobilized in those districts where trustees were appointed and the HDP votes have

decreased.

-22

,2-1

8,5

-17

,8-1

3,8

-13

,5-1

3,1

-12

,4-1

2,4

-12

,2-1

1,6

-11

,4-1

1,3

-11

,1-1

1,0

-10

,5-1

0,5

-10

,1-9

,9-9

,7-9

,4-9

,4-9

,3-9

,1-9

,1-8

,6-8

,4-8

,4-8

,1-8

,0-7

,9-7

,8-7

,7-7

,7-7

,6-7

,4-7

,3-7

,0-7

,0-6

,9-6

,7-6

,6 -6,0 -5,5

-5,4

-5,4

-5,3

-4,9

-4,8

-4,7

-4,7

-4,4

-4,4

-4,3

-3,9

-3,8

-3,5 -2

,8-2

,6-2

,3-1

,9 -0,7

-0,4 0,0

0,5

2,3

-25

-20

-15

-10

-5

0

5

10

15

ŞIR

NA

K_

BE

YTÜ

ŞŞ

EB

AP

HA

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Vote rate difference for 2018-2015 in HDP district municiplaities

where trustees have been appointed

(total number of voters: 3.024.905)

HDP farkıHDP vote rate

difference


Firstly, when we observe as to how the Ak Parti voting rates have changed in those districts where

trustees have been appointed in comparison to the previous election, we observe that in the

majority of these districts where the HDP votes have dropped, the governing party has

increased its voting rate. Considering that the Ak Parti voting rate has decreased more than

7 points compared to November 2015 throughout Turkey, it would not be wrong to correlate

the fact that the Ak Parti has increased its votes in the majority of these districts with the

trustee process.

The graph below has been generated by adding the change in the MHP votes in these districts

between the two elections to the graph above, and shows that the votes lost by the HDP have

to a large extent been shared between the governing party and its alliance partner.

12

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Vote rate difference for 2018 -2015 in the HDP district municipalites

where trustees have been appointed

(total number of voters: 3,024,905)

Ak Parti

farkı

HDP farkı

Ak Parti vote

rate difference

HDP vote rate

difference


As shown, there are almost no districts where the voting rates of the HDP and the other 2 parties

have simultaneously dropped. For example, a trustee had been appointed in January 2017

to Uludere district of Şırnak province which is number 2 in the list. In the Uludere district, the

HDP seems to have lost 18.5 percent of its votes compared to the 1 November 2015

elections. On the other hand, in this district, the Ak Parti has increased its votes by 12 percent

and the MHP by 3 percent. The voting shifts among these 3 parties have been similar in the

other districts where trustees have been appointed.

Finally, we shall compare the average vote difference of these 3 parties according to those districts

where trustees were appointed or not. The graph below shows the average vote change

according to 2015 elections in the 65 districts where trustees were appointed and the

remaining districts where no such development took place. For instance, the average vote

loss of the HDP in those districts where trustees were appointed is 7.65 points whereas it

has enjoyed an increase of half point in the average of the 907 districts where no trustees

were appointed. The situation is the exact opposite for the Ak Parti and the MHP as indicated

above. The Ak Parti has lost votes at a rate above 7 percent in those places where no trustees

were appointed whereas it enjoys an increase of 2.3 percent on average in the 65 districts

where trustees were appointed. The same also holds true for the MHP. The voting rate of the

alliance partner has experienced almost no change in those places where no trustees were

appointed whereas it has enjoyed an increase of 1.53 points in those districts where trustees

were appointed. In general, the vote swing experienced in those HDP municipalities where

-25

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The HDP district municipalities where trustees have been appointed

(total number of voters: 3.024.905)

Ak Parti farkı

HDP farkı

MHP farkı

Ak Parti vote rate difference

HDP vote rate difference

MHP vote rate difference


trustees were appointed shows that the governmental intervention has clearly decreased the

HDP voting rate.

0,5

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5

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kayyum YOK kayyum VAR kayyum YOK kayyum VAR kayyum YOK kayyum VAR

HDP Ak Parti MHP

2018-2015 Vote differences (according to districts where trustees

were appointed)

NO trustee Trustee

HDP

NO trustee Trustee

Ak Parti

NO trustee Trustee

MHP


Prof. Dr. Murat Güvenç of Kadir Has University conducted a clustering analysis of the district-based

data after the 24 June 2018 elections.2

This analysis which brings together districts with similar vote profiles shows at first glance a 3-poled

Turkey we have also identified on a province basis.

*24 June 2018 General Elections:

DISTRICTS WTH SIMILAR VOTE PROFILES

2 Güvenç, M. (2018) What happened in June 24? Assessment on the District-Based Election Profiles, TESEV, Informative

Notes.

The whole analysis can be found at http://tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Mu-

rat.Guvenc.24.Haziranda.ne_.oldu_..pdf

*


6. POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION: EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF

PARTIES (1950-2018), POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF TURKEY

(2002-2018) AND THE CULTURE OF DEMOCRACY

Prof. Dr. Hasan Kirmanoğlu

Introduction

In comparative politics, one of the methods used for comparing political party systems is the effective

number of parties. What is meant by effective is “actual, in effect.” The calculation of the

effective number of parties is based on a formula developed by Laakso-Taagepera (1979):

(1 / total of the squared vote rate of each party joining the elections). Let us presume that

there are two parties each having a vote rate of 50%. In this case, the number of parties

entering into the elections is equal to the effective number of parties, i.e. 2. What if a party

has 80% and the other has 20%? Then, what would the effective number of parties be?

According to the formula above, it would be 1.47. Therefore, this formula tells us two things:

Firstly, the effective number of parties may be different from the number of parties joining

the elections and secondly, as the effective number of parties decrease, inter-party vote rate

differences increase.

When the inter-party vote rates are not fully equal (which is the theoretical extreme), the effective

number of parties will always be less than the number of parties joining the elections. If the

effective number of parties is lower than the number of parties joining the elections, then the

vote difference between the first party and the other parties will increase and the first party

will be the dominant party whereas the decrease in the difference of vote rates of the parties

(the parties’ vote rates coming closer) is called vote fragmentation. It is to be noted that

irrespective as to whether the election results point to vote fragmentation or a dominant

party, it is entirely dependent on the culture of democracy in a country as to how things will

go in terms of democracy. Where there is a culture of democracy based on negotiation-

reconciliation that does not reduce democracy to the majority obtained through elections, it

will be possible for things to progress normally in either case (vote fragmentation or the

existence of a dominant party)..

The aim of this article is to examine the effective number of parties in the parliamentary elections

held from 1950 to 2018 and to do the same for the elections held from 2002 to 2018 in a province-

based manner in order to analyze the maps of political geography in Turkey.

Effective Number of Parties in the Parliamentary Elections Held Between 1950

and 2018

Graph 1 shows the effective number of parties for all elections held until present day. As shown, the

effective number of parties tend to increase from the 1950 elections until the 1999 elections

(especially in the elections held between 1983 and 1999) and to decrease from 2002 onwards.

This graph tells us the following: In an environment where democracy is understood as

majoritarianism instead of pluralism, the increase in the effective number of parties means

an increase in the criticism of political instability, whereas the decrease in the effective


number of parties means an increase in the criticism of authoritarianism. To explain this

determination, majoritarianism, unlike pluralism, prohibits the development of a democracy

based on negotiation and reconciliation, thus an increase in the effective number of parties,

i.e. a decrease in the difference between the vote rates of the parties, means an increase in

the criticism about the rise of political instability. On the other hand, when the effective

number of parties decreases, namely when the difference between the vote rates of the

parties increases, criticism against the party which receives the majority of the votes

increases about authoritarianism..

Graph 1 Effective number of parties*

*Source: www.tuik.gov.tr

Graph 2 shows the rate of the effective number of parties to the number of parties joining the

elections for each general election held between 1950 and 2018. As shown, this rate had been high

and volatile in the 1950-1991 elections (relatively low level of difference between the vote rates of

the parties) whereas there has been a distinct downwards trend since the 1995 elections (there is

an obvious difference between the winning party and the others). What is noteworthy is that the rate

has increased in 2018. The reason for this is mainly the vote loss the AKP has experienced with

respect to the previous elections.

2,2 2,12,4

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http://www.tuik.gov.tr/


Graph 2 Effective number of parties / number of parties entering into elections*

* Source: www.tuik.gov.tr

Distribution of the Effective Number of Parties Across the Political Geography of

Turkey (2002-2018 Elections)

The six maps below show the province-based values of the effective number of parties. Examining

the last six elections between 2002 and 2008, a mainly three-party distribution is observed.

The CHP is most of the time the first party in the provinces of Edirne, Izmir, Kırklareli, Muğla

and Tekirdağ. Those provinces in which the HDP is mostly the first party are Ağrı, Batman,

Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Iğdır, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli and Van. In all the remaining

provinces, the AKP becomes the first party in the elections.

When this triple distribution is examined over time (from the 2002 elections to the 2018 elections)

in terms of effective number of parties, the following points come up:

a) The 2002 elections in which the AKP joined the elections for the first time witnessed the

highest rate of vote fragmentation. This is clearly observed in the map of 2002 (through the

relative highness of the effective number of parties). This has to do with the fact that in the

last six elections, the AKP has had the lowest vote rate and the old center-rightist and leftist

parties which today no longer are influential in the politics of Turkey, had existed at a certain

level then.

b) In the 2007 elections but mostly in the 2001 elections, the effective number of parties

decreased and the dominance of the three parties I have mentioned above became obvious

in three regions.

c) In the June 2015 elections, with the vote loss of the AKP, we observe an increase in the

effective number of parties though not as much as the 2002 elections. This also has to do

with the support the HDP received especially in the large cities for exceeding the electoral

threshold.

d) The 1 November 2015 elections brought the political geography of Turkey back to a condition

very similar to that of the 2011 elections in terms of effective number of parties.

0,54

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0,00

0,10

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0,30

0,40

0,50

0,60

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http://www.tuik.gov.tr/


e) In the final elections held in 2018, the vote loss experienced by the AKP caused an increase

in the effective number of parties and transformation of the political geography into a

condition similar to that of 7 June 2015, except that in the residential units where the HDP

has dominance in 2018, the vote loss of the AKP is lower than that of 7 June 2015. Further,

especially in the Aegean, it is clear that the votes the IYIP received from the CHP and MHP

have been influential on the increase in the effective number of parties across Turkey.

f) An analysis of the provinces in which the AKP and CHP have been relatively dominant (in

other words, their fortresses) through the elections reveals an aspect that I find quite

interesting: The increase in the effective number of parties in those places where the AKP

has voting dominance (i.e. erosion of the AKP’s power) is compensated by (perhaps more

than necessary) the increase in the effective number of parties in those regions where the

CHP as the second party has dominance. With regard to province-based vote rates, the

existence of the AKP at the CHP’s fortresses is higher than the CHP’s existence in the AKP’s

fortresses. Furthermore, in metropolises including Izmir, the HDP has a substantial presence,

thus offers a competition.


The political geography of Turkey based on effective number of parties (2002-2018)*

* Maps visualized by KONDA.


Conclusion

Let us presume that ten parties join an election each receiving a vote rate of 10% or one of the

parties receiving the entire vote. Neither of these extremes are preferable. Because in the

former case, reconciliation would not be easy whereas the latter would inevitably render the

authoritarianism of the winning party. The reality is usually in the middle of these two cases:

such as the effective number of parties being two or five. Does it matter whether it is two or

five? Yes, it does. In what way? Depending on your understanding of democracy. If what you

understand from democracy is pluralism, it doesn’t matter. But if you interpret democracy as

majoritarianism, you would prefer that the number is two, or rather one. This, after all,

depends on the political culture of the society.

I believe that the observation of the political geography of Turkey in terms of effective number of

parties in the period between 2002 and 2018 highlights an important point in that the

political geography of Turkey that shapes the triple politics has the potential to transform into

a dual structure in which demography is the main determinant. I am talking about a probable

change in the composition of the total vote pool, i.e. not a conjunctural one but a structural

one, without mentioning any political leader or party (because what I’m talking about is

irrespective of these).


7. PROGRESS OF DIRECT PREFERENCES AND SELECTED

FINDINGS

In this section we have tried to summarize selected KONDA results which we believe will offer insights

on how electoral preferences have swayed through the June 24th election process and how

candidates and campaigns have influenced the electorate.

Progress of Direct Preferences Acoording to KONDA Findings

The May’18 Barometer report conducted after the decision of snap elections, formation of the

alliances and finalization of the presidential candidates, provided significant benchmarks

with respect to the starting point of the electoral process. The main characteristic of the

situation prevailing at the starting point had been that the Ak Parti was dominating the

political arena but the Ak Parti, CHP and MHP had been behind the voting rates they had in

the 1 November 2015 elections.

There were indeed factors and dynamics that would force the situation at the starting point to

change.

1. The elections involved alliances.

2. The Iyi Parti which did not exist in the 1 November 2015 elections and the Saadet Parti which

obtained the chance to enter the scene more powerfully thanks to the alliance, were also

involved in the picture.

3. The CHP nominated Muharrem İnce as the presidential candidate who had previously no

effect on the findings about the CHP in any survey, thus whose effect had not been previously

measured.

4. Again, the CHP made an unexpected move to establish a “no-electoral-threshold alliance”

with the Iyi Parti and the Saadet Parti.

5. Of course, it was of great curiosity as to how the campaign process and the campaigns,

discourses and promises of the parties as well as the list of nominees would change the

situation at the starting point as demonstrated in the May’18 Barometer.


The changes in the direct preferences reveal the following as main findings:

1. Naturally, the start of the electoral process has brought about a significant decrease in the

rate of the swing voters, hence the electorate have been clarifying their preferences as the

election approaches. The rate of the swing voters have dropped by 12 points since January.

2. Since January, the Ak Parti has increased its votes in direct preferences by 6 points and the

CHP by about 7 points.

3. The HDP since January has advanced towards a level that would not entail any risk of staying

behind the electoral threshold thanks to a 2-point increase.

4. The MHP and the Iyi Parti have been swinging symetrically while the Iyi Parti seems to have

even exceeded the MHP.

5. The other parties including the Saadet Parti seem to have eroded within the political

consolidation and have been unable to attain a significant presence.

What Have the Election Process and Campaigns Changed?

The progress of the findings of the surveys conducted before the presidential candidates and

alliances had been finalized (April’18 Barometer), at the beginning of the election process

(May’18 Barometer) and 14 days to the elections (June’18 Barometer) provide significant

clues as to the voting changes during the election process.

The analyses and graphs have been simplified and grouped for comparability. The R.T. Erdoğan and

D. Bahçeli votes in the April findings have been combined (RTE-DB/RTE) and grouped with

26

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Change in direct preferences

Swing voters Ak Parti CHP MHP

HDP Iyi Parti Other


the R.T.Erdoğan votes of the subsequent months. The K.Kılıçdaroğlu and M. İnce votes in

the April findings have been grouped (KK / Mİ) whereas the votes of others in the findings

were combined with the votes of T.Karamollaoğlu and D.Perinçek (Other / TK-DP).

In terms of age and gender, a significant change is observed in the İnce votes. İnce has increased

his votes in women, men and all age clusters significantly compared to the leader of his party.

This increase is at similar rates in all age and gender clusters.

On the other hand, Erdoğan has increased his votes in parallel to the conversion from undecided

status to political preference as the election date approaches whereas the increase in İnce’s

votes has been at a considerably high rate.

44

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ale

Change according to gender

RTE-DB / RTE KK / Mİ MA / MA SD / SD Other / TK-DP Swing voters Non-voters

46

46

44

48

46

45

42

37

35

29

22

9

21

18

8

24

18

9

7

7

4

8

9

5

8

10

5

6

7

4

11

8

4

11

11

6

10

15

32

10

16

30

10

17

31

2

2

4

2

2

6

3

5

11

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

Age

s

49

+

Age

s 3

3 -

48

Age

s 1

8 -

32

Change according to age



The undecided status has similarly decreased in educational level and employment status clusters

whereas the increase has been higher for M. İnce than R.T.Erdoğan. M. İnce’s voting rate has

been increasing even more as the educational level increases, however no significant leap is

observed among housewives.

Among university graduates, white collar workers and students, M. İnce’s voting rate hikes

significantly, whereas R.T. Erdoğan's share of the vote has been remaining in its typically high

rate.

26

25

30

41

38

33

54

52

50

41

32

13

31

24

12

16

12

6

12

14

7

9

11

6

6

6

3

8

6

4

7

6

3

10

11

5

9

18

33

8

16

34

11

15

28

3

3

8

3

4

9

2

3

6

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

Un

ive

rsi

ty

Hig

h

sch

oo

l

Be

low

hig

h

sch

oo

l

Change according to education


37

27

41

33

32

30

56

55

49

41

44

40

47

44

42

38

32

35

24

13

10

33

20

10

14

10

7

37

30

14

21

19

8

33

28

10

4

7

9

8

12

7

6

6

3

9

8

5

9

11

4

11

12

4

17

32

8

9

12

2

10

6

2

3

2

1

11

8

9

6

6

4

13

17

23

11

20

31

12

19

32

8

12

32

8

13

30

9

16

34

4

3

8

4

5

15

2

2

6

1

2

4

3

3

5

1

3

9

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

Un

em

plo

yed

Stu

de

nt

Ho

use

wi

feR

eti

red

Wo

rke

r,

sm

all

reta

ile

r,

farm

er

se

nio

r

leve

l

em

plo

ye

e /

wh

ite

co

lla

r

Change according to employment



As the undecided status subsides, M. İnce has been producing a significant leap among the modern

lifestyle cluster and the Alevis. In April, before the declaration of Demirtaş’ candidacy, the

Kurds had been in an abstaining state among the choices of Erdoğan, Demirtaş and

68

69

64

50

45

41

20

14

21

6

3

4

16

12

6

52

44

18

4

3

1

9

10

5

10

13

7

7

9

4

10

10

5

9

7

5

10

12

22

12

17

33

7

18

36

4

2

6

2

3

6

2

3

9

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

Re

ligio

u

s

co

nse

rv

ati

ve

Tra

dit

ion

al

co

nse

rv

ati

ve

Mo

de

rn

Change according to lifestyle

3733

31

5249

47

4846

43

3939

44

4034

16

2220

8

2318

9

128

3

1211

6

1010

5

611

4

26

5

34

2

45

3

84

4

2824

9

613

31

812

30

1117

30

1519

31

23

10

22

6

32

7

33

6

0% 50% 100%

June’18May’18Apr’18




Up

pe

r

inco

m

e

Ne

w

mid

dl

e

cla

ss

Lo

we

r

mid

dl

e

cla

ss

Lo

we

r

inco

m

e

Change according to economic class

3

7

9

49

47

44

27

25

30

50

47

44

79

63

31

20

15

8

7

6

5

26

21

10

2

12

2

8

9

5

1

3

2

10

11

5

11

6

4

9

9

4

52

49

23

1

1

1

4

11

38

10

16

30

10

12

29

10

16

31

2

5

3

3

7

3

4

7

2

3

7

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

Ale

vi

Mu

slim

Su

nn

i

Mu

slim

Ku

rdis

hTu

rkis

h

Change according to cultural belonging



undecidedness whereas the declaration of Demirtaş’ candidacy has produced a leap. In the

lower income group and among the Kurds, the R.T. Erdoğan preference has been in decline.

The main characteristics of these profilings and the change in the profiles are as follows:

M. İnce has produced a significant leap in traditional CHP votes and the demographic,

economic, cultural and sociologic clusters in which the CHP has a predominant presence.

However, this leap has not yet spread through the clusters in which the CHP has traditionally

been unable to receive votes. Thus, it may be considered that İnce has managed to reach

the clusters within the natural potential of the CHP and create satisfaction and confidence

in the candidates in these clusters.

Another pattern of findings that supports this result is observed in the M. Akşener votes.

The profiling and progress of the M. Akşener votes in April and even May findings had been

similar with those of the M. İnce votes, however, in June findings, in the clusters in which M.

İnce got stronger, M. Akşener votes have slightly regressed. This shows that in the clusters

which were directed towards M. Akşener with a potential for CHP votes, there is an inclination

towards M. İnce. This is somewhat an indication of the fact that M. İnce has been

consolidating his potential votes.

As for the progress of the swing voters, the rate is relatively high among women, in the

clusters with traditional conservative lifestyle, in lower middle class and lower classes. These

are clusters in which mainly the Ak Parti and R.T.Erdoğan are strong. Therefore, care should

be taken not to overlook whether the undecided state will be maintained, whether these

people will evolve towards Erdoğan or İnce and that they have a potential to influence the

election outcome.

At this point, personal or national economic crisis anticipation in these clusters may provide the

necessary clues. The graphs below show that in the pessimistic clusters with both personal

and national economic crisis anticipation, M. İnce and in the optimistic clusters R.T. Erdoğan

dominate.

Among those who believe that if Erdoğan is replaced, the economy will worsen, Erdoğan

overwhelmingly dominates whereas among those who think that if Erdoğan is replaced,

things will improve, M. İnce choice leads.

The optimists who do not anticipate personal or national crisis in the short term are also

those who state that if Erdoğan is replaced, things will go bad. These people overwhelmingly

prefer Erdoğan, thus it may be concluded that these clusters will vote for Erdoğan for the

sake of economic stability. Those who vote for M. İnce, on the other hand, are worried about

their personal life as well as the future of Turkey.


72

69

56

10

9

6

3

4

3

5

2

2

8

12

25

2

2

6

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

Optimists about personal life


23

26

29

37

26

12

12

12

6

13

13

7

12

18

35

3

4

8

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

Pessimists about personal life


76

74

64

6

6

3

2

2

2

5

2

1

8

13

23

3

2

6

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

Optimists about national life


19

22

23

41

29

14

13

14

7

13

13

7

12

18

37

2

3

9

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

Pessimists about national life



Electoral clusters

As our subscribers will recall, we have a model for defining and understanding electoral clusters for

which we use the findings pertaining to many political problems in combined form. We have

created a modelling by using the findings of political questions such as the political party for

which one will under no circumstances give up voting for, the political party for which one will

never/under no circumstances vote for, the political party which can solve the most urgent

and important problems of Turkey, the political party voted for in the 1 November elections,

the political party to vote for if there was a general parliamentary election today and the

leader to vote for if there was a presidential election today.

Those who indicate the same political party/leader in response to all these questions above are

defined as the “core electorate” of that party whereas those who indicate the name of a

particular political party in response to a certain number of the questions but respond to the

other questions as “undecided”, “these problems will persist” or “there is no political party

that I will never abandon” are defined as the “sympathizing electorate” of that party. We

have also defined “the electorate on the gray area”, i.e. those voters who would not be

considered as the electoral base of any political party including those who show no signs of

commitment to any political party directly in response to any of the abovementioned

questions.

The graph below shows the distribution of the overall electorate in view of this model. The core

electorate of the Ak Parti is 23.1 percent and the sympathizing electorate is 10.6 percent.

10.9 percent of the overall electorate are the core electorate of the CHP and 6.8 percent are

83

80

75

5

4

3

2

1

1

2

3

0

6

10

16

2

2

4

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

“If Erdoğan is replaced, the economy will worsen”


11

8

13

53

42

23

14

19

9

16

16

14

4

11

29

1

2

6

0% 50% 100%

June’18

May’18

Apr’18

“If Erdoğan is replaced, the economy will improve”



the sympathizing electorate of the CHP. There is a cluster of 36.4 percent who cannot be

considered as the electoral base of any political party.

Due to the fact that the political preferences have further clarified following the decision of snap

elections and the regression in the state of undecidedness, a change has been observed

between the February’18 Barometer and the June’18 Barometer findings. However, as noted

in the previous sections, although the undecided stated has decreased almost in half and

the rate of swing voters has regressed to 14 percent, the voters in the gray area have

decreased less, i.e. at about 7 points.

Almost half of the electorate in the gray area still indicate that they are either undecided or will not

vote, whereas the other half have different political preferences. The electorate in the gray

area consists of 36 people within a total of 100 people, 4 of whom prefer the Ak Parti, 4 the

CHP and 7 the Iyi Parti. These voters have no connection of loyalty with any particular political

party. And still, 14 among these 36 people state that they are undecided and 2 indicate that

they will not cast a vote.

22

22

23

11

9

11

2

2

3

3

2

2

43

44

36

6

8

11

6

7

7

3

2

2

4

5

6

0% 50% 100%

Feb.'18

May’18

June’18

Change according to electoral clusters

Ak Parti core Ak Parti sympathizer MHP sympathizer

MHP core Those in the gray area CHP core

CHP sympathizer HDP sympathizer HDP core


The profiles of electoral clusters are not different from the previous Barometer findings and political

party partisanship profiles. Within the voters in the gray area, young people and students are

still more common.

Young people

In the May’18 Barometer, we had mentioned certain electoral clusters expected to have great

influence on the 24 June election results and we had separately analyzed the young voters.

Although the Supreme Election Board did not make any declarations as to the first-time

voters in the upcoming elections, we calculate that 2.6 million voters have newly become

eligible to vote according to the Turkish Statistical Institute’s population data and our KONDA

measurements, which number makes 4.5 percent of the overall electorate.

Electoral group Number of voters % Voters

New voters 2,600,000 4.5

Students (above age 18) 5,200,000 9.0

Age group of 18-32 19,076,841 33.0

Age group of 33-48 18,864,408 32.6

Age group of 49-32 19,919,836 34.4

Total 57,861,085 100.0

In terms of KONDA findings, the graph below shows the progress of political preferences of first time

voters, young people between ages 18 and 32 and students in the May ve June findings.

4

38

4

22

2

6

2

10

7

7

14

14

2

2

0 50 100

Those in the gray area

Turkey

Preferences of the electorate in the gray area

Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP Iyi Parti Other parties Swing voters Non-voters


Roughly speaking, although the rate of swing voters and non-voters among young people and their

sub-clusters has decreased by one third, still the rate of swing voters and non-voters is

relatively high reaching two fold of the national average in some clusters.

In general, in the course of the electoral process and election campaigns within the past one month,

the preference for the CHP and MHP has increased and the rate of swing voters has slightly

decreased among young people at the age of 18-32. Yet, the Ak Parti and the CHP are still

behind their national averages among young people.

Again, another electoral cluster that will leave its mark on the 24 June election are the students who

make roughly 5.2 million people constituting 9 percent of the overall electorate. It is observed

that in the past one month, the Ak Parti has regressed and the CHP and MHP have made a

jump among students.

Among those who have become eligible to vote age-wise after 1 November, it is again observed that

the Ak Parti is in decline and the CHP is on the rise. 32 percent of the new voters indicate

that they are still undecided or consider not to vote.

Those voters who have deliberately refrained from voting in the 1 November elections still tend to

remain undecided or not to vote.

Kurds

11

22

29

32

31

30

19

23

38

37

9

11

24

11

21

18

28

15

22

18

5

2

7

9

9

6

13

7

6

5

8

6

7

6

11

11

9

9

10

8

6

8

6

10

8

8

8

10

7

8

2

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

1

44

39

21

27

15

23

18

30

13

21

14

10

6

5

3

4

4

5

2

3

% 0 % 50 % 100

June

May

June

May

June

May

June

May

June

May

Did

n’t

ca

st

a v

ote

in

the

1

No

ve

mb

er

ele

cti

on

s

Wa

sn

’t

eligib

le t

o

vo

te in

th

e

1

No

ve

mb

er

ele

cti

on

s

Age

s 1

8 -

32

Stu

de

nt

Tu

rke

y

Voting preferences of young people and new voters

Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP Iyi Parti Other parties Swing voters Non-voters


As shall be recalled in the May’18 Barometer, in the analysis of those clusters that would affect the

election outcome, the Kurds had been given a special place. Depending on the HDP’s passing

the electoral threshold or not, the parliamentary mathematics will radically change, thus it

will be directly determined by the Kurds’ choices as the HDP has essentially turned into the

political party of the Kurds.

Although the exact number is unknown, according to KONDA findings, there is a cluster of 14 percent

among the adult population who identify themselves as Kurds and 2 percent who identify

themselves as Zaza. Again, the KONDA findings show that two third of these voters live in the

region whereas the remaining one third live in other parts of Turkey, mainly Istanbul.

An analysis of the change in the preferences of the Kurds across the country during the election

process shows that the rate of HDP preference has increased from 46 percent to 53 percent.

It is also observed that the Ak Parti preference among the Kurds has increased from 22

percent to 24 percent.

Among those who define themselves as Zaza, the Ak Parti preference has decreased from 41 percent

to 31 percent whereas the HDP preference has increased from 9 percent to 23 percent and

the CHP preference from again 9 percent to 26 percent.


Among the Kurds in the region and outside the region, the undecided status in May has been turning

into a preference for the HDP.

41

40

24

22

31

41

29

26

23

23

38

37

24

20

4

6

26

9

11

13

4

1

22

18

7

6

1

1

3

1

1

1

6

5

1

1

53

46

23

9

42

33

53

50

10

8

9

9

2

3

4

7

8

1

1

2

1

3

3

1

2

2

1

1

1

14

21

14

18

9

28

11

19

15

19

14

21

2

2

2

4

9

3

4

3

2

4

2

3

% 0 % 50 % 100

June

May

June

May

June

May

June

May

June

May

June

May

Tu

rkis

hK

urd

ish

Za

za

Ku

rds

ou

tsid

e

the

regio

n

Ku

rds in

the

regio

nTu

rke

y

Voting preferences of the Kurds

Ak Parti CHP MHP HDP

Iyi Parti D. Political parties Swing voters Non-voters



8. GLOSSARY of TERMS All findings in Barometer reports are based on answers to the questions directed to respondents who

were interviewed face-to-face in field surveys. Some questions and response options are then

used in the rest of the report in short or simplified form. For example, the respondents who

respond to the question on how religious they see themselves as “a person who is a believer,

but does not fulfill religious requirements” are shortly identified as “believers” in the report.

This glossary is prepared for both the readers who receive the report for the first time and

the readers who need further clarification on the terms. The first table provides a list of the

terms and their explanations, and the following tables list the questions and response

options which establish the basis for these terms..

DEFINITION

Alevi muslim: A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Alevi Muslim

Lower middle class: Households with an income per capita in the 60 percent segment

but which do not own a car

Lower class: Households whose income per capita is in the lowest 20 percent

segment

Arab: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Arab

Headscarf: A woman who does not cover her head or a man with a headscarf

or whose spouse does not cover her head with a headscarf

Chador: A woman who wears chador or a man whose spouse wears a cha-

dor

Religious: A person who tries to fulfill the requirements of the religion

Religious conservative: A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as religious conservative

Traditional conservative: A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as traditional conservative

Believer: A person who believes in the requirements of the religion, but

does not fulfill them completely

Non-believer: A person who does not believe in the requirements of the religion

Urban area: Settlements with a population of more than 4000 (differs from the

official definition)

Rural area: Settlements with a population of less than 4000 (differs from the

official definition)

Kurdish: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Kurdish

Metropolitan: Settlements which are located within the integrated boundaries of

the most crowded 15 cities (differs from the official definition)

Modern: A person who identifies his/her lifestyle as modern

No cover: A woman who does not cover her head or a man whose spouse

does not cover her head

Pious: A person who fulfills the requirements of the religion completely

Sunni muslim: A person who identifies his/her religion/sect as Sunni Muslim

Turban: A woman who wears a turban or a man whose spouse wears a tur-

ban

Turkish: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Turkish

Upper class: Households whose income per capita is in the highest 20 percent

segment

New middle class: Households whose income per capita is in the 60 percent seg-

ment and which own a car


Zaza: A person who identifies his/her ethnic origin as Zaza

Multiple correspondence

analysis

It is a data analysis technique for nominal categorical data, used

to detect and represent underlying structures in a data set. It is

used for applying Correspondence Analysis (CA) to large data sets

with more than two variables.

Questions and Response Options

Which of the three lifestyle clusters below

do you feel yourself belonging to?

Modern

Traditional Conservative

Religious Conservative

We are all citizens of the Turkish Republic,

but we may have different ethnic origins;

which identity do you know/feel that you

belong to?

Turkish

Kurdish

Zaza

Arab

Other

Which religion or sect do you feel you belong

to?

Sunni Muslim

Alevi Muslim

Other

Settlement Code (Data obtained from the sample) Rural

Urban

Metropolitan

Do you cover your head or does your spouse

cover her head when going out of your

home? How do you cover your head?

No head cover

Headscarf

Turban

Chador

Bachelor male Which of the below describes you in terms

of piety?

A person who does not believe in the re-

quirements of the religion

A person who believes in the requirements

of the religion, but does not fulfill them com-

pletely

A person who tries to fulfill the requirements

of the religion

A person who fulfills the requirements of the

religion completely

Economic classes (determined by using

household size, household income and car

ownership)

Lower class

Lower middle class

New middle class

Upper class

Documents

KONDA · Doğu Perinçek 0.1 0.2 Swing voters - Non-voters / Non-voters - Invalid votes 12.4 13.8 Total 100.0 100.0 However, it is to be noted that the overlap of the KONDA measurements