Knowledge and Values

Knowledge and Values By Philip G. Smith

The first point I wish to make is that a small change in title might be conducive to a better understanding of what I’m going to say. Let’s change “Knowledge and Values” to “Human Knowing and Valuing.”

There are several reasons for such a change: (1) Even though it is rather commonplace in twentieth-century philosophy to recognize that epistemol- ogy is not about some transcendent realm (i.e., it does not enable one to vault outside of human experience and grasp with certainty some pervasive truths), nevertheless, it is well to remind ourselves of this, especially on those occasions when we wish to explore the relation of knowledge and values-the relation of human knowing to human valuing. If we have super- human standards for knowledge, then the kind of value assertions that human beings actually make and use will, of course, appear to be hopelessly noncognitive. More mundane standards for knowledge, on the other hand, enable one to take a closer look at various kinds of value assertions and to see whether some of them may be treated as propositional claims, supported by good reasons, and decidable, at least in principle, as being true or false.

(2) Another reason for introducing the word “Human” in the title, is to remind us of what is sometimes called “the human condition.’’’ It is in this human condition that we find one of the keys to understanding the relation of knowing and valuing. It has been said that we are stuck between the animals and the angels. What makes this condition so sticky is that human life is temporal, yet we have neither the preserving instincts of the lower animals nor the detached rationality of a God-like creature for whom visions of the past and the future are as vivid and compelling as the present. Human life is thus pervaded with concern. The reason we are not content to drift thoughtlessly with the present, is our fear of future consequences. We thus attempt rational self-direction. To be rational, in human terms, means to constrain present desires and action in the light of both past experience and a projection of values or disvalues that may be realized in the future. And it is this attempt at self-direction that is at the heart of both knowing and val u i ng .

(3) Finally, the participles “Knowing” and “Valuing” make it somewhat easier to avoid certain traditional mistakes than do the nouns “Knowledge” and “Value.” This is, I think, especially true in value theory where we shall take verbs and adverbs as being more literal than nouns and adjectives.

I. THE RELATION OF KNOWING TO DOING It has frequently been said, especially by pragmatists, that “knowing is

for the sake of doing.” This may well be a true saying, if taken in some very comprehensive sense. For example, if one views the history of the develop- ment of human knowledge from the perspective of, say, evolutionary theory, then the instrumental value of knowledge may well stand out as an important characteristic. But in any less comprehensive context, the notion that knowledge is for the sake of doing tends to obscure important differences between common sense and science and between the role of knowledge in doing and the role of doing in knowing.

Philip G. Smith is Chairman of the Department of Historical, Philosophical and Comparative Studies of Education at Indiana University, Bloomington.

1. I am indebted to C.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1962) for this statement of “the human condition.”

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30 EDUCATIONAL THEORY

Common sense knowing is, no doubt, organized largely around common doings. It has developed as a result of man’s taking a thoughtful, prudential posture in the midst of such doings. Again, while from the broad sweep of history, science may be viewed as an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary refinement of common sense knowing and doings, from any more limited frame, the instrumental value of scientific knowledge becomes rather tenuous. And what one learns in courses of study in the various sciences is almost never used in a replicative sense in ordinary experience. Indeed, such knowledge is seldom used even in the sense of application, unless, of course, one makes a career in one of the applied sciences.

Nevertheless, even scientific knowing is intimately related to doing. But the relationship is reversed; doing is for the sake of knowing. Scientific knowledge is developed and refined not by a passive contemplation but by the rather esoteric doings involved in experimentation and verification. How then is scientific knowledge connected to ordinary human experience?

At this point there is a profoundly confused notion, to the effect that scientific knowledge is predictive. But to predict means to prognosticate, to prophesy, in short, to foretell the future. If science really could foretell the future, it would, indeed, be quite useless. For if the future were fatally determined by the present, knowledge would be pointless; it could make no difference. We noted in our introductory remarks that one of the characteristics of the human condition is that human life is temporal. And to be thoughtfully prudential requires one to be rather self-consciously temporal. In contrast, scientific knowledge is non-temporal; it provides ways of understanding some of the contingent conditions of the space-time matrix in which we must live and shape our transitory lives. An understanding of what is contingent enables one to project some of the probable consequences of alternative doings. And this is the key to prudent and responsible human action. To the extent that scientific knowledge is useful in such projections, prudence and responsibility require that it be so used.

11. ROLE OF VALUING IN DOING

What has remained implicit in all we have said so far is the role of valuing in human doings. Just as knowledge would be pointless if future experience were rigidly determined by the kind of contingencies studied by science, any kind of decision-making would also be pointless if all possible forms and contents of future experience were of equal value. And if there were no sensible way of deciding that one thing is more valuable than another, the distinction between a sensible and prudent action and one that is foolish or perverse would be a distinction that is foolish and perverse. And if there be anyone here who really believes that this is the case, then rather than leaving the room, he might just as well continue to listen to me with great attention, for that would be no less sensible than deciding to do anything else.

All of this is not to say, however, that the concern that is a central characteristic of the human condition is so relentless that it dominates all of man’s doings. Even man has his moments. He can be both more animal-like and more angelic than one might suppose from an examination of the median or mode of human experience.

By “animal-like” I do not mean doings that are either impulsive or compulsive. Such doings are all too common at the median or center of human experience. Indeed, it is when we first eat the apple of understand-

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KNOWLEDGE AND VALUES 31

ing of this very human tendency to act on impulse, that we first feel concern for ourselves and, perhaps, for others. By “animal-like” I make reference, rather, to a dimension of human experience which, while always present, is not typically at the center or focus of our attention. We are, after all, as are all other animals, sentient beings. And every human experience has an immediate sensory quality to it. But rather than being merely pushed and pulled by this sensuous, animal dimension of our experience, we can, on occasion, with a kind of angelic unconcern, stop the inexorable tick-tock of our work-a-day lives long enough to contemplate and prize even the form as well as the content of this aspect of human experience.

111. MODES OF VALUING

Human valuing may take place in many forms or modes. The first distinction that is usually made in this connection is between the intrinsic and the extrinsic. This is a useful distinction, providing we recognize that what is thus differentiated are two modes of valuing rather than distinctive properties or attributes residing in what is valued.

When a person values something intrinsically, he prizes or cherishes it just for its own sake and in its own terms, without conscious regard for any of its relationships with anything else. Dewey once suggested that when objects are valued in this manner, they ought to be called invaluables rather than values. This is probably correct, providing we recognize that what is thus viewed as priceless or beyond estimation is so, not because its value could not be estimated, but because to do so would be to move outside this intrinsic mode of valuing. Conscious consideration of price, or of other types of worth are irrelevant and distracting to the kind of interest that is generated in the intrinsic mode.

As a result of valuing in this mode, one may of course, be aware of his own preferences and may even, as best he can, compare his present likes and dislikes to similar emotions or feelings embedded in both memory and imagination. One may thus develop a kind of comparative preference rating and place his present reactions at some suitable point on a scale. In doing so, one is not, strictly speaking, engaging in an evaluation. Although, of course, for persons of highly cultivated tastes, the results may be much the same.

The distinction between a preference rating and an evaluation may be viewed as a logical nicety in some quarters where, perhaps, to confuse the two may cause no great harm. But in passing, I cannot refrain from com- menting that in the field of educational research and evaluation, confusion on this point is a mischief maker of considerable significance.

Extrinsic Valuing

In contrast to valuing in the intrinsic mode, more frequently we are interested in this or that precisely because of its actual or potential relations to other things. In such cases valuing is done extrinsically. In this mode, not only valuing but evaluating is possible and is called for whenever, as Dewey might say, the value of something is problematic. But, of course, what any individual recognizes as problematic depends a great deal upon his past experience. All of us learn that certain objects are valuable without engaging in an assessment of merit or worth, just as we learn other characteristics, attributes, and contingent relationships, without engaging in Dewey’s

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“problem solving.” Were this not so, there could be no problems. In order for something to be problematic, it must be seen in relation to some context which is, at least tentatively, held to be settled and determinant.

Iv. FORMS OF EVALUATION

There are three common types or forms of evaluation that, when reasonably completed, may be used to certify or warrant the claim that something is valuable. Propositions that express the conclusions of such evaluations are, therefore, cognitive claims and may properly be referred to as being either true or false. What I have just said, is, of course, the keystone thesis of the position known as cognitivism in value theory. It should be noted, however, that this thesis does not necessarily involve the claim that all valuational assertions are propositions of this sort. Nor does it require one to hold that such valuational propositions are factual or empirical (i.e. synthetic). Nor, for that matter, does it require that such propositions be treated as purely analytic.

The terms ‘true’ and ‘false,’ in this connection, express the same basic methological claim they express in every field of disciplined inquiry, except metaphysics. The word ‘true’ means, “there is a sufficient con- vergence of evidence to warrant or certify the assertion.” The questions, what kinds of evidence are relevant, and what constitutes sufficiency, are questions to be answered by a normative examination of the types of evaluations that have produced reliable conclusions, vindicated in human experience.

There are three distinct forms of evaluation rather widely recognized in the literature of twentieth-century philosophy. But, unfortunately, there is as yet no standardized terminology for naming the types. This is partly the case because there are still some unresolved problems with respect to logical structure and ontological status. Many authors, therefore, tend to adopt more or less provocative naming that reflects their position on these con- troversial matters. I might say, in passing, that this typology of evaluations seems not to be well understood, in any set of terms, within the field of education. This failure is, I believe, a source of much confusion in the literature concerning evaluative research in education.

I have adopted the following names: 1. Evaluation of exemplified value 2. Evaluation of instrumental value 3. Evaluation of contributory value “To evaluate” means to assess merit, worth, desirability or, in short,

value (in the sense of valuableness). And the position I hold is that in cases where it is possible and feasible to find or to generate a respectable amount of relevant data, each of these types of evaluation may lead to conclusions that are objective and true in the methodological (rather than the metaphys- ical or ontological) meaning of these terms. And, as I said, this is a kind of minimum claim for cognitivism in value theory.

V. EVALUATIONS

Some brief comments about each of these types will, no doubt, be sufficient to enable this audience to see what kind of distinctions are made by this typology.

(1) To evaluate exemplified value means to assess or determine the

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presence or absence of certain properties or attributes that are held to be “good making” or “bad making” characteristics for the class or kind of thing that is the case in point. The process is essentially one of comparing something to a set of standards or ideals to determine to what extent these standards are exemplified in the case under consideration. The method of inquiry is essentially empirical, ranging from direct observation (as, e.g., in judging an athletic or artistic performance) to complex forms of chemical or other scientific analysis (as, e.g., in judging the nutritional value of some product).

The conclusion of such an evaluation asserts that the value standards are exemplified to such and such a degree and it implicitly claims that the standards are appropriate and defensible for such cases. The structure of this form of evaluation is that of sorting or classifying. What is distinctive about it is not (as is sometimes alleged) that there are emotions or attitudes involved, but rather that the standards that are used are themselves valuable or desirable. They are not merely desired or merely conventional and useful.

A nonessential but nonetheless typical characteristic of assessing exemplified value, in contrast to sorting and classifying, is that judgment rather than exact calculation plays the critical role. This is the case both because the appropriate standards are frequently not fully explicit (especially in the sense of exactness of weight in various combinations) and because the kind of cases to be evaluated typically requires discrimination of qualitative differences rather than measurement of quantitative ones. It is not surprising, therefore, that the problem of how to increase reliability without sacrificing validity is a troublesome one in this form of evaluation. Thus it is that expertise is frequently the nub of the matter. And the notion, now popular in some educational quarters, that we ought to have “expert proof” evaluation is even more perverse than the drive to develop “teacher proof” curricula.

(2) To evaluate instrumental value means to assess utility or effectiveness in relation to a valuable end, or to some intermediate state of affairs along the road. An instrumental value must have utility but not everything that has utility may be properly termed an instrumental value. Again, what is involved in the difference between utility and instrumental value is not merely emotions, attitudes or preferences, but the defensible valuableness of the end. The method of inquiry is constituted by the empirical- experimental procedures for assessing utility and effectiveness.

Much of the difficulty with this form of evaluation in education probably stems from Kaplan’s “The Law of the Hammer.” The training of many researchers in education is focused, almost exclusively, upon the use of certain statistical procedures designed to produce reliable estimates of how much of an observed variance can be attributed to various factors or vari- ables identified and included in the research design. Since this kind of research is easily confused with studies of so-called “cause-effect,” and since cause-effect sounds very much like means-end, and since one way to compare means is to compare their utility, educational researchers are inclined to hammer all evaluation problems into at least the appearance of something that could be studied by the methods and techniques that they understand. We all recognize that the field of education is loaded with evaluational problems. Actually, however, assessment of instrumental value is either inappropriate, or else of only supplemental importance, in connection with most probfems in the field of education.

(3) To assess the contributory value of something is to determine its

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merit or worth as an integral part of some larger, organic, valuable, whole. A logical calculus for dealing in such organic relationships is rather mind- boggling. But, strangely enough, even ordinary citizens can and do engage in this form of evaluation with some reliability and success. How do we manage evaluations in this form? At this point, C.I. Lewis speaks of a “synthetic envisionment of very large wholes”-in fact, even of “alife that is good on the whole.”* It is such an envisionment against which one may inspect an actual or projected event or experience and assess its fittingness and possible contribution. I suspect that the method that is used is more nearly that of the creative artist (or creative scientist) than that of “problem solving” as ordinarily conceived. In composing a painting or a symphony, the artist considers a line or a color, or an arrangement of sounds, in terms of how well “it works,” as they say, as an organic part of the larger whole he is striving to create. Or, as Harry Broudy has put it, no part should be otiose or ultimately absurd, in either a work of art or a human life.3

Since one cannot go about his daily affairs constantly envisioning large wholes against which to judge every upcoming experience and its possible alternatives, what we evidently do is to accept, in the absence of a reasonable doubt, a large array of “good things,” as having prima facie contributory value. Courtesy, kindness, a good night’s rest, a nutritious meal, are all simply recognized as fitting into and contributing to our vision of a good life style. Surely, in education, much of what is in the curriculum is there because of prima facie contributory value to the larger whole we call “education.” If we are called upon to justify the inclusion of poetry rather than push-pin, or say, bingo, what is at issue here is not intrinsic value versus instrumental value, but rather educational value, i.e., how does each stack up as contributory parts of what we mean by “education.” Various mean- ings of education are judged in turn, for contributory value to some envisionment of the “good life.”

Many philosophers of education, ranging from John Dewey to Richard Peters, recognize that poetry is rather more valuable than bingo. But I find their discussions of justification rather disappointing. A simple intrinsic- instrumental dichotomy just doesn’t provide an adquate catalogue of values, or of forms of justification.

VI. JUSTIFYING STANDARDS

This brings us to the problem of justifying the various standards, ends, and wholes, the defensibility of which is implictly claimed each time they are used in the three types of case evaluations we have discussed. It is at this point that non-cognitivism in value theory cannot be so easily brushed aside. Many non-cognitivists might agree substantially with all I have said so far, but they would now point out that it is precisely in relztion to standards and ends that the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ do not apply. Reason may be used in evaluating cases, but in so doing, reason is the slave of a passion that has embraced the standards or ends.

No one denies that human beings are passionate creatures who do sometimes become deeply committed to ends or standards without appar- ent reason. But what is at issue is not the facts of typical human behavior, in either valuing or believing, but the possibilities. Is it really the case that

2. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 505-510. 3. Harry S. Broudy, “Exploration of Value-The Third Culture,” unpublished paper deliv-

ered at YMCA Forum, University of Illinois, 1965, pp. 1-9.

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there are some standards or ends to which we must be committed if we are to get on with civilized human affairs and yet which are such that, even in principle, they cannot be rationally defended or justified? Are there necessary ends that can only be passionately embraced?

I’m not sure I know just what such a claim would mean. If some particular standards or ends can be shown to be necessary for the conduct of human affairs, then surely this itself constitutes some kind of rational justification for commitment to them. But perhaps, what is claimed is that there are standards or ends which cannot be defended rationally because they are presupposed by every form of rational defense. If so, such standards or ends would, presumably, be the counterpart in evaluating to the principle of induction in empirical inquiries. If this is what is meant by “reason must finally be the slave of passion” then this is no better an argument for non-cognitivism in value theory than it is for non-cognitivism in science. But it is, of course, an argument for a kind of benign skepticism in all areas of human knowing and doing.

How then can one know what is valuable when the question is about standards, ends, or wholes? The obvious answer is that in the face of a reasonable doubt, one must undertake an evaluation, using one or more of the three forms already discussed. There is no more reason to short-cut orderly inquiry in seeking knowledge of value than in seeking knowledge of fact. And if this seems to introduce into value inquiry, some sort of circular- ity, infinite regress, open-endedness, or “mountain range effect,” then this could be taken as an indication that we are finally getting values out of the realm of mysticism and under the control of fallible, but orderly and self- correcting, human inquiry. It is only the layman who supposes that science is not open-ended.

This is not to say that there are no important differences between evaluational inquiries and inquiries in the various sciences. At least in their present state, value inquiries are much closer to common sense than are the more esoteric investigations of an advanced science. Values tend to ground much more quickly into biological and cultural habits. This is to say that reasonable doubts are more easily generated concerning what is taken for granted in a scientific investigation than in a value inquiry. On the other hand, since values are much more directly related to human actions than are the theories, laws, and facts of science, it’s not surprising that there is greater human concern, even anxiety, about values.

VII. THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW

Perhaps nowhere is concern both more evident and evidential of the human condition, than in those situations calling for evaluations from the moral point of view. What are the defining characteristics of such situations? Said differently, how may we differentiate the domain of the moral as distinct from the non-moral?

We should realize at the outset that this question may itself be question- begging. Perhaps a// situations that, in any way, involve human beings, are moral. Or, shall we say, at least potentially moral. On the other hand, since moral valuations are not the only kind of valuations that are of human concern, it does seem useful to mark off various valuational points of view. And once this is done, one can note, in the manner of an anthropologist, the kind of situations in which persons take a moral point of view, as distinct from or in addition to, a prudential point of view, an aesthetic point of view,

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an economic point of view, or the like. Such a description of what people actually do does not, of course, settle the question of what they ought to do. But it does give us a kind of tentative ballpark demarcation that may provide a useful starting point.

It seems that we feel obligated to take the moral point of view toward any decision or action likely to have a significant impact upon the character or well-being of any person. Studies also reveal two characteristics of the moral point of view itself: (1) When relevant, the moral point of view takes precedence over all other points of view, e.g., a legal point of view, codes of etiquette, or the like; and (2) the “oughts” of the moral point of view are intended to be universalizable, and hence, in this sense, impersonal. This is sometimes indicated by use of the impersonal pronoun. For example, we say, “One ought to do so and so in a situation such as this.” In other words, logically speaking, there is always, from the moral point of view, a single correct answer to all questions of the form “What ought I to do?” And the answer is, “You ought to do what anyone ought to do, in a situation such as this.”

This manner of speaking enables one to see the difference between impersonal normative materials, such as principles, standards, ideals, and the like, and prescriptive statements, such as directives, exhortations, and other imperatives. One can also see a difference between an evaluation and a decision to act. One may, for example, conduct an evaluation of several possible courses of action in a given situation and conclude that “one ought to do such and such,” or that “such and such is the right thing to do. . . .” But if what we have said about evaluations is even approximately correct, then such a conclusion is an intellectual or cognitive conclusion; it is not a decision to act. It follows that, conceivably, one might conduct an evaluation from the moral point of view and arrive at a morally sound conclusion, yet if the person doing this were not a moral person, he might feel no obligation actually to do what one ought to do.

This point may be rather disappointing. But honesty requires us to acknowledge that this is the other side of the coin of cognitivism in value theory. If, in evaluations, reason is not to be the slave of passion, then the price we pay is to create a gap between knowing and doing. The question before us then is how, from a moral point of view, is this gap to be bridged.

Moral Autonomy

Let us examine this gap just a little more. In the first place, a recogni- tion of this gap enables us to understand certain human failures that are very real. In the Book of Common Prayer the general confession reads, “We have done those things we ought not to have done and we have left undone those things we ought to have done. And there is no health in us.” In the moral domain we are just as responsible for our omissions as for commis- sions. How many failures of nerve, of courage, of self-discipline, fall into this gap between knowledge and action? We can see how it is that the man of passionate commitment, whose resolution is not “sicklied o’er with the pale cast of thought” may, nevertheless, have a somewhat better moral track record than one who has far greater knowledge of the Good-i.e., knowledge of what is morally right. On the other hand, how many of the world’s remediable evils are the result of blind commitment, good intentions, or a sturdy but unenlightened moral recititude?

The second thing to note about this gap is that the only place it is really

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troublesome is in the moral domain. In science, for example, we noted that the relation of knowledge and action is reversed; action is for the sake of knowledge. The fact that scientific knowledge (and its attendant doings) can be used or neglected for either good or evil is, of course, a moral problem, rather than a problem within science. We also noted that since concern is a characteristic of the human condition, the gap between knowledge and action in the prudential domain is automatically bridged by a healthy self- interest. Said differently, one can give a rational justification for prudence and a prudential justification for being rational. But the reality of the gap between knowledge and action in the moral domain suggests that attempts to construct a rational justification for morality will never be fully successful. And a prudential justification for morality, if successful, would constitute a reduction of morality to self-interest. While some philosophers have under- taken this kind of reduction, to many of us it seems to be, at the very least, cou nter-i n t u it ive.

In contemporary ethical theory the notion of moral autonomy is used to bridge this gap. To be moral, by definition, one must have the kind of commitment or motivation that impels one to do what is right. But to be morally autonomous, this commitment must itself be consciously chosen and one’s action must be regulated or enlightened by knowledge. How do such commitments come about and in what way may moral autonomy be justified ?

It happens that some forty years ago, at the University of Illinois, Josiah Royce gave a series of lectures in which he struggled with these question^.^ Royce recognized that an appeal to non-moral considerations, such as rational self-interest, may be very useful in reinforcing moral commitment. But any justification of such commitment cannot be made in non-moral terms. The commitment that motivates action in the moral domain must be a free commitment to the ideals, standards or principles of that domain. In explaining this Royce said:

Ethical values . . . belong to single acts insofar as we judge that these acts do or do not conform to an already accepted purpose. But in order that my life should possess an ethical value . . . I must then possess purposes, or ideals, which I have accepted as mine. In the light of these ideals I must myself judge my own individual acts . . . . While no purpose can be morally authoritative over against my own acts unless this purpose appears to me to be my own . . . that which I choose, we are nevertheless unable to define this purpose by merely looking within, at our own instinctive prejudices and desires, I have no innate unity of life plan.5

The position that Royce took in these lectures is sometimes known as a theory of self-realization. But he showed that such a theory need not be egoistic nor selfish in motivation. It is true that as I strive for self-realization, I take actions that seem worthy to me in the light of my ideals. But my ideals need not place my personal advantage above the welfare of others. I may find self-satisfaction and self-realization in altruistic acts.

The question of how it is that one develops a benevolent sensitivity to the needs and wants of others and incorporates a concern for others as an important part of his own life style, is a question for social psychology.

4. Josiah Royce, Urbana Lectures in Ethics, 1907, unpublished papers, folio 76, Harvard

5. Urbana Lectures, folio 76, lecture 2, pp. 1-9. University Archives.

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Some of the studies of Piaget were addressed to this question. There are just two points to which I would like to call attention. First, if it is shown that one learns to take into account the desires of others-if one learns to strive for a harmony of interests rather than a stubborn and selfish dominance-if one learns this because of the prudential value of so doing, it is merely psychologizing (a form of the genetic fallacy) to argue that therefore all altruism is a disguised selfishness. And second, we should note that the question of how one learns to supress self-centeredness and to pay attention to what others want, is really question-begging. The ego-centrism of the human infant is really just an assumption of certain western traditions. Given the almost total dependence of the human infant, I should think a more interesting question is how it is that we manage to create a true individuality. How do we manage to build a life style that has some unique- ness of character and flavor? How is it that some persons actually do attain a large degree of autonomy?

VIII. CONTRIBUTORY MORAL VALUE

One of the questions that remain is how moral obligation relates to moral value. How does rightness relate to goodness? This is sometimes taken as the central question between teleologists and deontologists in ethical theory. Is one obligated to take those actions that are well calculated to bring into being what is morally good? If so, the action is determined to be the right thing to do in terms of its consequences and it is justified as having instrumental moral value. Utilitarianism is one example of such a view. The right thing to do is to act so as to maximize the good.

Or, by contrast, is it the case that one is obligated to take right actions? That is, take actions that are right more or less regardless of how things may work out in some particular case. All of this is related to the common sense question of whether the end justifies the means.

As I see it, the problem here is much like that of assessing the educational value of various curriculum materials. The difficulty with traditional views is, again, an inadequate catalogue or typotogy of value. Of course, it is the end that justifies the means as means. But the moral point of view requires more than an assessment of utility even for the most noble of ends. And it also requires more than an intrinsic interest or obligation toward certain acts just for their own sake. Acts may be judged both for their exemplified rightness, and for their contributory goodness. And both are required for an evaluation from the point of view of moral autonomy.

Finally, moral autonomy, as conceived by a non ego-centric, self- realizationist theory bridges the gap between knowledge and action and makes goodness and rightness mutually implicative. And if someone asks, “Why ought I be moral?” one can, in most cases, supply reinforcing or motivating considerations by an appeal to rational self-interest. For it is not very often that morality conflicts with a truly enlightened self-interest. But if this question means not merely why I ought to do some particular right act, but why I ought to incorporate the moral point of view into my life style, then I believe the answer must be that being moral is a contributory part of any life that is good on the whole.

If any mature person honestly cannot see this, then I can find no moral justification for his being moral. With such a person we will, no doubt, first

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appeal to his self-interest. If this doesn’t work, we then try to coerce or restrict his behavior for the sake of our self-interest. And we do this because, under the circumstances, this seems to be the right thing to do, even from a moral point of view.

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Knowledge and Values