Klein - Nature of Nature

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131 O n he Nature

Nature

Te t i t le o f th is lectur tx ""on the n a t ~ ~ r ef nat~xre " rnmc~ciiatel?

shows its com plex ity for wh at is rneant th e first 115e0 1t h e w o rd ? l a t u , r i s no t q u i te the sa me as \ \ ,hat i5 m ean t b y k 1 1 ~second use o f th is sa i r ie word . Th is wen is to ind icate a n

unavo idab le a l i~h igu i tyn the word n u fu rC . ncleed, the arnbiqt-

i ty , o r bet ter , the an~ b igu i t ies u rrou nd ing t l re use o f th isM orcl

a r e i r e ~ n e n d o u s .This lecture is supposed not to remove tl~rbse

ambigu i t ies bu t to b r ing them to the fo re .-1 am no t fan t irc lj

cer ta in w ho is to b lame if I do no t rea ch you ki~ith r! \\7orcl\,

N a tu re o r I . In all fairness, I t h in k b o th . L e i i n e s t a t e a t t h e

o u ts e t t h a t a ny a t t e m p t t o l e c t ~ ~ r en this srtbject is I)ot~i~clo

remain severely l imi ted and i~ lsu ff ic ien t .Still, it i5 ~)crhalti,

worthwhi le to rnake the a t tempt , wherever i t r11a~~catl .

Let m e first give yo11 some ex amples of the. use of t l lc \?lord

nufztre i11 ancicrit literature.

In Aeschylus' Promethcus Bou~id, 'Prometheus repor ts I~o\;l,

1. Vv. 488-90

Lecture first deliver~l t St John's College, Annapo l i s , Rebr ~ ia r ~8, 1964 Firct pultll\hctlin T/ae Independent Jozrrnal of Plailosophy, Vol 111, 1979

219





a long tirrte, and this breaking away gives rise to a great

awareness of the ""old" and t he "ncw," Are tve to li~xderstar~dtich

eor1\l3icnous events and changes- oth man-made and not inan-

xnadc -- to Be natural?

'There is a perpetual and grand fight co~xcernirtg this

cluestion.

I,ucretilrs answers it in thc affirmative. I-lis book is eiltitled

r io t "O n Nature" (as so Inany Greek t)ooks were) bu t De rcmni

rrclltcm,which we shorild perhaps translate "On the Nat(11alnessof 'Tliings." Eelipscs of the sun and th e moon, earthquakes,

\torxns, tl-r~rncler nd lightniilg, are natural events due to "natural

causes." 1,ileretius does not presume to describe these causes ac-

e~rrtitely.Most of the tinxe he mentions several possible threads

o-Icausatior~.~rlL hi s point is tha t there ~njcsfbe a natural con-

caterlation of events which leacis to the surprising and seernirlgl\.

extractrdinar~r cctlrrencc, that such an occurrence is not the

rcslllt of a whiii~ sica l nd irrational intervention on the part of

gods or ghosts, that everything- the inconspicuous as well as

th e eorispic~~orlrs--s bo ur ~d j. the "bond of i~a tur c" focclz~c

~znttrrar),"s we have to learn from ""nature's aspect and lessori"

(licidtlrac sprtdcs rufioclnc.) .TThis also holcls, according to

1 rrereti~~s,or the gradual as wcll as the \,iolerxt changes irr men's

live+,customs and laws- clralxges that, although man-made, oc-

erlr nat~urally nd in accordarxe with the ""bond of nature."

'Tlic alternative view is that conspicuor~s, ot 1na11-madea\

wcll a\ man-made occurrences are due to causes ter~netl ot-

xratirral and sometimes ""super-natural." The relationship implied

it 1 the use of the term rlcrftc~.als, in this context, one of rivcrlry.

'T'Iiic, ivalr) is profound and mo~xlel~tous.t may lead- utside

thv I,llcretian fralnc- to a deification of rlatrire as, for illstance,rn P l i n ~ , ~n d ScrlecaR (first centtury A.I l.) , in Lorenzo Valla"

(Liltcc~nth cntrrrj), in Sl)irrozdO nd in any so-called pantheistic

'1. (:f, V, 752.

5. 1. 302; 1. 57 , 92-1; VT, 9Ofif.

6, . 148; 11 , 61: [ I l , 93; 1'1, 41.

7, at~rrnlFlistory, 11, lritro., esp. 7 (5) 14 ff

8 . Nattir.ctl(:~jrruc,siiortc,~,T, 45 , 3.

9. le volupfrrtc. 1, 13.10 . St.(< I:'tlric.s I Preface.

philosophy. Nature is identified wit11 God or nearl?. so, as Z,orc3rr-

zo Valla says: ""Nature is the sa me as God or alnxost the sanlc~."'

As far as the non-man-made conspicuous c-~~entsre eon-

cerned, the Lucretia11 view tends to prc~ia il. t is clominarlt to-

day. Yet the naturalness of nat ural phenonrlcna is- itlitc apart

from the relationship of rivalry-- of a n intricatcl kind. I \hallhave to deal with that in a tnomcxxt.

As to the man-made conspicuous events, the struggle betmreext

the Lucretian and anti-Lucretian views goes on unremittingly.

Th e question is whether the eircumstanees sllrrounding radicill

changes in cu sto ~ns nd institutions are to be understoocji as

natural or as not natural, whether m an, as the principal agent

of such transitions, is the product of natural forces or is tlimseli

transcending natuie, guided either by his own reason or frrlfil

ling a proviclential plan, whether reason itself is natriral or abom

nature. In this struggle the relationship of rivalry i~ npl iedn th euse of th e word natu re is compounded with o ther relatioraships

which we have to consider next.

Let tls revert t o the inconspicuous things, elent s aticl \ i tua

tions, and especially to those no t man-made. Ilere, evcq thirig

is characterized by mobility ancl actua l anovemerlt, c,o illat a n \

stillness is but a transient phase in a continuous chain of c11:iitgc

But change itself is perceptible only with respect to, ancl f r o ~ n

a background of, somethi~~gtable and tr ~~ lj .ncllanging. Nn l l ~ r < ~

is indeed characterized- ejrond its lxorizorttal relationship ;\rttl

its relationship of rivalry- by a twofold aspect, that of ~tlohl'!-ify and t hat of stability, the la tter being the l~ackgrotlrrtl, he

foundation, and the source of th e former. To enlarge ftirtlter.

upon this inwarti rclations?zip of nature I shall haw to rr-\akv

a digression and deal with the etymology of the word r l a f z l r r ,

The English word n a f u rP stems directly from ihe 1,atin

nafura, and this is true of the corresponding wt)rcl\ i n nlo9l-

modern languages of Indo-European origin. excep";cor thck

Slavonic ones. Nat t~r u, n tu rn, though not a partic,i~)ialornr.

which it seems to be, is cognate with the deponent vcrh n r ~ $ r * o r _



--sz 3 6 5 : : 5 = 4

; rpP&. ,2 " s -" , * c , 3' 9 - " 7 ": -re 3""- "-.

0 S &;i.$-5c

r"v 3 " C . z e C :n 3 t 2 a -.< 0 3 r i c .m 2 z a = $n.,. S" 'ii : m "= ~ " ; L ? . E* d 3 - * < -5 E . g g g $=0 3 ? r t - " 2

- $ 5 "g'" gEL:m $3 d m *c

E. 5 c s 0:3 0 Er= E K C5$ + " = Z : = .

r r 3 - ? $S ; g - C p

gw +? a

3 yri ,

" zsz 9 . 5 < " .<in 3

=.To. %,? 7 ZE -5 2 5 'w

5 " r i - 3 5 C GD - 9 2 5

c f y o " 3 3b e 0 E3:=;5O i)

< 3 3 -c p 2 5$ u ,"'<

3 57Z g & - g =0 3 3"s - - * eC 3Q $+g-s"3

0

a-5 6. g.0 0-?

" " F " e lri-

3"n

* s e

C ti. C

C L . 3 z

" 3-2 '4

S; CL.a

3 'P';;

HZ"!

2. 6-Gw 3 w .CI

2Pie"

2;-3; 1'&

g- g.-+="

2 ky mr-

& % 20 g-v2 " *

rr C3C

2 ? - *

Z S ?g d

E" G -z.

g- g.!? ri- w.2 Ti/?

5. % 5"$ 2 5p- 4 <

c w.$ 2-. Q -7- 3 C:

="zz* " " -r erc 3 G



(:rcbc~ks callect sr~cl i source an bpxfi, meaning both a "begin-

xling" and a ""rule," meaning, Inore exactly, a comnlancliilg origin,

\orrich"i~ingwhich, by its co~rtrr~~zrtd ,rzitiafcs a chain of events

or a distribr~tionf tl.iings. The Latin prirlcipi~trn ranslates 1 5 ~ x 417erfec"irly well. Our Ei~glisllword principle rneans tlie same

tl-iirig, thougli it is often used vaguely arid most of the time in

a rtloclifiecl senst.. Wl~enever n apxii, a p~iizcipitr/,z,a prijlci-

~dtc,s ixivok<~cl ith respect to nature, t he yt~est ion f nature's

~rllcl~atigingspect is being answered. \&ha is riilore, this ar~swc~r

hralps tis to rcduee the seemingly irregular and eonspicilons

elranges in natiire to furrdainerltal identities, And the answer

rs still one coxicerning natr~re's iiward relationship.

Ansu~erswhich invoke a11 &pxq with respect to nature a rc

nlrrltifariorts, hut they I~elong gain to one and the same pat-

tc.rrr. Sorn~ti~~lechis pattcrn and the ele~llental ne are cotn-

hinecii, as seerns to be the case in the teaching of Anaxilllander,

reputedly tire first to use the term cjlpxxj. Anaxilllander meant

tho itrfinite ancl ind(2terrtzirtute (the hxstpov) to be the ap xq --""unclying and i nd est r~~ cti ble ";~ ~verything comes into being outol it arlcl everything reverts into it ; it thus underlies, corilprelle~lds

ancl governs exfcrythirrg,- n the opinion of the old Stoics "fierj

Ibri-lath" ~)eervadeshe entire universe and forins everything- it

i s divinity itself.-I n general, however, the cirpxq is either thc

bcgettirrg power or the xvorrib wllicll gives birth to all things,

o r Irotll. For Aristokle nature is &pxli in a twofold sense: it is

(a ) th c I~egc t t in~ ,lncllanging and inlperishat~lc ower which

works or1 a s~iitablenaterial, a nd it is (b) that pliable niaterial

wltich i s k i n g transfi)rmed by the begetting power into a natural

th ing . );'or Giordano Bruno, in thc sixteei~th entury, nature is

P,otll and ~ i ? i l r ~ l t a r i ~ o r l s l ~ ~he generator and the universal wombor, as he says, the ""matter" out of which everything comes " b ~ .

\say of separation, birth, and effltlxion." "That matter, then,"

17(' says!"'wllich unfolds what it has enfolded must be called

the. clivirlc and cxcrllent progellitor, generator and mother of

rrat~rr;il lrings; or, in s11111, ature in its totality."

T,vt trte call yollr attention again to this notion of an &pxfi,

o r a ~xinciplc,nvolved i r ~he eotlsideration of things natural.

12 . Diels-Kranz,: Anasiinantler t3. 1 - 3 .

13. (,'i~rtcc~vrzirrgit(, i :a irsc, I 'r i~l t ip l e i t c l O n r , Dial. IV.

It becomes necessary to invoke this notion becausc of t l ~ cspect

of stability and regularity of natu re and it is used to acconnt

for the inconspicuous as well as the conspicuous and sc1cinirigl~

irregularly changing phenomena. The hpxq, as tilt irun~ox.al>lc

start ing point of all change, delimits, ant1 aecotints for all changc.

It is indeed im13ossible o understand anything changing \vitl~oitt

resort to something taken hoth as unchanging anel as rcsl~or~si-

ble for the observed changes. But this has a mornctltous eonse-

cjuence: the inward relationship of rno13ility and stabilitj. ~vi thirl

naturei, the relationship between change and hpx~j f chal~gc,

leads us to abandon the horizontal relationship wliicsli sec~~nt~tl

to characterize our understanding of tlatnre. Nature itlel~ti-fietl.

in its aspect of stability, with something uilchanging bccorrrc\

identifiable with its own unc l~angiiig haracter, with that whiclr

it iinchangeabl~s, or~tside f all relationships. The shift tow:trcL

one of the poles of the inward relationship, narnelj. the pole of

stabilit~:of rest, of being, away from the pole of nlobilit!;

change, and becoming, perinits a reinarkable shift in o u r trw

of the word n u t ~ i r e .We speak of the nat~trr l f man, of tllc tlatrlrc.

of juctice, of the nature of tyranny, of the na ture of gods, of t l l ~

nature of a relationship, ancl so on and so forth. 7 '11 i5 \va? ol

speaking is meant to signify in every case tliat which cvcrything

by virtue of its inner unchanging corlstit txtio~~s; or, in other

words, that ~vhiehmakes everything be what it is. Tlle etynlolog~

of the word cp6crq, with its root cpu pointing no less to hc111q

than to becoming, appears justified. 'The title of this 1eclur.c

shows the shift in the meaning of n u t l~ rc :he "iiat~tre f nature."

rneans the "being of nature," tha t is, that which na tt ~r en it+

own right is supposed to ilcr.

Nature thus becoines paradigmatic for our ~~riderstitnclingof Being. On a large scale, we identify "natural 11ei1lg"with Being

itself. Everything "out there" in naturc we rrncferstantl sirnplj

to b ~ ,rior to any reflexion o n the nieanirlg of Being. Noboclq

can resist the temptation to assert that the sky ancl the stars,

the land a nd the sea, the mou l~ta ins nd th e rivers, the Jorests

and the marshes, the animals and the plants, cxrr, over

whelrningiy so, both in their unobtrusive and in tlieir ol~trusive

aspects; that everything is natural and that we o~irselves repart

of nature, forever surrounded anel dominated by it.- On ;I rl o

less large scale, however, this certainty may be tlireatcr~ed y



Lhr hunch that it itself, this certainty, is by no means natural,

that tllc~re nay be, irl fact, no nature a t all, that ek~erythingwhich

\lrrrou~lcIs s may have a magical cl~a ract er,acking identity and

any being of its own. Th e bird th at flies over my head rnay be

a podtent, a sign, or a demon, or my brother, or even I myself

i n a new guise; the nlen we know xnay be subject to miraculous

ellanges at any rnoment; the \vorld around us may be a snare

and a delusion. Do not consider this an extravagarlt ~ta te mc nt .

X is deeply rooted in human possibilities and actualities, pastand present. Notlling familiar to children is alien to man. And

let U(Salso remind ourselves that the word natziro does not oc-

cur at all in the Bible, 7 mean, in the Old Testament. Tllere is

n o Hebrew eqrrivalent for the word ~zature.Nor is it ever ri\ccl

i r r thc Gospels.

Man is riot only the waterslued between the domain of nature

and the domain of human artfulness and deviousness, wl ~i chdornains are linked in a horizontal relationship. Mail is also an

experienced juggler capablcl of establishing a relatior~shi~-,c-

tween th e natural and the trn-natural. X shall call th is relatioxi-

\hip a uerlicnl one.

Th e & p ~ r j ,he principle, can indeed be ilnderstood as not

belonging to natttrc but as tnerely apj?liecl to it, as regulating

the change but not as initiating it from within. A mathematical

principle seerns to be a11 &p ~ - $ l f this kind. In genera!,

r~~athc.~natiealrinciples of na ture are called " l a u ~ sf T L U ~ I J ~ ~ ~ . "r 7

I h i s expressiorl "laws of nature," rnentioned bj. Galileo in 161514

and by Bacon i n lIi23J5acquires citizenship in the Republic of

Letters thrortgh Descartes' Prir~ciple~sj j/zilosophy (1644). It

i s safe to say that --except for the poet Ovid who uses this ex-

~.xcs"ionrl o11c of his \iersesl"o whi ch Leibniz for one doe? not

14 . I,c.ttt-r to Grancl Iluchess Christina ( O p c r ~ , p. 316): ': . . nature is inexorableant1 imrnrrtable: she never transgresses the laws imposed on her . . . ."

15. 13r cf ignifntr . afrgrnc~rttis cientinrunt I: "inlmovable and irlviolable laws anddrcrc~es of Nairrre . . . ." (C f .Nnuun z Ilrgcanrtm 1, 5, 75; 11, 2, 5, 17).

16, 7iistici 1, 8 , 5: ". . . olnnia nattirac pmepostera legibus ibunt . . . ."

fail to allude- nollody before 1600 spoke of laws of natu re l7

and that practically everybody since bescartes has heen clrtir~g

that . Descartes, and after him Spi r~oza, alls the laws of rraturcs

both 1au)sand rules of nature, Let us investigate this re1iltio11-

ship of ~iat~iralawfulness by plltting before us some \pecific

laws of nature.

Consider Boyle's law (put)lisiled in 1662) which state\ that

the pressure exerted by a gas is reciprocally or inversely propor

tional to the expailsion of its volume, provided tile tempera tlrrcremains constant, in othe r words, that t he proclrrct of the two

numbers which represent the results of the meas t~r ingf pressrlre

and of voltrme respectively is always the same: PV= k. Tl~isurr,

had to be corrected later bj, Van der Waals to read

where a and h are two constants. Coiisider also the proportion

obtaining according to Galileo -- he annouriced it as earl?, as

16041N- between the distances traversed by 21odies in free fall

and the times required to traverse those distances: s, : s, :: t, ": tZ2. his pro11ortion has to be corrected ioo, if the bodit~s-all

from very great heights.

Royle founcl 'Itis law, as we say, "%empirically"' y meastiring

the eompres \ion of a ir and the corresponcli~lg ressure exorled

on a coltl~~l nf mercury and by tabulating the resr~lts.Galileo

assu~rzed n equal increinent of velocity at every momclrt of the

body's fall and verified the n~at hem ati cal onsecluence of thii,

hypothesis by letting smootll balls roll down on sr~ioothnclined

planes, Elis ~l~easuren~ents,owever ingenions, could achietlc.

only a low degree of accuracy.

Iri tllc case of Boyle's law, if we take one of the variables Ior V as a ftinction of the other according to the equation PV == k,

we get a neal geometrical representation of that function,

namely a rectangular hyperbola.- In the case of the distanc.e

traversed in free fall, we have the formula s = V2/zgt2,wh ich

follows directly from Galileo's assi~my>tiorif an equaX inrrcrnetlt

17. Montaigne, F;,~,wb, 1595, Rook 11, ch. xii. mentions 'la loy ncltitr~llc.'(Notelater added by Klein.)

18. Letter to Paolo Sarpi (Opere X, p. 115).



g at every momerlt of a body's fall,-These are simple cases of

rnathernatical lawfulness in nature, but they are paradigma tic

tor oltr understanding of "natural laws" as principles of nature.

Thchrc is no need for us to conjure up differential equations or

~rratrices f a complicated kind.

A Crlndan~ental uestion arises with regard to this mathe-

nratical lawfulr~ess f nature.

13oes the mathemat ical character of the laws come from

natrrre itself? This is what Galileo himself, in a famous and often~ltxotccd taternent, has to say about this subject: ""Pi losoph~,s

writtcn i n this grand book, the universe, which stands

crontir~ually pen to our gaze. Rut the book cannot be understood

~rnless ne first learns to cornprehend the language and read the

Letter\ in which it is cornposed. It is written i ~ ihe lang~tagcf

rnather-i~atics, nd its characters are triangles, circles, and other

geox-iletric figures without which it is humanly impossible to

rrndcrstancl a single word of it; without these, one wanders about

ira a dark lal)yrinth."'g According to Galileo, then, the languagP

of xlattlre is a lnather-tlatical one; to understand nature nlearls

to rei~cInattire's nlathematical ~nessage.13nt must we not, in Galileo's opinion, already havc learned

w ~ i c l now rrlatllerllaties i n order to be able to read this message

trwnsrriittcd by nature? Is not nlathenlatics 1)y itself utl-r~atural?

110~s ot i~iathematics elong "i a region beyond and above

rlattrre, at th e Limit or at the apex or vertex of nature, as it were?

Mathematics is accessible to reason without any reference to

rralllral thirtgs and events. Galileo \vould have agreed to that

~x~q)osiilori.Ie would have insisted, however, that bodies, in

the ir rnatcriality, have geometrical shapes, that natural things

antie:.\7chntsave by themselves mathematical features, thatxnatlarrnatics, tlitarefore, cannot be characterized as un-natural.

'd 4 wemr harcl to deny, ho~ rrver, hat mathematical truths have

;I ~)u"'ily arid precision not prerent in things natural.

Mathexnatieal principles are indeed applicab!e to natural

distril)utions and events but it is doubtful whether their source

uoulcl be fo1~11d n nature.

10 11 ~(lgggzcitoic 1623 (Opc~rc~I, p 232)

Where else, then, should it he tollrld? Let us rrntc. that

Newton's title of his Principia does not say ""mathc.n-tatica1prin-

ciples of nature," but rather "mathematical principles of the

knowl edge of nature" (Philosopliinc natziralis pr.incbij) irr

mathematics).Are, then, the matliematical principle:, applicsal)lc>

to nature principles which govern our human t~nderstanclirl~$?

But, if so, h o w do they govern our tui~derstandil~g?o the?. clcter

mine the operations of our reason, the prorr,say f rpclsoiliutg itsell,

or do they constitut e an autonomous region of synlbols 1,oirlting to ideal etltitiees hrough which our reason finds its path grop

ingly? Fnrtherrnore, w h a t makes these nla thc~na tical rineiplrbi,

applicable to natural things and events? Is it the inner coristitu-

tion of nature, the nature of nature, nature's very ki ng , as 13oylc

and Galileo apparerltly and many with them think? Or cloe\

reason impose its strictures on whatever it meets, as Karit pro-

clainis? Or does a divine architect choose among all possil>lc

mathenlatical principles some definite ones arid does he tltc~l

let nature conform to these, as marly in the se-venteentllt centrtr-1

held?

Whatever the answer- ur actual unclerstanding of natrtrtt

is stretched ~1pward"oward a matl-tematical goal \\>hie11 tl r

n~easurementsend to approximate and to support, while at thch

vertex the synlbolic ~-t-t athen~ati calormalism retains its \trangc.

and ~tn-natur alndependence. It is this srlb~nission f riatrtr(\to

mathematically formulated principles which I have eallccl

nature's t~ertical plationship. It is sr~mmarizedn Leonardo cla

Vinci's note: ""Nothing n nature happens without reason; cum-

preliend the reason and you will not be in neect of a n expc1ri-

m e ~ i t . " ~ ~Iowcver much th e rnen of the seventeenth ccntrrry t.x-

tolled the "experimental method," they were closer to the' spiritof 1,eonarclo's staternent than they might have "i-lougllt. I'ct rtrcb

also observe that the submission of nature to mathematical priri-

eiples makes natural phenomena independent of rnornl

judgments. Events in nature are understood to bi. neither goocl

nor bad; they obey mathematical necessit~and arc neutral will1

respect to tlie sphere of morality.

20. Codex Atlat .~ t ic irs 47v



Yet, th e phrase "laws of nature" is striking. Leibniz uses itconstantly. Newton speaks both of "'lawsof motion" and of "'lawsot nature." Laws imply legislation. Do laws of nature implylegislation, too? It is significant, I think, that for Lucretius the""boncl of nature" does not imply any legislation at al l. For many,especially Frenelr writers of the eighteenth century, who speak

withorlt any llesitatio~l f laws of nature, this way of speakingcloes not relate to any legislation either. They follow in Lucretius'p i t h . But for tlie writers of the seventeenth century who areresponsible for the phrase "laws of nature'" special kincl oflegislation was definitely presupposed. Laws of na ture or of rno-

tion were understood to be the result of divine legislation, the~;rrbject f which was not man but nature. T he law-giving torlature differed from what is eomrnonly called legislation, i,e.,fro111 giving laws to men, by the inviolable character of tlie laws:laws of nat ure are unbreakable, they deternline the rtececsar!)rlexils of r~a tu ra l vents. But that is precisely the paradoxical

cllaracter of the phrase "laws of rlature." It is in the nature ofall hrrman artd divine laws that, although they are meant to beobeyed, they can be, and actually are, broken or ignored. Lawsof nature, on the contrary, defy insubordination. For the pre-sent centr~ryhere exists a rnininial probability that predictablecv:vent\ may not occur. This nlinimal probability of non-

ocbctlrrenceeven defines nlathernaticallq!, one might say today,the lawfulness of a law of nature as such. But in the seventeenttic.entury the complctc inviolability of a matllernatical law ofxlatrlre is of mara amount iniportance. Why then is a law of nature,a

nlathematical principle, called a""lw"

t all?1,et me press this point, In antiqui ty the classical opposi-tion is not only hetmreen what is brought about "by nature"

(cp6nic:t)axid wllat is produced by human art (TEXVTJ) but also-arid $till lvit l~in he f rame of th e horizontal relationship- ha tbetween cp6o.l~ rid vcipoq, between nature on the one hand andeonventiori, custom, and law, on th e other. @6otq and vopoqolqxxxe each other, and the great question is, Which way shouldwe human heings go - he way of q6otq or t he way of vopoc;?Wtlcn, in Plato's Gorgias, Callicles champioris the vcipoq ~ q c ;

(p 6o ~o q, he "law of nature,"21 this plirase is meant to be a

deliberate challenge and a paradox. To clivest this plrrasc of itsparadoxical character it is necessary to invest nature wit11

qualities taken from the dornain of the voyoc,, from the domain,

that is, ruled by moral considerations, ordered according to whatis right and wrong, just and unjust, proper and irnproper, I n

Plat ds ?'imuc.us the attempt is made to endow na ture wit11 thesequalities. This is accomplished by letting W U X ~""soul") pervade

the en tire q6o15, while t he '%oul" itself is stretched out accord-ing to a strict melody, a strict vopoq, rooted in srtitably chosennumerical ratios- a melody or a voyoc; which, in i t s

mathemat ical character , represents the rnoral order of thirlgs,Thus the distinction of Good a nd Evil becomes crucial in oria

relation to nature, an everpresent possibility for our understancl-ing of what srrrrounds us. Not only the thinking of Cynics, 06

Aristotelians, and of Stoics bears witness to tha t. Whenever, in

the conduct of our lives, the claim is raised that the course ol-

nature sho~~lde followed, that we should live accordirlg to

nature, a moral di~nens ions introduced into our uriderstk~~lding

of nature- moral relationship. In a curious way, howevel; thevertical and the moral relatio~iships nter into a league with eachother, not only in the Timatvs, but also throughout theseventeenth century.

Listen to the remote, broken, and tremulous echoing of

Timaeus' words in John Loeke's Essay Concerning Hurrzun

Understanding:22 ""Toubt not bu t it will be easily granted thatthe knowledge we have of mathemat icul tru ths , is riotonly eer-tain but real knowledge, and not the bare empty vision of vain,insignificant chimeras of the brain; and yet, if we will consider,we shall find that it is only of our owu ideas . . . . An d Llenecit follows tha t rrmral knowledge is as capable of real cer taintyas mathematics. For certainty being bu t th e perception of theagreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demo~lstratiorrnothing but t he perception of such agreement by the interven-tion of other ideas or mediums, our moral ideas as well asmathematical being archetypes themselves, ancl so adequate arid

21. Cf. 483 e.

22. Bk. 4,XV, 6,7.



coxllplete ideas, all the agreernent or disagreement which we

shall find in therrr will prodilce real knowledge, as well as in

rrtatherrratieal figures." According to Locke, it is precisely the

fu~tcbtion f reasoil to discover inwardly those ideas within us

and to find the connectiorl between them.23Now, in Locke's Se-

C ' O T I ~ ssay o n Civil Goverrlment, reason is def ined as t he lutc;

(?J ~lcrtz~rc'which obliges ev er y~ ii e. "~ ~e infer that the "law of

nature" is withill I L S and dominates the ~n or al rder of wliicli

\lie lrave certai n knowledge. The tnoral order is thus seen as the

""natrrral mora l law." Locke only repeats what has been said by

rnarly others before him. The na tural moral law is the very fourr-

ciatiorr of tlre iu s rruturale, tlie natural code of law propounded*

to cite but one great example, by Hugo Crotius in his book .'Con-

etarnlrlg tlic Law of War and Peace" ( D r rrrc brlli et puciu, 1625)." 7I here he says: ""Natural law is unchangeable, so much so that

it chould riot be changed even by God . . . . Just as God cantrot

br ing it about that two times two not be four, he can ~rot ring

i t about that sorllething which is evil according to its innc.r nature

rrot Ile evil."

"Law of nature" is indeed a trad itional phrase. It is not con-

ecivetl on the Xevel of the matheniatical "laws of nature." The

tlistirrc~tion~etween the two kinds of "law" is not simpl) the

grarrtmatical distinction between a singular ancl a plural. Men

a5 diverse as Melanclrthon, lFiiobl)es, arld Spiiloza use, in fact,

th e plural for the first kind also. The distinction is tha t the "law

of ~lature"ndicates th e rrroral relationshiln of nature , while the

xnathcmatical "laws of nature" lx ar up011 nature's vertical rela-

tiorlsliip. Yet, as I ~nentioned efore and as the example of Lo cl~e

rX~o\vs,hot11 kinds of "law" enter int o a league with each other.

'To rnat2iematical principles and to lrloral rt~les common ground

is assigned. Tflris onrnlon ground is human reason. And tlre pro-lo~lrmtl, hough circular, reason why mathematical principles of

rrattrre are called laws at all is that they are conceived in the

ruriagchof rnoral ruler within us, which oblige everyone, while

tXlcse rr~oral ules, in turn, arc ix~terpretcd- n the seventeenth

rcrrtury at least -- as reflecting the inviolable mathenlatical prin-

ciiplewof nat lire.

!Xi. B k . '1. XVII, 2.

21. 1. 6.

Traditionally, the moral relationship of nature is not tied to

the mathematical aspect of na ture hut to reason understood as

"natural reason" (mtio naturalis) or 'natural light" ( 1 1 i r l i i ~ t l

nuturnle). This reason is natural because it is inborn. ai d tliat

means first of all that reason is taken to be given to us''biatttrc."

I quote from Francis Bacon, who summarizes the traditional

view as follows: "'It is true, though, tha t, as the sayirrg goes, men

have by the light and the law of n atur e (ex lurnina el icg(.

naturae) some notions of vir tue a nd vice, of justice a nd injury,of Good and Evil; this is most true."25 Although the larger par t

of th e "moral law" (lux moralis) is not accessible directly to that

natural light but has to be acquired otherwisq there is, aecord-

ing to the tradition as Bacon presents it, an inborn "instinct'

in us, a "law of con%cience,"a certain spark and, as it were, a

vestige of a pristine and original purity of reason which en ab lo

us to get hold of the moral law. But t hat this reason is onderstood

to be natural or inborn means secondly that we can understand

nature as providing a home for reason, as incorporating reasorl

within itself,

This leads us back to the question, raised earlier in t h i slecture, whether conspicuous changes it1 man-made srtr-

roondings, in customs and institutions, are natural or not

natural, whether man, in bringing about stich cllanges, ii ;inatura l agent or riot. From the point of view of tire moral rela-

tionship of nature which conjoins natu re arid reason i t i\

possible to claim tha t radical changes accolnplished by Inan kind

stemming frorn his rational insight into the rightness OL lilt

undertaking are indeed nat ural, since they are based or1 moral

certainty. Man, prompted by moral considerations, is tlins to

be considereci a natural agent. And the question posed I>\.

Hamilton, in the Federalist Puperr.No. 1 "wlrcther uxietir. of

men are really capable or not of establishing good governrrlent

from reflection a nd choice, or whether they a re forev(1r destined

to depend for their political constittitions on acciderlt or force':

this question i s to be answered- rior to any action- >? the af

firnration tha t societies of rnerr are naturally capable oi in-.

stituting a moral a nd beneficent political order as well as charlp-

25 . Dr dignitate et nugmclztis scir~ntinrunt,1623, I X .



in g an existing one into a better one. Violent changes stemnningfsonn men's passioris, on the other hand, are to be rejected asno t rratural.

Immetliately, an objection passionately raises its head. Are

not men's passions the effective forces that determine to a verylarge extent men's lives and fortunes? Do not passions prompt

mcbnto change their private and public ways? Is not indeed pas-

\ ion rather t han reason indicative of what is natural? This ob-

jeie.lion stems frorn an rxnderstanding of ~ latur e hich responds

primarily to what, in nature, is untamed, violent, devollring,and ~assionatc.The relationship involved in such a view ol

natrrre 1 shall call the passionate relationship.

Fierce desires, love, hate, burning ambition, pride, vanity,c%orrrpassion, eel?-seated fear, and the human bveaknesses in the

wake ol- such passions, seem to lord it over man's nature. Ellow

often do we riot use this excuse for our weakness: we ar e human,aren? we'? Do we not mean thereby that our natures are

donlinated by passion? And, in a larger perspectix, are we not

impressed by the fiery eruptions of volcanos, by the darkness

01 jrrngles, the treacherous sunlit peacefulness of prairies and

the threatening depth of the sea where, everywhere, the pas-

sioxlate struggle for self-preservation at the expense of everything

cl4sc living goes on incessantly? Urlbending passions are displayedin the fighti r~g morig factions, parties and wilful men wherever

political power is at stake. Over-reaching itself, nature sweeps

tiway th e remonstrances of reason, t he feeble attempts to con-trol exuberarnce, luxury, and profligacy. Disease and health

X,c.eox~ie indistinguishable, the one being no less natural thanth e other. The passionate relationship reduces every natural state

ol affairs to a pathological one.

The conflict Iset~veenhe moral and the passionate relation-

\hips ol nature is profound. The passionate relationslnip tends

i o elin~inate ot only the distinction between health and diseaseI , ~ t r also that between Good and Evil. In this respect It is-

\trangely enougln -- akin to the vertical relationship, inasmuchas the latter may - and actually does- eparate itself totally from

all moral eonnota"cons and treat natural phencomena as lyingbeneath or, if you please, beyond, Good and Evil. The clash be-

tween reason and the passions is reflected in our divergent and

yet co-existent interpretations of what is natural. Vlie are bonncl

to nature but the nat ure of th e bond is always ixn question, l t

is especially in question when political cloctrines postt~late

"state of nature" as the basis for the civil state .

The bond takes on a peculiar aspect in a relationship wl~icll

X have not to~ielnedupon so far and which X shall call the rola-

t ionship of deta chpd nearness. Nature nlay manifest itself as a

landscape or as an enchant ing display of color an d fragrariec.

The majesty of rnountain crests, the gerntleness of meadows, t h c

face and f igure of human beings, tlne vigor or the languor of

all living things around us, the solitude 01 the desert, the in-

finity of the ocean- ll this and much more than this ma? ovcr-

whelm our senses, elate us or fill us with melanelnoly. yet Icavc

us at a distance, secluded in detachment. We Inay be struck with

awe at the sublime spectacle of nature's irresistif)le power-a n d

ixnimagilnable magnitude. The impact of the sublinne may s21akt>

our detachment and transform it into the feeling of our

minuteness and insignificance. At this point nature's nnoral rela-

tionship begins to impinge upon the relationship of detachclc'i

nearness.

Let n7e stop enumerating all the possible relationships na turehas to itself and we have to nature, and let me try to sum rn ar i~ i~

what I have been saying. I have distinguished seven relatioxl-

ships, the horizontal one, the one of rivalry, the inward one, th e

vertical one, the moral one, the passionate one, and the orlc 01

detached nearness. It loolts as if I have been trying to ca t(+natur e in a net of relatio~nships,But you will realize, no doul>t ,

that it is I who am caught in the net ~lat ti re leverly weavt2s

around all of us. Nature is, in human understanding.

multidimensional. The ambiguities of tlne term riatt~re xpress

nature's all-pervasive presence in all hllman ~ n d e r ~ s t a n d d n g .t



\cealls as if what our understal lding is interit on reaching is

always clad irr the garb of nature.

1,et me confirm- nd complicate-what 1 ust said by call-

in8 an entirely different aspect of "nature" to your attention.

There are sorne birds, especially some water-b irds (as all have

probably heard), that engage in fantastic, highly complex, yet

well-coordinated and rhythmic dances while wooing their mates.

We arc ir~c lined o say that the birds thus perform a "ritual7'-

trsillg a word that describes certain actions and habits of men.Wllat is striking about our "rituals' is that they acquire the

character of a "second nature," as it were, and display as Inany

rcla tior ~al irnensions as "nature" does, each one showing some

analogy to the corresponding "~iatural"one.

As far as the horizontal relationship is concerned, almostevery artfu l human activity tends to reproduce itself, to repeati tse l f , to rnake the art ful product as familiar, i11 its constant re-

ay~pearing, s a natural thing, be it an object put to immediate

rrse, be it a tool, a machine, be it a device or an institution. The

ar t of rncxkiizg involves a ritual, a routine, to which we submit

reaclily to achieve our purposes.Witliin the relatioriship of rivalry, namely of that between

the rlatrlral arld the not-na tural or super-natural, the latt er is

approaelred in words, in songs, in sacrifices, in ceremo~lial f-

ferings, in ways of behavior which all follow a strict ritualprcbscribed to the last detail and to which, again, we submit

"natrrral l~~. ' '

The inward relat io~lship f nat ure finds its ritnalistic com-

ldlenient not so mtich in human actions as in human language,wlliell is ever-net?: conjoirling an d disjoining the elements of

\peeclr in ever-changing variations,while those elementsi l ~ r r r ~ ~ e l v e s ,elcborne food for dictionaries, constitute the stable

I>asi\on wllich the flow of language expands. But language tends

r~rr;lvoidal>lyo condense, to becorne sedentary, to wear itself

out , to ritualize itself in idioms, figures of speech, cliches andempty pllrascs.

'Shere is also a ritualistic complement to the vertical rela-

t ionship of nature expressing itself in our social demeanor, in

tlre syrnbolic ritual of polite formulae and manners which

X~et.iorr~eore nurllerous and more intricate the higher t he rurlgstrra the ladder of 2lurnan society.

The moral relationship of nature translates itself directly intoour own moral attitudes and actions towards others, into

habitual morality, which Aristotle emphasizes and which, he

says, "resembles nature."Se (This is actually the source of the

phrase "second nature.") This habitual morality may even lose

itself into an empty moralism, into a ritualistic insistence on

ways of behavior beyond the pale of reason.

Corresponding to the passionate relationship is the passion

of addiction, which is many-headed, ran gi~lg rom drug-addiction and compulsive reflexes to farlaticism of every kind.The ritualisnl in all these cases is the addiction itself.

Finally, t he relationship of detached nearness finds its com-

plement on the wings of that peculiar human urge to make inr-

ages and to love image-making for its own sake. The artifices

employed in this undertaking- a source of unending delight,

heart-ache, and exhilaration- end to become ritualistic not only

as to fashions, styles, procedures, and mannerisms but also as

to their self-interpretation, their self-sufficiency, and the ir self-

mirroring. The purest expression of the ritual in this region of

artful activities is the self-perpetuating pattern of th e ornament.

Thus nature has its counterpart in th e multidimensionality

of human rituals, Beneath the garbs of nature and of ritual Xc

hidden, we may well suspect, th e features of nakedness. Cau

tion then, is needed whenever we invoke nature, talk aborrt

nature, deal wit11 nature. Th e nakedness of things might wreck

our schemes,

26 . Cf. Aristotle, E lh . Nic. VII, 11, 1152 a 29 ff

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Klein - Nature of Nature