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Kitsch by t. Kulka

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  • British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 28, No. 1, Winter lgSS

    KITSCHTomas Kulka

    THERE IS no consensus among scholars as to the etymology of the word 'kitsch'.Some believe that it derives from the English 'sketch', while others link it to theGerman: 'etwas verkitschen' (to knock off cheaply). The experts do, however,agree that ever since the word was coined in the second half of the nineteenthcentury, it has borne distinctly negative connotations. The epithet 'kitsch' hasbeen used as a synonym for worthless art, artistic rubbish, or simply bad art.Yet, clearly, not every piece of bad art will be perceived as kitsch. If the author ofthese pages were to attempt to portray his dog, the reader would not think muchof the result; yet it is doubtful whether he or she would classify it as kitsch.Kitsch isn't simply an artistic failurea work which has somehow gone wrong.There is something special about kitsch which sets it apart from the rest of badart. Kitsch has a definite appeal. People like it, at least many do. Commercially,kitsch successfully competes with serious art. The mass-appeal of kitsch is beingexploited by advertising agencies.to promote commodities, as well as bypolitical parties to promote their ideologies. (The official art in Hitler's Ger-many or Soviet Russia may illustrate this point.) But what is it about kitsch thatcreates this appeal? Can we deny that the appeal is of an aesthetic nature? It seemsthat we are in no position to do so: judging by all the obvious indications, peoplewho like kitsch derive from it the same kind of pleasure we typically derive fromworks of art. But if we concede that kitsch has an aesthetic appeal and cling to arather plausible assumption that art is appreciated for its aesthetic qualities, wewill have to face the following problem: if the appeal of kitsch is of an aestheticnature, and if aesthetic qualities serve as a measure of artistic excellence, why iskitsch considered worthless?

    The problem of reconciling the mass appeal of kitsch with the dismissiveattitude of the art-educated elite can be easily resolved by a radical relativist: Degustibus non disputandum est. Just as some people prefer tea to coffee, some peopleprefer kitsch to so-called serious art. But what if we do not want to embraceradical subjectivism or relativism of this kind? Can we reconcile the mass-appealof kitsch with the dismissive attitude of the art-educated elite without interpret-ing aesthetic judgements as autobiographical statements expressing purelysubjective preferences?

    There seems to be another easy way out. One can simply say that the aestheticappeal of kitsch is confined to a distinct, albeit extensive, class of people who canbe characterized by their bad taste. This view differs from the relativist answer

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    by building normative, elitist, implications into differences of taste. However,it only shifts the question. For we still want to know what is wrong with kitschand what its aesthetic appeal consists in. The answer that its appeal consists in itsbeing appreciated by many people and the explanation of its deficiencies byreference to their bad taste is hardly philosophically illuminating. For thequestion still remains as to what it is about kitsch that makes it so attractive tothis group of people, and what, independently of this preference of theirs, atteststo the 'badness' of their taste. After all, we have no evidence that consumers ofkitsch consistently prefer bad art to good art outside the realm of kitsch.

    In an authoritative anthology edited by Gillo Dorfles1 the phenomenon ofkitsch in various artistic genres is examined by a number of scholars. They allconsider kitsch a bad form of art, yet none of them really explains what theaesthetic deficiencies of kitsch are. Interesting as much of what they say is, thediscussions of kitsch presented in this anthology are couched in socio-economicterms, not in specifically aesthetic ones. They refer to rapid industrialization, theemergence of new social classes, diffusion of cultural traditions by modernmeans of communication and transportation, mass culture, etc. They dealinformatively with those aspects of the human condition that have contributed 'to the emergence, the rapid diffusion and the prevalence of kitsch. They fail toexplain, however, what kitsch actually is, from the aesthetic point of view. Inthis paper I propose to fill in this gap. I hope to show what it is that disqualifieskitsch as respectable art despite its apparent aesthetic appeal. I shall try toaccount for both the popular success of kitsch and its deficiencies by reference toits internal, aesthetic properties.

    We have already noted two basic facts about kitsch: (1) that it has anundeniable mass-appeal; and (2) that it is considered (by the art-educated elite)bad. These two features make kitsch into a special category of its own.Consequently, the analysis of kitsch has to provide answers to the followingtwo questions: (Qi) What does its appeal consist in? and (Q2) What does itsbadness consist in? We have to explain why so many people are attracted tokitsch, as well as why kitsch, nevertheless, is not entitled to the status ofrespectable art.

    Let us ask what sort of instructions we would give to a painter to create aconvincing kitsch? What sort of advice would you offer him as to (1) what topaint, and (2) how to paint it, in order that a commercially successful kitsch beproduced?2 Let us begin with the first question.

    It seems plain that some objects of depiction (e.g., a fluffy little kitten, acrying child, or a thinly veiled beautiful young lady playing a violin against thesunset on the sea shore) would be much better candidates for kitsch than others(e.g., a factory chimney, a chair, or a washing machine). Let us list some of theobjects or themes that figure prominently in kitsch pictures: puppies or kittens

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  • 20 KITSCH

    of various sorts, children in tears, mothers with babies, long-legged girls withsensuous lips and alluring eyes, palm beaches with colourful sunsets, pastoralSwiss villages framed in mountain panoramas, pasturing families of deer in aforest clearing, couples embracing against the full moon, wild horses gallopingalong the waves of a stormy sea, cheerful beggars, sad clowns, sad faithful olddogs gazing towards infinity (often immortalized in porcelain), etc. The readercould easily extend the list.

    What is it that these themes have in common? They are all heavily emotion-ally charged. They are highly charged with stock emotions which spontaneouslyelicit a ready response. The subject-matter typically depicted by kitsch isgenerally considered to be beautiful (horses, long-legged girls), pretty (sunsets,Swiss villages), cute (puppies, kittens) and/or highly emotionally charged(mothers with babies, children in tears). It seems that these features do not justtypically concur with kitsch, but actually constitute a condition sine qua non.Consider ordinary objects of everyday life which are not considered particularlypretty and which are devoid of any emotional charge: e.g., an ordinary chair,factory chimney, or a washing machine. It is, of course, easy enough to makebad pictures of chairs, chimneys or washing machines, but no matter how hardyou try, it will not be kitsch. Take on the other hand an object which is generallyconsidered cute and which triggers a ready emotional response: our fluffy littlekitten, for example. Not only is it quite easy to produce such a kitten-depictingkitsch, it is actually quite difficult (given the appropriate technical skills) not toslide into one. From the above considerations it also follows that it would bemuch more difficult to produce an abstract kitsch painting than a figurative one.This, I think, agrees with our intuitions, for we seldom label an abstract work ofart as kitsch, no matter how bad it appears to us.

    Our first advice to a painter who is after producing a convincing kitsch wouldthus be: as to what to paint, choose an object which is generally consideredbeautiful (pretty, cute) and/or which triggers a ready emotional response.

    Before turning to the question how to paint it, i.e., to the stylistic, orpresentational constraints on kitsch, let us consider what further specificationsshould guide our choice of the represented subject-matter and what type ofemotional response one should aim to elicit. Let us take, for example, the'crying child' which figures so prominently in kitsch depictions. Our painterwill be more likely to succeed if he chooses a nice and cute child rather than awicked looking or an ugly one. The cry shouldn't be irritating or the hystericalcry which gets on your nerves but rather a sob of the soft and quiet variety. Thecrying child should elicit a sympathetic, patronizing response. We should feelsecure and comfortable when we look at the picture. The kitsch painter shouldremove any unpleasant or disturbing features of reality, leaving us only withthose which we can easily cope and identify ourselves with. There shouldn't beanything disturbing or threatening in kitsch. The success of kitsch also dependson the universality of the emotions it triggers. A typical kitsch is reassuring not

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    only because we respond spontaneously but also because we know that werespond 'rightly', that is, we know that we are moved in the right kind of way,which is to say, in the same way as everybody else. Kitsch does not work onindividual idiosyncrasies but on universal images, the emotional charge ofwhich is highly inter-subjective. Kitsch is to reassure us in our basic sentimentsand beliefs, not to disturb or question them.

    Let us sum up the above considerations and state our first condition for theapplication of the concept of kitsch: (1): Kitsch depicts an object or theme which isgenerally considered to be beautiful or highly charged with stock emotions.

    IIIt seems that condition (1) already provides us with the answer to question

    (Qi). In view of condition (1) it seems natural to conclude that the reason whyso many people are attracted to kitsch is that they like the depicted subject or thatthe theme of the picture elicits a ready emotional response. However, condition(1), by itself, does not really suffice to answer our question. We forgotsomething; or rather, we made an implicit assumption, whichdespite itsobviousnessshould be spelled out. In order that the spectator should respondappropriately to the represented subject-matter, he has to be capable ofrecognizing it. People have to be able to identify the depicted subject in thepicture as the beautiful or emotionally meaningful subject that they are familiarwith. Kitsch, as a matter of fact, always satisfies this requirement. We neverhave a problem in telling what kitsch is about. If we did, the emotional chargeand the relevant associations related to the depicted subject would not, so tospeak, get across and the picture thus wouldn't elicit the response which kitschtypically does. The question is: What is it that accounts for this instantidentifiability of depicted objects in kitsch pictures? What sort of advice wouldwe offer to our painter as to how to paint a convincing kitsch?

    Let us, for illustration's sake, confine ourselves to a given subject-matter, say,our fluffy little kitten, or a crying child. Can one produce such a kitten-depictingor child-depicting kitsch in any artistic style? It seems that some artistic styles arebetter suited for kitsch-depictions than others. Our painter would be morelikely to succeed were he to paint in compliance with the stylistic conventionsof, say, socialist realism, or nineteenth-century romanticism, rather than if hewere to adopt the canons of Cubism or Futurism. It seems very hard (if notimpossible) to imagine a convincing kitsch of a crying child done in the mannerthat Picasso portrayed Ambroise Vollard in 1910. Or, try to imagine whatwould happen to our fluffy little kitten if it were rendered in the manner thatMarcel Duchamp painted his Nude Descending a Staircase (1912). It simply wouldnot work. Such pictures would fail to elicit the instant emotional responsewhich kitsch typically does. Such problems, however, would not arise, if theabove mentioned subjects of depiction were rendered in the romantic orsocialist-realist style.

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  • 22 KITSCH

    The above considerations may lead us to the conclusion that kitsch employs avery natural, or realistic, mode of representation. After all, Cubist and Futuristrepresentations strike us (at least on the first sight) as somewhat odd andartificial. It would be, nevertheless, too hasty to identify the stylistic features ofkitsch with realism. For kitsch is in many respects very unrealistic andunnatural. The eyes of the crying child in kitsch pictures are disproportionatelylarge and the tears are roughly five times the size than any real tear can be. Whatcan, nevertheless, be said about kitsch is that it invariably uses the mostconventional, well tried and tested representational canons. The instant andeffortless identifiability of the depicted object in kitsch pictures is not a matter ofrealism (kitsch typically displays a total disregard for detail), but rather a matterof compliance with the most common representational conventions of the time.Any departure from the accepted conventions is undesirable for kitsch, for itmay make unnecessary demands on the spectator. The deciphering of thepicture should be as effortless as possible. Kitsch should, so to speak, speak themost common language understandable to all.. It shouldn't venture into anesoteric jargon (such as Cubism) or idiosyncratic dialect (such as JacksonPollock's biomorfic period). This is why we hardly ever find any stylisticinnovations in kitsch. The 'realism' of kitsch thus consists of the compliancewith the most well tried and tested representational conventions.

    We have noted that the adherence to the accepted representational conven-tions of the time is conducive to the instant identifiability of the depicted subject-matter. We may note further, however, that this compliance need not enhancethe artistic qualities of the depiction. Originality and artistic innovation, whichare generally considered positive features of works of art, often challenge theaccepted representational canons. Within the framework of accepted represen-tational conventions there is often enough space for innovation. However,sometimes this space becomes so saturated that artists feel a need to expand,modify, or abandon altogether the accepted canons of representation. It'is onsuch occasions that we speak of emerging new styles. New styles often meetwith hostile reactions. This is because the novel kind of presentation is notreadily acknowledged by the conservative public as a 'correct' or 'realistic'representation. Let me illustrate this point by just one example. This is what theofficial art critic of Le Figaro wrote in his review of the second Impressionistexhibition:

    The Rue La Peletier is really very unlucky. First there was the great fire at the Opera,and now a second disaster has come to upset the district. An exhibitionsupposedto be an exhibition of paintingshasjust been opened at the Durand-Ruel Gallery. . . It really is frightful seeing such an aberration of human vanity and lunacy. Dotell Monsieur Pissarro that trees aren't really purple and the sky isn't really the colourof butter; tell him the things he paints don't really exist anywhere and no intelligentperson can be expected to accept such rubbish. . . . Try and make Monsieur Degassee reason and tell him that there really are such things in art as drawing and colour

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    and technique and meaning . . . Try and explain to Monsieur Renoir that a woman'sbody is not just a bundle of decomposing flesh with green and purple patches thatshow what an advanced stage of putrefaction the corpse is in.3

    This passage shows that the critic considered the pictures incorrect andtherefore inadmissible representations because certain salient features of thosepaintings (e.g., the presence of green and purple patches in the rendering of anude) were not conducive to the instant identifiability of the depicted subject-matter (human body in this case).

    All this is quite relevant to our problem. Since the appeal of kitsch derives itsforce from the depicted subject, which is generally considered pretty or stronglyemotionally charged, it must be readily recognizable as such. This, as we havenoted earlier, is best achieved by compliance with the accepted painting conven-tions of the time. However, it is the very violation of these conventions whicheventually secured the Impressionists their esteemed place in the history of art.The requirement of instant and effortless identifiability thus militates againststylistic innovations. Kitsch never ventures into avant-garde. Kitsch doesn'tventure into styles that haven't yet become universally digested. It can jump onthe band-wagon only after the novelty becomes a commonplace. This, I think,accounts for the ultra-conservative, and stylistically reactionary, nature ofkitsch. Our kitsch painter would thus be well advised to refrain from anystylistic innovations and keep well within the most comprehensible represen-tational conventions. He should consider all features which do not directlycontribute to the instant identifiability of the depicted subject as superfluousandsince they may also distract our attention from the associations evoked bythe represented subjectpotentially harmful to kitsch. This is why kitsch islikely to be unexciting or even boring from the artistic point of view.

    These considerations also point to the context-dependent nature of kitsch. Inview of the above quoted passage we may assume that in the 1860s and 1870s itwould have been virtually impossible to paint a picture in the Impressionist stylewhich would be (then) considered kitsch. There is, however, no problem toproduce an Impressionistically styled kitsch today. This is because theImpressionist canons of representation have become by now accepted as a quitenatural and 'realistic' mode of representation. The Cubist mode of represen-tation, however, is even today still seen as artificial, unnatural and 'unrealistic'.This is why, I guess, even our fluffy little kitten wouldn't quite come out askitsch if rendered in truly Cubist manner.

    Let us summarize the above considerations by stating our second conditionfor the application of the concept of kitsch: (2): The object or theme depicted bykitsch is instantly and effortlessly identifiable.

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  • 24 KITSCH

    IIIOur two conditions may well be necessary, but they are not sufficient. Nor do

    they answer question (Q2): Why is kitsch, despite its appeal, considered bad?For, clearly, not only kitsch but also the Venus of Milo, Goya's Maya, Manet'sBar at the Folies-Bergere, as well as countless other respected works of art, satisfyour two conditions.

    What we have to ask then is what distinguishes kitsch from respectable worksof art in those cases where the depicted objects are generally considered beautifulor emotionally charged and the mode of rendering complies with the presentlyaccepted representational conventions. Let us consider our last example: EduardManet's A Bar at the Folies-Bergere (1881). The subject-matter of this pictureabeautiful girl serving at a cabaret baris instantly identifiable, and could easilybe exploited by kitsch. What is it, then, that places this painting at a safe distancefrom kitsch? Let me quote what James Ackerman says about this painting:

    The point of this picture is not that it tells you about a bar and a barmaid and how itwas at the Folies-Bergere. . . . the picture distils an exhilarating experience that can beshared with the artist, in which the objects in the theatre bar, bottles, glasses, gaslights, anonymous barmaid, and reflections in a mirror lose their mundane characterand ire transformed by a perceptive human intellect into a magical image. The picturedoes not simply represent a bar, it presents the end product of a transformation, we value itbecause it is like experiences we ourselves have had of suddenly seeing the ordinaryworld changed and exalted, but the picture is different from and superior to our experience.. . . once having witnessed this transformation, we are prepared to be exhilarated moreoften and more intensely. Knowing the picture can actually make the real environmentmore worthwhile. The value of Manet's image, then, lies in the isolation of an experience ofthe environmentan experience most viewers share with the artistand itsintensification.4

    The aesthetic appeal of the painting (unlike kitsch) is not simply parasitic onthe projected beauty of the barmaid. The picture creates beauty of its own. Thesubject-matter is presented to us in a manner which, according to Ackerman, issuperior to our experience. Ackerman draws our attention to the fact that thepicture transforms and intensifies our experience. 'The picture can actuallymake the real environment more worth while.' The artist transforms the subjectof his depiction in such a way that his painting evokes something that we mighthave not noticed or felt before. He elaborates its unique and often overlookedfeatures to reveal new aspects of reality. It was John Dewey who emphasizedthis function of art when he wrote: 'art is not nature, but nature transformed byentering into a new relationship where it invokes a new emotional response'.5

    Essentially the same idea has also been expressed by Nelson Goodman, who inhis worldmaking terminology says: 'How representational painting makesworlds is strikingly clear to anyone who has stepped into a new world afterseeing an exhibition of works that work'.6

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    It is a common psychological fact that when we perceive depicted objects inpictures we spontaneously draw upon our past experience of actual objects ofthe same general kind. The standard associations related to the depicted objectwhich are stored in the memory are evoked by the identification of the familiarobject in the picture. This is true of all representational pictures. Some pictures,however, transform the familiar ideas and associations related to the depictedobject in various manners. The standard associations can be sharpened, ampli-fied, intensified, or altogether transformed as a result of our visual experience ofa painting. This can be achieved in a countless number of ways. Surrealistpaintings, for example, typically exploit the tension between associationsrelated to the depicted object whose surface details and style of depiction arereassuringly naturalistic and their assembly, which is disturbingly unnatural.Standard associations can also be enriched by simply presenting objects fromunusual angles which emphasize its often overlooked features. By breakingobjects into fragmented brush strokes of discontinuous patches of pure pris-matic colours, and by their emphasis on the immediacy of the changing effectsof light and reflections the Impressionists have not only enriched our associa-tions, they have actually helped us to look at our environment in a new, moreintense and refined way. Oscar Wilde once said that there was no fog in Londonbefore Whistler had painted it. In a similar vein Georg Schmidt and RobertSchenk remarked that 'although the color-saturated atmosphere of Paris is olderthan the city itself, its beauty was first revealed by impressionists'.7 Examples ofrepresentational pictures which enrich, or transform our standard associationscould easily be multiplied. My claim is that kitsch does not belong to thiscategory. Kitsch does not exploit the artistic possibilities of structural elabora-tion, extension of expressive potentialities, elaboration of unique individualfeatures, interpretation and innovation. It works on stereotypes. Kitsch typi-cally presents its subject-matter in the most standard and schematic manner.The crying child completely lacks any individual features; it is an idealizedstereotype of a child. It functions as a sort of pictogram. If kitsch pictures weresupplied with suitable verbal labels (such as: 'Crying Child', 'Fluffy LittleKitten', etc.,) we could say that the picture and the label are interchangeable inthe following sense: the 'message' of kitsch is roughly the same as the 'message'of its label. The associations triggered by kitsch do not substantially exceed theassociations triggered by its label. Apart from the obvious differences due to thedifferent media, the label and the picture have roughly the same effect. The labelsums up the picture and the picture sums up the label.8 Unlike real art, kitschdoes not in any meaningful way enrich or transform the antecedently storedassociations. It functions merely as a stimulus, or a triggering device, for theirretrieval.

    The souvenir industry, which takes a lion's share of the kitsch market,exploits this very principle with utmost efficiency. A typical souvenir, say aplastic miniature replica of Santa Maria del Fiore is just about similar enough to

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  • 26 KITSCH

    Brunelleschi's masterpiece to remind you of the experience you had when yousaw the Florentine Duomo, but it does not enrich or add anything to thisexperience. The success of kitsch depends entirely on the acquired associationsrelated to the represented object but at the same time it does not enrich them:kitsch does not tell us anything new or interesting about its object. It merelyplays on the stored emotions and associations by 'naming' the depicted subject,so to speak, in an appropriate visual language.

    Let us sum up what has been said in this section by stating our third conditionfor the application of the concept of kitsch: (3): Kitsch does not substantially enrichour associations related to the depicted subject.

    IVLet us restate our three conditions and make a few concluding remarks about

    what these conditions amount to:(1) Kitsch depicts a subject which is generally considered beautiful or highly emotionally

    charged;(2) The subject depicted by kitsch is instantly and effortlessly identifiable;(3) Kitsch does not substantially enrich our associations related to the depicted subject.The first condition restricts the range of subjects that can be profitably exploitedby kitsch, while the remaining two conditions pertain to the stylistic propertiesof the rendering and the manner of the presentation of the subject-matter. Eachof the three conditions is considered to be necesary; jointly, they are consideredto be sufficient. The first two conditions suggest an answer to the question: whatdoes the mass-appeal of kitsch consist in? (Qi); while the third condition (inconjunction with the second) explains why kitsch is nevertheless considered bad(Q2). Jointly they point to the essentially parasitic nature of kitsch, and reveal thesubtle trick that kitsch plays on its consumers. Kitsch does not create beauty ofits own, its appeal is not really generated by the aesthetic merit of the work itself,but by the appeal of the depicted object. Good painters, even when they depictobjects that are generally considered to be beautiful or emotionally charged, donot simply capitalize on the emotional charge of their subject-matter. Theappeal of kitsch, on the other hand, is entirely parasitic on its referent.

    In semiotic terminology kitsch may be viewed as a transparent symbol thereferential function of which is essential to its success. It is transparent in thesense that its effect is not secured by the qualities of the symbol (i.e., of the workof art itself) but rather by what the symbol refers to. Unlike the case in real art,the what is more important than the how. The consumer of kitsch looks throughthe symbol, so to speak, to what the symbol stands for. He believes he likes (andaesthetically appreciates) the depiction, i.e., the kitsch picture, while what hereally likes is the depicted object. The referential function of kitsch carries itsadmirers from the picture itself (which they seldom scrutinize) to the associa-tions related to the depicted object. Kitsch consumers may believe that whatappeals to them are the aesthetic merits of the 'artistic' presentation. What is

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    really at work are the standard associations triggered by the picture, associationsto which they are positively predisposed. At the same time kitsch does nottransform these associations, it does not elicit a new emotional response. To useGoodmanian terminology again, kitsch does not make new worldsbecause itdoes not work.

    Tomas Kulka, Dept. of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem,Israel.

    REFERENCES

    1 Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste (New York:Universe Books, 1969).

    2 For reasons of scope I shall discuss only kitschin pictorial art. I believe, however, that theprinciples outlined below could, with certainmodifications, be extended to characterizekitsch in other artistic disciplines.

    3 Albert Wolf, he Figaro (3 April 1876),. quotedfrom Maurice Serullaz, Phaidon Encyclopedia ojImpressionism (Oxford: Phaidon, 1978), p. 20.

    4 'On Judging Art without Absolutes', CriticalInquiry, vol. 5 (Spring 1979), p. 462, myitalics.

    5 Art as Experience (New York: 1934), p. 462.

    6 'Aesthetics and Worldmaking: Reply to JensKulankampff, Journal of Aesthetics and ArtCriticism, vol. 39 (Spring 1981), p. 275.

    7 Kunst und Naturform (Basel: Basileus Presse,

    1958), quoted by E. M. Haffner, 'The New

    Reality in Art and Science', ComparativeStudies in Society and History, vol. 11 (Oct.1969), p. 389.

    8 In an obvious sense a picture is bound to bericher than a label. The crying-child picturehas to have some colours and some expressionor otherfeatures which labels lack. Thepoint about kitsch is that many of its specificfeatures usually do not matter much. As longas the tears are big and the child is cute, the restcan be altered in a great many ways withoutthe picture losing its effect as kitsch. This,again, contrasts with serious art.

    I want to thank Dr Yeal Cohen, Prof. NelsonGoodman and Prof. Avishai Margalit for theirvery helpful criticism of an earlier version of thispaper.

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