SYRIA AND THE PERILS OF PROXY WARFARE.

‘Maybe Caspar should grip his hand and slap his shoulder and praise him for digging out a plan

where somebody else did the fighting for America and faced the noose. No-risk fighting, no

casualties going home in body bags to Arkansas or Alaska or Alabama, no mothers trying to be

brave as the caskets went down into good Virginia or Vermont earth, because the poor bastards

getting killed were proxy soldiers and didn’t count’.

‘‘Policy, as laid down by our revered masters …’ He waved, a gesture of contempt, towards the

towers and façade across the river ‘ … dictates that we seek insurrection in that awful little corner of

the world. The word of the hour is “proxy”. Other people do the dirty work, get the shit on their

boots, follow the myth of a martyr, and we achieve – at minimum cost – the aims of our policy’’.1

The two epigraphs above are taken from a thriller written twelve years ago, and are provided by

fictional officers from the CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Yet both of them

help explain why states have engaged in proxy warfare, in order to fulfil strategic objectives at a

minimal cost in blood and treasure. The statement to the effect that ‘the enemy of my enemy is

my friend’ originates with the Arthashastra, an Indian treatise on statecraft dating from the 4 th

century BC,2 and a survey of recorded history from antiquity to the post-Cold War era shows

numerous examples where states have armed and funded proxies – rebels, warlords, factions

embroiled in a civil war, insurgent groups and terrorists – to undermine and weaken an

adversary.3 Proxy warfare offers a superficially seductive policy option to any state which is (to

quote Alexander Pope) ‘[willing] to wound, and yet afraid to strike’.4 It appears to offer fewer

1

risks than the direct commitment of one’s own armed forces, and enables the instigator to inflict

grave losses – both human and material – on an adversary. It is therefore hardly surprising that

the current civil war in Syria has generated claims of external assistance to the rebellion,

particularly those emanating from the Baath regime of Bashar al-Assad.

Certain caveats need to be noted. Firstly, the Syrian civil war is a fluid conflict, and this

article is at risk of becoming obsolete as soon as it appears in print. Indeed, at the time of writing

US President Barack Obama was deliberating over whether to launch punitive air and missile

strikes against the Assad regime in response to a reported chemical weapons (CW) attack in

Damascus (21st August 2013) which killed several hundred civilians.5 Secondly, it should be

emphasised that the principal responsibility for the bloodshed in Syria – which at the time of

writing had claimed an estimated 100,000 lives – lies with Assad and his regime.6 When faced

with protests against misrule and corruption in March 2011 the Syrian dictator could have

responded by addressing popular discontent and enacting reforms, but chose instead to unleash

his security forces against demonstrators, thereby provoking an armed insurrection.7 The

indiscriminate violence employed by Assad’s military and security forces has compelled

thousands of Syrians to take up arms, whilst the mass killings committed by the Shabiha militias

have inflamed the sectarian tensions pitting the Sunni majority against Assad’s own Alawite

community.8

It is also hypocritical for the Russian and Iranian governments in particular to condemn

both the violence in Syria and any external intervention in this conflict. Russia has been the Baath

regime’s primary source of arms since the 1970s, and has continued to supply Assad’s military

even though Russian-made jet aircraft and helicopters have been used to indiscriminately

bombard Aleppo, Hama, Homs and other cities and towns.9 The Iranian Revolutionary Guard

Corps (IRGC) has provided ‘advisors’ to assist the Syrian security forces, and 48 alleged IRGC

2

officers captured by the rebels were released in January 2013, reportedly as part of a prisoner

exchange.10 Nonetheless, it is evident that certain states are either backing the Free Syrian Army

(FSA) and other rebel groups, or are at any rate contemplating providing assistance to anti-Assad

forces for a combination of humanitarian and strategic motives. It is therefore important to

understand what the potential consequences of such a decision may involve.

Proxy warfare as a tool of policy:

A proxy war is defined here as one in which states (or sponsors) aid and abet non-state proxies

involved in a conflict against a common adversary, or a target. The sponsors involved will

usually be motivated by three distinct strategic goals. Sponsors may exploit proxies as part of a

policy of coercion. For example, during the early 1970s the Shah of Iran sustained the Iraqi

Kurdish insurgency in order to force Baghdad to agree to Iranian territorial demands on the Shatt

al-Arab.11 A secondary motive involves disruption, in which the sponsor is in a state of war or

heightened confrontation with the target, and intends to weaken it militarily. Syria itself has

consistently employed these means against Israel. Rather than risk defeat in a direct clash with

the Israelis (who trounced the Syrians in the wars of 1948, 1967, 1973 and 1982). Bashar and his

father, Hafez al-Assad, armed, funded and sheltered varying Palestinian groups (such as Fatah,

the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, and until recently Hamas) and the Lebanese Shiite party-militia

Hezbollah in order to wage an indirect war against the Jewish state; hence the Lebanese Druze

leader Walid Jumblatt’s jibe (used against both Bashar and his father) that the Syrian President is

‘a lion in the Lebanon and a rabbit on the Golan’.12 The third objective involves transformation,

in which the sponsor’s aim is to engineer a major political transition within the target state. This

can involve the overthrow of the ruling regime, the secession of part of the target’s territory, or its

incorporation into a neighbour as part of an irredentist territorial claim.13

3

There can be several sponsors involved in a proxy conflict, as was the case in

Afghanistan during the 1980s, where the anti-Communist mujahidin were supported by a number

of external backers (including the USA, UK, France, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and China). In this

respect, a proxy-sponsor relationship should involve a sustained period of assistance occurring

over a matter of months, and it can incorporate training by military personnel, notably by special

forces troops who are trained to wage guerrilla or counter-guerrilla warfare on a covert basis.

Furthermore, the actual strategic objectives of the sponsor states can be affected by inter or intra-

agency disputes within the governments concerned. With US assistance to Afghan insurgents

during the 1980s the policy-making establishment in Washington DC was split between officials

who followed the disruptive goal of ‘bleeding’ the USSR in a prolonged war of attrition in

Afghanistan, and those who had the transformative objectives of inflicting a military defeat on the

Soviets, and of overthrowing the Communist regime in Kabul.14

Any analysis of proxy warfare is hampered by two factors. The fact that sponsors usually

provide assistance covertly – on the basis of plausible denial – means that it is often difficult to

gain verifiable evidence that a faction within a given conflict has a proxy relationship with

external supporters.15 It is also very much in the interests of any government embroiled in a

domestic conflict to claim that it has been artificially generated by malevolent foreign powers. By

proclaiming that it is fighting ‘terrorists’ backed by hostile states the Baath regime in Syria is

seeking both to discredit its internal foes, and to absolve itself of any responsibility for provoking

an insurrection through its own misrule16. Nonetheless, it is likely that the Syrian civil war is will

become a proxy conflict, due to its intersection with regional rivalries and power-political

disputes.

4

Why overthrow Assad?:

Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar have provided small arms to Syrian rebel groups via Turkey and

Jordan, whilst the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan has permitted the FSA to organise itself

on its own soil, and has also provided a sanctuary for Assad’s political opponents. 17 For the USA,

Britain, France and other Western governments, the current conflict in Syria presents significant

political risks. If the Baath regime prevails, it is realistic to presume that the rebels and any

civilians deemed to have sympathised with their cause will be offered no quarter. The prospect of

massacres similar to the one in Hama in 1982 and a major refugee crisis – swelling the camps in

Jordan and Turkey – is a daunting one, particularly because at the time of writing there are

already about 5 million Syrian refugees or internally displaced requiring humanitarian aid. 18 It is

also likely that the Syrian President will emerge from the civil war with a more uncompromising

attitude towards the West, and a determination to wreak revenge on his external enemies. The

rebellion’s defeat can therefore have grave consequences for regional stability.

When the Syrian civil war broke out Erdogan’s AKP government initially sought to

mediate between Assad and the rebels, using diplomatic contacts to encourage the former to

negotiate with his enemies and to reform his regime. The Syria dictator’s determination to crush

the insurgency, military confrontations between the Syrian and Turkish armed forces (described

below) and the cross-border influx of thousands of refugees led Erdogan to declare Assad’s

downfall as an objective, and also to support the opposition Syrian National Council (SNC).19

Both the UK and France have successfully lobbied to lift the EU’s arms embargo to enable arms

to reach the Syrian rebels, although both governments deny any intention to provide direct

military assistance. The British Chief of the Defence Staff was reported to have met his French,

Turkish, Jordanian, Qatari and UAE counterparts in December 2012 to plan assistance to the

5

insurgency, with the British government becoming convinced that the civil war in Syria has

reached a ‘tipping’ point. For the UK, external assistance appears to have become a necessity not

only because of the humanitarian crisis in Syria, but the concern that without any Western aid the

anti-Assad rebellion could become dominated by radical Islamist groups.20 However, both the

vote against military intervention in the House of Commons (29 August 2013) and widespread

popular opposition to any further overseas conflicts is such that if the British government wishes

to place any coercive pressure on the Assad regime, proxy warfare is the only alternative to

inaction.21

For the USA Syria also represents a dilemma. The political and diplomatic consequences

of the wars and insurgencies in both Afghanistan (2001 onwards) and Iraq (2003-2011), not to

mention the losses suffered by the US and allied armed forces in both these conflicts, are such

that even the employment of air power is domestically contentious. Syria’s diplomatic ties with

Russia and China precludes the UN Security Council’s authorisation of a limited air campaign in

support of the FSA and other rebel groups (similar to that against Muammar Qaddafi in Libya in

2011), as it is difficult to see how any resolution similar to that of SCR1973 will be passed

without a Chinese or Russian veto. As far as domestic opinion is concerned there is little support

for even assisting the Syrian insurgents, and no political figure of note has seen fit to follow up on

Governor Mitt Romney’s call (made during last year’s Presidential election) to support ‘those

members of the [Syrian] opposition who share our values and ensure they obtain the arms needed

to defeat Assad’s tanks, helicopters, and fighter jets’.22

Despite these constraints, and Obama’s evident reluctance to see the USA involved in a

fourth conflict in a Muslim state since 9/11, the Americans have provided ‘non-lethal’ assistance

to the opposition Syrian National Council, in addition to humanitarian assistance to refugees.

Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the former Director of Central Intelligence, General David

6

Petraeus, have recommending arming rebel groups, whilst the CIA is reportedly present in Adana

in South-Eastern Turkey to coordinate weapons transfers to insurgents.23 Given the West’s

diplomatic confrontation with Iran – notably over its suspected nuclear weapons programme –

there are two further reasons why the US may end up providing direct military assistance to the

FSA and allied groups. Firstly, Iran’s alliance with Syria has provided the foundation for its

regional policies since the 1979 revolution, as it has both provided a counter to its enemies (the

USA, Israel and (prior to 2003) Iraq), and a means of projecting influence across the Arab world

through a ‘resistance front’ of anti-Western governments and political movements. The Baath

regime’s overthrow would undermine this alliance, and weaken Iranian power and influence in

the Middle East.24 Secondly, the reported use of Sarin nerve agent by Assad’s forces may compel

the Obama administration to escalate its aid to the rebellion.25 President Obama has already

declared that the use of nerve agents against rebels and civilians would constitute a ‘red line’.

Any failure to respond to CW attacks by the Baathist regime would discredit his administration

and damage the USA’s credibility in other key aspects of policy; not least amongst them, the

efforts by Washington DC to use coercive diplomacy to curtail and control Iran’s nuclear

programme.26 Covert aid to bolster the Syrian rebellion would therefore provide an alternative to

a military intervention that the USA is currently unwilling to undertake.

Assad’s downfall could also have profound consequences for two of Syria’s neighbours,

Lebanon and Israel. Like Iran, Syria has backed both Hamas and Hezbollah as part of a regional

‘resistance front’, and its assistance to Hezbollah in particular has not only enabled it to develop a

sophisticated military arsenal, but also to become a ‘state within a state’ in Lebanon. Using is

paramilitary arm (the Islamic Resistance, or IR) and its support base amongst Lebanese Shiites,

Hezbollah has become both a kingmaker in Lebanon’s politics, and a means for Syria to preserve

its influence over the country following the eviction of its army of occupation in the spring of

2005.27

7

As a consequence of the civil war Hamas has broken ties with Assad’s regime. In

contrast, Hezbollah has remained loyal to its Syrian patrons although at considerable cost to its

reputation, losing the popularity it had gained on the Arab ‘street’ as a result of its ‘divine

victory’ against Israel in the war of July-August 2006. Furthermore, it has become an object of

loathing amongst Syria’s rebels.28 The US government has accused Hezbollah of ‘providing

1 Seymour, Holding the Zero, 423, 481. This novel depicts a plot by the CIA and SIS to overthrow Saddam Hussein,

orchestrating a Kurdish offensive in Northern Iraq in conjunction with a military coup in Baghdad.

2 Kautilya, Arthashastra, Book VI, ‘The Sources of Sovereign States’, Chapter II, ‘Concerning Peace and Exertion’,

online on http://www.sdstate.edu/projectsouthasia/upload/Book-VI-The-Source-of-Sovereign-States.pdf.

3 For a more detailed description see Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy: Proxy Warfare in International Politics.

4 Alexander Pope, ‘Epistle to Dr Arbuthnot’ (1734), online at http://ethnicity.rutgers.edu/~jlynch/Texts/arbuthnot.html.

5 ‘Attacking Syria: Global cop, like it or not’, The Economist (London), 31 August 2013.

6 ‘Syria death toll now above 100,000, says UN chief Ban’, BBC News, 25 July 2013, online at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23455760.

7 Ziadeh, Power and Policy in Syria, ix-xvii, 59, 143. ICG Middle East Report No.109, Popular Protests in North

Africa and the Middle East (VII): The Syrian Regime’s Slow Motion Suicide , 13 July 2011. ICG Middle East Report

No.128, Syria’s Mutating Conflict, 1 August 2012.

8 Ajami, ‘Viewpoint: Echoes of Spanish civil war in Syria’. ‘Syria’s civil war: The country formerly known as Syria’,

Economist, 23 February 2013. International Crisis Group (ICG) Middle East Report No.143, Syria’s Metastasising

Conflicts, 27 June 2013.

9 For a summary of Syria’s military capabilities see IISS, The Military Balance 2011-2012, 348-351. The Syrian Air

Force has around 290 Soviet/Russian manufactured fighter and ground attack aircraft (MiG-29, MiG-23, MiG-21, Su-

22 and Su-24), and 113 attack helicopters of similar manufacture (notably the Mi-24). Transport helicopters such as the

Mi-8 and Mi1-7 have been modified to carry rudimentary bombs. Russia is reported to be still providing weaponry to

Syria despite official protestations to the contrary. ‘Revealed; Russia’s double dealing on arms to Assad regime leaves

UK isolated over Syria’, The Independent (London), 18 February 2013.

10 ’48 captives are Iran ‘thugs’, say rebels in Syria’, The New York Times (New York), 5 August 2012. ‘Iranians held

by Syria rebels released’, BBC News, 9 January 2013, online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-

8

training, advice, and extensive logistical support’ to the Syrian government forces, and one of its

military commanders, Ali Hussein Nassif, was reportedly killed in combat in Syria in October

2012.29 If Assad’s regime is overthrown, Hezbollah will lose a crucial conduit of arms supplies

and will be militarily weakened as a result, and both Israel and the anti-Syrian March 14 alliance

of Lebanese parties will be the main beneficiaries.30 It is therefore not surprising that the

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has recently confirmed that the IR is fighting alongside Syrian

20958065.

11 Little, ‘The United States and the Kurds. A Cold War Story’, 66-84.

12 Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism, 117-154. Harel and Isaacharoff, 34 Days: Israel,

Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon, 181. Jumblatt’s insult is a play on the Arabic word for ‘lion’ – ‘Assad fi Lubnan

warnaab fi al Giulan’.

13 Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy, 11-12, 20-21.

14 Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy, 112-137. See also Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (London: Penguin 2005), 56, 90, 125-129.

15 This is illustrated in Turkey’s case by official censorship of media reports on assistance to the Syrian rebellion. See

‘The press in Turkey: Not so free’, Economist, 6 April 2013.

16 ‘La mise en garde d'Assad à la France’, Le Figaro (Paris), 2 September 2013.

17 Joshi, ‘Transition from Assad’, 32-33. ‘Syria’s rebels: Entanglement at home and abroad’, Economist, 30 March

2013. Nonetheless, the Syrian rebellion’s weaponry has to use self-acquired or improvised weapons. See ‘DIY

Weapons of the Syrian Rebels’, The Atlantic (Boston MA), 20 February 2013, online at

http://www.theatlantic.com/infocus/2013/02/diy-weapons-of-the-syrian-rebels/100461/.

18 ‘Syria’s civil war: Closer to the capital’, Economist, 13 April 2013.

19 ICG Europe Report No.225, Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey, 30 April 2013, 1-4. Joshi and

Stein, ‘Not Quite ‘Zero Problems’’, 28-30.

20 ‘EU ends embargo on Syria rebels’, BBC News, 28 May 2013, online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-

east-22684948. ‘Exclusive: UK military in talks to help Syria rebels’, The Independent (London), 11 December 2012.

21 Hayes, ‘London’s Road From Damascus’.

22 ‘Mitt Romney: Arm the Syrian Rebels’, The Guardian (London), 8 October 2012. Pew Research Center, ‘Middle

Eastern and Western Publics Wary on Syrian Intervention’, 2 May 2013, online at

http://www.pewresearch.org/2013/05/02/middle-eastern-and-western-publics-wary-on-syrian-intervention/.

9

government forces, and Hezbollah’s military wing is not only training and organising pro-Assad

militias to fight alongside regular Syrian forces, but was involved in combat operations such as

the battle for the town of Qusayr (19 May-5 June 2013). Clashes between the IR and Syrian rebels

have also been reported across the border in Lebanon.31

23 ‘US committed to providing non-lethal aid to Syria opposition’, The Daily Telegraph (London), 21 April 2013.

‘Syria’s rebels lose an ally in Petraeus’, The Times (London), 14 November 2012. ‘The country formerly known as

Syria’, Economist.

24 Lawson, ‘Syria’s Relations with Iran: Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance’, 29-47. Takeyh, Guardians of the

Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs, 74-9.

25 ‘Guerre chimique en Syrie – Sur le front de Damas’, Le Monde (Paris), 27 May 2013.

26 ‘Chemical weapons in Syria: Crossing a red line’, Economist, 27 April 2013. ‘Faith in Syria’s rebel army moves

President Obama a step closer to giving arms’, Independent, 1 May 2013.

27 Norton, Hezbollah: A Short History. ‘Syria loses influence among Palestinians’, Financial Times (London), 22

November 2012. Ziadeh, Power and Policy in Syria, 82, 115.

28 ‘To Syrian Rebels, Hezbollah is the Party of Satan’, Daily Telegraph, 19 January 2012, online at

http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/michaelweiss/100131142/to-syrian-rebels-hezbollah-is-the-party-of-satan/.‘Hezbollah

offering direct help to Syrian army, rebels say’, New York Times, 17 October 2012.

29 ‘Hezbollah military commander ‘killed in Syria’’, BBC News, 2 October 2012, online at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19801884?print=true. ‘New border front line opens up between rebels

and Hezbollah’, The Times, 22 April 2013.

30 ‘If Assad goes, Hezbollah will be alone in the Levant – much to the delight of Israel’, The Independent on Sunday

(London), 11 November 2012. ‘The American-Israeli security relationship: Let’s try a less awkward embrace’,

Economist, 22 March 2013.

31 ‘Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah in Syria pledge’, BBC News, 30 April 2013, online at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/middle-east-22360351. ‘Syria conflict: Rebel reinforcements arrive in Qusair’, BBC

News, 31 May 2013, online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/word/middle-east-22728789. ‘Syrian rebels and Hezbollah

‘exchange fire in Lebanon’’, BBC News, 2 June 2013, online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/word/middle-east-

22746675.

10

The consequences of a proxy war:

Proxy warfare may appear to be an attractive policy option for sponsors, but it has several pitfalls.

For the proxy forces involved, the risk is that they can be treated as expendable by their external

patrons, and can be manipulated by them. Any conclusions about a proxy conflict in Syria are

tentative in nature, but it is possible that the rebels will face the risks associated with

abandonment, critical weaknesses in combat against Assad’s military and security forces, and

also exacerbated factionalism, potentially leading to internecine violence between rival insurgent

movements. For sponsor states, the risks involve the potential for escalated involvement (drawing

in their own armed forces), retaliation, and also the unintended consequences of backing rebel

forces, foremost amongst them a revival of radical Sunni Islamism, and the empowerment of an

al-Qa’ida movement weakened by the ‘war on terror’.

From the perspective of the Syrian insurgents, the first risk is that even with enhanced

military aid – including the provision of anti-tank missiles such as the Russian-made Kornet or

the American Javelin, or man-portable air defence systems (MANPADs) such as the Stinger – the

FSA and other rebel groups will not be able to defeat the Assad regime’s security forces, or

overcome both their armoured vehicles or their control over Syria’s airspace. The Libyan civil

war offers misleading parallels as far the Syrian conflict is concerned. Qaddafi’s armed forces

were far less cohesive than Assad’s, and the Transitional National Council provided more united

leadership and a greater degree of control over rebel forces than is evident with the SNC. Even in

this case NATO air intervention was required to decisively affect the balance between Qaddafi

and his enemies.32 Conversely, if the regime loses control of much of the country, it may be

tempted to intensify its use of CW against the rebels as an act of desperation. 33 There are

indicators suggesting that the insurgency is growing in strength; most notably with the apparent

acquisition of MANPADs and the closure of Damascus airport in December 2012 as a

11

consequence of a rebel offensive. If Assed resorts to the unrestricted use of nerve agents against

insurgents and civilians, then responsibility for such an atrocity with rest primarily with him and

his inner circle. Yet potential and actual sponsors of the Syrian rebellion need to consider the

consequences of such a decision on both insurgents and civilians alike.34

A second risk is that external aid can exacerbate factionalism within the rebel movement,

encouraging clashes between rival commanders. This is a likely trend, given the convoluted

politics of the revolution and the lack of a unified command amongst the rebel forces; these

characteristics invite comparisons with the Afghan mujahidin factions during the 1980s. The anti-

Assad resistance also consists of Sunni Salafist groups, including the radical Jabhat al-Nusra and

the more ‘moderate’ Ahrar al-Sham. The appeal of Sunni radicalism and fundamentalism is

difficult to gauge, as it appears as though some Syrian rebel groups have proclaimed Salafi

sympathies in order to gain the support of donors from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

Insurgent commanders have also expressed resentment at the lack of Western assistance to

counterbalance Iranian and Russian support for the regime, stating that the growing appeal of

Salafi groups can only be countered if the USA, Britain and other Western powers start arming

more moderate anti-Assad factions. Nonetheless, there is a potential risk that a revived Salafi

movement within the rebellion might inflame sectarian tensions within the country, and also

32 Hilsum, Sandstorm. Pollack provides a summary of the Libyan military’s weaknesses in previous conflicts in Arabs

at War. Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991, 422-424. For any potential sponsor of the Syrian rebellion, Russian

manufactured weaponry – or similar arms from former Soviet, Warsaw Pact and Yugoslav states – would provide

‘plausible deniability’, given that such weapons have been supplied to the Syrian armed and security forces.

33 ‘Syria ‘will use chemical weapons only if invaded’’, Jane’s Defence Review 49/31, 1 August 2012. ‘Syria nears ‘red

line’ as regime moves its chemical weapons haul’, Times, 4 December 2012.

34.’Syrian rebels start using missiles’, Independent, 29 November 2012. ‘Syria’s crisis: Bashar bashed’, Economist, 1

December 2012. ‘‘Growing evidence’ of chemical weapons use in Syria – UK’, BBC News, 26 April 2013, online at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22305444.

12

reinforce regime claims to the Druze, Alawi and Christian minorities that they are under threat

from a religiously-inspired Sunni insurgency.35

From an ethical perspective, sponsor states need to consider the moral effect of backing

factions that commit the types of atrocities that are inherent in civil wars. 36 The Baath regime

attributes several mass killings of civilians – such as the Houla massacre of May 2012 – to its

‘terrorist’ opponents, denying that the Shabiha or other loyalist militias are involved. Likewise,

the Syrian government can be accused of deliberately inciting sectarian tensions with its

propaganda. Nonetheless, there are reports that the FSA and other rebel groups have summarily

executed prisoners of war,37 whilst footage of an insurgent mutilating the body of a loyalist

soldier and eating his heart caused international revulsion which both the Syrian government and

its external backers have sought to exploit.38 The Alawite community fears that it has become

‘guilty by association’ for the actions of the Assad clan, even though Alawis do not back the

regime collectively, and have not indeed uniformly benefited politically or economically from its

existence. Conversely, there are disturbing indications that the Sunni majority’s attitudes towards

35 ‘Syria’s Salafists: Getting stronger?’, Economist, 20 October 2012. ICG Middle East Report No.131, ‘Tentative

Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition’, 12 October 2012.

36 Kalyvas examines this phenomenon in The Logic of Violence in Civil War.

37 ‘Syrian diplomats expelled after Houla massacre’, Channel 4 News (UK), 29 May 2012, online at

http://www.channel4.com/news/women-and-children-executed-in-syria-un. RT, the English-language service of the

Russian state broadcaster RIA Novosti, has claimed that insurgent death squads are targeting all government

employees, including non-combatants, although its openly pro-Assad output is such that this claim requires

independent verification. ‘Syrian atrocity: Bodies of postal workers thrown from roof’, RT, 12 August 2012, online at

http://rt.com/news/syria-aleppo-post-video-476/.

38 ‘Video: Syrian rebel cuts out soldier's heart, eats it’, CNN News, 14 May 2013, online at

http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/14/world/meast/syria-eaten-heart. The Russian President made the most of this atrocity,

expressing disbelief that the West was planning to arm ‘cannibals’. ‘Putin warns Cameron against arming Syrian rebels

as UK weighs options’, RT, 16 June 2013, online at http://rt.com/news/putin-cameron-syria-summit-786/.

13

the Alawites are hardening, raising the prospects that the regime’s overthrow may be followed by

a sectarian pogrom.39

The Palestinian community has also suffered the consequences of the civil war, with an

estimated 600 killed in fighting in Yarmouk and other refugee camps. Press reports also indicate

that rival Palestinian groups have clashed with each other, and that the PFLP-GC faction (to take

one example) has fought on the Baath regime’s side. The latter has had a consistent record of

exploiting rivalries and feuds between the Palestinian armed groups, using sympathetic proxies

against factions (notably Fatah) that have traditionally resisted Damascus’ effort to control the

Palestinian movement. This was reflected by Hafez al-Assad’s bitter rivalry with Yasser Arafat,

which contributed to the ‘Palestinian civil war’ pitting Fatah against its enemies in Lebanon in

1983, and the ‘war of the camps’ in the latter phases of the Lebanese civil war (1985-1987). 40 It is

therefore possible that Hamas’ decision to break ties with the Syrian regime could incur the

latter’s enmity. In late June 2012 a Hamas official, Kamal Ghanaja, was murdered in his

Damascus home, whilst two other figures in the Syrian-based leadership, Ahmad Khalil Khalil

and Ahmad al-Kharoubi, were reportedly shot dead by Syrian troops during clashes in Deraa

refugee camp.41 In Gaza itself, Hamas has been reportedly deprived of Iranian aid, which has

instead been channelled to a rival group, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).42 At the very least, Iran

39 ‘Syria’s Crisis: No end in sight’, Economist, 13 October 2012. Syria’s Mutating Conflict, 24-31.

40 ‘Syria’s Palestinians: Stateless and helpless as ever’, Economist, 17 November 2012. ‘A Syrian Airstrike Kills

Palestinian Refugees and Costs Assad Support’, New York Times, 16 December 2012. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the

Search for State, 551-573.

41 ‘Hamas member 'assassinated' in Syrian capital Damascus’, BBC News, 28 June 2012, online at

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18626026. ‘2 Hamas leaders killed in Syria, sources say’, Ma’an News

Agency, 27 October 2012, online http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=532288. Ma’an News is an

independent Palestinian agency based in Bethlehem and funded by the Danish and Dutch governments.

42 Najib, ‘Islamist advance – Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s growing influence’, 14-17.

14

and Syria have the means of militarily and financially empowering PIJ at Hamas’ expense; PIJ

also provides a potential proxy for Damascus and Tehran for conducting reprisals against Hamas

for its desertion from the ‘resistance front’.

Iran itself has at present a limited engagement in Syria, providing arms and other supplies

by air with the tacit support of the Iraqi government. At least 150 officers of the IRGC’s Quds

Force (its external operations department) are reported to have been sent to Damascus to aid

Assad’s government in the aftermath of the rebel bomb attack on its National Security

Headquarters on 18 July 2012, and the IRGC’s commander, Major-General Mohammed Ali

Jafari, has publicly admitted that Iran is providing military assistance to Assad’s regime. The

reported capture (and subsequent release) by insurgents of 48 Quds Force personnel passing

themselves off as ‘pilgrims’ remains unconfirmed, although these indicate a potential dilemma

for Iran which resembles that faced by the USA in South Vietnam in the early 1960s, and the

Soviets in Afghanistan in 1978-1979. Iran has decided for strategic reasons to provide arms and

‘advisors’ to an allied government facing a countrywide revolt; if such limited assistance fails to

stabilise the regime in question (as was the case respectively with the superpowers’ clients in

Saigon and Kabul) then Tehran will face a choice between an escalation of Iran’s involvement in

the Syrian conflict, or abandonment, which would undermine what remains of its regional

‘resistance front’.43 Conversely, the USA, Saudi Arabia and other adversaries may consider the

temptations of trying to embroil Iran with its own ‘Vietnam’, whilst Israel has a theoretical

incentive to embroil Hezbollah in a conflict in Syria which could prove as debilitating to

15

Nasrallah’s movement as the occupation of Southern Lebanon (1983-2000) was for the Israeli

Defence Force (IDF).44

The risks of escalation should be recognised with respect to the stability of Lebanon,

tensions between Syria and Turkey, and also Russia’s troubled relations with the West. Regarding

the latter, the Russians have demonstrated consistent diplomatic support for Assad’s regime,

realising that its downfall would represent the loss of Moscow’s only ally in the Arab world; a

rebel victory is likely, for example, to lead to the loss of the Russian naval depot at Tartus.

President Vladimir Putin furiously protested NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, proclaiming

that Western powers had exploited SCR1973 to justify the overthrow of Qaddafi, and Russian

officials have expressed the suspicion that any Western aerial intervention in Syria – whether to

impose a ‘no-fly zone’ or to launch punitive strikes – will simply provide a pretext for regime

change. This is not to say that Western powers should necessarily turn away from the Syrian

conflict simply in order to appease Putin. Since the 1990s, Russia has backed despotic regimes

(notably Slobodan Milosevic’s in Yugoslavia, and Saddam Hussein’s in Iraq) in an opportunistic

effort to counter Western influence, and in the case of Syria its ties with the Baath regime are

likely to undermine whatever prestige it retains with the Arab world.45 Yet is it sufficient to note 43 The bombing killed Assef Shawkat (the Deputy Defence Minister, and Assad’s brother-in-law), Dawoud Rajiha (the

Defence Minister), Hasan Turkmani (a former Chief of the Army and crisis manager) and Hisham Ikhtiyar (the head of

the National Security Bureau, overseeing the regime’s intelligence services). ‘Iran sends elite troops to aid Bashar al-

Assad regime in Syria’, Daily Telegraph, 6 September 2012. ‘Iran’s Revolutionary Guard admits it has advisors in

Syria, Lebanon’, Haaretz (Tel Aviv), 17 September 2012.

44 ‘Hezbollah has been lured into unknown territory in Syria as it wags costly battle for survival’, Independent, 2 June

2013. ‘Hizbullah may be hurting itself’, 22 May 2013, online at http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/

05/lebanon-and-syria/print.

45 Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia’s Line in the Sand on Syria’, 5 February 2012, online at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace website, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/05russia-s-line-in-sand-on-syria/9g77. Eyal, ‘Mr

‘Nyet’: Russia and Her Syrian Friend’, 43-44.

16

that Western support for Syria’s rebels would be yet another factor which undermined President

Obama’s efforts to ‘reset’ the US-Russian relationship.

A common response for the targets of proxy warfare is to support non-state groups

fighting against the sponsors,46 and in this respect the civil war in Syria also has the potential to

destabilise the sectarian balance in Lebanon. Ever since both tcountries gained independence

from France in 1943 Damascus has repeatedly meddled in Lebanese politics, promoting both

factional clashes and internal warfare.47 The presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon,48

Damascus’ alliance with Hezbollah, the intense hostility between pro and anti-Syrian political

factions, and the FSA’s ties with Lebanon’s Sunni community could all contribute to a

catastrophic eruption of sectarian and communitarian tensions which fuelled the civil war of

1975-1990. Clashes have already been recorded between pro and anti-Assad forces in Northern

Lebanon and Tripoli, 49 and on 19 October 2012 the commander of the Information Branch of

Lebanon’s Internal Security Forces (ISF), Wissam al-Hassan, was killed in a car-bombing in

Beirut; al-Hassan’s death is allegedly connected with the ISF foiling a plot to smuggle into the

country arms and explosives provided by Syrian intelligence. Assad’s regime is already linked

with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri and other Lebanese officials and

public opponents,50 and it is possible that the Syrian leadership will use proxy warfare to retaliate

against the March 14 parties for their links with the FSA and other insurgents.

46 Hughes, My Enemy’s Enemy, 21-22, 54.

47 Rathmell, Secret War in the Middle East, 1-6, 44-50, 128-131, 145-146.

48 ICG Middle East Report No.141, Too Close for Comfort: Syrians in Lebanon, 13 May 2013.

49 Joshi, ‘Lebanon risks being torn apart by Syrian conflict’. ‘Pro-Hezbollah fighters, rebels clash in Syrian border

towns: residents’, The Daily Star (Beirut), 18 October 2012. Bazargan, ‘My Neighbour, My Enemy’.

50 Alex Taylor, ‘Hasan’s pivotal security role’, Daily Star, 20 October 2012. ‘Army say gunmen agree to truce in

Lebanon's Tripoli’, Reuters, 23 October 2012, online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/23/us-lebanon-crisis-

idUSBRE89L0CK20121023. Young, The Ghosts of Martyrs Square, 2-5, 17-27.

17

The Syrian civil war has already undermined Erdogan’s policy of rapprochement both

with Damascus and Tehran, and there have to date been two significant military confrontations

between Turkey and Syria. The first involved Syria shooting down a Turkish Air Force F-4 jet in

July 2012, the second a Syrian mortar attack on the border town of Akcakale on 3 October 2012,

which provoked repeated Turkish artillery strikes on Syrian military positions across the

frontier,51 and in early December 2012 NATO agreed to station Patriot anti-aircraft missiles in

Eastern Turkey in response to Ankara’s requests for their deployment.52 Turkish sources have

expressed concerns that Assad may retaliate by reviving Syria’s relations with the Kurdish

insurgent group, the PKK, ties which his father abandoned as a result of Turkish military coercion

in 1998. The Turks suspect that the Syrian authorities have deliberately ceded control over the

North-East of the country to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Kurdish political group allied

with the PKK, as a reprisal for Ankara’s support for the Syrian National Council.53

There are also disturbing reports that the Syrian conflict has inflamed ethnic and sectarian

tensions in the border province of Hatay, which prior to 1938 was part of the then-French

mandate of Syria. Hatay has a sizeable Arab Alawite (or Alevi) community, estimated as being

500-700,000 in number (there are between 700,000-2.5 million Alevis in Turkey as a whole). The

51 ‘Tensions rise as Syria admits it shot down Turkish fighter jet’, Independent, 23 June 2012. ‘Turkey Strikes Syria,

Adds War Powers’, Wall Street Journal (New York), 5 October 2012.

52 ‘Syrie: l’OTAN s’engage a protéger la Turquie et menace Damas on cas de recours aux armes chimiques’, Le Monde

4 December 2012.

53 Damla Aras, ‘The Role of Motivation in the Success of Coercive Diplomacy: The 1998 Turkish-Syrian Crisis as a

Case Study’, Defence Studies 9/2 (2009), 207-223. ‘Turkey sends more troops to Syrian border’, Jane’s Defence

Weekly 29/32, 8 August 2012. For a more detailed analysis of the politics of the Kurdish communities in Syria, Turkey,

Iraq and Iran – and their interaction with regional governments – see ICG Middle Eastern Report No.136, Syria’s

Kurds: A Struggle Within A Struggle. 22 January 2013.

18

Alevis are already disenchanted with official discrimination by the AKP government, and are

alarmed by the presence of Syrian rebel fighters on Turkish soil. Ankara, for its part, suspects that

Alevi discontent is being deliberately stocked by Damascus, and the car-bomb attack in the

Turkish border town of Reyhanli (11 May 2013) have been described by Erdogan’s government

as Syrian-inspired.54

Two other potentially dangerous outcomes deserve consideration. The first is that the

Syrian conflict can lead to a renewed sectarian war in Iraq, pitting Nuri al-Maliki’s Shia-

dominated government against the former Sunni insurgents in the Al-Anbar Awakening Councils,

which have clan ties with the anti-Assad rebels, notably with the Shammar tribe on both sides of

the Syrian-Iraqi border.55 The latter evidently fears that Assad’s downfall would destabilise Iraq

(particularly given reports that Jabhat al-Nusra is aligned with al-Qa’ida in Iraq), and has

provided indirect assistance to the Syrian regime, notably by allowing Iranian resupply flights

access to Iraqi airspace. The civil war in Syria could therefore provide a catalyst for increased

sectarian violence in Iraq, with potentially a return to the bloody internecine conflict of the mid-

2000s.56

The second would involve any decision by Assad to resort to a ‘Sampson option’, 57 either

launching a ballistic missile attack on Israel as part of a desperate bid to rally popular support for

his regime, or disseminating missiles and chemical agents to Hezbollah or another proxy. Whilst

54 ICG Europe Report, Blurring the Borders, 19-24. Joshi and Stein, ‘Not Quite ‘Zero Troubles’, 29.

55 ‘Under siege: A special report from war-torn Mosul’, Independent, 12 April 2007. Joshi, ‘Transition from Assad’, 30.

56 ‘Iraqi al-Qa’ida declares takeover of leading Syrian rebel group’, Independent, 9 April 2013. Dodge, Iraq: From War

to a New Authoritarianism, 188, 193-4. There are reports of Iraqi Shias fighting alongside pro-government militias in.

See ‘Evidence mounts of foreign fighters taking up arms to aid Assad regime’, Times, 23 January 2013.

57 Syria Hersh used this term to describe Israeli nuclear deterrence in The Sampson Option: Israel, America and the

Bomb.

19

either of these scenarios are judged unlikely, it is sufficient to observe that Israel has specifically

warned that they would be treated as a casus belli, and the IDF has already conducted three air-

strikes against convoys in Syria that were apparently transferring arms to the IR. 58 The potential

therefore exists for a war between Israel and Syria, or a re-run of the 2006 clash with Lebanon, or

for both scenarios concurrently.59

Conclusions:

The current war in Syria may end with a negotiated settlement between the Baath regime and its

enemies, either via the UN or through other external brokers. Yet the likelihood is that whilst

Assad will fight on until he has crushed his internal foes, the FSA and other groups will reject a

compromise settlement and will seek the Baath regime’s overthrow. Given the bloodletting that

has occurred to date, the prospects for peace and reconciliation between regime supporters and

opponents are hardly promising. A Baathist victory would lead to retributive massacres and a

mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of refugees. Continued civil strife may lead to state

disintegration similar to that which occurred in Lebanon in 1975-1976, with all the humanitarian

consequences involved.

58 ‘Fate of Syrian Chemical Weapons May Trigger War’, Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 31 July 2012, online at

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israel-prepares-plans-to-neutralize-syrian-chemical-weapons-a-847203.html.

‘Israeli warplanes launch air strike inside Syria’, BBC News, 4 May 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-

east-22409380.

59 ‘Could Syria conflict become regional war?’, BBC News, 11 May 2013, online at

http://www.bbc.co.uk.news/world/middle-east-22486148. ‘Israel prepares as war clouds gather’, Independent, 3 June

2013.

20

Western and Gulf Arab states may decide to avert both outcomes by intensifying

assistance to the FSA and other rebel groups, arming them with portable anti-tank missiles and

MANPADs, or other sophisticated equipment required to take on the Syrian armed and security

forces on more even terms. Past precedents, notably the multilateral effort to aid the Afghan

mujahidin during the 1980s, suggest that such an engagement in proxy warfare may have the

following consequences. Foreign assistance could empower radical fundamentalist groups within

the rebel movement, possibly provoking internecine violence in the process. This trend is likely if

several states choose to sponsor different factions, and if the Syrian insurgency’s patrons have

competing motives for offering assistance (with some intending to force Assad to negotiate with

his enemies, while others seek to overthrow his regime).

There is also a risk that rebel guerrillas may commit more of their own atrocities as

reprisals against those committed by the Syrian military or the Shabiha – in which case, any state

that sustains them will share at least some of the culpability. A further challenge concerns the

likelihood that despite external assistance, Assad’s opponents will still find themselves at a

military disadvantage, particularly if the Baath regime continues to receive arms from Russia and

Iran, and more direct assistance from the IRGC and Hezbollah. Sponsors will in this contingency

be faced with the unpalatable alternatives of either escalating assistance, or abandoning their

proxies to their fate.

The fundamental problem with proxy warfare is that the policymakers who instigate it

rarely consider the long-term implications of their actions, and do not devise policies designed to

ensure a political resolution once the conflict is one. The USA and other Western powers

effectively abandoned the mujahidin once the Soviets had pulled their combat troops out of

Afghanistan (February 1989), and the eventual outcome was the civil war (1992-1996), the rise of

the Taliban, and the emergence of al-Qa’ida . Achieving strategic goals is a challenging enough

21

task in any ‘conventional’ military conflict, and states can resort to war without their

governments actually planning for their outcome.60 Yet the process of strategy becomes a far

harder one when the means employed are not ones own armed forces, but non-state irregulars

who may take the sponsors weapons and money, without necessarily feeling beholden to their

patron(s), or indeed obliged to act according to the latter’s political intentions. If the USA and

other powers do become embroiled in Syria, then it is vital that any covert or overt assistance

offered to Assad’s enemies is not proffered without a plan to help the Syrians stabilise their

country after regime change, and to prevent further bloodshed between its disparate communities.

Otherwise, proxy warfare could simply replace a totalitarian state with a failed one.

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Endnotes:

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The author would like to thank Dr Matthew Ford and the participants at the ‘Life After Counterinsurgency’

symposium (30th-31st May 2013) for their comments and criticisms on the original draft of this paper. The

analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied here are those of the author and do not necessarily

represent the views of the JSCSC, the Defence Academy, the MOD or any other UK government agency.

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