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Comments on “How (Not) to Measure Institutions” by Professor Stefan Voigt Philip Keefer Development Research Group, The World Bank. Key points. SV: Measures of institutions should Capture de jure and de facto institutions (or,equivalently(?), formal and informal institutions). - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Comments on “How (Not) to Measure Institutions” by Professor Stefan Voigt
Philip KeeferDevelopment Research Group, The World
Bank
Key points
SV: Measures of institutions should
• Capture de jure and de facto institutions (or,equivalently(?), formal and informal institutions).
• be objective.• be disaggregated.
PK: These are important, desirable standards. But application to two key questions is not clear.
• How do we measure the security of property rights≈ no opportunistic behavior by government?
• How do we measure the determinants of secure property rights?
Security of property rights?
Lots of smoke in the literature. • Rule of law is hard to define.• Subjective is worse than objective.• Aggregated is worse than disaggregated.• ALL TRUE!
But ceteris is not paribus:• no objective, disaggregated measures of
threat of opportunistic behavior.• And yet theory and qualitative evidence
indicate this is a first order concern in development.
• Hence: scholarly and policy communities (more or less) embrace subjective indicators.
Measuring threats of gov’t. opportunism
Subjective measures variously labeled “risk of expropriation”, “rule of law” , etc. Problems:
• Noise: low opportunism countries can be rated as high opportunism.
• Misattribution: they pick up other unobserved, growth-damaging features of countries
Appropriate response – throw out bath water, not baby:
• Ignore differences between Thailand and Malaysia, Canada and the US, or Brazil and Mexico. (bath water)
• DON’T ignore conclusions based on comparisons across many countries. (baby)
Measures of Institutions
Attempts to use institutional measures as proxies for threat of opportunistic behavior. Problematic.
• Assumes that institutions are the main drivers of opportunistic behavior.
• Assumes that the institutions we measure are the most important.
• Both may be incorrect.Exposes, instead, an important research agenda:
• under what conditions do governments refrain from opportunistic behavior?
• Institutional debate REINFORCES dependence on subjective measures of opportunism!
Institutional measures and opportunism
Presumed institutional determinants of opportunism:“Tail wagging the dog” constraints on political opportunism:
• Judicial independence• Central Bank Independence (opportunistic
behavior in monetary policy)• Problem: agency independence is a function
of politics (Keefer/Stasavage and many others)
Political institutions:• Political checks and balances (Subjective –
Polity; Objective – Henisz or Database of Political Institutions)/
• Democracy (Subjective – Polity; Objective: DPI, Przeworski, et al.)
• Problem: No controls for political incentives
Missing: the politics of opportunistic behavior
Institutional puzzle of opportunistic behavior:• Some democracies/non-democracies restrain
opportunism - many don’t.• Some parliaments check abusive behavior by
executive –many don’t.• Democracy and checks measures don’t capture
these distinctions.
Poor non-democ-racies
Poor democ-racies
Rich democ-racies
Corruption (0 – 6, least corrupt = 6), 1997
2.7 2.9 4.1
Bureaucratic quality (0 – 6, 6 = highest quality), 2000
2.3 2.4 4.6
Rule of law (0 – 6, 6 = highest quality), 2000
3.7 2.9 4.6
Need more thought/evidence on political incentives to secure property
rightsSecure property rights = public good.
• Opportunistic behavior reduces growth, hurting everyone.
• So pursue indicators of government incentives to provide public goods that vary within dems/non-dems (e.g., of “political market imperfections”).
Putting the politics into institutions
Within dems:Types of electoral institutions (PR, list)Measures of credibility of political promises
• Types of political parties (programmatic/not)• Age of democracy
Within non-dems: intra-ruling party characteristics? Can leaders make credible promises to party members?
• Age of party?• Internal checks on leaders?• Information distributed to members?
Sources? Unfinished agenda. But: Database of Political Institutions (WB); Cline Center for Democracy (U. Ill, Champaign).
Need more nuanced institutional data
Within dems:• Budget process, Exec – Parliament• Intra-parliamentary decision making• Rules for candidate selection
Sources: few, now, but Cline Center for Democracy. . .
In sum. . .
The world needs a better mousetrap to measure threat of opportunistic behavior. . .
. . . but an objective indicator not on the horizon.
Better place to put resources: improving empirical basis for investigating determinants of opportunistic behavior.
• Measuring political incentives• Measuring public sector characteristics (pub.
sec fin. mgt; civil service; judiciary; etc) – at least as intermediate determinants of opportunism.