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8/11/2019 Keith Ansell-Pearson
1/15
Review: Freedom and the Politics of Desire: Aporias, Paradoxes, and ExcessesAuthor(s): Keith Ansell PearsonReviewed work(s):
Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality by G. A. CohenMichel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom by Thomas L. DummDeleuze and Guatarri: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire by Philip GoodchildReal Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? by Philippe van Parijs
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jun., 1998), pp. 399-412Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/191843
Accessed: 14/03/2010 14:42
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2/15
REVIEW ESSAY
FREEDOM AND
THE
POLITICS OF DESIRE
Aporias,
Paradoxes,
and Excesses
SELF-OWNERSHIP,
REEDOM,
ND
EQUALITYby
.
A.
Cohen.
Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity
Press,
1995. 277
pp.
MICHELFOUCAULTAND THEPOLITICS
OF FREEDOM
by
ThomasL.
Dumm.
Thousand
Oaks,
CA:
Sage,
1996. 168
pp.
DELEUZEANDGUATARRI:N INTRODUCTION OTHE
POLITICS
OF
DESIRE
by
Philip
Goodchild.Thousand
Oaks,
CA:
Sage,
1996. 226
pp.
REALFREEDOMFORALL:
WHAT(IF
ANYTHING)
CANJUSTIFYCAPI-
TALISM?
y
Philippe
Van
Parijs.
New
York:Oxford
University
Press,
1995.
322
pp.
These four books
indicate that
political
theorizing
n
the
English-speaking
world s
in a
healthy
and
ively
stateand
hat
new
conceptual
ools for
working
through
the
anxieties and
uncertaintiesof our late
modern times are not
lacking.
With the
exception
of van
Parijs,
he books
underreview
are
keen
to
place
the notion of
freedom,
as
inherited
by
us
from
both
the liberal
and
Marxian
traditions,
under
suspicion.
It is
probably
Nietzsche who
best
captures
the sense of
disorientation
many political
theorists
currently
eel
abouttheir nheritanceDummmakesmuchof theseriousnessof Nietzsche's
death of
God thesis
with
its
vertiginous
descent into the
abyss).
The
experience
of
nihilism
refersto the
experience
of a
disjunction,
n
which our
actual
experience
of
the world and
the
conceptual
vocabulary
we have
at our
disposal
for
making
sense of it no
longer
fit
together.
As is well
known,
Nietzsche's
response
o
this
predicament
not
necessarily
modern)
was
to
call
for
a
revaluation
of all
values,
subjecting
our
metaphysical
and
moral con-
cepts
to a
supreme
elf-examination. This
experience
of
nihilism,
which
exists
in
excess
of the
opposition
of
negative
and
positive,
or
good
and
bad,
seems to definewell ourtroubled ontemporaryense of freedom,and t finds
POLITICAL
THEORY,
Vol.
26 No.
3,
June
1998 399-412
?
1998
Sage
Publications,
nc.
399
8/11/2019 Keith Ansell-Pearson
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400
POLITICAL
THEORY June 1998
articulation,
lbeit n
very
different
ways,
in
these books under
review. In
the
last hundredor so years,we have seen a revolution n thought akeplace in
the wake of the modem masters of
suspicion
(the
unholy
trinity
of
Marx,
Nietzsche,
and
Freud),
and once this
trajectory
f
thought
s
enhancedwith
the likes
of
Deleuze,
Derrida,Foucault,
and
others,
he
question
can no
longer
be
avoided:
what is the
status,
in both
the
ontological
and
axiological
dimensions,
of such a centralandcrucial
notion
n our
mental
andscape
ike
self-ownership ?
t
is
impossible
to remainnaive or
complacent
about the
status
of
this
notion,
the one that is
perhaps
definitive of the
triumph
and
tragedy
of
the
West,
but also
the
one
that
has
been
placed
in
peril
by
the
new
postmetaphysics.
The link between theeventof nihilismand the
calling
into
question
of the value
of
self-ownership
ies in
the
fact that
nihilism
signals
the end of
our
anthropocentric
aivete,
in which
the human
was
posited
as
the
meaning
and
measure of all
things.
Furthermore,
he notion of
an
autonomous
agent
n
possession
of miraculous
powers
of
autoproduction
nd
in
control
of its
own
destiny
has
been undermined
by
key trajectories
of
modern and late-modem
thought,
which
have
sought
to
show the heterono-
mous
determination
f
subjectivity,
whetherthese determinations
ake the
form of history, echnics,the transcendentalnconscious,orcapital.Itis with
these
thoughts
n mind that
I
shall
approach
he books
I
have
been asked to
review.
Thomas Dumm
has
written what
is
on the
whole an excellent
book on
Foucault
for the
Modernity
nd Political
Thought
eries edited
by
Morton
Schoolman.
It
reveals a
scholarly
intelligence
in
possession
of a nuanced
late-modern
sensibility.
Anyone
who has
any
doubts as to the
lasting
bril-
liance
of Foucault's
hought,
and ts
relevance o
political
theory,
houldread
this first-ratepiece of work. For what comes across most from Dumm's
skillful
reconfiguration
f
his
oeuvre,
s
the sense that
here
was a
philosopher
of
great
daring,
courage,
and
ntegrity
who made
one of the most
original
and
provocative
contributions
o
the
way
we think
aboutour ives
in the twentieth
century.
Foucault
was a
thinker not afraid
to take
risks,
and who never
remained
complacent
about
his own attainments
n
thought.
He was a
minor writer
n Deleuze's sense
of the
word,
that
is,
a thinker
who never
analyzed
the
marginal
and
dispossessed
of
society-madmen,
delinquents,
prisoners,
perverts,
and the
homeless-from
the
superior
moral
standpoint
of
the
majority,
ut
who
sought
o
tap
nto theiroften silent andautisticvoices
and
to utilize
the
experience
of the minor
so as
to
arrive
at a
more
dynamical
and
dangerous
conception
of
freedom-dangerous
in
the
sense that it
lives
in
excess,
esteems
transgression,
nd
engages
in
self-experimentation.
This
is not so much
an
aestheticization
f
the
ethical,
a
charge
requently
and
azily
8/11/2019 Keith Ansell-Pearson
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Pearson REVIEWESSAY 401
leveled
at Foucault's
late
work,
but more
of
a nonhuman
or
overhuman)
ethics. Dumm shows that Foucaultwas committedto the constructionof a
set of
practices
n which
self-experimentation
an be cultivated
beyondgood
and
evil.
Such
practices
engage
in excess and
transgression
but do not
eschew concerns
with
responsibility
nd
commitment.The
emphasis
s on
learning
the
meaning
of these notions
through
ived
experiences
where
the
identity
of
the
self
is not taken
as
given
and
where
self
and other
come into
being
through
processual
nteraction.
n
Foucault's
ransgressive
philosophy
of the
Outside,
the other
is to be treatedas one's
consumingpassion. '
As
Deleuze
wrote: To
eat and to
be
eaten-this
is the
operational
model of
bodies,
the
type
of their mixture n
depth,
theiraction and
passion,
andthe
way
in
which
they
coexist
with each other. 2
Dumm's
study
will
makean deal introduction
or
anyone
new to Foucault.
It
has
been
deftly
constructed,
t is written
with
care,
precision,
and
passion,
and
t
succeeds
n
enabling
he reader
o embark
pon
a radical
elf-questioning
concerning
the notion
of freedom.
The book
is divided into four
chapters.
The first
chapter
ays
out the
question
n the context of a
consideration
f our
liberal and
Marxian
heritage.
The second
chapterapplies
the
problematic
of
freedomto thequestionof space, dealingwith the loss of space,the sense
of new
spaces
such
as
cyberspace, utopian space,
Foucault's
heterotopias,
and it
contains
a
superb
critical
reading
of Isaiah Berlin's canonical
and
much-cited
essay
on the two
concepts
of
liberty.
This
part
of
the book should
be set
reading
for those
theorists rained
n
the
analytical
raditionand who
champion,
blindly
and
naively,
the cause of
good
sense and
common sense
in
philosophical
hinking.
His
basic
argument
ontra
Berlin,
to whom Dumm
is
remarkably
haritable t
should be
noted,
s to insist
that
the
assumption
of
a neutral
pace
of freedom
viz.
Berlin's
argument
n
favor
of
negative iberty)
betrays he inherent nstabilityof such a spacewhenvalorizedas anabsolute
category.
The
third
chapter
s devoted to an
exposition
of one of
Foucault's
most
seminal
texts
Discipline
and
Punish,
while
the fourthand
final
chapter
considers what
new
senses
of
freedom
might
be
possible
afterthe
demise
of
the
disciplinary
society
and locates in the
Holocaust
writings
of Primo
Levi
a
model
for a
modern
versionof the careof the
self
(it
was
possible
to cultivate
practices
of freedom
even in
the death
camps).
Dumm's text
is not without
problems.
He has a
tendency
for
the
pithy,
which,
at
times,
tested this
reader's
patience
and which allowed
the
quasi-
existentialistvoice
of the author o arrest
he flow
of
the
imaginative
exposi-
tion,
such as
when he
brazenly
declares at the
end of the
book that
a
world
without domination s
the
telos
of
genocide
(a
sentence that s too
pithy
for
its
own
good).
This kind of
homespun
philosophy
is
not to
my
taste,
but it
may
be fine for other readers. He also runs
the
danger
of
simplifying
or
8/11/2019 Keith Ansell-Pearson
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POLITICALTHEORY June
1998
eviscerating
he
challenge
of
Foucault's
conception
of new
ethical
practices
by makingit far too palatable, orwhile thesepracticesareindeedintended
to
display
generosity
oward he
Other r
otherness hat
s
both
inside
and
outside
of
oneself,
it also needsto
be
acknowledged
hat
such
practices
annot
escape
the dimension
of
cruelty.
The Foucault hat
emerges
romthis
probing
study
is a
deeply
historical hinkerbut not a
historicist.While
exposing
the
contingent
and
open
natureof social
practices
and ethical
norms,
Foucault
always
held thatsites
of resistance
and
self-overcoming
were
ocatablewithin
power
relationships;
ndeed,
for
him,
transgression
s never
simply
an
escape
but
always
an
entirely
contextualand relational
affair.The care
of the self'
advocated
by
the late Foucault
requires
no 'hard'notion of the self, the self
is
always
a
fragile
achievement,
engaged
in
a fluid
becoming,
a
processual
'self-overcoming
(this
is the
paradox
of Nietzsche's doctrine of 'how
one
becomes
what one
'is':
the
self
'is'
nothing
otherthan ts
becoming).
Dumm
succeeds
in
showing
the extent to which freedom for Foucault is
always
situated
and
situational,
constrained
by
social relations and
involving
the
mediation
of external
forces. The forces
of the outside are never
fully
present
or
determinable,
nd so serve to
guarantee
hat
the
self is
compelled
to alwayslive beyonditself.3Any nonutopian ision of freedomforDumm,
therefore,
must
comprehend
he
constitutive
powers
that situate t.
Dumm
has conceived
his
re-working
of Foucaultand
freedom
as
making
a
positive
contribution
oward
a
revitalizationof liberal
theory.
But
what
transpires
s a
major
testing
of our liberal
heritage
in which
many
of its
fundamental
notions
are
found
wanting.
His
critique
of
Berlin
could
quite
easily
be
extended
to once-called
postmodern
iberals such as Richard
Rorty:
In
presenting
space
as
neutral,
Dumm
writes,
Berlinmakes
it
the
ground
of freedom.
To establish his
space
as the
ground
s to render
t
outside
of contestationorstruggle.Spaceis uncontestable s a neutralground o the
extent
that
one is
prevented
rom
questioning
ts
production
or
recognizing
that
he
production
f
space
s
always
already
n
architectural
nterprise p.
48).
In
short,
he
liberal
conception
of
freedom,
as
articulated
romBerlinto
Rorty,
is incoherent
and
devoid
of
any
real
meaning
or substance.
Because
of
their
failure to
appreciate
he
importance
of contest and
struggle
in
the ethical
praxis
of
freedom,
iberals
end
up
positing
a
non-politics
of
freedom
(hence
the
significance
of
the
title
of Dumm's
book).
Of
course,
egitimations
of the
liberal
conception
of
freedom
requently
ake he
formof
a
historical
defense,
defending,
for
example,
the
sanctity
of
the
private
individual
against
the
totalitarian
hreat
of the
modern
State
(in
Rorty's
ate-modern
iberalism,
his
takes the
absolutist
form
of
stating
that the
practices
of
private
ironic
self-creation
can never
be
reconciled
with the demands
of
public
freedom).
But these
historical
arguments
imply
serve
to
highlight
the
largely
reactive
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404
POLITICAL
THEORY June
1998
question
once and for all
Marxism's
commitment o a
communist
utopia
in
which thepromised andwould offerabundanceor allreadilyandaccessibly.
It is not
surprising
hatsuch a
model of
social life
hadno
sustained
onception
of the
political
(there's
nothing
to
contest in a
land
without
need or
want).
We now
need a differentvision in
which
we learn o
live in
symbiotic
relation
with
the resourcesof
the
planet
and
sharethem
equally.
This
requires
a
loss
of faith
in
any extravagant,
re-green
materialist
ptimism:
A
(supposedly)
inevitable future of
plenty
was
a
reason for
predictingequality.
Persisting
scarcity
s now a
reasonfor
demanding
t,
Cohen writes
in his
introduction.
Of
course,
one
could accuse him here of
committing
a
naturalistic
allacy
to
the extent that he ends
up
depoliticizing
such a crucial
question
concerning
resources:
plenty
and
scarcity
do not exist
independently
and
ahistori-
cally
of
the
mediating
realms of
economics
and
technologies,
so to talk of
them in the
way
that
he does is to
treat them as
reified
abstractions.
One
wished he hadn't
completely
ettisoned
his
former
materialist
raining
n the
desire to
engage
with our dearmoral
philosophers
over the
value of certain
values.
Of
course,
Cohendoes
recognize
thathis
argument
n favor of an
ecologi-
cal socialism faces a majorproblem.Is not a class society,or some kindof
society
of
divisions,
inevitableunder
conditions
of
scarcity?
n
other
words,
how can
one
argue
or socialism from
ecological
premises?
Cohen's
response
is to disown Marx's
optimism
about material
possibility
while at the
same
time
disowning
his
pessimism
about social
possibility
under
conditions of
nonabundance
nd self-denial.The
major
ask of a Marxian
political
thinker
then
is
one
of
defining
equality
n a
context of
scarcity.
n
fact,
the
emphasis
in
this
argument
hould not
be on
scarcity,
believe. For what is
clear is that
Cohen's
denial of
the abundance
hesis of
old,
pre-green
Marxism is
as
much,if notmore,a moralargumenthan t is aneconomic one. He holds the
position
that
we
have
no
right
to continue
exploiting
and
exhausting
the
resources
of the
planet
in the
way
that we
allegedly
are. It is not
simply
that
we
can no
longer rely
on
technology
to fix
things
for
us as
the Marxism
of
old led us to believe.
Cohen's
ecological
socialism commits him to a
position
of
securing
a
tight
control over
technology,
in both
its
inventions and its
directions.
If
not an old-fashionedMarxist
any
longer,
Cohen
remains an
old-fashionedhumanist
or whom man
enjoys supreme
moral value on the
planet.
So
while I have no
great
problem
n his
calling
into
question
he
notion
of
self-ownership,
I
do
have
major
problems
with his eco-socialist vision
since it could
all too
easily
generate
a new
moralauthoritarianismhat
might
provejust
as
damaging
to the
dangerous
and excessive
cause
of
freedom as
any previous
deological
movement,
such
as
that
of
the liberaland ibertarian
crusadeof
self-ownership.
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REVIEW
ESSAY
405
Cohen finds
self-ownership
a
pernicious
value notfor Foucauldian
thical
(or supra-ethical) easons but for ecologico-moralones. He rightlylocates
with the old Marxisma latentand
concealedcommitment o
the same
liberal
principle
of
self-valorization,
where
the sense of self and its
various
fulfill-
ments
are
rendered
unproblematic
nd its
importance
akenfor
granted.
The
libertarian
rinciple
of
self-ownership imply
statesthat
every
personenjoys
over
him-
or herself full and
exclusive
rights
of control
and
use,
owing
no
service
or
product
o
anyone
else that
they
have not
contracted o
supply.
Of
course,
such a
conception
of the
self or human
being
is
instantly
recognizable
as a fiction. There is
nothing God-given
about
it,
and it
rests on a
complete
depoliticization
of socialexistence. It is the
metaphysicalposition
par
excel-
lence,
offering
neithera
transcendental
eduction
n
Kant'ssense
of a critical
philosophy
nor a
convincing
empirical
or
historical
account of its own
naturalistic tatus.
Cohen is also
right
to
point
out
that:such a
conception
of
the individualrests on a
complete
disavowal of
the
autonomous
character f
nature tself: nonhuman
hings
are
granted
value
only
to the
extent that
they
serve the function
of
satisfying
individual
human needs
and
desires. Self-
ownership
is
an
invalid
principle
for
Cohen because
it
disavows both
the
mediationof natureand substantive ocial relations.He admits hathisessays
may
not
strictly
refute the thesis of
self-ownership,
but he
hopes
that
they
will
make it seem a lot less
attractive o
many.
This is a
strong
collection of
essays
that will
appeal
to
anyone
who has
been
following,
or
participating
n,
the debates
hathave
taken
place
over the
last decade
and more
surrounding
he
competing
claims
of
liberalism
and
communitarianism,
nvolving
defendersof
liberty
and
champions
of
equality,
and
requiring
novel
thinking
concerning
distributive
ustice.
Cohen
does a
lot of
good
work in
exposing
on the
social and
political
level
the
hollow
characterof the thesis of self-ownership.But he has failed,with this reader
at
least,
to
make his
alternative
eco-socialism
any
more
attractive han
the
liberal
gregariousness
t seeks
to
supersede.
Of the
books under
consideration,
an
Parijs's
s the
least
philosophically
interesting
and
inspiring.
No new
conception
of
freedom
s
offered,
and
the
value and
valorizationof
the
principle
of
self-ownership-that
it is a
desirable
end-in-itself and that
we all know
what
it
means-is
simply
taken
as self-
evident. This
may
be an unfair
criticism
to
make since
the
author's
concern
is
not with the
finer
points
of
ontology
but with
making
a
pragmatic
contri-
bution to
policy
studies. As the
book's
inner
acket
has
it: The
book is
not
just
an
exercise in
political
theory,
but
seeks to
show
what
the
ideal of
a
free
society
means in
the real
world
by
drawing
out its
controversial
policy
implications.
Of
course,
this
begs
all
the
questions:
what is
just
an
exercise
in
political
theory?
And
what s
this
talisman
being dangled
n
frontof
us
that
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406 POLITICAL
THEORY June 1998
goes
by
the
name
of the
real
world ?Since
Parijs
does not
dwell on
these
points,neitherwill I, butswiftly move on to give thereadera sense of what
he
means
by
real
reedom
for all.
Parijs
opens
with two
uncontroversial
heses:
one,
that
capitalist
societies
aremarked
by
unacceptablenequalities
of
power
and
opportunities;
nd
two,
that freedom
is of
the
greatest
mportance.
One
of
the central
tasks of
the
book, therefore,
is
to
provide
a
concerted and
credible
response
to
the
libertarian
hallenge
hatwould claim
that hese two
convictions
are
mutually
exclusive
and that
one cannot have
both
real
liberty
and
equality
for
all.
If
we
value
freedom,
must we
necessarilygive
our
blessing,
whether
with or
withouta blind
eye,
to the
inequities
of the
presentsystem?
Is this the
price
we
pay
for our freedom?
It
is
certainly
not the
price
those who are
excluded
from
the
pleasures
of
this
freedom
pay.)
For
Parijs,
real
libertarianism
ntails
real freedom
for
all,
and
his
project
is
best
seen
as
an
enlightening
contribution
to
a
left-libertarianism.
The
opening
chapter
considers
the
question
of freedom
in
relationto
ideal-type
models
of
pure
socialism
and
pure capitalism.Chapter
2
unfolds the claim
that
the
regime
best suited to
attaining
he left-libertarian
deal is
one that
s
able to
afford,
and
mplement,
the highestsustainableunconditionalncome subject o the constraint hat
everyone's
formal freedom should be
protected. Chapters
3 and
4
then
attempt
to
respond
to the most
powerful objections
that could be raised
against
the
pursuit
of such an ideal.
Chapter
5 tackles
the
problem
of
exploitation,
aiming
to refute
the
objection
that the thesis of real
freedom
for
all cannot
serve as
a
model
of
social
justice
simply
because
it
insuffi-
ciently
takes
into account the
proper
basis
for an ethical
critique
of
capitalism,
namely,
an
outright
condemnation
of
exploitation.
The
final
chapter
oncludes
by
exploring
herelativemeritsof
capitalism
and
socialism
as social systems best able to actualizethe author's deal. Needless to say,
given
the author's
pragmatic
ent,
he
chapter
does
not
resolvethe issue
either
way
but
keeps
the debate
open,
preferring
reformist
ine that
commits itself
not to
any
outdated
model of
political
revolutionbut to
presenting
a
system-
atic
ethical
case for radical reform of
the
existing
system
through
the
introduction
f
an
unconditional
basic income.
The most
pertinent
question
to
ask
in
the context of
this
review
essay
would
seem to be this:
What does
Parijs
exactly
mean
by
real reedom for
all ?
What
exactly
does
freedom
enote
in
this schema?
The first
thing
to
noteis that
by
freedom
Parijs
means
something
neither
political
nthe
praxial
sense
nor
something
ethical
n the Foucauldian ense. For
Parijs,
both formal
freedom
(the
freedom
guaranteed
y
property
ights)
and
real
freedom
to
be
defined
shortly)
are
aspects
of
individual
reedom,
neither
of which has
any
relation to
collective
freedom
(whether
political
or
ethical)
except
in
an
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ESSAY
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instrumentalist
ense.
These two senses
of freedom
constitute,
therefore,
a
solely negative iberty f contrastedwith, say, the libertyof the ancients.
Real freedom s the freedom
to do
whateverone
wishes
to
do,
rather
han
the freedom o
practice
what
s dictated
o one
(the
freedom
f moral
duties,
for
example)
or
autonomously
chosen
preferences
this
is
a
significant
point
since it does
give
a
degree
of
levity
to
real
reedomthat
would
alarm
any
self-respectingmoralizing
iberal).
Formal
reedom
presupposes
he
right
to
self-ownership,
while
real
freedom,
t
logically
follows
for
Parijs,
deals
with
the
constraints
upon
a
person's
purchasing
power
and even
their
genetic
makeup.
Real freedom hus
entailsnot
simply having
the
right
to do
what
one
mightwant to do butequallyhavingthe meansto achievewhat one wantsto
do.
However,
this
conception
of real
freedom
is
qualified-for
obvious
practical
reasons of limited
resources
and the
possibly
exorbitant
demands
that
would be
placed
on social
provisions-by
stating
that
the
opportunities
for
accessing
the means for
doing
what one
might
want to do
are
distributed
in
maxim in
fashion: Some can
have
more
opportunities
han
others,
but
only
if
their
having
more does not
reducethe
opportunities
f
some
of
those
with less. In
other
words,
institutions
must
be
designed
so as
to
offer the
greatestpossible real opportunities o those with the least opportunities,
subject
to
everyone's
formal
freedom
being
respected
p.
5).
Of
course,
on the
model of a
socialist
philosopher
ike
Cohen's,
the real
freedom
proposed
by
Parijs
must
remain
irredeemably
apitalistic
since it
never
questions
the
ontological
and
ecological
primacy
accorded to self-
ownership.
It comes close
to the
old
Marxian
fantasy
of
maximizing
the
opportunities
f
individual
reedom or
all
draped
n
new
garb.
n
fact,
Parijs's
vision
of
freedom s
resolutely
and
consistently
antipolitical.
He
pours
scorn
at the
compromise
dea thatone
could
combine he
freedomof
self-ownership
with full democraticownershipof publicgoods andutilities,indeed,public
ownership
of
the external
world in
general.
For
him,
this is
incoherent
ince
the
individualself
cannot
possibly
be
said to be
free
in
any
real
ense if
he
or she
cannot
breathe,eat,
move,
and so
on
without
he
prior
approval
of
the
political
community
hat
owns
everything
n
the
world
except
the
self.
Parijs
is
good
at
attacking
he
incoherenceof
these
kind
of
half-hearted
onceptions
of
freedom,
but his own
arguments
are
so
ontologically
impoverished
hat
his
thesis on real
freedom
for all
ends
up being
both dull
and
singularly
unattractive. n
the face
of such
a
platitudinous onception
of
the
self,
one
positively
embraces the
experimental-abnormal
even-freedoms
cele-
brated
by
the
likes of
Foucault.
The
great
rony
here s
that
defendersof
Parijs
would
probably
argue
hata
Foucauldian
practice
of
freedom s
nothing
more
than he
fantasy
of an
eliteor
deviant
minority
from
Athens o
San
Francisco)-
whereas,
n
fact,
it is this
conception
of
so-calledreal
freedom
or
all,
in
which
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408 POLITICAL
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all the
emphasis
s
placed
on
private
ownership
of the
self and on the
private
ownership of externalobjects, which would serve to guaranteethat the
self-owned
individual
gets
shored
up
in a static and sterile
world of
private
fantasy.
Parijs
at one
point
accuses
normal libertarians
the
ones he calls
rights-fetishists )
f
being
seduced nto
offering
a moralized
conception
of
freedom
without
any
real substance
or
extensive
validity.
But he himself
is
guilty
of
offering
both
a
moralizedand
a
privatized
conception
of freedom.
In the
end,
therefore,
or all
its relevanceto concrete
policy
making
(and
I have
no doubt
that
it will
prove
to be
highly
relevant
n this
domain),
it is
the
lack of
ontological
magination
hat
seriously mpairs
he value of
Parijs's
intellectuallabors.He writes as if
modernity,
et alone
postmodernity,
had
never
happened
and
we could
talk about
freedomand
self-ownership
as
if
it
were 1789.
This
is
not to
say
that
he does not
recognize
he
peculiarly
modem
status
of the
thesis
of
self-ownership,
ince
he
clearly
does.
What s
missing
from
his
theorizing
is
any
recognition
of
the
philosophical
revolution of
modernity
and
postmoderity,
which,
as
we
approach
he end of
the twentieth
century,
might
egitimately
ead
in the direction
f some
kind
of
eco-socialism,
or,
alternatively,
n a
more
schizo
direction,
where
practices
of freedom
are
takento aplacewhere,to quotefromtwo
authorsdiscussed
below,
We
ain't
seen
anything
yet. 4
All of
this
brings
us
to
Deleuze
and Guattari
nd
their novel
and discon-
certing
attempt
o
map
out
the
complex
relationship
etween
capitalism
and
schizophrenia.
Deleuze
and
Guattari's
wo volumes
on this
topic-Anti-
Oedipus
1972)
and
A
Thousand
Plateaus
(1980)-remain
highly
controver-
sial
(there
would
be
something
wrong
f
they
ever
became
readily
assimilable
into
academic
practices),
and
as
yet,
they
have
not
had
any
major
mpact
on
Anglo-American
political
theorizing
(there
are
the odd
exceptions,
such
as
the workof WilliamConnollywhohasrecentlybegunto use their notionof
a rhizome
to rethink
he
politics
of
space
and
territory).5
n his
introduction
to
the
Politics
of
Desire,
Philip
Goodchild
provides
he first
systematic
study
of their
work
from
the
perspective
of
social
and
political
thought.
He
has
sought
to
carry
out
the
unenviable
ask
of
making
heir
deas
comprehensible
to
a
wide
audience
while
at
the same
time
remaining
aithful
to
the
mobile
and
intensive
character
of
their
lines of
thought.
The fact that
he has
only
partially
succeeded
in this
task
is
no small
achievement.
Deleuze
and Guattari
re
preeminently
ocial
and
political
thinkers
ince
they
construe
desire -the
fundamental
oncept
of theirfirst collaborative
work,
Anti-Oedipus-as
a
nonpersonal
orce
functioning
on
every
level
of
life
from the
biological
to the
social
and
the
technological.
Their
utilization
of the
notion
of
desire
an
readily
be
interpreted
s
metaphysical,
but
the
intention
is to
be
rigorously
materialist.
For
them,
desire
is
always
to
be
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thought
of
in
terms
of the
neologistic
couplet desiring-machines.
The
reality of desire precedes any distinctionbetween subject and object, or
between
ontology
and
epistemology (production
and
representation).
As
Guattari
nce
said in an
interview,
t is
everythingwhereby
he world and
its
affects
constitute
us outside of ourselves and in
spite
of
ourselves. It is
frequently
associated
with
some kind of
undifferentiated
magma,
but
this
is
to miss the
significance
of the
couplet desiring-machines,
which
is de-
signed
to
capture
he idea
of
permanent
low and of a
reality
hat s
constantly
dividing
and
inventing
tself anew.
Machines-whether
biological
functions
or
technological
artifactsand
prostheses-serve
to
arrange
nd
connectflows
of
production.
Moreover,
hey
do not
recognize
distinctionsbetween
persons
or
organs,
and between material luxes
and semiotic
ones
(all
codes
contain
a
margin
of
decoding
intrinsicto them because of
the fact
that
they
possess
a
surplus
value of code: chromosomal
DNA,
for
example).
It
was
a
concern
with the
politics
of
desire that
informed
Deleuze and
Guattari's
critique
of
antipsychiatry
and their
call for a
politicization
of
psychiatry
n
Anti-Oedipus.
For them the
experience
of
breaking
down is to
be an
experience
of
breaking-through.
heir
argument-contra
the likes of
the antipsychiatrists f the 1960s, such as R. D. Laingand David Cooper-
was to
insist that this
experience
be
intimately
inked
up
with
the social and
historical
reality
of
capitalism
o
that
o
separate
mental
alienationand
social
alienation s to
depoliticize
the
schizo-experience.
The
decoding
and deterri-
torializationof flows is what
defines the
process
of
capitalism
n
termsof its
fundamental
eality,
ts innermost
endency,
and ts
external
imit. At
the
same
time,
because
capitalism
s an
economic
system
based on
massive
antipro-
duction
(that
is,
producing
immense
surpluses
that
then
get
directed into
increased
policing,
militarization,
bureaucratization,
nd
general regulation
of society), it is subjectto a majorreterritorialization f the codes it has
decoded and the
flows it
has
unleashed.
Capitalism
onstantly
alls back
onto
the
invention of
neo-archaisms
and
maintaining
the
security
of
juridical
subjects
(the
fiction
of
persons
and
things)
so
as to
ward off
the
ultimate
tendency
toward
absolute
schizophrenia
it
shouldbe
apparent
hat his
term s
completely
de-medicalized
y
Deleuze
and
Guattari
and
refers
to the
social
experience
and
political
praxis
of
self-transformative
esire).
For
Deleuze and
Guattari,
herefore,
an
individual s
to be
conceived as
always
caught
up
in
assemblages
of desire
made
up
of
heterogeneous
com-
ponents;
indeed,
an
individual
cannot
be
thought
outside of
these
relations.
As
such,
the
individual s
neverthe
locus or
center
of
action.And
yet
Deleuze
and
Guattari
wish
to
valorize
freedom,
but
always
the
freedom
valorized is
the
nonhuman and
extra-human
kind,
which
belongs
to
desire.
Here one
might
take,
for
example,
as
an
analogy
with the
human
ndividual
of
modern
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thought,
the
biological organism.
Deleuze and Guattari
would claim that an
organism s alwaysthe functionof theframe nwhich it is encoded; t enjoys
no
privileged
existence
independently
of our
cognitive mapping
of
the
phenomenon
of life. Their later
conception
of
the
rhizome,
for
example,
contests
the idea that there exist
living systems
that are
informationally
closed.
A rhizome s a networkof
overlapping
erritories nd molecules
that
functions
as an
open system,
both
entropically
and
informationally,
nd that
designates
a constructive eedback
loop
between
independent
nformation
lineages
(whether
cultural,
inguistic,
or
biological germ
lines).
As
opposed
to conventional
phyletic
models, therefore,
hat
of the
rhizomedemonstrates
the extent to which
exclusively
filiative models of
evolutionaryphenomena
are
dependentupon exophysical
system
descriptions
hat
are
simply
unable
to account
for what is novel or
creative
within
evolutionary dynamics,
whether the
system
one
is
treating
is
biological
or social. Conventional
frames
thus
capture
only
a small
part
of the
possible
information that
assemblages
are able to
express.
Goodchild
has divided
his
Introduction
o Deleuze and Guattari nto
three
parts,
dealingrespectively
with
knowledge, power,
ndthe libera-
tion of desire. In part 1, he provides a useful outline of the principal
philosophical
influences
on Deleuze
(notably
Spinoza,
Nietzsche,
and
Bergson),
while
in
part
2 there s an instructive
and
intelligent
discussion of
the
ideas of
Deleuze and
Guattari
n
relation
o the
major
ntellectualmove-
ments of
the
century,
such as
structuralism,
econstruction,Marxism,
psy-
choanalysis,
feminism,
and
postmodernism.
The book concludes
with
some
speculations,
some
fanciful,
others
incisive,
on ethics and
becoming-
Deleuzean, which,
according
o
Goodchild,
nvolves
leading
a full and vital
life so as
to
escape
the
repetitive
movementsof the
death-instinct
this
claim
is based on a very poorreadingof Deleuze'sre-workingof Freud's nfamous
death-drive).
In
many ways
his book offers
a
refreshing
and
invigorating
account
of
Deleuze
and Guattari's
politics
of
desire,
and
it does so I
think
largely
because
of
its insistence
hat heir
project
was
a
positive
one
designed
to come
up
with
novel
images
of
positive
social
relations hat
would unleash
desire
from
its liberal
stranglehold,
eleasing
freedom
from its
privatization
and sanitization
n
bourgeois
society.
The ethical
guidelines
to be found
in
Deleuze,
and
they
are
indeed
nothing
more than
that,
are for Goodchild
the
expressions
of a
vitalist and
optimistic
philosophy,
in which each
wound
incurredn thetrialsof life constitutes
problem
or an affirmative thos-
one
has to
discover
how to turn
ts sad
passions
into active
joys (p.
208).
Throughout,
Goodchild
has striven
to
produce
a
reader-friendly
ext.
However,
his
attempt
to
be
overly
accessible
by
not
being
too technical
backfires
at
times.
For
example,
he
appends
at the
end of the book
a
glossary
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411
of
key
terms o
guide
the untutored
eader
hrough
he
thicketsof the
Deleuze
and Guattarirhizomatic unnels andpassagesof thought,but this has been
done
in
a far too cavalier
and
diosyncratic
ashion,
and
the
end result s
quite
abominable.
There is no substitute for
technical
precision.
Deleuze
and
Guattari's
ategories
need to
be treated
carefully
since
they
function n
quite
specific
contexts and
always
have a
material
dimension. The
concept
of
deterritorialization eans
something
quite specific
in relation
to the
logic
of
capitalism,
and
equally something specific
in
relation to their
under-
standing
of
the rhizomatic
evolution of
hominid
species
(where
it
serves to
explain
the transition o
bipedalism
via
the
deterritorializationf a back
paw
into a free, locomotivehand).InGoodchild's
glossary,
deterritorializations
risibly
renderedas
meaning leaving
home
and
traveling
n
foreign parts.
No
doubt
the author s
thinking
of Deleuze
and Guattari's
predilection
for
nomadic forms of
ethological
and ethical existence over
sedentary
ones,
but
even on this level the
description
s
lacking
in
precision:
need one
point
out
that
traveling
n
foreign
parts
also
happens
o be a
favorite
pastime
of fascist
brigades?
The
politics
that
emerges
from the
challenge
of
Deleuze and
Guattari s
clearlya politicsof freedom,but this is freedomconceived in a way thathas
never
been articulated
by
the
traditionof modern
thought,
whether
iberal,
Marxian,
or
libertarian.
n
contrast
o
a
politics
of
controlor
regulation,
hey
advocate a
politics
of desire that
allows
for
the
emergence
of
informal
networksor rhizomesbetween forms
of
life,
human
and
nonhuman,
n order
to
generate
maximumfreedomof
diversity
and
novelty-hence
theircham-
pioning
of nonhuman
ranssexuality
nd
polysexuality
as
well as their
nterest
in
the
symbiotic
possibilities opened up by
new
cybernetic
echnologies.
But
the
celebrationof the new
by
them
is
always
done in
the
context of a social
critique: why is it, they ask, for example, that the immense processual
potentials
brought
nto
being by
the
revolutions n
information
echnology,
biological
engineering,
elematics,
robotics,
and so
on lead
only
to a
revitali-
zation
of the
politics
of
control and
manipulation?
How
does one
resist an
oppressive
and
stupefying
mass-media
culture
and the
infantile
politics
of
consensualism
that
goes
with
it?
Postmoder
liberalism can
only
serve to
guarantee
a machinic
solitude for these
new
life-forms
since it
cherishesand
values
only
an
impoverished
and
infantilizing
subjectivity.
To
bring
this review
to a
close,
then. Few can
doubtthatwe
have
reached
something
of a
postmodern
impasse
in
our
conceptions
and
practices
of
freedom. Ethics
and
politics
have
perhaps
never
been more
demanding
or
us
moderns
ince we now
find ourselves
compelled
to think
aboutnew
values,
visions,
and
vistas withoutthe
support
or
aid of
transcendent
rinciples.
But
these
books,
each of which is
progressive
n
its own
way,
make one
confident
8/11/2019 Keith Ansell-Pearson
15/15