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Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making,1991–92Anuar AyazbekovPublished online: 07 Oct 2014.

To cite this article: Anuar Ayazbekov (2014) Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92, TheNonproliferation Review, 21:2, 149-168, DOI: 10.1080/10736700.2014.962248

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Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Decision Making,1991–92

Anuar Ayazbekov

This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The

study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan’s policy makers solved a

nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs

the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev

and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated

a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic’s nuclear status with the aim of maximizing

the state’s strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev’s course

of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.

KEYWORDS: Kazakhstan; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty; Russia; Soviet Union; United States;

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; nuclear weapons; disarmament

In the period from December 16, 1991, when Kazakhstan reluctantly proclaimed itsindependence, and May 23, 1992, when the Lisbon Protocol to the Strategic ArmsReduction Treaty (START) was signed, Almaty pursued a peculiar nuclear strategy, neitherconfirming nor renouncing its nuclear status. Only with the signing of the Lisbon Protocoldid Kazakhstan finally give up its nuclear ambitions and agree to become a non-nuclearweapon state. This day marked the end of one of the most complicated rounds of foreignpolicy making in the nation’s history.1

Kazakhstan’s decision to denuclearize appears to be anomalous from the perspec‐tive of the mainstream systemic theories of international relations.2 As has been noted inthe cases of South Africa and Ukraine, a voluntary nuclear relinquishment presents aninteresting instance of defying neorealist reasoning.3 Kazakhstan’s decision to denuclearizeby acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992similarly confuses the neorealist logic. It presents a paradox where the leadership clearlyperceived the surrounding international environment as hostile and threatening, but didnot follow any models of external behavior predicted by the systemic theory.

Kazakhstan inherited from the Soviet Union the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in theworld, comprising 108 SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 1,410 war-heads.4 From the systemic viewpoint, this was an excellent, historical chance to secure thestate with an almost absolute deterrence capacity—an opportunity particularly attractivegiven the sense of external vulnerability and the uncertain fate of conventional forcesstationed in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, instead of utilizing the abundant Soviet strategic

Nonproliferation Review, 2014Vol. 21, No. 2, 149–168, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2014.962248© 2014 Monterey Institute of International Studies, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

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and tactical nuclear arsenal for the purposes of internal balancing, the state’s leadershipopted to relinquish its nuclear arms.

Neoclassical Realist Explanation

Neoclassical realism asserts that in instances of deviance between perceived constraintsand challenges imposed by the international environment on one causal end and anation’s foreign policy responses on the other, it is the state-level variables that interveneand distort the systemic signals.5 The principal neoclassical realist premise is that theforeign policy of a state is necessarily the result of both external and internal factors—systemic constraints are channeled through domestic institutions of a state and the outputof this process is a foreign policy or behavioral pattern that may present “a particularinconsistency in the basic realist model or a specific empirical puzzle.”6 Applying theneoclassical realist model to the case of Kazakhstan’s denuclearization appears to be ananalytically potent strategy because theoretical variables on both ends of the causal linkbear a striking resemblance to the empirical evidence. Even though the logic of survivalunderpinned strategic foreign policy goals, Kazakhstani leaders opted for a choice notderivable from systemic realism theorizing.

Of particular interest here is the policy making by President Nursultan Nazarbayevand his advisory team, who together were responsible for recognizing and interpretingthreats to the state and devising appropriate foreign policies. The focus on policy makingby President Nazarbayev and his advisers is justifiable because an examination of thegroup decision making adds much to understanding a state’s international behavior incircumstances when an advisory group is at the “apex of the policy-making process” andwhen such a group produces “crucial, formative policy decisions that shape significant partof a country’s foreign policy.”7

A closer look at Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy making can expose how, in an attemptto transcend limitations imposed by systemic factors, the state’s leadership elaborated andpursued a protracting strategy that balanced between an immediate relinquishing ofweapons and an entrance to the nuclear club. Nazarbayev was a key actor inthe development and realization of this foreign policy scenario. At the same time, thepresident received information, advice, and analysis that assisted him both in identifyinginternational constraints and in planning and implementing his nuclear game. The existingliterature only implicitly suggests that Nazarbayev relied on his advisory group in devel-oping the nuclear agenda. Hitherto, the nuclear decision-making process under way inAlmaty was described rather abstractly, averting its detailed exposition and leaving thehuman agency out of the research focus. Since Kazakhstan’s denuclearization was certainlynot a single man’s endeavor, the input of the president’s advisers has to be credited. To acertain degree, the views and opinions of those around Nazarbayev steered Almaty’snuclear strategy. Archival materials reviewed in this article shed some additional light onhow the presidential advisory group was involved in charting Nazarbayev’s nuclearstrategy and thus facilitate a greater understanding of Kazakhstan’s denuclearizationpolicy.

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Kazakhstan’s Ambivalent Nuclear Politics

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about “a paradoxical situation,” where onenuclear superpower was replaced by four nuclear-armed states.8 Kazakhstan was amongthese four nuclear powers, now host to one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals.Immediately after independence, this generated noticeable domestic and internationalreactions, both in favor of and against a nuclear Kazakhstan. The state’s leadership faced amajor foreign policy issue that concerned some of the most fundamental aspects of itsexistence and future development. From December 1991 to May 1992, for the first sixmonths of the state’s independent and nuclear-capable existence, Kazakhstani leadership’sofficial position on its nuclear arsenal constantly oscillated between renouncing andretaining.9 Such behavior was induced by a specific strategy that included elements of: anintentional ambiguity about Almaty’s nuclear stance; frequent introduction of new issuesto the denuclearization agenda; and simultaneous political and security diplomaticmaneuvering vis-à-vis Russia and the United States.

The ambivalence of Kazakhstan’s nuclear stance manifested itself from the start. Oneof the earliest statements by Nazarbayev on the nuclear issue was made at a meeting withUS Secretary of State James A. Baker on December 17, 1991, where Nazarbayev told Baker:“As long as Russia has nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan will too.”10 This statement was soonreiterated in the first official letter to President George H.W. Bush, in which Nazarbayevinformed his US counterpart that, “Kazakhstan will join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons as a nuclear weapon state.”11 Intriguingly, according to scholar andformer State Department official Mitchell Reiss, as early as December 1991, Nazarbayevallegedly twice pledged in private talks with US officials to join the NPT as a non-nuclearstate, thus renouncing Kazakhstan’s claims over nuclear weapons deployed on itsterritory.12 In public statements made during the following months, however, Nazarbayevwithdrew his non-nuclear commitment and confirmed the nuclear status of the nation.13

Reiss writes that Nazarbayev was “deliberately more ambiguous on the nuclear issue inpublic than he was in private with the Americans.”14 To give another illustration, considerthe impressions of the two Western foreign ministers who discussed the issue withNazarbayev in January and February 1992. For French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas,Nazarbayev “virtually behaved like the leader of a nuclear power.”15 Meanwhile, UKForeign Secretary Douglas Hurd told reporters after meeting with Nazarbayev, “I am clearthat President Nazarbayev has no ambitions for Kazakhstan to be a nuclear power but heis very conscious of the cost and time taken to dismantle and transfer the nuclearweapons.”16 This seemed to be a specific diplomatic tactic employed by Nazarbayev tokeep the nuclear issue oblique for the moment.17

As Kazakhstan continued to defend its right to a nuclear status, it presented a newargument for its claim. Based on the provisions of the NPT, according to which any statethat produced and tested nuclear weapons prior to January 1967 was considered a nuclearweapon state, Almaty justified its claim for a nuclear state status to Washington: “Ifcircumstances made the independent Republic to become a nuclear state, then it [theRepublic] should be accepted as such, in accordance with the international definitions.”18

In a twist to this argumentation, Kazakhstan also proposed the introduction of a new

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classification of nuclear weapon state, whereby, because the nation was nuclear at presentbut intended to denuclearize in the future, it should be considered a temporary nuclearstate.19 These two policy positions are explicated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)’spolicy paper submitted to the president in April 1992:

Kazakhstan cannot be called a non-nuclear weapon state because this would contradictthe objective reality. Nuclear weapons were deployed on the Republic’s territory longbefore 1 January 1967. Thus, in accordance with the Treaty [NPT], Kazakhstan, as one ofthe successors to the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics], should be categorized asa state-possessor of nuclear weapon. At the same time, the ultimate goal of Kazakhstan isto become a territory free from nuclear weapons, that is a “nuclear free” zone. … Thelogic itself dictates the following conclusion: Kazakhstan possesses nuclear weaponstemporarily. But as of now it possesses them in reality. Therefore Kazakhstan is in its rightto have the status of a state-possessor of nuclear weapons. This position would allowKazakhstan to fully secure its interests as a sovereign state, an independent subject ofinternational law. In addition, the Republic in the foreseeable future would be able tokeep powerful leverages over global processes, alongside leading powers.20 (Emphasis inoriginal.)

On another occasion, showing some flexibility, Nazarbayev linked the prospects ofKazakhstan’s nuclear renouncement to geostrategic security concerns and global nucleardisarmament: “We have a perception of a threat from the United States, China, Russia,among others; if they [dismantle] their strategic weapons, we will follow suit.”21 Thenuclear claim was articulated until early May 1992, when, during a visit by JapaneseForeign Minister Michio Watanabe, the president clearly restated the point that Kazakhstanwas a nuclear state.22 Nonetheless, two weeks later, on May 19, 1992, Nazarbayev officiallyproclaimed Almaty’s intention to accede to START and to join the NPT.23

Four days later, on May 23, 1992, Kazakhstan’s State Counsellor Tolegen Zhukeyevsigned the Lisbon Protocol to START, proclaiming that Kazakhstan would join the NPT asnon-nuclear weapon state and would accede to START as a signatory state.

The shift in Kazakhstan’s position was determined by several factors. The keysecurity factors were: the conclusion of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) in Tashkent onMay 15, 1992; a statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry assuring Kazakhstan thatBeijing had no territorial claims; a message from Secretary of State Baker to Nazarbayevreaffirming the US security commitment to non-nuclear states if they were threatenedwith nuclear weapons; and the intention to sign the bilateral Agreement on Friendship,Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Kazakhstan and Russia.24 According toNazarbayev, an equally important factor for Almaty’s nuclear policy shift was the change ofthe US position whereby Washington finally agreed to recognize Kazakhstan as anindependent party to START. This was reflected in Nazarbayev’s letter to Bush written onthe eve of Nazarbayev’s visit to Washington, in which the Kazakhstani president explainedthe change of his position:

The signing of the CST led to the qualitatively new situation in the national securitysphere of Kazakhstan. Furthermore, considering the fact that the USA agreed with ourrequest to consider Kazakhstan as a Party to the START and that in the future Kazakhstanwill participate in the START process as an independent and full-fledged partner, and also

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considering the US assurances about holding its obligations for taking immediateassistance measures in case Kazakhstan becomes an object of aggression or threat …Kazakhstan accedes to the NPT as a non-nuclear state.25

Systemic Imperatives

For the Kazakhstani leadership, the nuclear dilemma was essentially a security dilemma. Inthis context, the nuclear arsenal was viewed both as a deterrence mechanism against apossible threat and as a bargaining tool to receive security guarantees in exchange for thearsenal’s relinquishment. As perceived by many in Almaty at this time, the probability of adirect military threat from China and Russia was high. One internal analytical documentwritten for Kazakhstan’s leadership stated:

Kazakhstan, elaborating its national security concept, has to come from its geostrategiclocation “at the junction” of two powers, RFSR [Russian Soviet Federative SocialistRepublic] and PRC [People’s Republic of China], each of which could possibly maketerritorial claims in the future and each of which possess powerful military potential,including nuclear weapons.26

In view of the alleged Chinese territorial claims and the likelihood of a far-right neo-imperialist rise in Russia, nuclear weapons were promoted as an effective deterrent. In oneinterview for the Western press, Nazarbayev said to reporters:

I must tell you that our neighbor China has nuclear weapons, our neighbor Russia hasnuclear weapons. … Some Russian politicians have territorial claims to Kazakhstan. Thereare Chinese textbooks that claim that parts of Siberia and Kazakhstan belong to China.Under these conditions how do you expect Kazakhstan to react?27

Since Moscow was, in fact, the only authority to exercise command and control overthe strategic forces deployed on the territory of four post-Soviet states, Russia had directleverage on Kazakhstan’s nuclear stance. On December 25, 1991, the same day USSRPresident Mikhail Gorbachev passed the nuclear codes to the president of the RussianFederation, Boris Yeltsin, the latter issued a decree on the “Improvement of theSteadfastness of the Combat Control of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]Unified Armed Forces’s Strategic Nuclear Forces in Emergency Situation,” which allowedRussia’s president to use nuclear forces deployed on the territory of the four ex-Sovietrepublics without the other presidents’ prior consent.28 Nazarbayev shared the distressover the impracticality of the unified nuclear control and the possibility of the unilateraluse of nuclear weapons by Russia even with Western diplomats. On January 25, 1992,French Foreign Minister Dumas, accompanied in part by his chief of staff, General ChristianQuesnot, had a meeting with President Nazarbayev.29 The excerpts from the minutes ofthis meeting reveal Nazarbayev’s attitude to the question of the unified control of thestrategic nuclear arsenal:

General Quesnot: Please pardon me, but I will ask you a military question. You said thatfor ten more years you will have in your possession the nuclear strategic weapon … Howdo you think you can make a decision to use this weapon? Do you want to have anindependent launch button or do you agree that this button will be held by Russia’spresident?

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Nazarbayev: We have signed an agreement in that respect. The launch button is with theCommander-in-Chief of the Commonwealth of the Independent States Unified Forces,with the Head of the General Staff [of the CIS Unified Forces], and with the president ofRussia. … The decision about a possible use is made by four heads of state that possessnuclear weapons. This is because the one who has the nuclear arms has to consider thathe can be retaliated [against].

Dumas: Yes, the retaliation.

Nazarbayev: This is why I am not indifferent; this is why we have a special instantaneousconnection line to make a decision.

[…]

General Quesnot: Do you possess any other physical device, apart from the telephonecommunication, to prevent the decision of the president of Russia, with whom, possibly,you would not agree?

Nazarbayev: I like this question! Today nobody, neither [Ukraine President Leonid]Kravchuk, nor [Belarussian head of state Stanislav] Shushkevich, nor I can block it [thedecision of the president of Russia on the use of nuclear weapons]. … After we signedthe agreement that a decision to use the nuclear weapon can only be made in concoursewith all of us [this most likely refers to the Almaty CIS summit agreements of December21, 1991], Yeltsin issued the decree [the December 25, 1991 decree] by which, in caseof a lack of time, Yeltsin, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Head of the General Staffcan make this decision. What does he [Yeltsin] mean by lack of time? The decision canbe made in different moods. I wrote him that this decree breaches our agreements. …I wrote him a letter that this is no good.30

As one Kazakhstani expert suggested, Yeltsin’s decree may have eventually become thedecisive factor in Nazarbayev giving up whatever nuclear ambitions he might haveentertained.31

The United States, another principal counteragent in Almaty’s nuclear diplomacy,had a genuine interest in the return of all Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia so that, onnuclear disarmament matters, they would have to deal with one party rather than withfour. In fact, the nuclear factor was a key reason for the United States to becomeinterested in Kazakhstan.32 This interest, however, reflected not only the significance ofAlmaty’s politics toward the United States, but also for the reciprocal implications wherebyKazakhstan was subjected to intense American pressure.

Consider a section of the “Nuclear and Security Issues Agenda” attached to the lettersent by Bush to Nazarbayev on December 28, 1991.33 A fairly bold style of language usedin the document discursively suggests an element of power politics from the United Statesfrom the earliest stage:

As a matter of high priority, Russia should confirm specifically that it considers itselfbound to fulfill all the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the NPT. All otherRepublics should promptly become parties to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states andtake all steps necessary to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty.34

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Using similar language, Secretary Baker wrote to Nazarbayev about his meeting withRussian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev: “On the question of START ratification, Ireiterated our view that the ratification process in the USA required a single partner andthat that partner should be the Russian Federation.”35

The United States also utilized NATO’s authority to exert pressure on the Kazakhstanileadership. In April 1992, the US chargé d’affaires in Almaty, William Courtney, conveyedthe “NATO statement on NPT Accession” to Kazakhstani Foreign Minister TuleitaiSuleymenov. The part of the text addressed to Nazarbayev reads:

Neither the mere physical presence of nuclear weapons in these states [Belarus,Kazakhstan, and Ukraine], nor the locus of past Soviet testing activities constitutesgrounds for regarding these states as nuclear weapon states under the [NPT]. … Alliesfully expect that Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan will accede to the NPT as non-nuclearweapon states. … This will facilitate their further integration into the internationalcommunity and will promote the security interests of all concerned states.36

The Kazakhstan MFA’s annual review reflects the scale of political pressure used byWashington to compel Almaty to abandon its nuclear ambitions:

The character of the Kazakhstani-American relations was mainly defined by the presenceof strategic offensive arms on the territory of Kazakhstan and Washington’s interest inthe adoption of the status of a nuclear-free state by Kazakhstan. The MFA’s efforts wereaimed at finding an active variant of the solution of this problem, while assertingKazakhstan’s right as an independent sovereign state. After long, sometimes exhaustingnegotiations we were able to persuade Russia and the USA to convert the START treatyto a multilateral format. Our statement on the intention to relinquish strategic weaponsin accordance with the START Treaty timetable and join the NPT has eliminated theelements of American power politics [politika silovogo davleniia] that manifestedthemselves prior to signing the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992.37

Issue Novelty and Foreign Policy Institutions

When the nuclear dilemma surfaced, neither Nazarbayev nor his policy advisers had readya finalized, comprehensive, and coordinated policy position. This situation was the resultof the infancy of Kazakhstan foreign policy per se as well as the novelty of the issue forNazarbayev himself.

Although some basic information about the nuclear infrastructure was known inAlmaty prior to independence, Nazarbayev admits that it wasn’t until December 1991 thathe learned the details about the nuclear weapons deployed on Kazakhstan’s territory.38 Inone letter to Bush, Nazarbayev confidently tells his American counterpart:

To be frank, due to understandable reasons, previously [before independence] informa-tion about the presence, qualitative composition, and potential power capacity of thistype of weapon [nuclear missiles] was not available for Kazakhstan. Naturally, some timewas needed for me personally to comprehend the situation.39

Therefore, it is logical that Nazarbayev initially had no set nuclear position.40 Todevelop one there was a need, to one degree or another, for the input from expertadvisers. While the circle of experienced diplomats, foreign policy experts, and nuclear

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specialists in the country was limited, the president mobilized every professional aroundhim to deal with this issue. The three main sources below the president which generatednuclear policy advice were: State Counselor Zhukeyev; the MFA; and the Centre forStrategic Studies (CSS).41 Zhukeyev’s role in planning and operationalizing the externalaffairs of the republic was quite influential up until 1994, when he was appointed SecurityCouncil Secretary for a few months. Reflecting on his ambitions during this period, oneexpert writes that Zhukeyev aspired to become “Kazakhstan’s foreign policy guru” and oneinterviewer described him as an éminence grise of foreign politics.42 For example,Zhukeyev was the person who signed the 1992 Lisbon Protocol on accession to the NPTon behalf of Kazakhstan. While Counsellor Zhukeyev was officially affiliated with thePresident’s Apparatus (the designation for the presidential office), the Apparatus had itsown foreign policy detachment, the International Department (Mezhdunarodnyi Otdel), therole of which, according to Kasenov, was more organizational than analytical.43 Theforeign minister was able to bypass the International Department to communicate itspolicy advice directly to the president.44 The CSS’s role in nuclear decision making isdocumented in its work statement for 1992: “[The CSS] prepared and submitted analyticalmemos on nuclear policy as part of the preparation process for the president’s visit to theUSA.”45 The Centre’s head, Omurserik Kasenov, at least at the earliest stage, had occasionalaccess to the president, bypassing the President’s Apparatus and submitting analysis andadvice to him directly.46 The input in nuclear policy making by the Supreme Soviet andthe State Defense Committee (SDC) was minimal. The Supreme Soviet was subservient tothe president’s politics: illustrative is its ratification of the NPT in 1993 without anydebate.47 The SDC was mainly focused on issues concerning conventional forces stationedin the republic and on coordinating defense policies within the CIS Unified ForcesCommand. In nuclear decision making, it played only a supportive role.48

Alternative Nuclear Discourses

On the nuclear problem, Nazarbayev was receiving different, often contradictory policyrecommendations from different governmental and non-governmental constituencies thatranged from dovish proposals of unilateral and unconditional nuclear disarmament tohawkish calls to run an independent nuclear weapon program. Nazarbayev recalls:“We had no choice but to embark on the difficult path of measuring conclusions andcounterarguments, doubts and fears, in a grand debate as we deliberated whether or notKazakhstan would become a nuclear power.”49

Nuclear proponents argued that nuclear weapons would effectively allow Kazakhstanto increase its own political status as a full-fledged member of the nuclear club and todeter possible security threats from China, Russia, and the Middle East. To overcometechnical and financial difficulties in managing the entire nuclear arsenal, a propositionwas made to keep a small number of strategic nuclear missiles in order to maintain a so-called “defensive sufficiency,” whereby not the quantity but the mere presence of nuclearweapons would count.50 An unpublished article by former foreign minister of the KazakhSoviet Socialist Republic, Mikhail Isinaliev, in response to the agreements reached byNazarbayev in Washington in May 1992, is another illustration of the pro-nuclear sentiments.

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In his article, Isinaliev expresses remorse about the news and conveys the position hearticulated to Nazarbayev during a meeting on May 13, 1992:

Why should Kazakhstan, which for half of a century has had nuclear weapons tested onits soil and acquired all material, moral, and physical ailments, now relinquish all nuclearweapons to Russia, rather than be an equal member of the ‘nuclear club’? … Why do youask Bush to consider Kazakhstan as a temporary nuclear state? The Republic is a de factonuclear power, this is why they are talking to us about weapons. … No one will give youa guarantee, and even if they do, this will be a sheet of paper that does not oblige themto do anything. … If you will acquiesce to the pressure in Moscow and Washington thenin the near future you will witness how Kazakhstan will be separated into three parts andthere will be no State of Kazakhstan.51

Meanwhile, Stephen F. Burgess of the US Air Force Counterproliferation Center andTogzhan Kassenova of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace note that the rolesof nationalist movements and the military establishment, which would be expected tosupport the nuclear retention, could not significantly influence nuclear policy making, asthe former “were too marginalized and weak,” and the latter “played only a supportive roleto President Nazarbayev and his immediate advisers.”52

At the other pole of the nuclear debate, nuclear pacifists—mainly from theenvironmental movement—urged an unconditional denuclearization, citing ecological/environmental concerns rooted in the catastrophic effects of nuclear testing at theSemipalatinsk nuclear test range. (Nazarbayev’s presidential decree closed the test site inAugust 1991.) Kazakhstan’s population had developed a “strong aversion to anythingnuclear” due to the significant human suffering and environmental damage caused by the

FIGURE 1Kazakhstan officials responsible for nuclear decision making.

The Apparatus of the President and the Cabinet of

Ministers

Head of the Apparatus Nurtai Abykaev

Head of the International Department

Gani Kasymov

The State CounselorTolegen Zhukeyev

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Minister Tuleitai Suleymenov

Deputy Minster Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev

Head of the International Security and Arms Controls

DirectorateBolat Nurgaliev

Head of the International Law Directorate

Askar Shakirov

The Center for Strategic Studies under the President

DirectorOmurserik Kasenov

Chief of Foreign Policy and National Security Program

Kairat Abuseitov

Senior Research FellowMurat Laumulin

The President Nursultan Nazarbayev

SOURCE: Author’s archival research and interviews

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456 nuclear tests conducted at the Semipalatinsk polygon.53 Supporters of such aunilateral and unconditional renouncement evidently did not seek any security or eco-nomic guarantees in return, as the main arguments were environmental and humanitar-ian. In addition, much of the political momentum for the country’s largest antinuclearmovement—Nevada-Semipalatinsk—which linked its cause with strong sentiments aboutmoving toward sovereignty and away from central rule by Moscow, dissipated afterKazakhstan became independent.54

Meanwhile, neither “hawks” nor “doves” were represented in the highest foreignpolicy making echelons. It made the former less susceptible to the extreme politicalpressure from Washington and Moscow, to which Nazarbayev was subjected. Correspond-ingly, the latter could not fully perceive prospects of appropriate political, security, andeconomic compensation for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, neither side had sufficienttechnical information about how to operate or maintain the nuclear weapons. It is unlikelythat the nuclear pacifists and nuclear protagonists realized that the full control overstrategic arms remained firmly in Moscow’s hands, and that a safe deconstruction of silo-launched nuclear missiles required enormous technical and financial resources that Almatydid not have.55

At the same time, Nazarbayev’s political post clearly gave him a better opportunityto perceive all elements of the puzzle. At an early stage, Nazarbayev discarded both ultra-dovish and ultra-hawkish opinions, choosing instead a “steady course between capitula-tion and confrontation.”56 According to Nazarbayev’s own recollections and the memoirsof then-Deputy Foreign Minister Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, the president affirmativelyadhered to the non-nuclear option but deliberately protracted the finalization of a nuclearquestion in order to gain maximum political, security, and economic compensations.57

Hence, out of the three major nuclear outlooks prevailing at the time—1) the “hawks,”who favored retaining the nuclear arsenal to serve as a deterrent and as political leverage;2) the “bargainers,” who argued for retaining nuclear arms until they could be exchangedfor security guarantees; and, 3) the “doves,” who wanted immediate and total denuclear-ization—Nazarbayev opted for the second one: the “bargainers’ line.”58

Obscure Foreign Policy Making

Just as Kazakhstan’s nuclear strategy seemed ambiguous to Russian and US diplomats, thenuclear decision-making process in Almaty continues to appear obscure to researchers.The existing literature on Kazakhstan’s denuclearization contains limited information onthe principal details of the foreign policy making processes and structures for the period inquestion. A usual practice in both primary and secondary sources is to abstract foreignpolicy making, either by focusing attention on the president’s role, or by anthropomorph-izing and substituting decision-making personalities with such constructs as “Kazakhstan,”“the Republic,” “Almaty,” etc.

Nazarbayev’s own autobiography and memoirs not surprisingly focus on thepresident’s deliberations and involvement in the denuclearization process, very looselyhinting at the advisory group around him.59 Similar difficulties in obtaining detailedinformation were encountered during interviews with former and active government officials.

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Nazarbayev’s character featured prominently during the author’s interviews, reflecting hisactive role in nuclear policy making. His custom to consult with his associates was alsoconfirmed by senior officials in the foreign ministry and the president’s office.60 At the sametime, names or ranks of these advisers were not disclosed. Nevertheless, the president’spractice to discuss nuclear issues both formally and informally suggests that there was anestablished circle of advisers who assisted him in elaborating Kazakhstan’s nuclear strategy.

Intentionally or not, Kazakhstani decision makers directly involved in nucleardeliberations tend not to be specific in their accounts either. In his memoirs, Nazarbayevhimself often uses pronouns such as “we” or “us” to describe his foreign policy makingcircle. Illustrative of this tendency, Nazarbayev describes nuclear negotiations with Baker inhis autobiography in the following manner:

However, I insisted that it would be wrong to see this as an attempt by us to stake a claim tothe nuclear weapons on our territory. We were realists; we knew how expensive it would beto maintain these weapons. … Nevertheless, we were not prepared simply to renouncethese weapons without getting something in return—in particular, security guarantees.61

In Nazarbayev’s memoirs, even the name and rank of the official who signed the LisbonProtocol on behalf of Kazakhstan was withheld. That person, State Counsellor Zhukeyev,was depicted as “a representative of Kazakhstan.”62

Tokaev is also vague in his recollections. Describing the complexity of the nucleardilemma, Tokaev recalls: “Kazakhstan faced an uneasy task of grasping the specifics ofglobal nuclear politics, to determine positions on different issues of nuclear disarmament.President Nazarbayev charted a denuclearization course.”63

Reiss, having interviewed many people who were involved in nuclear decisionmaking both in Almaty and Washington, made the following observation:

What may not have been known to US officials at this time [December 1991-May 1992]was the nature of a behind-the-scenes nuclear debate then under way in Almaty.Government officials and military officers argued over the perceived political advantagesand disadvantages that nuclear weapons conferred. … Although only the contours ofthis debate are known, it had clearly influenced Kazakhstan’s nuclear stance at the twoDecember 1991 summits and afterward.64

William C. Potter, director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ismore straightforward in his interpretation of the essence of Kazakhstan’s nuclear decision.Potter also bases his findings on the interviews he conducted with Kazakhstani and USofficials. Potter argues that nuclear decision making was contracted at the highest levelwith only two persons in charge of making decisions: “Although the ministers of foreignaffairs and defense were involved formally in the formulation of nuclear policy, in fact allkey internal and international nuclear deliberations appear to have involved only PresidentNazarbayev and State Counsellor Zhukeyev.”65

The Nuclear Letters

The archival documents reflect an uneasy diplomatic game around the two distinct nuclearissues that featured prominently in Almaty’s general strategy of protracted denuclearization.

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The first, and the principal one, was Kazakhstan’s nuclear status per se. The United States andRussia insisted that Kazakhstan should proclaim itself a non-nuclear weapon state and jointhe NPT under this category. Almaty attempted to avoid renouncing its nuclear status, firstby referring to the original NPT provisions on the categorization of nuclear states, and laterby introducing a new classification of “temporary nuclear weapon state.” The second policyposition concerned Almaty’s desire to become a full-fledged member of START, thustransforming it from a bilateral to multilateral treaty. Here as well, the US and Russianleadership had a divergent opinion as both states wanted to keep START bilateral. In thiscase, Almaty took a firm stand and skillfully steered a negotiating process to its advantage.

The internal exchange of letters between the president and the foreign policymaking apparatus was one form of nuclear decision making. The letters reviewed belowfollow the internal discussion about Kazakhstan’s nuclear status and its membership statusin START.

(Draft) Letter on the Nuclear Policy

Below is an analysis of the draft internal policy memorandum “To the issue of the nuclearpolicy of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” collectively prepared by MFA, CSS, and SDC some‐time between February and April 1992, and addressed to Vice-President Yerik Asanbayev.

Letter 1, Omurserik Kasenov, Sagadat Nurmagambetov, and Tuleitai Suleymenov toNazarbayev, circa February–April 1992.The authors envisioned three hypothetical models of Kazakhstan’s nuclear policy:

1. Obtain full or partial control over nuclear weapons deployed on the territory.2. Remain under Russia’s “nuclear umbrella,” keeping its nuclear rocket bases on

the country’s territory for some definitive period.3. To become, over time, a ”nuclear-free zone.”66

The principal suggestion is to combine the second and third policy options. The firstnuclear option was considered unachievable since “Kazakhstan cannot claim nuclearweapon state status because it is the Russian Federation that has [the] main nucleararsenals, research and development institutes, production and destruction factories, and acommand and control capability.”67 Therefore, the document suggests, Kazakhstan shouldproclaim itself not a nuclear state but a “nuclear zone,” that is, a region where nuclearweapons are stationed but kept under the command and control of the other state(Russia). In addition, the authors argue that the transformation of Kazakhstan into nuclearweapon state would encourage proliferation by a number of nuclear threshold states (e.g.India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa). Such a decision would certainly be unwelcomed by theinternational community, especially since Belarus and Ukraine had already agreed to giveup their inherited nuclear arms. Therefore, the authors write, Kazakhstan should proclaimthe intention to become a nuclear-free zone and to accede to the NPT not as non-nuclearweapon state in exchange for international guarantees for its state sovereignty andterritorial integrity as the condition for its accession to the NPT. To assert Kazakhstan’ssovereignty, they suggest that the nation participate in START negotiations as an equal

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partner. They recommend following this policy until 2005, the year by which the ICBMsstationed in the republic were expected to reach the end of their service lives.68

Letters on START Membership

The following section depicts the exchange of internal documents that ensued asdiscussions about Kazakhstan’s participation in START evolved into what eventuallybecame the Lisbon Protocol.

Letter 1, Suleymenov to Nazarbayev, March 30, 1992.In the March 30 letter to Nazarbayev, Suleymenov informs him about an urgent cable fromRussian Foreign Minister Kozyrev regarding START implementation and ratification, andelaborates his own vision with respect to the Russian letter.69 The status, roles, andobligations of the four post-Soviet nuclear states in START were outlined in two documentsproposed by Russia: 1) the “Agreement on implementation principles and procedures of theSTART Treaty”; and 2) the “Protocol on the mechanism of implementation of the STARTTreaty.” The leaders of the four nuclear states could not previously concur on these twodocuments during the Kiev summit on March 20, 1992.

According to Suleymenov’s reply to the Russian cable, Almaty’s (and possibly Kiev’sand Minsk’s) main disagreement with Russia on START concerned two points: theratification procedures and Russia’s status in the agreement. Regarding ratificationprocedures, the Russian side insisted that because START was a bilateral treaty (signedon July 31, 1991, by the Soviet Union and the United States), Kazakhstan, Ukraine, andBelarus, having ratified the treaty in their parliaments, would submit relevant approvaldocuments to the government of Russia. Therefore, Suleymenov concludes, the RussianFederation would be in the capacity of a party to the agreement. With respect to thestatus of Russia in the proposed agreement, Moscow wanted to include in the agreementa provision by which the Russian Federation would be defined as the “sole nuclear state”(edinstvennoe iadernoe gosudarstvo). Suleymenov reports that the United States “isaffirmatively against the conversion of the START treaty from a bilateral to a multilateralone,” though it was not against excluding a provision that would consider the RussianFederation as the “sole nuclear state.”70

According to the letter, Kazakhstan’s admission to START as an independent partyseemed unfeasible at that time for Almaty. So Suleymenov proposes to Nazarbayev thefollowing policy option: to accredit the Russian Federation to act as the party to theagreement and to appoint Russia to represent and ensure the interests of other memberstates (Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus). The copies of the ratification instruments wouldthen be submitted directly to the United States. Suleymenov justifies this alternative as onethat would “fully assert the interests of Kazakhstan as a sovereign state, independentsubject of international law.” The important result of this action, according to the letter,would be to deny Russia’s proposal—which was supported by the United States at thetime—to be the “sole nuclear state,” which was the “principal moment” for Almaty. Another,and “probably the most important” end, would be the creation of “favorable conditions inKazakhstan-US bilateral relations” on the eve of Nazarbayev’s visit to Washington.71

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Letter 2, Suleymenov to Nazarbayev, April 13, 1992.As negotiations with the Americans and Russians ensued, Suleymenov wrote an update onKazakhstan’s position on START.72 Suleymenov reminds Nazarbayev that according to theagreement drafted earlier by Russia, the three ex-Soviet republics—Kazakhstan, Belarus, andUkraine—would have to submit their ratification instruments to the government of Russia.Moscow would then be expected to undertake the obligations to represent the other threenuclear states in dealings with the United States. The foreign minister explains that thisprovision would make Russia the only party to the agreement. However, the US position hadchanged, Suleymenov adds: the United States agreed to the direct exchange of ratificationinstruments with Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine, though both the United States and Russiacontinued to support the recognition of Russia as the “sole nuclear” state. Such recognition,noted Suleymenov, would mean that Kazakhstan could only be a non-nuclear weapon state.

Considering the previous letter, where Suleymenov proposed to submit ratificationinstruments to Russia and to allow it to represent Kazakhstan’s interests, the MFA’sposition has clearly changed:

For Kazakhstan, such an approach by the USA and Russia is unacceptable, because itcontradicts our position regarding the status of our Republic as one of the former USSR’ssuccessors in relation to nuclear weapons. In principle the proposed variant of the STARTtreaty ratification procedures does not suit us because Kazakhstan, as one of the USSR’ssuccessor states, cannot delegate Russia the right to act as a Party to the Agreement.73

(Emphasis in original.)

Suleymenov writes that Kazakhstan is ready to submit ratification instruments to theUnited States and considers it to be a “significant concession” on the part of Kazakhstan asfar as the ratification procedures are concerned. The foreign minister notes that thisconcession “has to be mutual,” and in exchange, it would be desirable for the UnitedStates and Russia to “show some understanding on our position regarding the [nuclear]status of Kazakhstan.”74 (Emphasis in original.)

Letter 3, Suleymenov to Nazarbayev, April 25, 1992.On April 16, 1992, Washington proposed its own version of the document that wouldguide the four post-Soviet states’ actions toward START.75 It now took the form of aprotocol to START, and put the question of the nuclear or non-nuclear status ofKazakhstan (along with Belarus and Ukraine) in a different context: instead of recognizingthe Russian Federation as the “sole nuclear” state, the United States introduced provisionsconcerning the NPT and the obligations of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine to join thetreaty as non-nuclear weapon states.

Suleymenov sent Nazarbayev an analysis of the US variant of the proposedprotocol, highlighting important changes in the US position toward Kazakhstan’spolitical status within START. He summarized the main points: 1) the United Statesagreed for START to be ratified, not endorsed, by the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet; 2) theright of Kazakhstan to carry equal responsibilities with other signatory states is asserted;3) the United States has changed its position and now recognizes all four nuclearstates as equal signatory parties; 4) Kazakhstan will exchange ratification instrumentswith the United States on its own.76

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In the meantime, Suleymenov points at the issues of disagreement withthe United States. He expresses concern about the provision of Article 5 of theprotocol, according to which it would be possible for Russia to station its strategicoffensive weapons on the territories of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine “for theshortest possible time.”77 On this issue, Suleymenov argues that the presence of onestate’s nuclear weapons on the territory of another state will incur a negative reactionfrom the local population, particularly if the latter state is aiming to becomenuclear-free.

Another point of disagreement is the demand by Washington for Kazakhstan,Belarus, and Ukraine to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Suleymenov writes:“Both [the] USA and Russia argue that if these three countries join the NPT as nuclearstates then the size of the ‘nuclear club’ will increase from five members to eight, whichcan serve as a serious undermining factor for international security.”78 Suleymenovcomments that this stipulation is the main point of discord between Kazakhstan and theUnited States.

Letter 4, Nazarbayev to Baker, April 29, 1992.The main arguments from Suleymenov’s letter were reflected in the Nazarbayev-Bakerletter that continued a discussion of the proposed “Protocol on the Ratification andImplementation of the START Treaty” to be signed by the four post-Soviet nuclear states.79

Nazarbayev wrote to Baker that Article 5 of the Protocol, which allows Russian strategicforces to be deployed in Kazakhstan, “requires certain adjustment.”80 Justifying this point,Nazarbayev used Suleymenov’s argument of the negative reaction of the local populationof a sovereign state to the presence of foreign-owned nuclear weapons deployed on theirterritory, as outlined in the April 25, 1992 letter.

To avoid committing to a non-nuclear status, Nazarbayev proposes producing aseparate ratification and implementation protocol that omitted the draft Article 6 text,specifically its reference to the NPT and the defined timeframe within which Kazakhstan,Belarus, and Ukraine would join the treaty as non-nuclear weapon states.81 Nazarbayevlinks the need to exclude the reference to the NPT, and, consequently, to the non-nuclearstatus of Kazakhstan, with the probability of a successful ratification by the SupremeSoviet:

I want to sincerely and very confidentially inform you that the possibility of such anunfavorable […] turn of events, embedded in the Article 6 text, cannot be entirelyexcluded. There is a probability that [the] provision of a specific timetable for Kazakhstanto join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state can be used by particular forces in theparliament to delay ratification of the START treaty.82

It is noteworthy that Nazarbayev avoided precise formulations of Kazakhstan’snuclear status. In the concluding section, he wrote to Baker:

I would like to underline that Kazakhstan, striving to become a non-nuclear state,adheres firmly to the continuation of the global disarmament process under strict andeffective international control. In this process the Republic intends to be actively involvedas an equal partner. Kazakhstan fully supports the NPT and is ready to accede to it.83

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Here, Nazarbayev equivocated on whether Kazakhstan wants to enter the NPT as a nuclearor non-nuclear weapon state.84

Internal Nuclear Discussion

A review of these letters reveals additional nuances about Kazakhstani nuclear decisionmaking. One general finding is that there was an internal nuclear discussion amongAlmaty policy makers which gradually affected the country’s evolving nuclear stance. ByFebruary 1992, the nation’s leadership realized that it was practically impossible to obtaincommand and control over weapons stationed in the country that remained in Moscow’shands. This acknowledgment led to the arguments over Kazakhstan’s optimal nuclearstatus. Even if it was clear for Almaty that it would not be possible to keep nuclearweapons, in March and April, they decided that the official position should not bedefinitive in order to gain security guarantees from great powers.85 Most likely, it wasNazarbayev’s decision to keep the nuclear status obscure, at least until his forthcomingvisit to the United States, and his policy advisers adjusted their vision accordingly. At leastthis can be said about the MFA’s position, which originally pushed for a non-nuclear statusproclamation in a cowritten analytical memorandum, but later introduced a temporarynuclear state classification, and up until the end of April, was defending Kazakhstan’s rightfor a nuclear status in negotiations with Russia and the United States. The exchange ofletters demonstrates that, on at least several occasions, Nazarbayev solicited policy adviceand analysis. It also shows that Kazakhstan’s leadership attempted, although unsuccess-fully, to delink the issue of START membership from the issue of nuclear status in the NPT.On the other hand, as reflected in the documents, Kazakhstan firmly backed its positionthat it (along with Belarus and Ukraine) should become a full party to START even thoughthis step, much to the displeasure of Russia and the United States, transformed STARTfrom a bilateral to a multilateral treaty. The discussion, reflected in Letter 3 fromSuleymenov to Nazarbayev and in the following Letter 4 from Nazarbayev to Baker onthe proposed provision that would allow Russian strategic weapons to be temporarilystationed on Kazakhstan territory, shows that the MFA provided the president with directpolicy advice. The MFA also rejected the original idea, devised in conjunction with the CSSand SDC, of endorsing the Russian jurisdiction over stationed nuclear arsenals. Thepresident approved of the MFA’s justification for the undesirability of such a provision andreproduced it in his letter to the US secretary of state.

Thus, a principal finding is that there was an informal ad hoc group that providedpolicy advice to the president. The archival documents confirm that the presidentialforeign policy advisory team played a role in developing and implementing keycomponents of Almaty’s nuclear strategy. It assisted Nazarbayev in identifying, interpret-ing, and evaluating the strategic environment; it developed substitutive courses of actionfor the president to follow; and it provided Nazarbayev with the argumentation ofAlmaty’s position on different nuclear issues.

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Conclusion

This article demonstrates how Kazakhstan’s leadership, in an attempt to transcendconstraints of the international strategic security system, internalized and reacted tosystemic forces that were pressing Kazakhstan toward a specific behavioral pattern.President Nazarbayev’s decision not to go nuclear was by no means an easy one; it wasmade at a time of strategic uncertainty over the state’s future. However, the presidentrecognized that the resolution of the nuclear dilemma, while dichotomous in its essence,provided for a range of alternative courses of action not necessarily leading to animmediate renunciation of Kazakhstan’s nuclear status and relinquishing of strategicweapons. This circuitous course between retention and renouncement is where foreignpolicy making manifested itself. Here, the exposition of Almaty’s policy makers’ beliefs andcalculations helps to approximate an understanding of Kazakhstan’s decision todenuclearize.

NOTES

1. On Kazakhstan denuclearization, see Murat Laumulin, “Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Policy and the Controlof Nuclear Weapons,” in The Nuclear Challenge in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed., GeorgeH. Quester (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 181–211; William C. Potter, The Politics of NuclearRenunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center,1995), pp. 16–19, 35–42; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their NuclearCapabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 138–82; Nursultan Nazarbayev,Epitsentr Mira [The Epicenter of Peace], 2nd ed. (Almaty: Atamura, 2003).

2. On neorealist assumptions on nuclear proliferation, see Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow:Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Security Studies 2 (1993), pp. 37–78.

3. William J. Long, and Suzette R. Grillot, “Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africaand Ukraine,” Nonproliferation Review 7 (2000), pp. 24–40.

4. “Contribution to International Security,” Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the United States,<www.kazakhembus.com/page/contribution-to-international-security>, and Nuclear Threat Initiative,“Country Profile—Kazakhstan,” <www.nti.org/country-profiles/kazakhstan>.

5. For the review of the approach, see Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds.,Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

6. B.I. Finel, “Black Box or Pandora’s Box: State Level Variables and Progressivity in Realist ResearchPrograms,” Security Studies 11 (2001), p. 204.

7. Paul T. Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, “Foreign Policy-Making at the Top: Political GroupDynamics,” in Paul T. Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., Beyond Groupthink: Political GroupDynamics and Foreign Policy-Making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 8.

8. Omurserik Kasenov, Dastan Eleukenov, and Murat Laumulin, Kazakhstan and the Non-ProliferationTreaty (Almaty: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 4.

9. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 138–41.10. President Nazarbayev, cited by US Secretary of State James Baker in a report by John McWethy, ABC

World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, December 17, 1991, LexisNexis Academic.11. “Nazarbayev-Bush letter,” January 7, 1992, Archive of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan

(hereinafter APRK), fond 5N, opis 1, delo 289, I. 2. The filing system used in the APRK is identical to thesystems in Soviet and Russian archives. Basic archival categories in Russian are Fond, Opis, Delo, List.Fond designates an integral group of records from a single office or source, usually arranged as theywere created in their office of origin; Opis is a numbered hierarchical subdivision within a fond that listall of the files or storage units; Delo is a reference to a file or a storage unit and List refers to a specificdocument page. See Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, Archives of Russia Five Years After: ”Purveyors of

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Sensations” or “Shadows Cast to the Past”? (Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 1997),p. 18. The archival documents in Russian cited in this article were translated into English by the author.

12. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 141.13. Ibid.14. Ibid.15. Dumas cited in Mikhail Shchipanov, “Easier to Deal With Bush,” Kuranty, February 8, 1992, p. 3. Also,

consider the following excerpt from the Nazarbayev-Dumas dialogue: “Dumas: ‘Will you have more[nuclear] tests?’ Nazarbayev: ‘No, I put a ban on them. … For now.’” (Emphasis added.) See “Minutes ofthe talks between President Nazarbayev and French state minister–Minister of Foreign Affairs RolandDumas in Almaty, January 25, 1992,” APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 218, l. 13.

16. Steve Doughty, “West Must Pay Us to Destroy Our Nuclear Weapons,” Daily Mail, January 20, 1992,p. 10.

17. In general, Nazarbayev is believed to be a skilled diplomat. Reiss makes an inquisitive inference aboutNazarbayev’s ability to manipulate a situation in negotiations. Explaining the episode of Nazarbayev’sstopover in Moscow on May 17, 1992, en route to Washington, to discuss with Yeltsin his upcomingnegotiations with the Americans, Reiss presumes: “From his press statement after this meeting, it wasclear that Nazarbayev had fooled Yeltsin into allowing Almaty to keep half of its SS-18s beyond theseven-year START framework … Nazarbayev’s cleverness alerted Washington to the possibility that hemight attempt a similar ploy in Lisbon.” See Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 146.

18. “Nazarbayev-Bush letter,” April 7, 1992, APRK, f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1361, l. 27.19. President Nazarbayev, as quoted in the Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, April 28, 1992:

“I sent a letter to President Bush in which I informed him of our desire to become a non-nuclear state.However, pending the destruction of the nuclear warheads, I asked him to temporarily view Kazakhstanas a nuclear state.” It is unknown, though, whether the president meant the April 7, 1992, letter, as thatletter does not include any passage containing the term “temporary nuclear state.” See “Nazarbayev-Bush letter,” April 7, 1992, APRK, f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1361, ll. 25–28.

20. “Main provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept,” MFA, April 9, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 154–55.21. “Nazarbayev Seeks ‘Parity’ in Atom Cuts: When Others Disarm, So Will Kazakhstan,” Washington Post,

February 23, 1992, p. A26.22. On May 1, 1992, in an interview with Japanese TV, Nazarbayev stated that “Kazakhstan will retain its

nuclear weapons for at least 15 years,” quoted by NHK TV, May 1, 1992, transcript, as reported in BBCSummary of World Broadcasts, May 4, 1992. On May 2, 1992, during talks with Watanabe in Almaty,Nazarbayev told the Japanese diplomat that the republic “had no alternative but to keep nuclearweapons unless Russia, USA and China will guarantee the security of Kazakhstan,” quoted in “KazakhLeader Shows Understanding of Territorial Dispute,” Japan Economic Newswire, May 2, 1992.

23. “Joint declaration between the United States and Kazakhstan by President Bush and KazakhstanPresident Nursultan Nazarbayev, May 19, 1992.” US Department of State, Dispatch, vol. 3, no. 21, May25, 1992.

24. Omurserik Kasenov, and Kairat Abuseitov, The Future of Nuclear Weapons in the Kazakh Republic’sNational Security (McLean, Virginia: Potomac Foundation, 1993), p. 6.

25. “Nazarbayev-Bush letter,” May 16, 1992, APRK f. 5, op. 1, d. 289, l. 49.26. “Foreign Policy and National Security Concept,” Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS), (undated; first half of

1992), APRK f. 166N, op. 1, d. 13, l. 5.27. Agence France Presse, “Kazakhstan President Seeks Security Guarantees in Exchange for Disarma-

ment,” May 6, 1992, LexisNexis Academic.28. Nazarbayev, Epitsentr Mira [The Epicenter of Peace], p. 98.29. “Minutes of the talks between Nazarbayev and Dumas,” APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 218, I. 1–19.30. Ibid.31. Foreign policy expert, name and place withheld by request, interview with author, February 20, 2012.32. Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 2002), pp. 44.33. “Bush-Nazarbayev letter,” December 28, 1991, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 20, l. 267–79.34. “Bush-Nazarbayev letter,“ December 28, 1991, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 20, l. 278.35. “Baker-Nazarbayev letter,” March 20, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 20, l. 43.

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36. “NATO statement on NPT Accession,” April 22, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 40.37. “MFA annual report,” MFA, April 12, 1993, APRK, f. 75N, op. 1, d. 2, l. 4.38. Jonathan Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 137. Before

the proclamation of independence, on August 29, 1991, Nazarbayev closed the Semipalatinsk testingpolygon—an action that certainly required some basic understanding of the nuclear problem.

39. “Nazarbayev–Baker letter,” April 7, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1361, l. 25.40. Potter, Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, p. 16.41. For the description of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy making structure see Oumirseric Kasenov, “The

Institutions and Conduct of the Foreign Policy of Postcommunist Kazakhstan,” in Adeed Dawish andKaren Dawish, eds., The International Politics of Eurasia, vol. 4: The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia andthe New States of Eurasia, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995, pp. 263–85).

42. Daniiar Ashimbayev, “Kazakhstanskaia Diplomatiia: Kadry [The Kazakhstani Diplomacy: Cadre],”Kontinent. 3 (2004), p. 18; High-ranking governmental official, name withheld by request, interviewwith author, October 25, 2011, Astana.

43. Kasenov, “Institutions and Conduct,” p. 267.44. Tuleitai Suleymenov, former foreign minister of Kazakhstan, interview with author, Astana, December

7, 2011. Salim Kurmanguzhin, former deputy foreign minister of Kazakhstan, interview with author,Almaty, February 10, 2012.

45. “CSS annual report,” CSS, (undated; first half of 1993), APRK 166N, op. 1, d. 9, l. 2.46. Former official of the administration of the President of Kazakhstan, name withheld by request,

interview with author, November 30, 2011, Astana.47. Kasenov, “Institutions and Conduct,” p. 268.48. Stephen F. Burgess and Togzhan Kassenova, “The Rollback States: South Africa and Kazakhstan,” in

Tanya Ogilvie-White and David Santoro, eds., Slaying the Nuclear Dragon: Disarmament Dynamics in theTwenty-First Century (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2012), pp. 85–117.

49. Nazarbayev as quoted in Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, p. 13850. For the explications of the points, see the interview with Burkytbai Aiaganov, Krasnaia Zvezda,

February 26, 1992, p. 3.51. Isinaliev sent the article to Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, but it remained unpublished. See Isinaliev, “Net

Garantii Bezopasnosti [No Guarantees for Security],” May 21, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 1381, ll. 20–22.52. Burgess and Kassenova, “The Rollback States: South Africa and Kazakhstan,” pp. 99–100.53. Ibid, p. 99.54. Laumulin, “Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Policy,” p. 188.55. For Nazarbayev’s view on the nuclear debate in Kazakhstani society, see Nazarbayev, Epitsentr Mira

[The Epicenter of Peace], pp. 28–38.56. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 143.57. Nursultan Nazarbayev and Peter Conradi, Nursultan Nazarbayev: My Life, My Times and the Future

(Northampton: Pilkington Press, 1998), pp. 139–50; Nazarbayev, Epitsentr Mira [The Epicenter of Peace];Kassym-Zhomart Tokaev, Pod Stiagom Nezavisimosti. Ocherki o Vneshnei Politike Kazakhstana [Under theBanner of Independence. Essays on Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy] (Almaty: Bilim, 1997).

58. Aitken, Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan, pp. 137–38.59. Only in one instance does Nazarbayev directly credit the presence of the adviser, who was the Russian

general from the strategic forces branch providing expert advice to the president at the negotiationrounds in Washington. Nazarbayev recalls: “All the time the Russian officer was sitting next to me,giving me advice and correcting any mistakes which I made.” See Nazarbayev and Conradi, NursultanNazarbayev, p. 148.

60. Makhmud Kasymbekov, the Head of the Chancellery of the President, interview with author, Astana,November 24, 2011; Kurmanguzhin, interview with author, February 10, 2012; Suleymenov, interviewwith author, December 7, 2011.

61. Nazarbayev and Conradi, Nursultan Nazarbayev, p. 146.62. Ibid., p. 149. It is possible that this was due to Zhukeyev’s subsequent move to the opposition camp.63. Tokaev, Pod Stiagom Nezavisimosti Under the Banner of Independence}, p. 696.64. Reiss, Bridled Ambitions, p. 142.65. Potter, Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, p. 41.

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66. “To the issue of the nuclear policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Policy memorandum,” undated (circaFebruary–April 1992), APRK, f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, I. 185–89. The document is not dated, however in thetext it refers to an article published in Kazakhstanskaia Pravda on February 1, 1992, and the April 9,1992 MFA foreign policy concept contains different positions then those proposed in this document.

67. “To the issue of the nuclear policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Policy memorandum,” APRK, f. 75N,op. 1, d. 21, l. 186.

68. “To the issue of the nuclear policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Policy memorandum,” APRK, f. 75N,op. 1, d. 21, l. 189.

69. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” March 30, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 232–36.70. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” March 30, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 235.71. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” March 30, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 236.72. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 13, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 163–69.73. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 13, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 167–68.74. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 13, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 168.75. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 25, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 49–57.76. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 25, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 55.77. “Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 25, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 53.78. Here Suleymenov cites Kozyrev’s statement on the same subject made on April 11, 1992.

“Suleymenov-Nazarbayev letter,” April 25, 1992, APRK f. 75N, op. 1, d. 21, l. 56.79. “Nazarbayev-Baker letter,” April 29, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 42–44.80. “Nazarbayev-Baker letter,” April 29, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 43.81. Exact dates were not specified in the draft Protocol. There was a blank space left instead in Article 6.

“Nazarbayev-Baker letter,” April 29, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 44.82. “Nazarbayev-Baker letter,” April 29, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 44.83. “Nazarbayev-Baker letter,” April 29, 1992, APRK f. 5N, op. 1, d. 289, l. 44.84. The text of the “Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms” (the Lisbon Protocol)is very similar to the text of the document proposed by Baker in April. It is important to highlight thatthe three issues discussed between Nazarbayev and Suleymenov in the above exchange of letters arereflected in the protocol. First, in accordance with Article 5 of the protocol, Kazakhstan (together withBelarus and Ukraine) would join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in the “shortest possibletime.” Second, in accordance with Article 6, Kazakhstan (together with Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine)would exchange their ratification instruments with the United States. Third, the provision of temporarystorage of Russian nuclear weapons on the territories of the three states is omitted from the protocol.

85. Potter indicates February-April 1992 as “the crucial period of reassessment of Kazakhstan’s nuclearposture.” See Potter, The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation, p. 40.

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