Karbhari Summary Judgment Memo

7/28/2019 Karbhari Summary Judgment Memo

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MADISON COUNTY, ALABAMA

SAMMIE LEE DAVIS, as Personal

Representative of THE ESTATE OF DR.

MARIA RAGLAND DAVIS, deceased,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DR. VISTASP M. KARBHARI; DR. AMY

BISHOP, a/k/a AMY BISHOP

ANDERSON; and JAMES ANDERSON,

Defendants.

))))

))))))))))))))

CIVIL ACTION NO. : CV-11-900037

********************

DR. JACQUELINE U. JOHNSON, as

Personal Representative of THE ESTATE

OF DR. ADRIEL D. JOHNSON, SR.,

deceased,

Plaintiff,

vs.

DR. VISTASP M. KARBHARI; DR. AMY

BISHOP, a/k/a AMY BISHOP

ANDERSON; and JAMES ANDERSON,

Defendants.

)))))))))))))))))))

CIVIL ACTION NO. : CV-11-900038

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

DEFENDANT KARBHARIS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ELECTRONICALLY FILED6/26/2013 6:45 PM

47-CV-2011-900037.00CIRCUIT COURT OF

MADISON COUNTY, ALABAMAJANE C. SMITH, CLERK


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................................ii

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS ....................................................................4

LEGAL ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS TO AUTHORITY...................................12

I. DR.KARBHARI HAD NO DUTY UNDER ALABAMA LAW TO PROTECT THE

DECEDENTS FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF DR.BISHOP...................................12

A. Dr. Karbhari Did Not Know That Dr. Bishop Planned to Murder the

Decedents. ...................................................................................................13

B. Dr. Karbhari Did Not Have Specialized Knowledge That Dr. BishopPlanned to Murder the Decedents. ..........................................................17

C. Dr. Karbhari Possessed No Information That Dr. Bishop Posed an

Imminent Probability of Harm to the Decedents...............................18

II. DR.KARBHARI IS ENTITLED TO STATE-AGENT IMMUNITY. .............................20

A. The Emergency Procedures Handbook Did Not Impose Mandatory

Duties on Dr. Karbhari.............................................................................22

B. The Psychological Crisis Section Required Dr. Karbhari to ExerciseJudgment and Discretion Before Reporting Dr. Bishop to the Police..25

III. DR.KARBHARI DID NOT CAUSE THE DECEDENTSDEATHS. ............................30

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................31

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................33


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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Bailey v. Brunos, Inc., 561 So. 2d 509 (Ala. 1990) .........................................................18

Byrd v. Commercial Credit Corp., 675 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 1996)........................................31

Carroll v. Hammett, 744 So. 2d 906 (Ala. 1999)........................................................28, 30

Carroll v. Shoneys, Inc., 775 So. 2d 753 (Ala. 2000)................................................13, 15

City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So. 2d 755 (Ala. 2002) .......................................21

Ex parte Blankenship, 806 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. 2000)...................................................27, 30

Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000)....................................................................... 22

Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So. 2d 565 (Ala. 1999) ........................................21, 23

Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000)....................................................20, 21, 26

Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450 (Ala. 2006).................................................21

Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d 117 (Ala. 2002)....................................................................20

Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276 (Ala. 2008).........................................................22, 23

Ex parte Randall, 971 So. 2d 652 (Ala. 2007)............................................................26, 30

Ex parte S. Baldwin Regl Med. Ctr., 785 So. 2d 368 (Ala. 2000) ...................................15

Ex parte Spivey, 46 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 2002) ................................................................27, 30

Finley v. Patterson, 705 So. 2d 826 (Ala. 1997).........................................................18, 19

Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046 (Ala. 2003)...........................................22, 24, 25

Gooden v. City of Talladega, 966 So. 2d 232 (Ala. 2007)................................................31

Hail v. Regency Terrace Owners Assn, 782 So. 2d 1271 (Ala. 1999).............................18

Henley v. Pizitz Realty Co., 456 So. 2d 272 (Ala. 1984) ..................................................18

Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 2005)........................................28, 29, 30

Mobile City Lines, Inc. v. Proctor, 130 So. 2d 388 (1961) ...............................................30


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Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So. 2d 1368 (Ala. 1986)......................................13

Nail v. Jefferson County Truck Growers Ass'n, Inc, 542 So. 2d 1208 (Ala. 1988). .........19

New Addition Club, Inc. v. Vaughn, 903 So. 2d 68 (Ala. 2004) .....................12, 13, 14, 15

Parham v. Taylor, 402 So. 2d 884 (Ala. 1981).................................................................13

State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Owen, 729 So. 2d 834 (Ala. 1998) ..................................12

Webster v. Churchs Fried Chicken, Inc. 575 So. 2d 1108 (Ala. 1991) ...........................18

Whataburger, Inc. v. Rockwell, 706 So. 2d 1220 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)..........................19

Wilder v. Sigma Nu Fraternity, Inc., 390 Fed. Appx. 910 (11th Cir. 2010) ...............15, 19


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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs have asserted claims against an innocent man. Although it is

understandable that Plaintiffs seek to blame someone for the tragedy of February 12,

2010, the blame lies solely at the feet of the confessed murderer, Dr. Amy Bishop.

Continuation of this case against Dr. Karbhari can no longer be justified.

From the very outset of this case, Plaintiffs central allegation has been that Dr.

Karbhari, along with former President Dr. David Williams, their staff, and UAHuntsville

police, knew that Dr. Bishop was a danger to others based on their response to her request

to meet after her tenure denial. For example, on July 21, 2011, Plaintiffs sought to avoid

dismissal by claiming:

Months before the massacre, Defendant Karbhari and former

UAH President, Dr. David Williams, ran out of the back of

Shelbie King Hall protected by two armed police officers in

order to flee a possible confrontation with Defendant Bishop

over the denial of her tenure. Their flight was likely recorded

by UAH security cameras.

In fact, counsel for Plaintiffs went even further in the hearing on the Motion to

Dismiss, claiming that it did come to us through good sources, and has come to us again

through even better sources, eyewitness reports that police were called and that there was

protection given. Plaintiffs counsel went on to claim that UAHuntsville thought the

crisis was severe enough they needed armed guards to run out of the back of the building

and protect the president of the university. Counsel even claimed that there is a video

of that of the two officials with the university running out the back door.


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Discovery revealed that there is no such video and Plaintiffs only source was

the confessed murderer, Dr. Bishop. Although it is self-evident that Dr. Bishop lacks any

credibility whatsoever, even assuming her statements were admissible and true,1

Plaintiffs claims against Dr. Karbhari still fail as a matter of law. In fact, through the

efforts of nonparty UAHuntsville to uncover all potential records relating to this alleged

incident, discovery has revealed that the centerpiece of Plaintiffs case was a nonevent.

Here are the uncontested facts relating to this incident:

On November 12, 2009, a full three months before the shooting, Dr. Bishopreceived a letter from Dr. Williams informing her that her final appeal for tenure

had been denied.

Dr. Bishop called the Presidents office, but was advised that he was unavailable.Dr. Bishop told the Presidents assistant that she would come to the office and

wait.

The normal practice in the Presidents office at that time was for UAHuntsvillepolice to be informed of a potentially tense meeting such as a termination or, in

1Dr. Karbhari disputes each of the allegations Dr. Bishop makes about him in her

purported Affidavit and preserves all objections to its admissibility should Plaintiffs actually

offer it as evidence in this case. In addition to her lack of credibility, Dr. Bishop states that she

lacks memory of specific events and that her mental condition was such that she was out oftouch with reality. Much of her alleged testimony is simply outlandish. Concerns have also been

raised about the manner in which it was obtained and notarized that cast further doubt on its

admissibility. For these reasons, as well as the Courts prior Orders regarding Dr. Bishops FifthAmendment right against self-incrimination, the Affidavit is not being introduced as an exhibit to

this Motion. These concerns do not impact the ripeness of this Motion because even if Dr.

Bishops Affidavit were admitted and even if it were assumed to be true, Dr. Karbhari would stillbe entitled to summary judgment.


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this case, the denial of tenure. Accordingly, UAHuntsville police were told that

there may be a meeting with a professor who had been denied tenure.

Less than an hour later, Mary Beth Walker, the Executive Assistant to thePresident, spoke with Dr. Bishop and was informed that Dr. Bishop would not be

coming to the Presidents office.

Ms. Walker then informed the UAHuntsville police that the professor was notcoming and the danger situation is over and we dont need that safety issue

anymore.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs entire case against Dr. Karbhari rests on the mere fact that

a potentially contentious meeting three months before the shooting never actually

occurred. Although the evidence is undisputed that Dr. Karbhari was not told that Dr.

Bishop had sought a meeting with Dr. Williams on November 12, 2009, what could have

been done if he had been told? Was he supposed to call the police and ask them to arrest

Dr. Bishop for failing to show up for a meeting? If the police had been told, what were

they to do? Arrest her for being upset about the denial of tenure? How could anyone be

expected to predict, based on her failure to attend a meeting, that Dr. Bishop would

murder her colleagues three months later? How could anyone predict that Dr. Bishops

reaction to being denied tenure would be to murder the three professors who voted for

her? Plaintiffs claims against Dr. Karbhari go well beyond the realm of speculation.

Based on this evidence, Dr. Karbhari is entitled to summary judgment for three

reasons: First, Dr. Karbhari had no legal duty to protect the Decedents from the criminal

acts of Dr. Bishop. Second, Dr. Karbhari is entitled to State-agent immunity. Third, Dr.


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Karbharis alleged negligence was not the cause of the Decedents deaths. Further

discovery will not change these conclusions.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

Dr. Karbhari began his employment with UAHuntsville as Provost and Executive

Vice President of Academic Affairs in September 2008.2

At that time, the tenure review

process was already underway for Dr. Bishop.3

By the time the tenure issue reached Dr.

Karbhari, Dr. Bishops colleagues and numerous faculty committees had already

provided their opinions about her. According to the information provided to Dr. Karbhari,

Dr. Bishop was denied tenure because of her academic performance, such as her low

research productivity at UAH and the fact that she has directed no doctoral students.4

The decision was not unanimous.

The Chair of the Biology Department, Dr. Gopi Podila, strongly supported the

award of tenure. Although he was Dr. Bishops immediate supervisor, and likely would

have been the point of contact for any complaints about her, he was her strongest

advocate.5

Dr. Podila disagreed with the recommendation of the tenure committee and

argued that Dr. Bishop should be granted tenure based on her record of professional

performance at UAH, and the potential she holds.6

2Ex. 1 (Karbhari Aff.) 1.


4Ex. 2 (UAH0000941-UAH0000943).

5Ex. 1 ( Karbhari Aff.) 2.

6Ex. 3 (UAH0000920-UAH0000922).


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Likewise, Dr. Podilas supervisor, Dr. John Fix, the Dean of the College of

Science, recommended tenure be granted.7

He noted that Dr. Bishop had: done an

acceptable job in teaching, created a productive lab, and been involved in several

significant forms of campus service.8

He did note, however, that [t]he results so far are

solid, though not overwhelming.9

Dr. Adriel D. Johnson, Sr. also supported Dr. Bishops bid for tenure.10

In a

September 25, 2009 memorandum to another member of the tenure review committee,

Dr. Johnson expressed his belief that Dr. Bishop should be granted tenure based, in part,

on their professional interactions in the Department of Biological Sciences and the

College of Science, her positive student evaluation scores and comments, and the fact

that Dr. Bishop has been an enthusiastic participant in her service activities.11

Dr. Maria Ragland Davis was another supporter of Dr. Bishops tenure and

promotion.12

On May 1, 2009, she wrote Dr. Karbhari a letter on behalf of Dr. Bishops

tenure appeal.13

Although she thought Dr. Bishop was a bit unconventional, Dr. Davis

attempted to rally her colleagues to also express their support of Dr. Bishop and their

desire to see her stay.14

She praised Dr. Bishops no-nonsense teaching style,

7Ex. 4 (UAH0000705-UAH0000707).

8Id. at UAH0000706-UAH0000707.

9Id. at UAH0000707.10

Ex. 1 ( Karbhari Aff.) 3.

11Ex. 5 (DAVIS and JOHNSON 000057).

12Ex. 1 ( Karbhari Aff.) 3.

13Ex. 6 (UAH0001242-UAH0001243).

14Id.


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complimented her for working tirelessly, and thought she was able to work miracles

for her students.15

In all of the documentation related to Dr. Bishops tenure review, which was

reviewed by several different individuals and committees and then again as part of her

appeal, there was not a single concern raised about her mental stability, report of any

threats or harassment, or mention of any potential for violent behavior.16

Nor did anyone

ever informally advise Dr. Karbhari of any such concerns.17

Rather, based purely on the

conclusion that her academic work did not satisfy the standard for awarding tenure, on

November 10, 2009, then-President David Williams sent Dr. Bishop a letter advising her

of the final decision not to grant her tenure or promotion.18

At 3:45 PM on November 12, 2009, after talking with Dr. Podila and Dean Fix

and after a 12 second call to the Provosts office, Dr. Bishop called the office of the

President seeking a meeting with Dr. Williams regarding her tenure denial.19

She spoke

with Caroline Mandel, an administrative assistant to the President, and told her that she

had received a letter from Dr. Williams and wanted to meet.20

Ms. Mandel informed Dr.

Bishop that Dr. Williams was not available, but Dr. Bishop responded that she would

15Id.16

Ex. 1 (Karbhari Aff.) 4.


18Ex. 7 (UAH0000863).

19Ex. 8 (Spreadsheet of Telephone Records).

20Ex. 9 (Mandel Aff.) 3-4.


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come and wait in the office.21

Ms. Mandel documented this call with a note that said:

Jack Fix, Dr. Padila [sic], mis-communicated, misunderstanding.22

Ms. Mandel was then a recent college graduate and had only been working in that

job for about one month.23

After the phone call from Dr. Bishop, Ms. Mandel spoke with

Mary Beth Walker, the Executive Assistant to the President, regarding Dr. Bishops

request to come and wait in the office.24

Ms. Mandel was concerned that she did not

know how she would persuade Dr. Bishop to leave the office if she came over.25

She

was annoyed, but not scared.26

At that time, the normal practice in the Presidents office was to notify

UAHuntsville police if there was going to be a potentially tense situation, such as a

meeting with an employee regarding their job being terminated.27

In accordance with this

policy, and because of the concern raised by Ms. Mandel, the UAHuntsville police were

informed that there might be a meeting with a professor who had been denied tenure.28

21Ex. 9 (Mandel Aff.) 5.

22Ex. 9 (Mandel Aff.) 6; Ex. 10 (UAH0002363).

23Ex. 9 (Mandel Aff.) 1-2.




27

Ex. 11 (Walker Aff.) 4.28

Ex. 11 (Walker Aff.) 4. Ms. Walker assumed that, in response to such notice,

UAHuntsville police would send someone to be hanging around in a [ ] concealed spot. Id. 5.

In actual practice, however, UAHuntsville police did not dispatch anyone to the scene based on

notice of a potentially tense meeting. Ex. 12 (Gailes June 25, 2013 Aff.) 5. Rather, theUAHuntsville police would have only responded if they were subsequently informed that

someone had become concerned about their safety.Id. Because there are no records of any police

officer being dispatched to the scene and no police officer recalls providing security to Dr.


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At 3:58 PM, about six minutes after her call with Ms. Mandel ended, Dr. Bishop

called Dr. Debra Moriarity.29

Dr. Bishop advised that she was planning to go discuss her

appeal with then President David Williams and/or Dr. Karbhari.30

During this call, Dr.

Bishop said: My career is over. I might as well kill myself.31

As this type of comment

was consistent with Dr. Bishops dramatic personality, Dr. Moriarity did not think she

was actually suicidal and did not interpret her comment to be an actual threat of

suicide.32

Dr. Bishop advised Dr. Moriarity that her children were in the car with her

and that she needed to take care of them before she went into Shelbie King Hall.33

Dr.

Moriarity asked Dr. Bishop to call [her] back after she had dropped off her children.34

Karbhari, Dr. Williams, or their staff, the clear inference is that nobody expressed any concerns

about their safety to the police.

29Ex. 8 (Spreadsheet of Telephone Records); Ex. 13 (Moriarity May 5, 2011 Aff.) 5.

Dr. Moriarity thought that these discussions occurred much earlier in 2009. Dr. Moriaritytestified: The conversations in questions occurred, to the best of my recollection, in or around

April or May of 2009. Ex. 13 (Moriarity May 5, 2011 Aff.) 5. Because calls from the parking

lot would have been made from Dr. Bishops cell phone, as confirmed by Dr. Moriaritystestimony, id. 6, those records are the best evidence to determine the actual date of the

conversations. Those records reveal that the only day in 2009 that Dr. Bishop called Dr.

Moriarity from her cell phone was November 12, 2009. Ex. 14 (Dr. Bishop Cell Phone Records)

at 12. Likewise, the only day that Dr. Bishop called the Presidents office was November 12,2009.Id. Therefore, the only possible date that Dr. Bishop could have had these discussions with

Dr. Moriarity was November 12, 2009.30

Ex. 13 (Moriarity May 5, 2011 Aff.) 6.

31Ex. 13 (Moriarity May 5, 2011 Aff.) 7.





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At approximately 4:20 p.m., Dr. Bishop once again called Ms. Mandel and

reiterated her request to see the President.35

Ms. Mandel advised Dr. Bishop again that

Dr. Williams was not available.36

Ms. Mandel also informed Ms. Walker of this call.37

In response, Ms. Walker called Dr. Bishop at 4:28 PM and spoke to her for just

over three minutes.38

During this call, Dr. Bishop informed Ms. Walker that she would

not be coming to the Presidents office.39

At 4:40 PM, less than an hour after Dr.

Bishops initial call to Caroline Mandel, Ms. Walker informed the UAHuntsville police

as follows:

. . . Chief Gailes or somebody was going to be around

Madison Hall in case we had an upset professor coming over

because of her tenure decision. . . . Tell the Chief that she is

not coming over and that the danger situation is over and he

does not need to have someone over here . . . we dont need

that safety issue anymore.40

A search of the Computer Aided Dispatch Record Management System contains

no records of any dispatch to the Presidents office or relating to Dr. Bishop that day.41

In

fact, there are no dispatch records of any calls relating to complaints about Dr. Bishop

prior to February 12, 2010.42

The fact that UAHuntsville police were never actually

35Ex. 9 (Mandel Aff.) 10; Ex. 8 (Spreadsheet of Telephone Records).



38 Ex. 11 (Walker Aff.) 7; Ex. 8 (Spreadsheet of Telephone Records).39

Ex. 11 (Walker Aff.) 7.

40Ex. 15 (Recording of November 12, 2009 Call to UAHuntsville Police Dispatch); Ex.

11 (Walker Aff.) 8.

41Ex. 16 (Sisco Aff.) 6.

42Ex. 16 (Sisco Aff.) 9.


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dispatched to respond to a situation involving Dr. Bishop is confirmed by the Affidavits

from thirteen different UAHuntville police officers answering specific questions posed by

Plaintiffs counsel.43

After talking with Ms. Walker, Dr. Bishop called Dr. Moriarity back. Dr.

Moriarity observed that she had calmed down considerably and that she was certainly

not suicidal.44

Dr. Bishop told Dr. Moriarity they wont let me see them and they told

me not to come up.45

She said, They act like I am going to walk in and shoot

somebody.46

Dr. Moriarity interpreted this to be just a figure of speech.47

Dr. Moriarity subsequently called Dr. Karbhari and relayed Dr. Bishops

comment: My career is over. I might as well kill myself.48

Dr. Karbhari asked if Dr.

Bishop was okay and whether Dr. Moriarity thought she would harm herself.49

Dr.

Moriarity responded, No. She is calmed down now.50

Dr. Moriarity relayed her

thoughts that Dr. Bishop was just very unhappy with the tenure process, but that she was

not going to actually harm herself.51

Dr. Moriarity did not tell Dr. Karbhari about Dr.

43Ex. 17 (Beavers Aff.); Ex. 18 (Beswick Aff.); Ex. 19 (Brady Aff.); Ex. 20 (Culp Aff.); Ex. 21

(Gailes June 21, 2013 Aff.); Ex. 22 (Holland Aff.); Ex. 23 (Jarrett Aff.); Ex. 24 (Lang Aff.);

Ex. 25 (Malcolm Aff.); Ex. 26 (McLaughlin Aff.); Ex. 27 (Sinclair Aff.); Ex. 28 (Sisco May

31, 2013 Aff.); Ex. 29 (Stolz Aff.).


45Id. 11.

46Id. 11.47

Id. 11.

48Id. 12.

49Id. 13.

50Id. 13.

51Id. 13.


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Bishops comment that the secretary acted like she was going to shoot somebody, as

she thought this was just a figure of speech.52

Dr. Karbhari was never told of Dr. Bishops call to the Presidents office or that

the UAHuntsville police had been alerted of a potentially tense meeting.53

In fact, Dr.

Karbhari never received any information suggesting that anyone was afraid of Dr. Bishop

or that she had made any threats of violence.54

Dr. Karbhari was not aware that Dr.

Bishop possessed or had access to a weapon, that she had been going to a shooting range,

or that she had a history of violence.55

Dr. Karbhari strongly disputes Plaintiffs allegation that he, along with Dr.

Williams, ran out of the back of Shelbie King Hall protected by two armed police

officers in order to flee a possible confrontation with Defendant Bishop.56

As confirmed

by Dr. Karbharis calendar, he was not even in the office at that time, but rather was at

the airport that afternoon interviewing and vetting candidates for the position of Dean of

the College of Engineering.57

The allegation is further undercut by the fact that Dr.

Bishop did not contemporaneously relay her alleged observation to Dr. Moriarity.58

More

52Ex. 13 ( Moriarity May 5, 2011 Aff.) 14.

53Ex. 11 (Walker Aff.) 9; Ex. 1 (Karbhari Aff.) 5.


55 Ex. 1 (Karbhari Aff.) 6.56

Ex. 1 (Karbhari Aff.) 7, 9.

57Ex. 1 (Karbhari Aff.) 9; Ex. 30 (UAH0010564).

58Dr. Karbhari notes his dispute of Dr. Bishops Affidavit solely to ensure that there is no

confusion in the record about what his position is. This is necessary because Plaintiffs counsel

has, in the past, sought to attribute positions to Dr. Karbhari based on the procedural requirement

that allegations must be assumed to be true. Despite the dispute over these facts, summary


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importantly for purposes of this motion, during the three month period following

November 12, 2009, Dr. Karbhari had no meetings or substantive contact with Dr.

Bishop.59

Dr. Karbhari believed that Dr. Bishop had accepted the denial of tenure and

was moving on with her career by looking for employment elsewhere.60

Likewise, the

Presidents office had no memorable interactions with her after November 12, 2009.61

Even after the shooting, on February 15, 2010, a criminal background check was

performed on Dr. Bishop. It showed no criminal history.62

LEGAL ARGUMENT AND CITATIONS TO AUTHORITY

I. DR. KARBHARI HAD NO DUTY UNDER ALABAMA LAW TO PROTECT THEDECEDENTS FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF DR.BISHOP.

To survive summary judgment, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Dr. Karbhari had

a legal duty to protect the Decedents from Dr. Bishop.63

The general rule in Alabama is

that no such duty exists except in the most extraordinary and highly unusual

judgment of the claims against Dr. Karbhari does not depend on a resolution of this factual

dispute.



61 Ex. 9 (Mandel Aff. 11); Ex. 11 (Walker Aff.) 10.62

Ex. 16 (Sisco Aff.) 2-3.

63[T]he existence of a duty is a question of law to be determined by the trial judge,

New Addition Club, Inc. v. Vaughn, 903 So. 2d 68, 73 (Ala. 2004)) (quoting State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co. v. Owen, 729 So. 2d 834, 839 (Ala. 1998)), and [a] negligence action cannot be

maintained without showing that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Id. at 76 (citationomitted).


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circumstances.64

To create a duty to protect, Plaintiffs must submit substantial evidence

of each of the following three elements:

(1) the particular criminal conduct must have been foreseeable;

(2) the defendant must have possessed specialized knowledge of the

criminal activity; and

(3) the criminal conduct must have been a probability.65

The undisputed evidence does not support any of these three elements.

A. Dr. Karbhari Did Not Know That Dr. Bishop Planned to Murder theDecedents.

The Alabama Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no duty to protect

unless the defendant knew of the particular criminal conduct at issue. The best example

of this requirement is Carroll v. Shoneys, Inc.,66

in whichthe Court affirmed summary

judgment on a claim brought by the representative of a murder victim who was killed by

her husband because the plaintiffs failed to present substantial evidence that the particular

criminal act of murder was foreseeable. In that case, the plaintiff presented evidence that

the defendant knew that the husband had beaten, choked, and threatened his wife the

night before the murder.67

In addition, the defendant personally witnessed the husband

64Parham v. Taylor, 402 So. 2d 884, 886 (Ala. 1981). See also, Moye v. A.G. Gaston

Motels, Inc., 499 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. 1986) (It is the general rule in Alabama that absentspecial relationships or circumstances, a person has no duty to protect another from criminal acts

of a third party.).

65New Addition Club, 903 So. 2d at 73 (quoting Carroll v. Shoneys, Inc., 775 So. 2d

753, 756 (Ala. 2000)).

66775 So. 2d 753.

67Id. at 754.


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threaten his wife the night before the murder and tell her that he was going to get her.68

The night of the murder, the victim informed the defendant that she and her husband had

been fighting and she was afraid to return to work.69

The defendant told the victim to

come into work anyway and advised that, if the husband showed up, they would call the

police.70

Despite these facts, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the defendant had no

duty to protect the victim from the criminal acts of her husband, reasoning that the

particular criminal conduct which occurredmurderwas not foreseeable.71

The

Alabama Supreme Court held that:

The particular criminal conduct in this case was a murder . . .

[T]here was no evidence . . . that any employee of [the

defendant] was told, or reasonably should have foreseen, that

[the husband] would enter the [defendants] restaurant and

murder his wife.72

Many other cases reinforce the requirement that the defendant know of the

particular criminal conduct.For example, in New Addition Club, Inc. v. Vaughn,73 the

plaintiff alleged that the defendant had a legal duty to protect the victim based on the

defendants knowledge that the murderer was hot tempered, had brandished a shotgun,

and had punched his girlfriend. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed judgment against

68

Id.69

Id. at 755.

70Id.

71Id. at 756-57.

72Id.

73903 So. 2d 68, 75 (Ala. 2004).


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the defendant based on its finding that he did not have a legal duty to protect the victim

because the defendant did not know the criminal would commit the specific act of

murder.74

Likewise, in Wilder v. Sigma Nu Fraternity, Inc.,75

the plaintiff sought to create a

legal duty based on the defendants knowledge that the criminal was extremely hostile,

had already engaged in one fight on the premises, possessed a knife, and was making

death threats towards guests of a party. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument and

affirmed summary judgment, holding that the facts surrounding the fraternity members

knowledge of the dangerousness of the situation do not indicate that they were aware of

the probability of the specific harm that befell [plaintiff].76

In light of the clear holdings of Carroll, New Addition, and Wilder, it is self-

evident that Dr. Karbhari had no legal duty to protect the Decedents. No one ever told Dr.

Karbhari that Dr. Bishop planned to murder the Decedents.77

In fact, the evidence against

Dr. Karbhari pales in comparison to the evidence offered and rejected in Carroll, New

Addition Club,andWilder. Dr. Karbharihad no knowledge that Dr. Bishop had a history

74Id. at 76 ([N]othing suggests that the Club knew, or had reason to know, that

Crenshaw would kill Mary. The particular criminal activity, not just any criminal activity, must

be foreseeable.) (quoting Ex parte S. Baldwin Regl Med. Ctr., 785 So. 2d 368, 370 (Ala.

2000)).75

390 Fed. Appx. 910 (11th Cir. 2010).

76Id. at 913.

77Ex. 1 (Karbhari Aff.) 6; Am. Compls. at 6 (Had Defendant Karbhari followed life-

safety and other mandatory regulations as required, the sworn officers in the UAH police force,

who have direct access to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), would have in theproper course investigated Bishop and discovered her prior criminal record of violence . . . .).


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of violence.78

Dr. Karbhari had no knowledge that Dr. Bishop had threatened violence

against anyone.79

Dr. Karbhari had no knowledge that Dr. Bishop possessed a weapon.80

In fact, Plaintiffs allegations are based solely on the purported testimony of Dr.

Bishop. Even assuming that her testimony were admissible and true, which it certainly is

not, it would only prove that Dr. Bishop told Dr. Karbhari that she was suicidal months

before the shooting and that Dr. Karbhari, along with Dr. Williams, hurriedly left Shelbie

King Hall on the day Dr. Bishop wanted to meet about her tenure denial. With regard to

Dr. Karbharis alleged knowledge that Dr. Bishop was suicidal, as explained by Dr.

Moriaritys testimony, Dr. Bishop had a dramatic personality and made such

statements just to garner some sympathy.81

Based on this, and in conjunction with Dr.

Moriaritys assurance that Dr. Bishop did not plan to harm herself, there would have been

no reason to respond to this information.

Likewise, Dr. Karbharis alleged departure from Shelbie King Hall would not

provide any supporting evidence to create a duty. Even if you ignore all of the

contradictory evidence to Dr. Bishops testimony, it would only suggest that Dr. Karbhari

exited the building because he was afraid of Dr. Bishop. As Dr. Bishop never made any

threats to Dr. Karbhari, never made any threats to Dr. Williamss staff, and never even

showed up for the meeting, what could Dr. Karbhari have done in response? Even with


79Id.

80Id.

81Ex. 13 (Moriarity Aff.) 8.


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such information, the particular criminal conduct which occurredmurderwas not

foreseeable.

There is not a single piece of evidence that would suggest that Dr. Karbhari was

ever told or had any reason to suspect that Dr. Bishop might harm the Decedents in any

way. Even if you assume that on November 12, 2009, Dr. Karbhari, Dr. Williams, and

their staff were afraid of Dr. Bishop, that would not allow them to foresee that Dr. Bishop

would murder the Decedents on February 12, 2010. Indeed, such a conclusion would

have been completely irrational given their support of Dr. Bishop receiving tenure. How

could anyone foresee that Dr. Bishop would murder the three people who actually voted

in support of her receiving tenure?

B. Dr. Karbhari Did Not Have Specialized Knowledge That Dr. BishopPlanned to Murder the Decedents.

Plaintiffs also fail to establish a legal duty to protect the Decedents because they

have presented no evidence that Dr. Karbhari had specialized knowledge about Dr.

Bishop. Despite all of the records produced in this case, including the E-mail of Dr.

Karbhari, Dr. Bishops personnel file, and all of the documents relating to her denial of

tenure and the subsequent appeal, there is not a single document that suggests that Dr.

Karbhari received any warning that Dr. Bishop planned to murder her colleagues.

Moreover, there is nothing to suggest that Dr. Karbhari had enough personal

interaction to become privy to some specialized knowledge about her. Unlike the

Decedents, who worked closely with Dr. Bishop and supported her receiving tenure, Dr.


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Karbhari only had limited contact with her.82

None of his interactions with Dr. Bishop

ever provided him any clues that Dr. Bishop planned to commit this heinous crime.83

Therefore, under Alabama law, he had no duty to protect.

C. Dr. Karbhari Possessed No Information That Dr. Bishop Posed anImminent Probability of Harm to the Decedents.

The third prong of establishing a legal duty to protect is proving that the murder

must have been a probability. The Alabama Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there

is no legal duty to protect unless a defendant possesses knowledge that there is an

imminent probability of harm to the victim.

84

The evidence in this case demonstrates that Dr. Karbhari had no knowledge that

would suggest that there was an imminent probability of harm to the Decedents on

February 12, 2010. Even assuming Dr. Bishops purported testimony to be true, Dr.

Karbhari would have only possessed knowledge that Dr. Bishop was upset and claimed to

be suicidal three months prior to the shooting.

Plaintiffs lack of evidence is fully elucidated by examining a couple of cases that

have found that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find an imminent probability of


83Id. 12-14.

84 See Hail v. Regency Terrace Owners Assn, 782 So. 2d 1271, 1274-75 (Ala. 1999)

(stating that the Alabama Supreme Court has rarely held that the danger to an invitee posed by

the potential criminal act of a third person was so imminent that the premises owner should haveforeseen the eventual consequence); Finley v. Patterson, 705 So. 2d 826, 829 (Ala. 1997)

(holding that the special-circumstances exception arises only in the rare case when the person

knows or has reason to know that acts are occurring or are about to occur on the premises thatpose imminent probability of harm to an invitee); Webster v. Churchs Fried Chicken, Inc. 575

So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Ala. 1991) (citing the well-established rule that plaintiffs must prove that

there was an imminent probability of harm); Bailey v. Brunos, Inc., 561 So. 2d 509, 511 (Ala.1990) (same);Henley v. Pizitz Realty Co., 456 So. 2d 272, 277 (Ala. 1984) (same).


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harm: Nail v. Jefferson County Truck Growers Association, Inc.85

andWhataburger, Inc.

v. Rockwell.86

Although subsequent decisions have recognized that these two cases have

been overruled or significantly narrowed because they were decided under the scintilla

rule,87

they do demonstrate the lack of evidence against Dr. Karbhari.

InNail, the defendant was aware that the feud between the criminal and the victim

was escalating in the weeks before the shootout, the criminal told the defendant within

a week of the shooting about the increasing tension, the victims mother warned the

defendant just four days before the shooting that the criminal had threatened her son, and

just three days before the shooting the defendant hired a security guard because of the

potential for violence between the criminal and the victim.88

Likewise, in Whataburger,

in the moments leading up to the criminals attack on the plaintiff, he actually requested

several times that the defendant call the police, but the defendant failed to do so and,

instead, instructed the group to take it outside.89

Without question, the allegations from Dr. Bishop that Dr. Karbhari had some

information about her mental health three months before the shooting falls woefully short

of the type of information that creates an imminent probability of harm. As there is no

85542 So. 2d 1208 (Ala. 1988).

86706 So. 2d 1220 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997).

87 The Alabama Supreme Court recognized in Finley, 705 So. 2d at 829 n.3, thatNail wasdecided under the scintilla rule which had since been abandoned by statute. With regard toWhataburger, the Eleventh Circuit recently stated: we are doubtful about the viability of its

assertion that debatable questions of foreseeability, and thus duty, are reserved for the jury in

light of more recent Alabama case law. Wilder, 390 Fed. Appx. at 912.

88Nail, 542 So. 2d at 1211-1213.

89Whataburger, 706 So. 2d at 1222.


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evidence of any escalation in Dr. Bishops conduct in the three months leading up to the

shooting, there is not even a scintilla of evidence of an imminent probability of harm in

this case.

Because Dr. Karbhari had no duty to protect the Decedents against the criminal

acts of Dr. Bishop, summary judgment is due to be granted.

II. DR.KARBHARI IS ENTITLED TO STATE-AGENT IMMUNITY.Under the Cranman doctrine of State-agent immunity, [a] State agent shall be

immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the

basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agents . . . exercising his or her

judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government.90

Thus, State-

agent immunity protects state employees, as agents of the State, in the exercise of their

judgment in executing their work responsibilities.91

Plaintiffs allege that, [a]s Provost, Defendant Karbhari was responsible for

reviewing and evaluating the recommendations regarding tenure and was or should

have been well informed of Bishops mental instability, harassment of and threats toward

herself and others, if for no other reason than by the tenure evaluation process.92

Plaintiffs further allege that Dr. Karbhari was negligent, by, . . . using his own judgment

and discretion . . . by not reporting Bishops condition.93

90Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000) (emphasis in original).

91Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d 117, 122 (Ala. 2002).

92Am. Compls. 30.

93Id. 42.


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Plaintiffs claims against Dr. Karbhari clearly arise from his exercise of judgment

in executing his responsibilities as Provost of UAHuntsville. Therefore, the burden then

shifts to the plaintiff to show that the State agent acted willfully, maliciously,

fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority.94

Given the law in Alabama on the legal duty to protect against the criminal acts of a

third party, it is a legal impossibility for a state agent to act willfully, maliciously,

fraudulently, in bad faith, or beyond his or her authority95

by merely failing to predict

that a third party will commit a criminal act. Stated differently, the negligent failure to

foresee a future crime is not an intentional act. Thus, to satisfy their burden, Plaintiffs

must prove that Dr. Karbhari actually knew of Dr. Bishops plan and then intentionally

stood by as she committed the act of murder.96

There is not a shred of evidence

suggesting that anyone other than Dr. Bishop knew of her evil plan.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs attempt to shift the focus away from the murder and point

instead to the alleged failure to follow the UAHuntsville Emergency Procedures

Handbook three months before the murder. But, this alleged failure is completely

94Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006).

95Id.

96Allegations of negligence are not sufficient to remove the immunity the City is

provided for [an officer's] performance of a discretionary function. City of Birmingham v.Sutherland, 834 So. 2d 755, 762 (Ala. 2002) (holding police officers conduct satisfied the

Cranman standard of State-agent immunity because he was exercising discretion in effecting a

warrantless arrest and, hence, the city could not be held liable; the plaintiff failed to specificallyallege, or to present any evidence tending to prove, that Officer Wooten's actions were taken in

bad faith, or that his conduct was willful or malicious. The gist of the allegations made by

Sutherland was that Officer Wooten negligently had exceeded his authority in effecting thearrest.) (citingEx parte City of Montgomery, 758 So. 2d 565, 570 (Ala. 1999)).


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divorced from the actual cause of the Decedents death. Yet, even if this Court were to

assume that the Decedents were somehow injured on November 12, 2009, Plaintiffs still

cannot meet their burden of proving that Dr. Karbhari acted beyond his authority.

A. The Emergency Procedures Handbook Did Not Impose MandatoryDuties on Dr. Karbhari.

Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Karbhari acted beyond his authority by failing to diagnose

that Dr. Bishop was experiencing a severe psychological crisis and then failing to report

that observation to the police as recommended in the UAHuntsville Emergency

Procedures Handbook. The Alabama Supreme Court has found that a state-agents failure

to comply with a checklist of detailed rules that do not require the exercise of discretion

can provide substantial evidence that the agent acted beyond his authority and, thus, was

not entitled to immunity.97

On the other hand, the Alabama Supreme Court has held that

failures to follow general policies and procedures are protected by state-agent immunity.

An examination of these cases and the Handbook demonstrates that Plaintiffs argument

fails as a matter of law.

In Ex parte Kennedy,98

the Court held that a training manual provided to law

enforcement tactical officers did not constitute a detailed set of rules or regulations

capable of demonstrating that state agents acted the beyond their authority. The plaintiff

alleged that during a standoff with plaintiffs decedent, the defendants violated rules and

97A State agent acts beyond authority and is therefore not immune when he or she

fail[s] to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a

checklist. Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala. 2003) (quotingEx parte Butts,

775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).

98992 So. 2d 1276 (Ala. 2008).


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checklist, that imposed duties to be discharged by the

defendant officers. The manual, itself, can best be described

as a teaching tool for law-enforcement officers in dealing

with disabled persons.103

In contrast, the Alabama Supreme Courts decision in Giambrone v. Douglas104

is

a case involving a mandatory set of explicit rules that governed how the defendant was to

perform his specific job functions. In Giambrone, the athletic director of a high school

explicitly instructed the defendant wrestling coach to follow a detailed set of rules in the

performance of his coaching duties.105

The coach violated two of those rules: one rule

prohibited the use of illegal headlocks (explicitly defined in the rule), and the other

prohibited the coach from arranging competitions between individuals whose physical

abilities are widely disparate.106

The plaintiff-student was injured when the coach, 29

years old and weighing approximately 200 pounds, performed an illegal headlock while

engaged in a full-speed wrestling match with the student, who was 15 years old and

weighed approximately 130 pounds. The Court held that these were detailed rules or

regulations that removed the coachs judgment in determining whether he should

perform an illegal move during a full speed challenge match with his student, who was

14 years younger and weighed approximately 70 pounds less.107

103Id. (internal citation omitted).

104874 So. 2d 1046.

105Id. at 1053-54.

106Id. at 1054.

107Id. at 1055.


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Unlike the mandatory rules considered in Giambrone, the Emergency Procedures

Handbook does not dictate how Dr. Karbhari is to perform his duties as Provost of

UAHuntsville. Rather, like the how-to training manuals analyzed in Kennedy andCity

of Montgomery, the Handbook merely provides general safety guidelines and suggestions

to the entire UAHuntsville community on what to do in various emergency situations.

UAHuntsville faculty, staff and students are merely encouraged to become familiar

with the Handbooks provisions. For example, in the event of a fire on campus the

Handbook recommends to [c]ontain the fire by closing doors and windows.108

Certainly, Plaintiffs cannot seriously contend that UAHuntsville personnel should be held

liable for acting beyond authority if, for example, he or she decided to exit a burning

building rather than attempt to close the doors and windows. The same is true in this case.

B. The Psychological Crisis Section Required Dr. Karbhari to ExerciseJudgment and Discretion Before Reporting Dr. Bishop to the Police.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the Emergency Procedures Handbook contains

rules or regulations that impose duties on UAHuntsville personnel, the Psychological

Crisis page would have required Dr. Karbhari to exercise his personal judgment and

discretion in making a subjective assessment of Dr. Bishops mental state. The Alabama

Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that such rules and regulationswhich

still require a state official to exercise personal judgment and discretionare not the type

of detailed rules or regulations, such as those stated on a checklist, capable of

triggering the beyond authority exception to State-agent immunity.

108Ex. 31 (EPH000001 EPH000022) at 14.


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In Ex parte Randall,109

the defendant was employed as a licensing consultant for

the Department of Human Resources (DHR) and was charged with evaluating home-

day-care providers to ensure they were in compliance with DHRs minimum standards.

One such minimum standard required that [n]o medication . . . shall be administered

without a written, signed authorization form from the childs parent(s)/guardian(s).110

The defendant discovered during her review of the day cares records that there were no

medical authorization forms on file.111

However, after being falsely assured by the day

care that it was not administering medication to children in its care and was in

compliance with the minimum standard, rather than concluding that the day care was in

violation, the defendant indicated on the licensing-evaluation checklist that the medical

authorization requirement was not applicable.112

The plaintiffs child later died due to

an overdose of cough suppressant administered by the day care. The plaintiffs alleged

that the defendant acted beyond her authority by improperly completing the licensing-

evaluation checklist. The Court disagreed, reasoning that the defendant:

did not erroneously report an objective fact, such as whether a

swimming pool was enclosed by a fence . . . A good case has

been made that [the defendant] exercised poor judgment in

the discharge of duties imposed upon her by statute.

However, these circumstances are insufficient to deprive her

of State-agent immunity underCranman.113

109971 So. 2d 652 (Ala. 2007).

110Id. at 654.

111Id. at 663.

112Id.

113Id. at 664.


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Similarly, in Ex parte Blankenship114

the Alabama Supreme Court held that an

Elmore County Board of Education policy requiring that a student must be present at

school the entire day in order to participate in extracurricular activities that day did not

remove the defendants authority and discretion to allow non-school members to

participate in band activities.115

In Blankenship, the parents of a minor brought suit

against a high schools band director and principal after their 13-year-old daughter was

statutorily raped by a 19-year-old man. Both were members of the same marching band at

a public high school in Elmore County, although neither attended the high school. The

parents alleged that the defendants acted beyond their authority by allowing the 19-year-

old to participate in band activities when he was not a student at the high school. The

Court disagreed, reasoning that:

[T]he policy C.S. relies on does not limit the discretion of a

principal and a band director in allowing students who do not

attend their high school or nonstudents to participate in

extracurricular activities of that school. . . .

One with 20/20 hindsight might question the wisdom of

Blankenship and Fryers decision to allow a person they

thought was a student from a private school outside Elmore

County to participate in the band activities and the wisdom of

their failing to verify that he was a student at the private

school he claimed to attend. State-agent immunity protects

agents of the State in their exercise of discretion in educating

students. We will not second-guess their decisions.116

114806 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. 2000).

115Id. at 1189.

116Id. at 1189. See also Ex parte Spivey, 46 So. 2d 322, 327, 333 (Ala. 2002) (explicit

command in faculty handbook requiring that all safety hazards should be removed or reported .

. . immediately was not the type of detailed rule[] or regulation[] that would remove a State

agents judgment in the performance of required acts; defendant was still required to exercise


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In addition, and directly contrary to Plaintiffs contention that Dr. Karbhari acted

beyond his authority,Howard v. City of Atmore117

found that an agency rule requiring an

assessment of a persons mental condition was legally incapable of triggering the beyond

authority exception. In Howard, the plaintiff argued that the defendant jailer acted

beyond authority by failing to comply with a police department rule requiring jailers to

[m]ak[e] checks of intoxicated persons, drug addicts, physical and mental health risks

and suicidal risks every thirty minutes.118

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was

aware of information that should have alerted him that the plaintiffs decedent was a

suicide risk.119

The Court disagreed, reasoning that [w]hether an inmate is a drug

addict, a physical or mental health risk, or a suicide risk must be determined on a

case-by-case basis, and necessarily requires the exercise of judgment in each case.120

Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Karbhari knew or should have known based on

information, reports, and conclusions that Bishop was severely unstable and

experiencing a psychological crisis, and therefore acted beyond his authority by failing to

his judgment in determining . . . when a safety hazard exists); Carroll v. Hammett, 744 So. 2d

906, 911-12 (Ala. 1999) (holding that statute mandating that defendant principal shall notifyappropriate law enforcement officials when any person violates local board of education policies

concerning . . . threatened physical harm to a person did not remove principals discretion after

learning of threat to plaintiff; [i]n determining whether a student has violated one of the localboard of educations policies . . ., the principal is engaged in the performance of a discretionary

function, because making that determination requires the principal to use his personaljudgment.) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis omitted).

117887 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 2003).

118Id. at 207.

119Id.

120Id. (emphasis in original).


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report Dr. Bishop to the police.121

In addition to the lack of factual support for this claim,

the actual text of the Psychological Crisis page demonstrates that Howardis applicable

and that Dr. Karbhari would have been required to use his subjective judgment and

discretion.

First, the Psychological Crisis does not state that the police must be called every

time someone even mentions suicide. Rather, it required Dr. Karbhari to determine

whether Dr. Bishop was just being dramatic or whether she was making an actual,

legitimate suicide threat. Such decisions inherently require subjective judgment. As none

of Dr. Bishops colleagues, including the Decedents, ever reported that they thought she

was suffering a psychological crisis, how could such a determination be considered

nondiscretionary? In fact, Dr. Moriarity assured Dr. Karbhari that Dr. Bishop was just

very unhappy with the tenure process, but that she was not going to actually do

anything.122

Dr. Moriarity, who knew Dr. Bishop far better than Dr. Karbhari, believed

that this statement by Dr. Bishop was merely consistent with her dramatic personality.123

Second, Plaintiffs allege that, university personnel must notify University Police

when a faculty member is experiencing psychological crisis.124

However, under the plain

text of the Psychological Crisis page this assertion is simply incorrect. It states:

Faculty/Staff: A faculty/staff member experiencing a psychological crisis

should be directed to the nearest hospital emergency room or call their

family physician. If a faculty/staff member is experiencing a severe

121Am. Compls. 37-40.

122Ex. 13 (Moriarity Aff.) 13.

123Id. 8.

124Am. Compls. at 2.


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continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent causes, produces the injury

and without which the injury would not have occurred.127

Generally proximate cause is a question to be determined by

the trier of the fact. Even so, the question of proximate causemay be decided by a summary judgment if there is a total lack

of evidence from which the fact-finder may reasonably infer a

direct causal relation between the culpable conduct and the

resulting injury.128

In this case, there is no evidence of a direct causal link between Dr. Karbharis

alleged failure to follow the Handbook and Dr. Bishops murder of the Decedents. In an

attempt to establish some causal link, Plaintiffs allege the following with respect to

causation:

Had Defendant Karbhari performed his duties, the sworn

officers in the UAH police force, who have direct access to

the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), would

have readily discovered Bishops prior criminal record of

violence in the exercise of its responsibilities, confirmed her

dangerous instability, and uncovered lies in her employment

application to UAH.129

Yet, discovery has demonstrated that Plaintiffs theory of causation is incorrect because

such a search would not have revealed any criminal history for Dr. Bishop. Thus, the sole

cause of the Decedents death was Dr. Bishop.

CONCLUSION

Dr. Karbhari respectfully requests this Court grant summary judgment on the

claims against him because (1) he was under no duty to protect the Decedents from the

127Byrd v. Commercial Credit Corp., 675 So. 2d 392, 393 (Ala. 1996).

128Gooden v. City of Talladega, 966 So. 2d 232, 23940 (Ala. 2007) (internal quotations

and citations omitted).

129Am. Compls. 43.


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criminal acts of Dr. Bishop; (2) Dr. Karbhari is entitled to State-agent immunity; and (3)

he was not the proximate cause of the Decedents deaths.

Respectfully submitted on the 26th

day of June, 2013.

/s/Jay M. Ezelle

Randal H. Sellers (ASB-3398-E56R)

Jay M. Ezelle (ASB-4744-Z72J)

Stephen A. Sistrunk (ASB-4229-E63S)

STARNES DAVIS FLORIE LLP100 Brookwood Place

Seventh Floor

Birmingham, AL 35209

(205) 868-6000 (Telephone)

(205) 868-6099 (Facsimile)

E-mail: [email protected]

[email protected]

[email protected]


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 26, 2013, I electronically filed the foregoing with the

Clerk of the Court using the Ala-File system and have also served a copy of the foregoing

by U.S. Mail to the following:

Sam Ingram, Esquire

Brian Mosholder, Esquire

CARPENTER, INGRAM &

MOSHOLDER, LLP

303 Sterling Centre

4121 Carmichael Road

Montgomery, AL 36106

J. Allen Brinkley, Esquire

BRINKLEY & CHESTNUT

307 Randolph Avenue

Post Office Box 2026

Huntsville, AL 35804-2026

Joe Peddy, EsquireEthan R. Dettling, Esquire

SMITH, SPIRES & PEDDY, P.C.

Suite 200, 2015 Second Avenue North

Birmingham, AL 35203

Douglas S. Fierberg, EsquirePeter C. Grenier, Esquire

BODE & GRENIER, LLP

Ninth Floor, Connecticut Building

1150 Connecticut Avenue, NW

Washington, D.C. 20036

/s/ Stephen A. Sistrunk

Stephen A. Sistrunk (ASB-4229-E63S)


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Documents

Karbhari Summary Judgment Memo