Discussion Paper

Justice, Human Rights, and the International Legal System

Independent Commission on Multilateralism

June 2016

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Introduction

TheUnitedNationsCharter,initspreamble,linksfundamentalhumanrightstothedignityandworthofthehumanpersonandtheequalrightsofmen,women,andnations.1Italsocallsonnations to establish conditions underwhich justice and respect for international law can bemaintained.Itisnotsurprising,then,thathumanrightsfeatureasoneofthethreepillarsoftheUNinitsCharter,alongwithpeaceandsecurity,anddevelopment.EffortstobetterintegrateworkonhumanrightsandtheruleoflawmoregenerallywithintheotherareasofworkoftheUNareongoing,fromcurrentpeaceandsecurityreviewstothe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopmentandthesecretary-general’s“HumanRightsupFront”initiative,exploredbelow.Immediatelyafteritsfoundingin1945,theUnitedNationsembarkeduponanormativeprocessofdefiningthefundamentalrightsandfreedomsitaimedtopromoteandguarantee.In1948,asafirststep inthatprocess,theUNGeneralAssemblyadoptedtheUniversalDeclarationofHuman Rights (UDHR).While not a legally binding instrument, it remains up to this day thecornerstoneofinternationalhumanrightslawandpavedthewayforamyriadofmoredetailedand binding instruments to come.2 In 1966, the General Assembly adopted its first twointernational human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR)andtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,Social,andCulturalRights(ICESCR).3Thus,adoptedundertheauspicesoftheUnitedNations,theUDRH,ICCPR,andICESCRformthecoreofthe“universalhumanrightssystem”—universal inthatthenormativeinstrumentsareuniversal in their scope of application and adherence is open to all states. The UDHR wasadopted by consensus, and its normative core remains uncontested and is considered to bepartofcustomaryinternationallaw.TheICCPRandICESCRareamongstthemostwidelyratifiedinternational treaties. Theyhavebeen and continue to be further built uponby a significantnumberofmoresubject-specificinstruments.ThecontentoftheUDHR,ICCPR,andICESCRhas,toalargeextent,alsoinspiredthenormativesubstanceofnationalandregionalhumanrightsinstruments.Accompanying thesenormative instruments is awide varietyof internationalmechanisms toassist stateswith implementing their legal obligations, tomonitor actual compliance, and toinvestigate andprosecute violations. They range from the establishmentof theOfficeof theHighCommissionerforHumanRights(OHCHR),totreatymonitoringbodies,totheUNHumanRightsCouncil and itsSpecialProcedures, to international criminal tribunals. Severalof thesemechanisms will be discussed below. The significant development of the human rightsframeworkandarchitectureof theUnitedNationsand its resonanceat regionalandnationallevelsarean indicationofan increasinglystrongercultureofhumanrightsaroundtheworld.1UnitedNationsCharter,Preamble:“Toreaffirmfaithinfundamentalhumanrights,inthedignityandworthofthehumanperson,intheequalrightsofmenandwomenandofnationslargeandsmall.”Fulltextavailableatwww.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/preamble/index.html.2ThetextoftheUDHRisavailableatwww.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/UDHRIndex.aspx.3Thetextofthecorehumanrightstreatiesisavailableatwww.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/UDHRIndex.aspx.Otheruniversalhumanrightsinstrumentsareavailableatwww.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UniversalHumanRightsInstruments.aspx.

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TheUNhasplayedapivotal role in fosteringglobal acceptanceand respect for anumberofuniversal and inalienable rights and freedoms and a shared commitment to hold thoseresponsible for violating these rights and freedoms accountable and bring perpetrators tojustice. Both in the multilateral system anchored in the United Nations, as well as moregenerally, human rights have come to occupy a major place on the stage of internationalrelations.Asonescholarasserts:“Nodiscussionof international lawandinternationalpoliticscan ignore the human rights movement. In some ways, we live in an age of human rightstriumphant.”4However,wearestill faraway frombeingable to take respect forhumanrights forgranted.Significantchallengesintermsofimplementationandfullcomplianceremain,aroundtheglobe.Despite thewidespread adoption, ratification, and implementation of human rights treaties,the establishment of a significant number of treaty-monitoring bodies, existing programs fortechnicalassistancewith implementation,and theestablishmentofavarietyofquasi-judicialandjudicialmechanismstodetectandaddressallegedviolationsandprevent impunity,therearestillmorestatesthat fallshortof fullyrespectinghumanrightsthantherearestatesthatfullycomply.5AsnocomponentofthemultilateralsystemanchoredintheUNotherthantheSecurityCouncilhas actual enforcement powers, the international human rights architecture is particularlyweakwhenitcomestoenforcingcomplianceandsystematicallyholdingstatesandindividualsaccountableforfailurestorespecthumanrightsandensuretheirfullenjoymentbyall.Thisalsoraisesimportantquestionsabouttheefficacyoftheinternationalhumanrightsarchitecturetoguarantee systematic access to justice when human rights are violated. While tremendousprogress has been made over the past three decades in investigating and prosecutingwidespreadandsystematichumanrightsviolations,themultilateralsystemanchoredintheUNisoftennotable topreventorhalteven thesemostegregiousofhuman rightsviolations. Inmanycases,eithergeopoliticsgetsinthewayorthedemandsforpeacetriumphoverdemandsfor human rights and justice.While the full enjoyment of human rights by all is the primaryresponsibilityofstates—requiringaseriesofmeasuresthatcanonlybetakeninthedomesticlegalorder—themultilateralsystemanchored intheUNhasaresponsibilitytoholdstatestotheirobligationsandcommitmentsunder internationalnormsthatupholdhumandignityandfundamentalrightsandfreedoms(inparticularhumanrights,humanitarian,andrefugeelaw).This paper deals with challenges related to the enforcement of human rights compliancethroughaccountabilityandjusticemechanismsintheinternationalhumanrightsarchitecture.6It focuses firston theUN’sefforts toenforce respect forhuman rights through international4LawrenceM.Friedman,TheHumanRightsCulture:AStudyinHistoryandContext(NewOrleans:QuidProBooks,2011),p.1.5InitsannualStateoftheWorldreport,AmnestyInternationalwarnedthatshort-termnationalinterestanddraconiansecuritycrackdowns led toanunprecedentedassaultonhuman rights in2015,highlighting inparticular thebrazenviolationsof therights ofmigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. Available at www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2016/02/annual-report-201516/.6 While a crucial component in the promotion of and respect for human rights worldwide, regional instruments andmechanismsarenotdealtwithinthispaper,which,inlightoftheICM’smandateandfocus,focusesonthemultilateralsystemanchoredintheUN.

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criminal justice, inparticular theroleof theSecurityCouncil. It thenexaminesalternativestointernational criminal justice for ensuring compliance with human rights, as well asaccountability and justice for violations thereof. The paper then puts forth some generalconclusions and submits specific recommendations to strengthen the multilateral system’scapacitytopromoteandensurerespectforhumanrights,aswellasaccountabilityandjusticeforviolationsthereof.

I. TheUN,InternationalCriminalJustice,andtheRoleoftheSecurityCouncilThe United Nations Charter entrusted the Security Council with the maintenance ofinternational peace and security, while the other core tasks of the organization—notablyhumanrightsanddevelopment—wereassignedtoitsotherprincipalorgans.UndertheCharter,the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is the main organ with responsibility for humanrights.Overtime,however,andinparticularsincetheendoftheColdWar,theSecurityCouncilhasincreasinglytakenontasksrelatedtohumanrights,mostnotablytoensurejusticeforthemostseriousviolationsofhumanrights:genocide,crimesagainsthumanity,andwarcrimes.7Afterusing its legislativepowersunderChapterVIIof theUNCharter toestablishtheadhocInternationalCriminalTribunalsfortheFormerYugoslavia(ICTY)andRwanda(ICTR)intheearly1990s,8statesalso conferred twokey competencieson theSecurityCouncilunder theRomeStatuteestablishingtheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC):thepowertorefersituationstotheICC (Article13) and theauthority to suspend specific investigations andprosecutions (Article16).9TheCouncil alsoplayeda central role in theestablishmentofhybrid courtsprosecutinginternationalcrimes,notablytheSpecialCourtforSierraLeone(SCSL)andtheSpecialTribunalonLebanon(STL).10The Security Council thus played a key role in the rapid development of the internationalcriminaljusticearchitecture.However,ithastakenonthisroleratherreluctantlyandonanadhocbasis—andthereisongoingskepticismwithinthecouncilastoitsroleinenforcingrespectforhumanrightsandassuringaccountabilityandjusticeforviolationsthereof.

7Foranoverviewofthedefinitionofgenocide,crimesagainsthumanity,andwarcrimesunderinternationalcriminallaw,seewww.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Crimes/Introduction.8TheICTYandICTR,respectively,wereestablishedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolutions827(1993)and955(1994).InResolution1966 (2010), the council calleduponboth tribunals to finish theirworkby theendof2014 toprepare for their closureandtransfer of responsibilities to theUNMechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT). See alsowww.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Courts/International.9RomeStatuteoftheInternationalCriminalCourt(1998),availableatwww.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf.10SeeUNSecurityCouncilResolutions1315(2000)and1664(2006).Seealsowww.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Courts/Hybrid.

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TrackRecordoftheSecurityCouncilinInternationalCriminalJusticeAdHocTribunalsUsingitspowersunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,theSecurityCouncilsetuptwoadhocinternational criminal tribunals to investigate and prosecute the most serious internationalcrimescommitted in thecontextof thearmedconflicts in the formerYugoslavia in1993andRwanda in 1994. In doing so, the council not only acted as an international legislator byadoptingthestatutesofthetwotribunals,butitalsotookonthetaskofenforcingcooperationwiththetribunalsbyobligingmemberstatestofullycooperate,includingbyarrestingindictedpersons. Yet the councilwas reluctant to fully assume the responsibilities that camewith itsenforcementrole,especiallyinthecontextoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslavia,wherethepermanentmembers’useoftheirvetopowerhamperedcouncilactionto secure the arrest of General Radovan Karadžić and former President SlobodanMilošević.Bothtribunalsarenearingcompletionoftheirwork,andwhiletheircaselawhasbeenseminalto the development of international criminal law and international humanitarian law in anumberofkeyareas,theirrecordinensuringadequateaccountabilityandjusticewilllikelybemixed.11WiththeestablishmentoftheSpecialCourtforSierraLeone,theSecurityCouncilventuredintoa hybrid model of an ad hoc tribunal, integrating domestic and international dimensions.Created in 2002, the court started its first trial in 2004, convicted former Liberian PresidentCharles Taylor for war crimes in 2012, and concluded its work in 2013. While some havecriticized the constrained timeframe,many view it as an exemplarymodel to follow.On theother hand, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, established by the council to prosecute thoseresponsibleforthekillingoflateLebanesePresidentRafiqHaririin2005,hassofarhadlimitedeffect;itofficiallybegantofunctionin2009andbeganproceedingsagainstkeydefendantsinabsentiain2014.12ApartfromtheSecurityCouncil,boththeGeneralAssemblyandthesecretary-generalcanandhave played a role in the establishment ofmixed international-national, or so-called hybrid,tribunals. For example, in 1997, the General Assembly, at the request of the Cambodiangovernment,tooktheinitiativetosetuptheExtraordinaryChambersintheCourtsofCambodia(ECCC).Thismodelhasnotbeenreplicatedsince,partlyduetothemixedsuccessoftheECCC,butalsoduetotheemergenceoftheICC.WhiletherehavebeensignificantproblemswiththeECCC,theGeneralAssemblyshouldkeepthisprecedentinmindforthefuture.13While proposals to establish ad hoc tribunals emerge every now and then, it is generallyexpectedthatboththeSecurityCouncilandotherUNorganswillbereluctanttocreatemore

11See,forinstance,LilianBarriaandStevenRoper,“HowEffectiveAreInternationalCriminalTribunals?AnAnalysisoftheICTYandICTR,”InternationalJournalofHumanRights9,no.3(2005).12BethvanSchaack,“LebanonTrialBeginsWork,”JustSecurity,January16,2014,availableonlineatwww.justsecurity.org/5827/lebanon-tribunal-begins-work/.13Foranoverviewofco-calledhybridtribunals,seewww.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Courts/Hybrid.

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tribunalsofthisnature,foravarietyofreasons:theyhaveproventobecostlyanddifficulttofinance, have taken more time than expected to finish their work, and overall have notdemonstratedthemselvestobefullyeffective.Fortheseandotherreasons,statessupportiveof the ICC will likely continue favoring referrals to the ICC where there is no possibility foradequatejusticethroughdomesticcourts.TheInternationalCriminalCourt(ICC)Asapermanent internationalcriminaltribunal,whichat leasttechnicallyhas jurisdictionoverinternationalcrimesregardlessofwheretheyhavebeencommitted,14theICCremediesmanyof the disadvantages inherent to ad hoc tribunals. While not established by or under theauspices of the Security Council, the council has a key role in the ICC system.Asmentionedabove, the council has the power to suspend specific investigations and prosecutions by thecourt(Article16)andtoreferspecificsituationstothecourt(Article13).Thecouncil’swieldingofboththesepowershasbeensubjecttocriticism.In2002,thecouncilusedArticle16oftheRomeStatutetoeffectivelydefercourtproceedingsby unanimously adopting a resolution that granted immunity from ICC prosecution to UNpeacekeepingpersonnelfromcountriesthatwerenotpartytothecourt(Resolution1422).In2003, it renewed that resolution for another twelve months (Resolution 1487). This verycontroversialdecision,whichsomeconsider tobe incompatiblewithat least thespiritof theRomeStatuteand theUNCharter,wasmade in thecontextofpossibleallegations regardingthepeacekeepingoperationinBosniaandHerzegovina.ItisinterestingtonotethatArticle16oftheRomeStatutehasneverbeenappliedtosuspendjudicialproceedingsintheinterestofpursuing peace agreements, the original purpose forwhich itwas incorporated in the RomeStatute (eventhoughtheoptionwassubmittedanddiscussedregardingsituations inUgandaandKenya).Thecouncilhasonlyuseditspowertoreferspecificsituationstothecourttwice.Itdidsoforthefirsttimein2005forthesituationinDarfur(Resolution1593),andasecondtimein2011forthesituationinLibya(Resolution1730).TheLibyareferralwasconsensual(i.e.,supportedbyallfifteencouncilmembers),whiletheDarfurreferralwassubjecttoavote,inwhichelevenstatesvotedinfavorandfourabstained(Algeria,Brazil,China,andtheUS).Whilethecouncilhasbeenaskedandevenurgedtoreferothersituationstothecourt,includingthesituationinSyria,ithaschosennottodoso.CriticismofSecurityCouncilreferralstotheICChascomefromallsides.Manyhavearguedthatthereferralsithasmade—andnotmade—arepoliticallymotivated,anargumentsupportedbythe fact that thecouncilhasbeen inconsistent inapplying its referralpower.Somehavealsoarguedthat thecouncildoesnothave thepower toenforcecooperationwith thecourtbyastatethatisnotpartytotheRomeStatute.However,mostagree,includingtheICCitself,that

14Itmaynotalwaysbeabletoexercisethatjurisdiction,dependingonwhetherthestatesconcernedarepartiestotheICCandwhethertheSecurityCouncildoesordoesnotexerciseitsreferralpower.

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ChapterVIIoftheUNCharter—underwhichtheSecurityCouncilcanmakedecisionsbindingtoallUNmemberstates—providesasolidlegalbasisforthecounciltotakesuchaction.15Moreover,where the council has referred situations to the court, it has not, or at least notalways,followeduponitsreferraldecisionbyenforcingcooperationbystateswiththecourt—in particular in the area of arrest and surrender. Rather than genuinely pursuing anaccountabilityagenda,someargue,thecouncilhaschosentorefersituationstothecourtasamatterofpoliticalexpediency—andthenneglectedtofollowuponreferraldecisionstoenforcecooperationwiththecourt.Forexample,thecouncilhasneverincludedindividualsindictedbytheICCinitssanctionslists,hasnotincludedtheissueofcooperationwiththecourtinitstermsof reference when visiting situation countries, and has refrained from issuing statementsdemandingfullcooperationbythesituationcountry,evenwhenthecourthadissuedaformalfindingofnon-cooperation(asinthecaseofLibya).16StatespartiestotheRomeStatutearealsoincreasinglycriticalofthepracticeofimposingthefinancialcostsof investigationsresulting fromcouncil referralsonthestatesthathave joinedtheRomeStatutesystem,insteadofontheUNmembershipthatthecouncilatleastformallyrepresents.Atatimewhenthecourtisincreasinglyunderfinancialpressure,referralsthatdonotresult ineffectiveprosecutions—includingdueto lackofcouncilaction—seemtoocostly,and financial pressure leads to active investigations having to be limited, as in the case ofDarfur.17Sowhilecouncilreferralswere initiallyhailedasastrongmessageofsupporttothecourt,aswellasacommitmenttoaccountabilityandjusticebytheUNSecurityCouncil,advocatesofthecourt have, over time, becomewary of such referrals and today often view them asmixedblessings for the court—a view that is increasingly shared by the court itself, as the chiefprosecutorexpressedinsomerecentstatementstotheUNSecurityCouncil.18ObstaclestotheCouncil’sEffectivenessinPursuingInternationalCriminalJusticeOne reason for the Security Council’s reluctance to ensure accountability is the complexrelationship between peace and security, on the one hand, and justice, on the other. It isgenerallyacceptedthat,withoutjustice,lastingpeaceisimpossibletoachieve.Itisequallytrue,however, that justice is very hard to achieve without peace, or at least the cessation ofhostilities with sincere efforts to negotiate and, if need be, enforce peace. Pushingaccountabilitydemandsatthewrongtimeor inthewrongwaycanbecounterproductiveforachievingbothpeaceandbetterrespect forhumanrights.While it isalsogenerallyaccepted

15SeealsoZhuWenqi,“OnCo-operationbyStatesNotPartytotheInternationalCriminalCourt,”InternationalReviewoftheRedCross88,no.861(March2006),availableatwww.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_861_wenqi.pdf.16TheProsecutorv.SaifAl-IslamGaddafi,ICC-01/11-01/11-577(Pre-TrialChamberI,December10,2014).17InternationalCriminalCourt,“TwentiethReportoftheProsecutoroftheInternationalCriminalCourttotheUNSecurityCouncilPursuanttoUNSCR1593(2005),”2015,para.12.18InternationalCriminalCourt,“Twenty-FirstReportoftheProsecutoroftheInternationalCriminalCourttotheUNSecurityCouncilPursuanttoUNSCR1593(2005),”2015.

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thatthechallengeofreconcilingtheequallylegitimategoalsofjusticeandpeaceisoftenoneoftimingandsequencing,inpracticethishasfrequentlyproventobeaverydifficulttask.The so-called “peace-justice dilemma” has existed for a long time, but the challenge itrepresents has grown in the past decade. During this time, international criminal justice hasevolved significantly, resulting in an emerging international consensus that there can be noimpunity for the most serious crimes under international law—and that amnesties orimmunities for such crimes are not acceptable. This gives additional momentum to thoseadvocatinganaccountabilityagenda,whilelimitingtheroomformaneuverformediationandnegotiation efforts, which often rely on amnesty and immunity deals to achieve politicalsolutionsabletohaltconflict.As far as the Security Council is concerned, and given its primary role of maintaininginternationalandpeacesecurity,thecouncilclearlygivesprioritytothedemandsofpeace insituationsofacutecrisis.Itseeksprimarilytoendviolenceandtopreventfurthercasualtiesbyforgingpeaceagreementsortakingmeasuresthatatleastpavethewayforspeedycessationofhostilities, often a prerequisite for holding peace talks in the first place. The human rightsdimension(bothinitspreventiveandremedialaspects)anddemandstoensureaccountabilityforcrimes thathavebeencommittedaspartofaconflictareoftenconsidered tobeatbestdemandsofsecondaryimportanceandatworstarenotconsideredatall.Apart from the inherent tensions between justice and peace, the council’s broader divisionslimititseffectivenessinwieldingitspowersrelatedtoensuringjusticeforserioushumanrightsviolations.Not allmembersof the SecurityCouncilwant it toplay a leading role in ensuringaccountability—andcertainlynotbymakinguseofitsreferralpowersundertheRomeStatute.ThreeofthepermanentmembersofthecouncilarenotpartiestotheRomeStatute,andallofthemcanatanytimevetoanyreferralproposaltheydeemundesirable.Evenwherereferralshaveprovenpossible, necessary follow-upactionhas consistently failedover lackof politicalagreementinthecouncil.ExpectationsthatastrongnumericalmajorityofICCstatespartiesonthecouncil (as in theyear2014)would lead tomoreconsistentaccountabilityworkormorepoliticalsupportforthecourthavenotbeenrealized.Skepticismamongcouncilmemberswithvetopowersthusremainsoneofthemainobstaclestoeffectiveengagementwiththecourt.The Syrian crisis can serve as an example of this dynamic, since there was substantive andreliable documentation early on that serious war crimes and human rights violations werecommittedsystematicallyandonalargescale.ThisledtocallsfromtheUNHighCommissionerfor Human Rights and others for accountability for these crimes, in particular by asking theSecurity Council to possibly make a referral to the ICC.19But many governments took apragmaticposition,wishing to safeguard theoptionofan immunityoffer toSyrianPresidentBasharal-Assadandhisinnercircleasameanstofacilitateanendtotheconflictandapeacefultransition(disregardingthefactthattheSyrianregimenevershowed interest inan immunity

19UNHumanRightsCouncil,“ReportontheWorkingGrouponEnforcedorInvoluntaryDisappearances,”UNDoc.A/HRC/27/49,August4,2014,para.32.

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offer). It thus took considerable time for governments to formally ask that the UN SecurityCouncilreferthesituationinSyriatotheICC—andafurthereighteenmonthsforthedemandtobetakenup in theSecurityCouncil. In theend, theproposedreferral failedduetovetoescastbytwoofthecouncil’spermanentmembers.20Theuseofvetopowertoblockeffortsbytheinternationalcommunitytopreventorhaltmassatrocitycrimes, includingbyensuringaccountabilityforthoseresponsibleforwidespreadandsystematic human rights violations, has been the subject of serious criticism. Efforts toelaborateacodeofconductontheuseofthevetoinsituationswheremassatrocitiesoccur,21whichwouldalsoentailacommitmentnot toblock ICCaction,are important toaddress thisproblem. These efforts, however, are still in relatively early stages and, if ever realized,maytakealongtimetohavefulleffect.

II. BeyondInternationalCriminalJustice:ComplementaryMechanisms

TheICCcurrentlyhasjurisdictioninthe124statesthathaveratifiedtheRomeStatute.22Inallothercountries,whenstatesthemselvesfailtoinvestigateandprosecuteinternationalcrimesthrough national proceedings, only the Security Council has the power to ensure access tojustice,viathecreationofadhoctribunalsorthroughreferralstotheICC.23Asdiscussedabove,however, the council is often divided on whether to pursue such action, and permanentmembersinparticulararenotkeentoimposeinternationaljusticemechanismsonstatestheyconsider political allies. For the ICC itself, referrals by the Security Council can be highlyproblematic, as theCouncil has showna lackofwillingness toenforce the state cooperationnecessarytoconducteffectiveinvestigations.Nevertheless,theneedtoprevent impunityfor internationalcrimes—and,consequently,callsfor accountability—will continue and is likely to increase over time. Themultilateral systemanchoredintheUNcanandshouldcontinuetoplayapredominantroleinheedingthosecalls.It is therefore important to consider other options than establishing ad hoc internationaltribunalsorreferralstotheICCbytheSecurityCouncil,inparticularasthesemaywellcontinuebeingtheexceptiontotheruleinthefuture.

20“Russia,ChinaBlockSecurityCouncilReferralofSyriatoInternationalCriminalCourt,”UNNewsCentre,May22,2014,availableatwww.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47860#.VafNEvlVhHw.21TheseeffortsincludeaFrenchinitiative,theAccountability,CoherenceandTransparencyGroup(ACT)initiative,andareformproposalbytheElders.Foragoodsummary,seeSecurityCouncilReport,“TheVeto,”October19,2015,availableatwww.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_3_the_veto_2015.pdf.22 An up-to-date list of states parties is available in the UN Treaty Database, available athttps://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en.23ThisiswithinthemultilateralsystemanchoredintheUnitedNations.Thereare,ofcourse,otherbodiesthatcanplaythisroleinregionalhumanrightssystem,suchastheAfricanCourtonHumanandPeoples’Rights,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,ortheInter-AmericanCourtofHumanRights.

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DomesticCriminalJusticeandthePrincipleofComplementarityTheRomeStatuteoftheICCisbasedontheprincipleofcomplementarity,wherebystateshavethe primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute the most serious crimes underinternational law. The court was set up as a reserve option to prosecute the most seriousinternationalcrimeswhenstatesareunwillingorunabletodoso.ThisessentialfeatureoftheICC—based also on lessons learned from the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia andRwanda—hasbeen largelyneglectedbytheSecurityCouncil.Byactivelyseekingtomaketheprincipleofcomplementarityworkasenvisaged in theRomeStatute, thecouncil couldshowcommitment to fighting impunity for serious human rights violations. It could also openopportunities to strengthen domestic capacity to ensure respect for human rights,accountability, and justice and other interesting alternatives to setting up new tribunals orreferringsituationstotheICC.Rather than going through new tribunals or the ICC—with all the political and financialimplications they entail—the council could systematically express concern over particularhumanrightsviolationsandurgestateswithjurisdictionoverthesecrimestoconductimpartialandeffective investigations,withaviewtobringingperpetratorsto justice.Wherenecessary,thesedomesticinvestigationscouldreceiveinternationalsupport(financialortechnicalsupportor active judicial cooperation by UNmember states). Progress on efforts made by affectedstates to investigate and prosecute serious human rights violations could be included inreportingtothecouncil,whichwouldallowforeffectivefollow-upwherenecessary.Wherestatesarereluctantorunwillingtoasserttheirjurisdictionoverseriousandwidespreadhuman rights violations, the council could consider setting deadlines and indicating that itwouldconsidertheoptionofreferringthesituationtothe ICC if itwasnotsatisfiedwiththeresponsefromthestatesinquestion.Itcouldthususethethreatofreferraltoenforceeffectivemeasures toprevent furtherhumanrightsabuses,aswellas toensureperpetratorsareheldaccountable andbrought to justice. Inmany situations, such strategicuseof theprincipleofcomplementarity—and the requirement that states live up to their primary responsibility toinvestigate and prosecute international crimes—would not only promote greater nationalownershipofjusticeandaccountabilityprocesses(theveryraisond’êtreoftheinclusionofthisprinciple in theRomeStatute)but couldalso lead tomore timely, sustainable,andculturallyappropriatesolutions.For domestic jurisdictions to be able to carry often significant caseloads of criminalinvestigations into andprosecutionsof serious andwidespreadhuman rights violations, theymust not only be willing but also able to do so. International technical assistance to builddomestic jurisdictions’ capacity to handle these caseloads will, in many cases, be of crucialimportanceforsuccess.Measurestostrengthennationallawenforcementandjudicialsystemsand toenable them to carryout effective investigations andprosecutionsdonotnecessarilyrequire an intergovernmental mandate or even involvement from the Security Council or

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GeneralAssembly;theycanbeandarepartoftechnicalassistanceprogramsofferedbyvariouspartsoftheUNsystem(aswellasbymanyotherrelevantactors).24In some cases, host governmentsmay prefer this option, as it is not only in line with theirprimary responsibility andensuresnational ownershipbut also gives themmore control andexposesthemlesstoscrutinyfromintergovernmentalbodies.Nevertheless,asignificantlevelof transparency will be required in any case, as the funding of such technical assistanceprograms can quickly become costly, and donor countries will only want to contributefinancially if they have faith in the quality of the program and the political will of the stateinvolved.HybridCriminalJusticeModelsDomesticcriminaljusticemechanismsmay,however,notalwaysbeavailable,andeveniftheyare, theymay not be functional or compliant with international human rights standards forcriminalinvestigationsandprosecutions.Wherethisisthecase,andwherethereisnottimetowaitforlong-termcapacitybuildingtobecomplete,theinternationalcommunityhasresortedtoso-calledhybridcourtsortribunals,partlynationalandpartly international innature.Suchcourtsor tribunalsusuallyhave jurisdictionover serious crimesunderboth international andnational lawandaregenerallystaffedbyamixof localand international judges,prosecutors,andother staff. Thesehybridmodelsallow the international systemtoplaya significant rolewhileatthesametimeinvestinginlocalcapacitybuilding.While suchhybridmodelsarenotalwayseasy to replicate, as theyneed tobebasedon thespecific context, culture, and priorities of the state concerned, creativemodels are possible.ExamplesincludetheSpecialPanelsoftheDiliDistrictCourtinTimor-Leste,theExtraordinaryChambers in the Courts of Cambodia, theWar Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia andHerzegovina, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, and,mostrecently, theSpecialCriminalCourt intheCentralAfricanRepublic. Itwouldbe interestingtodrawupontheirrespectivesuccessesandfailurestoestablishlessonslearnedtobuildoninthefuture.Non-judicialMechanismsTargetedSanctionsforHumanRightsViolationsOvertime,somenon-judicialapproaches,suchaseconomicsanctionsagainstcountriesthatareresponsible for international crimes or fail to prevent impunity for such crimes, have beenexploredandtested,butingeneraltheyhaveproventocausedisproportionateharmtolittle

24At times, such support can be institutionalized, as was the case with the establishment of the International CommissionagainstImpunityinGuatemala,anindependentinternationalbodysetupthroughabilateralagreementbetweentheUNandGuatemalatosupportthedomesticcriminaljusticesystemininvestigatingandprosecutingserioushumanrightsviolations.Seewww.cicig.org/index.php?page=mandate.

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avail.25In light of this, the Security Council has also experimented with so-called targetedsanctions—alsoquestionablyreferredtoas“smartsanctions”—aimeddirectlyateliteinterestsand specific individuals responsible, either directly or indirectly, for committing internationalcrimesorofferingsafehavenstoallegedperpetratorsofsuchcrimes.TheSecurityCouncilhasadopted,overtime,threecategoriesofsuchsanctions:thosetargetedat individuals, at specific commodities, and at particular regions in a country. In thehopeoflimitingnegativeside-effectsonthefullenjoymentofhumanrightsandonhumanitariananddevelopmentwork,allUNsanctionstodayare"targeted,"butnotallsucceedinavoidingtheseunintended consequences. “Smart” sanctions, which directly target specific individuals, raisethemostconcernsandcriticism, includingbecausetheycancreateserious issues forpersonswhohavethemisfortuneofsharingthesamenameastheindividualstargeted.Moreover, while the implementation of targeted sanctions is a relatively recent approach,26theiruse in several contextshasprovidedenoughevidence todemonstrate that theycanbeeffective but that caution is warranted when implementing them in support of peace. Thisevidenceindicatesthat“targetedsanctionshaveunintendedconsequences,includingincreasesin corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, burdens on neighboringstates,strengtheningofpoliticalfactions,resourcediversion,andhumanitarianimpacts.”27TheHumanRightsCouncilandItsSpecialProceduresWhilemanyofthemechanismsexploredinthispapertoensureaccountabilityforhumanrightsviolationsdealwith the responsibility of individuals, it isworth recalling that states bear theprimaryresponsibilityforensuringandwherenecessaryenforcingprotectionofhumanrightsand, as such, must also be held accountable for failure to respect their obligations underinternational law.TheHumanRightsCouncil, a subsidiarybodyof theUNGeneralAssembly,playsanimportantroleinthisregard.The establishment of the Human Rights Council in 2006—to replace the Human RightsCommission,asubsidiarybodyofECOSOC—isitselfanexampleofmultilateralreformaimedatincreasing state compliance with international human rights law and accountability forviolations thereof.28TheHuman Rights Commissionwas criticized as not only ineffective butalsooverlypoliticalinitsinvestigationsandreportsandselectiveinitsexaminationofcountrysituations.TheHumanRightsCouncilwasdesignedtocorrectthisbyhavingahigherbarfortheelection of its membership, ensuring that its methods would be “transparent, fair, and

25UNEconomicandSocialCouncil,“TheBossuytReport:TheAdverseConsequencesofEconomicSanctions,”UNDoc.E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33,June21,2000.26GlobalPolicyForum,“TargetedSanctions,”availableatwww.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/sanctions/targeted-sanctions-new-tools-new-challenges.html.27TargetedSanctionsConsortium,“TheEffectivenessOfUnitedNationsTargetedSanctions,”November2013,availableathttp://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/internationalgovernance/shared/Effectiveness%20of%20UN%20Targeted%20Sanctions%20-%206.Nov.2013%20.pdf.28Forashortoverview,seeSecurityCouncilReport,TheSecurityCouncilandHumanRights:AnEvolvingRole,January2016,pp.3–4.

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impartial,” and establishing a mechanism for periodic review of all UN member states’compliancewiththeirinternationalhumanrightsobligationsandcommitments.29The Human Rights Council’s founding resolution established a new procedure named theUniversalPeriodicReview(UPR).Itscreationaimedtobroadenthenewbody’sfocustoincludeall UNmember states and ensure equal treatment in the way each country’s human rightsrecord is assessed. It also allowed the council to counter some of the criticism that itspredecessor was politically motivated in selecting which countries would have their humanrightsrecordscrutinizedbytheinternationalcommunity.TheUPRisacontinuousprocess;thecouncilreviewsthehumanrightsrecordofatleastforty-eightUNmemberstateseachyearsothat all member states are reviewed every four years. The process stipulates that memberstatessittingontheHumanRightsCouncilarereviewedduringtheir termofmembership—ameasurethataimstoaddresstheperceivedhypocrisyofknownhumanrightsviolatorswinningelectiontothecouncil.Threereportsserveasthebasisofeachreview:areportfromthestateitself on achievements and challenges; information from independent human rights experts,treatybodies,andUNentities;andreportsfromNGOsandothernationalstakeholdersinthestateunder review.Whilemanyof theexchanges in theUPR remainquite “diplomatic,”andsomeresultingrecommendationsaremoremeaningful thanothers, ithaseffectivelybecomean important “springboard for follow-up action by non-governmental organizations,governments,andtheUNitself.”30Fact-FindingMechanismsandCommissionsofInquirySince the beginning of the 1990s, fact-findingmechanisms and commissions of inquiry havebecomeincreasinglypartoftheinternationalcommunity’s“toolbox”torespondtoallegationsof serious and widespread violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.International organizations, including the UN—under the auspices of the Security Council,Human Rights Council, General Assembly, and Office of the Secretary-General—haveestablished commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, independent panels of experts,monitoringcomponentsofpeaceoperations,andspecialrapporteursorrepresentatives.Thesearealltasked—albeitwithvaryingmandatesandpowers—withmonitoringand/orinvestigatingallegedviolationsofinternationalhumanrightsandhumanitarianlaw,thusofferingsomesortofaccountabilityandsometimespavingthewayforcriminaljusticeatalaterstage.MechanismsofthisnaturecreatedbytheSecurityCouncilhavebeencriticizedfortheirisolatedapproach,oftenignoringthemainhumanrightsactorsontheground,suchastheUNOfficeofthe High Commissioner for Human Rights or international and national human rights NGOs,whencollectingevidenceofviolations.Theyhavebeencriticizedlessforduplicatingtheworkofthese other actors than for compiling incomplete facts and evidence due to their shortmandatesandlimitedpresenceinthefield.BetterinteractionwiththebroaderUNsystemand

29UNGeneralAssemblyResolution60/251(April3,2006),UNDoc.A/RES/60/251,OP12;AndrewClapham,HumanRights:AVeryShortIntroduction(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015),pp.72–75.30Ibid,p.76.

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other human rights actors on the ground could qualitatively and quantitatively improve theoutcomeoftheseSecurityCouncilinitiatives.TheHumanRightsCouncilhasinrecentyearsalsocreatedanumberofcommissionsofinquiryforsituationsinvolvingwidespreadandseriousviolationsofhumanrights.Thesecommissionshavedoneimportantwork,albeitwithcertainlimitations.TheCommissionofInquiryonSyria,forexample,hasnot(yet)contributedtoensuringaccountabilityinthecountry,eventhoughithasreportedextensivelyontheviolationscommittedbytheconflictpartiesinalargenumberofreportsandhasseveraltimescalledontheSecurityCounciltoreferviolationstotheICC.TheCommissionofInquiryonHumanRightsintheDemocraticPeople’sRepublicofKorea—equallychallenged in achieving actual accountability—chose a different approach by producing adetailed and extensive final report and asking that itsmandate be discontinued. This had astrongand lastingsymbolic impact,eventhough ithasnotresulted in the implementationofoneofitsmainrecommendations:anICCreferral.Theworkofthecommissionsissometimesalsooflimiteduseforcriminalinvestigationsifandwhen these take place, as the information gathered is often subject to confidentialityguarantees(i.e.,theidentitiesofthewitnessesarenotdisclosedtoanyone)orisinsufficientlyprecise or direct to meet evidential standards. This makes the work of the commissionseffectiveforfactfindingandestablishingpatternsandpoliciesbutofmorelimiteduseinactualcourtproceedings.Themainvalueoftheworkofcommissionsof inquiry isthereforetoraiseawareness of an ongoing human rights crisis and to make concrete recommendations onpossibleaccountabilitymechanisms.TheHumanRightsCouncilcanusethisworkasabasisforrecommendations to the General Assembly, which can then take relevant action. Anotherpowerful tool of the council is to designate a special rapporteur to examine a situation,preferablythroughacountryvisit.Evenwhenacountryisuncooperative,therapporteurmayproduceareportofferinghisorherunderstandingofthehumanrightssituation.TheLargelyUntappedPotentialofthePeacebuildingCommissionThe Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) could potentially play a bigger role in ensuringaccountability and justice for serious human rights violations as part and parcel ofpeacebuilding efforts. Where a country emerges from conflict, effective transitional justicemechanismscanbeessentialtoassistacommunityinitsreconciliationprocessandtofacilitatethetransitiontostability.ThePBC’smandateallowsittobringallthenecessaryactorstogether,aswell as to raise thenecessary funds. So far, however,workon transitional justicehasnotplayedaprominentrole intheactivitiesofthePBC,evenwhentruthandreconciliationwereimportantelementsof thenationalprocess (suchas in Liberia).There seems tobeageneralrecognitionthatthepotentialofthePBCforaccountabilityworkremainstobeexplored.TheRoleofHumanRightsandJusticeinAchievingLastingPeaceandSustainableDevelopmentTheneedforcoherenceandforfullyintegratingjusticeandhumanrightsintotheUN’sworkisalso recognized in current policy debates on the link between peace, inclusivity, and

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development.Respectforhumanrights, including,andperhapsinparticular,thoseofwomenand girls, is essential to achieve and sustain both peace and development. The2000 UnitedNationsMillenniumDeclarationandDevelopmentGoals (MDGs) recognized the linkbetweenhumanrights,goodgovernance,anddevelopment.Butwhileitwascleartomostthatachievinghumanwell-beinganddignityforallwouldnotbeachievedifdevelopmentgoalswerepursuedinisolationfromeffortstopromotehumanrights,theMDGsfailedtofullyintegratethehumanrightsdimension.The 2030Agenda for SustainableDevelopment,with its inherently universal, transformative,and inclusive approach, takes the linkage between human rights and development muchfurther.Goal16ofthe2030Agendacallsforthepromotionof“peacefulandinclusivesocietiesfor sustainable development,” the rule of law, and justice and accountable institutions. Butsynergies between the aspirations of the 2030 Agenda and obligations under internationalhumanrightslawgowellbeyondGoal16.AsthePreambleofthe2030Agendapointsout,theseventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can and even “seek to realize the humanrights of all.”31The agenda’s pledge to “leave no one behind” also resonates fully with thefoundation of international human rights law reflected in the Preamble of the UDHR,whichrecalls that “recognitionof the inherentdignity andof theequal and inalienable rightsof allmembersof thehumanfamily is thefoundationof freedom, justiceandpeace intheworld.”Theimplementationofthe2030AgendaandtheSDGsandtargetsoffersacriticalopportunitytotakeonboardandbuilduponthepositivepoweroffullrespectforhumanrightstoachievesustainabledevelopmentforall.Atthesametime,implementationofthegoalsandtargetswillcontribute to efforts to realize the human rights of all people, everywhere and withoutdiscrimination.Respect for human rights is also a fundamental ingredient for any recipe to build or restorepeace. Failure to uphold basic human rights is one of themain drivers of violence and rootcausesofconflict.Butsofar,theinternationalcommunityhasfocusedmoreonaddressingpastviolationsofhumanrightsthanonrecognizingthepositivepowerofhumanrightsforpeace.Theinternationalcommunityhasincreasinglycometoaccepttheneedtoaddresshumanrightsviolationsintransitionprocessesfromconflictorstaterepressiontopeace.Transitionaljusticemechanismsareimportant“becausesystemichumanrightsviolationsaffectnotjustthedirectvictims,butsocietyasawhole.…Ahistoryofunaddressedmassiveabusesislikelytobesociallydivisive, togeneratemistrust…and tohamperor slowdown theachievementof securityanddevelopment goals.… [U]ltimately, [it] can lead to cyclical recurrence of violence in variousforms.”32Butmorerecognitionisneededofthepositivepowerofpromotingandguaranteeingrespectforhumanrights, inparticularthoseofwomenandgirls.Theenjoymentofsuchrightsbyall,31ForanoverviewofthelinkagesbetweentheSDGsandthecoreinternationalhumanrightsinstruments,seewww.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/MDGs/Post2015/SDG_HR_Table.pdf.32InternationalCenterforTransitionalJustice,“WhatIsTransitionalJustice?,”availableatwww.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice.

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particularly vulnerable groups, fosters inclusive, cohesive, and peaceful societies andcontributestoachievingsustainabledevelopmentanddeepandlastingpeace.Alreadyin1945,thedraftersoftheUNCharterrecognizedtheimportanceofensuringrespectforhumanrightsfor maintaining international peace and security. Article 55 of the charter sees “universalrespect for, and observance of, human rights” as integral to “the creation of conditions ofstability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations amongnations.”33Importantprogresshasbeenmadethrough the inclusionofhumanrightscomponents inUNpeace operations.34But respect for human rights cannot be outsourced to peace operationsalone. It must become an integral part of the multilateral system’s efforts to prevent andresolveconflictandbuildlastingpeace.Twosecretary-generals,JavierPérezdeCuéllarandKofiAnnan,havetriedtopushtheSecurityCouncil tostepup itsconflictpreventionmeasuresbyfocusing more on human rights violations as early warnings of developing conflicts. Butsystematicengagementofthecouncilinthisarearemainsdifficult,andmuchdependsontheactivismofthesecretary-generalorindividualcouncilmembers.35The report of the secretary-general’s High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operationsstressedthesignificant roleofhumanrights inconflictprevention,protection inconflict,andpeacebuilding. It put forth a number of specific recommendations that could strengthen thecouncil’s effectiveness in preventing or mitigating human rights violations in situations ofarmedconflict.Thepanelalsounderlinedtheneedtoreacttoinformationonmassivehumanrightsviolationsearlyon.Similarly,thereportoftheAdvisoryGroupofExpertsforthe2015ReviewofthePeacebuildingArchitecture gives significant consideration to accountability for human rights violations. Thereport recommends that theUNtakeaclear stanceagainst impunity inpost-conflict settingsand“supportgovernmentsandcivilsocietytotacklethisobstacletosustainablepeacebuildingthrough political engagement, as well as national and international processes of justice.”36Overall, thereportargues thatsuccessfulpeacebuilding isdependentuponuniting thepeaceandsecurity,development,andhumanrightspillarsoftheUN.HumanRightsupFrontTheUNhasalsosoughttomainstreamthepromotionofrespectforhumanrightsinitsworkbytrying to induceadifferentmindset in thinkingabouthumanrightswithin theUNsystem. Inlate 2013, the secretary-general launched the Human Rights up Front initiative, primarily acoordinationtoolthatseekstobringaboutcultural,operational,andpoliticalchangesthatwill

33SecurityCouncilReport,HumanRightsandtheSecurityCouncil.34Forashortoverview,seeibid.,p.10.35Ibid.,pp.14–16.36UNAdvisoryGroupofExperts,TheChallengeofSustainingPeace,June29,2015,p.57,availableonlineatwww.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/150630%20Report%20of%20the%20AGE%20on%20the%202015%20Peacebuilding%20Review%20FINAL.pdf.

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ensuretheUNsystemtakesearlyandeffectiveactiontopromoteandencouragerespect forhumanrightsandtopreventorrespondtolarge-scaleviolations.ItsetsoutsixactionsthatcanhelptheUNsystemmeetitsresponsibilitiesonhumanrights,fromtrainingallUNstafftoseehuman rights as central to their work—regardless of their department or program—toimprovingmanagementof informationonviolations.37ButthequestionremainswhetherandhowtheHumanRightsupFrontinitiativecanaddressthemultilateralsystem’smainweakness:enforcementofrespectforinternationalhumanrightsnormsandstandards.

III. ConclusionsandRecommendationsThe past three decades have seen significant developments with respect to internationalcriminal justice, including for serious and widespread violations of human rights. TheInternationalCriminalTribunalsfortheformerYugoslaviaandRwanda,aswellasotheradhoctribunals that were subsequently established have driven the speedy and in-depthdevelopment of international criminal law. The ICC was established as a permanent,independent, international tribunal to dealwith themost serious crimes under internationallaw.While the ICC isoften subject to criticism, suffers from lackof adequatediplomatic andfinancialsupport,andhasrecentlynotattractedmanynewstatesparties, it isclearlyheretostayandremainsattheheartofinternationalefforttofightimpunityforinternationalcrimes.Manyofthesedevelopments,inparticulartheestablishmentoftheICC,wouldnothavebeenpossiblewithout thesignificantandpersistenteffortsofcivil society,whichwereessential tomobilizingthepoliticalwill requiredtoachievetheseresults.Moregenerally,civilsocietyhasand continues to play a seminal role in promoting respect for human rights, as well asaccountabilityandaccess to justice forviolations thereof. Inorder to implementandachievemanyoftherecommendationsbelow,itwillbekeyforcivilsocietytocontinuetoplaythatrole,withthesupportoftheUNandmembersstates,bothatthelocalandinternationallevels. Beyond its initial role in setting up the ICTY and ICTR, the Security Council has been andcontinues to be a key player in ensuring justice and accountability for the most seriousinternational crimes. Crucial in this respect is the council’s competence, under the RomeStatuteoftheICC,torefersituationstothecourtforinvestigationandprosecution.Thecouncil,however,hasonlytwicemadeuseofitscompetenceinthisrespectandbeencriticizedroundlyforitslackoffollow-uptoandenforcementofthesedecisions.Whilethecouncilcouldtakeanumberofmeasurestoreduceitsperceivedandrealbias inrelationto internationalcriminaljustice, its internal political dynamics, which prevent a more consistent, effective, andproductiveuseofICCreferrals,areunlikelytochangeinthenearfuture.Itisthereforeequallyimportanttoinvestincomplementarymechanismsabletoensureaccountabilityandaccesstojustice.AkeyentrypointforactionhereisforstatesandtheUNaliketowalkthetalkontheprincipleofcomplementaritythatunderpinstheRomeStatutefortheICC.Thisprinciplerecognizesand

37Seewww.un.org/sg/rightsupfront/doc/RuFAP-summary-General-Assembly.shtml.

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emphasizes the primary responsibility of states to investigate and prosecute internationalcrimes. Increased reliance on domestic criminal justice not only avoids the need to overlyburden the ICC but also contributes to national ownership and capacity. Giving a moreprominent role todomestic justice for international crimesdoes, however, require adequatetechnical,financial,anddiplomaticsupportfromboththeUNanditsmemberstates.Apart fromcriminal justicemechanisms,the internationalcommunityshouldalsocontinuetoinvestandstrengthenothermechanismstoensurehumanrightscomplianceandaccountability.Mainstreaming human rights into the UN’s work on peace and security and development isimportantnotonlytoensurefullrespectforhumanrightsbutalsotoreachtheambitiousgoalsofachievinglastingpeaceandsustainabledevelopment.The international community’s “toolbox” includes a variety of existing mechanisms andprograms.Theyshouldbeusedandsequenced inamannerappropriateandtailoredtoeachcontext’sspecificchallenges,opportunities,andconstraints.Moreover,theUNshouldsettheexampleandadoptandimplementazero-tolerancepolicyforhuman rights violations by its own representatives and personnel. The recently adoptedSecurity Council Resolution 2272, which endorses special measures recommended by thesecretary-generaltopreventandcombatsexualexploitationandabusebyUNpeacekeepers,isasignificantstepintherightdirection.Finally,theUNanditsmemberstatesshouldinvestmoreinthepositivepowerofhumanrights.Where individuals and societies fully enjoy their fundamental rights and freedoms, lastingpeaceandsustainabledevelopmentareeasiertoachieve.Promotingrespectforhumanrightsisnot,andshouldnotbe,asoftoptioninforeignpolicyandmultilateralwork.ItisvitaltotheUN inachieving its fundamentalpurposesofpreventing thescourgeofwar,achieving lastingpeaceandsecurity,and“leavingnoonebehind.”Recommendations

1. Invest in prevention and the positive power of human rights: Serious and sustainedinvestment in promoting respect for human rights will contribute to conflict prevention,lastingpeace,and sustainabledevelopmentand reduce the scaleof theneed forexpostfactojusticeandaccountabilityprocesses.• Member states should increase their own and the UN’s budgets for domestic and

international prevention programs that strengthen human rights compliance,accountability,andjusticemechanisms.Theyshouldstrengthenfinancialandtechnicalsupport for national and local human rights architectures and capacities, recognizingand reinforcing the important role played by civil society actors. They should alsoincreasethebudgetoftheOHCHRsothatitcanstrengthenitspresenceonthegroundand better involve local actors in reporting to ensure deep contextual understandingandbuildlocalcapacity.

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• Memberstates, theUN,andcivil society shouldensure that strategiesandpolicies toimplement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development take on board its humanrightsdimensiontoensurethatnooneisleftbehindandtomonitorandassessprogressontheSDGsandtheirtargetsinachievingresultsforallpeople,inparticularwomenandgirls and other particularly vulnerable groups. To this effect, they should integratehumanrightsintonationaldevelopmentplans.

• MemberstatesandtheUNshouldensurerespectforhumanrightsandthecapacitytoworkonpreventingandaddressinghumanrightsviolationsintheirresponsestoconflictandviolence,includingsanctionsregimes,counterterrorismmeasures,andprogramsforpreventingandcounteringviolentextremism.Theyshouldintegratesafeguardstoavoida negative impact on human rights protections and on the space for political,diplomatic,andoperationalengagement,inparticularwithnon-statearmedgroups,toimproverespectforhumanrightsandhumanitarianlaw.

• The UN secretary-general shouldmaintain a dedicated team to lead and expand theHumanRightsupFrontinitiativeandapplyitmoresystematically.

2. Ensure access to adequate justice: TheUN,member states, and civil society should joinefforts tomake theprincipleof complementarityworkby increasing theuseofdomesticjusticemechanismsandbysupportinginternationalmechanismswheredomesticonesarenotableorwillingtoact.a. Strengthendomesticcapacities

• TheSecurityCouncilshouldsystematicallypressurestatestocomplywiththeRomeStatuteoftheICCbyinvestigatingandprosecutinginternationalcrimeswheretheyhavedomesticjurisdictionandbycooperatingwithotherstatesandtheICCwherethelatterhavejurisdiction.Whereverappropriate,thecouncilshouldimposetravelbansandassetsfreezesonpeopleinvestigatedbystatesortheICCforinternationalcrimes.

• Member states and theUN should seriously commit to and invest in building thecapacity of national and local justice systems by using all available measures tocreate the necessary political will and by providing or mobilizing resources andtechnical assistance. In doing so, they should prioritize countries where massiveviolationsofhumanrightsoccurorarelikelytooccur.Wherestatesareunwillingorunable to investigate or prosecute international crimes within their domesticjurisdictionandtheinternationalsystemmuststepin,hybridmechanismsshouldbethepreferredoptionandshouldbedesignedtomaximizethetransferofknowledgeandexpertisetorelevantdomesticprofessionalsandinstitutions.

• CivilsocietyshouldbuildontheICC’sRomeStatutemovementtopushforpoliticalwillandadequateresources.

b. Reduce bias and selectivity in the Security Council and international criminal justicesystem

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• Memberstatesshouldmakegenuineandrealcommitmenttohumanrightsandthefight against impunity a condition for election to andpossible enlargementof theSecurityCouncil.

• The Security Council should commit to constraining its permanentmembers fromusingvetoesinsituationsofmassatrocities,buildingonexistingproposals.

• The Security Council should set up amechanism toobtain systematic briefings bytheprosecutoroftheICConongoingpreliminaryinvestigationsandshouldrequestthatallcountry-specificbriefingstothecouncil includeasectionontheavailabilityof justice for human rights violations (to facilitate early warning and continuedmonitoringandevaluation).

• TheSecurityCouncilshouldadoptcriteriaorguidelinesforreferralstotheICCsoastoincreasesystematicconsiderationofcasesanddecreasethepossibilityofrealorperceived selectivity. The criteria should include a mechanism for states underconsideration to adjust their position and response to human rights violations toavoidtheneedforareferral.

• TheSecurityCouncil shouldengage ina strategicdialoguewith the ICC toaddressthechallengesitfaces(e.g.,byorganizinganannualretreatforcouncilmembersandkeyICCstaff)and,whenitreferscasestothecourt, itshouldensurethecourthasadequatefinancialandhumanresourcestofulfillitsmandate.

• The General Assembly and the secretary-general should, wherever they feel it isappropriate,recommendsituationsforICCreferraltotheSecurityCouncil.38

c. Complementjusticewithothermechanismsthatcontributetoaccountability• Member states and the UN should select and sequence available tools and

mechanismsinlightofeachcontext’sspecificneeds,opportunities,andconstraints.• Member states and the UN should provide adequate resources for existing

internationalmechanisms.• MemberstatesandtheUNshouldincreasetheimpactoffact-findingcommissions

andcommissionsofinquirybyensuringtheyhaveappropriatemandates,expertise,access, and political support, aswell as bymaking better use of the InternationalHumanitarian Fact-Finding Commission in contexts with serious and widespreadviolationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw.

• MemberstatesandtheUNshould,wherepossible, support regionalhumanrightscourts, which have a particular role to play in guiding and supporting nationalsystems.

3. Managethecomplexrelationbetweenhumanrights,justice,andpeace:ThemultilateralsystemanchoredintheUnitedNationsmustembracethefactthattherecanbenojusticewithout peace andno lastingpeacewithout justice and should address the inherent andcomplextensionsbetweentheirrespectivedemands.

38TheproposaltogivereferralcompetencetotheGeneralAssemblyitselfundertheRomeStatutehasbeenonthetableforanumberofyearsbutisnotseriouslypursuedbytheproponentsasithasverylimitedchancesofsuccess.

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• Member states and the UNmust acknowledge that the relationship between humanrights, justice, and peace is complex and will articulate itself differently in differentcontexts and at different points in time (no one size fits all).Moreover, they shouldacknowledgethatprotectionofhumanrights requiresacomprehensiveapproachandcommitment. The UN Peacebuilding Commission, in coordination with OHCHR,academia,andcivil society, couldprovidea forumforexchangesonwhathasworkedand notworked in dealingwith the tensions and dilemmas in different contexts. Theinputfromcivilsocietyorganizationsonthegroundwillbecrucialinsuchanexercise.

• Member states and the UN should look at the whole toolbox of mechanisms forpursuingjusticeandshoulduseandsequenceappropriatetools inlightofspecificandevolving contexts. “Justice” does not always have to be criminal justice—appropriatetransitional justicemechanismscanbepowerful toolstoaddressthetensionbetweenthedemandsof criminal justice and thedemandsof both immediate and sustainablepeace.

• MemberstatesandtheUNshouldinvolveand,wherepossible,supportaleadrolefornational, local, and regional actors to ensure adequacy, efficiency, legitimacy,sustainability, and ownership of peace process that fully integrate the human rightsdimension.

• Member states should strengthen the mandate and resources of the PeacebuildingCommission,itsrelationshipwiththeSecurityCouncil(withthelatterencouragingandrecommendingstatestoresorttothePBC),anditsfundsforsupportingpeacebuildingcapacityontheground.

• The UN should train and instruct mediators and negotiators on the importance oftackling human rights and justice issues throughout peace processes and establish aforumtoexchangeanddocumentlessonslearned.

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