Bagongahasa vs. Romualdez DigestFACTS:

Respondents are absolute and lawful owners of separate parcels of lands situated in Sitio Papatahan, Paete, Laguna. However, sometime in 1994 and 1995, the then Secretary of Agrarian Reform declared the property to be part of the public domain, awarded the same to the Defendants and forthwith issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to the respective petitioners.

As absolute and lawful owners thereof, the respondents also maintain that they have not been notified of any intended coverage thereof by the DAR; that to the best of their knowledge, there is no valuation being conducted by the Land Bank of the Philippines and the DAR involving the property; that there was no compensation paid and that the DAR-CENRO Certification shows that the landholdings have 24-32% slopes and therefore exempt from CARP coverage. Petitoners defend that they are farmer beneficiaries of the subject properties, covered by Proclamation No. 2280 which reclassifies certain portion of the public domain as agricultural land and declares the same alienable and disposable for agricultural and resettlement purposes.

The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) ruled in favor of respondents. Upon appeal, however, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) held that the complaints filed were virtual protests against the CARP coverage, to which it has no jurisdiction. The DARAB further held that, while it has jurisdiction to cancel the Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs), which had been registered with the Register of Deeds (RD) of Laguna, it cannot pass upon matters exclusively vested in the DAR Secretary. Moreover, the DARAB ruled that the assailed CLOAs having been registered in 1994 and 1995 became incontestable and indefeasible. The CA reversed then partially amended its decision. The CA, invoking Section 1 (1.6), Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure held that the DARAB has the exclusive original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate cases involving correction, partition, and cancellation of Emancipation Patents and CLOAs which are registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), as in this case. The petitioners appealed, arguing, among others, that the CA erred in undermining the issue of jurisdiction as the case is cognizable by the Regional Director and not by the PARAD and/or the DARAB.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the DARAB has jurisdiction over the petition of the CLOAs

HELD:

The petition is granted.

REMEDIAL & CIVIL LAW: Jurisdiction over petitions for cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Awards.

InHeirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, the Court ruled that under Section 2(f), Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure,the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. In Spouses Teofilo Carpio and Teodora Carpio v. Ana Sebastian, et.al., this Court held that even if the parties therein did not have tenancy relations, the DARAB still has jurisdiction. However, the said case must be viewed with particularity because, based on the material allegations of the complaint therein, theincident involved the implementation of the CARP, as it was founded on the question of who was the actual tenant and eventual beneficiary of the subject land. Hence, this Court held therein that jurisdiction should remain with the DARAB and not with the regular courts. However, this case is different. Respondents complaint was bereft of any allegation of tenancy and/or any matter that would place it within the ambit of DARABs jurisdiction.

However, this Court refuses to rule on the validity of the CARP coverage of the subject properties and the issuance of the assailed CLOAs. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction was initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve the particular issue of non-issuance of a notice of coverage, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter.

Petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the CA is REVERSED.

Case Digest: Nestle & Nestle Waters v. Uniwide Sales, et al.FACTS:

Respondents filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a petition for declaration of suspension of payment, formation and appointment of rehabilitation receiver, and approval of rehabilitation plan.

The newly appointed Interim Receivership Committee filed a rehabilitation plan in the SEC. The plan was anchored on return to core business of retailing; debt reduction via cash settlement and dacion en pago; loan restructuring; waiver of penalties and charges; freezing of interest payments; and restructuring of credit of suppliers, contractors, and private lenders.

The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC an Amended Rehabilitation Plan (ARP). The ARP took into account the planned entry of Casino Guichard Perrachon, envisioned to infuse P3.57 billion in fresh capital. SEC approved the ARP.

The Interim Receivership Committee filed in the SEC a Second Amendment to the Rehabilitation Plan (SARP) in view of Casino Guichard Perrachon's withdrawal. SEC approved the SARP.

Petitioners, as unsecured creditors of respondents, appealed to the SEC praying that the Order approving the SARP be set aside and a new one be issued directing the Interim Receivership Committee, in consultation with all the unsecured creditors, to improve the terms and conditions of the SARP.

SEC denied petitioners' appeal for lack of merit. Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the petition for review filed by petitioners. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was also denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: administrative law; doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction

In light of supervening events that have emerged from the time the SEC approved the SARP on 23 December 2002 and from the time the present petition was filed on 3 November 2006, any determination by this Court as to whether the SARP should be revoked and the rehabilitation proceedings terminated, would be premature.

Undeniably, supervening events have substantially changed the factual backdrop of this case. The Court thus defers to the competence and expertise of the SEC to determine whether, given the supervening events in this case, the SARP is no longer capable of implementation and whether the rehabilitation case should be terminated as a consequence.

Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

In other words, if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the court is had even if the matter may well be within the latter's proper jurisdiction.

The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.

Petition for review is DISMISSED.