Judicial Department Cases - 1

7/29/2019 Judicial Department Cases - 1

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JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT(DIGESTED CASES)

SECTION 5DRILON V. LIMFACTS:Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil

ompanies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and vo

for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain

provisions contrary to law and public policy.

n a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretarys

esolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More

mportantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the

Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy

mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only

he power of supervision over local governments. The court cited the familiar distinction between control and

upervision, the first being the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had don

n the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the second is the

power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.

SSUES:The issues in this case are

1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional; and

2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than supervision, over the local government

HELD:The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that Section 187 of the Local Government Co

s unconstitutional but affirmed the said lower courts finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of t

Manila Revenue Code have been observed.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance an

f warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance

s not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measu

Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the

Code should be.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, or

he act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover suc

authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not laydown such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary

Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervis

Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue

Code, the Court carefully examined every exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements hav

ndeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not

affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation wi

atisfy due process.


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LARRANAGA V. COURT OF APPEALSFacts:Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention before the RTC of CebCity. He was arrested and was detained without the filing of the necessary Information and warrant of arrest. The

petitioner alleged that he must be re leased and be subj ec t to a pr el iminary invest igat ion. However

pen d i ng th e r e s o lu t ion o f the Cou r t fo r th e p et i t ion for cer t ior ar i , pro hib i t i on and mandamuwith writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant o

arrest directed to the petitioner.ssue:

. Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation.2 . W h e t h e r p e t i t i o n e r s h o u l d b e r e l e a s e d f r o m d e t e n t i o n p e n d i n g t h

nvestigation.Held:

.Yes. Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14, 1997. The rule is th

he right to prel iminary investigat ion is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of

ntering a p l e a a t a r r a i g n m e n t . P e t i t i o n e r , i n t h i s c a s e , h a s b e e n a c t i v e l y a nonsistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation even before he

was cha r ged i n cour t . A l s o , pe t i t i one r r e f use d t o e nte r a ple a d ur in g th e arraignment becau

here was a pending case in this Court regarding hisi gh t t o ava i l o f a r egu l a r p r e l i mi na r y i nves t i ga t i on . C l ea r l y , t he ac t s o f p e t i t i o n e r a n d

c o u n s e l a r e i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a w a i v e r . P r e l i m i n a r y investigation is part of procedurdue process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.

2.No. The filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detain

will cure the defect of that detention or at least

d e n y h i m t h e r i g h t t o b e r e l e a s e d b e c a u s e o f s uch de f ec t . The o r i g i na l war r an t l e s sarrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the

Reg i ona l T r i a l Cour t l awf u l l y acqu i r ed j u r i s d i c t i on ove r t he pe r s on o f t he pe t i t i one r by

vi rt ue of th e wa rr an t of ar re st it is su ed on Au gu st 26 , 19 93 against him and the other accused inonnection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. V. COURT OF APPEALSFacts:

Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the SuprCourt which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as

Board of Investments (BOI).

BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration

hanging the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa file

motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not mov

econsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petitioneview with CA.

CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) dafter its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction he BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omni

nvestments Code of 1987.

Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the R

Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Qu


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udicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal

down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the B

hall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.

While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E

226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

SSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

HELD:YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method

nforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, whichtatute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Cour

Appeals.

ARUELO V. COURT OF APPEALShe filing of said pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give Gatchalian a new five-day pero file his answer.

ssue:

whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction w

t allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, P

II of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure

Held:

No. Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by

Revised Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings beforeegular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing

motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Sectio

Rule 1, Part I provides:

Sec. 2.Applicability These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before

Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limurisdiction.

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motion

dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election protests orquo warranto cases pending before the regourts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings inegular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested

he Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

JAVELLANA V. DILG

GRIO-AQUINO,J.:


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This petition for review on certiorari involves the right of a public official to engage in the practice of his profession

while employed in the Government.

Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5, 1989, CEngineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of

Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG

Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known

he "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for oppression, misconducand abuse of authority.

Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglung

of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authorit

for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG MemorandumCircular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8, 198

avellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C.

Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule; tavellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG

Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 which provides:

MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-38

TO ALL: PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS, CITY AND MUNICIPALITY MAYORS, KLGCDREGIONAL DIRECTORS AND ALL CONCERNED

SUBJECT: AMENDING MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 80-18 ON SANGGUNIAN

SESSIONS,PER DIEMS, ALLOWANCES, STAFFING AND OTHER RELATED MATTER

In view of the issuance or Circular No. 5-A by the Joint Commission on Local Government Personne

Administration which affects certain provisions of MC 80-18, there is a need to amend saidMemorandum Circular to substantially conform to the pertinent provisions of Circular No. 9-A.

xxx xxx xxx

C.Practice of Profession

The Secretary (now Minister) of Justice in an Opinion No. 46 Series of 1973 stated inter alia that

"members of local legislative bodies, other than the provincial governors or the mayors, do not keepregular office hours." "They merely attend meetings or sessions of the provincial board or the city or

municipal council" and that provincial board members are not even required "to have an office in the

provincial building." Consequently, they are not therefore to required to report daily as other regulargovernment employees do, except when they are delegated to perform certain administrative function

in the interest of public service by the Governor or Mayor as the case may be. For this reason, they m

therefore, be allowed to practice their professions provided that in so doing an authority . . . first besecured from the Regional Directors pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 74-58, provided, howev

that no government personnel, property, equipment or supplies shall be utilized in the practice of thei

professions. While being authorized to practice their professions, they should as much as possible att

regularly any and all sessions, which are not very often, of their Sanggunians for which they wereelected as members by their constituents except in very extreme cases, e.g., doctors who are called up

to save a life.For this purpose it is desired that they always keep a calendar of the dates of the sessio

regular or special of their Sanggunians so that conflicts of attending court cases in the case of lawyeand Sanggunian sessions can be avoided.

As to members of the bar the authority given for them to practice their profession shall always be sub

to the restrictions provided for in Section 6 of Republic Act 5185. In all cases, the practice of any


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profession should be favorably recommended by the Sanggunian concerned as a body and by the

provincial governors, city or municipal mayors, as the case may be. (Emphasis ours, pp. 28-30,Rollo

On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which the complainant, EngineerDivinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor Javellana, presented their respective evidence.

Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law for the

easons stated in his letter-request. On the same date, Secretary Santos replied as follows:

1st IndorsementSeptember 10, 1990

Respectfully returned to Councilor Erwin B. Javellana, Bago City, his within letter dated September

1990, requesting for a permit to continue his practice of law for reasons therein stated, with this

information that, as represented and consistent with law, we interpose no objection thereto, provided

such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions.

LUIS T

SANTO

Secretar

p. 60,Rollo.)

On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth guidelines fhe practice of professions by local elective officials as follows:

TO: All Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, Regional Directors and A

Concerned.

SUBJECT:Practice of Profession and Private Employment of Local Elective Officials

Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials andEmployees), states, in part, that "In addition to acts and omission of public officials . . . now prescrib

in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions o

any public officials . . . and are hereby declared to be unlawful: . . . (b)Public Officials . . . during theincumbency shall not: (1) . . . accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker,

agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office

unless expressly allowed by law; (2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorizby the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their

official functions: . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Under Memorandum Circular No. 17 of the Office of the President dated September 4, 1986, the

authority to grant any permission, to accept private employment in any capacity and to exerciseprofession, to any government official shall be granted by the head of the Ministry (Department) or

agency in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides

part, that:

No officer shall engage directly in any . . . vocation or profession . . . without a writtenpermission from the head of the Department:Provided, that this prohibition will be

absolute in the case of those officers . . . whose duties and responsibilities require that

their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an

employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted


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outside of office should be fixed by the Chief of the agency to the end that it will not

impair in anyway the efficiency of the officer or employee . . . subject to any addition

conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in theinterest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service

Commission.

Conformably with the foregoing, the following guidelines are to be observed in the grant of permissi

to the practice of profession and to the acceptance of private employment of local elective officials, twit:

1) The permission shall be granted by the Secretary of Local Government;

2) Provincial Governors, City and Municipal Mayors whose duties and responsibilitie

require that their entire time be at the disposal of the government in conformity withSections 141, 171 and 203 of the Local Government Code (BP 337), are prohibited to

engage in the practice of their profession and to accept private employment during the

incumbency:

3) Other local elective officials may be allowed to practice their profession or engageprivate employment on a limited basis at the discretion of the Secretary of Local

Government, subject to existing laws and to the following conditions :

a) That the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by t

local chief executive concerned to the end that it will not impair in anyway the efficiency of the officials concerned;

b) That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utiliz

in the pursuit of one's profession or private employment;

c) That no conflict of interests between the practice of profession orengagement in private employment and the official duties of the concer

official shall arise thereby;

d) Such other conditions that the Secretary deems necessary to impose

each particular case, in the interest of public service. (Emphasis suppliepp. 31-32,Rollo.)

On March 25, 1991, Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the administrative case against him on the ground mainly th

DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole an

xclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.

n an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana's motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His motion for

econsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991.

Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Sec

90 of which provides:

Sec. 90.Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited frompracticing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as

local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schoo

except during session hours:Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall

not:


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(1)Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government u

or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the natioor local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the lo

government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian membconcerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on

occasions of emergency:Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensatio

therefrom. (Emphasis ours.)

Administrative Case No. C-10-90 was again set for hearing on November 26, 1991. Javellana thereupon filed thispetition forcertiorari praying that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and Section 90 of the new L

Government Code (RA 7160) be declared unconstitutional and null void because:

1) they violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and lega

assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for

the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminincrease, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts andquasi-judicialbodies

shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

2) They constitute class legislation, being discriminatory against the legal and medical professions for only sanggun

members who are lawyers and doctors are restricted in the exercise of their profession while dentists, engineers,architects, teachers, opticians, morticians and others are not so restricted (RA 7160, Sec. 90 [b-1]).

n due time, the Solicitor General filed his Comment on the petition and the petitioner submitted a Reply. After

deliberating on the pleadings of the parties, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

As a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities noonly because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in t

nforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction (Santiago vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, 192SCRA 199, citing Cuerdo vs. COA, 166 SCRA 657). With respect to the present case, we find no grave abuse of

discretion on the part of the respondent, Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), in issuing thequestioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the administrative

harge against him.

n the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their

duties are necessarily impressed with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a publicrust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effe

omplaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a

ouncilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City

Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims agai


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City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] o

RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession, if such practice

would represent interests adverse to the government.

Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No.

81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular

renches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local

Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officialsavoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in

hose instances where the law allows it.

Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provin

and municipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunmembers "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools expect during session hours

here are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law

more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF LEGFEES

R E S O L U T I O NCORONA,J.:

May the legislature exempt the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from legal fees imposed by

Court on government-owned and controlled corporations and local government units? This is the central issue in

administrative matter.

The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or contro

orporations under Section 22,[1] Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The said provision states:

SEC. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and

instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local governmentcorporations andgovernment-owned or controlled corporations with or without independentcharter are not exempt from paying such fees.

However, all court actions, criminal or civil, instituted at the instance of the provincial, city ormunicipal treasurer or assessor under Sec. 280 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall be exempt

from the payment of court and sheriffs fees. (emphasis supplied)

The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA [2] 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):

SEC. 39.Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is hereby declared to be the policy ofthe State that the actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and maintained at all

times and that contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as

possible in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and their employers.Taxes imposed on the
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GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution ratenecessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to thecontrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall beexempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds . These exemptions shallcontinue unless expressly and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as of theapproval of this Act are hereby considered paid .Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations,issuances, opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this provision are herebydeemed repealed, superseded and rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect.

Moreover, these exemptions shall not be affected by subsequent laws to the contrary unless thissection is expressly, specifically and categorically revoked or repealed by law and a provision is enacted

to substitute or replace the exemption referred to herein as an essential factor to maintain and protect the

solvency of the fund, notwithstanding and independently of the guaranty of the national government tosecure such solvency or liability.

The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or moniescorresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution,

levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies including

Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members,including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or

performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his positionor work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favour of the GSIS. (emphasis

supplied)

The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect legal fees in actions and proceedings instituted by

GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes, assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds under Section 39.

his reason, the GSIS urges this Court to recognize its exemption from payment of legal fees.

According to the GSIS, the purpose of its exemption is to preserve and maintain the actuarial solvency o

funds and to keep the contribution rates necessary to sustain the benefits provided by RA 8291 as low as possible. L

he terms taxes, assessments, charges, and duties, the term fees is used in the law in its generic and ordin

ense as any form of government imposition. The word fees, defined as charge[s] fixed by law for services of pu

officers or for the use of a privilege under control of government, is qualified by the phrase of all kinds. [3]Henc

ncludes the legal fees prescribed by this Court under Rule 141. Moreover, no distinction should be made based on

kind of fees imposed on the GSIS or the GSIS ability to pay because the law itself does not distinguish based on th

matters.

The GSIS argues that its exemption from the payment of legal fees would not mean that RA 8291 is superio

he Rules of Court. It would merely show deference by the Court to the legislature as a co-equal branch. [4]

deference will recognize the compelling and overriding State interest in the preservation of the actuarial solvenc

he GSIS for the benefit of its members.[5]
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The GSIS further contends that the right of government workers to social security is an aspect of social just

The right to social security is also guaranteed under Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Article 9 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Court has the powe

promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, including the right to so

ecurity, but the GSIS is not compelling the Court to promulgate such rules. The GSIS is merely asking the Cour

ecognize and allow the exercise of the right of the GSIS to seek relief from the courts of justice sans payment of l

fees.[6]

Required to comment on the GSIS petition, [7] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that

petition should be denied.[8] According to the OSG, the issue of the GSIS exemption from legal fees has been resol

by the issuance by then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.[9] of OCA[10]Circular No. 93-2004:

TO : ALL JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT AND COURT PERSONNEL OF THE

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS INCITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIALCOURTS, SHARIA CIRCUIT COURTS

SUBJECT : REMINDER ON THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVECIRCULAR NO. 3-98 (Re: Payment of Docket and Filing Fees in Extra-Judicial

Foreclosure); SECTION 21, RULE 141 OF THE RULES OF COURT;

SECTION 3 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 385; and ADMINISTRATIVE

CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 (Re: Exercise of Utmost Caution, Prudence, andJudiciousness in Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders and Writs of

Preliminary Injunctions)

Pursuant to the Resolution of the Third Division of the Supreme Court dated 05 April 2004 and

to give notice to the concern raised by the [GSIS] to expedite extrajudicial foreclosure cases filed in

court, we wish to remind all concerned [of] the pertinent provisions of Administrative Circular No. 3-98, to wit:

2. No written request/petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages, real or chattel,shall be acted upon by the Clerk of Court, as Ex-Officio Sheriff, without the

corresponding filing fee having been paid and the receipt thereof attached to the

request/petition as provided for in Sec. 7(c), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

3. No certificate of sale shall be issued in favor of the highest bidder until all feesprovided for in the aforementioned sections and paragraph 3 of Section 9 (I) of Rule 141

of the Rules of Court shall have been paid.The sheriff shall attach to the records of thecase a certified copy of the Official Receipt [O.R.] of the payment of the fees and shall

note the O.R. number in the duplicate of the Certificate of Sale attached to the records of

the case.

Moreover, to settle any queries as to the status of exemption from payment of docket and legal

fees of government entities, Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides:

SEC. 21. Government exempt. The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies

and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local
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governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or withoutindependent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.[11]

x x x x x x x x x

The OSG contends that there is nothing in Section 39 of RA 8291 that exempts the GSIS from fees imposed

he Court in connection with judicial proceedings. The exemption of the GSIS from taxes, assessments, fees, char

or duties of all kinds is necessarily confined to those that do not involve pleading, practice and procedure. Rule

has been promulgated by the Court pursuant to its exclusive rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of

Constitution. Thus, it may not be amended or repealed by Congress.

On this Courts order,[12] the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation [1

he petition of the GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS

xemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis. Read in its proper and full context, Section 39 intend

preserve the actuarial solvency of GSIS funds by exempting the GSIS from government impositions through ta

Legal fees imposed under Rule 141 are not taxes.

The OCAT further posits that the GSIS could not have been exempted by Congress from the payment of le

fees. Otherwise, Congress would have encroached on the rule-making power of this Court.

According to the OCAT, this is the second time that the GSIS is seeking exemption from paying legal f

4] The OCAT also points out that there are other government-owned or controlled corporations and local governm

units which asked for exemption from paying legal fees citing provisions in their respective charters that are simila

Section 39 of RA 8291.[15] Thus, the OCAT recommends that the petition of GSIS be denied and the issue be set

once and for all for the guidance of the concerned parties.

Faced with the differing opinions of the GSIS, the OSG and the OCAT, we now proceed to probe into the h

of this matter: may Congress exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees? No.

The GSIS urges the Court to show deference to Congress by recognizing the exemption of the GSIS un

Section 39 of RA 8291 from legal fees imposed under Rule 141. Effectively, the GSIS wants this Court to recogniz

power of Congress to repeal, amend or modify a rule of procedure promulgated by the Court. However,

Constitution and jurisprudence do not sanction such view.

Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-mak

powers under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution:
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Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x x x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutionalrights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice oflaw, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall

provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shallbe uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify

substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall

remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

x x x x x x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a traditional po

of this Court.[16] It necessarily includes the power to address all questions arising from or connected to

mplementation of the said rules.

The Rules of Court was promulgated in the exercise of the Courts rule-making power. It is essenti

procedural in nature as it does not create, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Corollarily, Rule 14

basically procedural. It does not create or take away a right but simply operates as a means to implement an exis

ight. In particular, it functions to regulate the procedure of exercising a right of action and enforcing a cause of act

7] In particular, it pertains to the procedural requirement of paying the prescribed legal fees in the filing of a plead

or any application that initiates an action or proceeding.[18]

Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the ru

promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution

particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal

docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement.[19] It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initia

pleading but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matte

nature of the action.[20] Appellate docket and other lawful fees are required to be paid within the same period for tak

an appeal.[21] Payment of docket fees in full within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an app

22] Without such payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and

decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.[23]

An interesting aspect of legal fees is that which relates to indigent or pauper litigants. In proper cases, co

may waive the collection of legal fees. This, the Court has allowed in Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19, Rule 14

he Rules of Court in recognition of the right of access to justice by the poor under Section 11, Article III of

Constitution.[24] Mindful that the rule with respect to indigent litigants should not be ironclad as it touches on the ri

of access to justice by the poor,[25] the Court acknowledged the exemption from legal fees of indigent clients of

Public Attorneys Office under Section 16-D of the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended by RA 9406. [26] This
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not an abdication by the Court of its rule-making power but simply a recognition of the limits of that power

particular, it reflected a keen awareness that, in the exercise of its rule-making power, the Court may not dilut

defeat the right of access to justice of indigent litigants.

The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social security of government employees in support of

petition. It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and distinct from that of its individual members.

ights of its members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions pertain to it solely and are not shared by

members. Its capacity to sue and bring actions under Section 41(g) of RA 8291, the specific power which involves

xemption that it claims in this case, pertains to it and not to its members. Indeed, even the GSIS acknowledges tha

laiming exemption from the payment of legal fees, it is not asking that rules be made to enforce the right to so

ecurity of its members but that the Court recognize the alleged right of the GSIS to seek relief from the court

ustice sans payment of legal fees.[27]

However, the alleged right of the GSIS does not exist. The payment of legal fees does not take away

apacity of the GSIS to sue. It simply operates as a means by which that capacity may be implemented.

Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concern

pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of

afeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and proced

s now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with

Executive.[28]

Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of

ule-making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and development inEchegaray v. Secretary of Justice

Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading,practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was

subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII

provides:

Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules

concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the

practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall notdiminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice

and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject

to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shallhave the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice

and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
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The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re

Cunanan, Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding

admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passinggrade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the

1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional . In his ponencia, Mr.Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgmentpromulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and

although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less

certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any

attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case withthe law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power

to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed byCongress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix theminimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of thepower of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice andprocedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The ruling of this Court inIn re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. Forthe 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented

by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

x x x x x x x x x

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

x x x x x x x x x

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in allcourts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,

which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang

Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure forthe speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the samegrade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of thejudiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Amongothers, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

x x x x x x x x x

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x x x x x x(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement ofconstitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, theadmission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to theunderprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive

procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of

the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantiverights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shallremain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given

the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The


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Court was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courtsand quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power ofCongress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure . Infine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this

Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregna

wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of

Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, a

or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim

egislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.

Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees with

ransgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Courts independence fiscal autono

0] Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees, [31] including l

fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and

Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF).[32] The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF [33] expre

declare the identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by

Constitution and public policy.[34] Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Courts finan

esources but also comprise an essential element of the Courts fiscal independence. Any exemption from the paym

of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units

necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs

Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.

WHEREFORE, the petition of the Government Service Insurance System for recognition of its exemp

from the payment of legal fees imposed under Section 22 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court on government-owne

ontrolled corporations and local government units is hereby DENIED.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to promptly issue a circular to inform all courts in

Philippines of the import of this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

SECTION 6MACEDA V. VASQUEZ
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Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitio

RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificat

ervice by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 d

have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda kn

hat no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respond

Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

ssue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Sonstitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct

under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for

felonious act.

n the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service,

nvestigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative supervision

all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and c

personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this pow

t is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the pro

administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intr

nto this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties,

Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judgourt employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

RAQUIZA V. JUDGE CASTANEDA JR.

BARREDO,J.:

Petition to order the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (Testate

Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi) from the sala of respondent judge, Hon. Mariano Castaeda to another bran

and administrative complaint against the same judge for "(1) violation of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) rendering decisionknowing it to be unjust and illegal (3) extortion by means of oppression; and (4) bribery.

After respondent judge had filed his comment on said petition and administrative complaint, the Court resolved on

August 3, 1976 to refer the a administrative complaint to Justice Jose G. Bautista of the Court of Appeals fornvestigation, report and recommendation. Under date of September 1, 1977 and after duly hearing the parties, Justic

Bautista submitted the following report:

Complainant Antonio V. Raquiza charges the dent Hon. Mariano Castaeda Jr., under four counts,

namely:

I. Violation of the Anti-Graft Law;


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II. Decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal;

III. Extortion by means of oppression; and

IV. Bribery.

I Under Count I. complainant charges respondent of giving Mrs. Natividad Castellvi Raquiza and

Mrs. Nieves Toledo-Gozun unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in violation of paragraph (Section 3, Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti- Graft Law. which reads:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practof any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any

private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of

hisofficial administrative orjudicial functions through manifest partiality, respondentbad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and

employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses orpermits or other concessions.

These two parties according to complainant are not entitled to get any share from the second release oP1,000,000.00 for the Castellvi Estate and yet they were able to receive P200,000.00 and P500,000.0

respectively. Complainant further claims that Mrs. Raquiza has no more share or participation in the

Castellvi Estate and in the case of Mrs. Gozun she has no right to be given a share of the second releaas it is intended solely for the Raquiza children.

Complainant also charges respondent under paragraph (f), section 3 of Republic Act 3019 which

provides:

(f)Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification

act within a reasonable time on any matter Pending before him for the purpose of

obtaining, directly or indirectly from any person interested in the matter some pecunia

or material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest orgiv

undue advantage in favor of discriminating against any other interested party.

in having allegedly neglected or refused after several motions and oral demands, the release of the

amount of P1,000,000.00 (Treasury Warrant No. D-04,231,948) to the Raquiza children thereby givi

undue advantage to both Mrs. Raquiza and Mrs. Gozun discriminating against the Raquiza children.

II Under Count II, complainant charges respondent with a violation of Article 204 of the RevisedPenal Code for knowingly and deliverately issuing his illegal orders of February 25, and 26, 1976

allowing Mrs. Raquiza to obtain a loan of P200,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank using the

equivalent amount in the second release of P1,000,000.00 deposited in the bank in the name of theCastellvi Estate as collateral. Complainant contends that respondent Judge knows that Mrs. Raquiza h

no more participation or interest in or any rights to the Castellvi Estate since according to the records

Civil Case No. 2761 entitled "Pobre vs. Natividad Castellvi Raquiza," both parties agreed to give all

properties subject matter of the suit to the Raquiza children.

III Under Count III, complainant alleges that respondent committed attempted extortion by

oppression in that after Mrs. Raquiza got the total of P330,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank

connection with the first release of P1,000,000.00, he visited the respondent Judge in his house askin


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that he would also release the balance of P300,000.00 to the Raquiza children because part of the mo

would be used by complainant in going to the United States for his eye treatment; and that responden

promised to give the necessary order the following day. Complainant went to Pampanga the followinmorning per advice of respondent and saw the judge in his private chamber; that the judge invited

complainant to a corner of the room and told him that he needed money, that taken aback by such

alleged act of graft and corruption, complainant shouted in a very loud voice, "You are corrupt." Theis graft and corruption in this office and then left the room; but that following the saying, "a man in n

is a beggar", complainant called the judge a few days later and assistant. that they were reconciled bu

nonetheless. the respondent despite several requests from Atty. Yuzon, counsel for the complainant,

consistently failed to comply with his promise that he would release money for the Raquiza children;that after the reconciliation, complainant visited the respondent Judge in his house and the latter

promised to give the order the following day; that it was only after repeated trips of Atty. Yuzon or h

assistant. Mr. Gracio Dacutan, to Pampanga that the respondent Judge released the total amount ofP350,000.00 to the Raquiza children; that as the Raquiza children urgently needed some of the mone

for themselves, the balance was not enough anymore to finance the trip of the complainant to the Un

States; hence, he asked again the President to release another P1,000,000.00; that the complainantbrands the imposition of this hardships by respondent Judge, which is supposedly a case of extortion

means of oppression where respondent subjected complainant, his counsel Atty. Yuzon and his assist

Gracio Dacutan, had to shuttle everyday for a period of about one month between Manila to Pampangto get the promised order of release which never came up to the present.

IV As to the fourth count, the complainant charges the respondent of bribery, in that "he (respond

gets bribe money from Mrs. Raquiza and surely from all other parties;" that on the first release of

P1,000,000.00, respondent Judge extorted P70,000.00 from Mrs. Raquiza out of the release of aboutP330,000.00.

In his comment or answer to the charges, respondent alleged that those indictments are devoid of fact

and/or legal basis because:

As to Charge I (Violation of Anti-Graft Law) and II (knowingly rendering unjust and illegal judgmen

respondent Mrs. Raquiza still has a share in the Castellvi Estate because by testamentary provision

approved by final judgment, Natividad Castellvi Raquiza as instituted heir, is entitled to 2/8 share of estate although one-half (1/2) of said 2/3 had been transferred to her children by virtue of a comprom

agreement submitted by Urbane Pobre in Civil Case No. 2761 entitled Urbano Pobre vs. NatividadCastellvi-Raquiza (Exhs. 2 & 3, Orders of Judge Honorio Romero dated March 29, 1971 and May 26

1971 in Sp. Proc. No. 6824). Note that a case for reconveyance was filed by Natividad Castellvi Raqu

(Civil Case No. 3509 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against her children. Said case is stipending hearing and decision according to respondent. Respondent avers that it was only after carefu

study of the records (16 big volumes) of Special Proceeding No. 6824 that he granted on June 19, 19

the motion of Mrs. Raquiza filed on January 23, 1975 for authority to obtain loan believing that Mrs.

Raquiza still has a share, interest and participation in the subject estate.

Respondent also explained that the testate estate of Alfonso Castellvi is still on liquidation when the release of 1 million was made by the government in partial payment of the expropriated property of t

estate; that as several claim of creditors have not been paid, respondent was not inclined at the outset allow any Cash release; and that the second release of 1 million could not have been intended solely

the Raquiza children, much less for the use of the complainant in his trip to the United States for his

treatment as claimed; that the reason given in complainant's request to the President dated December

1975 for the release of the P1 million out of the P2,600,000.00 was that the money would be used "inpatenting the Super-Gas Reducer in all car manufacturing countries in the world" (Exh. 5); that

complainant's representative capacity as attorney-in-fact of his children as well as the purpose for

seeking the withdrawal of the entire second release of P1 million is questionable because Lily Raquizone of the complainant's children, denied having signed or granted any power of attorney (p. 32, Roll


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that in view of the foregoing, respondent judge could not properly be charged with having knowingly

rendered an unjust judgment or interlocutory order.

As to Charge III (IX) by Means of Oppression):

Respondent states that the commission of attempted extortion against complainant is highly improbabthat complainant did not describe the' shouting spree' incident faithfully because:

Respondent does not approve of being approached in his house in connection with his official functio

and without promising complainant anything, advised the latter to see respondent in his office; that thfollowing morning when complainant went to his court chamber, Atty. Celia Macapagal and otherlawyers and two or three of the court's personnel were inside the chamber; that complainant then plea

for help that he would be able to go to the United States for his eye treatment, saying that after all the

first release was authorized by the President precisely for that purpose; that complainant wanted in thcorresponding order to be issued by respondent that so much amount of his children's shares in the

second release should be specifically ordered paid or given to complainant; that in a nice way,

respondent explained to complainant of the unsettled claims of creditors of the late that even morecomplainant was not the movant but his children and what his children would want to lend him is a

matter between him and his children; that complainant then replied, "Judge, if you would not give me

the small amount I need, I will be your number one enemy ... you chut"; that respondent stood up to

reach for his crutches (respondent then had swollen foot due to his arthritis) and ordered 'Arrest thatman' but complainant had already left; that complainant's accusation is the height of absurdity since

respondent would not be that stupid and careless to choose his court chamber (barely 2-1/2 x 3-1/2

meters) and in the presence of many listeners and viewers to attempt an extortion against complainanman of known stature, an ex-Governor. Congressman, Cabinet member and a delegate to the

Constitutional Convention.

As to Charge IV - (Bribery):

Respondent explains this is unthinkable because

Petitioner should surely admit that Mrs. Raquiza is even hard to converwith. To talk to her, one has to speak loud or shout. She could much le

be whispered to. This considering, one could not ask something from h

without being heard. Write her a note, for evidence in order to be caughThis is absurd.

that authority was given Mrs. Raquiza only on June 19, 1975 almost 5 months of study of her motion

filed on January 23, 1975; that the authority was for P500,000.00, which was even reduced to only

P333,000.00 or 1/3 of P1,000,000.00 when such release was known.

As the letter complaint and the answer or comment of respondent are both verified, they were adopte

part of the respective evidence of the parties. They also introduced additional oral and documentaryproofs. Besides complainant, his counsel Atty. Manuel Yuson and the latter's assistant. Gracio Dacut

testified. For the respondent, Atty. Celia Macapagal, Atty. Vicente Sicat and respondent Judge offeretestimonial and documentary evidence.

After a careful study of all the evidence on record, I find the charges not substantiated. There is factu

and legal basis for respondent's conclusion that Mrs. Raquiza has still a share or participation in the

Castellvi estate and that Mrs. Gozun has likewise a right to be given a share of the second release. Asthe first (Mrs. Raquiza,' her right as instituted heir of 2/3 of the estate is recognized by final judgmen

although by compromise agreement, 1/2 was transferred by her to her children (Exh. 2). The Raquiza

children sought a reconsideration of the order of Judge Romero (Exh. 2), but the motion was denied b

the same Judge (Exh. 3). There appears no appeal from said order.


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Moreover, the Raquiza children subsequently respected the remaining share of their mother by expre

agreeing to her request to the Philippine Veterans Bank president for additional loan (Exh. 4).

It is not also rebutted that several claims chargeable against the estate has not been completely settledfor which reason respondent at the outset refused to grant any release. However, for humanitarian

considerations and

... mainly on the basis of the President's handwritten note on complainant's letter, date

July 16, 1975 (Exh. 8), respondent authorized the withdrawal from the funds of the

Castellvi Estate in the Philippines Veterans Bank derived from the first release of P1million, for the delivery to the Raquiza children Daisy, Antonio. Jr.. Levy and Dougla

in the amount of P248,000.00, and an additional amount of P20,000.00, under his orde

dated August 20, 1975 and November 24, 1975 respectively; and a separate amount ofP60,000.00 to complainant's daughter Lily Raquiza (Exh. 9 and 19); and after the said

Raquiza children were granted their aforementioned shares, respondent ordered the

immediate payment of Mrs. Raquiza's loan by the said bank, in the amount ofP330,000.00;

19 That under his letter, dated December 29, 1975, (Exh. 5),

complainant requested again the President to release P1 million from th

funds of the Castellvi Estate to the Raquiza children to be used by thempatenting the Super-Gas Reducer in all car manufacturing countries in

world', and after the President authorized the release of PI million by th

Government subject to the availability of funds, the Treasurer of thePhilippines, following the recommendation of the TJAG of the AFP,

issued Treasury Warrant No. D-281-948 for payment to the Castellvi

Estate, which was actually released to the Phil. Veterans Bank, by theArmy, on February 11, 1976;

As regards the payment to Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun it appears that of the three expropriated

properties, one parcel belongs to the Castellvi Estate while two parcels are owned by Maria Nieves

Toledo, who at the time when payment was ordered, had not yet received any partial payment and hafiled a motion for execution (Civil Case No. 1623 or G.R. No. L-20620) praying for partial payment.

respondent correctly argues, '... for reasons of justice and equity (he) just followed the mandate of the

Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974, for payment of the corresponding justcompensation to both owners of the properties condemned.' Thus, in sharing landowner Maria Nieve

Toledo Gozun in the second release, respondent had factual and legal basis and can hardly be brande

giving "unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference" under paragraph (e), section 3 of the Anti-Gra

Law.

Similarly, considering that Mr. Raquiza has a sham in the Castellvi estate which is still on liquidation

that the second release could not have been intended solely for the Raquiza children nor for

complainant's trip to the United States for his alleged eye treatment; and that complainant's authority represent all his children had been questioned by no less than one of his children, I find it hard torespondent Judge knowing that they unjust and illegal.

Relative to the charge of extortion by means of oppression, the undersigned believes as more probabl

the version testified to by the respondent at the investigation as well as in his verified comment. Indeit would be stretching credibility to its b point to believe that in a small room (2-1/2 x 3-1/2 meters) t

respondent would have thrown all precautions to the winds and demand bribe money in the presence

Atty. Celia Macapagal, Atty. Sicat, Atty. Yuzon, Fiscal Macalino, Messrs. Yalong and Dacutan-

Complainant's version cannot stand the test of common experience and the ordinary instincts of humanature and therefore should be disbelieved. There is no evidence presented by complainant that when

visited that respondent in the latter's residence in Quezon City, the respondent asked for money. Ther


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more privacy in respondent's home rather than in his small office and yet respondent in a place of

absolute privacy never asked or demanded for bribe money.

One salient fact also denies the veracity of the version of the complainant relative to the "shoutingincident." It is not denied that at the time the respondent could hardly stand and walk without crutche

He could not have stood therefore on a corner of the court chamber during the incident. What is more

he was seated on a chair at the end of his desk to the right and that since complainant was only one

meter away from him, the conversation naturally would have been audible and the witnesses inside thcourt chamber never testified that the respondent was asking money from the complainant. The evide

also remains unrebutted that a few days after the said incident, the complainant apologized to therespondent for what he had done. On top of it all, it is difficult to believe that the respondent would hcommitted extortion or attempted extortion against the complainant, who is reputedly of high stature,

counting that he was a former provincial governor, congressman, cabinet member and delegate to the

Constitutional Convention and it could have taken so much nerve and daring to do such an act.

As regards the fourth charge of bribery, complainant claims that Mrs. Raquiza had told him that out othe P300,000.00 she obtained as loan from the first release of P1 million, she gave P70,000.00 to the

respondent, the undersigned also finds that this charge was not substantiated. In the first place, the

testimony is purely hearsay. As the complainant testified on cross-examination:

Q Your other charge is bribery. You mentioned that the Judge extorted P70,000 fromMrs. Raquiza, what is your basis ?

A It was told to me by Mrs. Raquiza.

Q I thought you are a widower?

A I am separated from her, but she comes to the house very often.

INVESTIGATOR:

May the Investigator inquire, is that separation legal

A I filed a divorce in the States.

xxx xxx xxx

Q So you are not a widower?

A I am a widower.

Q I cannot understand that?

A Yes, I am married to another woman.

Q You said you were told by Mrs. Raquiza?

A She told me she practically spent 1/2 of what was given to her.

xxx xxx xxx

Q So, your basis is what you got from Mrs. Raquiza

A Yes.


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Q Of your own personal knowledge, you don't know that?

A I have not seen Mrs. Raquiza giving the money to him. (pp. 16 17,18, tsn., Feb. 2,

1977)

Mrs. Raquiza was not presented to testify on the matter. The rules even in an administrative casedemands that if the respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offen

the evidence presented against him should be competent and derived from direct knowledge. The

judiciary, to which respondent belongs, no less demands that before its member could be faulted, it

should be only after due investigation and based on competent proofs, no less. This is all the more sowhen as in this case the charges are penal in nature.

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonab

doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconducin office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in regard to

admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply (33 C.J. 945, see. 47); also National

Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) vs. Martinez, 62 SCRA 411; Castral vs.Bullecer 64 SCRA 289; Melquiades Udani Jr. vs. Pagharion 65 SCRA 549)

Parenthetically, under Count I and II, 'misconduct' also implies a wrongful intention and not a mere e

of judgment' (Buenaventura v. Hon. Mariano V. Benedicto, 38 SCRA 71). It results that even ifrespondent were not collect in his legal conclusions, his judicial actuations cannot be regarded as gramisconduct, unless the contrary sufficiently appears. And undersigned finds, as above discussed, that

complainant's evidence is wanting in this respect.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that the charges against the respondent be dismissed

lack of merit.

We have reviewed the record, including the pt of the testimonies of the witnesses and the other evidence submitted bhe parties. After careful consideration thereof, We find the conclusions of fact and the recommendations of the

nvestigator in the above report to be well taken and fully sup. ported by the evidence on record.

ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Bautista is approved, the respondent judge is exonerated and t

administrative case against him is dismissal The petition to transfer Special Proceedings No. 6824 to another judge idenied.

SECTION 10NITAFAN V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUEFACTS: Nitafan and some others seek to prohibit the CIR from making any deduction of withholding taxes from talaries or compensation for such would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. On J

7 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the directive of the Chief Jus

SSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the payment of income

HELD: What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during tontinuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. Butalaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.

SECTION 11DE LA LLANA V. ALBA

Constitutional Law Political Question if there is no question of law involved BP 129


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n 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purpos

was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would

emoved because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provi

which provides the security of tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges N

Congress.

SSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline judges of inferior co

and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judgUnder the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to

distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent off

After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who wo

hereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairmen

ecurity of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is on

eparation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically,

devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislati

herefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumb

ustices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration.

fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not ren

advisory opinions.No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its

prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a c

where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vac

positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. Th

s no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by t

iberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power

eorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored

disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discern

xcept to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with

basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalida

tatute, the former is to be preferred.

PEOPLE V. JUDGE GACOTT JR.Facts: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacottdismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand anfine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the

ssue: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline respondudge

Held: To support the Courts ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Custice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutio

Commission of which Regalado was also a mem

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two situati

nvisaged therein. The first clause which states that the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lowourts, is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exer

hereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard


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decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurd

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated fromfirst by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can order their dismissal by a vote of a majority

he Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein. In this insta

he administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court it

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, a decision en ban

needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judicia

disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceedP10, 000.00 or b

ndeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardleshe sanctions, imposable or imposed, would r

Documents

Judicial Department Cases - 1