JS S BARRIS TERS RULES · js s barris ters rules ˝˙ ˝ ˇ ˛ ˇ ˇ˘ ... • transamerica life canada v oakwood associates advisory group ltd, 2019 abca 276 1.4 • beck v arres

ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS

Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP

JSS BA RRI STERS RULES OCTOBER 2019

Volume 2 Issue 15

Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP is pleased to provide summaries of recent Court Decisions which consider the Alberta Rules of Court. Our website, www.jssbarristers.ca, also features a Cumulative Summary of Court Decisions which consider the Alberta Rules of Court. The Cumulative Summary is organized by the Rule considered.

Below is a list of the Rules (and corresponding decisions which apply or interpret those Rules) that are addressed in the case summaries that follow.

1.2 • BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523

• WOODBRIDGEHOMESINCVANDREWS,2019ABQB585

• METISNATIONOFALBERTAASSOCIATIONLOCALCOUNCIL#63VALBERTA(CORPORATEREGISTRY),

2019ABQB614

• TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB623

• SCHREIBERVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2019ABQB641

• ANCTIMBERLTDVALBERTA(MINISTEROFAGRICULTUREANDFORESTRY),2019ABQB653


• REYESVDYCK,2019ABQB667

• TRANSAMERICALIFECANADAVOAKWOODASSOCIATESADVISORYGROUPLTD,2019ABCA276




1.5 • ATBFINANCIALVCOREDENTPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB680

• CWCWELLSERVICESCORPVOPTIONINDUSTRIESINC,2019ABCA331

2.6 • CLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTDVGOCOMMUNITYCENTRE,2019ABQB706

2.10 • ALBERTAUNIONOFPROVINCIALEMPLOYEESVALBERTA,2019ABQB553

2.22 • UBAHVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCESLIMITED,2019ABQB692


3.2 • TIGERCALCIUMSERVICESINCVSAZWAN,2019ABQB623

3.15 • HAZKARDEVELOPMENTSINCVCOCHRANE(TOWN),2019ABQB552

• LEAVITTVCANADIANCOUNCILOFINDEPENDENTLABORATORIES,2019ABQB589

• IRVINEVKRISTENSEN,2019ABQB607


2019ABQB614

• ALBERTA’SFREEROAMINGHORSESSOCIETYVALBERTA,2019ABQB714

3.16 • ALBERTA’SFREEROAMINGHORSESSOCIETYVALBERTA,2019ABQB714

3.22 • ALLERGANINCVALBERTA(JUSTICEANDSOLICITORGENERAL),2019ABQB610

• ALBERTA’SFREEROAMINGHORSESSOCIETYVALBERTA,2019ABQB714

3.23 • MBBVALBERTA(CHILDANDFAMILYSERVICES),2019ABQB621


3.26 • REYESVDYCK,2019ABQB667

ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS 2

JSS BARR IST E RS RULES


3.27 • MACLEODVTRIBECAINNERCITYCUSTOMHOMESINC,2019ABQB524


3.30 • BROWNVBLISS,2019ABQB530


3.45 • BODNARCAPITALCORPORATION(301831ALBERTALTD)VSYNERGYPROJECTSLTD,

2019ABQB528

3.62 • SWEETLANDVMACINNIS,2019ABQB736

3.65 • WOODBRIDGEHOMESINCVANDREWS,2019ABQB585

• HUFFVZUK,2019ABQB691

• SWEETLANDVMACINNIS,2019ABQB736

3.68 • RDXTECHNOLOGIESCORPORATIONVAPPEL,2019ABQB477

• OUELLETTEVLAWSOCIETYOFALBERTA,2019ABQB492

• HUGHESVSTEWART,2019ABQB494

• DEVINEVALBERTASUPPORTS,2019ABQB502

• BILEYVINTERNATIONALALLIANCEOFTHEATRICALSTAGEEMPLOYEES,2019ABQB506

• PEETSVALBERTA(JUSTICE&SOLICITORGENERAL),2019ABQB507

• LAIRDVALBERTA(TRANSPORTATIONSAFETYBOARD),2019ABQB567


• KNAKEVPERERA,2019ABQB581

• IRVINEVKRISTENSEN,2019ABQB607


2019ABQB614

• YAREMKEVICHVJACULA,2019ABQB620

• BAHADARVREALESTATECOUNCILOFALBERTA,2019ABQB633

• SMITHVCANADA(CORRECTIONALSERVICECANADA),2019ABQB639

• GACIASVEQUIFAXCANADACO,2019ABQB640


• ATBFINANCIALVCOREDENTPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB680

• UBAHVCANADIANNATURALRESOURCESLIMITED,2019ABQB692

• BELCZOWSKIVREID,2019ABQB709

• ORRVALOOK,2019ABQB713

• KOZINAVREDLICK,2019ABQB749


3.74 • SWEETLANDVMACINNIS,2019ABQB736

• HEVAPEGAAPPEALBOARD,2019ABCA298

3.75 • HAZKARDEVELOPMENTSINCVCOCHRANE(TOWN),2019ABQB552

• LEAVITTVCANADIANCOUNCILOFINDEPENDENTLABORATORIES,2019ABQB589





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www.jssbarristers.ca

4.22 • HLFNINDUSTRYRELATIONSCORPORATIONVHORSEMAN,2019ABQB564


• RDXTECHNOLOGIESCORPORATIONVAPPEL,2019ABCA338

4.29 • FJNVJK,2019ABCA305

• LAYVLAY,2019ABCA355

4.31 • LAUGHRENVMCALEER,2019ABQB501

• BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523

• EDGARVSECURITYNATIONALINSURANCECOMPANY,2019ABQB628

• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2019ABQB634


• NAHALVGOTTLIEB,2019ABQB650

• KENSINGTONMASTERBUILDERSINCVKRUGER,2019ABQB661




4.33 • LAUGHRENVMCALEER,2019ABQB501

• BECKVARRESCAPITALINC,2019ABQB523

• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2019ABQB634


• NAHALVGOTTLIEB,2019ABQB650

• ROYALBANKOFCANADAVJ&SENGINEERINGSOLUTIONSINC,2019ABQB693

• WIEBEVWEINRICHCONTRACTINGLTD,2019ABCA323



• RIEGERVPLAINSMIDSTREAMCANADAULC,2019ABQB666

• PEMBINAPIPELINECORPORATIONVCONEY,2019ABQB699

5.6 • CHARUKVTERRAVESTINDUSTRIESLIMITEDPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB747

5.7 • CHARUKVTERRAVESTINDUSTRIESLIMITEDPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB747

5.10 • WOODBRIDGEHOMESINCVANDREWS,2019ABQB585

5.12 • ARCHERVRIBBONCOMMUNICATIONSCANADAULC,2019ABQB481


5.17 • RIEGERVPLAINSMIDSTREAMCANADAULC,2019ABQB666

5.19 • PEMBINAPIPELINECORPORATIONVCONEY,2019ABQB699


• PEMBINAPIPELINECORPORATIONVCONEY,2019ABQB699


6.3 • ATHWALVMATHER,2019ABQB676


6.11 • ANCTIMBERLTDVALBERTA(MINISTEROFAGRICULTUREANDFORESTRY),2019ABQB653




6.14 • P&CLAWFIRMMANAGEMENTINCVSABOURIN,2019ABQB537

• OWNERS:CONDOMINIUMPLANNO7721985VBREAKWELL,2019ABQB674

• CLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTDVGOCOMMUNITYCENTRE,2019ABQB706

• CHARUKVTERRAVESTINDUSTRIESLIMITEDPARTNERSHIP,2019ABQB747


6.31 • CHEMTRADEELECTROCHEMINCVSTIKEMANELLIOTTLLP,2019ABQB562


• CHEMTRADEELECTROCHEMINCVSTIKEMANELLIOTTLLP,2019ABQB562

• ATHWALVMATHER,2019ABQB676

6.34 • CHEMTRADEELECTROCHEMINCVSTIKEMANELLIOTTLLP,2019ABQB562


• KENSINGTONMASTERBUILDERSINCVKRUGER,2019ABQB661

• OWNERS:CONDOMINIUMPLANNO7721985VBREAKWELL,2019ABQB674




• KOZINAVREDLICK,2019ABQB749

7.9 • ARNDTVSCANDINAVIANCULTURALSOCIETYOFCALGARY,2019ABQB475

8.7 • NAHALVGOTTLIEB,2019ABQB650

9.4 • HUGHESVSTEWART,2019ABQB494


• PEETSVALBERTA(JUSTICE&SOLICITORGENERAL),2019ABQB507


• YAREMKEVICHVJACULA,2019ABQB620

• GACIASVEQUIFAXCANADACO,2019ABQB640



9.13 • MAKVTJK,2019ABQB547

• 1905393ALBERTALTDVSERVUSCREDITUNIONLTD,2019ABCA269

9.15 • HAMMONDVHAMMOND,2019ABQB522

10.2 • WALSHVSTEPHENMKHOPEPROFESSIONALCORPORATION,2019ABQB516





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10.29 • STACKARDV1256009ALBERTALTD,2019ABQB480



• CALLAWAYVOFFICEOFTHEELECTIONCOMMISSIONER(ALBERTA),2019ABQB573

• STEERVCHICAGOTITLEINSURANCECOMPANY,2019ABQB670

• MANSONINSULTATIONPRODUCTSLTDVCROSSROADSC&IDISTRIBUTORS,2019ABQB684

10.30 • LAYVLAY,2019ABCA355

10.31 • CALLAWAYVOFFICEOFTHEELECTIONCOMMISSIONER(ALBERTA),2019ABQB573



10.33 • STACKARDV1256009ALBERTALTD,2019ABQB480

• CHEMTRADEELECTROCHEMINCVSTIKEMANELLIOTTLLP,2019ABQB562

• CALLAWAYVOFFICEOFTHEELECTIONCOMMISSIONER(ALBERTA),2019ABQB573



10.44 • ALBERTAHEALTHSERVICESVWANG,2019ABCA328


10.45 • ALBERTAHEALTHSERVICESVWANG,2019ABCA328

11.21 • ARCHERVRIBBONCOMMUNICATIONSCANADAULC,2019ABQB481


11.27 • REYESVDYCK,2019ABQB667


12.49 • STALZER(ESTATE)VSTALZER,2019ABQB658

13.4 • SLAWSKYVEDMONTON(CITY),2019ABCA302

13.5 • ALBERTA’SFREEROAMINGHORSESSOCIETYVALBERTA,2019ABQB714


13.6 • STALZER(ESTATE)VSTALZER,2019ABQB658

• KENTVMACDONALD,2019ABQB669


13.7 • KENTVMACDONALD,2019ABQB669

• HUFFVZUK,2019ABQB691



13.18 • ANCTIMBERLTDVALBERTA(MINISTEROFAGRICULTUREANDFORESTRY),2019ABQB653


• ATHWALVMATHER,2019ABQB676


14.4 • KAUFMANNVEDMONTON(CITY)POLICESERVICE,2019ABCA272

• SANTOROVBANKOFMONTREAL,2019ABCA322





• RANAVRANA,2019ABCA278

• ALANENVELLIOTT,2019ABCA290

• SRGTAKAMIYACOLTDV58376ALBERTALTD,2019ABCA301

• ALBERTAHEALTHSERVICESVWANG,2019ABCA328

• MAKISVCOLLEGEOFPHYSICIANSANDSURGEONSOFALBERTA(COMPLAINTREVIEWCOMMITTEE),

2019ABCA341


14.8 • RANAVRANA,2019ABCA278

• SLAWSKYVEDMONTON(CITY),2019ABCA302

14.32 • SANTOROVBANKOFMONTREAL,2019ABCA322

14.36 • SLAWSKYVEDMONTON(CITY),2019ABCA302

14.37 • 1905393ALBERTALTDVSERVUSCREDITUNIONLTD,2019ABCA269

• SLAWSKYVEDMONTON(CITY),2019ABCA302

14.47 • TEMPLANZAVFORD,2019ABCA309

14.57 • HEVAPEGAAPPEALBOARD,2019ABCA298

14.59 • BRUENVUNIVERSITYOFCALGARY,2019ABCA275


14.67 • RDXTECHNOLOGIESCORPORATIONVAPPEL,2019ABCA338

14.88 • BRUENVUNIVERSITYOFCALGARY,2019ABCA275

• FJNVJK,2019ABCA305



15.6 • SCHREIBERVCANADA(ATTORNEYGENERAL),2019ABQB641

SCHEDULE C • BILEYVINTERNATIONALALLIANCEOFTHEATRICALSTAGEEMPLOYEES,2019ABQB506


• FJNVJK,2019ABCA305

BECK V ARRES CAPITAL INC, 2019 ABQB 523 (MASTER PROWSE) Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 1.4 (Procedural Orders), 3.31 (Statement of Defence), 4.1 (Responsibility of Parties to Manage Litigation), 4.2 (What the Responsibility Includes), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 13.8 (Pleadings: Other Contents)

TheDefendantsappliedtodismisstheActionforlongdelay

pursuanttoRules4.31and4.33.ThePlaintiffs’Statement

ofClaimwasfiledinMayof2013.TheDefendantshad

neverfiledaStatementofDefence,buthadrespondedto

andbeeninvolvedinvariousApplicationsintheAction

andinrelatedActions,includingarelatedforeclosure

Actionandinsolvencyproceedingsrespectingoneofthe

Defendants.

RegardingdismissalfordelaypursuanttoRule4.33,

MasterProwsefoundthattheDefendantshadcontinued

toparticipateintheActionatthesametimethattheyhad

filedandpreparedfortheirdismissalApplication.Assuch,

theMasterheldthattheActionshouldnotbedismissed

onaccountofRule4.33(2)(b),whichstatesthattheCourt

mustdismissanActioniftherehasbeenover3yearsof

delayunless“anapplicationhasbeenfiledorproceedings

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havebeentakensincethedelayandtheapplicanthas

participatedinthemforapurposeandtotheextentthat,in

theopinionoftheCourt,warrantstheactioncontinuing”.

RegardingtheDefendants’Applicationtodismissthe

ActionforprejudicialdelaypursuanttoRule4.31,Master

Prowsefoundthat“relevantevents[had]continuedtooccur

subsequenttotheinitialflurryofactivityfrommid-2013

toearly2014”,includingoneoftheDefendantsbeingput

intoreceivershipin2015andintobankruptcyin2017,and

anotheroftheDefendantsbeingstruckfromthecorporate

registryforaperiodoftime.Asaresult,therelevantfactsin

theActiondidnotalloccurpriortothefilingoftheStatement

ofClaimin2013andthengostale:theycontinuedasthe

Actioncontinued.MasterProwsenotedthatpursuanttoRule

13.8(1),eventsoccurringaftertheStatementofClaimwas

filedmayberelevanttoincludeinpleadings.

MasterProwsealsonotedthatpursuanttoRule1.2(3)

(a),thepartiesaretomanagethelitigationquicklyand

economically.Further,Rule4.1statesthattheparties

areresponsibleformanagingtheirdispute,andRule4.2

requiresthemtorespond“inasubstantivewayandwithin

areasonabletimetoanyproposalfortheconductofan

action”.GiventhattheDefendantshadwaited6yearsto

fileaStatementofDefence,whenRule3.31(3)(a)says

theyshoulddosowithin20days,MasterProwsefoundthat

theDefendantshadnotmettheirobligationtomovethe

matterforward,andalsoheldthattheyhadnotestablished

significantprejudiceasaresultofdelaysintheAction.The

Rule4.31Applicationwasaccordinglyalsodismissed.

Finally,MasterProwseaddressedadisputebetweenthe

partiesrespectingtheDefendantmortgageadministrator

trustee’sfees,whichwasnotcurrentlypartoftheAction.

MasterProwsenotedandthatpursuanttoRule1.2,the

Rulesshouldbeusedtoidentifyissuesindisputeand

facilitatethequickestmeansofresolvingthem;and

pursuanttoRule1.4,theCourtmaymakeOrdersand

directionstoimplementthepurposeoftheRules.Assuch,

MasterProwsedirectedthepartiesto“considerandcome

forwardwithproposalsastohowtoadjudicatethefees

issueinthequickestwayattheleastexpense”pursuantto

Rule1.4.

WOODBRIDGE HOMES INC V ANDREWS, 2019 ABQB 585 (MANDZIUK J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings) and 5.10 (Subsequent Disclosure of Records)

Thiscaseinvolvedadisputeoverpaymentforservicesand

materialsprovidedfortheconstructionofamodularhome.

TheCourt’sconsiderationoftheRulesinitsDecisionwas

largelyconfinedtothepreliminarymatterofamending

pleadings.

ThePlaintiffarguedatTrialthattheDefendanthadbeen

unjustlyenrichedbyconstructionservicesandmaterialsit

hadfurnishedtotheDefendant.TheDefendantrebutted

thisallegationbyarguingthattherewasa“donative

intent”withrespecttotheservicesandmaterialsprovided,

whichisajuristicreasonforanyenrichment.ThePlaintiff

counteredbypointingoutthattheDefendanthadnotpled

donativeintentorlegitimateexpectationsinitsStatement

ofDefencewhichpromptedtheDefendanttopointoutthat

thePlaintiffhadalsoneglectedtopleadunjustenrichment

initsStatementofClaim.Thepartiesbothsoughttoamend

theirpleadingstoincludetheseclaims.

TheCourtdecidedthatitwouldadjudicateonallofthe

mattersandargumentsraisedregardlessofwhetherthey

hadbeenincludedinthepleadings.TheCourtstatedthat

thisapproachisconsistentwiththespiritofRule1.2to

facilitateproceedingsinajustandcost-effectiveway.

Moreover,theCourtconfirmedthatRule3.65allowsthe

Courttoacceptamendmentstopleadingsregardlessof

theirlateness,subjecttofourexceptions:wheredoingso

wouldcauseapartyprejudicenotcompensablewithCosts;

whereanamendmentis“hopeless”;wheretheamendment

seekstoaddapartyorcauseofactionaftertheexpiryofa

limitationperiod;orwherethereisanelementofbadfaith

associatedwiththeamendment.Noneoftheseexceptions

appliedtoanyoftheamendmentssoughtbyeitherparty.

Therefore,alloftheamendmentswereallowed.

Afterdecidingonthemeritsofthecase,theCourt

addressedtheissueofCosts.AttheoutsetofTrial,the

CourtwasadvisedthatthePlaintiffhadfailedtoproduce




sought.LocalCouncil#63wasabletomeetthistest,and

HoJ.determinedthatdeclaratoryreliefwassuitablein

thiscase.

AstheRegistrarhadsuspendedLocalCouncil#63

pendingadeclarationfromtheCourtastothevalidity

ofthedissolution,HoJ.determinedthattheOriginating

Applicationwasanappropriatemethodtoobtainresolution

ofthisissue.TheCourtfoundthatRule1.2supportedthis

methodofresolutionasitwas“themosttimelyandcost-

effectivewaytoprovidetheRegistrarwithdirection.”

TheApplicationunderRule3.68tostriketheOriginating

Applicationwasdismissed.

TIGER CALCIUM SERVICES INC V SAZWAN, 2019 ABQB 623 (SHELLEY J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 1.4 (Procedural Orders) and 3.2 (How to Start an Action)

TheApplicantsoughtanassessmentofdamagesresulting

fromthegrantingandexecutionofinjunctiveandAnton

PillerreliefwhichwasoverturnedonAppeal.Notingfactual

disputesandcredibilityissues,theRespondentscross-

appliedtohavetheassessmentofdamagesconvertedintoa

separateAction,pursuanttoRule3.2(6).

TheCourtrecognizedthediscretionavailabletoitin

controllingitsownprocess,asmanifestedthroughthe

widearrayofproceduralOrdersauthorizedunderRule1.4,

andthebreadthofthedirectiveinRule1.2“toprovidea

meansbywhichclaimscanbefairlyandjustlyresolved

inorbyacourtprocessinatimelyandcost-effective

way”.Inexercisingthatdiscretion,theCourtdeclinedto

directthattheApplicationbeheardbywayofaseparate

Action.AstheexistingActionhadbeendiscontinued

againsttheApplicant,theApplicant“shouldnotbeput

throughtheexpense,time,andenergyrequiredofafull

action.”JusticeShelleyfoundthatthefactualdisputesand

credibilityissuescouldberesolvedbyCourtdirectionshort

ofcompellingaseparateActionandsetoutaprocesstobe

followedinarrivingatthosedirections.

some250pagesofrelevantrecordswhichresultedinextra

TrialtimeandinconveniencefortheDefendant’scounsel.

TheCourtreiteratedthatRule5.10requirespartiesto

continuouslydiscloserelevantandmaterialrecordsevenif

theyarediscoveredorcreatedafteranAffidavitofRecords.

TheCourtthereforeawarded$1,000inCoststothe

Defendantforthelatedisclosurewhileotherwiserequiring

thepartiestobeartheirownCostsbecausetherewas

mixed-successonthemeritsoftheAction.

METIS NATION OF ALBERTA ASSOCIATION LOCAL COUNCIL #63 V ALBERTA (CORPORATE REGISTRY), 2019 ABQB 614 (HO J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review) and 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

TheMetisNationofAlbertaAssociation(“MNAA”)was

registeredasanon-profitsociety.LocalCouncil#63was

arelated,incorporatedsociety.Duetotheformationofan

alternativeMetisassociationinthearea,themembersof

LocalCouncil#63actedtodissolveLocalCouncil#63.

MNAAdisputedthedissolution,sendingnoticetothe

Registrarthatthedissolutionwasexecutedinaccurately.

Inresponse,theRegistrarsuspendedLocalCouncil#63,

pendingadeclarationbyCourtOrderastothevalidityof

thedissolution.TheDirectorsofLocalCouncil#63then

filedanOriginatingApplicationunderRule3.15toobtain

theCourtOrderrequiredbytheRegistrar.

MNAAthenmadeanApplicationpursuanttoRule3.68to

striketheOriginatingApplication.

MadamJusticeHofoundthatthedirectorsofLocalCouncil

#63hadstandingtobringtheOriginatingApplication.The

directorsweremembersanddirectorsatthetimeofthe

attempteddissolutionandhadamaterialinterestanddirect

stakeintheissue.Further,HoJ.notedthattheCourthas

absolutediscretiontodecidewhethertograntdeclaratory

relief.DeclaratoryreliefmaybegrantedwheretheCourt

hasjurisdiction,thedisputeisrealandnottheoretical,the

Applicanthasagenuineinterestinthedispute,andthe

Respondenthasaninterestinopposingthedeclaration

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dismissalunderRule4.33.Schreiberarguedthat

dismissingtheActionwouldoffendhisrighttodueprocess

whichhealsoarguediscodifiedintheRules,asRule1.4

allowstheCourttosetasideanyprocessmandatedbythe

Rulesthatisanabuseofprocess.

TheCourtrejectedSchreiber’sarguments,reiteratingagain

thatRule4.33ismandatoryafterthreeormoreyears

havepassedwithoutasignificantadvance.TheCourt’s

assessmentunderRule4.33doesnotincludeaninquiry

intoprejudiceorthereasonforthedelay.Theobligationis

onthePlaintifftoadvancetheActionandtheDefendantis

undernoobligationtoassistwiththatapartfromrefraining

fromdeliberatelyobstructingtheprocess.ItwasSchreiber’s

responsibilitytoeitheradvancetheActionortoobtainan

agreementoraCourtOrdersuspendingthepassageoftime.

Schreiberhaddoneneitherofthesethings,andtherefore,

theCourtdismissedtheActionpursuanttoRule4.33.

ANC TIMBER LTD V ALBERTA (MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY), 2019 ABQB 653 (TOPOLNISKI J) Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 6.11 (Evidence at Application Hearings) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)

TheApplicant,theMinisterofAgricultureandForestry(the

“Minister”),soughtanOrderstrikingportionsofandentire

AffidavitsfiledinsupportofANCTimberLtd.’s(“ANC”)

intheunderlyingmotionforaninteriminjunctionand/or

interimstayofaforestrydirective(the“Directive”).The

DirectiveprimarilyconcernedrestrictionsonANC’sability

toharvesttimberunderthetermsofaforestmanagement

agreement(“FMA”).Afteranunsuccessfulbidtoobtain

regulatoryapprovaltoharvesttreesinanareacontemplated

bytheFMA,butprohibitedbytheDirective,ANCfileda

motionseekingtheabovenotedrelief(the“Underlying

Motion”).

ANCinitiallyreliedonvoluminousAffidavits,totalling

1576pages,intheUnderlyingMotion(the“Affidavits”).

TheMinisterrespondedwithamotiontostrikesome

43paragraphsoftheAffidavitsaswellasnumerous

SCHREIBER V CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL), 2019 ABQB 641 (MASTER BIRKETT)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 1.4 (Procedural Orders), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 15.6 (Resolution of Difficulty or Doubt)

ThePlaintiffinthisAction,Schreiber,attemptedto

resumetheActionfollowinghisextraditionfromCanada

andimprisonmentinGermanyforaperiodofyears.The

DefendantAttorneyGeneralthenappliedtodismissthe

ActionduetodelaypursuanttoRule4.33or,inthe

alternative,Rule4.31.Schreiberrespondedbyarguingthat

heshouldnotbeheldresponsiblefordelayresultingfrom

hisimprisonmentandthatdoingsowouldinterferewithhis

Charterrighttodueprocess.

TheCourtbeganbyconfirmingthatthedelayRulesmust

bereadinconjunctionwithRule1.2whichstatesthatthe

purposeoftheRulesistoprovidefairandjustresolutions

inatimelyandcost-effectivemanner.Moreover,theCourt

notedthatthisActionstraddledthetransitionfromthe

oldRulestothenewRules,andthatRule15.6allowsthe

Courttosuspendormodifytheapplicabilityofthecurrent

Rulestoavoidanunduedifficultyorinjusticearisingfrom

thetransition.However,theCourtalsonotedthatthe

now-expiredtransitionalRule15.4clarifiedthatthedelay

periodforActionspredatingthecurrentRuleswouldbe

eitherthreeyearsfromthecomingintoforceofthecurrent

Rules,orfiveyearsaspreviouslystatedintheformerRules,

whicheveroccurredfirst.Therefore,Schreiberhadthree

yearsfromthecomingintoforceofthecurrentRulesto

advancetheActioneveniftherehadbeenapreviousdelay

notexceedingafurthertwoyears.

Rule4.33requiresaCourttodismissanActionthathas

notbeensignificantlyadvancedforthreeormoreyears,

andinthiscasebothpartiesconcededthatadelayofmore

thanthreeyearshadoccurred.Therefore,therewasno

needfortheCourttoconsiderRule4.31whichallowsthe

CourttodismissanActionfordelayofanunspecificperiod

wherethedelayhascausedsignificantprejudice.Thekey

issuefortheCourttodeterminewaswhetherSchreiber’s

incarcerationamountedtoanexceptiontomandatory




exhibitsonthegroundsthattheevidencewasirrelevant,

unnecessary,hearsay,argument,conclusoryand/or

expertopinionevidence.Thecontestedexhibitsincluded

numerousthird-partyreports,newspaperarticles,maps,

andsomesummariespreparedbyunidentifiedsources

(the“ContestedEvidence”).TopolniskiJ.foundthatthe

overarchingissuewaswhethertheContestedEvidencewas

properlyadmissibleevidence,orwhetheritshouldbestruck

underRule3.68(4)(a).

JusticeTopolniskinotedagrowingtrendoflitigants

conductingresearchontheinternetandattaching“what

spewsforthtoanaffidavitwithoutregardtoitspropriety.”

Accordingly,HerLadyshippromptlydissuadedlitigantsof

anynotionthatthisconductwasappropriateorhelpful.

TopolniskiJ.reviewedRule13.18andfoundthatwhile

typicallyAffidavitsmustbeswornonthebasisofpersonal

information,theRulesdoallowforhearsayevidenceifit

isaccompaniedbyastatementprovidingthesourceof

theevidenceandthedeponent’sbeliefinitstruth.Her

LadyshipnotedthoughthattheCourtisnotmandatedto

acceptsuchevidence.

TurningtotheargumentofwhethertheContestedEvidence

wasexpertopinionevidence,TopolniskiJ.founditwas

tritelawthatexpertevidenceispermissibleoninterim

motionsandidentifiedRule6.11asspecificallyallowing

expertevidenceinAffidavitform.Indeterminingwhether

toaccepttheevidence,JusticeTopolniskithoroughly

reviewedtheseminalfactorsinR v Mohan,[1994]2SCR

9andconcludedthatthebenefitofadmittingsomeofthe

ContestedEvidenceoutweigheditscost.

Accordingly,incompliancewiththefoundationalRule1.2

forexpedientandcost-effectivehearings,JusticeTopolniski

struckseveralparagraphsandexhibitswithintheContested

Evidenceforbeingargumentative,conclusory,irrelevant,

and/orexpertopinionevidencewhileallowingsomeofthe

evidencetoremaininsupportoftheUnderlyingMotion.

TIGER CALCIUM SERVICES INC V SAZWAN, 2019 ABQB 665 (SHELLEY J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules) and 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay)

TheDefendantsappliedpursuanttoRule4.31todismiss

theActionfordelay.TheStatementofClaimhadbeenfiled

inDecemberof2016,andasofAugustof2019,theAction

hadnotproceededtoPart5Questioning.TheStatementof

ClaimoriginallynamedthirteenDefendants,andincluded

allegationsoffraudandconspiracywhichwerehotly

contested.TheDefendantshadfiledthirtyApplicationsin

theAction,whilethePlaintiffshadfilednine.

JusticeShelleyappliedthesixconsiderationsfor

ApplicationspursuanttoRule4.31setoutbytheCourtof

AppealinHumphreys v Trebilcock,2017ABCA116:1)

whetherthenon-movingpartyfailedtoadvancetheAction

tothepointthatalitigantactingreasonablywouldhave

attained;2)whethertheshortfallofprogressqualifiedas

inordinate;3)ifthedelaywasinordinate,didthenon-

movingpartyprovidedanexplanationforthedelay;4)if

thedelaywasinordinateandinexcusable,hasthedelay

impairedasufficientlyimportantinterestofthemoving

partytowarrantdismissaloftheAction(hasthemoving

partydemonstratedsignificantprejudice);5)ifthemoving

partyreliedonthepresumptionofsignificantprejudice

createdbyRule4.31(2)wherethedelaywasinordinate

andinexcusable,hasthenon-movingpartyrebuttedthe

presumption;and6)ifthemovingpartymetthecriteria

todismisstheActionunderRule4.31(1),wastherea

compellingreasonnottodismisstheAction?

TheDefendantsnotedthatthenatureoftheAction,

includingallegationsoffraud,requiredtheActiontobe

prosecutedwithgreaterdiligenceandexpediencythan

not.ThePlaintiffsreliedonRule1.2,whichrequiresboth

partiestoidentifytherealissuesindisputeandfacilitate

thequickestmeansofresolvingtheclaimattheleast

expense.

JusticeShelleynotedthattheActionwascomplexand

hotlycontested,andthattherewasnodelayconsidering

thecomplexityandcircumstancesoftheAction.Shelley

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J.notedthatiftherewasdelay,itwouldnotconstitute

inordinatedelay,andinanyevent,thePlaintiffshad

explainedthedelay,notingthesheervolumeofsteps

taken.JusticeShelleyconsideredwhethertheDefendants

hadsufferedsignificantprejudice,andnotedthatthe

Defendants’bareassertionofprejudicewasinsufficientto

establishlitigationornon-litigationprejudice.

JusticeShelleyfoundthattherewasnodelayorinordinate

delay,andthusnoremedieswereavailabletothe

Defendants.TheApplicationwasdismissedwithCoststo

thePlaintiffs.

REYES V DYCK, 2019 ABQB 667 (MASTER SCHULZ) Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of these Rules), 3.26 (Time for Service of Statement of Claim), 3.27 (Extension of Time for Service), 11.27 (Validating Service) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)

ThePlaintiffappliedforanextensionoftimetoservea

StatementofClaimpursuanttoRule3.27,notwithstanding

thatthe1-yearperiodforserviceunderRule3.26(1)had

alreadyexpired.Alternatively,thePlaintiffsoughtanOrder

validatingservicepursuanttoRule11.27.TheStatement

ofClaimrelatedtoinjuriesresultingfromamotorvehicle

accident.ThePlaintiffhadservedacourtesycopyofthe

StatementofClaimontheDefendant’sinsurer,andthen

engagedinnegotiationswiththeinsurer,butdidnot

personallyservetheDefendant.

MasterSchulzreviewedRule3.27andfoundthatthe

PlaintiffcouldapplyforanextensionpursuanttoRule

3.27(1)(c),whichpermitsanextensionoftimeforserving

aStatementofClaimwhere“specialorextraordinary

circumstancesexistresultingsolelyfromthedefendant’s

conductorfromtheconductofapersonwhoisnota

partytotheaction”;orpursuanttoRules3.27(a)(ii)or

3.27(a)(iii),whichapplywhere“liabilityisorwillnotbe

contested”,orwhereatimeperiodintheAction“willnot

bereliedonorwillbewaived”.

MasterSchulzfoundthatthePlaintiffreasonablybelieved

thatliabilitywasnotbeingcontestedbytheinsurer.The

Masterexplainedthatwheresuchareasonablebelief

exists,theCourtmayexerciseitsdiscretiontodetermine

whethertimeforserviceshouldbeextended.Sincethere

hadbeennounduedelay,andthe“goaloftimely,cost-

effectiveresolution”setoutinRule1.2wasbeingmet,

MasterSchulzexercisedhisdiscretiontorenewtimefor

serviceoftheStatementofClaimfor3months,pursuantto

Rule3.27(a)(ii).However,theMastercautionedcounselto

communicateclearlytoavoidsuchissuesarising.

TheMasternextconsideredwhether,inthealternative,

servicecouldbevalidatedpursuanttoRule11.27given

thatthePlaintiffhadservedtheDefendant’sinsurer.Under

Rule11.27(1),servicemaybevalidatedwherethemethod

ofserviceused“broughtorwaslikelytohavebroughtthe

documenttotheattentionofthepersontobeserved”.

MasterSchulznotedthattheevidencebeforetheCourtwas

locatedinthePlaintiff’sAffidavit,butmuchtheAffidavit

evidencewasnon-compliantwithRule13.18andcouldnot

berelieduponbecauseitwasbasedoninformation,and

thePlaintiffdidnotstatethatshebelievedtheinformation

tobetrue.Asaresult,theCourtwasnotsatisfiedthatthe

StatementofClaimwasbroughtorwaslikelytohavebeen

broughttotheDefendant’sattention,soservicecouldnot

bevalidated.

TRANSAMERICA LIFE CANADA V OAKWOOD ASSOCIATES ADVISORY GROUP LTD, 2019 ABCA 276 (SLATTER, O’FERRALL AND SCHUTZ JJA)Rules 1.2 (Purpose And Intention Of These Rules), 4.1 (Responsibilities Of Parties To Manage Litigation), 4.2 (What The Responsibility Includes) and 4.31 (Application To Deal With Delay)

TheAppellants(Defendants)appealedtheChambers

Judge’sOrderwhichaffirmedaMaster’sDecisionto

dismisstheAppellants’ApplicationtodismisstheAction

forinordinatedelaypursuanttoRule4.31.Atthetime

oftheApplication,theActionwasover10yearsold,and

Questioninghadnotyetbeencompleted.TheMasterand

theChambersJudgebothfoundthattherewasinordinate

delay,butbothdeterminedthatthedelaywasexcusableon

accountoftheAppellants’contributionstothedelay.The

MasterandChambersJudgebothalsofoundthattherewas

notsignificantprejudicetotheAppellants.




TheAppellantsassertedthattheChambersJudgeerredby

departingfromthesixstepanalysissetoutinHumphreys

v Trebilcock,2017ABCA116.ThePanelheldthat“there

isnouniversalmandatoryformula”fordeterminingthe

applicationofthedelayRules,andthattheessential

elementsofthetestaresetoutinthetextofRule4.31

itself.ThePanelheldthattherewasnoconceptualerrorin

thewaytheChambersJudgeanalyzedtheApplication.

ThePanelalsoconsideredtheAppellants’assertionthat

inactionbytheDefendantcannotcreateanexcusefordelay

bythePlaintiff.ThePanelnotedthatthePlaintiffdoeshave

the“primaryobligation”tomovethelitigationforwardand

thattheDefendantdoesnothavetotakeactionintheface

ofPlaintiffinaction;however,thePanelnotedthatthisdid

notdisplacetheDefendant’sdutytodischargeitsprocedural

obligationsandtocooperateinaneffectivewaywiththe

Plaintiff’seffortstoprogresstheAction.ThePanelnotedthat

Rules1.2and4.1bothestablishthegeneralobligationfor

allpartiestomanagelitigationandtoplanforitsresolution

inatimelyandcosteffectivemanner,andthattherewere

numerousexamplesofspecificdutiesonDefendantstotake

stepswithinaspecificorreasonableamountoftime.The

PanelthusconfirmedthataDefendant’sdelayisrelevantto

anApplicationunderRule4.31.

ThePanelheldthatthequestionofwhetherdelayis

excusableisaquestionoffactwhichisentitledto

deferenceunlessbasedonanerroroflaworprinciple.

ThePanelfoundthattheChambersJudgedidnoterrin

laworprinciplebyrelyingontheAppellants’conductto

findthatthedelaywasexcusable.TheAppellantsasserted

theChambersJudgeerredbyfindingthattherewasno

prejudiceonaccountofthedelay.ThePanelnotedthat

aChambersJudge’sconclusionastowhetherthereis

significantprejudicewhichwouldjustifydismissalofan

Actionisdiscretionaryandentitledtodeference.ThePanel

foundthattheChambersJudge’sfindingsweresupportable

ontherecordanddidnotdiscloseanyerrorsthatwould

justifyappellateintervention.

TheAppealwasdismissed.

ATB FINANCIAL V COREDENT PARTNERSHIP, 2019 ABQB 680 (NIELSEN ACJ) Rules 1.5 (Rule Contravention, Non-Compliance and Irregularities), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

TheApplicantsoughtSummaryJudgmentagainstoneof

theDefendantsregardingadebtandcontractualinterest

arisingfromapersonalguarantee,andanOrdersummarily

dismissingoralternativelystrikingtheDefendants’

Counterclaimagainstitasanabuseofprocessand

impropercollateralattack.TheApplicantalternatively

soughtSecurityforCostsiftheCounterclaimwasnotstruck

ordismissed.

NielsenA.C.J.notedthatRule3.68governsthestrikingof

claims,andthatthetestforgrantingSummaryJudgment

pursuanttoRule7.3wasrecentlyclarifiedbythe

AlbertaCourtofAppealinWeir-Jones Technical Services

Incorporated v Purolator Courier Ltd,2019ABCA49.

TheburdenisonthepartyseekingSummaryJudgmentto

demonstratethattheDefendanthasnomeritoriousdefence

totheAction;whilethepartyresistingSummaryJudgment

mustshowthatthereisagenuineissueforTrial,orthatthe

mattercannotbeproperlydeterminedonasummarybasis.

NielsenA.C.J.grantedtheApplicant’sApplicationfor

SummaryJudgmentregardingthedebtandcontractual

interestowedtoit.HisLordshipnotedthattheDefendant

hadnottakenissuewiththetermsorexecutionofthe

guarantee,but“simplyraisedspeculation”astothe

Applicant’sactions,andresistancetoSummaryJudgment

mustbegroundedintherecord,andnotspeculation.

NielsenA.C.J.alsosummarilydismissedtheCounterclaim

andexplainedthatitwas“fatallyflawed”becauseit

advancedclaimsonbehalfofseparatelegalentities,

andbecausetheallegationsintheCounterclaimwerea

collateralattackonotherCourtproceedings.

AstheCounterclaimwasdismissed,NielsenA.C.J.wasnot

requiredtoconsidertheApplicationforSecurityforCosts,

however,HisLordshipexplainedthathewouldhaveordered

SecurityforCostspursuanttoRule4.22.HisLordship

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notedthatanon-exhaustivelistoffactorsshouldbe

consideredtodeterminewhetherSecurityforCostsshould

beordered,includingwhethertheRespondenthasany

assetsinAlberta;theirlikelihoodofsuccessintheAction;

whethertheApplicanthassoughtsecurityforstepsalready

taken;theriskthattheApplicantmaynotbeabletorecover

anyCostsaward;andwhethertheApplicantappliedfor

SecurityforCostsattheearliestopportunity.NielsenA.C.J.

foundthatSecurityforCostswouldhavebeenappropriate

becauseeachoftheDefendantswereeitherinsolvent,

orappearedtobeinsolvent;becauseitwasunlikelythat

theRespondentswouldbesuccessfulinadvancingthe

Counterclaim;andbecausetheApplicantwasnotseeking

securityforstepsalreadytakenintheAction.

CWC WELL SERVICES CORP V OPTION INDUSTRIES INC, 2019 ABCA 331 (SLATTER, HUGHES AND FEEHAN JJA)Rules 1.5 (Rule Contravention, Non-Compliance and Irregularities), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)

ThePanelheardanAppealofaDecisionofaChambers

Justice,whichhadupheldtheDecisionofaMasterto

dismissanApplicationforlongdelaynotwithstandingthe

factthatthreeyearshadpassedwithouta“significant

advance”.ThoughRule4.33(2)requiresanActiontobe

dismissedafterthreeyearsofdelay,theChambersJustice

andtheMasterfoundthattheexceptionprovidedinRule

4.33(2)(b)applied.

ThePanelnotedthatRule4.33(2)(b)isamanifestation

ofthegeneralrulethatproceduralobjectionsmustbe

raisedinatimelyway.Moreover,Rule1.5addresses

contraventionsofproceduralrequirementsandrequires

anApplicationtobefiledundertheRulepromptly,andit

prohibitsanApplicationundertheRulewhentheapplying

partyhasacquiescedtoacontravention.ThePanelstated

thattheexceptioninRule4.33(2)(b)shouldbeinterpreted

holisticallyinaccordancewithitswording.TheCourtcan

allowanActiontocontinuewhere“intheopinionofthe

Court”aPlaintiffhasreasontobelievethatdelayhasbeen

waivedbyaDefendant.

Inthiscase,thepartieshadfiledadetailedlitigationplan

andmadesincereattemptstofollowit.Therefore,thePanel

ruledthattheChambersJusticeandMasterwereentitledto

concludethattheexceptioninRule4.33(2)(b)applied.

Inclosing,thePanelalsoaddressedtheChambersJustice’s

andMaster’sconclusionthattheActioncouldnotbe

dismissedpursuanttoRule4.31.ThoughbothCourts

foundthatinordinateandinexcusabledelayhadoccurred

triggeringapresumptionofsignificantprejudice,they

bothfoundthattherewasnoactualsignificantprejudice

sufferedbecausethecasewaslargelydocumentbased.

ThePanelruledthatthiswasafindingfactontherecord

deservingofdeference.

TheAppealwasdismissed.

CLARK BUILDERS AND STANTEC CONSULTING LTD V GO COMMUNITY CENTRE, 2019 ABQB 706 (RENKE J)Rules 2.6 (Representative Actions), 6.14 (Appeal From Master’s Judgment or Order), 7.3 (Summary Judgment), 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)

TheDefendantshadunsuccessfullybroughtanApplication

forSummaryDismissal.OnAppealoftheMaster’s

DecisionbeforeJusticeRenke,thepartiesagreedthatthe

standardofreviewonallissuespursuanttoRule6.14was

correctness.JusticeRenkesetouttoconsiderSummary

DismissalunderRule7.3throughtheframeworkas

clarifiedinWeir-Jones Technical Services Incorporated v

Purolator Courier Ltd,2019ABCA49.

ThePlaintiffreliedonanunswornreportappendedtoan

Affidavit,somethingtheDefendantsarguedwasoffside

Rules7.3(2)and13.18,bothofwhichrequirethatan

Affidavitsubmittedinsupportoffinalreliefbeswornon

thebasisofpersonalknowledge.TheCourtnotedthatthe

PlaintiffwasrespondingtotheApplicationforfinalrelief,

andwasthereforeentitledtorelyonhearsayevidence.

Ultimately,theCourtwassatisfiedthatSummaryDismissal

wasappropriategiventhatthePlaintiffhadno“beneficial,

proprietary,orpossessoryrights”inthepropertywhichwas

thesubjectoftheloss.Thisfindingwasapplicableboth




theCourt.MacklinJ.foundthatUNAwouldbespecially

affectedbytheStayApplicationandhadspecialexpertise

orinsightpertainingtoitsperspectiveonthedutyto

consultrequirementundertheCharter.

Accordingly,JusticeMacklingrantedtheApplicationby

UNAtointerveneintheStayApplicationsubjecttothe

conditionsthat:(1)UNA’ssubmissionswouldbelimited

tothequestionofwhetherthereisaseriousissuetobe

tried;(2)writtensubmissionsbyUNAwouldbelimitedto

nomorethanfivepages;and(3)oralsubmissionswouldbe

limitedto10minutes.

UBAH V CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES LIMITED, 2019 ABQB 692 (ROOKE ACJ) Rules 2.22 (Self-Represented Litigants), 2.23 (Assistance Before the Court), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 7.3 (Summary Judgment), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders) and 14.5 (Appeals Only with Permission)

ThePlaintiff,Ubah,hadinitiatednumerousclaimsin“all

threetiersofAlbertaCourts”andtheFederalCourt.In

February2019,RookeA.C.J.struckUbah’sStatement

ofClaimagainstCanadianNaturalResourcesLimited

(“CNRL”)andotherspursuanttoRule3.68andCivil

PracticeNote#7(“CPN7”).Atthetime,RookeA.C.J.

notedthattheCPN7processpermitstheimmediate

impositionofCourtaccessrestrictionsuponapparently

vexatiouslitigantsbutinvitedthepartiestoprovide

submissionsrespectingwhetherfurtherCourtaccess

restrictionswereappropriate.ThisDecisiondealtwiththe

impositionofCourtaccessrestrictions.

RookeA.C.J.firstreviewedUbah’s“troublingrecord

ofabusiveandunsuccessfullitigationandhisother

interactionswithCanadian[C]ourts”.Inadditionto

Ubah’sinteractionswiththeCourtofQueen’sBench,His

LordshipnotedthatUbahhadinitiatedeightcivilActionsin

ProvincialCourt.OneofthoseActionswasstruckpursuant

toRule3.68,andanotherwasdismissedasunmeritorious

pursuanttoRule7.3.UbahhadalsoinitiatedeightActions

inFederalCourt.Rooke.A.C.J.foundthatUbahhada

totheexpressclaiminnegligence,aswellastheclaimin

negligentmisrepresentationwhichtheCourtheldhadbeen

putinissuebythefactspleadedpursuanttoRule13.6.

Thisresultwasnotavoidedthroughcharacterizationofthe

claimasarepresentativeActionpursuanttoRule2.6,asthe

PlaintiffhadnotcompliedwiththeformalitiesofthatRule.

ALBERTA UNION OF PROVINCIAL EMPLOYEES V ALBERTA, 2019 ABQB 553 (MACKLIN J)Rule 2.10 (Intervenor Status)

IntheunderlyingAction,theAlbertaUnionofProvincial

Employees(“AUPE”)broughtanActionagainstHer

MajestytheQueeninRightofAlberta(“HMQ”)seekinga

declarationthatthePublic Sector Wage Arbitration Deferral

Act,RSA2019,cT-41.7(“Bill9”)breachestheAUPE’s

freedomofassociationasprotectedbys.2(d)ofthe

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms(the“Charter”).

OnJuly29,2019,JusticeMacklinwastohearan

ApplicationbyAUPEforaninteriminjunctionstayingthe

implementationoroperationofBill9untilitsconstitutional

challengecouldbedeterminedonitsmerits(the“Stay

Application”).

TheUnitedNursesofAlberta(“UNA”)appliedforintervenor

statusintheStayApplicationonthegroundsthatitwould

bespeciallyaffectedbyHisLordship’sdecisioninthe

StayApplicationduetoitspotentialimpactonUNA’s

parallelconstitutionalchallengeofBill9.Further,theUNA

statedthatithadspecialexpertiseorinsighttobringto

bearontheissues.HMQopposedtheApplicationbythe

UNAtointerveneonthegroundthatithadnotmetthe

requirementsnecessaryforthegrantingofintervenorstatus.

MacklinJ.notedthatRule2.10providesthataCourtmay

grantstatustoapersontointerveneinanActionsubjectto

anytermsandconditionsandwiththerightsandprivileges

specifiedbytheCourt.Notingtherelevantjurisprudence,

JusticeMacklinfoundthatanintervenor’sApplication

maybeallowedwhere,amongotherthings,theproposed

intervenoris(1)speciallyaffectedbytheDecisionfacing

theCourt;or(2)theproposedintervenorhassomespecial

expertiseorinsighttobringtobearontheissuesfacing

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patternof“knowinglyignoringandbreaking[C]ourtrules

andinstructions”,andsuggestedthathebelievedhehad

an“absoluteright”todoso.

HisLordshipexplainedthatCourtaccessrestrictionsmay

beimposedwherefuturelitigationabuseisplausibleand

emphasizedthatonlyoneabusiveproceedingmaybe

sufficienttotriggerCourtaccessrestrictions.Inthiscase,

Ubahhad“conducteddozensofabusivelawsuits,judicial

reviews,applications,andappeals”.HisLordshipfound

thatgatekeepingwas“obviouslyrequired”,andthatonly

globalCourtaccessrestrictionsacrossallAlbertaCourts

couldmitigatehisconduct.

Assuch,pursuanttotheCourt’sinherentjurisdiction,

RookeA.C.J.declaredUbahavexatiouslitigantand

imposedCourtaccessrestrictions.Inadditiontoother

restrictions,Ubahwasprohibitedfromcommencingor

continuinganyAppeal,Action,Application,orproceeding

inanylevelofCourtinAlbertawithoutleavefromthe

Court;wasrequiredtoberepresentedbyamemberin

goodstandingoftheLawSocietyofAlbertatorequest

leave;andwasprohibitedfromactingasagent,next

friend,orMcKenzieFriendtoanyotherpersoninCourt

proceedingspursuanttoRule2.22or2.23.Further,Ubah

wasrequiredtoapplybeforeasingleAppealJudgefor

leavetocommenceorcontinueaproceedinginProvincial

Court,andnotedthatifthesingleAppealJudgegranted

himleavetocommenceanAppeal,hemaystillberequired

toapplyforpermissiontoAppealpursuanttoRule14.5(1)

(j),andindoingsowasrequiredtoappendacopyofthe

OrderdeclaringhimavexatiouslitiganttotheApplication

anddepose“fullyandcompletelytothefactsand

circumstancessurrounding”theproposedproceedingto

satisfytheCourtthattheAppealisnotabusive.

PursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c),RookeA.C.J.dispensedwith

Ubah’sapprovalastotheformandcontentoftheOrder.

HAZKAR DEVELOPMENTS INC V COCHRANE (TOWN), 2019 ABQB 552 (MCCARTHY J)Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review) and 3.75 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties to Originating Application)

TheApplicant/Cross-Respondent,HazkarDevelopments

Inc.(“Hazkar”),broughtanApplicationforJudicialReview

ofadecisionbytheRespondent/Cross-Applicant,the

TownofCochrane(the“Town”),refusingalandusere-

designationofaparceloflandtoaccommodateupto11

single-detachedhomes.TheTowncross-appliedtodismiss

Hazkar’sJudicialReviewApplicationonthebasisthatit

hadnotserved“directlyaffectedparties”withnoticeofthe

JudicialReviewApplicationwithintherequisitetimeframe.

TheissuebeforetheCourtwaswhetheragroupofresidents

(the“Residents”)wholiveneartheproposeddevelopment

were“directlyaffected”persons.Rule3.15requiresthat

“everypersonorbodydirectlyaffected”byaJudicial

ReviewApplicationbeservedwithit.TheTownarguedthat

becausetheMunicipal Government Act,RSA2000,c21

(the“MGA”)requiresadjacentlandownerstobenotified

forlandusere-designations,theymustalsobeservedwith

anApplicationforJudicialReviewofadecisionregardinga

landusere-designation.

TheCourtdisagreedandconfirmedthattherequirements

undertheMGAshouldnotbeconflatedwiththe

requirementsundertheRules.CaselawcitedbytheTown

wasdistinguishedonthebasisthatitdealtwithRule3.75

whichgovernswhenapersoncanbeaddedasaRespondent

toanOriginatingApplication.TheCourtconfirmedthat

determiningwhethersomeoneisan“affectedperson”for

thepurposesofRule3.15isafactualexercise.

However,theCourtruledthattheResidentswere“affected

persons”underRule3.15.Theyhadpresentedremarksat

theoriginallandusehearingandraisedlegitimateconcerns

abouthowtheproposeddevelopmentwouldimpacttheir

lives.ThiswassufficientintheCourt’sviewtorequirethat

theybenotifiedoftheJudicialReviewApplication.The

Cross-ApplicationtostriketheJudicialReviewApplication

wasgranted.




LEAVITT V CANADIAN COUNCIL OF INDEPENDENT LABORATORIES, 2019 ABQB 589 (YUNGWIRTH J) Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review) and 3.75 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties to Originating Application)

TheAssociationofProfessionalEngineersandGeoscientists

ofAlberta(“APEGA”)appliedtobeaddedasapartyto

aJudicialReviewinwhichtheApplicanthadsought,

amongotherthings,adeclarationthataprofessional

technologistshouldbeconsideredan“engineer”underthe

Respondent’srules.APEGAarguedthattheActionrelated

toissuesunderitsregulatorymandate.

JusticeYungwirthnotedthatpursuanttoRule3.15(3)

(c),anOriginatingApplicationforJudicialReviewmust

beservedoneverypersonorbodyaffecteddirectlyby

theApplication.APEGAhadnotbeenservedwiththe

OriginatingApplication.HerLadyshipalsonotedthaton

Application,theCourtmayaddapartytoanActionifit

issatisfiedthatsuchanOrdershouldbemade,pursuant

toRule3.75(2)(b).However,theCourtmaynotdosoifit

wouldcauseprejudicetoapartynotcompensablethrough

aCostsaward,pursuanttoRule3.75(3).

HerLadyshipthenexplainedthattheCourtmustfirst

considerwhethertheApplicanthasa“legalinterestinthe

outcomeoftheproceeding”.Ifso,thentheCourtmust

thenaskwhetheritis“justandconvenient”toaddthe

Applicantasaparty,andwhethertheApplicant’sinterests

wouldonlybeadequatelyprotectedifitweremadeaparty.

HerLadyshipfoundthatAPEGAhadalegalinterestinthe

proceedings,thatitwouldbejustandconvenienttoadd

APEGAasaparty,andthatAPEGA’sinterestswouldonly

beadequatelyprotectedifitweremadeaparty,asthere

wascurrentlynopartyinvolvedintheActionrepresenting

theinterestsofprofessionalengineers.Finally,Justice

Yungwirthheldthatitwouldnotbeprejudicialtoadd

APEGAasaparty.Assuch,APEGA’sApplicationwas

granted.

IRVINE V KRISTENSEN, 2019 ABQB 607 (JEFFREY J)Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review) and 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

TheRespondentbroughtanOriginatingApplicationtoquash

acommonlawpeacebondandstaycriminalproceedings.

TheApplicantssoughttostriketheActionpursuanttoRule

3.68,characterizingitasanApplicationforJudicialReview,

whichtheRespondenthadfiledbeyondthesix-month

deadlinesetoutinRule3.15.TheCourtagreed.

WhiletheRespondentarguedtheconstitutional

inapplicabilityofRule3.15,theCourtnotedthatthe

constitutionalissueshadnotbeenproperlyadvancedby

wayofaNoticeofConstitutionalQuestion.Inanyevent,

theCourtwaspreparedtostriketheActionwithoutreliance

onRule3.15,astheremedysoughtintheActionwas

impossible;thepeacebondwasnolongerofanyforce

andeffect,andthecriminalproceedingshadalreadybeen

stayed.TheRespondent’sActionwasboundtofail,and

thereforeconstitutedanabuseofprocess.

ALBERTA’S FREE ROAMING HORSES SOCIETY V ALBERTA, 2019 ABQB 714 (MILLAR J) Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review), 3.16 (Originating Application for Judicial Review: Habeas Corpus), 3.22 (Evidence on Judicial Review) and 13.5 (Variation of Time Periods)

UnderAlberta’sStray Animals Act,RSA2000,cS-20

andHorse Capture Regulation,AR59/1994,horses

maybecapturedforreasonsofpublicsafety,thehorses’

safety,ortoconserveorprotectlands.TheApplicants

allegedthatwildhorsecapturehadbeenoccurringin

Albertawithoutaproperdecisionastowhetheritwas

necessary.TheApplicantssoughtdeclarationsthat:(a)

thegovernmentmustproperlyreachanopinionaboutthe

necessityofthecapturebeforeauthorizingit;and(b)that

anyactivelicensesissuedtoremovehorses,andanypublic

landdesignation,isvoid.TheyalsosoughtanOrderof

mandamusrequiringthegovernmenttoprepareandpublish

awrittenopinionbeforedesignatinganylandsaspublic.

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Asapreliminaryissue,MillarJ.consideredwhetherthe

ApplicantshadstandingtobringtheApplication,and

determinedthattheApplicantsdidhavestanding.

Next,MillarJ.consideredtheadmissibilityofanAffidavit

providedbytheApplicants(the“TicknorAffidavit”).The

ProvincearguedthattheTicknorAffidavitwasinadmissible,

aspursuanttoRule3.22,onlyevidencebeforethe

decision-maker(includingQuestioningpursuanttoRule

3.21ifpermissible)isadmissibleonJudicialReview.

However,HisLordshipdeterminedthattheCourtcould

useitsdiscretiontoadmittheTicknorAffidavitpursuant

toRule3.22(d).ItnotedthatthisJudicialReviewwas

atypicalinthattherewasnotarecordofproceedingsto

review;rather,thequestionwaswhethertheMinisterhad

properlyexercisedhisjurisdiction.TheTicknorAffidavit

wasnecessarytoreviewthebackgroundandcontextofthe

legislationandApplication.

MillarJ.thenconsideredwhethertheApplicationhad

beenfiledintime.TheProvincearguedthatpursuantto

Rule3.15(2),Applicationstosetasideadecisionoract

ofaMinistermustbebroughtwithin6months(otherthan

habeas corpusApplicationswhichmaybebroughtatany

timepursuanttoRule3.16).TheApplicantsarguedthat

theywerenotseekingtosetasidetheMinister’sdecision,

butratherseekingdeclarationsinrespectofanomissionby

theMinister.

MillarJ.notedthatRule3.15specificallystatesthatRule

13.5,whichpermitstheCourttogranttimeextensions,

doesnotapplytothe6-monthtimeperiodinRule3.15.

HisLordshipnotedthatlimitationsperiodsbringfinality

andcertaintytoevents,andemphasizedthattheimposition

ofahardlimitationperiodintheRulessignalsthatthe

legislatureintendedforthetimelimittobeafixedone.

MillarJ.alsoemphasizedthat,whereadeclarationis

sought,theeffectofthedeclarationmustbeconsidered.

Iftheeffectisto“setasideanadministrativedecision,

thetimelimitdoesapply”.SincetheApplicants’intention

wasnottosetasidethelegislation,butrathertoeffectively

setasidetheMinister’sdecision,MillarJ.determinedthat

theApplicationwas“welloutsideofthelimitationperiod”

imposedbyRule3.15.

ALLERGAN INC V ALBERTA (JUSTICE AND SOLICITOR GENERAL), 2019 ABQB 610 (ROMAINE J)Rule 3.22 (Evidence on Judicial Review)

TheApplicantpharmaceuticalmanufacturerappliedfor

JudicialReviewofadecisionoftheRespondentMinisterof

Health.

ContrarytoRule3.22,whichlaysouttheevidenceaCourt

mayconsiderwhenconductingaJudicialReview,the

Applicantattemptedtoadduceevidencenotpreviously

submittedtoAlbertaHealthduringtheoriginaldecision-

makingprocess.TheCourtconfirmedthatJudicialReview

isnotaTrialde novoandrefusedtopermitevidencethat

wasnotbeforetheadministrativedecisionmaker.

MBB V ALBERTA (CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES), 2019 ABQB 621 (LEMA J)Rule 3.23 (Stay of Decision)

TheApplicantinthiscase,MBB,appliedtoresumeliving

withhisfosterparentsuntilaJudicialReviewofadecision

whichhadchangedhisresidencetoagrouphomehadbeen

decided.TheApplicationwassupportedbyMBB’sfoster

parentsbutopposedbytheDirectorofChildandFamily

Services(the“Director”).TheDirectormadethedecision

tochangeMBB’splaceofresidencepursuanttotheChild,

Youth and Family Enhancement Act,RSA2000,cC-12

(the“CYFEA”).

OneoftheissuesconsideredbytheCourtwaswhether

MBBwas,insubstance,seekingastayoftheDirector’s

decision.MBBandhisfosterparentsspecificallyraised

Rule3.23whichallowstheCourttograntastayofa

decisionoractpendingaJudicialReviewofthatdecisionor

act.However,theCourtdeterminedthattheJudicialReview

Applicationwasprematureinthiscase,astheCYFEA

providesitsownappealmechanismforreviewingdecisions

bytheDirector.MBBshouldhaveusedthisappeal

mechanismpriortofilingtheJudicialReviewApplication.

TheApplicationwasdismissedandMBBwasdirectedto

pursuetheappealsprocessundertheCYFEAifhesochose

to.ThepartieswerealsodirectedtobeartheirownCosts.




ANC TIMBER LTD V ALBERTA (MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY), 2019 ABQB 710 (TOPOLNISKI J)Rule 3.23 (Stay of Decision)

TheMinisterofAgricultureandForestry(the“Minister”)

hadputguidelines(the“Guidelines”)intoplacetoprotect

caribouandcontrolforestharvestbythelumberindustry.

TheGuidelinesaffectedANCTimberLtd.(“ANC”)licenses

forforestharvestandANC’spapermillbusiness.ANCmade

anApplicationtostaytheGuidelines.

TheCourtattemptedtodefineANC’sApplication,but

ultimatelyfoundthattheApplicationcouldnotproceed.

TheCourtfoundthatinteriminjunctionswerenotan

availableagainsttheCrownpursuanttosection17ofthe

Proceedings Against the Crown Act,RSA2000,cP-25.

TheCourtheldthatstayofproceedingsandinterlocutory

injunctionsareofthesamenatureandtherefore,a

mandatoryinterlocutorystayisalsonotanactionthatcan

betakenagainsttheCrown.TheApplicationwastherefore

dismissed.

DespitethattheApplicationcouldnotbemadeagainst

theCrown,theCourtthenalternativelyconsideredwhether

ANChadmettheonustoestablishastayasanappropriate

remedysetoutinRule3.23.Rule3.23givestheCourtthe

abilitytostaytheoperationofadecisionoractpendingthe

outcomeofanoriginatingApplicationforJudicialReview.

Inordertoobtainastay,theApplicantbearstheburden

ofmeetingthetestsfromR v Canadian Broadcasting

Corp,2018SCC5(“CBC”),whichprovidesthatwherean

Applicantseeksamandatoryinjunction,theApplicantmust

establishastrongprimafaciecase;andRJR MacDonald

v Canada (Attorney General),[1994]1SCR311(“RJR”),

whichprovidesthatwhenanApplicantseeksaprohibitive

injunction,theApplicantmustestablish(1)astrongprima

faciecaseorthereisaseriousquestiontobetried;(2)the

Applicantwillsufferirreparableharmifthestayisrefused;

and(3)onabalanceofconvenience,theApplicantwill

suffergreaterharmwithoutthestay.

TheCourtconsideredthetestinCBCandfoundthatANC

hadnotestablishedastrongprimafaciecase.

AsfortheelementsofthetestfromRJR,theCourtfound

thatANChadmetthe“lowthreshold”ofthefirstelement

ofthetest.IndeterminingwhetheranApplicantwould

sufferirreparableharm(thesecondpartofthetest),the

CourtstatedthatANCmustshowtheywouldsufferactual

harmwhichcouldnotbecompensatedbydamages,but

acknowledgedthisdidnotrequirecompleteimpossibility

ofcompensationbydamages.TheCourtwasunconvinced

byANC’sargument,whichtheCourtfoundwasmere

speculationorconjecture,andANCfailedthesecondpart

ofthetest.TheCourtthenconsideredthethirdaspectof

thetest,consideringthepublicinterestandthestatusquo.

AsnotedinRJR,theMinisterhasalowbartomeettoshow

harmtopublicinterest.TheGuidelinesandchangesto

ANC’soperationswereputforwardinresponsetothreatsto

thecariboupopulationandanefforttoexercisesustainable

forestmanagementprinciples.Thebalanceofconvenience

favouredtheMinisterwhenconsideringthepublicinterest

factor.TheCourtalsoconsideredthestatusquoargument

putforwardbyANC,buttheCourtfoundthattheycould

notidentifywhatwouldbethestatusquoandhencethis

factorwasneutralinregardtothebalanceofconvenience.

TheCourtthereforefoundthatastaypursuanttoRule3.23

wouldalsonotbeappropriate.

MACLEOD V TRIBECA INNER CITY CUSTOM HOMES INC, 2019 ABQB 524 (MASTER PROWSE)Rule 3.27 (Extension of Time for Service)

ThePlaintiffs’processserverattemptedtoserveaStatement

ofClaimonthefinaldateforservice,oneyearafterthe

StatementofClaimhadissued.Theprocessserverattended

ataresidenceknowntobetheindividualDefendant’shome

andthecorporateDefendant’sregisteredoffice.

Theprocessservereffectedserviceoftheregistered

officebyleavingtheStatementofClaimattheresidence;

however,theindividualDefendantwasnotpresentto

acceptpersonalservice.Theprocessserverspokewiththe

individualDefendantbyphone,whocommittedtomake

arrangementsforservicethatevening.Theindividual

Defendantdidnotfollowthrough,anditwasnotuntilthe

followingmorning,onedayaftertheStatementofClaim

hadexpired,thatpersonalservicetookplace.

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ThePlaintiffsbroughtanApplicationforadeclarationthat

theyhadservedtheindividualDefendantonatimelybasis,

oralternatively,foranOrderextendingthetimetoserve.

Insupportofvalidatingservice,thePlaintiffsreliedona

casewhereintheCourtdeclinedtostrikeaStatementof

Claimforfailuretoserveintime,asthelate-servedparties

hadknowledgeoftheexistenceoftheStatementofClaim

andthegeneralnatureoftheclaimbeingadvancedbefore

theStatementofClaimexpired.MasterProwsewasnot

persuaded,asitwasnotclearthattheindividualDefendant

hadbeenadvisedofthegeneralnatureoftheStatementof

Claim.

InsupportofanOrderextendingtimeforservice,the

PlaintiffsreliedonRule3.27(1)(c),whichpermitsthe

Courttoextendthetimeforservicewhere“specialor

extraordinarycircumstancesexistresultingsolelyfrom

thedefendant’sconductorfromtheconductofaperson

whoisnotapartytotheaction.”TheCourtacceptedthat

theprocessserverwasapersonwhowasnotpartytothe

Action,andthattheprocessserver’scarelessnesswasa

specialorextraordinarycircumstance.Itwasalsosignificant

thattheindividualDefendanthadagreedtomake

arrangementstoacceptservicepriortotheexpiryofthe

StatementofClaim,butultimatelyfailedtodoso.Master

ProwseextendedthetimeforserviceoftheStatementof

ClaimontheindividualDefendanttothedateservicehad

beenaffected.

BROWN V BLISS, 2019 ABQB 530 (MASTER SCHLOSSER) Rules 3.30 (Defendant’s Options), 3.69 (Joining Claims), 11.25 (Real and Substantial Connection) and 11.31 (Setting Aside Service)

AfteroneoftheDefendantsappliedtostaytheAction

becauseanew,earlierActionhadalreadybeenbroughtin

Ontario,theCourtconsideredwhetherithadjurisdiction

tohearthematter,andwhetherornotOntariowas,

nevertheless,themoreconvenientforum.TheOntarioand

Albertaclaimsdiffered,butrelatedtothesamefacts.

InconsideringwhetherAlbertahadjurisdictionsimpliciter

overthemattersintheAlbertaAction,MasterSchlosser

consideredthenon-exhaustivelistofcircumstancesin

whicharealandsubstantialconnectionwithAlbertais

presumedtoexist,setoutunderRule11.25(3).TheMaster

notedthatserviceofaclaimwithoutarealandsubstantial

connectiontoAlbertamaybesetasidepursuanttoRules

3.30and11.31.MasterSchlosseralsonotedthatRule

3.69,whichgovernsthejoiningofclaims,speakstothe

desirabilityofkeepingrelatedActionstogethertopreserve

judicialeconomyandavoidinconsistentJudgments.

TheMasterfoundthatwhiletheDefendantwasnota

“necessary”partytotheAlbertaAction,hewasa“proper”

party,andthereforethatAlbertahadjurisdictionoverthe

ActionpursuanttoRule11.25(3)(i).

MasterSchlossernextconsideredwhetherOntariowas

amoreconvenientorappropriateforum.Indoingso,

theMasterconsideredanumberoffactorsincludingthe

comparativeexpensetothepartiesofproceedingineither

province,thelawineachprovince,enforcementofan

eventualJudgment,thedesirabilityofavoidingmultiple

proceedings,andtheefficiencyandfairnessofthe

Canadianlegalsysteminitsentirety.MasterSchlosserheld

that,onbalance,itmadesensefortheAlbertaandOntario

ActionstoproceedtogetherinOntario.TheAlbertaAction

wasthereforestayedontheconditionthattheDefendant

consenttoaddingaCounterclaimintheOntarioActionto

dealwiththePlaintiff’sclaimagainsthim.TheDefendant

wasawardedCosts.

BODNAR CAPITAL CORPORATION (301831 ALBERTA LTD) V SYNERGY PROJECTS LTD, 2019 ABQB 528 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rule 3.45 (Form of Third Party Claim)

TheApplicant(Defendant)appliedtoextendthetimefor

filingandserviceofaThirdPartyClaimsetoutinRule

3.45.Rule3.45requiresaThirdPartyClaimtobefiled

andservedontheThirdPartyDefendantwithin6months

ofthefilingoftheDefendant’sStatementofDefenceor

DemandforNotice.ThedeadlineunderRule3.45had

expiredinMarchof2016,andtheApplicantfiled,but

didnotserve,aThirdPartyClaiminJulyof2017.The

StatementofClaimwasfiledinJanuaryof2011and

allegedtheApplicanthadinstalledadefectivegeothermal




heatingsystem.TheproposedThirdPartyDefendantswere

theApplicant’ssubcontractorsontheproject.

MasterSchlossernotedthattoextendthetimeforaThird

PartyNotice,theCourtmustconsider:i)thelengthofthe

delay;ii)theexplanationforthedelay;andiii)therelative

prejudicetotheparties.MasterSchlosseralsonotedthat

theApplicantmustalsodemonstratethattheproposed

ThirdPartyClaimhas“anairofreality”suchthatitisnot

“hopelessand[…]doomedfrom[its]inception”.

MasterSchlosserheldthattheStatementofClaimmade

itapparentthattherewerepotentialclaimsagainstthe

proposedThirdParties,suchthatthelimitationperiodfor

theproposedThirdPartyClaimstartedtorunonthedate

theStatementofClaimwasserved.MasterSchlosserfound

thattheproposedThirdPartyDefendantsdidnothave

sufficientnoticeoftheproposedThirdPartyClaimwithin

theperiodrequiredbysection6(4)oftheLimitations Act,

RSA2000cL-12toallowtheThirdPartyClaimstobe

addednotwithstandingtheexpiryofthelimitationperiod.

MasterSchlosserheldthatthe“limitationsdefencewould

almostcertainlysucceed”andthatthe“extensionofthe

timeforserviceofahopelessclaimisnottobepermitted”.

MasterSchlossernotedinobiterthatcaselawhad

indicatedthatthethresholdthataRespondenthadtomeet

wasthatitwas“plainandobvious”thattheclaimwould

fail,however,suggestedthatfollowingWeir-Jones Technical

Services Incorporated v Purolator Courier Ltd,2019ABCA

49,“itmaybemoreappropriatetospeakintermsofa

meritoriouslimitationsdefence,provedonabalanceof

probabilities.”

TheApplicationwasdismissed.

SWEETLAND V MACINNIS, 2019 ABQB 736 (LEMA J)Rules 3.62 (Amending Pleading), 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings) and 3.74 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties After Close of Pleadings)

JoanSweetland,aPlaintiffintheunderlyingAction

(“Ms.Sweetland”),wasseverelyinjuredinabuscrash

in2012(the“Action”).Ms.Sweetlandappliedtoamend

herStatementofClaimagainstthebusdriverand

transportationcompaniestoaddallegationsofbad-faith

treatmentbyandconspiracyonthepartoftheirinsurerand

adjuster(the“AmendmentApplication”).TheDefendants

andproposednewDefendantsopposedtheAmendment

Applicationongroundsincludinglimitations.

Ms.SweetlandpointedtoRule3.62(1)(b)whichdirects,

amongotherthings,thatapartymayamendapleading

afterthecloseofpleadingswiththeCourt’spriorpermission

inaccordancewithRule3.65.LemaJ.referencedRule

3.74forthepropositionthat,onapplication,theCourtmay

orderthatapersonbeadded,removed,orsubstitutedas

apartytoanActioniftheCourtissatisfiedthattheOrder

shouldbemade.

JusticeLemaoutlinedthe“classicrule”thatpleadingscan

beamendednomatterhowcarelessorlatethepartyseeks

toamendsubjecttofourexceptions:(1)seriousprejudice

notcompensableinCosts;(2)a“hopeless”amendment

(whichwouldhavebeenstruckifpleadedoriginally);(3)an

amendmentsoughtafterexpiryoflimitationperiod;and(4)

afailuretopleadearliertaintedbybadfaith.

Afterreviewingtherelevantjurisprudenceandthe

applicableprovisionsoftheLimitations Act,RSA2000,

cL-12(the“Limitations Act”),JusticeLemafound,

inter alia,thatthetwo-yearlimitationperiodinss.3(1)

oftheLimitations Acthadexpiredastheproposednew

Defendantsandtheirrespectiveimpugnedactionsand

decisionsalloccurredpriortothesummerof2017.AsMs.

Sweetlanddidnotraiseanydiscoverabilityissuesorinvoke

anyotherexceptionordefenceundertheLimitations Act,

LemaJ.dismissedtheAmendmentApplication.

HUFF V ZUK, 2019 ABQB 691 (NIXON J)Rules 3.65 (Permission of Court to Amendment Before or After Close of Pleadings) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements)

ATrialhadbeenheldinthismatterwhichincludedclaims

bythePlaintiffthattheDefendanthaddefamedhim.

SomeoftheimpugnedstatementsraisedbythePlaintiff

duringtheTrialhadnotbeenincludedintheStatement

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ofClaim.AtthecloseoftheTrial,theDefendant’scounsel

submittedthatheneednotaddressthesestatements.

CounselreliedonRule13.7whichrequiresthatthe

particularsofdefamationbepled.

NixonJ.notedthatthepurposeofRule13.7inthecontext

ofdefamationistoensurethataDefendanthasadequate

noticeofallegeddefamatorystatements.Moreover,the

overallintentoftheRulesistoensurethatallegationsare

sufficientlypledpriortoTrial.ADefendantshouldknowthe

caseheisrequiredtomeetinordertoprepareadefence

andavoidsurpriseatTrial.However,NixonJ.alsonoted

thatamendmentstoaStatementofClaimcanbemade

evenattheendofTrialpursuanttoRule3.65.Thekey

questionaCourtwillconsideriswhetheraDefendantwill

sufferprejudiceiftheamendmentsareallowed.

TheCourtruledthattheDefendantwouldnotsuffer

prejudiceifcertainstatementsnotincludedinthe

pleadingswereconsideredbytheCourt.Someofthe

statementshadbeenincludedintheagreedexhibitsprior

totheTrialsotheDefendantwasmadeawareofthemand

addressedthem.

TheCourtruledthatothercertainstatementsnotpled

thatwouldcauseprejudicetotheDefendantiftheywere

consideredbytheCourt.Specifically,thePlaintiffalleged

thattheDefendanthadmadedefamatorystatementsina

letterofcomplainttotheAlbertaDentalAssociationand

College.Formalcomplaintstoprofessionaldisciplinary

bodiesaresubjecttoabsoluteprivilege,anditwas

thereforelikelythattheDefendantwouldhaveamended

hisStatementofDefencetoincludethisdefencehadthe

allegationsbeenproperlyincludedintheStatementof

Claim.NixonJ.ruledthattheallegationsregardingthe

letterofcomplaintwouldnotbeconsideredbytheCourt.

RDX TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION V APPEL, 2019 ABQB 477 (MAHONEY J)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

ThePlaintifffiledaStatementofClaiminAlbertaalleging

fraudandmisrepresentation.Agroupoftheseveral

Defendants(“CWT”)respondedwithanApplicationtostay

theAlbertaActiononthebasisthattheStateofNewYork

wastheappropriateforum.CWTlaterfiledanApplication

allegingthattheAlbertaActionwasres judicataonaccount

ofaJudgmententeredinNewYork.TheCourtfoundthat

theres judicataApplicationfellunderRule3.68(2)(d),

engagingthemeritsoftheAlbertaAction,andconstituting

attornmenttoAlberta’sjurisdiction.Assuch,CWTwas

precludedfromchallengingjurisdiction,andtheCourt

wentontoconsidertheres judicataApplication,aswell

asarelatedApplicationbroughtbythePlaintifftorestrain

CWTfromseekingrecognitionoftheNewYorkjudgmentin

Ontario.

OUELLETTE V LAW SOCIETY OF ALBERTA, 2019 ABQB 492 (PHILLIPS J)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

TheAppellants(the“Ouellettes”)appealedtheDecision

ofMasterRobertsonstrikingtheirAmendedStatementof

Claim(the“Claim”)againsttheLawSocietyofAlberta(the

“LSA”),pursuanttoRule3.68onthegroundsthatthere

wasnoclaiminlaw.

ThePlaintiff,Mr.ChristianSylvaOuellette(“Mr.Ouellette”)

isaformermemberoftheLSAandwasdisbarredin2016

followingadisciplinaryhearing.Mr.OuelletteandMr.

Ouellette’ssonweresuingtheLSAintheunderlyingAction

seekingadeclarationthatthedisbarmentdecisionwas

voidab initio(duetotheactualbiasor,inthealternative,

reasonableapprehensionofbias),reinstatement,Charter

damagesaswellasotherrelief.Mr.Ouellette’ssonwas

alsosuingfordamagesarisingoutofthelossofparental

guidance,whichheclaimswascausedbytheproceedings

againsthisfather.

JusticePhillipsnotedthatgenerallyitisdifficulttosucceed

inanActionfordamagesagainstaregulatorsuchasthe

LSA.First,Charterbreachesdonotnecessarilyleadtoan

awardofCharterdamages.Second,policyreasonsmay

militateagainsttheexistenceofaprivatedutyofcareowed

byaregulator.Protectionfromlawsuitsisimportantto

controlthedepletionofresourcesandthepotentialchilling




effectthatitcouldhaveonaregulatororgenerallywith

respecttoquasi-judicialdecisionmaking.Thesepolicy

reasonscannegateaprimafaciedutyofcareowedbya

regulator.

PhillipsJ.alsonotedthatstatutoryandcommonlaw

immunityfurtherrestrictstheabilitytosuearegulatorand

that,inordertoovercometheimmunitygrantedunder

theLegal Profession Act,RSA2000,cL-8(the“Act”),a

Plaintiffmustfirstestablishasupportableclaimaswellas

anabsenceofgoodfaith,forinstancebyprovingmalice

orbadfaith.Inotherwords,andasstatedbyMaster

Robertson,aregulatorcannotbesuedwhendoingitsjob.

JusticePhillipsreviewedtherelevantjurisprudenceand

foundthatthecaselawmadeitclearthattheLSAdid

notoweaprivatelawdutyofcaretoMr.Ouelletteorhis

son.Additionally,JusticePhillipsfoundthatthecaseof

Merchant v Law Society of Alberta,2008ABCA363was

instructiveforthepropositionthattheusualruleisfora

litiganttoexhaustallappealprocesseswithintheActprior

tocommencingaclaim(whichhadnottakenplace).In

otherwords,fortheCourttogooutsidetheAppealprocess

oftheLSAinthiscasewouldbeacollateralattackand

thereforeanabuseofprocess.

Accordingly,JusticePhillipsdismissedtheAppeal,and

MasterRobertson’sOrderstrikingtheClaimwasupheld.

HUGHES V STEWART, 2019 ABQB 494 (NIELSEN ACJ) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)

TheApplicant,Hughes,filedanOriginatingApplication,

whichwasbroughttoNielsenA.C.J.’sattentionforreview

asapossiblevexatiousproceeding,pursuanttoCivil

PracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”).NielsenA.C.J.explained

thatCPN7isadocument-basedreviewpursuanttoRule

3.68,whichwasrecentlyintroducedtomanageapparently

vexatious,abusive,orunmeritoriouslitigationinacost-

effective,proportionate,andtimelyway.CPN7employs

“restrictedformsofevidence”andhasanarrowfocus.It

shouldonlybeusedinthe“clearercasesofabuse”,and

wherethepleading’sdefectsareapparentonitsface.

NielsenA.C.J.reviewedHughes’Application,and

determinedthatitwassuitableforreviewunderCPN7.His

LordshipcametothisconclusionbecausetheApplication

containedbaldallegationsofabuse,perjury,andother

misconductbutdidnotappearto“provideabasisforthe

RespondentsandCourttorespond”;andbecauseitsought

“disproportionateorimpossibleremedies”withoutproviding

abasisforthem.Assuch,NielsenA.C.J.stayedtheAction

andrequiredHughestofilewrittensubmissionspursuantto

paragraph3(b)ofCPN7.

Finally,HisLordshipnotedthatHugheswasalreadysubject

toaFinalOrderRestrictingAccesstoPrivateInformation

(the“Order”),whichimposedgatekeepingprocedures

respectingprivateinformation.GiventheOrder,itappeared

thatHughes’litigationwasabusive,soNielsenA.C.J.

imposedinterimCourtaccessrestrictionsonHughes,and

heldthatHughes’approvaloftheOrderwasnotrequired

pursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).

DEVINE V ALBERTA SUPPORTS, 2019 ABQB 502 (THOMAS J)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

JusticeThomasreviewedtheApplicant’sOriginating

ApplicationpursuanttoCivilPracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”)

asbeinganApparentlyVexatiousApplicationorProceeding

(“AVAP”).TheCPN7protocolwasinitiatedbycounselfor

theRespondentswritingtotheCourttoindicatethatthe

OriginatingApplicationwasanAVAP.

JusticeThomasnotedthattheCPN7protocolisdesigned

tomanagelitigationwhichonitsfaceappearstobe

unmeritorious,hasnoprospectofsuccess,orisotherwise

abusiveandvexatious.TheCPN7protocolprovidesa

mechanismforanAVAPtobereviewedbytheCourt

which,ifconvincedthatthepleadingmaybesubjecttobe

struckpursuanttoRule3.68,willinitiatea“showcause”

procedurewhichprovidestherespondentwith14daysto

providewrittensubmissionstotheCourttodemonstrate

whytheAVAPisalegitimateactionandshouldbe

permittedtocontinue.JusticeThomasnotedthattheCPN7

protocolisreservedfor“clearercasesofabuse”.

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JusticeThomasconcludedthatonitsface,theOriginating

Applicationdisclosedthreeissueswhichsuggestedthat

itwasanAVAPwhichcouldbestruckpursuanttoRule

3.68.First,theApplication’spleadingswereincomplete,

astheonlystatedgroundfortheApplicationwas“Forall

thebasis’soutlined”intheApplicant’sAffidavit.Rule3.68

requirespleadingstobeevaluatedwithoutreferenceto

externalevidence,andthus,JusticeThomasconcludedthat

thepleadingitselfwasfatallyincomplete.

Second,JusticeThomasconcludedthateveniftheAffidavit

wasconsidered(“inanexcessofcaution”)theApplication

didnotprovideabasisforameaningfulresponseasit

requestedtheCourtto“strikedown”thelegislationand

regulationbehindgovernmentprogramswithoutspecifying

whichlegislationorprovisionsshouldbestruckdown,and

didnotprovideafactualfoundationorlegalbasisforwhy

thoseprovisionsshouldbestruckdown.TheAffidavitalso

disclosedanintentiontopursueexpandingandescalating

litigation,itselfanindiciaofabusivelitigation.

Third,JusticeThomasfoundthattheApplicationappeared

toseekimpossibleremediesdirectedatremedying

perceivedgovernmentalshortcomings,ratherthanenforcing

theApplicant’sindividualrights.JusticeThomasnotedthat

requestingtheCourttooperateoutsideitsproperauthority

andtoacknowledgeperceivedgovernmentshortcomingsis

animproperpurpose.

JusticeThomasconcludedthattheOriginatingApplication

wasanAVAP,andinitiatedtheshowcauseprocedurefor

theApplicanttoprovideawrittenresponsejustifyingwhy

theproceedingshouldnotbestruckinwholeorinpart

pursuanttoRule3.68.

BILEY V INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES, 2019 ABQB 506 (THOMAS J) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders), 10.29 (General Rules for Payment of Litigation Costs) and Schedule C

TheCourtinitiatedareviewofthePlaintiff,Biley’s,Action

pursuanttotheprocesssetoutinCivilPracticeNoteNo.

7(“CPN7”)whichconductsadocumentbasedreviewof

apparentlyvexatiousorabusiveproceedingstodetermine

iftheyshouldbestruckpursuanttoRule3.68.Biley

submittedwrittensubmissionsinaccordancewithCPN7’s

requirementsthroughwhichheattemptedtoexplainthe

allegationsandremediessoughtinhisclaimagainstthe

Defendants,aswellasanAffidavit.Theotherpartiesalso

submittedwrittensubmissions.

ThomasJ.notedthatpursuanttoRule3.68,theCourt

maynotconsiderevidenceindeterminingwhetherallor

partofanActionshouldbestruckundertheRule,and

thereforedeclinedtoconsiderBiley’sAffidavit.HisLordship

concludedthatBileyhadfailedtorebutthepresumption

underCPN7thathisclaimwasabusiveandhopeless,and

thereforestruckitout.

WithrespecttoCosts,ThomasJ.notedthatpursuantto

Rule10.29,Biley’sclaimpresumptivelyfellunderColumn

5ofScheduleC,butalsocommentedthatlump-sumCosts

awardsareappropriateinabusivelitigationsituationsto

concludetheproceedingsandsendamessagethatsuch

litigationwillbe“dealtwithswiftlyanddecisively”.As

such,HisLordshipawarded$4,000inCoststobepaid

forthwith,anddispensedwithBiley’sapprovalastothe

formandcontentofhisOrderpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).

PEETS V ALBERTA (JUSTICE & SOLICITOR GENERAL), 2019 ABQB 507 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)

ThePlaintiff,DavidAndrewPeets(“Mr.Peets”),fileda

StatementofClaim(the“Claim”)againstAlbertaJustice.

TheClaimwasbroughttotheattentionofAssociateChief

JusticeNielsenpursuanttoparagraph5ofCivilPractice

NoteNo.7(“CPN7”)forreviewasapossibleApparently

VexatiousApplicationorProceeding(“AVAP”).

UnderCPN7,if,oninitialreviewbytheCourt,anAVAP

appearstobeunmeritorious,hasnoprospectofsuccess,oris

otherwiseabusiveandvexatious,thentheCourtissuesafirst

writtendecisionthatidentifiestheapparentissue(s)whichmay

beabasistoapplyunderRule3.68tostrikeoutthefiling.




TheClaimasserted,amongotherthingsthat,thatMr.Peets

wasunlawfullyincarceratedwithoutlawfulexcuseand

receivedcruelandunusualpunishmentinviolationofthe

Criminal CodeandtheCharter,forwhichMr.Peetssought

$25millionindamages.

NielsenA.C.J.foundthattheClaimmayhavebeenan

AVAPforanumberofreasons,including:(1)theClaimdid

notappeartoprovideabasisfortheDefendantsandCourt

torespond;(2)whileMr.Peetsindicatedthatmanyofhis

Charterrightswerebreached,theClaimdidnotindicatethe

factsofthoseallegedbreaches;and(3)theClaimsought

impossibleordisproportionateremedies.

Accordingly,NielsenA.C.J.orderedthatMr.Peetshad14

daysafterthedateoftheDecisiontofileandservewritten

submissionspursuanttopara3(b)ofCPN7.HisLordship

furtherorderedthattheCourtwouldprepareandservethe

interimOrderstayingtheActionandthatMr.Peets’approval

ofthatOrderwasnotrequiredpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).

LAIRD V ALBERTA (TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD), 2019 ABQB 567 (ROOKE ACJ)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

TheCourtwasaskedbytheDefendant,theAlbertaSerious

IncidentResponseTeam(“ASIRT”),toengageCivil

PracticeNote7whichallowstheCourttoevaluatewhether

aStatementofClaimrepresentsanApparentVexatious

ApplicationorProceeding(“AVAP”).ThePlaintiff,Laird,

allegedintheStatementofClaimthathehadbeenavictim

ofhundredsofunprovokedattacksbythepoliceincluding

numerousunwarrantedarrests.

TheCourtconsideredLaird’sStatementofClaimand

concludedthereweremultipleproblemswithitthatcould

begroundsfordismissalunderRule3.68.TheStatement

ofClaimdidnotprovideenoughinformationtoallowthe

Defendantstorespondtoit;thedetailsandspecificsof

theallegationswereeitherabsentorseverelylacking.

Moreover,theStatementofClaimappearedtobehopeless

innumerousrespects.ManyofLaird’sclaimscouldbe

consideredhighlyimprobable,absurd,orhyperbole.

TheCourtconcludedthatareviewpursuanttoCivilPractice

Note7waswarranted.Lairdwasinvitedtomakewritten

submissionswithin14daysastowhytheStatementof

Claimshouldnotbestruck.Followingreceiptofthose

writtensubmissionsandthoseoftheDefendant’s,theCourt

confirmedthatitwouldthenevaluatewhethertostrikethe

StatementofClaimfollowingananalysisofRule3.68.

DEVINE V ALBERTA SUPPORTS, 2019 ABQB 568 (THOMAS J)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders) and 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs)

UponreceiptoftheApplicant’sdocumentsentitled

“OriginatingApplication”(the“Application”)counselfor

theRespondentswrotetotheCourttoindicatethatthe

ApplicationmaybeanApparentlyVexatiousApplication

orProceeding(“AVAP”),asdefinedunderCivilPractice

NoteNo.7(“CPN7”)andmaybestruckunderRule3.68.

JusticeThomasagreed,notingthattheApplication:(1)was

irregularinthatitallegednofacts,butinsteadreferenced

anAffidavitasprovidingthebasisforthelitigation;(2)

didnotappeartoprovideanadequatebasisfortheCourt

andRespondentstomakeameaningfulresponse;and

(3)soughtimpossibleremediesandwasfoundtohavea

politicalratherthanpersonallitigationpurpose.

Accordingly,pursuanttoCPN7,JusticeThomasstayed

theApplicationuntilafterreviewoftheApplicant’swritten

submissionsastowhytheApplicationshouldnotbestruck

pursuanttoRule3.68.

Afterreviewingthewrittensubmissions,ThomasJ.

concludedthattheApplicationwasanabusiveproceeding

andthereforeshouldbestruckpursuanttoRule3.68.

ThomasJ.foundthatsincetheCPN7processwasinitiated

bytheRespondents,Rule10.29applied,andtheApplicant

waspresumptivelyliabletopayCosts.HisLordshipalso

notedthattheApplicanthadobtainedafeewaiverto

initiatetheproceedingandthereforedidnotincurany

expensetocommencetheApplication.JusticeThomas

foundthatmisuseofthefeewaiverprocedurecanopen

AlbertaCourtsuptoabusivelitigation.Accordingly,Justice

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Thomasorderedalump-sumCostawardof$500.00to

eachgroupofRespondents.Finally,HisLordshipordered

thatcounselfortheAlbertaGovernmentRespondents

wouldprepareanOrderforthestepsindicatedinHis

Lordship’sDecisionandthatpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c)the

Applicant’sapprovalofthatOrderwasnotrequired.

KNAKE V PERERA, 2019 ABQB 581 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

UponreceiptofaStatementofClaim,severalDefendants

jointlyrequestedthattheCourtengageCivilPracticeNote

No.7andreviewtheActionasapossibleApparently

VexatiousApplicationorProceeding.

InreviewingtheStatementofClaim,AssociateChief

JusticeNielsennoted:i)baldordeclaratoryallegations

whichdidnotappeartoprovideabasisforameaningful

response;ii)requestsforimpossibleordisproportionate

remedies;andiii)requestsforremediesonbehalfofother

thirdpartieswhoarenotinvolvedinthislawsuit,i.e.,

“busybody”litigation.

HisLordshipconcludedthattheStatementofClaim

exhibitedindiciaofhopelessandabusiveproceedings,and

thereforeshouldbesubjecttotheshowcause,document-

basedreviewcontemplatedinCivilPracticeNoteNo.7.

Assuch,theActionwasstayedpendingafinaldecision

onwhethertheStatementofClaimshouldbestruckout

pursuanttoRule3.68,whichwouldfollowabriefwindow

ofopportunityforthePlaintifftorespondtothedeficiencies

identifiedbytheCourt.

YAREMKEVICH V JACULA, 2019 ABQB 620 (MICHALYSHYN J) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)

AfterthePlaintifffiledaone-lineStatementofClaim

seeking$250,000forperjury,MichalyshynJ.reviewed

itpursuanttoCivilPracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”)to

determinewhetheritshouldbestruckashopeless

andabusive.MichalyshynJ.explainedthatCPN7was

implementedtomanageActionsthatappearontheirface

tobeabusive.ThroughCPN7,theCourtissuesawritten

DecisionsettingouttheissuesuponwhichtheStatement

ofClaimmaybestruckpursuanttoRule3.68.Theparty

filingtheapparentlyabusiveStatementofClaimmaythen

providewrittensubmissionsdemonstratingwhytheAction

islegitimate.MichalyshynJnotedthatCPN7hasanarrow

focusandistobeusedonlyin“clearercasesofabuse”.

AfterreviewingtheStatementofClaim,MichalyshynJ.held

thatitappearedsuitableforreviewunderCPN7.TheAction

wasstayed,andthePlaintiffwasinvitedtoprovideawritten

submissionexplainingwhyitshouldnotbestruckoutin

wholeorinpartpursuanttoRule3.68within14days.

MichalyshynJ.alsonotedthatthePlaintiffhadfiledseveral

documentscontainingOrganizedPseudolegalCommercial

Arguments(“OPCA”),whichwarrantimmediateandbroad

Courtintervention.MichalyshynJ.gavetheparties14days

toprovidewrittensubmissionsaboutwhetherthePlaintiff

shouldbesubjecttoCourtaccessrestrictions.HisLordship

alsoimposedinterimCourtaccessrestrictionsduetothe

Plaintiff’suseofOPCA,anddispensedwiththePlaintiff’s

approvaloftheOrderpursuanttoRule9.4(c).

BAHADAR V REAL ESTATE COUNCIL OF ALBERTA, 2019 ABQB 633 (MASTER PROWSE)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

ThePlaintiffrealtorbroughtanActionagainsttheReal

EstateCouncilofAlberta(“RECA”)andalawfirmalleging

thattheDefendantswereliableformaliciousprosecutionas

aresultofconductproceedingstakenbyRECAagainstthe

Plaintiff.TheDefendantsappliedtostriketheStatementof

ClaimpursuanttoRule3.68onthebasisthatitdisclosed

noreasonableclaimagainstthem.

TheCourtdismissedtheApplicationconcludingthat

theDefendantshadnotestablishedthattherewasno

reasonableprospectthatthePlaintiff’sclaimwould

succeed.Specifically,theCourtfoundthat,inlightofthe




pleadings,whicharepresumedtobetrueunderRule3.68,

itwasnotclearthatRECA’sallegationsagainstthePlaintiff

werenotrootedinmalice.

TheMasteralsodeclinedtoexercisediscretionunderRule

3.68tostrikepartsoftheStatementofClaimcontaining

allegationsofnegligence,whileleavinginallegations

ofmaliciousprosecution.Todosowouldbeanearly

impossibletaskgiventhat“thequestionofwhatisand

whatisnotmaliceissufficientlymurky.”

SMITH V CANADA (CORRECTIONAL SERVICE CANADA), 2019 ABQB 639 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

ThePlaintiff,Smith,filedaStatementofClaimforpoor

treatmentofhistenniselbowwhileincarceratedatthe

BowdenInstitution.TheStatementofClaimwasbrought

beforetheCourtforreviewunderCivilPracticeNote7

whichprovidesproceduralguidanceindealingwithan

ApparentVexatiousApplicationorProceeding(“AVAP”).

NielsenA.C.J.statedthattheCourtmaystrikethe

StatementofClaimwhenitisaclearcaseofabuseor

hasapparentdefects.NielsenA.C.J.firstconsidered

thequantumofdamagesappropriatetoclaiminthe

circumstanceofpoorlytreatedtenniselbow.Theamount

ofdamagesclaimedbySmithwasexcessive,and

NielsenA.C.J.notedthatexcessiveordisproportionate

claimsare“abasistoconcludetheactionisanabuse

ofcourtprocesses.”NielsenA.C.J.alsonotedthatwhen

aproceedingseeksaglobalcorrectionofagovernment

shortcoming,itisgenerallyaproceedingwithanimproper

purpose.ForthesereasonsAssociateChiefJusticeNielsen

stayedtheAction.NielsenA.C.J.orderedthatSmithhad

14daystoprovidenomorethan10pagesofwritten

submissionstodefendhisActionortheCourtwouldstrike

theActioninwholeorinpartpursuanttoRule3.68.

GACIAS V EQUIFAX CANADA CO, 2019 ABQB 640 (NIELSEN ACJ) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)

ThePlaintiff’sStatementofClaim,whichallegedthatthe

DefendanthadreportedthePlaintiff’screditinformation

inaccurately,wasforwardedtoNielsenA.C.J.inaccordance

withCivilPracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”),sothatitcouldbe

reviewedasapossibleApparentlyVexatiousApplicationor

Proceeding(“AVAP”).HisLordshipexplainedthatCPN7is

aprocessthroughwhichtheCourtinterveneswhenamatter

appearstobeclearlywithoutmerit“onthefaceofthe

pleading”.Onlyrestrictedformsofevidenceareconsidered

duringaCPN7review.

NielsenA.C.J.reviewedthePlaintiff’sStatementof

Claimandnotedthatit“appear[ed]tobeanattemptto

implementapseudolegalschemetoeliminatedebt”.As

theStatementofClaimcontainedapparentOrganized

PseudolegalCommercialArguments(“OPCA”),it

constitutedanabuseoftheCourt’sprocessesandwas

thereforesuitableforreviewunderCPN7.Inaccordance

withCPN7,HisLordshipthereforeprovidedthePlaintiff

with14daystoserveawrittensubmissionexplainingwhy

theStatementofClaimshouldnotbestruckoutinwholeor

inpartpursuanttoRule3.68.

BecausethePlaintiffhademployedOPCAstrategies,His

LordshipalsoimposedinterimCourtaccessrestrictionson

thePlaintiffpursuanttoCPN7.ThePlaintiff’sapprovalof

theOrderimposingthoserestrictionswasdispensedwith

pursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).

BELCZOWSKI V REID, 2019 ABQB 709 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements)

TheCourthadpreviouslydeterminedthattheStatement

ofClaimfiledinthisActionwasanApparentlyVexatious

ApplicationorProceedingbecausethePlaintiffhadmade

bald,unsupportedallegationsand,specifically,failedto

giveparticularsofallegeddefamationasrequiredunder

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Rule13.7.Furthermore,thePlaintiffrequestedexcessive,

impossibleordisproportionateremedies,includingCharter

reliefforwhichtheStatementofClaimcontainednofactual

foundation.

TheCourtorderedthatthePlaintiffbesubjecttoashow-

causedocument-basedreviewunderRule3.68andstayed

theActionwithoutthePlaintiff’sapprovalpursuantto

Rule9.4.

ORR V ALOOK, 2019 ABQB 713 (FRIESEN J)Rule 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)

ThePlaintiffappliedunderRule3.68(4)tostrikeallorpart

ofanAffidavitsworninsupportoftheDefendant’sposition

foraSummaryTrial.TheActionrelatedtothePlaintiff’s

claimforcompensationasamemberofacommitteetasked

withinstructingcounselandadvancingclaimsonbehalf

oftheDefendantIndianBand(the“Band”)regarding

aboriginallandandlegalstatusclaims.Theimpugned

AffidavitwasswornbythelawyerfortheBandinthe

aboriginallandandlegalstatusclaimsandconcernedthe

lawyer’sopinionregardingthesuitabilityofthematterfor

determinationbywayofSummaryTrial.ThePlaintiffargued

thathereasonablybelievedhimselftobethelawyer’s

formerclientandthatthelawyerwasactinginaconflict

ofinterestandinbreachofthedutyofloyaltybyproviding

evidenceagainsthim.Further,thePlaintiffarguedthatthe

Affidavitwasfrivolous,irrelevant,andimproperargument

andopinionwhichshouldbestruckbeforeTrial.

JusticeFriesenheldthatRule3.68(4)allowsapartyto

seekaninterlocutoryorpreliminaryrulingtostrikeallor

partofanAffidavit,butthattheapplicationoftheRule

isdiscretionary.FriesenJ.notedthatRule3.68wasnot

intendedtoencourageinterlocutoryApplicationsregarding

evidentiaryexclusionspriortothembeingheardand

assessedbytheTrialJudge.

JusticeFriesennotedthattheimpugnedAffidavithadbeen

filednearlytwoyearsbeforethepresentApplicationwas

brought,indicatingtherewasnourgentneedtostrikethe

AffidavitpriortotheSummaryTrial.JusticeFriesenheld

thatthequestionsofadmissibilityandweighingofevidence

raisedbythePlaintiff’sApplicationwerebestdetermined

bytheTrialJudge,whowouldbeinthebestpositionto

knowthefactsofthematterandconsidertheargumentsin

thebroadercontextoftheAction.

ThePlaintiff’sApplicationwasdismissedwithoutprejudice

tothePlaintiff’srighttoaddresstheissuesattheSummary

Trial.

KOZINA V REDLICK, 2019 ABQB 749 (MASTER SMART)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

ThePlaintiffallegedtheDefendantpoliceofficers,police

chiefandpoliceservicehadcoveredupanincidentof

policebrutalitywhichoccurredduringhisarrest.The

DefendantsarguedtherewasnogenuineissueforTrial

andappliedtostrikeallorpartoftheStatementofClaim

pursuanttoRule3.68,oralternatively,SummaryDismissal

pursuanttoRule7.3.TheCourtdeclinedtogranteither

Application.

InrefusingtoexercisehisdiscretionunderRule3.68to

strikethepleadings,specificallytheCharterreliefsought,

MasterSmartfoundthattherewasareasonableprospect

thatthePlaintiff’sclaimforCharterdamagesagainstthe

DefendantscouldsucceedatTrial.Furthermore,Master

SmartfoundthattheStatementofClaimwasnotanabuse

ofprocessnorwasitadvancedinbadfaithandshould

thereforenotbestruck.

HE V APEGA APPEAL BOARD, 2019 ABCA 298 (KHULLAR JA)Rules 3.74 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties After Close of Pleadings) and 14.57 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties to an Appeal)

AregulatedmemberoftheAssociationofProfessional

EngineersandGeoscientistsofAlberta(“APEGA”)was

thesubjectofdisciplinaryproceedings.Heappealedthe

findingsofAPEGA’sAppealBoardtotheCourtofAppeal.

ByvirtueoftheEngineering and Geoscience Professions

Act,RSA2000,cE-11(the“Act”),theAppealBoard




wasnamedasaRespondent.TheAppealBoardthen

appliedtoaddAPEGA’sInvestigativeCommitteeasan

additionalRespondent,pursuanttoRule14.57,whichRule

incorporatesRule3.74intoappellateprocedure.

TheregulatedmemberresistedadditionoftheInvestigative

Committee,arguingthattheAppealBoardwastheonly

RespondentnamedintheAct.JusticeKhullarfoundthat

theActdidnotgosofarastodirectthattheAppealBoard

betheonlyRespondentandnotedthattheAppealBoard’s

participationintheAppealwassignificantlycircumscribed

giventhegeneralrulethatanadjudicativetribunalis

prohibitedfrommakingargumentsinsupportofitsown

decisioninastatutoryAppeal.TheCourtorderedthe

additionoftheInvestigativeCommitteeasaRespondent

totheAppeal,asitwouldnotcausetheregulatedmember

prejudice,andwouldensureanadversarialprocess.

HLFN INDUSTRY RELATIONS CORPORATION V HORSEMAN, 2019 ABQB 564 (ROSS J)Rule 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order)

TheCourtconsideredanApplicationforanOrderfor

SecurityforCostsagainsttwoindividualRespondentswhom

theApplicantsclaimedwereinsolvent.

TheCourtfollowedatwo-stepprocess:first,considering

thefactorsinRule4.22;andsecond,consideringwhether

itwasjustandreasonabletogranttheOrder.JusticeRoss

firstdeterminedthatthefactorssetoutinRule4.22

supportedanOrderforSecurityforCosts.JusticeRoss

foundthatiftheApplicantssuccessfullydefendedthe

CounterclaimbroughtbytheRespondents,theRespondents

wouldnotbeabletopayaCostsawardandtheApplicants

wouldbeunabletosatisfyaCostsOrderagainstassetsin

Alberta.Furthermore,inanalyzingthemeritsoftheAction,

HerLadyshipfoundtheevidencesuggestedthattherewas

astrongcaseagainsttheRespondents.

JusticeRossalsoconfirmedthat,giventheevidencewhich

suggestedtheRespondentshadimproperlyusedmoney

meanttobenefittheApplicants,itwasjustandreasonable

togranttheApplicationforSecurityforCosts.

RDX TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION V APPEL, 2019 ABCA 338 (FEEHAN JA)Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 14.67 (Security for Costs)

UponappealingseveralDecisionsmadebytheCase

ManagementJusticeinrelationtoanongoingdispute

overforum,theDefendantssoughtastayoftheCase

ManagementOrderpendinganAppeal.ThePlaintiff

thereafterbroughtaCross-ApplicationseekingSecurityfor

CostsoftheAppeal,pursuanttoRules4.22and14.67.

TheApplicationforastaywasdismissed,saveforasmall

portionoftheCaseManagementOrder.

WithrespecttoSecurityforCosts,theCourtobservedthat

suchOrdersasagainstDefendantsarerare,“particularly

wheretheplaintiffhaschosentolitigateinajurisdiction

wherethedefendantshavenopresenceandhavenochoice

inbeingpartiestotheaction”.Notingtheimportanceofthis

considerationwhere“thereisaseriouscontestbetweenthe

partiesastotheappropriateforumforthelitigationbetween

them”,theCourtdeclinedtograntSecurityforCosts.

FJN V JK, 2019 ABCA 305 (WATSON, SLATTER AND O’FERRALL JJA)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 14.88 (Cost Awards) and Schedule C

TheAppellantappealedaCostsDecisionoftheTrial

JudgefollowingaTrialregardingchildsupportobligations.

TheTrialJudgefoundthattheAppellanthadengagedin

litigationmisconductbybeinguncooperativeasawitness,

byattemptingtomisleadtheCourtthroughhisevidence,

bynotbeingforthcomingwithfinancialdisclosure,andby

failingtoadmitparentagewhichledtoapreviouscontested

Application.

IntheCostsDecision,theTrialJudgeappliedColumn4

ofScheduleC,consideringtheamountatissuewasto

includetheamountofchildsupporttobepaiduntilthe

childturned18.TheTrialJudgealsodoubledtheColumn

4Costsonaccountoflitigationmisconduct,forbothTrial

CostsandforpriorstepsandApplications.TheTrialJudge

alsodisregardedasettlementoffermadebytheAppellant

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onthebasisthatitincludedarequestfortheRespondent’s

husbandtoadoptthechild.

TheAppellantallegedthattheTrialJudgeerredbyapplying

thewrongcolumnofScheduleC,byawardingmisconduct

Costs,byalteringpriorCostsorders,andbyignoringa

genuinesettlementoffer.

TheMajoritynotedthatCostsawardsarediscretionary

andshouldonlybesetasidewheretherewasanerrorin

principle,ortheawardwasplainlywrong.TheMajority

foundthattheTrialJudgeerredbyincludingallchild

supporttoage18inthecalculationofthequantumfor

thepurposesofdeterminingtheappropriateScheduleC

column.TheMajorityheldthatColumn2ofScheduleC

wastheappropriatecolumn.

RegardingtheenhancedCostsaward,theMajoritynoted

thattheTrialJudgecitedthecorrectprinciple,whichis

thatCostsfortheTrialareinfluencedbyTrialconduct,

notgeneralconduct.However,theMajorityfoundthatthis

principlewasnotapplied,astheTrialJudgeconsidered

pre-TrialconductasjustifyingadvancedCostsincludingfor

stepswhereCostshadalreadybeenruledonbyprevious

Courts.TheMajorityalsodeterminedthattherewasnothing

objectionableabouttheAppellant’sdisclosurewhichwould

justifyenhancedCosts.TheMajorityalsoheldthatthe

TrialJudgeerredbyapplyingdoubleCostsbasedupona

rejectionoftheAppellant’sevidence,notingthatdoing

sowould“virtuallyjustifydoublecostsagainsttheloser

ineverycase”.TheMajorityalsoheldthattheTrialJudge

erredinlawbydoublingfixedCostsamountswhichhad

alreadybeencalculatedbypriorJudges.

RegardingthesettlementoffermadebytheAppellant,the

MajoritynotedthattheofferwasnotgovernedbyRule4.29

orCalderbankprinciples,thatthefinancialoffermadeby

theAppellantwasfoundtobe“reasonable,evengenerous”,

andwouldhavebeenbetterthanthesumsultimately

awardedbytheCourtofAppeal.TheMajorityheldthatit

wasnot“unseemly”fortheAppellanttoincludearequest

fortheRespondent’shusbandtoadoptthechildasitwould

bringfinalitytohisfinancialobligations.TheMajority

foundthattheofferwasabonafideofferwithadequate

timeforconsideration,whichshouldbefactoredinthe

determinationofCosts“toaffirmthepolicysupporting

settlementoffers”.TheMajorityheldthatCostsshould

bepayableonColumn2ofScheduleCuptothedateof

theoffer,andthatthepartiesshouldbeartheirownCosts

thereafter.

TheMajoritynotedthatthedefaultpositionforAppeal

CostsunderRule14.88isthatCostsareawardedtothe

partywhohadsubstantialsuccessonAppeal.TheMajority

alsocommentedthatorderingnoCostsonAppealsinfamily

lawcasesdiscouragespartieswithgoodcasesbutweak

resources.TheAppellantwasfoundtobesubstantially

successfulonAppealandwasawardedCostsfortheAppeal

onColumn2ofScheduleC.

LAY V LAY, 2019 ABCA 355 (ROWBOTHAM, WAKELING AND CRIGHTON JJA)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer To Settle), 10.30 (When Costs Award May Be Made), 10.44 (Appeal to Judge), 13.5 (Variation of Time Periods), 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission), 14.59 (Formal Offers to Settle) and 14.88 (Cost Awards)

TheAppellantshadbeenunsuccessfulontheirAppeal.

TheAppellantssoughtarulingfromtheCourtofAppeal

onCostsoftheActionortovarythedecisionofan

AssessmentOfficeronCosts.TheCourtofAppealnoted

thatanAssessmentOfficerdecisionmaybeappealed

pursuanttoRule10.44.UnderRule10.44theAppeal

oftheAssessmentOfficer’sdecisionistotheCourtof

Queen’sBenchandnottotheCourtofAppeal.Oncethe

CourtofQueen’sBenchissuesaDecisionfollowingthe

AssessmentOfficer’sdecision,thenthatDecisionofthe

CourtofQueen’sBenchmaybeappealedtotheCourtof

AppealifthepartyisgrantedpermissiontoAppealunder

Rule14.5(1)(e),asaCostsDecisioncanonlybeappealed

ifpermissiontoAppealhasbeenobtained.

TheCourtofAppealthereforeheldthatitdidnothave

jurisdictiontomakeadeterminationonCostsandthe

Applicationwasdismissed.




InobitertheCourtofAppealmadeanumberofcomments

aboutCostsdeterminations.Rule14.88(3)statesthat

thedefaultruleisthatCostsinanAppealwillbeatthe

samescalethatappliestotheJudgmentappealedfrom.

Generally,asperthe“InformationNote”associatedwith

Rule14.88,arequestforspecificdirectiononCostsmust

bemadewithintwo-monthsoftheDecision.Thetwo-month

periodcanbevariedbyRule13.5(2)whichallowsthe

CourttoextendatimeperiodspecifiedintheRules.As

aresult,CostscanbespokentoatanytimeiftheCourt

extendstimepursuanttoRule13.5.ThisCourtstated

thatthisconclusionisfurthersupportedbyRule10.30(1)

whichstatesthataCostsawardmaybemadeafterand

Applicationhasbeendecided,afteraJudgmentorfinal

Orderisgranted,orinrespectofasettlement,Application

orproceedinguponagreement.TheCourtfoundthatthese

Ruleswereirrelevant,astheAppellantswerenotseekinga

rulingonCosts,butwereinfactappealingtheAssessment

Officer’sdecision.

TheCourtfurthercommentedonthedoublingofCostsin

obiter.TheCourtofAppealconsideredtheinterpretation

ofRules4.29and14.59.Inthiscase,priortoobtaining

aJudgment,theDefendanthadmadeasettlementoffer

tothePlaintiffs.TheCostsawardfollowingtheJudgment

wasdoubledforallstepstakenaftertheoffer.Thiswas

inaccordancewithRule4.29.Rule4.29allowsfora

doublingofCostsforstepstakenafteranoffertosettleis

madethatismoregenerousthantheJudgmentorOrder.In

thiscase,theAssessmentOfficerhadalsodoubledCosts

forAppealstepstaken.TheCourtofAppealreiterated

thatRule14.59(4)providesthatwhereaformalofferto

settleanAppealismade,thenCostswillbeawardedin

accordancewithRule4.29.Noformaloffertosettlean

Appealwasmadeinthiscase.TheCourtofAppealmade

nodeterminationontheamountofCosts,butimpliedthat

theamountshouldnothavebeendoubledforAppealsteps

taken.

LAUGHREN V MCALEER, 2019 ABQB 501 (MASTER FARRINGTON)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)

TheDefendantbroughtanApplicationtodismissthe

Action,commencedin2003,fordelaypursuanttoboth

Rules4.31and4.33.

ThePlaintiffallegedthatfollowingthecommencementof

theAction,therewasanagreementbetweentheparties

thattheActionbeheldinabeyanceuntilasecondAction

wasresolved.TheActionwasadvancedbetween2011and

2014.FollowingQuestioningoftheDefendantonApril

15,2014,nofurtheractivityoccurredfornearlythree

years.DaysbeforeApril15,2017,Plaintiff’scounselsent

anAppointmentforQuestioning.TheDefendant’scounsel

rejectedtheAppointmentonthebasisthatinsufficient

noticehadbeenprovided.ThePlaintiffthenfiledtwo

ApplicationsrelatingtoTrialreadiness.ThePlaintiffalso

sworeanAffidavitassertingreadinessforTrial,presumably

waivingtherighttofurtherinterlocutorystepssuchas

Questioning.

WithrespecttothedelayApplication,MasterFarrington

foundneithertheunsuccessfulattempttoschedule

Questioning,northePlaintiff’sapparentwillingnessto

foregofurtherQuestioning,tobeasignificantadvancein

theAction.ItwasknownbyallpartiesthatQuestioning

oftheDefendantwasofminimalassistancebecause

theDefendanthadsufferedaninterveningbraininjury.

Moreover,theApplicationsrelatingtoTrialreadinessdidnot

constituteasignificantadvance,asonehadbeendismissed

andtheotherhadbeenadjourned.MasterFarrington

dismissedtheActionpursuanttoRule4.33.

Inthealternative,MasterFarringtonwouldhavealso

dismissedtheActionforinordinatedelayunderRule

4.31.ThedelayApplicationwasfiled14yearsafterthe

commencementoftheAction.DespitethePlaintiff’sclaims

thattherewasanagreementbetweenthepartiespermitting

delayinproceedingwiththeAction,therewasnoevidence

ofawrittenstandstillagreement.TheMasterstated:“Itis

onethingtoholdamatterinabeyanceforpracticalreasons

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forareasonableperiodoftime.Itisquiteanotherthingto

holditinabeyanceforeightyearswithoutsomethingmore

formal.”

EDGAR V SECURITY NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 2019 ABQB 628 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rule 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay)

TheDefendantbroughtanApplicationtodismisstheAction

fordelaypursuanttoRule4.31.InAugustof2017,the

partieshadagreedtoalitigationplan.Despitetheeffortsof

theDefendant,thePlaintifffailedtomeetanyofdeadlines

inthelitigationplan.

MasterSchlosserappliedtheRule4.31testsetoutin

Humphreys v Trebilcock,2017ABCA116.Thefirstpart

ofthetestrequiresthattheCourtconsiderwhetherthe

PlaintiffhasadvancedtheActiontothepointoflitigation

thatareasonablelitigantwouldhaveattained.Master

Schlosserfoundthepartieswerebestabletodecidewhere

themattershouldbe,andtheydidsoviathelitigationplan.

Ifthelitigationplanhadbeenfollowed,thematterwould

havebeenconcludedbythetimetheApplicationtodismiss

wastobeheard.Asthelitigationplanwasnotfollowed,the

PlaintiffhadfailedtoadvancetheActionsufficiently.

MasterSchlosserfoundthedelaytobeinordinate;the

Plaintiffhadnotprovidedanyadequateexcuseforthe

delay;therewasnocompellingreasonnottodismiss;and

thePlaintiffhadnotrebuttedthepresumptionthatdelay

causedsignificantprejudicetotheDefendants.Master

SchlosserdismissedtheActionfordelayunderRule4.31

withCoststotheDefendant.

ALSTON V HAYWOOD SECURITIES INC, 2019 ABQB 634 (MASTER PROWSE)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)

TheDefendantsmadeApplicationstodismisstheAction

fordelay.ThePlaintiff’sclaimallegedthattheDefendant

Flowerandhisemployer,theDefendantHaywood,as

financialadvisors,failedtofollowherinstructionsand

breachedtheirfiduciaryduty.

MasterProwsefirstconsideredRule4.31.TheCourt

setoutthefactorsthataCourtwillconsideronan

applicationbroughtpursuanttoRule4.31fromHumphreys

v Trebilcock,2017ABCA116:(1)Hastherebeen

“inordinate”delay?(2)Ifso,isthedelay“inexcusable?”;

(3)Ifso,hasthenon-movingpartyrebuttedthe

presumptionthatsignificantprejudicehasoccurredasa

resultofthedelay?and(4)Ifnot,isthereacompelling

reasonnottodismisstheAction?

MasterProwsefoundtherehadbeeninordinatedelay:the

StatementofClaimwasgreaterthannineyearsoldand

wasstillnotreadytobesetdownforTrial.Thedelaywas

alsoinexcusableleadingtoapresumptionthatsignificant

prejudicehadoccurredasaresultofthedelay.ThePlaintiff

hadfailedtorebutthispresumptionandtherewasno

compellingreasonforMasterProwsetoallowtheActionto

continue.TheApplicationtodismisstheActionpursuantto

Rule4.31wasgranted.

Inthealternative,MasterProwseconsideredRule4.33

whichrequiresanActiontobedismissedifthreeormore

yearshavepassedwithouta“significantadvance.”After

reviewingthechronology,MasterProwsefoundthatthelast

significantadvanceintheActionwasoneoftheDefendant’s

answerstowritteninterrogatoriesservedonMarch8,2016.

MasterProwsefoundthatApplicationstoproducefurther

documentsandtosetaTrialdatethatwerefiledsubsequent

toMarch8,2016werenotsufficienttoresetthethree-year

periodbecausetheywereneveractuallyheard.

WithregardstoRule4.33,theActionasagainstthe

DefendantHaywoodwasdismissedastheirApplication

wasmadethreeyearsafterthelastsignificantadvance.

However,theDefendantFlower’sApplicationfordismissal

oftheActionfordelaypursuanttoRule4.33wasdismissed

forbeingpremature.

MasterProwsedismissedtheActionagainstboth

DefendantspursuanttoRule4.31,andasagainstthe

DefendantHaywoodpursuanttoRule4.33.




KENSINGTON MASTER BUILDERS INC V KRUGER, 2019 ABQB 661 (MASTER SCHLOSSER)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

KensingtonMasterBuilders(the“Builder”)wascontracted

tobuildahomeforKrugerandFick(the“Purchasers”).

Upondemandforthefirstprogresspayment,thePurchasers

refused.ThePurchasersbelievedthereweredeficiencies

whichweresignificantenoughtowithholdpayment.

In2013theBuildersuedunderthecontractandthe

Purchaserscountersued.TheBuilderappliedforSummary

JudgmentpursuanttoRule7.3,andthePurchasersmade

across-ApplicationtodismisstheActionfordelaypursuant

toRule4.31.

Rule4.31allowsforanActiontobedismissedfor

delaywhenthedelayisinordinateandinexcusable,as

determinedinthediscretionoftheCourt.MasterSchlosser

foundthatthedelayswereattributabletoboththeBuilder

andthePurchasers.Thesedelayswerenotinexcessof

whatisordinary,andtherewasnoevidenceofserious

prejudice.MasterSchlosserwouldnotdismisstheAction

fordelayunderRule4.31andhencedismissedthe

Purchaserscross-Application.

Rule7.3allowstheCourttoassesstheamountofthe

awardandissueJudgment.MasterSchlossergrantedthe

Builder’sSummaryJudgmentApplication.MasterSchlosser

quicklysummarizedthevaluesasclaimedbytheBuilder,

implicitlyacceptedthevaluesasclaimed,andorderedthe

Purchaserspaytheoutstandingamountfortheworkas

completedincludinginterestpursuanttothecontract.

ROYAL BANK OF CANADA V J&S ENGINEERING SOLUTIONS INC, 2019 ABQB 693 (MASTER PROWSE)Rule 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)

TheApplicant,aThird-PartyDefendantintheAction,

appliedtodismissthethird-partyproceedingsagainstit

duetolongdelaypursuanttoRule4.33.Theissuetobe

decidedbytheCourtwaswhethertheApplicant’sThird-

PartyStatementofDefencerepresenteda“significant

advance”.Ithadbeenfiledwithinthepastthreeyears.

NAHAL V GOTTLIEB, 2019 ABQB 650 (MASTER PROWSE)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 8.7 (Confirmation of Trial Date)

TheDefendantsbroughtanApplicationtodismissthe

Actioncommencedin2011fordelaypursuanttoboth

Rules4.31and4.33.

TheDefendantsfiledtheirRule4.33ApplicationonApril

11,2019.Inthethreeyearsprior,severalstepshad

occurredincludingthesettingofaTrialdate:theTrial

CoordinatorhadcancelledtheTrialasneitherpartyhad

compliedwithRule8.7byconfirmingTrialreadiness.The

PlaintiffhadsubsequentlybroughtanApplicationtoseta

newTrialdate.ThelatterApplicationdidnotproceedasthe

DefendantsappliedtodismisstheActionfordelaybeforeit

washeard.

Withrespecttothe4.33delayApplication,MasterProwse

foundthatcommencingastepthatisthennotcompleted

doesnotsignificantlyadvancetheAction.Furthermore,

theMasterconsideredthatthetwomethodsofsettinga

matterdownforTrial,eitherthroughcompletionofaForm

37orthroughCourtdirection,areessentiallyinterimsteps

inadvanceofTrial.TheMasterfoundthatiftheTrialisnot

held,thentheinterimstepdoesnotconstituteasignificant

advanceintheAction.MasterProwsedismissedtheAction

pursuanttoRule4.33.

Inthealternative,MasterProwsewouldhavealsodismissed

theActionforinordinatedelaypursuanttoRule4.31.The

Actionhadbeenunderwayforalmosteightyears,which

delayMasterProwsefoundtobeinordinate;thePlaintiff

hadnotprovidedanyadequateexcuseforthedelay;and

thePlaintiffhadnotrebuttedthepresumptionthatthe

delaycausedsignificantprejudicetotheDefendants.

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Volume 2 Issue 15


preservedandthatlegalclaimswouldnotbeaffectedby

theCCAAproceedingsforfailingtomeettimelines.

IntheirApplicationforleavetoAppealtheSaleOrdermade

pursuanttosection13oftheCCAA,WiebeandParkland

expressedconcernthatpriortotheSaleOrder,partsof

theWeinrichclaimwere“vulnerabletobeingstruckunder

thedrop-deadrule”undertheStayOrders.TheApplicants

arguedthattheSaleOrdercreatedagreaterscopeforthe

claimtocontinuebytheapplicationofRule4.33(2)(a).

Rule4.33(2)(a)carvesoutanexceptionforthedrop-dead

ruleofthreeyearsunderRule4.33(2)iftheActionisstayed

oradjournedbyanOrder.Rule4.33(10)wasalsoplead,

whichstatestheCourtcannotextendthedrop-deadperiod.

SlatterJ.A.consideredthetestthataCourtwillconsider

whenanApplicationforleavetoAppealismade:(1)

WhetherthepointonAppealisofsignificancetothe

practice;(2)Whetherthepointraisedisofsignificance

totheActionitself;(3)WhethertheAppealisprimafacie

meritoriousorfrivolous;and(4)WhethertheAppealwill

undulyhindertheprogressoftheAction.

JusticeSlattergrantedleavetoAppealtheSaleOrder.

SlatterJ.A.foundthataretroactivestaywasofsignificance

tothepracticeofinsolvencylaw,ofsignificancetothe

Weinrichclaim,andwasanarguableand/ormeritorious

issuewhichwouldnotundulyhinderprogresssincethe

CCAAproceedingshadlargelyconcluded.

TIGER CALCIUM SERVICES INC V SAZWAN, 2019 ABQB 500 (SHELLEY J)Rules 5.2 (When Something is Relevant and Material), 5.13 (Obtaining Records from Others), 6.28 (Application of this Division) and 6.32 (Notice to Media)

ThePlaintiffsweregranted,andactedupon,severalex

parteAntonPillerOrders.MNPLLPhadbeenappointed

bytheCourttoassistinthecomputerforensicsearch

providedforintheAntonPillerOrders;itwasnotaparty

totheAction.TheCourtofAppealoverturnedtheOrders,

promptingseveralaffectedparties(the“Applicants”)to

seekanorganizedreturnofmaterialthathadbeenseized

MasterProwsefoundthattheThird-PartyStatement

ofDefencedidconstituteasignificantadvanceforthe

purposesofRule4.33(2)becauseitputontherecordthe

specificdefencesbeingadvanced.Moreover,MasterProwse

rejectedtheApplicant’sargumentthattheStatementof

DefencewasfiledsimplytoavoidaNotinginDefaultand

wasthereforenotasignificantadvance.Theavoidance

ofaNotinginDefaultshowedthattheStatementof

Defencehada“substantialfunctionalresult”whichwasa

significantadvanceintheAction.

TheApplicationtodismisstheActionforlongdelay

pursuanttoRule4.33wasdismissed.

WIEBE V WEINRICH CONTRACTING LTD, 2019 ABCA 323 (SLATTER JA)Rule 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)

TheApplicants,RoyWiebe(“Wiebe)andParklandAirport

Development(“Parkland”)appliedforleavetoAppeal

pursuanttosection13oftheCompanies’ Creditors

Arrangement Act,RSC1985,cC-36(the“CCAA”).

WeinrichContracting(“Weinrich”)hadconstructedan

airportrunwayforParklandbuthadnotbeenpaidinfull

pursuanttothecontractwithParkland.Inmid-2014,

WeinrichfiledaStatementofClaimagainstParkland

fortheirunpaidbillandagainstWiebeforfraudulent

misrepresentationleadinguptotheformationofthe

contract,amongotherthings.

BeforeWeinrich’sclaimsweredealtwith,Parklandbecame

insolventandenteredCCAAproceedingsinlate2016.

UponenteringtheCCAAproceedings,allActionsagainst

Parklandwerestayed,andtheOrderstayingtheActions

wereextendedmanytimes(the“StayOrders”).Limitation

periodswerealsosuspendedbyvirtueoftheStayOrders.

Arguably,onlypartsofWeinrich’s2014Actionfellwithin

thescopeofsomeoftheStayOrders.

InAprilof2019,theCaseManagementJusticeforthe

CCAAproceedingsgrantedanOrdertoapprovethesaleof

Parkland’slandstoitsfirstmortgagee(the“SaleOrder”).

TheSaleOrderalsostatedthatclaimsagainstotherswere




ThelimitedscopeofQuestioningpursuanttoRule6.7

wasemphasizedbyreferencetotherelativelybroader

scopeofQuestioningunderPart5oftheRules.Through

Rule5.17,Part5engagesthepartiesorrepresentatives/

affiliatesofpartiestothesubjectmatteroftheAction.

Part5Questioningisfortheinformationalbenefitofthe

questioningparty,andassuch,thequestionedindividuals

areexpectedtobefullyinformedonallmattersrelevant

andmaterialtotheissuesintheActionpursuanttoRules

5.2and5.25,failingwhichRule5.30providesaccessto

informationnotwithinaquestionedindividual’simmediate

knowledge.

Ultimately,theCourtconcludedthattheinformation

soughtbythePlaintiffsbywayoftheUndertakingswasnot

sufficientlyrelatedtotheissueofcertificationwhichwas

thesubstanceoftheApplication,andtheApplicationto

compelresponsestoUndertakingswasdismissed.

PEMBINA PIPELINE CORPORATION V CONEY, 2019 ABQB 699 (ROMAINE J)Rules 5.2 (When Something is Relevant and Material), 5.19 (Limit or Cancellation of Questioning) and 5.25 (Appropriate Questions and Objections)

TheApplicant,PembinaPipelineCorporation(“Pembina”),

appliedtolimitthenumberofitscurrentandformer

employeesthattheDefendants(collectivelyreferredtoas

“Coney”)wouldbeallowedtoquestionintheunderlying

litigation.Specifically,PembinasoughtanOrderdeclaring

thatfouroftheemployeesthatConeysoughttoexamine

shouldnotbeproducedforQuestioning(the“Proposed

Witnesses”).

JusticeRomainenotedthatwhiletheRulesdonotexpressly

limitthenumberofcorporatewitnessesanadverseparty

mayquestion,Rule5.19(a)allowstheCourttolimitthat

number.HerLadyshipnotedthattheissuefortheCourtto

grapplewithwaswheretodrawthelinebetweenlegitimate

andnecessaryquestioningandquestioningthatismerely

“fishing”forevidencewithoutareasonablebasisorthat

hasbeenproposedforillegitimatestrategicreasons.

orsourcedfromseizedmaterial.TheApplicantssoughtthe

returnofscannedelectronicimagesheldbyMNPLLP.

MNPLLPargued,andtheCourtaccepted,thatsuchnon-

partyproductionwasgovernedbyRule5.13,asinformedby

thescopeofrelevanceandmaterialitydefinedinRule5.2.

MNPLLPwasorderedtoproducethescannedelectronic

images.TheCourtfoundthatMNPLLPwasentitledto

reimbursementfortheCostsofproduction,andindicated

thatthePlaintiffsweretheappropriatepartiestobearsuch

expense,butacknowledgedthattheRulesrequirethe

partiesrequestingproductiontopayassociatedCosts.

TheApplicantsalsorequestedasealingOrderovera

portionoftheCourtrecord,ascontemplatedbytheseries

ofRulesbeginningwith6.28.JusticeShelleywasinclined

tograntasealingOrder,asthepersonalandconfidential

informationatissuehadonlybeendisclosedasaresult

oftheimproperlyobtainedOrders.However,HerLadyship

requiredthatproofofnoticetothemediafirstbeprovided,

asrequiredunderRule6.32.

RIEGER V PLAINS MIDSTREAM CANADA ULC, 2019 ABQB 666 (POELMAN J)Rules 5.2 (When Something is Relevant and Material), 5.17 (People Who May be Questioned), 5.25 (Appropriate Questions and Objections), 5.30 (Undertakings) and 6.7 (Questioning on Affidavit in Support, Response and Reply to Application)

ThePlaintiffsbroughtanApplicationtocompelresponses

toUndertakings.TheUndertakingshadbeenrefusedby

theDefendant’sdeponentinAffidavitsfiledwithrespect

toaclassactioncertificationhearing.TheCourtreviewed

theprinciplesapplicabletocross-examinationonan

AffidavitpursuanttoRule6.7,notingthatadeponent

actsaswitnessforthepurposeofapendingApplication.

Accordingly,thescopeofUndertakingobligationsborne

byadeponentislimitedtoinformationordocuments

referencedorrelieduponinthedeponent’sAffidavit,

orinformationrelatingtoanimportantissueinthe

Application,thecollectionofwhichwouldnotbeunduly

onerous.

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RomaineJ.reviewedRules5.2and5.25andheldthat

duringQuestioningapersonisonlyrequiredtoanswer

relevantandmaterialquestions,andthataquestionis

deemedrelevantandmaterialonlyiftheanswertothat

questioncouldreasonablybeexpectedeither:(a)to

significantlyhelpdetermineoneormoreoftheissuesraised

inthepleadings,or(b)toascertainevidencethatcould

reasonablybeexpectedtosignificantlyhelpdetermineone

ormoreoftheissuesraisedinthepleadings.

Inthiscontext,JusticeRomainereviewedeachofthe

ProposedWitnessesanddeterminedthatConey’sproposed

QuestioningoftheProposedWitnessescouldnotbe

justified.HerLadyshipconcludedthatConeyhadnot

establishedthattheProposedWitnesseshadanyrelevant

andmaterialinformationontheissuesintheunderlying

litigationandgrantedPembina’sapplicationaccordingly.

CHARUK V TERRAVEST INDUSTRIES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 2019 ABQB 747 (FRASER J)Rules 5.6 (Form and Contents of Affidavit of Records), 5.7 (Producible Records) and 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order)

TheDefendanttoaclaimofwrongfuldismissalproduced

anAffidavitofRecordsdisclosingaverylargenumberof

e-mails.ThePlaintiffbroughtanApplicationchallenging

therelevanceandmaterialityofthevoluminousdisclosure,

ultimatelyreceivinganOrderfromaMasterdirectingthe

DefendanttoparticularizeitsStatementofDefenceand

totakefurthereffortstobetterfilteritsproductionfor

relevanceandmateriality.

TheDefendantappealedtheMaster’sDecision,arguing

thatitsAffidavitofRecordsproperlydisclosedallrelevant

andmaterialrecordsasrequiredpursuanttoRule5.6,

inthedescriptive,bundledformatcontemplatedinRule

5.7.JusticeFraser,uponnotingthestandardofreviewof

correctnessonanAppealfromaMaster’sDecisiononall

issuespursuanttoRule6.14,agreedthattheStatement

ofDefenceshouldbeamended.JusticeFraserwasnot,

however,preparedtoupholdthedirectiononrelevance

andmateriality,remarkingthatHisLordshipwasnotina

positiontodeterminerelevanceandmateriality,andrather,

findingthattheDefendanthadmetthelowthresholdof

establishingaplausiblelineofargumentthatthee-mailsas

awholewouldprovidecircumstantialevidencerelevantand

materialtowrongfuldismissal.Accordingly,JusticeFraser

deferredaDecisiononCoststotheTrialJudge,suggesting

that“severelyenhanced”Costsbeawardedintheeventthe

e-mailsaredeterminednottoberelevantandmaterial.

ARCHER V RIBBON COMMUNICATIONS CANADA ULC, 2019 ABQB 481 (MASTER FARRINGTON)Rules 5.12 (Penalty For Not Serving Affidavit Of Records) and 11.21 (Service By Electronic Method)

ThePlaintiffbroughtanApplicationtocompelthe

productionoftheDefendant’sAffidavitofRecordsand

seekingpenaltyCostsforlateserviceofanAffidavitof

RecordspursuanttoRule5.12.ThePlaintiffhadsenthis

AffidavitofRecordsviafaxtotheDefendant’scounsel.Six

monthslater,thePlaintiffbroughttheApplicationwithout

anyfurtherfollowupcallsorcorrespondencerequestingthe

Defendant’sAffidavitofRecords.TheDefendantprovided

alegalassistant’sAffidavitadvisingthattherewasno

recordofthePlaintiff’sAffidavitofRecordhavingbeen

received.ThePlaintiffassertedthatserviceofhisAffidavit

ofRecordstriggeringthetimelinefortheDefendant’s

AffidavitofRecordswasestablishedbyRule11.21and

thepresentationofthedeliveryconfirmationprintout.The

DefendantconsentedinadvancetoanOrdersettingadate

fortheproductionofitsAffidavitofRecords,disposingof

thataspectoftheApplication.

MasterFarringtonnotedthatRule11.21requiresthe

documenttobereceivedbytherecipient“inaformthatis

usableforsubsequentreference”anditwasnotclearon

theevidencewhetherthathadoccurred.

MasterFarringtonnotedthatRule5.12containsmore

discretionthanitspredecessorRule190,asitstatesthat

theCourt“may”imposeapenaltyifthenon-movingparty

failedtoserveanAffidavitofRecordswithoutsufficient

cause.MasterFarringtonalsonotedthatestablishing

sufficientcauseforneglecttoserveanAffidavitofRecords

isahighbar,butcanbemadeoutbyextraordinary

circumstancesoverwhichthepartyhadnopractical




JusticeDunlopalsocommentedonthefiledandunfiled

AffidavitswhichwereprovidedtotheCourt,andnoted

thatoneAffidavitwasswornbythePlaintiff’scounselbut

couldhavebeenswornbyaparty,anddidnotprovide

theevidentiarybasisforaRestrictedCourtAccessOrder.

ThePlaintiffprovidedapartyswornAffidavit(the“Party

Affidavit”)followingJusticeDunlop’srequestatthehearing

ofthematter,resolvingtheevidentiaryissueswiththe

counselswornAffidavit.DunlopJ.notedhowever,thatthe

PartyAffidavitcontainedmuchmoreinformationthanis

requiredtoobtainaRestrictedCourtAccessOrder.

DunlopJ.notedthatconfidentialityOrdersshouldonlybe

grantedwhere(a)itisnecessarytopreventaseriousrisk

toanimportantinterest;and(b)thesalutaryeffectsof

theOrderoutweighthedeleteriouseffectsincludingthe

righttofreeexpressionandthepublicinterestinopenand

accessibleCourtproceedings.JusticeDunlopalsonoted

thatanyconfidentialityOrdershouldberestrictedasmuch

asreasonablypossiblewhilepreservingtheinterestin

question.

JusticeDunlopfoundthattherewereimportantpublic

intereststobeprotectedthroughaRestrictedCourtAccess

Orderwhichweretheconfidentialityofthesettlement

processandtheprivacyinterestsofminorsinthejustice

system.JusticeDunlopnotedhowever,thattheStatement

ofClaimandsubsequentmediacoveragehadalready

disclosedtheminorPlaintiff’smedicalinformationthatwas

soughttobeprotected.JusticeDunlopalsofoundthatonly

thesettlementamountandrelatedinformation(suchas

thecontingencybasedlegalfeespaid)neededtobemade

confidentialtoprotecttherelevantinterests.JusticeDunlop

notedthatthePartyAffidavit,whichwasunfiled,contained

muchmoreinformationthanwasrequiredtosupportan

Ordertoapprovethesettlement.JusticeDunlopnoted

thatthePlaintiffwasfreetore-craftthePartyAffidavit

toremovetheunnecessaryinformation,andtosubmit

onewhichexcludedthesettlementamountandrelated

information,andaseparateAffidavitwhichincludedthe

settlementamount,andthatonlythelatterAffidavitwould

besealed.

TheApplicationwasgrantedinpart.

control.Lastly,MasterFarringtonstatedthatthepurpose

andintentofRule5.12istoencouragetheprompt

productionofdocuments,andtopenalizea“dilatory

defendantthathasdefaultedinitsproductionobligations”,

butthatitwasnotagoalinandofitself,citingtheLaw

SocietyofAlberta Code of Conductwhichdiscourages

partiesfromattemptstogainadvantagesbasedonslipsor

oversightsnotgoingtothemeritsofthedispute.

MasterFarringtonfoundthatthepenaltyinRule5.12was

notwarranted,anddismissedtheApplication.

ATHWAL V MATHER, 2019 ABQB 676 (DUNLOP J)Rules 6.3 (Applications Generally), 6.32 (Notice to Media) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)

TheActionstemmedfromaseverebraininjurysustained

bytheminorPlaintiff.Thepartieshadreachedasettlement

andintendedtoapplyforCourtapprovalpursuanttothe

Minor’s Property Act,SA2004,cM-18.1.Theminor

Plaintiff’sLitigationRepresentativealsoappliedfora

RestrictedCourtAccessOrdertosealcertainAffidavits,

restrictpublicaccesstothesettlementapprovalhearing,

andtorestrictaccesstothetranscriptofthathearing.

JusticeDunlopnotedthatRules6.28-6.36applytothe

procedureforaRestrictedCourtAccessApplication,and

thatRule6.32requiresnoticebeprovidedtothemediavia

theCourt’seNoticesystem.DunlopJ.notedthatRules6.3

and13.18alsoappliedtothisApplication.

JusticeDunlopnotedthatthereliefrequestedinthe

Applicationwassimplyfora“RestrictedCourtAccess

Order”withoutparticulars,andthatparticularswereonly

providedbywayofaproposedformofOrderwhichwas

notfiled.JusticeDunlopfoundthatthiswasdeficientand

incontraventionofRule6.3whichrequiresspecifying

the“remedyclaimedorsought”.Failingtospecifythe

particularsoftheOrderresultedininsufficientnoticebeing

giventotheRespondentsandthemedia.Further,Justice

DunlopnotedthatthegroundsstatedintheApplication

simplydeclaredthatthereliefsoughtwasintheminor

Plaintiff’sbestinterests,butdidnotaddressthelegaltest

foraRestrictedCourtAccessOrder.

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raisedargumentssurroundingtheparolevidenceruleand

that,atthetimethepromissorynotewassigned,nothing

wasexplainedbythelawyertheymetwith.

JusticeLeenotedregrettablythat,anyeffortsbyVickeato

taxorreviewthestatementsofaccountwouldlikelybe“out

oftime”giventhesixmonthlimitationofRule10.10(2).

JusticeLeeconcludedthatthefactualissuesindispute,

theexceptionstotheparolevidenceruleandtheconceptof

anyoralagreementsmadeinthecasebetweenVickeaand

theRespondent,possiblylimitingtheextentandamount

ofthepromissorynote,madethecasenotsuitablefor

SummaryJudgment.Accordingly,JusticeLeeallowedthe

Appeal,setasidetheSummaryJudgment,andawarded

CoststotheAppellants.

OWNERS: CONDOMINIUM PLAN NO 7721985 V BREAKWELL, 2019 ABQB 674 (MANDZIUK J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)

InanActionbroughtbyacondominiumcorporationto

recoveraninsurancedeductiblefromacondominium

owner,competingApplicationsforSummaryJudgmentand

SummaryDismissalwerebroughtbeforeMasterWachowich.

Theownerwassuccessful,andthecorporationappealed

pursuanttoRule6.14.

Onappeal,JusticeMandziukobservedthenowwell-settled

standardofreview:“ThestandardofreviewforanAppeal

fromaMastertoaJusticeoftheCourtofQueen’sBench

iscorrectnessonallissues.DeferencetotheMaster’s

Decisionisnotrequired.TheCourthearingtheAppealis

abletoconductadenovoanalysis,reviewingallrelevant

andmaterialevidence,submissionsandtherecordinorder

toreachadecision”.TheCourtproceededtoconducta

fullre-hearingoftheApplications,anddeterminedthat

therecordwassufficienttofairlyresolvethematterona

summarybasis,referencingthetestforSummaryJudgment

whichhadbeenclarifiedbytheCourtofAppealinWeir-

Jones Technical Services Incorporated v Purolator Courier

Ltd,2019ABCA49subsequenttoMasterWachowich’s

decision.JusticeMandziukallowedtheAppealandfoundin

favourofthecorporation.

P & C LAWFIRM MANAGEMENT INC V SABOURIN, 2019 ABQB 537 (LEE J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 10.10 (Time Limitation on Reviewing Retainer Agreements and Charges)

LeeJ.consideredanAppealfromtheMaster’sDecision

tograntSummaryJudgmenttotheRespondent/Plaintiff,

P&CLawfirmManagementInc(“P&C”),againstbothof

theAppellants/DefendantsVickeaSabourin(“Vickea”)and

RobinSabourin(“Robin”)(collectively,the“Appellants”)

pursuanttoapromissorynote.

JusticeLeeaddressed,asapreliminarymatter,the

Appellants’provisionofadditionalevidencefortheAppeal.

P&Cobjectedonthebasisthattheadditionalevidencewas

notrelevantandmaterialonthebasisthatitcontained

inadmissibleparolevidence,wasirrelevant,orwassimply

argumentative.JusticeLeenotedthatRule6.14(3)allows

foradditionalevidenceif,intheopinionoftheJudge

hearingtheAppeal,itisrelevantandmaterial.Inthis

regard,LeeJ.concludedthatthetwonewAffidavitswere

relevantandmaterialastheyaddressedthetimingofthe

deliveryofthestatementsofaccount,taxation,andthe

scopeoftheAppellant’sinvolvement.Accordingly,Justice

LeeallowedthetwonewAffidavits.

JusticeLeenotedthattheprimaryissuebeforetheCourt

waswhethertheSummaryJudgmentshouldhavebeen

grantedinthismatterunderRule7.3.Bothpartiesagreed

thatthestandardofreviewonAppealfromaMaster’s

Decisionis“correctness”.

JusticeLeeconcludedthatSummaryJudgmentwasnot

appropriateinthisinstance.JusticeLeenotedtheseminal

jurisprudenceofHryniak v Mauldin,2014SCC7and

Weir-Jones Technical Services Incorporated v Purolator

Courier Ltd,2019ABCA49emphasizingthattheremust

be“fairness”intheprocessforbothparties.JusticeLee

noted,asanexample,thattheMasterfoundthatVickea

wasresponsiblefortaxingP&C’saccountseventhough

atthetimetheaccountswereissued,shehadnolawyer

representingheranddidnotknowtheaccountsexisted,

whichwasherpresentdefence.Additionally,theAppellants




ARNDT V SCANDINAVIAN CULTURAL SOCIETY OF CALGARY, 2019 ABQB 475 (GROSSE J)Rule 7.9 (Decision After Summary Trial)

From2004throughto2007thePlaintiff(“Mr.Arndt”)

servedasacaretakerattheScandinavianCulturalCentre

inCalgary(the“Defendants”).Mr.Arndtcommenceda

seriesoflegalActionsarisingoutofhistimeworkingforthe

Defendants.IneachofthetwoActionsbeforetheCourt,

the“0901Action”andthe“1001Action”,theDefendants

raiseddefencesthat,ifsuccessful,wouldhavebeena

completeanswertoMr.Arndt’sclaims.Ultimately,through

casemanagement,themeritsofthesedefenceswere

orderedtobeheardbySummaryTrial.

JusticeGrosseheardtheSummaryTrialwithamix

ofAffidavitandviva voceevidence.The0901Action

was,ineffect,anActionforwrongfuldismissal.Justice

Grossenotedthat,accordingtoRule7.9(2),aJudgemay

declinetograntJudgmentafteraSummaryTrialif,onthe

evidence,theJudgeisunabletofindthefactsnecessary

todecidetheissuesoffactorlaw.JusticeGrossefound

thattheexistenceofavalidsettlementagreementbetween

thepartiesdealtwiththemajorityoftheissuesinthe

0901Action.Nonetheless,pursuanttoRule7.9(2),Her

Ladyshipwasunabletodecidevariousissuesofabsolute

privilegeontherecordbeforetheCourt.Accordingly,

JusticeGrossestayedtheseportionsofthe0901Action

pendingimplementationofthenowenforceablesettlement

agreement.

Turningtothe1001Action,JusticeGrossenotedthatthe

DefendantsargumentsweregroundedintheLimitations

Act,RSA2000,cL-12(the“Limitations Act”).Justice

Grossefoundthat,initsoriginalform,the1001Actionwas

aclaimfornegligence,stemmingfromaprolongedphysical

injurytoMr.Arndt’shandsandarmswhichultimately

requiredsurgery.GrosseJ.foundthatinhistestimonyat

theSummaryTrial,Mr.Arndtdescribedexperiencingpain

anddiscomfortinhisshoulders,elbowsandforearmsin

2006andlinkingthatpaintohisworkfortheDefendants

asearlyas2007,butdidnotcommencethe1001Action

until2010.Accordingly,JusticeGrossedismissedthe1001

ActiononbasedontheapplicationoftheLimitations Act.

CHEMTRADE ELECTROCHEM INC V STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP, 2019 ABQB 562 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 6.31 (Timing of Application and Service), 6.32 (Notice to Media), 6.34 (Application to Seal or Unseal Court Files) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

TheApplicantinthismattersoughttosetasideaConsent

Orderwhichtemporarilysealedmaterialsfiledwithrespect

toanApplicationtosetasideserviceexjuris.TheApplicant

wasnotapartytotheConsentOrderbutwasinvolvedina

relatedAction.TheApplicantarguedthatbothitandthe

mediawereentitledtoadvancednoticeofanApplication

foraRestrictedCourtAccessOrderpursuanttoRules6.31

and6.32.

TheCourtnotedthat,whilethetermsoftheConsentOrder

requiredboththeApplicantandthemediabeprovided

copiesoftheConsentOrder,theApplicantwasnotprima

facieentitledtonoticeoftheApplicationundertheRules.

Moreover,whilethemediawasentitledtonotice,no

responsehadbeenobservedfromanymediaorganization.

TheApplicant’slackofentitlementtonoticeaside,the

Courtconsiderednon-complianceasagroundforsetting

asidetheConsentOrder.RookeA.C.J.notedthatthe

Applicanthadprovidednoauthorityestablishingthatfailure

tocomplywithRules6.31and6.32renderedaRestricted

CourtAccessOrderanullity.Rather,suchacontravention

ornon-compliancewiththeRuleswaspresumablyamatter

tobeconsideredinmakingaCostsaward,ascontemplated

inRule10.33(2)(f).

Inanyevent,RookeA.C.J.wasnotconvincedthatthere

hadbeenacontraventionornon-complianceingranting

aRestrictedCourtAccessOrderbywayofConsentOrder.

Inadditiontoinherentjurisdiction,Rule6.34(3)givesthe

CourtthediscretionindeterminingwhoanApplication

mustbeservedupon,and“anyothermatterthatthe

circumstancesrequire”.Accordingly,itwassuggestedthe

Courtcouldimplicitlyexerciseitsdiscretiontowaivenotice

upongrantingaConsentOrder,andRookeA.C.J.expressly

exercisedthatdiscretioninthiscase.

39

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Volume 2 Issue 15


anApplicationandCross-Applicationinrespectofthe

ApprovalandVestingOrdertoconfirmorissueastay,and

todenyorliftastay,respectively.

InfirstaddressingvarianceoftheApprovalandVesting

Order,theCourtobservedthattheentryofaformalOrder

actedtoousttheCourt’sabilitytomodifyanOrderunder

Rule9.13.TheCourtthennotedthatSection187(5)of

theBIApermits“everycourt[to]review,rescindorvary

anyordermadebyitunderitsbankruptcyjurisdiction”,

however,thepartieshadconcededthatmerevariance

oftheOrderwasnotdesired,andrather,theysoughtto

determinewhetherornotanAppealwasavailableasof

eitherrightorleave.

JusticeWatsonacknowledgedthatasingleAppealJudge

mayonlymakerulingsthatareincidentaltotheoperation

oftheCourtofAppeal,pursuanttoRule14.37,and

thereforedeclinedtoruleontheavailabilityofAppealasof

rightontheauthorityofSection193oftheBIA.However,

HisLordshipdidgrantleavetoAppealvariouspointsof

law,includingwhetherornotanAppealasofrightwas

available.

HAMMOND V HAMMOND, 2019 ABQB 522 (LEMA J)Rule 9.15 (Setting Aside, Varying and Discharging Judgments and Orders)

ThePlaintiffinamatrimonialpropertyActionappliedfor

anOrderforchildsupportandrelatedrelief.TheDefendant

wasproperlyservedwiththeApplicationandAffidavit,

butfailedtoattendthehearing.TheOrdersoughtbythe

PlaintiffwasgrantedintheDefendant’sabsence.The

DefendantappliedunderRule9.15(1)(b)tosettheOrder

aside,claimingthathedidnotappearbecauseofan

“accidentormistake”.TheDefendantsworeanAffidavit

whichdescribedthemistakeasfailingto“properlynotethe

dateofattendance”andnotingthathedidnot“intendto

allowanOrderofthekindgranted”togouncontested.

LemaJ.heldthatfailuretoappearonaccountofan

accidentormistakemustdemonstratethatnon-attendance

wasinadvertentorunintentional,andthattheinterfering

eventmustsatisfythe“butfor”test.Therationaleofthe

MAK V TJK, 2019 ABQB 547 (BERKOV J)Rule 9.13 (Re-opening Case)

FollowingtheconclusionofevidenceduringafamilyTrail,

butpriortotheCourtissuingaJudgmentorDecision,the

Applicant’scounseldiscoveredanew,relevantdocument.

TheApplicantappliedtoreopentheTrialunderRule

9.13(b).TheRespondentreliedonR v Palmer,[1980]1

SCR759(“Palmer”),arguingthattheApplicationshould

bedismissedastheimpugneddocumenthadbeenprovided

totheApplicant’scounselpriortotheTrial,andtherefore

couldhavebeendiscoveredwithduediligence.

InreviewingRule9.13,theCourtnotedthattheRule

islargelyaimedatanAppealCourt’sexerciseofits

jurisdictionratherthanthatofaTrialJudge.Thecaselaw

advancedwithrespecttoRule9.13consideredsituations

whereanApplicationwasbroughtafteraJudgmentor

Decisionhadbeenrendered.Despitethis,theCourtfound

theprinciplesfromthosecaseshelpful.JusticeBerkov

reasonedthataTrialJudgeexercisingdiscretiontore-open

theTrialmustemphasizefairnessinconsideringwhether

newevidenceiscredibleandmaterial,andwhetherthere

isariskofamiscarriageofjustice.TheJusticefoundthat

whilethePalmercriterionwasrelevant,HerLadyship’s

discretionasTrialJudgeinvokedabroaderanalysis.

Ultimately,theCourtnotedthattheimpugneddocument

hadbeeninaccuratelyreferenced,whichmisledthe

Applicantintonotconsideringtheimpugneddocument’s

relevance.TheCourtgrantedtheApplication,butallowed

theRespondenttoprovidefurtherevidencetoexplainthe

impugneddocument.

1905393 ALBERTA LTD V SERVUS CREDIT UNION LTD, 2019 ABCA 269 (WATSON JA)Rules 9.13 (Re-Opening Case) and 14.37 (Single Appeal Judges)

AnApprovalandVestingOrderwasgrantedbytheCourt

ofQueen’sBenchundertheBankruptcy and Insolvency

Act,RSC1985,cB-3(the“BIA”)andaformofOrder

wasfiledshortlythereafter.OnAppeal,thepartiesbrought




andsupplementedthefactorssetoutinRule10.2

withrespecttoreviewofthereasonablenessoflawyer’s

fees.Ultimately,theCourtheldthatenforcementofthe

agreementwasreasonable.

STACKARD V 1256009 ALBERTA LTD, 2019 ABQB 480 (JONES J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

TheApplicationsoughtthereturnofamortgagewhich

theApplicanthadtransferredtotheRespondents.Itwas

alsoallegedthattheRespondentshadimproperlyusedthe

mortgageproceedsincontraventionofaConsentOrder.The

Applicationwasdismissed,andtheCourtwasaskedtorule

onCosts.

TheRespondentscitedtheirentitlementtoCostspursuant

toRule10.29,andfurtherreliedonthefactorslistedin

Rules10.33(1)and(2).Inthisregard,theRespondents

arguedthattheissuesandcircumstancesoftheAction

werenotfavourabletoresolutionbysummaryprocess,a

conclusionthatshouldhavebeenequallyapparenttothe

Applicant,andmoreover,thepursuitofSummaryJudgment

andallegationsregardingthemisappropriationofmortgage

fundscausedanunnecessarydetourintheAction.

TheApplicantarguedthattheCourtshoulddeclineto

awardCosts,awardreducedCosts,ordeferanOrderwith

respecttoCosts.TheApplicantexpressedthataCosts

awardpayableforthwithcouldfinanciallyimpairherability

toproceedwithanApplicationforcontemptofCourt.

ThoughtheCourtdisagreedwiththeRespondents’

suggestionthattheissueswerenotsuitableforsummary

determination,itwasnotconvincedthattheRespondents’

presumptiverighttoCostshadbeendisplaced.TheCourt

orderedthatCostsbepayableforthwith,astheApplicant

couldhavechosentopursuecontemptofCourtinsteadof

SummaryJudgment,butdidnot,andshouldnotthenbe

permittedtodefertheconsequencesofthatchoice.

RulewasdescribedbyLemaJ.asbeingtoremedythe

injusticeofanOrdergrantedagainstapartywhowould

haveappeared,butfortheinterferingevent.JusticeLema

notedthatchoosingnottoattend,or“effectivelychoosing

nottoattendasreflectedinalackofdiligence”wasnot

sufficient.

JusticeLemafoundthattheDefendanthadfailedto

describewhatcausedhimtofailtoproperlynotethedate

ofthehearing,andinferredthatitwasasaresultofeither

alackofdiligence,oraconsciousdecisiontoallowthe

litigationtoproceedwithouthimuntilhesawtheOrder

grantedagainsthim,neitherofwhichwereanaccidentor

mistakepreventingattendanceforthepurposesofRule

9.15.TheApplicationtosetasidetheOrderwasdismissed.

WALSH V STEPHEN M K HOPE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, 2019 ABQB 516 (WOOLEY J)Rules 10.2 (Payment for Lawyer’s Services and Contents of Lawyer’s Account), 10.7 (Contingency Fee Agreement Requirements), 10.9 (Reasonableness of Retainer Agreements and Charges Subject to Review), 10.18 (Reference to Court) and 15.5 (Contingency Fee Agreements)

AdisputearosebetweenthePlaintiffandherlawyer

regardingacontingencyfeeagreementthatwasentered

intoin2009.Indeterminingtheenforceabilityofthe

agreement,theCourtrevieweditscompliancewiththe

specificrequirementsofcontingencyretainerssetoutin

Rule10.7,notingthattransitionalRule15.5(1)excepts

theapplicationofsubsection(2)ofRule10.7wherea

contingencyagreementismadeunder,andcomplies

with,theoldRules.TheCourtfoundthattheimpugned

agreementmettherequirementsoftheformerRules,and

wasanenforceablecontingencyfeeagreement.

AsthePlaintiffhadallegedthatenforcementofthe

agreementwouldbeunreasonable,theCourtreviewedthe

reasonablenessoftheagreement.Insodoing,theCourt

tooknoteoftheframeworkforreviewbyanAssessment

Officer,ascontemplatedinRule10.9,andtheauthority

oftheCourtinconsideringassessmentmattersreferredto

it,pursuanttoRule10.18.Moreover,theCourtconsidered

41

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STEER V CHICAGO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, 2019 ABQB 670 (HOLLINS J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

ThePlaintiffsintheunderlyingAction,Wayneand

AntoinetteSteer(the“Steers”),initiallyboughtahouse

inCalgarywhichhaddefectsthatcausedseverewater

leakage.TheSteersunsuccessfullysuedtheirtitleinsurer,

ChicagoTitleInsuranceCompany(“CTIC”),forthe

remediationcosts.CTICtookthepositionthattheloss

wasnotcoveredunderthesubjecttitleinsurancepolicy.

MasterProwseagreedwithCTICanddismissedtheSteers’

ApplicationforSummaryJudgment.JusticeHollinsheard

theSteers’AppealfromMasterProwse’sDecisionalong

withCTIC’scross-ApplicationforSummaryDismissalits

favour.JusticeHollinsdismissedtheSteers’Appealand

grantedSummaryDismissaltoCTIC.CTIC,inthewithin

Application,appliedforitstaxableSchedule“C”Costsof

thatproceeding.

HollinsJ.notedthat,subjecttoHerLadyship’sdiscretion,

thesuccessfulpartyisgenerallyentitledtoitsCosts

pursuanttoRule10.29(1)(a).JusticeHollinsreviewed

thefactorssetoutinRules10.33andRule10.31(1)for

determiningtheappropriateCostsaward.JusticeHollins

furtherconsideredwhenitmightbeappropriatefora“no

costs”award.

HerLadyshipemphasizedthata“nocosts”awardmay

beappropriateininstanceswhereaDecisionistruly

publicinterestlitigationandthelitigantshavenoorlittle

pecuniaryinterestintheoutcome(whichdidnotapply

inthiscase)orwhenthecaseinvolvesanovelpointof

law.JusticeHollinsfoundthat,priortoMasterProwse’s

Decision,theonlyreportedcasedealingwiththescopeof

titleinsuranceinsimilarcircumstanceswasMacDonald

v Chicago Title Insurance Company,2015ONCA842

(“MacDonald”),whichfoundthattheCTICpolicy(identical

totheSteers’)didcovertheirhome’sphysicaldefects.

HerLadyshiphighlightedthatwhileitwasnotcorrectto

saythattheSteershad“nodecidedcasesonpoint,”it

CALLAWAY V OFFICE OF THE ELECTION COMMISSIONER (ALBERTA), 2019 ABQB 573 (KIRKER J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Awarded Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)

IntheunderlyingApplication,JusticeKirkerdismissedan

interlocutoryinjunctionApplication(the“Application”)

broughtbytheApplicantsnotingthat,whilesatisfiedthere

wasaseriousquestiontobetried,theApplicantshad

failed,inter alia,toestablishtheywouldsufferirreparable

harmiftheApplicationwasrefused.

KirkerJ.notedthatpursuanttoRule10.29,thesuccessful

partytoanApplicationisentitledtoaCostsaward.Justice

KirkerreviewedthediscretionaryprovisionsofRule10.31

andthefactorstoconsiderwhenutilizingdiscretionunder

Rule10.33.

HerLadyshipnotedtherelevantjurisprudenceandfound

that,pertheRespondent’ssubmissions,aninjunctionis

anintense,compactproceedingwhichcanandoftendoes

consumemanylawyerhoursoveraveryshorttimeperiod

andthatpartieswhocommencesuchproceedingsmust

understandtheriskofasubstantialCostawardagainst

themiftheyfail.

JusticeKirkerfurthernotedthatCostordersaremadeto

indemnifythesuccessfulpartyforonlyaportionofitslawyer’s

feesandthatonlyinexceptionalcaseswillaCourtdirect

thepayortopayasumthatsubstantiallyorfullyindemnifies

theothersideforitslegalfees.GiventhattheRespondent

didnotprovidetheCourtwithevidenceoftheexpensesit

incurredtorespondtotheApplication,intheabsenceofthat

evidence,KirkerJ.wasreluctanttoawardCostsintheamount

claimedbytheRespondentasitmaytoocloselyapproximate

asubstantialorfullindemnityCostsaward.

BalancingtheseconsiderationsJusticeKirkerconcluded,

guidedbythetariffamountsforwrittenargumentset

outinitem12ofScheduleC,thatCostsof$5,000for

theApplicationBriefand$1,000fortheCostsBrief

plusreasonabledisbursementswereappropriateinthe

circumstances.




fallsshortofwhatisexpectedofaresponsiblelitigant.”

Furthermore,theuseofamultipliermaybeappropriateto

reflecttheamountandcomplexityoftheclaim.

TheCourtdeterminedthatthecontractinissueallowed

forsolicitorandclientCoststobeawardedtothePlaintiffs

becauseitallowedforrecoveryof“reasonableattorneys’

feesandexpenses.”However,theCourtstillassessed

whetherenhancedCostscouldbeawardedifthisfinding

wasinerror.InthecaseofthePlaintiffs,ThomasJ.found

thatamultiplierof2.5timestheSchedule“C”amount

wouldbeappropriategiventheamountandcomplexityof

theAction.

WithregardstotheDefendantsbyCounterclaim,Thomas

J.ruledthatCostsbasedonamultiplierof3.5times

theSchedule“C”amountwaswarrantedbecausethe

Defendants’/PlaintiffsbyCounterclaim’sconduct“fellshort

ofwhatisexpectedofaresponsiblelitigant.”Theyhad

includedcertainpartiesinthelitigationwithoutanybasis

fordoingso.

ALBERTA HEALTH SERVICES V WANG, 2019 ABCA 328 (ANTONIO JA)Rules 10.44 (Appeal to Judge), 10.45 (Decision of the Judge) and 14.5 (Appeals only with Permission)

ThisAppealrelatedsolelytoCosts,andtherefore

permissiontoAppealtoafullAppealPanelpursuantto

Rule10.5(1)(e)wasrequired.TheApplicantsappealed

theDecisionofaChambersJudgewhohaddenied

theirApplicationunderRule10.45(3)(c)towaivethe

requirementtofilethetranscriptofCostassessment

proceedingsbeforeanAssessmentOfficerforacertification

ofCostswhichtheApplicantshadappealed.TheChambers

JudgedeniedtheApplication,relyingonRule10.44(2),

astheAppealwasatrueAppealontherecordandwas

necessarytodetermineiftheAssessmentOfficer’sdecision

wasreasonable.TheApplicantsallegedthattheywere

deniedproceduralfairnessinfrontoftheChambersJudge

andthattheChambersJudgeexhibitedbiasagainstthem.

JusticeAntonionotedthatthetestanApplicantseeking

permissiontoAppealmustmeetrequiresdemonstrating:

wastruethatlimitedauthoritiesexisted.JusticeHollins

foundthatHerLadyshipwouldhaveawardedCTICitsfull

taxableCostsonthismatterbutforthefactthat,whenthe

SteersdecidedtocommencetheirAction,MacDonaldwas

theonlycaseonwhichtheycouldreceivelegaladviceand

evaluatetheiroptions.JusticeHollinsreasonedthatifCosts

areawarded,inpart,toencouragepartiestotakealong,

hardlookattheirchancesofsuccessbeforeemployingthe

processesoftheCourt,thenHerLadyshipcouldnotfault

theSteersforhavingbeguntheirAction.However,that

reasoningwasimpactedbytheSteersdecisiontogofurther

andunsuccessfullyAppealtheOrderofaMaster.

Accordingly,JusticeHollinsorderedtheSteerstopayone-

halfofCTIC’staxableCosts.

MANSON INSULTATION PRODUCTS LTD V CROSSROADS C&I DISTRIBUTORS, 2019 ABQB 684 (THOMAS J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and Schedule C

TheCourt,afteraTrialinvolvingmanydifferentparties,

addressedtheissueofCosts.ThePlaintiffshadbeen

largelysuccessfulwhiletheDefendantsbyCounterclaim

wereentirelysuccessful.TheCourtstatedattheoutsetthat

thepartiesarepresumptivelydueSchedule“C”Costsin

accordancewithRule10.29.TheCourtalsonotedthatit

hasbroadauthorityunderRule10.31tovarytheamount

suggestedinSchedule“C”toaccountfornumerousfactors

listedinRule10.33includingtheconductofpartiesto

litigation.TheCourtthenconsideredwhethertoaward

elevatedCosts.

ThomasJ.summarizedthecaselawprinciplesgoverning

elevatedCosts.HisLordshipconfirmedthatfullindemnity

Costsareawardedinexceedinglyrarecasesincivil

litigation,whereacontractspecificallyallowsforthemto

beclaimed.Moreover,solicitorandclientCostsarealso

rare.Theyareonlytobeawardedwherethereisafindingof

intentionalmisconduct.TheCourtalsohasfullauthorityto

awardCostsbasedonadifferentcolumnofSchedule“C”

orbasedonamultipleofSchedule“C”Costs.Enhanced

Costscanbejustified“wheretheconductofthelitigant

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LoparcoJ.consideredtheparties’competingApplications

respectingthedivisionoftheirproperty.Thehusband’s

estatearguedthatthewifecouldnotseekanunequal

divisionofmatrimonialpropertybecauseshehadnotfiled

aCounterclaimseekingitonthebasisthat,pursuantto

Rule13.6(2),pleadingsmustincludethefactsuponwhich

eachpartyreliesaswellastheremedyclaimedbyeach

party.However,LoparcoJ.alsoexplainedthattheCourt

maydistributematrimonialpropertyunequallypursuantto

section7(4)oftheMatrimonial Property ActRSA2000,

cM-8,evenifithasnotbeenspecificallypleadedbya

party.However,thewifefailedtoestablishthatanunequal

divisionwasnecessary.Assuch,LoparcoJ.assessedand

dividedtheparties’matrimonialpropertyonanequalbasis.

SLAWSKY V EDMONTON (CITY), 2019 ABCA 302 (KHULLAR JA)Rules 13.4 (Counting Months and Years), Rule 14.8 (Filing a Notice of Appeal), 14.36 (Case Management Officers) and 14.37 (Single Appeal Judges)

TheApplicantattemptedtoapplyforanAppealofa

JudicialReviewDecision.TheCaseManagementOffice

(“CMO”)refusedtofiletheApplicant’sNoticeofAppeal,

claimingthatitwasfiledoutsideofthetimeallowed.The

ApplicantappliedunderRule14.36(3)torescindthe

CMOdecisionthattheAppealwasfiledoutsideofthetime

allowedandappliedtoextendtheAppealdeadline.

TheCourtconsideredRule14.8(2)(iii)incalculatingthe

timeforanAppeal,whereitstatesthatanAppealmust

bemadewithinonemonthafterthedateoftheDecision.

WhencountingonemonthfromthedateofDecision,the

CourtappliedRule13.4(1)whichsaysthedeadlineisthe

same-numbereddayinthesubsequentmonth.

Therewasadisputeastowhenthe“dateofdecision”

asdescribedinRule14.8(1)occurredinthiscase.The

ChambersJudgehadreleasedadditionalreasonstodismiss

anApplicationtoreopenCosts,lendingtotheconfusion.

TheCourtofAppealfoundtheseadditionalreasonsdidnot

extendthedeadlinefortheNoticeofAppealasthey“did

notcontributetoorchange”thesubstantivereasons.The

Appealwasfiledoutoftime.

i)agoodarguablecasehavingenoughmerittowarrant

scrutinybytheCourt;ii)importantissuestothepartiesand

ingeneral;iii)practicalutilityoftheAppeal;andiv)the

effectofdelayintheproceedingscausedbytheAppealwill

notbeundulyprejudicial.

JusticeAntoniofoundthattheAppealdidnothave

arguablemeritastheChambersJudge’scommentswere

directedatallowingallargumentstobemadeinanorderly

fashionwithoutinterruption-theydidnotraisefairness

concerns.Further,AntonioJ.A.foundthattheDecisionwas

notofimportancewithinthemeaningofthetest,asthe

DecisionunderAppealwasadiscretionaryoneforwhich

theDecisionandtheprocessbywhichitwasmadewould

havenoprecedentialvalue.JusticeAntonionotedthat

theApplicantshadalreadyobtainedthetranscriptofthe

proceedingsandfiledthemwiththeAppealmaterials,and

thus,therewasnopracticalutilitytotheAppeal.Giventhe

abovefactors,JusticeAntonioheldthattherewasnoreason

todelaytheAppealintheCourtofQueen’sBench.The

ApplicationforpermissiontoAppealwasdismissed.

STALZER (ESTATE) V STALZER, 2019 ABQB 658 (LOPARCO J) Rules 12.49 (Evidence in Summary Trials) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)

TheestateofahusbandinamatrimonialpropertyAction

soughtdivisionofmatrimonialpropertyafterhisdeath.

ThewifeopposedtheApplicationandsoughtanalternate

divisionoftheirproperty.

LoparcoJ.notedthatalthoughthepartiesseparatedin

2006,theproceedingswerestillongoingatthetimeofthe

husband’sdeathin2016.Thepartieshadmadevarious

Applicationsagainsteachother,butthepresidingJustice

haddeterminedthatthefinaldivisionoftheirproperty

couldnotbeadjudicatedinChambers.Thematterof

separatingtheparties’matrimonialassetswasthendirected

tobeheardbyLoparcoJ.atSummaryTrialbasedon

Affidavitevidence,asthepartieshadnotsoughttoadduce

oralevidencepursuanttoRule12.49.




TheCourtnotedthatthePlaintiffpurchasersweretheones

takenbysurpriseinitiallyinthelitigation.ThePlaintiffs

onlydiscoveredthroughdocumentdisclosurethatthe

Defendantshadareportintheirpossessionthatshowed

thepresenceofconcretespalling,whichwouldexplainwhy

aclaimforfraudulentmisrepresentationwasnotincluded

intheoriginalStatementofClaim.However,theCourtalso

foundthatthePlaintiffshadenoughtimetoamendthe

StatementofClaimaftermakingthisdiscovery,butthey

neverdidso.Therefore,theCourtruledthatthePlaintiffs’

claimforfraudulentmisrepresentationwasbarred.

KAUFMANN V EDMONTON (CITY) POLICE SERVICE, 2019 ABCA 272 (BIELBY, WAKELING AND HUGHES JJA)Rule 14.4 (Right to Appeal)

TheApplicanthadbeenbannedbytheCityofEdmonton

(the“City”)fromusingtheCity’srecreationcentres,

outdoorpoolsandarenasforaperiodoftwoyears.Upon

JudicialReview,thebanwasvacated,asitwasdetermined

tobeunreasonableontherecordprovidedtotheCourt,and

thematterremittedbacktotheCityforreconsideration.

NotwithstandingtheApplicant’ssuccessuponJudicial

Review,theApplicantbroughtanAppeal.

OnAppeal,theAppellantdidnottakeissuewiththeform

ofOrderarisingoutofJudicialReview,buthadconcerns

withthereasonsoftheChambersJudge.TheCourtof

AppealdismissedtheAppeal,notingthatRule14.4(1)

allowsapartytoappealonlyfeaturesofanOrderor

Judgment.Intheabsenceofastatutoryprovisiontothe

contrary,apartycannotAppealreasoningoftheChambers

Judge.

SANTORO V BANK OF MONTREAL, 2019 ABCA 322 (CRIGHTON, HUGHES AND PENTELECHUK JJA)Rules 14.4 (Right to Appeal) and 14.32 (Oral Argument)

TheApplicantappealedseveralOrderstotheCourtof

Appeal.OneAppealconcernedtheOrderofaMaster.The

Appealwasdenied,asRule14.4prohibitsAppealsfrom

aMasterdirectlytotheCourtofAppeal.TheApplicant

alsosoughtanAppealofaChambersJudge’sdismissal

ofaMaster’sDecisionregardingforeclosureOrders.The

WhenaNoticeofAppealisfiledoutsideofthetimelimit,a

singleJudgehasthediscretiontoextendthedeadlineorto

striketheAppealunderRule14.37(2)(c).

Inconsideringwhethertoextendthedeadline,theCourt

statedthefactorstograntanextensioninthe“interestsof

justice”:(1)theApplicantmusthaveabonafideintention

toAppeal;(2)theApplicantmusthaveareasonablechance

ofsuccess;and(3)theApplicantmusthaveanexplanation

fortheirdelay.Further,theotherpartiestotheAppealmust

notsufferprejudicefromallowingtheAppeal,norcanthe

Applicanttakeanadvantagefromtheextension.

Underthesecondfactor,theCourtconsideredwhether

theApplicant’sAppealwouldhaveareasonablechance

ofsuccess.TheonusisontheApplicanttoshowthe

likelihoodofsuccess.Thisrequiresmorethanamere

assertionbytheApplicantbutisequivalenttoconsidering

whethertheAppealishopeless.TheCourtfoundtheAppeal

hadnoreasonablelikelihoodofsuccess,andtherefore,

itwasnotintheinterestsofjusticetograntthetime

extension.TheApplicant’sNoticeofAppealwasfiledoutof

timeandJusticeKhullarrefusedtogranttheextension.

KENT V MACDONALD, 2019 ABQB 669 (LOPARCO J)Rules 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements)

ThePlaintiffscommencedanActionafterpurchasinga

residentialhomefromtheDefendants.Shortlyafterthe

purchase,thePlaintiffsdiscoveredwateringressandmould

inthebasementaswellasconcretespallingthatrequired

repairs.

OneoftheissuestoberesolvedbytheCourtwaswhether

theDefendantscouldbeheldliableforfraudulent

misrepresentationeventhoughthePlaintiffshadnot

includedtheparticularsofthisclaimintheStatement

ofClaim.TheCourtnotedthatRule13.7requiresthe

particularsofaclaimforfraudormisrepresentationto

beincludedinpleadings,asdoesRule13.6(3).The

reasonforthisistopreventapartyfrombeingtakenby

surpriseatTrialbyaseriousallegationsuchasfraudor

misrepresentation.

45

OCTOBER 2019

Volume 2 Issue 15


andshouldnotberewardedwithafurtherlevelofAppeal.

Accordingly,HisLordshipdeniedMr.Rana’sApplicationto

Appeal.

ALANEN V ELLIOTT, 2019 ABCA 290 (HUGHES JA)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only with Permission)

TheApplicantsoughtpermissiontoappealaDecision

oftheCourtofQueen’sBenchdecliningtosetasidean

interimarbitrationawardofCosts.

TheCourtreasonedthatCostsDecisionsarediscretionary

andareaffordeddeferenceonreview,andtherefore

permissiontoAppealCostsDecisionsunderRule14.5(1)

(e)shouldbegrantedsparingly.Thisresultwasnotedtobe

consistentwiththetestforpermissiontoAppealaCosts

awardestablishedundertheformerRules,whichremains

persuasive.

UponengagingtheanalysiscalledforbyRule14.5(1)(e),

JusticeHughesfoundthattheApplicant,havingadmitted

thattheCostsawardcausednofinancialhardship,failed

toprovethattheissueswereimportant(bothtotheparties

andingeneral)andthattheAppealhadpracticalutility.

HerLadyshipdeniedpermissiontoAppealtheCosts

Decision.

SRG TAKAMIYA CO LTD V 58376 ALBERTA LTD, 2019 ABCA 301 (ROWBOTHAM JA)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only with Permission)

TheApplicantappliedforpermissiontoAppealaDecision

byasingleJudgeoftheCourtofAppealdenyingits

ApplicationforastaypendingAppeal.

TheCourtfoundthatinordertobesuccessfulunder

Rule14.5(1)(a),theApplicantmustshowthatitisin

theinterestsofjusticetohaveanAppealPanelreviewa

singleJudge’sDecision.Permissioncanbegrantedifthe

Applicantestablishesthatthereis(a)aquestionofgeneral

importance;(b)apossibleerroroflaw;(c)anunreasonable

exerciseofdiscretion;or(d)amisapprehensionof

importantfacts.

ApplicantdidnotappearatthatscheduledAppealhearing

andtheCourtelectedtoproceedbasedonwrittenmaterials

only,aspermittedbyRule14.32(3).

RANA V RANA, 2019 ABCA 278 (O’FERRALL JA)Rules 14.5 (Appeals Only with Permission) and 14.8 (Filing a Notice of Appeal)

Theself-representedApplicant,SalimRana(“Mr.Rana”),

soughtpermissiontoAppealO’FerrallJ.A.’sDecision

denyingMr.Rana’sApplicationtorestoretheunderlying

Appeal(the“RestoreApplication”).Mr.Ranacontended

thathewasdeniedafairhearingbecauseHisLordshipdid

nothearoralsubmissionsfromMr.Rana.

Mr.Ranahadinitiallyfiledacaveatagainsthismother’s

land.Hewasthenservedwithanoticetotakeproceedings

onhiscaveat.Hedidsoandinthecourseofthat

proceedinghesoughttohavehismother’sPowerof

Attorneydeclaredinvalid.ThatApplicationwasdenied.

Mr.Ranaappealed;buthisAppealwasstruckandlater

deemedabandonedforfailuretocomplywithdeadlinesin

theRulesforfilinganAppealrecordunderRule14.8.In

theRestoreApplication,JusticeO’Ferrallfoundthatthere

wasnoevidenceintheApplicant’smaterialthattheAppeal

recordhadbeenorderedorprepared,norhadtheOrderfor

theAppealrecordbeenfiledandservedontheRespondent,

asrequiredbytheRules.

JusticeO’FerrallnotedthatRule14.5(1)(a)requiresan

ApplicanttoobtainpermissiontoAppealtheDecisionofa

singleAppealJudge.Thisrequirementservesagatekeeping

functionandrequirestheApplicanttodemonstratewhyit

isintheinterestsofjusticetohaveafurtherlevelofreview.

O’FerrallJ.A.emphasizedthatthetestforpermissionto

AppealtheDecisionofasingleAppealJudgeiswhether

theApplicantisabletodemonstratethatthereis:(1)a

questionofgeneralimportance;(2)apossibleerrorof

law;(3)anunreasonableexerciseofdiscretion;or(4)a

misapprehensionofimportantfacts.

JusticeO’Ferrallfoundthatnoneoftheforegoingtestshad

beenmetandthatthepatternofdelayexhibitedbyMr.

Ranaoverthecourseoftheproceedingswasunacceptable




permissiontoAppealandnotedthatthetestforpermission

toAppealmaymanifestitselfdifferentlydependingonthe

subjectmatteroftheAppealandtheoverallcontextofthe

Appeal.HerLadyshipemphasizedthat,fundamentally,

iftheCourtisconvincedtheAppealhasnochanceof

success,permissiontoAppealshouldnotbegranted.

JusticeKhullarreviewedeachoftheApplicant’sarguments

andfoundthattherewasnoreasonablechanceofsuccess

inanyoftheargumentssavefortheonesgroundedin

proceduralfairness.NotingthattheCollege’spositionon

thisissueandtherelativelylowthresholdforanarguable

caseonthisbasis,JusticeKhullargrantedtheApplicant

permissiontoAppeallimitedtothequestionofprocedural

fairness.

TEMPLANZA V FORD, 2019 ABCA 309 (VELDHUIS JA)Rule 14.47 (Application to Restore an Appeal)

TheApplicantappliedunderRule14.47torestoreher

AppealafterithadbeenstruckforfailingtofiletheAppeal

recordintimeandsubsequentlydeemedabandoned.The

ChambersJudgehadgrantedtheRespondents’Summary

JudgmentApplications,dismissingtheApplicant’sclaimsas

beingoutoftimeandotherwisewithoutmerit.TheChambers

JudgealsodeclaredtheApplicantavexatiouslitigant.

JusticeVeldhuisnotedthatrestoringanAppealisa

discretionaryremedywiththerelevantfactorsbeing:i)

whethertheApplicantdemonstratedanintentiontoproceed

withtheAppealintime;ii)whethertheApplicantexplained

thedefectordelaythatcausedtheAppealtobestruckor

abandoned;iii)whethertheApplicantmovedwithreasonable

promptnesstocurethedefectandhavetheAppealrestored;

iv)whethertheAppealhasarguablemerit;andv)whether

theRespondentshavesufferedanyprejudice,including

consideringthelengthofthedelay.JusticeVeldhuisalso

notedthatthethresholdforrestorationishigherforan

Appealthathasbeendeemedabandoned,andthatthe

Applicantbearstheonustofurnishresponsiveevidence.

JusticeVeldhuisacceptedtheApplicant’sexplanationfor

thedelaybeingthatshehadfinancialdifficultypayingfor

thetranscriptsintime,andthatshehaddemonstratedan

Furthermore,theCourtnotedthatwhentheApplicantis

seekinganAppealofaproceduralApplication,suchasa

stay,permissiontoAppealshouldbegrantedonlyonsome

topicoflaw,jurisdiction,orpolicywhichisimportanttothe

public,totheCourt,ortocounselwhomayargueAppeals

later.Accordingly,ifthematterappealedisdiscretionary,it

willbedifficulttoachievepermissiontoAppeal.

GiventhatthestayDecisionwasdiscretionaryandwas

issuedinuniquefactualcircumstances,RowbothamJ.A.

foundthattherewasnoissuewarrantingtheattentionofan

AppealPanel.TheApplicationforpermissiontoAppealwas

dismissed.

MAKIS V COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF ALBERTA (COMPLAINT REVIEW COMMITTEE), 2019 ABCA 341 (KHULLAR JA)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only with Permission)

TheApplicant,Dr.ViliamMakis(the“Applicant”),sought

permissiontoAppealaDecisionoftheCourtofQueen’s

BenchdismissinganApplicationforJudicialReviewofthe

decisionoftheComplaintReviewCommitteeoftheCollege

ofPhysiciansandSurgeonsofAlberta(the“College”).

TheApplicanthadfiledtwocomplaintswiththeCollege

pursuanttotheHealth Professions Act,RSA2000,cH-7,

allegingharassment,abuse,andcareersabotage(the

“Complaints”).TheComplaintsDirectordeterminedthere

wasinsufficientevidenceofunprofessionalconductand

dismissedtheComplaints.

OnApplicationforJudicialReview,theChambersJudge

determinedthattheApplicantdidnothavestandingto

challengethereasonablenessoftheComplaintReview

Committee’sdecision.Further,theChambersJustice

determinedthattheApplicantwasboundbyjurisprudence

whichheldthatapersonwhocomplainstoaprofessional

regulatorybodyhasthesameinterestasanymemberofthe

public.

OnAppeal,theCollegedidnotopposetheApplicationfor

permissiontoAppeal,butdidsubmitthattheApplicant’s

righttoAppealshouldbelimitedtoissuesofprocedural

fairness.KhullarJ.A.reviewedRule14.5pertainingto

47

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Volume 2 Issue 15


CourtofAppealnotedthatthisisgenerallynotabasis

todenyCoststothesuccessfulparty.TheAppellantalso

arguedthatheshouldnothavetopayCostsbecausehe

was“effectivelywithoutaremedy”,havingbeenunableto

sueforcivildamagesoremploytheRespondent’sinternal

grievanceprocesses.TheCourtofAppealrejectedthis

argumentaswell.ThefactthattheAppellanthadnoclaim

againsttheRespondentwaswhatentitledtheRespondent

toCostsandcouldnotbeusedasabasistosuggestthatno

Costsshouldbeordered.

TheRespondentssoughtdoubleCostsafterthedateoftheir

CalderbankoffertosettletheAppealfor$1.00ontheeve

oforalargument.TheCourtofAppealnotedthatunder

Rule14.59,Costsmaybedoubledwhenaformalofferof

settlementismade,butsuchdoubling“isnotautomatic

orpresumed”.TheCourtnotedthattheCostsrulesexist

toencouragereasonablesettlementoflitigation,andthat

offersmustthereforebereasonable.Itheldthattheoffer

wasnotagenuineoffertosettleandthereforeshould

notimpactCosts.TheRespondentsalsosoughtCostsfor

secondcounselattheAppeal.TheCourtofAppealheld

that,whileitwasnotunreasonableforsecondcounsel

toappearattheAppeal,theissueswerenotsufficiently

complextojustifytheadditionalfees.Assuch,theCourtof

AppealawardedCoststotheRespondentonColumn5of

ScheduleC.

intentiontoproceedwiththeAppeal.However,Veldhuis

J.A.foundthattheotherfactorsweighedheavilyagainst

restoringtheAppeal,notingthattheApplicantdidnot

movewithreasonablepromptness,andthattherewasno

merittotheAppealoftheChambersJudge’sOrders.Justice

VeldhuisalsofoundthattheApplicanthadengagedin

conductexemplaryofavexatiouslitigantbeforetheCourtof

Appeal,andthatthe“Appealisthemostrecentinstallment

oftheApplicant’sever-wideninglitigationodyssey”.Justice

Veldhuisheldthatitwasnotintheinterestsofjusticeto

continuetheproceedings.TheApplicationtorestorethe

Appealwasdismissed.

BRUEN V UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY, 2019 ABCA 275 (SLATTER, BIELBY AND WAKELING JJA) Rules 14.59 (Formal Offers to Settle) and 14.88 (Cost Awards)

AfteranunsuccessfulAppealofaDecisiongrantinganon-

suitApplicationwhichstruckouttheAppellant’sclaim,the

partiesappliedforarulingonCosts.TheCourtnotedthat

pursuanttoRule14.88,thesuccessfulpartytoanAppeal

isentitledtoCostsinaccordancewithScheduleCunless

otherwiseordered.ThatmeantthattheRespondentwas

entitledtoCostsonColumn5ofScheduleC.

TheAppellantarguedthatheshouldnothavetopayCosts

becausethelitigationhadlefthimimpecunious,butthe

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