22 June 1995

Joint Pub 4-05

Joint Doctrinefor

Mobilization Planning

PREFACE

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3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in thispublication apply to the commanders ofcombatant commands, subunified commands,joint task forces, and subordinate componentsof these commands. These principles andguidance also may apply when significantforces of one Service are attached to forces ofanother Service or when significant forces ofone Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication isauthoritative; as such, this doctrine will befollowed except when, in the judgment of thecommander, exceptional circumstancesdictate otherwise. If conflicts arise betweenthe contents of this publication and thecontents of Service publications, thispublication will take precedence for theactivities of joint forces unless the Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally incoordination with the other members of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, has provided morecurrent and specific guidance. Commandersof forces operating as part of a multinational(alliance or coalition) military commandshould follow multinational doctrines andguidance ratified by the United States. Fordoctrine and procedures not ratified by theUnited States, commanders should evaluateand follow the multinational command’sdoctrine and procedures, where applicable.

WALTER KROSS Lieutenant General, USAF Director, Joint Staff

1. Scope

This publication provides a conceptualfoundation for the planning and conduct ofjoint military mobilization and demobilizationand some additional methods of forceexpansion, including use of volunteers andPresidential Selected Reserve Callup. It alsoprovides the context for joint participation inthe planning and programming activitiesundertaken within the Department of Defenseunder the Graduated Response framework,especially those activities aimed at thereconstitution of military capability to deterany future threat to national security.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth doctrine togovern the joint activities and performanceof the Armed Forces of the United States injoint operations as well as the doctrinal basisfor US military involvement in multinationaland interagency operations. It providesmilitary guidance for the exercise of authorityby combatant commanders and other jointforce commanders and prescribes doctrine forjoint operations and training. It providesmilitary guidance for use by the Armed Forcesin preparing their appropriate plans. It is notthe intent of this publication to restrict theauthority of the joint force commander (JFC)from organizing the force and executing themission in a manner the JFC deems mostappropriate to ensure unity of effort in theaccomplishment of the overall mission.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................... vii

CHAPTER IMOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

• Introduction ............................................................................................................. I-1• The National Perspective ......................................................................................... I-1• The Joint Military Perspective ................................................................................ I-4• Summary .................................................................................................................. I-9

CHAPTER IIMOBILIZATION TENETS

• Introduction ........................................................................................................... II-1• Mobilization Tenets............................................................................................... II-1• Summary ................................................................................................................ II-6

CHAPTER IIIROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

• Introduction .......................................................................................................... III-1• National Direction and Control ............................................................................ III-1• Military Command and Control ........................................................................... III-1• Joint Military Mobilization Planning and Execution ........................................... III-1• Summary ............................................................................................................... III-6

CHAPTER IVRESOURCE AREAS

• Introduction .......................................................................................................... IV-1

SECTION A. MANPOWER ............................................................................... IV-2• Sources of Military Manpower ......................................................................... IV-2• Mobilization Personnel Management Policy .................................................... IV-2• Civilian Manpower ........................................................................................... IV-2• Manpower Mobilization Options ...................................................................... IV-4• Effects of Manpower Mobilization on Other Resource Areas ......................... IV-5

SECTION B. MATERIEL AND EQUIPMENT ................................................. IV-6• Sources of Materiel and Equipment.................................................................. IV-6• Materiel and Equipment Mobilization Options ................................................ IV-7• Effects of Materiel and Equipment Mobilization on Other Resource Areas IV-7

SECTION C. TRANSPORTATION .................................................................... IV-8• Sources of Mobilization Transportation ........................................................... IV-8• Transportation Mobilization Options.............................................................. IV-10• Effect of Transportation Mobilization on Other Resource Areas .................. IV-11

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SECTION D. FACILITIES ............................................................................... IV-12• Sources of Facilities ........................................................................................ IV-12• Facilities Mobilization Options ...................................................................... IV-12• Effect of Facilities Mobilization on Other Resource Areas ........................... IV-16

SECTION E. INDUSTRIAL BASE.................................................................. IV-16• Industrial Mobilization Sources ...................................................................... IV-16• Industrial Mobilization Options ...................................................................... IV-16• Effect of Industrial Mobilization on Other Resource Areas........................... IV-16

SECTION F. TRAINING BASE ....................................................................... IV-18• Sources and Options for Expanding Training Base Capacity ........................ IV-18• Effect of Training Base Expansion on Other Resource Areas ....................... IV-18

SECTION G. HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT ................................................. IV-19• General ............................................................................................................ IV-19• Sources of Emergency HSS ............................................................................ IV-19• Options for Mobilizing HSS ........................................................................... IV-20• Effect of HSS Mobilization on Other Resource Areas ................................... IV-21

SECTION H. COMMUNICATIONS ................................................................ IV-21• Sources and Options for Mobilization Communications Support ................. IV-21• Effect of Communications Mobilization Activities Other Resource Areas IV-21

SECTION I. HOST-NATION SUPPORT ......................................................... IV-22• Sources of HNS ............................................................................................... IV-22• Options for Mobilizing HNS .......................................................................... IV-22• Effects of Mobilizing HNS on the Other Resource Areas.............................. IV-22

SECTION J. THE ENABLING RESOURCES: ENVIRONMENT, LEGALAUTHORITIES, FUNDING .............................................................................. IV-23• General ............................................................................................................ IV-23

SECTION K. SUMMARY ................................................................................ IV-27• Summary ......................................................................................................... IV-27

CHAPTER VMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

• Introduction ........................................................................................................... V-1

SECTION A. MOBILIZATION PLANNING ..................................................... V-2• Mobilization Planning and OPLANs ................................................................. V-2• Mobilization Plans and Military Campaign Plans ............................................. V-2• Mobilization Estimate of the Situation .............................................................. V-3• Mobilization and Deliberate Planning ............................................................... V-4• Mobilization and Crisis Action Planning .......................................................... V-7

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SECTION B. MOBILIZATION EXECUTION ................................................... V-8• Mobilization Decisions and Orders ................................................................... V-8• Monitoring the Status and Progress of Mobilization......................................... V-8

SECTION C. SUMMARY ................................................................................. V-10• Summary .......................................................................................................... V-10

CHAPTER VIJOINT DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

• Introduction .......................................................................................................... VI-1

SECTION A. DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING ............................................... VI-1• Demobilization and National Security.............................................................. VI-1• Demobilization Planning Guidelines ................................................................ VI-2• Planning Considerations ................................................................................... VI-3• Recovery Planning ............................................................................................ VI-3

SECTION B. EXECUTION ................................................................................ VI-4• General .............................................................................................................. VI-4• Demobilization Execution ................................................................................ VI-5

SECTION C. SUMMARY .................................................................................. VI-5• Summary ........................................................................................................... VI-5

APPENDIX

A Legal Authorities .............................................................................................. A-1B Automated Tools.............................................................................................. B-1C Mobilization Estimate ...................................................................................... C-1D Administrative Instructions .............................................................................. D-1

GLOSSARY

Part I—Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................. GL-1Part II—Terms and Definitions ........................................................................... GL-4

FIGURE

I-1 Range of Military Operations ......................................................................... I-2I-2 Graduated Response ....................................................................................... I-3I-3 Mobilization/Demobilization Cycle ............................................................... I-7II-1 Mobilization Tenets...................................................................................... II-1III-1 Joint Staff Mobilization Responsibilities .................................................... III-3III-2 Military Department Responsibilities ......................................................... III-4IV-1 Military Manpower Mobilization: Sources and Options ............................ IV-3IV-2 Materiel and Equipment Mobilization: Sources and Options ..................... IV-6

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IV-3 Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options .................................... IV-9IV-4 Facility Mobilization: Sources and Options .............................................. IV-13IV-5 Industrial Mobilization: Sources and Options .......................................... IV-17IV-6 Expanding Training Base Capacity: Sources and Options ....................... IV-18IV-7 Health Service Support Mobilization: Sources and Options ................... IV-20IV-8 Examples of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization .................. IV-24V-1 Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems ........................................ V-3V-2 Mobilization in the Deliberate Planning Process ......................................... V-7V-3 Mobilization and CAP .................................................................................. V-9VI-1 Demobilization Planning Guidelines .......................................................... VI-2VI-2 Representative Demobilization Actions in Resource Areas ...................... VI-5

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

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Discusses the Mobilization and National Security Strategy

Describes the Objectives of Mobilization Tenets

Covers the Roles and Responsibilities of Mobilization Planning

Provides the Resource Areas Available for MobilizationPlanning

Discusses the Planning and Execution of Mobilization

Considers the Joint Planning and Execution of Demobilization

Mobilization is the processof preparing for war orother emergencies.

The President identifiesnational objectives andinterests in the NationalSecurity Strategy of theUnited States.

The mobilization process of preparing for war or otheremergencies includes assembling and organizing personneland materiel for active duty military forces, activating theReserve component including federalizing the National Guard,extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing theindustrial base, and bringing the Armed Forces to a state ofreadiness for war or other national emergency. There are twoprocesses implied in this definition: the Military MobilizationProcess and the National Mobilization Process.

The United States preserves its security by the judiciousapplication of national power to achieve national objectivesderived from national interests. A strong national defensedepends on maintaining a strong economy, infrastructure,and viable network of multinational and regional politicalalliances. The National Military Strategy implements theDefense agenda which asserts that we can meet the challengesof the foreseeable future with a much smaller force than wasrequired in the past but still a total force. The graduatedresponse process provides a planning framework for thenational direction and control of military and nationalmobilization activities. The graduated response conceptcomprises three stages of mobilization preparedness activity:planning and preparation, crisis management, and nationalemergency or war.

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The Total Force Policy isone fundamental premiseupon which our militaryforce structure is built.

There are fourmobilization tenets that,together, describe thecharacteristics ofsuccessful mobilization.

The roles of mobilizationmanagement are theresponsibilities of theNational CommandAuthorities and the JointPlanning and ExecutionCommunity.

From the joint operation perspective, the Total Force Policyshifted significant military missions from the Activecomponent (AC) to the Reserve component (RC). Thispolicy increased reliance on military retirees, Department ofDefense civilians, contractor personnel, and host-nationsupport, and ensured that mobilization actions will beconsidered for most military operations. Mobilization anddemobilization are also functions of the joint operationplanning process which complement and support thedeployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment ofjoint forces in crisis and war.

The four tenets that provide the foundation for mobilizationdoctrine are as follows: Objective includes the clearly defined,attainable, and decisive objectives that are imperative to jointoperations. Operational and mobilization planners mustcoordinate their efforts to ensure that the time necessary formobilization actions is clearly understood, and the resultingimpacts clearly identified. Unity of effort demands theintegrated efforts of the nation’s military and national sectorstoward achievement of common objectives established by thePresident. Flexibility is necessary to develop an appropriateresponse in a crisis, overcome unforeseen problems, adapt touncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war. Timeliness isessential to achieving overwhelming force on the battlefieldat the right time and place and requires the coordination ofresources, personnel and information in order to react fasterthan the enemy.

The members of the Joint Planning and Execution Communityplan and execute joint military mobilization. The primaryexecutors of mobilization are the Military Departments.They develop mobilization plans to support the combatantcommanders’ operation plans (OPLANs). They are guided inthese efforts by policy and resource levels established by theSecretary of Defense and by planning tasks specified by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan (JSCP). Combatant commanders’OPLANs specify the level of mobilization and the RC forcesneeded to support the plan. The Joint Staff is responsiblefor integrating the mobilization plans of the MilitaryDepartments, United States Special Operations Command, andsupporting Defense agencies; recommending resource

Mobilization Tenets

Roles and Responsibilities During Mobilization

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Executive Summary

The major mobilizationactivities are viewed byresource area and areessential for timely forceexpansion andsustainment.

priorities and allocations; recommending levels ofmobilization; and monitoring the status and progress ofmobilization execution.

There are 12 interdependent resource areas that areincluded in military mobilization. Mobilization planners anddecisionmakers should understand that activities occurring onany one area may have an influence on each of the others. Onoccasion, additional industrial production, training basecapacity, health service support, communications support, andhost-nation support is needed. The appropriate legal authoritiesand funding may also need to be provided if conflicts or statutesneed to be resolved. Thorough coordination and effectivecommunications will ensure that mobilization activitiesinitiated in a resource area can be supported by the otherareas. Logistics provides the foundation of combat powerand is the bridge connecting the economy with the warfightingforces.

Manpower, including personnel management, civilianmanpower, manpower mobilization options, and the effectson other resource areas, is an important aspect of mobilizationand involve personnel from all levels. Materiel andequipment includes all classes of supply, equipment on handin units, war reserves, pre-positioned equipment, and the outputof the depot maintenance system and industrial base.Transportation resources are required to support mobilization,deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, anddemobilization operations. Facilities are used to house, train,equip, and support troops as well as storage space, maintainequipment, and conduct operations. The industrial baseincludes domestic commercial production facilities andgovernment-owned facilities. Training bases are used to trainnonprior Service personnel to support and sustain an expandedforce structure as well as offer reclassification and refreshertraining for pretrained individual manpower. Health servicesupport is expanded to serve the mobilized force and providethe capability to treat, evacuate, receive, and redistributecasualties. The Federal Government relies primarily uponcommercial providers for the communications required fornational defense and crisis response. Host-nation supportprovides manpower, equipment, facilities, and services duringwar or emergency offset requirements. Mobilization plannersmust consider the effect of mobilization activities on theenvironment as well as the necessities of legal authorities

Resource Areas

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The relationship betweenmobilization plans,operation plans, andcampaign plans is veryimportant for planningand executingmobilization.

Military demobilizationplanning is as importantas mobilization planning.

and funding to enable the timely execution of mobilizationactivities. Without these resources, the other resource areaswould not be obtainable when necessary.

The mobilization annex of the JSCP guides the MilitaryDepartments and combatant commanders in preparingmobilization plans that will support the OPLANs developedin the deliberate planning process. A campaign plan describeshow a series of joint major operations are arranged in time,space, and purpose to achieve a strategic objective. Themobilization estimate of the situation provides a tool formobilization planners to make a systematic appraisal ofmobilization requirements and options in either adeliberate or crisis action plan situation. A mobilizationbase must be maintained at all times and requires resources,manpower and industrial base capacity being the mostimportant, which can be made available to permit forceexpansion and sustainment when necessary. Successfulmobilization planning during crises depends upon theavailability of accurate data regarding the readiness of RC unitsand personnel, pretrained individual manpower, civilianemployees, and other support. The Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff recommends to the Secretary of Defense theassets that are to be called up and their planned use when RCforces are to be mobilized to augment the AC.

Demobilization is the process of transitioning from a crisissituation or from a wartime military establishment anddefense-based economy to a peacetime configuration whilemaintaining national security and economic vitality.Demobilization plans must reflect the post-conflict missionsof supported commanders and be synchronized with plans forbattlefield recovery and redeployment operations. Ideally,demobilization planning should begin soon after mobilizationcommences. The proposed demobilization policies shouldinclude joint force readiness, the health of the nationaleconomy, and morale of and benefits for Service membersand the Department of Defense civilian employees and theirfamilies. The supported and supporting commanders play acoordinating and synchronizing role in order to ensurereadiness of assigned forces to required levels for futureconflicts. Military personnel are released from active duty orreturned to reserve status while materiel and equipment maybe mothballed, stored, distributed to other nations, destroyed,

Mobilization Planning and Execution

Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution

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Executive Summary

sold for scrap or turned over to the Defense Reutilization andMarketing Offices.

This publication defines joint mobilization and demobilizationdoctrine for joint forces within the broader context of jointdoctrine. It describes the role of mobilization anddemobilization in national security and military strategy anddefines joint mobilization tenets. It describes mobilizationroles and responsibilities at the national level and relates themto roles and responsibilities for mobilization planning andexecution within the Joint Planning and Execution Community(JPEC). It identifies the major mobilization decisions andactivities in each of 12 resource areas (manpower, materieland equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base,training base, health service support, communications, host-nation support, environment, legal authorities, and funding)and describes how they affect each other. Finally, it outlinesthe nature of military mobilization and demobilization planningin joint operations and JPEC participation in planning andprogramming activities.

CONCLUSION

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military and national mobilization. GR is theprocess by which the United Statesresponds to early ambiguous or explicitwarning of an emerging national securityemergency. It includes preplanned measuresin the areas of force readiness, industrial basepreparedness, operational requirements, andsustainability. From a joint operationsperspective, mobilization is a function of thejoint command and control process, whichtogether with the Department of Defense(DOD) Total Force Policy provides the basisfor joint military mobilization planningand execution. This chapter examines therelationship between mobilization andnational security from both perspectives. Itconcludes with a definition of demobilization,an essential first step toward maintainingnational security after a crisis or war.

2. The National Perspective

“The highest type of strategy—sometimes called grand strategy—isthat which so integrates the policiesand armaments of the nation that resortto war is either rendered unnecessaryor is undertaken with the maximumchance of victory.”

Edward Meade EarleMakers of Modern Strategy

a. National Security Strategy. As anation, the United States preserves its

CHAPTER IMOBILIZATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY

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a. Mobilization is the process ofpreparing for war or other emergencies byassembling and organizing personnel andmateriel for active duty military forces,activating the Reserve component includingfederalizing the National Guard, extendingterms of service, surging and mobilizing theindustrial base, and bringing the ArmedForces of the United States to a state ofreadiness for war or other national emergency.There are two processes implied in thisdefinition.

• The Military Mobilization Process bywhich the nation’s Armed Forces arebrought to an increased state of readiness.

• The National Mobilization Process ofmobilizing the national economy to meetnon-defense needs and sustain the ArmedForces in war or military operations otherthan war.

b. From a national perspective, theimportance of a responsive mobilizationcapability to our national security is implicitin the President’s National Security Strategyand its derivative military strategy. Thenational process of graduated response (GR)provides the framework for achieving thedesired mobilization capability and is a modelfor coordinating resources and plans for

“The Congress shall have power...To provide for calling forth the Militia toexecute the Laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governingsuch part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States,reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of the officers, and theauthority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed byCongress.”

Constitution of the United States, Amendment II

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security by the judicious application ofnational power to achieve national objectivesderived from national interests. The Presidentidentifies national interests and objectives inthe National Security Strategy of the UnitedStates. National interests and objectives arethe ends of our national security strategy.The ways and means for achieving these endsare explained in broad terms by the Presidentin his political, economic, and defenseagendas. Each agenda includes a set ofpolicies and programs aimed at achievingnational objectives. Programs for maintaininga strong national defense depend on ourmaintaining a strong economy, infrastructure,and viable network of multinational andregional political alliances.

b. Military Strategy

• The National Military Strategyimplements the Defense Agenda of thePresident’s National Security Strategy.It is a strategy reflecting new andenduring realities in a rapidly changing

post-Cold War world characterized byinstability and uncertainty and in whichthe United States provides leadership.Explicit in the military strategy is theassertion that we can meet thechallenges of the foreseeable futurewith a much smaller force than wasrequired in the past, but still a totalforce--a carefully tailored combinationof Active component (AC) and Reservecomponent (RC), together with retiredmilitary personnel, DOD civilianemployees, DOD contractors, and host-nation support (HNS). Implicit in thestrategy is retention and improvementof the capability for rapid and efficientmobilization of forces and resources torespond to natural disasters at the low endof the range of military operations andto deter or counter a broad spectrum ofthreats to our national security.

• Figure I-1 depicts a representative rangeof military operations together with thelevels of mobilization available to the

RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

LEVEL OF RESPONSE RANGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING FURTHERFORCE EXPANSION

CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATIONOF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

PRESIDENTIAL ORCONGRESSIONAL

DECLARATIONOF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

GLOBAL

MULTIPLE REGIONALCONTINGENCIES

REGIONALCONTINGENCY

PEACE OPERATIONS

HUMANITARIANASSISTANCE

COUNTER DRUG

CIVIL DISTURBANCENATURAL DISASTER

TOTALMOBILIZATION

FULLMOBILIZATION

PARTIALMOBILIZATION

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTEDRESERVE CALLUP

RC VOLUNTEERS

SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION

Figure I-1. Range of Military Operations

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GRADUATED RESPONSE

NATIONALDIRECTION& CONTROL

MILITARYCOMMAND& CONTROL

GRADUATED RESPONSE

RESOURCE AREAS

FEDERALINTERAGENCYCOORDINATION

& SUPPORT

MANPOWER

MATERIAL / EQUIPMENT

TRANSPORTATION

FACILITIES

INDUSTRIAL BASE

HEALTH SERVICESUPPORT

COMMUNICATIONS

HOST-NATION SUPPORT

ENVIRONMENT

LEGAL

JOINTMILITARY

PLANNING &PROGRAMMING

FEDERALAGENCYPLANNING &PROGRAMMING

MILITARYMOBILIZATION

NATIONALMOBILIZATION

III

PLANNING

PREPARATION

IICRISIS

NATIONAL

I EMERGENCY

III

PLANNING

PREPARATION

IICRISIS

NATIONAL

I EMERGENCY

Figure I-2. Graduated Response

President when RC forces are needed foran appropriate response. Congress hasprovided the President with acomprehensive menu of authorities fortailoring an appropriate response in acrisis. Several of these are availablewithout a declaration of nationalemergency. Others require Presidentialor congressional emergency declarations.Detailed discussions of mobilizationlevels and emergency authorities areprovided in Chapter IV, “ResourceAreas,” and Chapter V, “MobilizationPlanning and Execution.”

c. Graduated Response

• As shown in Figure I-2, the GR processprovides a planning framework for thenational direction and control of militaryand national mobilization activities.Overall responsibility for GR rests with the

National Security Council (NSC) and itsinteragency structure. Virtually everyFederal agency has a role to play inmanaging a national response to a crisis.National resources in the 12 resource areas(manpower, materiel and equipment,transportation, facilities, industrial base,training base, health service support,communications, host-nation support,environment, legal authorities, and funding)are focused on defense needs. The DODprovides support to Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA) duringnatural disasters under the FederalResponse Plan. FEMA coordinates theactions and programs of the other Federalagencies in support of the DOD duringregional contingencies and mobilizationefforts.

• The GR concept comprises threestages of mobilization preparedness

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activity: planning and preparation, crisismanagement, and national emergency orwar.

•• S t a g e I I I — P l a n n i n g a n dPreparation. In Stage III, the UnitedStates maintains vigilance, observingnational and international events fordeveloping threats to national security.Federal departments and agenciesdevelop emergency plans and maintainthe capability to carry out the plans withinfunding limitations. Although essentiallya period of peace, it is during this stagethat the gradual emergence of a potentialnew threat would be perceived andactions could be taken to deter the threat.

•• Stage II—Crisis Management.Stage II activities are designed aroundoptions for responding to specific crisissituations as they develop. TheDepartment of Defense and other Federaldepartments and agencies initiatepreparatory actions that are not feasibleduring Stage III because of resourceconstraints or the absence of a morespecific basis for focused planning andpreparation. During this stage, thenation’s civilian leadership may elect notto risk political capital and significanteconomic disruption; these arecharacteristic of overt mobilizationactions, but leaders may approve limitedactions for improving US preparedness.Such actions would be designed tomaximize response potential withminimum disruption of the economy.Limited surge of the defense industrialbase, a Presidential declaration ofnational emergency, and a PresidentialSelected Reserve Callup (PSRC) couldoccur as Stage II actions.

•• Stage I—National Emergency orWar. In Stage I, the United Statesbegins a mobilization of the economyfor a crisis or war. A Presidential or

congressional declaration of nationalemergency should be expected at an earlypoint in Stage I activities. The principaldistinguishing feature between Stages Iand II is a substantial increase in themagnitude of defense industrialproduction and other essentialnational defense activities. Industrialbase expansion will be characterized byexpanding facilities, building newfacilities, and conversion of non-defenseproducers. Critical resources could bediverted from nonessential production,and significant disruption of the nationaleconomy would be a consequence. Theincreased demand for resources wouldmandate increased interagencycoordination and support of mobilizationactions and prioritization of resourceshortages.

• Successful GR requires effectiveinteragency coordination in each stageto synchronize production capacity, laborforce expansion and stabilization,economic and trade policies, energy andtransportation allocations, and otheractions that prepare the United States torespond to hostilities and signal itscommitment to national security.

3. The Joint MilitaryPerspective

a. Total Force Policy. The Total ForcePolicy is one fundamental premise uponwhich our military force structure is built .It was institutionalized in 1973 and caused ashift of substantial military roles and missionsto the RC along with the resources necessaryto maintain high levels of readiness, especiallyin units that are needed early in a crisis. Asthe Total Force Policy matured, militaryretirees, DOD civi l ian personnel,contractor personnel, and host-nationsupport personnel were brought under itsumbrella to reflect the value of theircontributions to our military capability. Total

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RESERVE FORCES PREPAREDNESS—LEGACY OF THE ’80s

During the 1980s, major improvements were made in Reserve Component (RC)force readiness to perform wartime missions. By the fall of 1990, modernizationefforts had given the RC the ability to field approximately 84 percent (in dollarvalue) of the equipment they required for war. The DOD policy of “First tofight, first to equip” required resourcing both Active and RC units in thesequence in which they were required to perform their wartime missions.Successful recruiting efforts, the assignment to the RC of important peacetimeand wartime responsibilities, and substantially improved training opportunities,also contributed significantly to improved RC force readiness.

The increase in RC readiness levels in the 1980s occurred concurrently withthe largest ever expansion of the RC peacetime structure. From 1980 to theend of the decade, the number of Selected Reservists increased by 35 percent,growing from approximately 850,000 to more than 1,150,000. This growth didnot come at the expense of personnel readiness. On the contrary, throughoutthe decade, the Services devoted considerable resources to ensure individualproficiency of Selected Reserve members. During this same period, moreemphasis was placed on the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the pool of pre-trained individuals.

Individual RC volunteers were integrated into the Active force from the start ofthe Persian Gulf crisis, even before the involuntary Reserve call-up. By 22August, more than 10,500 volunteer RC members already were serving on activeduty. Their contributions were essential to provide capabilities required fromthe first days of the crisis—particularly strategic airlift—and to performmissions almost exclusively assigned to Reserve units including, for example,water purification and port security.

Thousands of Air Reserve Component (ARC) personnel volunteered withinhours of the initial US response to support the time-sensitive movement of USpersonnel and materiel to the Persian Gulf. ARC volunteers flew 42 percent ofall strategic airlift missions and 33 percent of the aerial refueling missions.They also provided continental United States (CONUS) base maintenance,medical, civil engineering, aerial port, and security police support to deployingAir Force units and airlift mission. By 22 August, Air Force Reserve volunteershad moved seven million tons of cargo and 8,150 passengers to the theater.As of 25 August, Air Force Reserve volunteers began operating Westover AFB,MA as a major eastbound staging operation on a 24-hour basis. Westovercontinued to operate on a volunteer basis for four months until these samevolunteers were mobilized on 3 December.

force policy focuses awareness and energy onsound, thorough mobilization planning andthe development of procedures that areessential to the timely activation of reservemilitary power . The Total Force Policy wastested by the war in the Persian Gulf, whichinvolved the largest mobilization and

deployment of Reserve forces since theKorean War. There was significant relianceon military retirees, DOD civilian personnel,contractor personnel, and host-nation supportfor critical skills and performance of manyessential tasks.

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US Naval Reserve (USNR) volunteers contributed medical, logistics, and cargohandling skills to CONUS base support operations. While approximately 50percent of all USNR volunteers were involved in health care, Naval Reservistsalso were deployed outside the United States for other tasks. For example, adetachment of Active Seabees at Subic Bay, Philippines, was deployed toSouthwest Asia (SWA) in August with their parent battalion. When a strike by3,000 civilians of the public works center was imminent, 150 volunteers from aReserve public works center augmented units deployed to Subic Bay andhelped keep essential services in operation. As a result, the base suffered nointerruption in operations, and response time to trouble calls noticeablyimproved. Some volunteers subsequently were deployed to Bahrain toaugment the Navy Logistics Support Force’s public works force.

Approximately 1,100 US Marine Corps Reserve volunteers supported thepreparation for deployment of Marine Corps (USMC) forces to SWA. They notonly provided maintenance and logistical support for deploying Active USMCunits but also transport services, to include KC-130T crews who flewtransatlantic refueling missions. In addition, they were assigned liaison andlinguist duties with deploying Active units.

US Coast Guard (USCG) Reserve volunteers provided port security andsupervised the loading of explosives and hazardous cargo at US east and GulfCoast ports. The USCG activated Port Security Harbor Defense Units from itsNinth District (Cleveland) to work with US mobile inshore underwater warfareunits in SWA. This marked the first extended use of USCG volunteers for thismission.

More than 5,580 Army RC personnel volunteered for temporary tours of activeduty. For example, during Operation DESERT SHIELD, Army Reserve (USAR)terminal transportation unit members volunteered to work with the MilitaryTraffic Management Command to manage the flow of combat forces from USeast and Gulf Coast ports. Other USAR and National Guard (ARNG) volunteersprovided maintenance and logistics support, chemical defense training, andaviation operations assistance for AC forces. RC medical personnel alsobackfilled active Health Service Command professionals, who deployed duringthe first days of the crisis. Some volunteers deployed directly to theater. SouthCarolina ARNG members deployed with Third US Army to help establishstrategic communications for the headquarters.

The large number of RC members who volunteered during the conflict’s earlystages vividly demonstrates their commitment and dedication. Individualvolunteers also provided essential manpower before the decision toinvoluntarily activate the Reserves had been made. This provided excellentsupport during a difficult time. Ironically, the extent of the volunteering wasso wide-spread that a short-lived personnel problem was created when unitswere particularly “short-manned” because their members were made up largelyof early volunteers. While corrected by cross-leveling and other personnelactions, the irony of such a problem attests to the general success with RCvolunteers and, further, demonstrates the feasibility of using such measuresearly in future crises.

SOURCE: DOD Final Report to Congress, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War , April 1992.

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b. Mobilization and Demobilization inJoint Planning and Operations. Militaryforces fulfill their role in maintaining ournational security by preparing for and, ifnecessary, conducting joint operations acrossthe range of military operations (Figure I-1,on page I-2). The Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System (JOPES)defines the functions, planning systems, andinformation management tools foraccomplishing these tasks. Joint operationfunctions are arrayed in the Mobilization/Demobilization Cycle in Figure I-3. Onecomplete cycle is shown. It is meant to depictan era of relative peace interrupted by a crisisand war requiring the mobilization,deployment, employment, sustainment,redeployment, and demobilization of jointforces. It shows the major steps in thedeliberate planning process that produced theoperation plan used as the basis for crisisresponse. It also depicts a gradual return to apeacetime environment secured by the return

to the pre-crisis force st ructure. Themobilization and demobilization functionshave been emphasized to place them inperspective with the other joint operationfunctions.

• Mobilization

•• The mobi l izat ion funct ionincludes activation of the RC andsurging and expanding the industrialbase. Lessons learned from the war inthe Persian Gulf and the emergence of anew national military strategy at the endof the Cold War have led US militaryplanners to a broader understanding ofthe scope of activities that should beincluded under the umbrella of the term,mobilization. Planners have alsoacquired an awareness of the importanceof mob i l i za t i on p lann ing f o rcontingencies requiring less than fullmobilization.

MOBILIZATION / DEMOBILIZATION CYCLE

Combatant CommanderReceives Planning Task

From CJCS

Combatant CommanderDevelops Concept of

Operations

Combatant CommanderPrepares OPLAN

CJCS Reviews andApproves OPLAN

Supporting CommandersPrepare Supporting

PlansActive

Component

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR WAR OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

DELIBERATE PLANNING CRISIS RESPONSE DELIBERATE PLANNINGTIME

RESERVE COMPONENTS

FO

RC

ES

TR

UC

TU

RE

EMPLOYSUSTAIN

DEPLOY REDEPLOYMOBILIZE DEMOBILIZE

Figure I-3. Mobilization/Demobilization Cycle

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•• Because the most visible mobilizationactivity is activating members of the RCserving in units or in individualmanpower pools, there has been atendency to focus planning on manpowerissues. Mobilization , however, involvesmuch more than expanding and fillingthe military force with people. Theforce must be equipped, trained, andsustained over time if it is to achieve andmaintain its designed capability. Theseactivities require the support of theDOD civilian work force and contractorsupport. They also require increasedresources in the areas of materiel,transportation, facilities, industrialproduction, training base capacity, healthservice support, command and controlcommunications, and host-nationsupport. Extraordinary actions may berequired to ensure continued compliancewith, or temporary waivers of,environmental protection laws. Fundingand legal authorities are also required toenable mobilization activities.Mobilization , therefore, must includedetermining and satisfying demandsfor these resources to support the totalforce during deployment, employment,sustainment, and redeployment.

•• Mobilization planning complementsand supports joint operation planningc o n d u c t e d b y t h e c o m b a t a n tcommanders. It is accomplishedprimarily by the Military Services,United States Special OperationsCommand (USSOCOM), and theirmajor subordinate commands based onguidance received from the Secretary ofDefense. It requires development ofsupporting plans by the DefenseLogistics Agency (DLA), DefenseInformation Systems Agency (DISA),Defense Mapping Agency (DMA),

FEMA, Selective Service System (SSS),Department of Labor, Department ofHealth and Human Services (DHHS),Department of Transportation (DOT),Department of Energy, Office of PersonnelManagement (OPM), and other Federalagencies. Just as the Military Servicesmobilize their reserve organizations andindividuals to augment military capability,supporting Federal agencies mustoversee mobilization of the supportbase required to sustain the mobilizedforce. The Joint Staff supports theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff inhis role as principal military advisor tothe National Command Authorities(NCA); facilitates resolution of conflictsfor scarce resources among the Services,combatant commanders, and Defenseagencies; provides input for resolutionof claims for resources between themilitary and civil sectors in wartime; andoversees mobilization planning.

• Demobilization. Demobilization is theprocess of transitioning a crisis orwartime military establishment anddefense-based national economy to apeacetime configuration whilemaintaining national security andeconomic vitality. Implied in thisdefinition are two types of activities:those associated with reducing thepercentage of the nation’s productioncapacity devoted to the Armed Forcesand defense industry, and thoseundertaken to maintain national securityand economic vitality. These tasks, whichhistorically compete for resources, canmake the management of demobilizationeven more complex and challenging thanmobilization. Demobilization planningand execution are covered in Chapter VI,“Resource Areas.”

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4. Summary

T his chapter has examined t herelationships between mobilization andnational security from the nationalperspective and from the perspective of jointmilitary operations. From the nationalperspective, a rapid, efficient mobilizationcapability is required to respond to abroadspectrum of emergencies. Nationalmobilization capability is achieved throughcoordinated planning and resourcemanagement within the DOD and betweenthe DOD and other Federal agencies. TheGR process provides a planning framework

for national direction and control of militaryand mobilization activities. From the jointoperation perspective, the Total ForcePolicy shifted significant military missionsfrom the AC to the RC. This policy increasedreliance on military retirees, DOD civilians,contractor personnel, and host-nation support,and ensured that mobilization actions will beconsidered for most military operations.Mobilization and demobilization are alsofunctions of joint operations, whichcomplement and support the deployment,employment, sustainment, and redeploymentof joint forces in crises and war.

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Intentionally Blank

CHAPTER IIMOBILIZATION TENETS

II-1

1. Introduction

As shown in Figure II-1, there are fourmobilization tenets that describe thecharacteristics of successful mobilizationand provide the foundation for mobilizationdoctrine. The tenets are: objective, unity ofeffort, flexibility, and timeliness.

2. Mobilization Tenets

a. Objective. Joint operations aredirected toward clearly defined, attainable,and decisive objectives. Planning for jointoperations provides the basis for determiningwhether the mobilization of reserve forces andother resources is required to achieve theobjectives. Operational planners mustclearly understand the mobilizationimplications associated with their plans toensure that needed resources are identified,mob i l i zed , and used e ffec t i ve l y.Requirements for activating RC forces mustbe clearly identified, as well as the need toexpand the capability or capacity of otherresource areas.Operat ional andmobilization planners must coordinatetheir efforts to ensure that the time necessaryfor mobilization actions is clearly understood,and the resulting impacts clearly identified.The supported combatant commander mustbe apprised of the mobilization actionsrequired of the supporting commanders andthe supporting establishment.

“The art of war owns certain elements and fixed principles. We must acquirethat theory, and lodge it in our heads—otherwise we will never get very far.”

Frederick the Great

OBJECTIVE: THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

The Persian Gulf War serves as a model for defining and articulating objectives.In successive announcements, the NCA provided clear objectives: theliberation of Kuwait, the defense of Saudi Arabia, the protection of US citizens,and the restoration of stability to the region.

Initial mobilization and deployment supported a strategy based on internationaleconomic, political, and diplomatic isolation of Iraq in addition to militarypressure. After several months, the United States and its coalition partnersconcluded that the initial strategy would not achieve the objectives within areasonable period of time, given the continued buildup of Iraqi forces in theoccupied emirate and the concerted effort by the Iraqis to supplant Kuwait’spolitical infrastructure. Accordingly, the original strategy evolved to one calling

OBJECTIVE

UNITY OF EFFORT

FLEXIBILITY

TIMELINESS

MOBILIZATION TENETS

Figure II-1. Mobilization Tenets

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b. Unity of Effort. Unity of effort inmobilization demands the integratedefforts of the nation’s military and nationalsectors toward achievement of commonobjectives established by the President.Integration is achieved through theeffective use of planning and executionprocesses that provide for timely andthorough coordination within the chain ofcommand and among the DOD, other Federalagencies, and the civil sector. A manpowercallup alone, for example, would not besufficient to provide unit and individualreplacements to sustain a theater force in aprotracted conflict. At the time of callup orinduction, there must be enoughorganizational clothing and equipment foreach Service member, as well as training base

capacity and facilities to provide necessarytraining. At the time of deployment, theremust be enough strategic transportation to thetheater of operations. At the time ofemployment, there must be enough combatequipment in the theater, as well as food,ammunition, fuel, and repair parts to sustainpeak performance. Additionally, there mustbe adequate health service support availablein the event of injury or sickness. Unity ofeffort requires the integration ofmobilization activities within each andamong the various resource areas. Ifintegration is not accomplished, insufficientresources in one or more areas could delaythe arrival of unit and individual replacementson the battlefield or impair their combateffectiveness.

for offensive military operations against Iraq. If coalition political and economicmeasures, together with mobilization and deployment of massive additionalforces, did not persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, the military power tocompel withdrawal would be ready.

Throughout, the objectives remained clear and unchanged. They guidedpolitical leaders and military planners in mobilizing resources for executingthe strategy as it evolved. The result was a major victory and the achievementof national and coalition objectives.

Training bases must have the capacity to satisfy manpower mobilizationrequirements. This may require additional training for prior service and initialbasic training for nonprior service personnel.

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c. Flexibility. Flexibility is necessary todevelop an appropriate response in a crisis,overcome unforeseen problems, adapt touncertainties, and adjust to the friction of war.Flexibility for mobilization planning andexecution has been provided for in jointplanning and execution systems and in thecomprehensive set of legislated emergencypowers that give the President, in hisconstitutional role as commander in chief,wide latitude in crafting a response to adeveloping crisis. There are substantialemergency authorities available to thePresident before a declaration of nationalemergency, such as the PSRC authority and

authorities ensuring priority of industrialproduction for defense needs. Otherauthorities are made available to the Presidentupon a declaration of national emergency. TheNational Emergencies Act provides that whenthe President declares a national emergency,he must specify the powers he is invoking.Although the powers are limited to thosespecifically invoked, others may be invokedsubsequently. This means that the Presidenthas the flexibility to act incrementally tosignal US resolve in a developing crisis andauthorize certain preparatory actions withoutcausing undue provocation. Joint planningand execution systems also provide

UNITY OF EFFORT: WORLD WAR I

The absence of unity of effort contributed to a confusing and wasteful WorldWar I mobilization. Only the most rudimentary advance planning had beenaccomplished before the declaration of war in April 1917. This was basedlargely on the nation’s reluctance to become involved in a European war,resistance to war planning, and failure to coordinate US foreign and militarypolicies.

Months after war was declared, military leaders still had no idea of the size ofthe force that would have to be raised. Lack of knowledge concerning thesituation in Europe and failure to use available intelligence resulted in asuccession of ever-growing estimates, which concluded that 1.3 million menand 30 divisions would be needed by the end of 1918 and 100 divisions bymid-1919.

There was little coordination of personnel and materiel acquisition activities.Hundreds of thousands of conscripts reported to hastily constructed traininginstallations that would not be supplied with enough organizational clothing,equipment, and weapons to properly equip them for several months.

The government, civilian economy, and Services competed for resourceswithout a competent coordinating authority. War production was chaotic.Priorities for raw materials, labor, and electric power were determined in adhoc negotiations among public and private officials. East Coast ports ofembarkation were quickly overwhelmed, and inland transportation became socongested that the President was forced to seize the nation’s railroad system.

A sealift shortage, evident even before German submarines began sinkingmerchant ships faster than new ones could be built, cast doubts on the nation’sability to deploy forces to Europe even after they were trained and equipped.The net result was that half-trained US forces were sent to France in Britishvessels. The forces were largely equipped with British and French artillery,tanks, machine guns, and aircraft, and were required to undergo further trainingbefore they could be used effectively on the battlefield.

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maintaining reserve forces and other resourcesat optimum readiness levels. Flexibility alsodemands a system for accuratelymonitoring the status and progress ofmobilization and the ability to replan andredirect mobilization activities to work aroundbottlenecks, resource shortfalls, and forproviding protection of the force, equipment,and infrastructure being mobilized.

flexibility in mobilization by delegatingauthority to the maximum extent consistentwith control in order to promote freedom ofaction by subordinates and ensure continuitywhen communications are disrupted. TheJoint Planning and Execution Community(JPEC) also contributes to flexibility byadaptive planning (i.e., developing a widerange of military response options forconsideration by decisionmakers) and

FLEXIBILITY: THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

Flexibility overcame limitations in planning, force structure, and capabilitiesin a number of instances during the Persian Gulf crisis and war of 1990-1991.The availability of pre-positioned supplies and a fairly extensive host-nationinfrastructure enabled the combatant commander to turn the absence of afully developed deployment and transportation schedule to tactical advantageat the beginning of the crisis by gambling on the deployment of combatelements at the expense of logistic and administrative support units.

Forces deployed to the theater had insufficient organic transportation capabilityto carry out the campaign plan. Intensive efforts by the Joint Staff and theDepartment of State mobilized critical ground transport from host-nation andallied assets to execute the planned offensive.

The decision to deploy the US Army’s VII Corps from Europe showedconsiderable flexibility. The absence of the Soviet threat allowed what wouldotherwise have been a dangerous gamble. Besides powerful combat forces,VII Corps also included a fully structured support command, which provedextremely useful in addressing theater logistic shortfalls.

Although the Persian Gulf crisis did not provide a truly strenuous test ofproduction surge capabilities, industry did accelerate output of critical supplies,equipment, and munitions. Perhaps the best example of flexibility in this areawas the deployment of a system prototype still undergoing developmentaltesting, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft. Its advancedtechnology gave the combatant commander the capability to monitor thebattlefield and look deep behind enemy lines in a way never before possible.

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d. Timeliness. Timely mobilization of allresources is essential to achievingoverwhelming force on the battlefield at theright time and place. It is also essential toseizing and maintaining the initiative. Wemust be able to react faster than the enemy isable to react. Achieving a capability fortimely mobilization of resources requirestimely indications and warnings of the threatand appropriate response to such indicationsand warning; efficient mobilizationprocedures and frequent exercises; RCs withthe resources necessary to maintain requiredreadiness levels; a civilian work force

prepared to support military missions;contractors prepared for their roles;stockpiles of materiel and equipment tosustain the force until industrial base outputcan be expanded; and synchronized plans forthe expansion of transportation, facilities,training base, health service support,communications, and host-nation supportnecessary to deploy, employ, and sustain themobilized force. Timeliness requiresobtaining relief from environmental and anyother legal or regulatory constraints, whennecessary, as well as legal authorities andfunding to enable each mobilization activity.

LESSONS ON TIMELINESS FROM 20TH CENTURY WARS

Timeliness has always been a major problem in mobilization. In World War I,industrial mobilization was geared to a projected big push planned for thesummer of 1919. The surprising success of the last-ditch German offensive inthe spring of 1918, followed that autumn by the climactic All iedcounteroffensive, precipitated the commitment of US troops to combat armedand equipped with British and French rather than American supplies andweaponry.

In World War II, personnel mobilization could never be completely synchronizedwith requirements. The result was a recurrent boom and bust cycle with regardto enlisted and junior officer replacements. Partially trained troops repeatedlyhad to be stripped out of units in training to fill up units in combat or about tobe deployed, thereby delaying the combat readiness of later deploying units.

The rapid demobilization after World War II, and neglect of military readinessin the immediate postwar period, left the United States without a viablecapability for responding to a crisis that arose with little or no warning. Theunfortunate result was that we were woefully unprepared for the surprise NorthKorean attack on South Korea in June 1950. We conducted a desperatedelaying action, and were nearly forced off the Korean peninsula at Pusan,before reinforcing units and other resources could be mobilized and deployedto effectively counter the initial North Korean offensive.

Major mobilization decisions during the Persian Gulf crisis were deliberatelysynchronized with United Nations resolutions and US congressional action.In so doing, these decisions not only satisfied the operational requirements ofour joint military forces, they also provided clear signals of US resolve toadversaries, allies, and the US public, whose continuing support for our PersianGulf policy was critical to its success.

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3. Summary

This chapter identified and defined fourmobilization tenets that, together, describe thecharacteristics of successful mobilization.

Historical examples, drawn from selected 20thcentury mobilizations, provide examples ofsuccess or the consequences of failure to heedeach tenet.

CHAPTER IIIROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

III-1

“Prepare war, wake up the mighty men.”Joel III:9

1. Introduction

This chapter describes roles andresponsibilities for joint militarymobilization planning and execution. Theroles and responsibilities for exercisingcommand and control of our military forcesand for military mobilization are the principalfocus of this chapter. The roles andresponsibilities of the various Federal agenciesthat mobilize national resources to support andsustain the nation’s military forces in time ofwar are outside the scope of this publication,but it is important to understand that virtuallyevery Federal department and agency wouldprovide significant support to the Departmentof Defense if warranted by an emergencysituation.

2. National Direction andControl

The Constitution of the United Statesdivides responsibility for and authority overthe nation’s Armed Forces between Congressand the President. The NCA is the highestauthority that directs the nation’smilitary —including mobilization. The NSCat the direction of the President establishesnational security emergency preparednesspolicy, normally by means of an Executiveorder that assigns emergency preparednessresponsibilities, including mobilization, to theDOD and other Federal departments andagencies.

3. Military Command andControl

For joint military operations, which includethe preparation and execution of integratedmobilization plans, this fundamental

responsibility extends from the President andthe Secretary of Defense, as the NCA, to thecombatant commanders.

4. Joint Military MobilizationPlanning and Execution

a. Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD)

• Basic guidance to direct and coordinatemobilization planning within theDepartment of Defense is contained inthe DOD Master Mobilization Guide(MMG) , which implements DODresponsibilities under the NSC nationalsecurity emergency preparedness policy.The MMG is the first level ofmobilization planning. It identifiesmobilization responsibilities for DODcomponents and describes the tasks to beperformed in peacetime and at the timeof mobilization. It provides ac o m m o n f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h epreparation of detailed mobilization plansby the Joint Staff, Military Departments,and Defense agencies.

• Mobilization planning is heavilyinfluenced by the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan (JSCP), which tasksthe combatant commanders, their Servicecomponents, and the MilitaryDepartments to develop and refineoperation plans (OPLANs) andsupporting mobilization plans.Another influence on mobilizationplanning is DOD Directive 1225.6,“Equipping the Reserve Forces,”which specifies the DOD policy of firstto fight, first to equip regardless ofcomponent.

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• In time of crisis and war, OSD assiststhe Secretary of Defense in managingm o b i l i z a t i o n b y d e v e l o p i n gimplementing guidance for issuance bythe Secretary of Defense to the Joint Staff,Military Departments, and Defenseagencies. OSD assembles cost data andcompiles reports on the costs of militaryoperations, as required by law.

b. Joint Planning and ExecutionCommunity. The JPEC collectively plansfor the mobilization, deployment,employment, sustainment, redeployment,and demobilization of joint forces. JPECmembers concerned with mobilization includethe Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff,Mi l i ta ry Depar tments , combatantcommanders and their Service components,and selected Defense agencies. Theirmobilization responsibilities are covered inthe following paragraphs:

• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.The Chairman, in consultation with theother members of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, prepares integrated plans formilitary mobilization. Through theMobilization Guidance to the JSCP(CJCS Instruction 3110.13), theChairman of the Joint Chiefs ofS t a f f e s t a b l i s h e s p l a n n i n grelationships. The Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff develops mobilizationoptions and provides mobilizationrecommendations to the Secretary ofDefense. The Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff is also responsible forpreparing and submitting to theSecretary of Defense general strategicguidance for the development ofindustrial mobilization programs. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff alsomonitors the status and progress ofmobilization and prepares requiredreports for submission by the Presidentto the Congress.

• Joint Staff. The Joint Staff supports theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffin integrating the mobilization plans ofthe Military Departments and Defenseagencies. The Director of Logistics,J-4, is the focal point in the Joint Stafffor integrating mobilization plans andcoordinating mobilization executionduring crises and war. The mobilizationroles of the Joint Staff are shown inFigure III-1.

• Combatant Commanders. Thecombatant commanders organize andemploy assigned and attachedforces. They are pr inc ipa l l yresponsible for the preparation andimplementation of OPLANs. Theyparticipate in the development ofnational military and theater strategiesand participate in the Planning,Programming, and Budgeting System(PPBS) in addition to theiroperations planning responsibilities. Aspart of their operations planningresponsibilities, they determinemobilization requirements and, basedon additional planning guidance,incorporate information on specific forcelevels projected to be available intoOPLANs and OPORDs.

•• S u p p o r t e d C o m m a n d e r s .Supported commanders are tasked in theJSCP or by other joint operation planningauthority to prepare specific plans intheir respective areas of responsibility.They specify the level of mobilizationn e e d e d t o s u p p o r t t h e p l a n ;identify time-phased requirements forRC forces; and identify the RC forcesneeded fo r re inforcement, fo rdeployment and movement of the force,and for backfill of deployed units. Thisplanning establishes the requirementsfor forces and sustaining resourcesupon which supporting mobilization

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Figure III-1. Joint Staff Mobilization Responsibilities

JOINT STAFFDIRECTORATE

MOBILIZATION RESPONSIBILITIES

Manpower andPersonnel, J-1

Reviews manpower-related mobilization requirements.

Identifies options for personnel augmentation and recommends appropriate authorities.

Monitors the allocation and priorization of Inductees to the Services.

Initiates manpower mobilization reporting for the Joint Staff during a crisis.

Intelligence, J-2

Serves as the intelligence staff officer for the Joint Staff.

Provides information and warning about foreign intelligence and security service threatsto the force.

Operations, J-3

Provides the combatant commander’s requirements and the J-3’s recommendation to theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the J-4 concerning the need for mobilizingReserve component units.

Recommends military courses of action in crisis and war.

Logistics, J-4

Prepares joint mobilization estimates and studies.

Prepares mobilization planning guidance for use by the combatant commanders.

Determines the adequacy and feasibility of mobilization plans to support operation plans.

Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for legal authorities pertaining to mobilization.

Monitors the status and progress of mobilization and prepares required reports forsubmission by the President to the Congress.

Develops recommendations for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning thelevel of mobilization, emergency authorities required, and the need for induction underthe Selective Service Act.

Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact for matters pertaining to mobilization ofmanpower, materiel and equipment, transportation, facilities, industrial base, trainingbase, health service support, host-nation support, and their impact on the environmentand the economy.

Develops joint mobilization doctrine, policies, procedures, and reporting instructions.

Strategic Plansand Policy, J-5

Develops concepts for military mobilization to support strategic concepts and objectives.

Prepares recommendations for declarations of national emergency and war.

Command,Control,

Communicationsand Computers,

J-6

Provides Joint Staff position to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the MilitaryDepartments concerning mobilization requirements for command, control,communications, and computers systems, facilities, and services.

Ensure the design of command and control systems is capable of supporting the NationalCommand Authorities, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, MilitaryDepartments, and combatant commanders during mobilization.

OperationalPlans and

Interoperability,J-7

Plans, conducts, and evaluates mobilization exercises.

Force Structure,Resources, andAssessment, J-8

Serves as the Joint Staff point of contact concerning Active/Reserve component mix andother force and resource development issues.

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plans are based. This planning requiresextensive coordination among thesupported commander, supportingcommanders, and the Services.Supported commanders requestinvocation of emergency mobilizationauthorities when ordered to executeoperation orders (OPORDs) requiringmobilization support.

•• Suppor t i ng Commanders .Supporting commanders are tasked in theJSCP or by other joint planning authorityto provide augmentation forces andother support to a designated supportedcommander or commanders. In this rolethey may also require mobilized assetsto accomplish their respective supportmission. Their supporting plans includemobilization requirements whenappropriate. As noted above, extensivecoordination is required to ensurethat all mobilization requirements areidentified.

• Military Departments and USCG.The Military Departments provide

forces and logistic support to thecombatant commanders at the directionof the Secretary of Defense. Inpeacetime, and until transferred to theDepartment of the Navy in time of war,the USCG serves under the control of theSecretary of Transportation. USCG unitsunder DOT control may be assigned to acombatant commander with the approvalof the Secretary of Transportation. Theyprovide forces to the combatantcommanders, except for forces under thecontrol of the Secretary of Defense andthose assigned to multinationalpeacekeeping organizations. Theyprepare detailed mobilization plansidentifying the actual forces and supportto be provided and execute mobilizationat the direction of the Secretary ofDefense. Specifically, the MilitaryDepartments have the responsibilitiesshown in Figure III-2.

• Defense Agencies. Four Defensea g e n c i e s h a v e s i g n i f i c a n tresponsibilities for supporting jointmilitary mobilization. They are DISA,

MILITARY DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBILITIES

Prepare military and industrial mobilization plans.

Identify and request invocation of emergency authoritiesnecessary to implement mobilization plans.

Plan for the fill and sustainment of organized and / orstructured units with all categories of personnel andequipment.

Mobilize the Reserve Component in crisis and war.

Mobilize their civilian work force in crisis and war.

Figure III-2. Military Department Responsibilities

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Roles and Responsibilities

DLA, Defense Finance and AccountingService (DFAS), and DMA. DISA andDMA receive operational direction fromand report through the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary ofDefense. DLA reports to the Secretaryof Defense through the Under Secretaryof Defense for Acquisition andTechnology, but is responsible forproviding materiel and services to thecombatant commanders and MilitaryDepartments. DFAS reports to theSecretary of Defense through the DODC o m p t r o l l e r. T h e f o l l o w i n gparagraphs summarize the roles andresponsibilities of each of theseagencies in support of joint militarymobilization.

•• Defense Information SystemsAgency. During peacetime, DISAparticipates in all command, control,communications, and computers (C4)mobilization planning activities withOSD, the Joint Staff, DOD components,combatant commanders, and commercialvendors. DISA collects and analyzes thetelecommunications requirementsderived from this participation anddevelops mobilization plans. Duringwar and military operations other thanwar, DISA modifies its mobilizationplans, if required, and ensures theresponsiveness of the DefenseCommunications System (DCS) to theactual requirements of the NCA, OSD,Joint Staff, combatant commanders, andServices. DISA also manages theNational Communications System andemploys the nation’s commercialcommunications resources to supportDefense requirements.

•• Defense Logistics Agency. Based onthe Services’ mobilization plans, DLA,in peacetime, develops mobilizationplans to support the MilitaryDepartments and other authorized

customers with DLA-managed materieland services. These plans includesubstantial industrial preparednessplanning based on the combatantcommanders’ critical item list (CIL) andextensive production base analysisconducted in coordination with OSD, theJoint Staff, and the Military Departments.Across the entire range of militaryoperations, DLA provides logisticsupport to the Services, advises theJoint Staff on the status of inventoriesof DLA-managed i tems, andrecommends resource allocations andproduction priorities when appropriate.

•• Defense Finance and AccountingService. DFAS is the focal point forjoint financial management issues.DFAS works with the combatantcommanders to develop the financialmanagement annexes to joint operationplans. DFAS develops guidanceregarding personnel pay issues, providingentitlement and tax information tomembers and dependents, and ensuringthat the financial systems are able tosupport mobilization efforts. DFAS hasf o r m e d a D FA S - w i d e c r i s i smanagement system to ensure that allDFAS Crisis Coordination Centers areinformed of financial management issuesas they occur.

•• Defense Mapping Agency. Inpeacetime, DMA develops andmaintains mobilization plans to ensurecontinued mapping, charting, andgeodesy (MC&G) support to jointforces under crisis and wartimeconditions. It provides the combatantcommanders with operational levels ofMC&G stocks sufficient to meet initialmobilization requirements. In crisis andwar, DMA executes its plans andprocedures for increased datacollection and increased production anddistribution of its products.

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5. Summary

This chapter identified and described theroles and mobilization managementresponsibilities of the NCA and JPEC. Themembers of the JPEC plan and execute jointmilitary mobilization. The primary executorsof mobilization are the MilitaryDepartments. They develop mobilizationplans to support the combatant commanders’OPLANs. They are guided in these effortsby policy and resource levels established bythe Secretary of Defense and by planning

tasks specified by the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff in the JSCP. Combatantcommanders’ OPLANs specify the level ofmobilization and the RC forces needed tosupport the plan. The Joint Staff isresponsible for integrating the mobilizationplans of the Military Departments,USSOCOM, and supporting Defenseagencies; recommending resource prioritiesand allocations; recommending levels ofmobilization; and monitoring the status andprogress of mobilization execution.

CHAPTER IVRESOURCE AREAS

IV-1

1. Introduction

a. Military mobilization requires theassembly and organization of resources in12 interdependent resource areas as listed inChapter I, “Mobilization and NationalSecurity.” Mobilization planners anddecisionmakers should understand thatactivities occurring in any one area mayhave an influence on each of the others;(e.g., activating additional manpower createsdemands for additional materiel andequipment, transportation, and additionalworkloads at affected facilities). Dependingon the situation, it could also generaterequirements for additional industrialproduction, training base capacity, HSS,communications support, and HNS.Increasing levels of manpower and otherresources may also create conflicts withenvironmental protection statutes,especially at various facilities in the UnitedStates. Some mobilization actions may bedelayed until these conflicts are resolved byeither complying with environmentalprotection standards or by requestingtemporary waivers. The appropriate legalauthorities and funding would also have tobe obtained to enable the callup.Mobilization decisions in each resourcearea, therefore, should be made with an

understanding of the effect the decisioncould have on other resource areas.

b. Mobilization planners deal withresource area interactions duringdeliberate and crisis action planning (CAP)through staff coordination and the exchangeof information among supported andsupporting organizations. Thoroughcoordination and effective communicationswill ensure that mobilization activitiesinitiated in a resource area can be supportedby the other areas.

c. This chapter provides an overview ofmajor mobilization activities by resourcearea. The discussion of each area is presentedfrom a joint perspective; i.e., mobilizationactivities common to two or more MilitaryDepartments or undertaken to support andsustain joint operations. The discussion ineach resource area includes listing the sourcesof the resource, the options available todecisionmakers for using the resource, andthe likely effect a mobilization decisionmade in the area could have on the otherareas.

d. Logistics provides the foundation ofcombat power and is the bridge connectingthe economy with the warfighting forces.

“The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge weapons andtransport supplies; women will make tents and serve in the hospitals; the oldmen will have themselves carried into the public squares to rouse the courageof the fighting men, and to preach the unity of the Republic. The publicbuildings shall be turned into barracks, the public squares into munitionsfactories. All suitable firearms shall be turned over to the troops; the interiorshall be policed with fowling pieces and cold steel. All saddle horses shallbe seized for the cavalry; all draft horses not employed in cultivation willdraw the artillery and the supply wagons.”

Decree by the Committee on Public Safety, (French Revolution, 23 August 1793)

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Logistics is the science of planning andcarrying out the movement andmaintenance of forces. It deals with thedesign and development, acquisition, storage,movement, distribution, maintenance,evacuation, and disposition of materiel; theacquisition, construction, maintenance,operation, and disposition of facilities; themovement, evacuation, and hospitalization ofpersonnel; and the acquisition or furnishingof services. The art of logistics is how tointegrate the strategic, operational, andtactical sustainment efforts within acombatant commander’s area ofresponsibility (AOR), while scheduling themobilization and deployment of units,personnel, and supplies in support of theemployment concept of the combatantcommander. The relative combat powermilitary forces can bring to bear against anenemy is constrained by the ability to deliverforces and materiel to the required points ofapplication across the range of militaryoperations. Operational planners mustunderstand the importance of effective andintegrated logistics and mobilizationplanning for joint operations at a time whendemands on military resources are increasing.

SECTION A. MANPOWER

“People and not things are thefundamental factor determining theoutcome of war.”

General Lo Jui-ChingMay 1965

2. Sources of MilitaryManpower

Manpower mobilization augments thepeacetime AC military end strength. Sourcesof military mobilization manpower includemembers of the RC, military retirees,volunteers with prior service, and nonpriorservice personnel who volunteer or aredrafted. These resources are organized by

law to provide responsiveness in crises.Figure IV-1 associates these sources ofmanpower with manpower mobilizationoptions and the actions required to initiate acallup. The legal authorities required for thecallup of the various manpower pools arelisted with the corresponding option.

3. Mobilization PersonnelManagement Policy

In addition to the callup of manpower fromreserve and retiree manpower pools andconscription, three other actions can betaken to ensure optimum availability andut i l i za t ion of manpower dur ingmobilization. These are stop-loss, stop-movement, and personnel redistributionactions. Stop-loss actions allow the MilitaryDepartments to retain personnel beyond theirterms of service. Stop-movement actionsrefer to a number of policy and proceduralactions that can be taken by the MilitaryDepartments to stabilize AC personnel andensure the maximum number are available forassignment to theaters of operation or otherhigh-priority duties. These activities mayinclude canceling temporary and permanentchange of station travel, changing tour lengthpolicies, and curtailing attendance at Serviceschools. Redistribution actions are alsotaken within the Military Departments duringa crisis to ensure that high-priority units aremaintained at the highest level of personnelreadiness until an efficient personnel fill andreplacement pipeline can be established.

4. Civilian Manpower

Civilian manpower is an integral part ofthe DOD Total Force Concept. Future crisesacross the range of military operations willrequire careful management of the civilianwork force to support military operations inoverseas theaters of operations and CONUS.

a. In theaters, civilians with skillsessential to support military missions may

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Resource Areas

SITUATIONSOURCES OFMANPOWER

MOBILIZATIONOPTIONS ACTION REQUIRED

DomesticEmergency (e.g.,natural disaster,civil disturbance)

Army National Guardand Air NationalGuard

Federalize NationalGuard troops under10 USC 12406 and331-333

President publishesproclamation and an executiveorder.

Any level ofemergency (with orwithout a declared

nationalemergency)

Volunteers from theNational Guard andReserve

Call for volunteersunder 10 USC12301(d)

Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments solicit volunteerswith needed skills and publishcallup orders.

Regular and Reserveretirees with 20+years of active service

Recall retirees under10 USC 688(a)

Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments publish calluporders.

Volunteer enlistees Enlist qualifiedvolunteers

Military Departments acceptqualified applicants inaccordance with DOD andService standards and policies.

Selected Reserve- Units- Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA)

Call to active duty upto 200,000 SelectedReservists under 10USC 12304(Presidential SelectedReserve Callup)

President publishes Executiveorder. Military Departmentspublish callup orders based onSECDEF implementinginstructions. President mustreport to the Congress within 24hours on anticipated use offorces.

Draftees Initiate conscription National Command Authoritiesrequests amendment to theSelective Service Act (50 USCapp. 451 et seq.) authorizingconscription.

War or NationalEmergency

Ready Reserve- Units- Individual Ready Reserves (IRR)- IMAs

Call to active duty upto 1,000,000 ReadyReservists for up to24 months under 10USC 12302(a)(Partial Mobilization)

Presidential proclamation of anational emergency and anExecutive order (orcongressional declaration ofnational emergency). MilitaryDepartments publish call uporders based on SECDEFimplementing instructions.

Remaining ReadyReserveRetired ReserveStandby Reserve

Call to active dutyremaining Reservecomponent personnelunder 10 USC 12301(Full Mobilization)

Passage of legislation or a jointresolution of the Congressdeclaring war or nationalemergency. MilitaryDepartments publish calluporders.

New units andpersonnel

Add new forcestructure andpersonnel necessaryto achieve nationalsecurity objectives(Total Mobilization)

Passage of legislationauthorizing additional forcestructure and manpower.

Figure IV-1. Military Manpower Mobilization: Sources and Options

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remain after other US civilians and theirfamilies have been evacuated. The Servicesand Defense agencies designate thesepersonnel as emergency-essential andprovide necessary training and other supportfor their crisis and wartime duties to includethe intrinsic responsibility of providingprotection to US civilians in the AORconsistent with the capabilities and operationalmission. Other civilian employees withcritical skills may deploy to the theaterindividually or with supported militaryunits. The geographic combatant commanderdetermines admission requirements to thetheater, and the respective Services andagencies implement those requirements fortheir employees. Some foreign-nationalcivilian employees (local or third countrynationals) may also remain to support themission based on the need for their skills, levelof danger, and agreements with the hostcountry.

b. In the United States, the Services andDefense agencies reallocate incumbentcivilian personnel from peacetime to thehighest priority functions through detailing,reassignment, and cross training. When acrisis begins, the Services and agenciesactivate Recruiting Area Staf fingCommittees to find joint, local solutions formeeting these requirements. Solutions caninclude:

• Overtime and extended workweekauthorizations.

• Implementing plans for replacingemployees ordered to active dutybecause of RC or retired-militaryobligations.

• Using civilian retirees and retiredmilitary personnel not expected to berecalled.

• Using employees on loan from otherFederal, State, or local agencies.

• Using contractors.

• Joint advertising and allocation of newemployees after hiring.

• Activating applicable crisis procedureswith OPM regional offices and with Stateand local employment offices to providerequired applicants on an expeditedbasis.

5. Manpower MobilizationOptions

Manpower mobilization options providegreat flexibility to the NCA for respondingto a crisis. Response levels are tied to the legalauthorities available before a Presidentialdeclaration of national emergency or acongressional declaration of nationalemergency or war as shown in Figure IV-1and Figure I-1. Before a declaration ofnational emergency, the Secretaries of theMilitary Departments can call for RCvolunteers who have needed skills andactivate them for short periods of time. RCvolunteers were used effectively duringOperation JUST CAUSE in Panama andOperation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY inHaiti. Volunteer Reservists and recalledretirees were used in Operations DESERTSHIELD and DESERT STORM in thePersian Gulf. PSRC authority makes up to200,000 Selected Reservists available for upto 270 days (10 USC 12304). It was also usedeffectively in the Persian Gulf and duringrecent operations in Haiti. This authority canbe used to send a strong signal of US resolveto friends and foes alike and can serve as aprelude to mobilization. A Presidentialdeclaration of national emergency andinvocation of the partial mobilizationauthority makes up to one million ReadyReservists available for up to 24consecutive months. This partialmobilization authority, also used for the firsttime in the Persian Gulf crisis, includesmembers of the IRR, which is a source of

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Resource Areas

pretrained manpower to be used as Serviceneeds dictate. Like the PSRC, activationsunder this authority can be madeincrementally or all at once to meet the needsof the crisis as it develops. A congressionaldeclaration of a national emergency or waris required before full mobilization may beordered (10 USC 12301(a)). Under fullmobilization the Retired and StandbyReserves become available, as well as ReadyReserves not called previously. Manpowerrequirements for force expansion beyond thepeacetime-authorized force structure andsustainment in a protracted conflict mayrequire legislation authorizing activationof the SSS for the conscription of additionalforces.

6. Effects of ManpowerMobilization on OtherResource Areas

a. Selected Reserve Manpower.Mobilized Selected Reserve units createtime-phased demands for all classes ofsupply, especially rations, fuel, andammunition; major items of equipment; andrepair parts. They also create temporary, butsignificant, demands for intra-CONUStransportation as they move from homestations to mobilization sites and for strategicairlift and sealift for deployment overseas.They create workloads at existing facilitiesfor personnel support, energy, housing,training areas, and storage and may requireconstruction of new facilities. They createdemands for additional industrial baseoutput of all classes of consumables and formajor end-items when war reserve stocks aredepleted. Mobilized Selected Reserve unitsand personnel may impose limited demandson the training base if some unit membersare unskilled or have not completedmandatory training. They may createsignificant demands on health servicesupport (HSS) as they mobilize, deploy, andsustain casualties. Dependents of RCmembers will also impose additional

workloads on CONUS health careresources. When deployed overseas, SelectedReserve units and personnel will createdemands for available HNS such astransportation and facilities. Finally, theyrequire a legal authority to authorize theircallup and funds to pay for tours of active dutyand benefits.

b. Pretrained Individual Manpower(PIM). Individuals mobilized from thevarious sources (IRR, military retirees, andStandby Reserve) place the same demands onother resource areas, as described above, oncethey report to their assigned units. Before theyare assigned to a unit, however, they createdemands for intra-CONUS transportation;for an initial issue of clothing and individualequipment; and for subsistence, housing,and health care. Most individuals mobilizedfrom PIM sources will need reclassificationor refresher training in the training base. Ifassigned overseas as unit fillers orreplacements, they will place a demand fora nonunit personnel space on the strategictransportation system and require weapons,ammunition, and mobility bags.

c. Nonprior Service (NPS) Manpower.NPS manpower (draftees and volunteers)imposes essentially the same demands as PIMimposes on the other resource areas. Becausethey are untrained at accession, they willimpose demands on the training base forbasic and initial skills training.

d. Civilian Manpower. Civilian personnelcreate demands on resource areas based ontheir employment categories. DOD civilianemployees at military installations normallylive at home and only require a salary andworkspace to do their jobs. A DOD civilianor contractor employee required in thetheater of operations may require clothing,chemical and biological defense equipmentand training, passports and visas, housing, andsubsistence; intra-CONUS, strategic, andintratheater transportation; basic battlefield

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SITUATIONSOURCES OF

MATERIEL ANDEQUIPMENT

MOBILIZATIONOPTIONS

ACTION REQUIRED

Any level ofemergency

Equipment on handin units

Redistribute based onemergency priorities

Military Department decisionsbased on supported commandersrequirements and priorities.

War reserve andpre-positionedstockpiles

Release stocks Military Department decisions forretail items. Joint MaterielPriorities and Allocation Boarddecisions for wholesale stocksinsufficient to meet demands of allclaimants.

Depot system Accelerate output Military Department decisionsbased on supported commanders’requirements and priorities.

Industrial base Accelerate output Military Departments and Defenseagencies act to surge production ofneeded materiel and equipment.

Materiel andequipment insecurity assistancepipelines

Divert neededequipment fromsecurity assistancepipelines

National Command Authoritiesdecision based on a determinationthat national security requirementsoutweigh political consequences.

Domestic andforeign commercialvendors

Purchase off-the-shelfproducts that meetmilitary requirements

Military Department and Defenseagency decisions based onFederal acquisition regulations.

7. Sources of Materiel andEquipment

The materiel and equipment resourcearea includes all classes of supply. Itincludes equipment on hand in units, warreserves, pre-positioned equipment, and theoutput of the depot maintenance system andindustrial base. Additional sources includeitems in the security assistance pipelines andoff-the-shelf items from domestic and foreigncommercial sources. These sources and theoptions and actions for obtaining them arelisted in Figure IV-2.

survival training; and health care. The use ofDOD civilian and contractor personnel orlocal nationals makes military personnelavailable to fight. They are used because theyhave critical skills that are not available in theMilitary Services.

SECTION B. MATERIEL ANDEQUIPMENT

“ W h e n a n a t i o n i s w i t h o u testablishments and a military system,it is very difficult to organize an army.”

Napoleon IMaxims of War

Figure IV-2. Materiel and Equipment Mobilization: Sources and Options

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Resource Areas

items are resolved by priority andallocation decisions taken internally by theMilitary Departments based on OPLANpriorities and guided by the DOD policy toequip earlier deploying units before thosescheduled to deploy later, regardless ofService component. When confronted with amateriel or equipment shortage common totwo or more US military claimants, theSecretary of Defense, with the advice of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,determines priorities among the Services.The Joint Materiel Priorities and AllocationBoard (JMPAB) executes this responsibility.The JMPAB is chaired by the J-4, Joint Staffand includes other Joint Staff directors as wellas general or flag officer representativesfrom the Military Departments. In coalitionwarfare, the United States may be responsiblefor providing significant materiel andequipment support to one or more allies.When shortages occur, priority andallocation decisions for resolving conflictsamong allies, or between US claimants andallies, are made by the NCA.

9. Effects of Materiel andEquipment Mobilization onOther Resource Areas

Increased materiel and equipmentdensities create work loads requiringadditional manpower for operations andmaintenance. Higher equipment densitiesgenerate requirements for additional repairparts, tools, and test equipment. Additionaltransportation resources would be requiredto move items from storage or production siteswithin the United States to destinationsoutside the United States. Additional storageand maintenance facilities may be requiredat transshipment points and receivingorganizations. Industrial base output mustbe capable of meeting the added demand forspares. Training base capacity might have

8. Materiel and EquipmentMobilization Options

Materiel and equipment mobilizationconsists of many activities that can be groupedunder two major tasks: (1) increasing theavailability of materiel and equipment toaccommodate the needs of a larger activeforce, and (2) alleviating shortages byallocating or redistributing materiel andequipment in accordance with emergencypriorities . These activities can be undertakeneither separately or in combination to equipand sustain the mobilized force.

a. Increasing Materiel and EquipmentAvailability. Decision options that increasemateriel and equipment availability includethe release of war reserve and depot stocks,accelerating the output of the depotmaintenance system, diverting items fromforeign military sales and other securityassistance programs, accelerating productionrates of existing contracts for consumableitems like clothing and rations, andprocurement of commercial substitutes fromdomestic or foreign sources. Each of theseactions increases the number of items inthe supply pipeline. Except for the diversionof items earmarked for security assistanceprograms, these options are exercised by theMilitary Departments, DLA, and otherDefense agencies as they provide for thelogistic needs of their forces assigned to thecombatant commanders. Action to divertitems from security assistance programscould have a significant effect on our relationswith affected allies and must be taken at theNCA level. However, once diverted andallocated to a Military Department, they aredistributed as determined by the owningMilitary Department.

b. Allocating Materiel and EquipmentShortages. Shortages of Service-unique

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commercial firms. These assets move unitsand unit equipment through themobilization process from home stations tomobilization sites and to ports of embarkation;nonunit personnel from their homes toreception and training sites and then toreplacement centers and ports of embarkation;and nonunit equipment from production andstorage sites to ports of embarkation.Deployment, employment, sustainment,redeployment, and demobilizationoperations are supported primarily bystrategic airlift and sealift, which moveunits, nonunit personnel, and sustainmentitems (nonunit equipment and supplies) fromthe United States to the theaters of operation.RC transportation terminal brigades andbattalions provide the military interface atcommercial seaports of embarkation,deployment support brigades assist withloading the equipment on commercialtransportation, and port security companiesprovide security at military ocean terminals.All of these units must be mobilized earlyto support deployment from CONUS. Thesources of additional transportation resourcesfor mobilization and the options formobilizing them are listed in Figure IV-3. Itis important to note that transportation assets

to be expanded to provide additional operatorand maintenance personnel. HSS might alsohave to be expanded to care for the increasednumber of operator and maintenancepersonnel. Additional funding would alsohave to be obta ined. Add i t iona lcommunications support will be required toprocess greater volumes of inventorymanagement and transaction data betweenunit customers and points of supply and repair.

SECTION C.TRANSPORTATION

“You can’t have any more of anythingthan you can haul.”

Colonel J. Monroe Johnson, USA

10. Sources of MobilizationTransportation

Transportation resources are required tosupport mobi l izat ion, deployment,employment, sustainment, redeployment, anddemobilization operations. Mobilizationactivities are supported principally by intra-CONUS air, rail, highway, pipeline, portfacilities, and inland waterway assets of

Activating the CRAF is a proven option for augmenting organic airlift capability.

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Resource Areas

SITUATIONSOURCES OF

TRANSPORTATIONAUGMENTATION

TRANSPORTATIONMOBILIZATION

OPTIONSACTIONS REQUIRED

Any level ofemergency

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

Reserve component airliftassets

Task Air MobilityCommand, Reservecomponent, and NavalReserve assets.

Secretaries of the Air Force andNavy activate units and individualswith an appropriate callup order.

Voluntary charter Charter availablecommercial aircraft.

USCINCTRANS obtainscommercial charter airlift.

Civil Reserve Air Fleet(CRAF) Stage I

Activate when required toaugment capacity.

USCINCTRANS activates andoperationally directs CRAF Iassets with SECDEF approval.

CRAF Stage II Activate when required toaugment capacity.

USCINCTRANS activates andoperationally directs CRAF IIassets with SECDEF approval.

STRATEGIC SEALIFT

Voluntary charter Charter availablecommercial vessels whenrequired to augmentUSTRANSCOM controlledfleet.

USCINCTRANS obtainscommercial charter shipping.

DOD reduced operationalstatus ships

Activate when required toaugment sealift capacity.

USCINCTRANS requests reducedoperational status approval.

Ready Reserve Force Activate when required toaugment sealift capacity.

USCINCTRANS requests throughCJCS; SECDEF approves (byagreement with the Secretary ofTransportation (SECTRANS);Maritime Administration (NationalDefense Reserve Fleet)implements.

Sealift Readiness Programvessels

Activate when required toaugment sealift capacity.

USCINCTRANS, with approval ofSECDEF, activates with theconcurrence of SECTRANS, andcommands assets of theSRP/VTA.

Voluntary TankerAgreement (VTA)

Augment when required toaugment sealift (tanker)capacity.

USTRANSCOM activates asrequired.

Fast Sealift Ships Activate when necessaryto augment sealiftcapacity.

USCINCTRANS obtainscommercial charter airlift.

CONUS TRANSPORTATION

Commercial air, rail,highway, barge,transportation terminal unit

Activate the Contingencyresponse program.Mobilize seaport ofembarkation transportationterminal units.

The Contingency responseprogram team assembles at thecall of USCINCTRANS to preventor resolve transportation shortfalls.Secretary of the Army publishescallup order for transportationterminal units.

Figure IV-3. Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options

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SITUATIONSOURCES OF

TRANSPORTATIONAUGMENTATION

TRANSPORTATIONMOBILIZATION

OPTIONSACTIONS REQUIRED

Nationalemergency or

war

STRATEGIC AIRLIFT

CRAF Stage III Activate when necessaryto augment airlift capacity.

USCINCTRANS activates andcommands CRAF III assets withthe approval of SECDEF.

Foreign voluntary charters Charter available foreignaircraft.

USCINCTRANS enters intoagreements with foreign carriersconsistent with the Fly AmericanAct.

NATO AlliedPre-committed CivilAircraft Program aircraft

Request NATO resourceswhen required to augmentUS airlift capacity.

North Atlantic Council requestsreinforcements and responds torequests for airlift.

STRATEGIC SEALIFT

Requisitioned US-flag andeffective United Statescontrolled shippingvessels

Requisitioned as requiredto meet sealiftrequirements.

With declaration of Nationalemergency, SECTRANSrequisitions ships at the request ofSECDEF.

Naval Inactive Fleet of theNational Defense ReserveFleet

Activate when required toaugment sealift capacity.

With declaration of Nationalemergency, USCINCTRANSrequests through CJCS; SECDEForders activation.

NATO vessels Request NATO resourceswhen required to augmentUS sealift capacity.

North Atlantic Council requestsreinforcements and responds torequests for NATO ships.

CONUS TRANSPORTATION

Air, rail, highway, andbarge

Seek priorities andallocations of domestictransportation whenrequired to augmentcapacity.

With declaration of Nationalemergency, the President invokespriorities and allocations for DOD.

Aircraft Program airlift (in NATOemergencies) can be called to provide theneeded capacity. Limited peacetime sealift,operated by Military Sealift Command, canbe augmented by voluntary or contract charter,activation of the Ready Reserve Force (RRF),chartering, requisition of US-flag and effectiveUnited States Controlled shipping (USowned but under foreign registry), and alimited number of NATO ships (in NATOemergencies). Foreign-owned flag ships arealso a potential source of additional sealiftthrough chartering. Activation of any shipsfrom the National Defense Reserve Fleetwhich remain after activation of the RRFwould only occur as attrition fillers.

must be mobilized before substantialdeployments can be executed.

11. TransportationMobilization Options

a. A variety of decision options areavailable for mobilization of strategic andintra-CONUS lift assets. As Air NationalGuard and Air Force Reserve assets of theAir Mobility Command (AMC) and airliftassets of the Naval Reserve are beingactivated, voluntary and contract AMCcharter, Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF),and North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) Allied Pre-committed Civil

Figure IV-3. Transportation Mobilization: Sources and Options (continued)

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Resource Areas

b. Defense priority for the various modesof intra-CONUS transportation resourcesc a n b e o b t a i n e d t h ro u g h t h eUSTRANSCOM/Mi l i t a ry Tra f f i cManagement Command (MTMC)Contingency Response Program (CORE).CORE provides quick acquisition of domesticsurface transportation resources duringpeacetime, national emergencies, or majormilitary deployments. The CORE network,a major component of the CORE program, isan association of members from DOT, theDepartment of Defense, other Federalagencies, and the commercial transportationindustry. The CORE network functions as arapid response team to prevent or resolvetransportation shortfalls.

12. Effect of TransportationMobilization on OtherResource Areas

Mobilization of transportation resourceswill substantially affect the manpowerresource area because highly skilledoperators and crews are required, as well asmaintenance and cargo handling personnel,at ports and transshipment points. The effecton ports, airfields, highways, pipelines,railroads and inland waterways; facilitiesrequired for activation, maintenance, andstorage; and repair parts and materialshandling equipment may be significant.Legal authorities and funding are requiredto enable transportation resource expansion.Influence on the training base could besignificant in a protracted conflict with highattrition rates of operator or crew personnel.

a. Augmenting Strategic Airlift. Eachadditional aircraft affects runway,throughput, marshalling, and temporarystorage capacity at airfields; these factors couldbecome constraints at departure, en route andarrival airfields. Aircrews require subsistenceand transient quarters, and aircrew shortagesand crew rest considerations could also becomeconstraints. Influence on the military training

base should be minimal unless commercialcarriers lose their capability to conduct theirrespective training. Some additional demandswill be placed on the industrial base as stocksof repair parts are depleted. Shortages of aviationfuel, lubricants, repair parts, hull and liabilityinsurance, and qualified mechanics could becomeconstraints.

b. Augmenting Strategic Sealift. In additionto applicable constraints listed above, the charter,requisition, or activation of each additionalship draws on the available pool of licensedofficers, and certified merchant seamen. Thewithdrawal of commercial vessel insurance andwar-risk exclusion for crew life insurance mayalso constrain the use of commercial vessels. Tosurmount this constraint, the President mayauthorize the Secretary of Defense, actingthrough the Secretary of Transportation, to issuewar-risk insurance under Title XII of theMerchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 USC 1285.Crew shortages could become a constraint,particularly if market forces and mortality ratesresult in a reduced pool of available private sectorUS merchant mariners. Also, pulling ships fromnormal commercial service can have adverselong-term impacts on the commercial sealiftcarrier’s business. Ships require berthing andanchorage space at ports, which, together withtemporary storage, staging areas, cargo handlingcapabilities, and transportation mode links,determine throughput capacity. Laws governingthe handling of hazardous materials, such asammunition, limit the number of ports that canhandle such loads. Drydocks, shipyardfacilities, and skilled labor are required foractivation and periodic refitting. Constraints inthe other resource areas should be minimal exceptin extreme conditions marked by high attrition.Additionally, shortages of stevedores may beexperienced if heavy demands are placed onmultiple commercial ports within the samegeographic area.

c. Augmenting I n t r a - C O N U STransportation Resources. The responseand assistance of the CORE Program

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Network enables the Department of Defenseto obtain transportation resources (air, rail,highway, barge, pipeline, and port facilities) notavailable through normal procurementchannels. If the voluntary efforts of the COREnetwork members still result in transportationshortfalls, the Department of Defense canrequest that DOT issue priority service orallocation orders to the commercialtransportation industry to support DODrequirements. Demands in the other resourceareas should not be significant, except in extremecircumstances. Spot shortages in operator, crew,or maintenance personnel could occur if largenumbers of commercial carrier employees areordered to military duty or if local transportationdemands are heavy. Spot shortages of fuel, repairparts, maintenance, and transshipment facilitiescould also occur during peak periods. At someinstallations, capacity of railheads and spurs couldbe a constraint.

SECTION D. FACILITIES

“Fleets cannot operate without bases.”

Major General John A. Lejeune,USMC (testimony to House Naval

Affairs Committee, 13 March 1920)

13. Sources of Facilities

The Department of Defense uses a widevariety of facilities to house, train, equip, andsupport troops. Facilities are also needed toprovide storage, maintain equipment, andconduct operations. Military bases, depots,medical treatment facilities, airfields, andseaports are representative examples. Facilitieswith the capacity for supporting increasedworkloads during mobilization are obtainedfrom the following sources: commercialfacilities that support the Department ofDefense in peacetime; unused and standbycapacity at existing government facilities; andnew capacity developed on property acquiredby the Department of Defense through lease,purchase, or exercise of other legal means.These are listed in Figure IV-4, together withthe options and actions for acquiring neededfacilities during mobilization.

14. Facilities MobilizationOptions

Options for expanding facilities duringmobilization include reopening unusedcapacity with actions short of newconstruction, initiating emergency military

The Department of Defense exercises its legal authority to provide for portfacilities during mobilized sealift operations.

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Resource Areas

SITUATION SOURCES OFFACILITIES

FACILITIESMOBILIZATION

OPTIONSACTIONS REQUIRED

Any level ofemergency

Existing governmentproperty

- Standby capacity Activate standbycapacity

Military Departments act withinavailable funding.

- Unused capacity Develop unusedcapacity

Military Departments initiateemergency military constructionprojects using unobligated funds (10USC 2803) or SECDEF ContingencyConstruction Authority (10 USC 2804)

Newly acquiredproperty

Lease, purchase, anddevelop as required

Nationalemergency or war

Existing governmentproperty

Develop unusedcapacity

Military Departments initiateemergency military constructionprojects with additional authoritiesavailable upon declaration of nationalemergency:

Newly acquiredproperty

Lease, purchase, anddevelop as required

-SECDEF authority to modify currentmilitary construction program withinmilitary construction appropriationsand unobligated family housingfunding (10 USC 2808).

-Supplemental military constructionappropriations.

Recaptured formergovernment property

Recapture and developas provided by law

SECDEF acts under statutoryprovisions for recapture of specifiedparcels of former Federal property.

Figure IV-4. Facility Mobilization: Sources and Options

construction projects to increase capacity atexisting facilities, and acquisition of newfacilities through the recapture of formerfederal property. Facilities can include allkinds of military installations, airfields, andseaports. CONUS and outside CONUSfacilities are included.

a. Initiate Emergency MilitaryConstruction. The Secretary of Defenseand Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments can initiate emergencymilitary construction projects withunobligated balances of military constructionfunds, the Secretary of Defense contingencyconstruction authority, or with a modifiedmilitary construction program, enabled witha declaration of national emergency andunobligated military construction and family

housing funds. Beyond these options,construction of new or expanded facilitiesrequires a request for a supplemental militaryconstruction appropriation. Waivers or relieffrom environmental protection statutes andsome occupational health and safetyregulations may also be required.

b. Acquire Additional Real Propertyand Commercial Facilities. Under the law,hundreds of parcels of former federalproperty may be recaptured to provide landand improved infrastructure for conversioninto needed facilities. In addition, privatelyowned lands may be acquired bycondemnation for defense purposes, such astraining or manufacturing of ammunition andother items of materiel.

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CRAF: A MIDDLE-AGED SUCCESS

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), a 43-year old program designed to augmentthe organic capability of the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)with civil aircraft, was called into service first time ever on 18 August 1990.On that date, Military Airlift Command (now Air Mobility Command (AMC))activated the 38 cargo and passenger aircraft of Stage I to meet the initialsurge requirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD. The Secretary of Defensefollowed 5 months later, on 16 January 1991, by activating CRAF Stage II, addingmore aircraft to meet the pressing sustainment requirements of OperationDESERT STORM.

Established in 1952, CRAF was sized and structured to meet the threat of aSoviet invasion of Europe. Its purpose was “to augment US military airlift forceswith civil air carriers to support emergency airlift requirements.” Under CRAF,US air carriers voluntarily commit cargo and passenger aircraft to supportairlift requirements that exceed airlift capabilities. The carriers pledge specificaircraft by tail number to one of three stages of crisis escalation: Stage I—Committed Expansion; Stage II—Defense Airlift Emergency; or Stage III—National Emergency. The CRAF support is also divided into five functionalsegments: long-range international, short range international, domestic,Alaskan, and aeromedical. Once activated, the carriers continue to operatethe aircraft and provide full support, including fuel, spare parts, andmaintenance. AMC, however, assumes mission control. Several carriers alsohave agreed to serve as senior lodgers during Stage III. In that capacity, theyprovide expanded ground support services to all aircraft and their crews, usingdesignated commercial airports.

Each stage of CRAF is designed to meet the increased airlift requirements ofescalating levels of emergency. The Commander in Chief, USTRANSCOM cancall up Stage I aircraft on 24-hour notice to meet crisis requirements. TheSecretary of Defense can activate Stage II aircraft, also on 24-hour notice,during an emergency that is less than a full mobilization. The Secretary ofDefense also can activate Stage III aircraft, under either of the followingconditions: one, the President or Congress declares a Defense-orientednational emergency, or, two, in a situation short of a declared Defense-orientednational emergency. In Stage III, the air carriers have 48 hours to make theiraircraft available to the government.

Although principally aimed at augmenting organic airlift capabilities duringwartime, the CRAF Program is also used to allocate some of AMC’s peacetimevalues to carriers that commit aircraft to, for example, the long-rangeinternational segment of CRAF, based upon aircraft type (cargo or passenger),payload, block speed, and range, etc. AMC then uses the mobilization valuesto establish “entitlements,” expressed in annual dollar shares of its cargo orpassenger business.

A “joint venture” concept provides another incentive for carriers to join theCRAF Program. Under this concept, carriers are not required to convert themobilization values associated with their commitment into peacetime business.Instead, they can trade those mobilization values to their joint-venture CRAFpartners that want to augment normal commercial business with military

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movements. The concept was established to induce carriers, particularly small-package carriers, to join CRAF that may not do so otherwise.

The process for CRAF activation begins when the combatant commandersspecify their requirements, expressed in a variety of terms (military units,equipment end items, ammunition, resupply materiel, etc.), and the date theyare needed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) approves thoserequirements, and USTRANSCOM translates the requirements into time-phaseddeployment data and designates them for movement by either airlift or sealift.USTRANSCOM then provides the airlift deployment data to AMC to developdetailed lift requirements and the flight schedules necessary to meet them.After programming its organic lift capability, AMC determines the civilaugmentation necessary, taking into consideration the amount currentlyavailable by expanding the scope of on-going contracts (expansion buy). AMCalso assesses, as warranted, the CRAF stage that best meets the unsatisfiedairlift requirements, notifies the carriers of possible CRAF activations, andeither activates CRAF Stage I (with USTRANSCOM approval, sends a messageto the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (through USTRANSCOM) requestingdeclaration of an airlift or national emergency to activate either Stage II or III.The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then notifies the Secretary of Defense,who, if he concurs with the CJCS’s position, apprises the Secretary ofTransportation of his intent to activate CRAF. Once activated, the Chairmanassigns airlift priorities to meet the CINC’s requirements.

Shortly after the President’s decision to launch a military response to Iraq’sinvasion of Kuwait, US air carriers voluntarily began supporting the airliftrequirements of Operation DESERT SHIELD through an AMC “expansion buy.”They moved their first passengers on 7 August 1990. By the 17th, they hadcompleted in excess of 100 passenger and cargo missions (i.e. internationalflights) involving more than 30 aircraft. On 18 August 1990, AMC activated the38 aircraft from 16 carriers in CRAF Stage I. In one month, those aircraft flew391 missions in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Over the next fourmonths, the number of CRAF missions increased to 1,903.

On 16 January 1991, the Secretary of Defense authorized the activation ofCRAF Stage II to meet the additional cargo airlift requirements of OperationDESERT STORM. Consequently, by 12 February, the daily CRAF missioncapability increased to an average 23.4 missions per day, an 86 percent increaseover support for Operation DESERT SHIELD.

The CRAF Program is a DOD success story. This program, first originated tosatisfy Cold War requirements, has proven its worth through the years insatisfying peacetime airlift requirements that exceeded organic military liftcapabilities. Further, during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, the US commercialcarriers responded to both the program’s incentives and the Stage I-IIactivations completing in excess of 4,700 missions to move units, equipment,and resupply materiel. This proved invaluable in providing AMC with the meansto satisfy the combatant commander’s surge, sustainment, and redeploymentrequirements.

SOURCE: Review of Strategic Mobility Programs, Volume 2: Civil ReserveAir Fleet , Bethesda: Logistics Management Institute, 1991.

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15. Effect of FacilitiesMobilization on OtherResource Areas

Expanding facilities will require moremanpower, both military and civilian, tostaff tenant organizations and providerequired services. The greatest effect willbe on the civilian side in the form of contractconstruction workers and DOD personnelemployed to expand tenant support services.Host-nation civilians will provide the bulk ofthis support overseas. There will be asignificant local demand for constructionmaterials and equipment—from stocks andfrom the industrial base. As the facility growsin capacity or expands operations, theincreased population will require morehealth care and other support services. Ifthese resources are available, the effect onplanned facilities expansion will be minimal.Shortfalls in these areas will reducecapacity and constrain productivity.

SECTION E. INDUSTRIALBASE

“It is a war of smokestacks as well asof men.”

George C. Marshall(Address to the US Chamber of

Commerce, 29 April 1941)

16. Industrial MobilizationSources

The US industrial base includes domesticcommercial production facilities andgovernment-owned facilities. Some of thegovernment-owned facilities are governmentoperated and some are contractor operated.Foreign producers of essential componentsand parts must also be included, becauseforeign producers may be the only source forcomponents of major equipment items.Because of the unique relationship existingbetween the United States and Canada, the

Canadian defense industry is recognized as partof a single North American defense industrialbase. The capabilities of Canadian industrymay be included in US industrialpreparedness planning. Figure IV-5 liststhese sources together with the options andactions required to expand their output.

17. Industrial MobilizationOptions

Industrial base expansion includes actionsto accelerate production within the existingindustrial infrastructure, add new productionlines and factories, and implementprovisions of the Defense Priorities andAllocation System (DPAS). Because manycomponents of key military items ofequipment are now procured from offshoresources, increased emergency procurementfrom these sources has become, of necessity,a major industrial mobilization option.

18. Effect of IndustrialMobilization on the OtherResource Areas

a. Expand the Industrial Base. Surgeproduction and industrial base expansion willrequire additional skilled manpower from thenondefense sectors of the national economy.Local manpower shortages could developin areas hard hit by extensive militarymanpower mobilization and competitionbetween DOD contractors and others forlimited numbers of the same skills. Materieland equipment stocks, transportation, andfacilities could be significantly affected ifraw materials, finished products, tools, andtest equipment become short; local and longdistance hauling is not sufficiently manned;and new construction does not meet thedemand. Additional legal authorities maybe invoked or requested from the Congressupon the determination that DOD productionin a crisis is being adversely affected.Environmental and occupational healthand safety regulations may also require

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The Department of Commerce is responsiblefor DPAS activities concerning industrialresources. Accordingly, the Department ofDefense will coordinate with the Departmentof Commerce concerning industrial resourceissues requiring resolution through DPAS.

c. Obtain Allied Production Support.The Department of Defense has becomeincreasingly reliant on offshore productionof essential components, repair parts, tools,and test equipment needed for domesticproduction of virtually all major weaponssystems and other key items of materiel andequipment. Wartime surge and industrial base

waivers. Substantial additional funding maybe required to enable increased production.

b. Implement the DPAS. The DPAS isauthorized by the Defense Production Act (50USC app. 2071) and allows preferentialtreatment for contracts or orders relatingto certain approved defense or energyprograms for military production andconstruction, military assistance to any foreignnation, and stockpiling. This authorityspecifically includes reordering nationalpriorities and rationing available industrialresources (articles, materials, services, andfacilities, including construction materials).

SITUATION INDUSTRIAL BASESOURCES

INDUSTRIALMOBILIZATION

OPTIONSACTIONS REQUIRED

Any level ofemergency

DOMESTIC INDUSTRY

Commercial producers ofgoods and services

Accelerate production fromcurrent sources of goodsand services

Military Departments andDefense Logistics Agencycontract for acceleratedproduction from currentproducers of materiel based onplanned or actual consumptionrates and prioritized requirementsof the combatant commanders:

Expand production basecapacity

-Under provisions of DefensePriorities and Allocation System(DPAS), 50 USC app. 2071,obtain priority performance onDOD contracts and orders.

-Using DPAS authorities andstreamlined acquisitionprocedures, increase industrialcapacity for production of materieland equipment required tosustain the mobilized force.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Government-owned/government-operatedproduction facilities

-Accelerate production rates oractivate standby and laid-awayproduction capacity atgovernment-owned/government-operated facilities andgovernment-owned/contractor-operated facilities.

Government-owned/contractor-operatedproduction facilities

FOREIGN INDUSTRY

Commercial producers ofgoods and services

-Seek additional productionfrom foreign suppliers.

Figure IV-5. Industrial Mobilization: Sources and Options

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expansion can be expected to have asignificant effect on offshore producers aswell. The reliability of these sources couldsignificantly influence the ability to provideneeded materiel and equipment to supportand sustain operations. Conversely, theavailability of offshore production support inareas where the domestic production base canno longer expand, could have substantialpositive results on the manpower, materiel andequipment, and facilities resource areas.Similar to domestic source problems, foreignsupplier problems should be forwardedthrough the DPAS chain for resolution by theOffice of the Secretary of Defense and theDepartment of Commerce.

SECTION F. TRAINING BASE

19. Sources and Options forExpanding Training BaseCapacity

The Services expand their institutionaltraining bases to train NPS personnel tosupport and sustain an expanded forcestructure. The training base also providesreclassification and refresher training forPIM who need it. Based on the rate of force

expansion and attrition due to casualties,training base output requirements, overtime, are determined and compared toavailable capacity. If there is a shortfall,additional capacity is added by mobilizingadditional training organizations from theRC, by hiring DOD civilian employees, andby contracting for additional instructors andother training resources from the privatesector. Sources, options, and actions forexpanding training base capacity are listedin Figure IV-6.

20. Effect of Training BaseExpansion on OtherResource Areas

Training base expansion may causesignificant effects on the manpower,materiel and equipment, facilities, healthservice support, and funding resourceareas. It may also affect the environmental,transportation, industrial base,communications, and legal areas. It is notexpected to have any measurable influenceon HNS, although the training of alliedmilitary personnel, along with securityassistance and other agreements, could affectthe training base capacity.

SITUATION

SOURCES OFADDITIONAL

TRAINING BASECAPACITY

TRAINING BASEEXPANSION

OPTIONSACTIONS REQUIRED

Any level ofemergency

Military Departments act to expandtheir institutional trainingestablishments:

Wartime policies andprograms of instruction

Implement wartimetraining policies andprograms

-Implement wartime programs ofinstruction; extend the training dayand training week; increase classsize.

Reserve componenttraining units

Expand existing trainingcenters and schools

-Call up Reserve component trainingbase augmentation units as required.

New training centersand schools

Add new trainingcenters and schools

Call up remaining Reservecomponent training baseaugmentation units; activate newtraining units; acquire new trainingfacilities and support.

Figure IV-6. Expanding Training Base Capacity: Sources and Options

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SECTION G. HEALTHSERVICE SUPPORT

“No price is too great to preserve thehealth of the fleet.”

Lord St. VincentLetter to the Admiralty, (1796)

21. General

Theater, CONUS, and aeromedicalevacuation HSS is expanded to serve themobilized force and provide the capabilityto treat, evacuate, receive, and redistributecasualties in CONUS. HSS requirementsare determined from decisions establishingthe theater medical support and theaterevacuation policy. Several factors, such ascasualty rates, availability and readiness ofHSS units, transportation resources, bloodsupplies, and HNS assist in determining thetheater HSS required. CONUS hospital bedsand facilities are increased to accommodatethe expected flow of casualties and increasesin the population of the CONUS support base.The aeromedical evacuation system isincreased to employ the necessarycontingency aeromedical evacuationelements needed to support the increased

intratheater, intertheater and CONUSevacuee requirements. The nonactive dutybeneficiary population eligible forgovernment health care may be transferredto the Civilian Health and Medical Programfor the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)Program or a Managed Care/TRICAREcontract as requirements for serving uniformedmilitary beneficiaries approach the availablecapacity. Experience from OperationsDESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORMindicated, however, that costs may be too highfor the CHAMPUS Program. The MilitaryDepartments were required to backfillvacancies created by deploying HSS personnelwith reservists in order to maintain the samelevel of HSS care for dependents and retirees.Military Department mobilization plansshould include provisions for activating RCHSS professionals for immediate backfillat CONUS medical treatment facilities.

22. Sources of Emergency HSS

The sources of skilled HSS manpowerand hospital beds to meet emergency andwartime requirements for health care arelisted in Figure IV-7, together with theoptions and actions required to mobilizeadditional health care capacity.

During mobilization, health services support may be provided by reassigningpersonnel from CONUS to hospital ships deployed to the theater of operations.

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23. Options for Mobilizing HSS

a. Options for mobilizing additionalhealth service support professionalsparallel those for other manpower skills.In time of national emergency, the transfer ofmembers of the United States Public HealthService (USPHS) commissioned corps to theDepartment of Defense may also provideadditional health service professionals.

b. Theater HSS and aeromedicalsupport is expanded by calling up,transferring, and reassigning health serviceprofessionals from the CONUS base to ACand RC HSS units and hospital ships deployed

to the theater. Additional callup of reserves isrequired to backfill CONUS health servicefacilities vacated by their peacetime staffs.

c. The CONUS HSS base is expanded,as necessary, to provide care for casualtiesreturned from combat theaters. In additionto expanding CONUS military hospitals, thisprocess may also include implementing, inturn, the Department of Veterans Affairs(DVA)-DOD Contingency Plan and theNational Defense Medical System (NDMS),which provide additional beds andprofessional staff from DVA and commercialcivilian resources.

SITUATIONSOURCES OF

HEALTH SERVICESUPPORT

MOBILIZINGHEALTH SERVICE

SUPPORTACTIONS REQUIRED

Any level ofemergency

Reserve componenthealth service supportunits and individuals

Mobilize volunteerindividuals and units ofthe Selected Reserve

Military Departments order units andvolunteer individuals to active dutywithin the limits of Presidentialauthorities invoked.

Department of VeteransAffairs hospitals

Implement theDepartment of VeteransAffairs-DODContingency Plan

DOD and Department of VeteransAffairs act in accordance with theDepartment of Veterans Affairs andDOD Health Resources Sharing andEmergency Operations Act (38 USC8111A) when DOD requirementsexceed supply of continental UnitedStates military hospital beds.

Host-nation health caresystems

Activate host-nationsupport agreements

Geographic combatant commanderrequests support in accordance withagreements.

Nationalemergency or war

Reserve componenthealth service supportunits and individuals

Mobilize remainingReserve componenthealth service supportunits and individuals

Military Departments order Reservecomponent units and individuals toactive duty.

Domestic civilian healthcare system

Transfer United StatesPublic Health Servicecommissionedmembers to DOD orUnited States CoastGuard

United States Public Health Serviceassigns members to DOD or USCGwith SECDEF or SECTRANSrequest and Presidential Executiveorder.

Activate NationalDisaster MedicalSystem

SECDEF acts under provisions ofPublic Health Service Act when bedrequirements exceed capacity ofDOD and Department of VeteransAffairs.

Figure IV-7. Health Service Support Mobilization: Sources and Options

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microwave transmissions. In operationsother than war, the DCS and the FederalCommunications Commission jointlyoperate a telecommunications servicespriority system, which prioritizes theprovisioning and restoration of criticalFederal, State, local, and private circuitsneeded for national security. DISA, themanager of the National CommunicationsSystem (NCS), monitors situations that coulddevelop into emergencies, providesrecommendations for the use of resources, andmaintains liaison with commercial providers.In time of national emergency or war, thePresident may invoke special war powersunder Section 706 of the act (47 USC 606).These powers allow the President to takeimmediate measures to ensure thecontinuous operation and security oftelecommunications services withoutnegotiations or the consent of those who areaffected. The DCS assets of the NCS arereserved for the exclusive use of the DOD.Other NCS assets support other departmentsand agencies of the Federal government.These other assets are made available to theDOD in crises and war when DCS capacity isexceeded. The Joint Staff controls only a fewcommunications assets, which are allocatedduring emergencies to provide additionalcommunications in the theater of operations.

26. Effect of CommunicationsMobilization Activities onOther Resource Areas

Virtually all communications resourcesrequired across the range of militaryoperations come from unused andredirected capacity maintained inpeacetime. Some increases in personnel toaccommodate additional operations,maintenance, and security needs may berequired. The effect on other resource areasis expected to be minimal, except as the resultof unexpected attrition or protracted globalwar, which would generate requirements toreplace fixed infrastructure.

24. Effect of HSS Mobilizationon Other Resource Areas

The process of expanding theater HSSmay significantly burden the manpower,materiel and equipment, transportation,facilities, industrial base, training base,HNS, and legal resource areas. Increasingthe CONUS HSS base may significantlyinfluence the manpower, materiel andequipment, facilities, industrial base, and legalresource areas. Some effects could also befelt in the transportation and training baseareas. The transfer of dependent and retireehealth care support to the CHAMPUSProgram or Managed Care/TRICAREcontract may have a significant effect onfunding. The effect of mobilization in theremaining resource areas is not expected tobe significant. Few or no changes areexpected in the communications or HNSareas.

SECTION H.COMMUNICATIONS

“Communications dominate war...theyare the most important singleelement...political or military.”

Mahan The Problem of Asia, 1900

25. Sources and Options forMobilizationCommunications Support

The Federal Government relies primarilyupon commercial providers for thecommunications required for national defenseand crisis response. For this reason, theCommunications Act of 1934 provides thePresident with substantial authority duringthe entire range of military operations toregulate and control virtually every form oftelecommunications resource at the nationaland local levels. Included within this authorityare devices and stations for wire, radio, and

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SECTION I. HOST-NATIONSUPPORT

“We must take a powerful armamentwith us from home to a distantland...Here a friendly country is alwaysnear, and you can easily obtainsupplies. There you will be dependenton a country which is entirely strangeto you...”

Nicias of Athens(on the Syracusan expedition,

415 BC)

27. Sources of HNS

Manpower, equipment, facilities, andservices provided by host or allied nationsduring war or emergency offset requirementsfor corresponding US military resources thatare not affordable or practical to maintain inpeacetime. A number of agreements aremaintained with an ever-growing array ofallies for defense cooperation during theentire range of military operations. Everyeffort should be made through the Departmentof State and the Department of Defense toestablish some form of mutual support,defense cooperation and/or cross-servicingarrangements with US allies and emergingdemocracies around the globe. Initialcooperation can be achieved by helping toestablish a data base of military andcommercial capabilities available in eachnation, as well as standardized procedures toallow for rapid communication andunderstanding in a crisis situation.Additionally, this process enhances diplomaticefforts during peacetime and facilitates crisismanagement/contingency decisionmaking byquickly providing more options to US andcoalition NCA. Direct HNS is that whichcan be provided by an ally’s military unitsthat are organized and equipped for thatspecific purpose. Financial stipulations mayhave already been established on a bilateralbasis with a formula spelled out formally in a

defense cooperation agreement. However,other arrangements may be made based onthe situation at hand, to include multinationalagreements with a regional or coalitionorganization or the United Nations (UN).Financial reimbursement policies andprocedures may be developed through the useof in and out audit surveys (UN system) orsome other process. Indirect support may beprovided by host-nation commercial entitieswith licensing agreements or permissionsgranted by an allied government.

28. Options for MobilizingHNS

a. Implement Existing Agreements.Mutual support or defense cooperationagreements can be implemented upon themutual consent of the United States and theproviding nation throughout the full range ofmilitary operations.

b. Obtain Additional Support. Thevariable and uncertain nature of globalsecurity threats may create unforeseensituations where it may be necessary to seekad hoc HNS. Such support is normallyobtained through government-to-governmentnegotiations or through negotiationsconducted at a mutually agreed lower level.

29. Effects of Mobilizing HNSon the Other ResourceAreas

Implementation of existing or additionalmutual support or defense cooperationagreements, depending on the nature of thesupport provided, will affect the providingnation or nations’ resource areas,particularly manpower, materiel andequipment, transportation assets, and possiblyfacilities. In addition to offsetting US resourcerequirements for the specified support, theability of the host-nation may greatlyinfluence one or more US resource areas,

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particularly if the host nations are unable orunwilling to provide the level of supportexpected by the United States.

SECTION J. THE ENABLINGRESOURCES:

ENVIRONMENT, LEGALAUTHORITIES, FUNDING

“Modern war is a death grapplebetween peoples and economicsystems, rather than a conflict ofarmies alone.”

Bernard M. Baruch1870-1965

30. General

Each of the nine resource areas discussedin the preceding sections of this chaptercontributes to developing, expanding,sustaining, or positioning military capabilityso that it may be applied to protect our nationalsecurity interests in an emergency.Mobilization planners, however, must alsoconsider the effect of mobilization activitieson the environment as well as the necessitiesof legal authorities and funding to enablethe timely execution of mobilization activities.This section discusses, in turn, the sources ofthese enabling resources as well as the optionsavailable and actions necessary to obtain them.

a. Environment

• General. The United States has as u b s t a n t i a l f r a m e w o r k o fenvironmental laws. Awareness ofenvironmental issues, requirements forcompliance, and the liabilities orpenalties associated with noncompliancemandate the identification and resolutionof environmental issues that affectmobilization. Most environmental lawsand regulations do not provide automaticrelief or waivers in time of emergency,and DOD policy in the United States is

to maintain environmental standardsto the maximum extent practicableduring emergencies. The implicationsof this policy affect several resourceareas. For example, emergencylegislation may be required to exempttemporarily critical industries andmilitary organizations from a wide arrayof regulatory requirements. Some issuesregarding environmental matters in theUnited States may require resolutionthrough the Environmental ProtectionAgency (EPA), such as fines leviedagainst the Department of Defense byEPA or state authorities for violation ofenvironmental statutes. Additionalmanpower and other resources may berequired to ensure continued compliancewith environmental protect ionrequirements. Military personnel mayb e a c c o u n t a b l e i n c r i m i n a lproceedings for failing to comply withenvironmental statutes. TheDepartment of Defense is ultimatelyresponsible for compliance, cleanup, andconservation involved in CONUSmilitary locations. Overseas, US policyis to follow Final Governing Standardsdeveloped by the designated DODexecutive agent. These standards arebased on host-nation law and the DODOverseas Environmental BaselineGuidance Document, whichever is morestringent, unless status-of-forcesagreements or other internationalagreements require another standard.

• Types of Environmental StatutesAffecting Mobilization. As shown inFigure IV-8, four categories ofenvironmental statutes concernmobilization planners.

•• Compliance. Compliance statutesrequire DOD facilities to meet pollutionemission standards; to obtain andmaintain Federal, state, and local permits

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to release pollutants; and to meet recordkeeping and training requirements. EPA,Coast Guard, state, and locali nspec to rs conduc t pe r iod icinspections for compliance. In caseso f s e v e r e o r l o n g - s t a n d i n gnoncompliance, agreements are oftennegotiated between the regulatoryagency and the installation commander.If an agreement cannot be reached, issuesare referred to successively higher levelsof authority for resolution. Examples ofcompliance statutes include:

Clean Air Act (42 USC 7401 et seq.)

Clean Water Act (33 USC 1251 etseq.)

Resource Conservation andRecovery Act (42 USC 6901 et seq.)

•• Cleanup. Cleanup statutes obligatethe DOD to protect human health andthe environment from past activitiesthat have contaminated the land (e.g.,firing ranges and waste disposal sites).Included are sites the Department ofDefense now owns, or has owned in thepast, and non-DOD property where DODoperations have been conducted or DODwaste disposal has been arranged with theproperty owner. Enforcement of cleanupstatutes normally relies on cleanuporders or agreements. The Departmentof Defense is required to survey all of itsproperty in CONUS and US territories forpotential hazardous waste disposal sitesand identify those that require cleanup.The worst cases are identified on the EPANational Priorities List, and their cleanupis regulated by EPA. Examples of cleanupstatutes include the Comprehensive

EXAMPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTESAFFECTING MOBILIZATION

COMPLIANCE

CLEANUP

CONSERVATION

IMPACT ANALYSIS

Clean Air ActClean Water ActResource Conservation and Recovery Act

Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensationaland Liability ActDefense Environmental Restoration Program

Endangered Species ActCoastal Management Act

National Environmental Policy Act

Figure IV-8. Examples of Environmental Statutes Affecting Mobilization

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• Options for Obtaining Relief fromEnvironmental Requirements

•• The potential impact thatmobilization might have upon theenvironment should be identified insupporting mobilization plans andshould provide for compliance withapplicable environmental laws. Whenc o m p l i a n c e i s no t p o s s i b l e ,negotiations may be conducted withFederal, state, and local agencies todevelop acceptable alternative means ofcompliance. During some criticalmobilization activities, existing nationalsecurity exemption authorities may beexercised. As a last resort, requests foremergency legislation may besubmitted to exempt critical industriesand DOD organizations from regulatoryrequirements.

•• Planning for actions to remedydamage caused as the result of waiversor noncompliance with environmentalstandards during mobilization should betaken as soon as possible. For example,additional military and civilian personnelwith needed skills such as explosiveordnance disposal may be required toclean up the area of operations.

•• As most major contingencies have thepotential to significantly affect theenvironment, planners should consultwith their supporting environmentaland legal offices at the earliest possibletime. Clean Air Act conformityexclusion determinations should bemaintained in a single office along withany agreements negotiated withregulators.

b. Legal Authorities

• Categories of Legal Authority. Thereare nearly 400 legal authorities drawn

Environmental Response Compensationand Liability Act (42 USC 9601 et seq.)and the Defense EnvironmentalRestoration Program (10 USC 2701 etseq.).

•• Conservation. Conservation statutesinclude a wide variety of requirementsfor the Department of Defense,including the acquisition and use of non-DOD Federal lands with specificrestrictions on designated wildernessareas, wild and scenic rivers, nationalmonuments, and coastal zones. Alsoincluded are requirements for themanagement and protection of wildlifeand protection of historical property.This legislation affects DOD trainingareas. These statutes are predominantlyFederally enforced but may also beenforced through citizen suits. Examplesof conservation statutes are theEndangered Species Act as amended (16USC 1531 et seq.) and the Coastal ZoneManagement Act as amended (16 USC1451 et seq.).

•• Impact Analysis. The NationalEnvironmental Policy Act of 1969, 42USC 4321-4361, requires that majorFederal actions significantly affecting thequality of the human environment bepreceded by a detailed statement by theresponsible Federal official. Thisstatement, commonly referred to as theEnvironmental Impact Statement(EIS), identifies the environmentalimpact of the proposed actions, adverseenvironmental effects that cannot beavoided, and alternatives to the proposedactions. Mobilization activities ,particularly as they relate to facilities andlocation of manpower, may trigger theneed for EISs unless deemed anemergency under 40 CFR 1506.11, andother arrangements are made.

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and may affect one or more otherresource areas. Appendix A, “LegalAuthorities,” contains a more completedescription of key legal authoritiesrelative to mobilization.

c. Funding

• Although financial considerations willnot necessarily be a major factor indeciding on military action, fundingdoes often require special attention. Tofacilitate funding mobilization forunplanned military operations, it may benecessary to cite special legal authoritiesto provide financial resources beforereceiving appropriated funds from theCongress. At the outset of an operation,senior decisionmakers should beaware of the magnitude of associatedcosts and recognize the possibleimpacts on other areas. The Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not makefunding decisions. In peacetime, theChairman assesses the effect ofoperational resource requests made bythe Military Departments and Defenseagencies in the PPBS process andrecommends to the Secretary of Defensehow available funding should bedistributed in order to implementNational Military Strategy. In wartime,the Chairman, in consultation with theJoint Chiefs of Staff, may provide adviceto the NCA concerning fundingpriorities.

• Major mobilizations will affectvirtually all resource areas, wellbeyond the costs of salaries, benefits,and subsistence of the personnelinvolved. The costs of transportation,housing, HSS, training, and equippingthe force should be included in estimatingthe total cost and should be included insupplemental or amended fundingrequests submitted to the Congress.

directly from, or based on, provisions ofthe US Code, that enable or limitmobilization and emergency actions.As seen in the sources and options figuresin this chapter, many of these areavailable to the President in any level ofemergency; others become available witha Presidential declaration of nationalemergency. Still others have beenreserved by the Congress pendingpassage of a public law or joint resolutionof national emergency or declaration ofwar.

• Action Required to Obtain LegalAuthorities. All emergency authoritiesspecify the level of emergency at whichthey can be invoked and implemented.Once invoked, the President maydelegate authorities to lower levels, ifallowed by law (e.g., the Secretary ofDefense, Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments, combatant commanders)(3 USC 301). As provided in theNational Emergencies Act of 1976, 50USC 1631, the President mustexplicitly invoke the desiredemergency authorities in Executiveorders published in the Federal Registerand transmitted to the Congress. Forexample, requests for manpowermobilization authorities from theMilitary Departments and combatantcommanders are integrated by the JointStaff and forwarded with a draftexecutive order to the Secretary ofDefense as a recommendation forPresidential action. Generally, for majormobilization actions such as involuntarymanpower callups, which may besensitive in both the domestic andinternational political arenas, authoritiesare invoked for incremental levels ofpersonnel callup. Failure to obtain therequested authority, waiver, or reliefprecludes initiation of the desiredactivity in a particular resource area

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SECTION K. SUMMARY

31. Summary

This chapter has provided an overview ofmajor mobilization activities by resourcearea. Mobi l i za t ion p lanners anddecisionmakers at all levels in the JPEC

should understand that activities initiated inany one area influence each of the others.Thorough coordination and integration ofmobilization plans between resource areaproponents is essential for timely forceexpansion and sustainment until thetermination or resolution of the emergencythat required mobilization.

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CHAPTER VMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

V-1

1. Introduction

a . Mob i l i za t i on p lans suppo r tcombatant commanders’ OPLANs, selectedCONPLANs, functional plans, OPORDs, andcampaign plans. They are detailed plansprepared by the Military Departments,USSOCOM, and Defense agencies. They arebased on policy and planning guidance inthe DOD MMG and the Defense PlanningGuidance (DPG) and in tasks specified by theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in theJSCP. They reflect requirements for forceexpansion with RC units and PIM and forexpansion of the CONUS base to sustain themobilized force for as long as necessary toachieve military and national securityobjectives. They explain how force andresource expansion is to be accomplished.

b. Mobilization is a complex, time-sensitive process with many participants andactivities spanning the 12 resource areas.Mobilization plans must be carefullyintegrated among participants and resourceareas. Mobilization execution must besequenced and carefully synchronized toensure that resources are available to thesupported and supporting commanders whenneeded. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff, supported by the Joint Staff,integrates mobilization planning and

monitors the status and progress ofmobilization execution. The Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff advises theSecretary of Defense on establishingpriorities; allocating resource shortagesamong claimants; and redirecting executionactivities, when necessary, to eliminatebottlenecks and overcome unforeseenproblems.

c. Opportunities to determine the validityof mobilization plans and practicemobilization procedures are provided byperiodic CJCS-sponsored worldwidecommand post exercises. These exercisesinvolve the NCA, OSD, the Joint Staff, theServices, the combatant commands, and otherselected Federal agencies.

d. This chapter provides a jointperspective of mobilization planning andexecution. It explains the relationshipsbetween mobilization plans, OPLANs, andcampaign plans. It introduces theMobilization Estimate of the Situation, a toolto assist the thought processes of mobilizationplanners and decisionmakers. It describes thejoint mobilization planning that takes placewithin the deliberate planning and CAPprocesses. It also provides an overview ofthe mobilization execution process.

“The Greeks by their laws, and the Romans by the spirit of their people, tookcare to put into the hands of their rulers no such engine of oppression as astanding army. Their system was to make every man a soldier, and obligehim to repair to the standard of his country whenever that was reared. Thismade them invincible; and the same remedy will make us so.”

Thomas Jefferson(Letter to Thomas Cooper, 1814)

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SECTION A. MOBILIZATIONPLANNING

“The stroke of genius that turns the fateof a battle? I don’t believe in it...Youthink out every possible developmentand (when) one of these developmentsoccurs, you put your plan in operation,and everyone says, ‘What genius...’whereas the credit is really due to thelabor of preparation.”

Ferdinand FochInterview, April, 1919

2. Mobilization Planning andOPLANs

a. The MMG, Contingency PlanningGuidance (CPG), and the DPG provideSECDEF guidance for mobilizationplanning in support of joint operations. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff amplifiesthe guidance in the mobilization annex (CJCSInstruction 3110.13) of the JSCP.

b. The mobilization annex of the JSCPguides the Military Departments andcombatant commanders in preparingmobilization plans that will support theOPLANs developed in the deliberate planningprocess. Mobilization planning guidancein the JSCP is focused on the areas ofmanpower and industrial mobilization.Manpower mobilization requirements derivedfor each contingency establish the level ofmobilization assumed for each contingencyand drive the determination of mobilizationrequirements in the 12 resource areas. Theindustrial mobilization guidance requires theMilitary Departments to conduct industrialpreparedness planning and to maintain aproduction base that will support contingencyrequirements.

c. During the deliberate planning process,the Military Departments and USSOCOMfurnish mobilization-related information to

the combatant commanders, whoincorporate it into the OPLANs underdevelopment or revision.

d. The major mobilization plans andplanning systems are shown in Figure V-1.

e. Manpower mobilization informationfurnished by the Military Departments andUSSOCOM for inclusion in OPLANsprovides the foundation for detailedplanning in the other resource areas. Thisinformation comprises the number of AC andRC personnel required by Service and skillfor each option included in the OPLAN. Thefunctions are:

• Direct support for each option; i.e.,units and individuals needed to augmentthe supported commander’s combat andsupport force.

• CONUS base; i . e . , un i t s andindividuals required for the level ofCONUS-base expansion to support eachoption.

• CONUS and outs ide CONUSbackfill ; i.e., units and individualsrequired to replace those deployed to thetheater of operations.

• Strategic transportation; i.e., units andindividuals needed to augment peacetimestrategic airlift and sealift capabilities.

3. Mobilization Plans andMilitary Campaign Plans

a. A campaign is a series of related jointmajor operations that arrange tactical,operational, and strategic actions toaccomplish strategic and operationalobjectives. A campaign plan describes howa series of joint major operations arearranged in time, space, and purpose toachieve a strategic objective. They are the

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Mobilization Planning and Execution

operational extension of the combatantcommander’s theater strategy. They translatestrategic concepts into joint plans for militaryaction by specifying how operations, logistics,and time will be used to attain theaterobjectives. Campaign plans communicatethe commander’s purpose, objectives,concept, and intent to his subordinates andalso to supporting components, the Joint Staff,and the Military Departments so they candevelop supporting plans. Campaignplanning encompasses both the deliberateand crisis action planning processes. If thescope of contemplated operations requires it,campaign planning begins with or duringdeliberate planning, thus unifying bothplanning processes. A more completediscussion of campaign plans is provided inJoint Pub 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning JointOperations,” and Joint Pub 5-00.1, “Doctrinefor Joint Campaign Planning.”

b. A campaign plan has importantimplications for mobilization planners.Firm strategic objectives, force levels, and theadded dimension of time provide key elements

of information with which the mobilizationplanner can extend mobilization planningand initiate additional force and resourceexpansion options if needed. Additionalindustrial mobilization and the reinstitutionof the draft may be indicated in the expectationof a long war with high materiel and personnelattrition. Conversely, if the campaign planexpects a short war with low attrition,mobilization planners can concentrate onmanaging mobilization at a lower level.

4. Mobilization Estimate of theSituation

a. A commander’s estimate of thesituation provides a logical process ofreasoning by which a commander considersall the circumstances affecting the militarysituation and arrives at a decision as to acourse of action to be taken to accomplishthe mission (Joint Pub 1-02). A staff estimateis similar, with the major difference being thatthe culmination of the staff estimate processis a conclusion or recommendationcommunicated to the commander.

Figure V-1. Major Mobilization Plans and Planning Systems

MAJOR MOBILIZATION PLANS ANDPLANNING SYSTEMS

Army Mobilization and Operations Planning andExecution System

Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan

Air Force War and Mobilization Plan

Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan

Coast Guard Manpower Mobilization and Support Plan

Defense Logistics Agency Basic Emergency Plan

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b. The mobilization estimate format inAppendix C, “Mobilization Estimate,” appliesthe staff estimate concept to mobilizationplanning. The mobilization estimateprovides a tool for mobilization plannersto make a systematic appraisal ofmobilization requirements and options ineither a deliberate or CAP situation. Althoughdesigned from the point of view of the JointStaff, J-4, the format may be adapted to fitthe circumstances of mobilization planners onthe combatant commander and Service staffs.

c. Like other staff estimates, the purposeof the mobilization estimate is to determinewhether the mission can be supported andwhich COA is best. The mobilizationestimate requires input from all functionalareas of the Joint Staff, Service staffs, and thecorresponding staff sections at the combatantcommands. Although not every situationdemands an extensive planning effort, themobilization process is complex andinvolves interactions among resource areasthat may influence the outcome of theanalysis. It is important, therefore, that themobilization proponent on a staff establish andmaintain effective communications with theother staff sections.

d. The accuracy of the informationgathered to complete paragraph 2 of theestimate and the quality of the analysis madein paragraph 3 of the estimate are essentialto the validity of the mobilization estimate.

• In paragraph 2, a net assessment ismade of the mobilization capability ineach resource area. The net assessmentconsists of the time-phased mobilizationcapability or capacity in each resourcearea compared to the requirements ofeach COA. Shortages or overages shouldbe identified and quantified in terms ofthe unit of measure used in the area (e.g.,number of personnel, training seats, shorttons, hospital beds, and days of supply).

• In paragraph 3, estimates of the effectsof mobilization activities in eachresource area on the other areas aremade to determine if the mobilizationaction is feasible. For example, when aCOA requires training base expansion,the analysis process for paragraph 3should establish that there are enoughqualif ied instructors, facil i t ies,equipment, and medical support for anexpanded training establishment. Ashortage in one or more of these areaswill limit the training base expansion andmay render the COA infeasible.

e. The completed analysis shouldsupport conclusions concerning thefeasibility or infeasibility of each COA withrespect to mobilization and the ultimate staffrecommendation on the best COA.

5. Mobilization and DeliberatePlanning

During peacetime, mobilization plannersin the JPEC participate in two primaryactivities: maintaining a mobilization baseand participating in the deliberate planningprocess to develop detailed mobilization plansto support OPLANs.

a. Maintaining a mobilization base atresource levels adequate to support themobilization requirements of OPLANs is afull-time peacetime task for mobilizationplanners in all resource areas. Themobilization base is defined as a pool ofresources that can be made available topermit force expansion and sustainmentwhen necessary. The two most criticalresources in the mobilization base aremanpower and industrial base capacitybecause of the time and expense involved indeveloping skilled military and civilianpersonnel and technologically sophisticatedmilitary equipment.

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• Manpower Programs. With policy andplanning guidance provided by OSD, theM i l i t a r y D e p a r t m e n t s a n dUSSOCOM manage manpowerprograms, which include RC manpowerpools with the numbers of personnel andthe skill mix required to meet estimatedwartime sustainability requirements. TheIRR and other PIM pools are maintainedby a combination of laws and policies,such as the 8-year military serviceobligation (10 USC 511) and programsfor recruiting and retaining skilled RCpersonnel. Manpower programs arefunded through the PPBS process.Manpower mobilization basemaintenance is also supported by theSSS, which will draw on a pool of 18- to26-year-old registrants if a military draftis required to sustain the force and isenabled by legislation.

• Industrial Preparedness Programs.Military Department and Defense agencyobjectives for materiel and equipment

sustainability are to maintain warreserve stocks of critical equipment insufficient quantities to fulfill estimatedsustainability requirements untilindustrial base output can be expandedto meet expected consumption rates. Thebasis for industrial preparednessp l a n n i n g i s t h e c o m b a t a n tcommanders’ CILs. The CIL is theaccumulation of current inventory items(consumable and nonconsumable) thateach combatant commander hasidentified as deficient through routinereporting in the Chairman’s JointMonthly Readiness Review.

• Maintaining a mobilization base in theother resource areas requires planningand investment by the MilitaryDepartments for mobilization activitiessuch as facilities and training baseexpansion, mobilization of strategic andCONUS transportation resources, andexpanding HSS capabilities.

WE’LL MUSTER IF WE MUST

In sharp contrast to the dedicated professionals serving in the ReserveComponent today, the common, or enrolled, militia — every able-bodied malecitizen between the ages of 18 and 45 — was not quite what one might expectit to be during the period 1820-1850. To say it was loosely organized andtrained would be, in most cases, an understatement. It appears the generalmale population of that time was neither interested in military affairs nor inthe pomp and circumstance of war. In the East, where the enrolled militia washardly necessary since the frontier had been conquered at least to theMississippi River, the enrolled militia met rather irreligiously once or twice ayear for militia muster and drill, according to the law. If one had “the commondefense of the nation” in mind when he came to view such musters, it wasquickly dispelled as the day turned from muster to picnic to drunken brawl inrather too rapid succession. Accounts of common militia musters are myriadin newspapers and writings of the period; we shall savor a sample from GeorgiaScenes :

“At twelve, about one third, perhaps one half, of the men had collected, and aninspector’s return of the number present, and of their arms, would have stoodnearly thus: 1 captain, l lieutenant; ensign, none; fifers, none; privates, present,24, ditto, absent, 40; guns, 14; gunlocks, 12; ramrods, 10; rifle pouches 3;bayonets, none; belts, none; spare flints, none; cartridges, none; horsewhips,walking canes, and umbrellas, 10.”

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In going through the manual, the captain had some choice words:

“ ‘Tention the whole! Please to observe, gentlemen, that at the word ‘fire!’ youmust fire; that is, if any of your guns are loaden’d, you must not shoot inyearnest, but only take pretense like; and you, gentlemen fellow-soldiers, who’sarmed with nothing but sticks, riding-switches, and corn-stalks, needn’t gothrough the firings, but stand as you are, and keep yourselves to yourselves.”

The drill proved just as ludicrous:

“ ‘Tention the whole! To the left—left, no—right—that is, the left—I mean theright—left, wheel, march!’ In this the captain was strictly obeyed; somewheeling to the right, some to the left, and some to the right-left, or both ways.

‘Stop! Halt! Let us try it again! I could not just then tell my right hand from myleft! You must excuse me, if you please; experience makes perfect, as thesaying is. Long as I have served, I find something new to learn every day; butall’s one for that.’ ”

Before the aforementioned evolutions, however, the captain had twice sentfor some grog “for their present accommodation” to settle the dispute aboutquitting or at least omitting the drill. Following the aforementioned mix-up,the whole were dismissed. They immediately returned to you-know-where formore of you-know-what. So much for another militia muster.

SOURCE: Winey, Michael, We’ll Muster if We Must , Vignettes of MilitaryHistory, Carlisle Barracks, US Army Military History Institute, 1976.

Reserve component assets are available to augment AirMobility Command Strategic airlift.

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b. CJCS Instruction 3122.03, “JointOperation Planning and Execution System(JOPES) Volume II (Planning and ExecutionFormats and Guidance),” establishes thestandard formats and guidance fordeveloping OPLANs. Mobilization planningtakes place in every phase of the deliberateplanning process, as shown in Figure V-2.

c. Detailed mobilization planning isconducted and documented in eachOPLAN for the RC units and non-unitpersonnel spaces (for estimated filler andreplacement requirements) scheduled in thetime-phased force and deployment data

(TPFDD). Mobilization plans in otherresource areas are more general and willnormally include provisions that are adaptablefor support of any OPLAN.

6. Mobilization and CrisisAction Planning

a. The JPEC uses CAP procedures toplan, mobilize, and deploy forces in time-sens i t ive s i tuat ions. Successfu lmobilization planning and execution duringcrises depends on the availability of accuratedata regarding the readiness of RC units andpersonnel, PIM, civilian employees, and other

DELIBERATEPLANNING

PHASEOPERATION PLANNING ACTIVITIES MOBILIZATION

PLANNING ACTIVITIES

Phase IInitiation

Supported commander receives planning taskand major forces apportioned for planningfrom Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

Level of mobilization assumed forplanning.

Mobilization base capabilitiesreviewed

Phase IIConcept Development

Mission statement deduced Mobilization staff estimates arecompleted

Subordinate tasks derived Supporting mobilization options arechosenConcept of operations developed

Phase IIIPlan Development

Forces are selected and time-phased Detailed supporting mobilizationplanning is initiatedSupport requirements are computed

Deployment feasibility is determined

Mobilization shortfalls are identifiedand resolvedShortfalls are identified and resolved

Operation plan is completed

Phase IVPlan Review

Operation plan reviewed and approved byCJCS Supported commander incorporates

mobilization information intooperation planSupported commander revised OPLAN using

review comments

Phase VSupporting Plans Supporting plans are prepared

Detailed supporting mobilizationplans are completed

Figure V-2. Mobilization in the Deliberate Planning Process

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required support. The readiness of themobilization base and the quality of priorplanning for drawing on its resources is alsokey. Prescripted requests for legal authorities,environmental waivers, and standbylegislation should be ready to submit todecisionmakers. Standing operatingprocedures (SOPs) should be current andfamiliar to all military and civilian personnelwith major mobilization responsibilities.Reference material supporting the SOPsshould be current and readily available.Mobilization plans should be exercised andvalidated as part of joint and Service exerciseprograms. Ongoing mobilization baseplanning and a well-coordinated exerciseprogram will increase the likelihood ofsuccessful mobilization efforts during waror other national emergencies.

b. Figure V-3 summarizes mobilizationplanning activities by CAP procedure phase.

c. In a time-sensitive environment,mobilization planners must continuouslymonitor the developing situation in orderto determine the mobilization implicationsand initiate the mobilization estimate processas soon as possible. Joint Staff mobilizationplanners should determine and advise theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of themobilization feasibility of each COA underconsideration. Crisis action teams on the JointStaff and in the Military Departments shouldprepare mobilization orders and requests forlegal authorities so that they are ready fordecisionmakers during execution.

SECTION B. MOBILIZATIONEXECUTION

7. Mobilization Decisions andOrders

a. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff recommends to the Secretary of

Defense the assets that are to be called upand their planned use when RC forces areto be mobilized to augment the AC. NCAapproval is required for the execution ofan OPORD. In preparing a mobilizationrecommendation to the NCA, the followingshould be considered:

• Assessments of t h e Serv ices ,combatant commanders, and Servicecomponent commanders.

• Input from the Joint Staff.

• Technical advice, legal opinions, andpolicy considerations from OSD.

b. After the NCA decision to initiatemobilization, the Secretary of Defensedirects the Military Departments toproceed. The Services publish mobilizationorders in accordance with their respectiveprocedures. OSD may issue implementationinstructions and provide additional policyguidance, if required.

c. Some mobilization actions require thePresident or Secretary of Defense to notifythe Congress. For example, some legalauthorities require reports at specific intervals.Others require specific information on howthe authority is being used and how long itwill be needed. Reports on expendituresrelated to the crisis are also required. TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and theDOD Comptroller are normally responsiblefor preparing these reports, which requirecontinuous coordination throughout the JPEC.

8. Monitoring the Status andProgress of Mobilization

Because mobilization involves interrelatedactivities in 12 resource areas, the NCA, OSD,Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,Secretaries of the Military Departments,

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PHASE ISituation

Development

PHASE IICrisis

Assessment

PHASE III COADevelopment

PHASE IVCOA

Selection

PHASE VExecutionPlanning

PHASE VIExecution

EVENT

Event occurs withpossible Nationalsecurityimplications

CINC's report/assessmentreceived

CJCS sendswarning order

CJCS presentsrefined andprioritizedcourses of actionto NationalCommandAuthorities(NCA)

CINC receivesalert order orplanning order

NCA decide toexecute operationorder

ACTION

Monitor worldsituation

Increaseawareness

Develop COAs CJCS advice toNCA

CINC developsoperation order

CJCS sendsexecute order byauthority ofSECDEF

Recognize problem Increase reporting CINC assigns tasksto subordinates byevaluation requestmessage

CJCS may sendplanning order tobegin executionplanning beforeselection of COAby NCA

Refinetime-phased forceand deploymentdata

Submit CINC'sassessment

Joint Staffassessessituation

Force preparation CINC executesoperation order

Joint Staff adviceon possiblemilitary action

CINC reviewsevaluation responsemessages

Joint Planning andExecutionCommunityreports executionstatus

NCA-CJCSevaluation

Create/modifytime-phased forceand deploymentdata

Beginredeploymentplanning

USTRANSCOMpreparesdeploymentestimates

Evaluate COAs

MOB ACTION

Monitor situation Review plans Completemobilizationestimates

Continueplanning

Requestmobilizationauthority

Monitor progressof mobilization

Estimatemobilizationrequirements

Recommandmobilization COA

Improvemobilization baseposture

Begindemobilizationplanning

OUTCOME

Assess that eventmay have nationalimplications

NCA/CJCSdecide to developmilitary COA

CINC sendscommander'sestimate withrecommended COA

NCA select COA CINC sendsoperation order

Crisis resolved

Report event toNCA/CJCS

CJCS releasesNCA COAselection in alertorder

Redeployment offorces

Figure V-3. Mobilization and CAP

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USSOCOM, and other members of the JPECneed accurate and timely information on thestatus and progress of mobilization.Information received by proponents ineach of the resource areas is analyzed andcoordinated with the other resource areaproponents to provide decisionmakers withrecommendations for controlling, replanning,redirecting, or stopping mobilizationoperations. Joint Pub 5-03.1, “Joint OperationPlanning and Execution System (JOPES), VolI (Planning Policies and Procedures),”provides detailed procedures and automatedinformation to support operations planningand execution.

SECTION C. SUMMARY

9. Summary

This chapter covered mobilization planningand execution from the perspective of theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Itexplained the relationship betweenmobilization plans, OPLANs, and campaignplans. It introduced the Mobilization Estimateof the Situation, which is a logical processfor determining feasible mobilization COAsto support OPLANs. The chapter alsodescribed mobilization planning activities thattake place within the various phases of thedeliberate and CAP procedures and concludedwith an overview of mobilization execution.

CHAPTER VIJOINT DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION

VI-1

1. Introduction

a. Demobilization is the process oftransitioning from a crisis situation or froma wartime military establishment anddefense-based economy to apeacetime configuration while maintainingnational security and economic vitality. Itinvolves more than releasing personnel fromactive duty, deactivating units, andreorganizing the RC. Although theseactivities drive the process, capability orcapacity in the other resource areas must bereduced and reorganized at the same time. Asin mobilization, activities in each resourcearea during demobilization will affect eachof the others. For this reason, closecoordination between resource areaproponents is just as important duringdemobilization as it is during mobilization.

b. This chapter provides the nationaland joint military perspectives ofdemobilization planning and execution. Itrelates demobilization to national securitystrategy, the range of policy options availableto the national leadership, GR, total forcepolicy, and the range of military operationsdiscussed in Chapter I, “Mobilization andNational Security.” It also providesguidelines for demobilization planning andexecution and an overview of demobilizationactivities in the 12 resource areas.

SECTION A.DEMOBILIZATION

PLANNING

2. Demobilization and NationalSecurity

a. From a national perspective, the resultsof a successful demobilization processshould put the United States in a positionto respond to future challenges to ournational security. Policies would beestablished to regulate the pace ofdemobilization and retain the militarycapability required to ensure post-conflictnational security commitments during thetransition to a peacetime environment. TheArmed Forces would eventually bereturned to their precrisis structure byreleasing RC units from active duty. The sizeof the total force, as well as the size of theAC, RC, and civilian components could alsobe changed as a result of the crisis, but anysuch force structure changes are not inherentto the demobilization process. Industrial baseand other civil sector resources mobilizedduring the conflict would be released to fuelthe post-conflict national economy. Planningand preparation for a future crisis would becharacterized by a return to GR Stage IIIactivities.

“Resolved, that the commanding officer be and he is hereby directed todischarge the troops now in the service of the United States, except twenty-five privates, to guard the stores at Fort Pitt, and fifty-five to guard the storesat West Point and other magazines, with a proportionate number of officers;no officer to remain in service above the rank of a captain.”

Resolution of the Continental Congress(disbanding the Continental Army, 2 June 1784)

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b. The scope of demobilization will varyaccording to the extent of the precedingmobilization. As shown in Figure I-1, thescope of mobilization can range from arelatively brief use of a few volunteerreservists to a protracted force and resourceexpansion well beyond the original peacetimelevels. Demobilization of volunteersfollowing Operation URGENT FURY inGrenada and the massive demobilizationfollowing World War II are examples of therange of the demobilization activities.D e m o b i l i z a t i o n p l a n n e r s a n ddecisionmakers, therefore, could bechallenged anywhere within theseextremes. The demobilization guidelines inparagraph 3 provide guidance for plannersthroughout this spectrum.

c. From a joint military perspective,demobilization plans should reflect thepost-conflict missions of supportedcommanders and be synchronized with plansfor battlefield recovery and redeploymentoperations. DOD policies for the release ofreservists and RC units ordered to activeduty should first reflect militaryrequirements and then considerations ofequity and fairness for military personnel andtheir families. The demobilization personnelmanagement programs of the MilitaryDepartments will be challenged to facilitate

the return of Service members and theirfamilies to civilian life and will need toprovide transition assistance as membersreenter an economy that could be depressedbecause of economic conditions brought onby the crisis. National Guard and Reserveunits and members ordered to active duty toaugment the AC will, consistent withoperational requirements, receive priority forredeployment. They will be released fromactive duty as expeditiously as possible.

3. Demobilization PlanningGuidelines

Study of the demobilizations following thetwo World Wars and the Gulf War providevaluable lessons for today’s demobilizationplanners and have been distilled into thefollowing guidelines illustrated inFigure VI-1 for demobilization planningand execution:

a. Mission First. Demobilization plansmust support the post-conflict mission as itevolves. The supported commander’simmediate postwar priorities should comefirst. As the transition to a peacetime stateproceeds, long-range national securityobjectives should drive demobilizationactivities to ensure the Armed Forces areprepared for the next crisis.

Mission First

Begin Planning Early

Understand Possible Consequences

Coordinate and Communicate Plans and Policies

DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING GUIDELINES

Figure VI-1. Demobilization Planning Guidelines

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Joint Demobilization Planning and Execution

b. Begin Planning Early. Ideally,demobilization planning should begin soonafter mobilization commences.

c. Understand Possible Consequences.The proposed demobilization policies shouldinclude consideration of the following:

• Joint force readiness.

• The health of the national economy.

• Morale of and benefits for Servicemembers and DOD civilian employeesand their families.

d. Coordinate and Communicate Plansand Policies. The demobilization policies andprocedures that worked best in the past werethose that had been developed and coordinatedby interested personnel and agencies bothwithin and outside the Department of Defense.Public information programs that explaineddemobilization policies helped gain andmaintain public support.

4. Planning Considerations

a. Demobilizing the Armed Forces couldbe a relatively straightforward return ofmobilized RC units and individuals to theirformer status. It could also be a broaderprocess including measures such asdeactivation of units, rapid discharge ofindividuals, and a major reorganization of theRC, which might be necessary after a longwar. Similarly, demobilization of the defenseindustry could range from an almost totalreconversion of a defense-oriented industrialbase to a simple reduction in the output of afew providers who surged production to meetthe near-term demands of a short-lived crisis.

b. Recovery activities must also beplanned along with demobilization. Theseinclude activities for restoring force readinessand controlling the rate of industrial base

conversion to avoid disrupting the nationaleconomy. As manpower is being releasedfrom the Services and industrial productionis being cut back, the Services must retain orreplace skilled manpower required to restorereadiness and replenish war reserves and otherstocks to be prepared for the next crisis.

c. Demobilization planning isaccomplished at two levels. At the nationallevel, NCA must decide on the rate ofdemobilization and the size and compositionof the post-conflict force structure and itsresource base. These national-level decisionsdrive demobilization planning and resourcerequests at the theater and supporting levels.They also guide the post-conflict activities ofthe supported and supporting commanders.

d. The key to military demobilization isthe supported commander. Thecommander’s mission and requirementsshould take precedence over all others. Othergeneral planning factors should include:

• The situation and requirements in othertheaters. The NCA, with the advice ofthe Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,should establish a priority of support.

• Future missions in the theater.

• Availability of strategic lift forredeployment.

• CONUS reception and processingcapacities for manpower and materiel.

5. Recovery Planning

a. Recovery planning should be closelycoordinated with demobilization planning.Recovery includes the actions necessary inthe theater of operations and CONUS base torestore a credible capability to respond, in theshort term, to a future threat. Included areactivities such as:

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• Rebuilding of major equipment items.

• Restorating personnel strength andtraining readiness to required wartimelevels for future contingencies.

• Restoring war reserve stocks toacceptable levels.

• Maintaining essential industrial surge andexpansion capabilities.

• Finalizing recovery of redeployedequipment returned to CONUS.

• Terminating war-related contracts for theconvenience of the government.

• Reestablishing contracts at garrison orhome base as troops return.

b. The planning and resourcing of theseactivities are the responsibility of OSD andthe Military Departments. The Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff assists the NCA inproviding strategic direction for these efforts.

SECTION B. EXECUTION

6. General

Demobilization activities can beginbefore the end of the crisis or war as theneed for resources declines and assets fordemobilization support become available.Most demobilization actions, however, willcommence following the conflict whenimmediate post-conflict missions have beenassigned by the supported commander andrequirements for military forces and resourcesdecline. Although demobilization, likemobilization, is essentially a MilitaryDepartment responsibility, the supportedand supporting commanders play acoordinating and synchronizing role whenthe resources of two or more Services areinvolved or when two or more Services arecompeting for the same resources. In anyevent, the combatant commanders monitorthe status and progress of demobilizationand concurrent recovery operations toassess the adequacy of actions to restorereadiness of assigned forces to required levelsfor future conflicts.

Military air bases with the capacity for supporting increased workloads aredemobilized during peacetime, but can be activated to provide the needed facilitiesfor conducting airlift staging operations during mobilization.

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7. Demobilization Execution

Following redeployment, the MilitaryDepartments and USSOCOM deactivate unitsor return them to a reserve status. Militarypersonnel are released from active duty orreturned to reserve status. The number ofcivilian employees may be reduced.Materiel and equipment may be mothballed,stored, distributed to other nations throughforeign military sales or other securityassistance programs, destroyed, sold for scrap,or turned over to Defense Reutilization andMarketing Offices. As with mobilization,assets in the other resource areas are requiredto support the demobilization of manpowerand equipment; but as these supportrequirements decline, demobilizationactivities are accomplished in the otherresource areas. Representative actions inother resource areas are listed in Figure VI-2.

SECTION C. SUMMARY

8. Summary

This chapter has provided an overview ofmilitary demobilization planning fromnational and joint military perspectives. Itexplained the relationship of demobilizationwith national security strategy and theconcepts of GR, total force policy, and therange of military operations introduced inChapter I, “Mobilization and NationalS e c u r i t y. ” I t p r o v i d e d a s e t o fdemobilization planning guidelines derivedfrom the lessons and experience of pastdemobilizations. It also provided a briefdiscussion of demobilization execution and arepresentative listing of demobilizationactivities in the 12 resource areas.

RESOURCE AREA ACTION

TransportationStrategic airlift and sealift assets are deactivated or returned to the Reservecomponent or to the private sector.

FacilitiesBuildings are closed, sold, or returned to the private sector or host nation.Staffing is reduced. Contracts for services and utilities are reduced orterminated.

Industrial BaseContracts are reduced in scope or terminated. Production capacity is laid-awayor converted to commercial use.

Training Base Capacity is reduced by closing training centers or reducing staffs and otherresources to provide capacity based on future demands.

Health Service Support

Hospital resources and staffs provided by the National Disaster Medical Systemor the Department of Veteran Affairs-DOD Contingency Plan are released whenno longer required. Medical force structure is deactivated or returned to areserve status. Contracts with nongovernment and host-nation providers areterminated.

Communications Support National and joint assets are redeployed. Leased capacity and equipment fromcommercial sources are reduced in scope or terminated.

Host-Nation SupportAgreements and contracts with host governments or commercial providers arerenegotiated or terminated.

EnvironmentMilitary Departments and Defense agencies act to meet environmentalstandards and regulations with cleanup and other appropriate activities.

Legal AuthoritiesThe President informs the Congress when legal authorities invoked for the crisisare no longer needed and are revoked or rescinded.

FundingFunding required for demobilization and recovery activities is provided inaccordance with established peacetime procedures.

Figure VI-2. Representative Demobilization Actions in Resource Areas

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Intentionally Blank

APPENDIX ALEGAL AUTHORITIES

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1. General

a. Flexible and adaptive mobilizationplanning requires a range of options availablebefore a declaration of national emergency,as well as after. Legal authorities formobilization actions can be categorized asbeing available in peacetime, or available aftera Presidential declaration of a nationalemergency or a congressional declaration ofa national emergency or war.

b. Authorities available without adeclaration of national emergency may beinvoked by the President or, in some cases, adepartment head like the Secretary of Defenseor Secretary of a Military Department.Examples of such authorities are the PSRC;the President’s option to suspend anyprovision of law pertaining to promotion,retirement, or separation of a Service memberduring an RC activation (the stop-lossauthority); the Military DepartmentSecretaries’ authority to recall regular andreserve military retirees with more than 20years of active service; and authoritiesrequiring priority performance on defensecontracts.

c. A national emergency can be declaredby the President, the Congress, or both.Current law regarding national emergenciesis contained in the National Emergencies Actof 1976 (50 United States Code (USC) 1601-1651). The act provides that when thePresident declares a national emergency, thespecific authorities being invoked be includedin the declaration or in subsequent Executiveorders. Presidential powers are limited tothose authorities invoked until the Presidentsubsequently announces the invocation ofadditional specified authorities (50 USC1621(b), 1631). Congress may terminate thePresident’s declaration at any time with a

concurrent resolution and must review thedeclaration and situation every six months (50USC 1622).

d. Before 1976, a declaration of nationalemergency, which made virtually all of thePresident’s emergency powers available atonce, could be interpreted as an all-or-nothingresponse regardless of the nature or perceivedseverity of a crisis. The National EmergenciesAct of 1976 greatly reduced the risk that adeclaration of national emergency would sendoverly provocative signals of US intent toadversaries and unduly alarm allies. With thesame broad menu of emergency powers, thePresident can now tailor the national responsein a crisis, without undue provocation, andconvey more accurate signals of US intent toallies as well as adversaries.

e. The War Powers Resolution (50 USC1541-1548) is a statute enacted overPresidential veto that is intended to enforceCongress’ war-making powers under articleI, section 8 of the Constitution. The resolutiondeclares that the President, as Commander inChief, may introduce US Armed Forces intohostilities, or into situations where hostilitiesare imminent, only pursuant to (1) adeclaration of war; (2) specific statutoryauthorization; or (3) a national emergencycreated by attack upon the United States, itsterritories or possessions, or its Armed Forces.The law requires the President to consult withCongress in every possible instance beforeintroducing US Forces into hostilities orsituations where hostilities are imminent. Theresolution also requires the President to reportperiodically to Congress on the status of USForces’ involvement in hostilities andwithdraw the forces within 60 days unlessCongress has either declared war or extendedthe 60-day period.

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NOTE: Since passage of the resolution in1973, Presidents have consistentlyheld the position the lawunconstitutionally infringes on thePresident’s power to carry out hisrole as Commander in Chief;however, no President has yetchallenged the resolution in court.Rather, Presidents have generallyconsulted Congress beforeintroducing troops into potentiallyhostile situations (e.g., the PersianGulf conflict and humanitarianassistance in Somalia). This issuehas not been resolved and couldaffect the US response in somefuture crisis.

f. The “Digest of War and EmergencyLegislation Affecting the Department ofDefense, 1991” lists nearly 400 emergencyauthorities available for mobilization andcrisis planning. This Appendix identifies andbriefly describes those emergency authoritiesmost likely to affect joint mobilizationplanning and execution in each resource area.

2. Manpower

Individual and unit members of the RC maybe ordered to active duty voluntarily orinvoluntarily under authorities provided intitle 10, USC.

a. Voluntary Order to Active Duty. TheSecretaries of Military Departments may orderany member of the RC to active duty with theconsent of the member (10 USC 12301(d)).Members of the Army and Air NationalGuard, however, cannot be activated underthis statute without the consent of the governorof the state, commonwealth, or territory. RCvolunteers may be employed to augment theactive force for any operational mission orcontingency operation.

b. Presidential Selected Reserve Callup.The President may authorize the Secretary of

Defense (or the Secretary of Transportationwith regard to the Coast Guard when it is notoperating as a Service of the Navy) to orderup to 200,000 members of the SelectedReserve for any operational mission for notmore than 270 days (10 USC 12304). Thisauthority can be invoked with or without adeclaration of national emergency.

c. Partial Mobilization Authority.Following a Presidential declaration ofnational emergency or when otherwiseauthorized by law, the President may authorizethe Secretaries of the Military Departments,at the direction of the Secretary of Defense,to order to active duty up to 1,000,000members of the Ready Reserve (SelectedReserve, IRR, and Inactive National Guard(ING)), without their consent, for a period notto exceed 24 consecutive months (10 USC12302).

d. Full Mobilization Authority. ThePresident, upon a declaration of nationalemergency or war by Congress or whenotherwise authorized by law, may invoke 10USC 12301(a) authorizing the Secretary ofDefense to direct the Secretaries of theMilitary Departments to order to active dutyany member of the RC (Ready Reserve,Retired Reserve, Standby Reserve), withouttheir consent, for the duration of theemergency or war plus six months.

e. Stop-Loss Authority. This authoritystops normal attrition of experienced militarypersonnel through expiration of enlistments,retirements, and other routine releases fromactive duty. With this authority, during anyperiod RC members have been involuntarilyordered to active duty, the President maysuspend any provision of law relating toretirement, promotion, separation of militarypersonnel determined to be essential to thenational security (10 USC 12305).

f. Retiree Recall. Under 10 USC 688 andregulations established by the Secretary of

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Legal Authorities

Defense, the Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments are authorized to recall to activeduty military retirees (AC or RC) who havecompleted 20 or more years of active service.Retired members may be assigned duties theSecretary concerned considers necessary inthe interest of national defense.

g. Recall of the Retired Reserve. Reservemembers in a retired status (with less than 20years of active service) can only be calledinvoluntarily to active duty in time of war ornational emergency declared by the Congress.In addition, this authority requires that theSecretaries of the Military Departments firstdetermine, with the approval of the Secretaryof Defense, that there are not enough qualifiedReserves available in other categories,including the ING, to fill the required spaces(10 USC 12301(a)).

h. Recall of the Standby Reserve. Unitsand members in the Standby Reserve may beordered to active duty (other than for training)only as provided in 10 USC 12301. Inaddition, this authority requires that theService Secretaries first determine that thereare not enough qualified members in theReady Reserve in the required categories whoare readily available.

i. Call to Active Duty of Delayed EntryProgram Personnel. Qualified personnelwith no prior military service may be enlistedas untrained members of the IRR for up to365 days before reporting for active dutyunder 10 USC 513. All such persons may beordered to active duty under all provisions ofthe law and regulations applying to the IRR.

j. Conscription. If Congress deems itnecessary under the Selective Service Act (50USC app 451-473), the Selective ServiceSystem can begin involuntarily draftingeligible, non-exemption men for militaryservice. Repeal of section 17(c) of 50 USCapp 467(c) is necessary before the Selective

Service System may initiate an involuntarydraft of nonprior service personnel.

3. The Defense Production Actof 1950 (DPA)

Authority for expanding capability orcapacity in the materiel and equipment,transportation and industrial base resourceareas is provided by the DPA. This act (50USC app. 2061-2171), which has beenperiodically revised and renewed byCongress, provides that basis for the DPAS.It authorizes the President, in peace, conflict,and war, to divert national resources, deemedcritical to the national defense, from civil tomilitary use, and reorder economic prioritiesto provide for the national defense andnational security. Specifically, the Presidentmay require private sector providers ofmaterials and services, identified as essentialand critical to national defense, to give priorityperformance to defense contracts and orders.The President may also authorize governmentagencies, like the Department of Defense,Department of Transportation, andDepartment of Commerce, to guarantee loansneeded by defense contractors to expediteproduction, deliveries, or service.

4. Facilities

There are three fundamental emergencyauthorities available to facilitate constructionprojects required to expand facilities duringmobilization.

a. Emergency Construction Authority.The Secretary of a Military Department isauthorized by 10 USC 2803 to executeemergency military construction projects ifthe Secretary determines: (1) the project isvital to the national security or to theprotection of health, safety, or the quality ofthe environment; and (2) the requirement forthe project is so urgent that to defer it for thenext military construction authorization act

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would be inconsistent with National securityor to the protection of health, safety, or thequality of the environment. The maximumamount a Secretary may obligate is $30million taken from the unobligated balancesof funds appropriated for militaryconstruction.

b. Contingency Construction. TheSecretary of Defense is authorized by 10 USC2804 to execute contingency militaryconstruction projects, before a declaration ofnational emergency, upon determination thatthe deferral of the projects would beinconsistent with national security or nationalinterest.

c. Construction Authority in the Eventof a Declaration of War or NationalEmergency. In the event of a declaration ofwar or the declaration by the President of anational emergency requiring use of theArmed Forces, the Secretary of Defense mayundertake construction projects needed tosupport the Armed Forces without specificlegislative authorization. Such projects,however, must be able to be completed withinthe total amount of unobligated militaryconstruction funds, including fundsappropriated for family housing per 10 USC2808.

d. Recapture and Condemnation of RealProperty. There are more than 60 permanentlaws in the US Code authorizing the President,Secretary of Defense, or specified Secretaryof a Military Department to recapture specificparcels of former federal property for defensepurposes. In general, the availability of theseauthorities is contingent on a declaration ofnational emergency by the President orCongress or the existence of a state of war.As a practical matter, many of these sites havebeen rendered virtually unusable for defensepurposes, because of commercialdevelopment undertaken over the years sincesome of these laws were enacted (some as

early as 1925). The US Army Corps ofEngineers, however, maintains a list ofproperties still usable for national defensepurposes. In addition, 10 USC 2663 and 2664authorize Secretaries of the MilitaryDepartments to bring condemnationproceedings, in courts with appropriatejurisdiction, to acquire land or facilitiesdeemed necessary for a variety of defensepurposes including construction of trainingsites, and production of munitions and lumber.

5. Training Base Expansion

There are no legal authorities specificallydirected to expansion of the military trainingbase in connection with mobilization.Training base expansion activities, however,may require activation of RC training unitsand individual manpower, expansion offacilities, equipment and transportationresources, under emergency authoritiespertaining to these resource areas. Trainingbase expansion plans must also take intoaccount the provision of 10 USC 671, whichrequires a minimum of 12 weeks of basictraining (or its equivalent) before assigningany member of the Armed Forces to dutiesoutside CONUS. The intent of this law is toensure that no Service member is assignedoverseas without essential battlefield survivalskills.

6. Health Service Support

a. Activation of RC HSS units andindividuals is governed by the sameauthorities for mobilizing other manpowerskills as discussed in paragraph 2 above.

b. The President is authorized by 42 USC217 to declare the commissioned corps of theUSPHS a military service in time of war ornational emergency.

c. Under the provisions of the DVA andDepartment of Defense Health Resources

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Legal Authorities

Sharing and Emergency Operations Act (38USC 8111A), the DVA will make availableto the DOD beds for the care of militarycasualties.

d . The NDMS, es tab l i shed andadministered by the DHHS under theauthority of Executive Order 12656,“Assignment of Emergency PreparednessResponsibilities,” provides backup support tothe DOD and DVA HSS in caring for militarycasualties. Although not legally obligated,nonfederal public and private hospitals haveagreed to provide about 100,000 beds toaugment DOD and DVA resources, if neededin an emergency. This commitment istriggered when the Secretary of Defensedetermines military casualties threaten tooverburden the DOD and DVA systems.

7. Communications

Section 706 of the Communications Act of1934 (47 USC 606) authorizes the President,during times of emergency or war, to exerciseextraordinary management or control overnational telecommunications resources tomeet requirements for telecommunicationsservices beyond those normally provided byindividual commercial suppliers orgovernment agencies.

8. Host-Nation Support

Authorities for obtaining HNS manpowerand services are provided in various treatiesin force to which the United States is signatory,by 20 major agreements with foreign nations,and over 400 logistic agreements.

9. Environment

Major environmental protection statutesaffecting mobilization are discussed inChapter IV, "Resource Areas." The Presidenthas authority, when in the national interest, toexempt Federal facilities from certainprovisions of environmental law. DOD policy

relating to environmental statutes, stems fromstatutes and Executive Order 12088, whichrequires the Department of Defense, togetherwith other Executive branch agencies, to bein full compliance with applicableenvironmental laws and regulations. TheDepartment of Defense has never soughtexemption from any provision ofenvironmental law.

10. Funding

The following emergency authorities areavailable to the DOD to provide essentialfunding for mobilization and other emergencydefense expenditures.

a. Budget Supplemental. The Secretaryof Defense may submit additionalappropriations requests to Congress to meeturgent requirements.

b. Budget Amendment. The Secretary ofDefense may submit budget revisions toCongress before the congressionalappropriations process has been completed.

c. Reprogramming. The Secretary ofDefense may reprogram funds withinappropriations thresholds established byCongress to meet the requirements of anyemergency. Reprogramming actions aboveestablished thresholds must be submitted toCongress for approval.

d. Transfer Authority. Authority andthresholds for transferring funds betweenappropriations are established in the currentappropriations act. Transfers that exceedthresholds require congressional approval.

e. Deficiency Authority (Food andForage Act). 41 USC 11 permits the DODto obligate funds in excess of amountsauthorized and appropriated to covernecessities of the current year, undercircumstances in which appropriations forclothing, subsistence, fuel, quarters,

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transportation, or medical and hospitalsupplies are exhausted. This authority ensuresthe availability of sufficient funds to care for

the unexpected increases in DOD personnelstrength as a result of a crisis and mobilization.

APPENDIX BAUTOMATED TOOLS

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1. General

JPEC:

a. Prepares systems to monitor forces andphases of the crisis or mobilization.

b. Plans for information managementsystems to consolidate automated dataprocessing (ADP) support for all functionalareas of a mobilization, thereby reducing thetotal number of varying systems carryingsimilar data.

c. Reduces administrative functions tomeet mobilization surge requirements.

d. Reviews ADP procedures that stimulatedevelopment of effective C4 capabilities forenhanced crisis response.

e. Designs and tests mobilization-relatedADP systems to ensure their ability to operateeffectively.

2. Planning

The Services mobilize, train, equip, andprepare forces, including the RC, formovements in CONUS to meet scheduleddeployment and employment dates.Movement of mobilized RC units from homestation to mobilization station is a supportinstallation responsibility. MTMC, aUSTRANSCOM component command, isresponsible for planning intra-CONUSmovements to support mobilization anddeployment using OPLAN TPFDD files andintra-CONUS movement data. The Servicesand Defense agencies will provide significantRC mobilization-related movementrequirements to USTRANSCOM. Thesupported combatant commander prioritizesa n d v a l i d a t e s r e q u i r e m e n t s t o

USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM thencoordinates with the support installation andsupported combatant commander to resolvemovement constraints and advises theChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff oftransportation capabilities in CONUS. Duringdeployment, USTRANSCOM monitors themovement of forces and materiel by common-user lift from home station to the port ofdebarkation. In this circumstance,USTRANSCOM will immediately be able toidentify a conflict so resolution can beobtained from the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff and the appropriate combatantcommander.

3. Reporting SystemsSupporting Mobilization

a. JOPES Deployment Data Base.JOPES is the primary system for use inplanning joint military operations. Itconsolidates policies and procedures fordeveloping, coordinating, disseminating,reviewing, and approving joint OPLANs andbridges the gap between deliberate planningand the CAP process and execution. In mostcases, data derived from JOPES are also usedduring execution. The CAP Procedurescontained in JOPES delineate the proceduresfor developing response actions under time-constrained conditions.

b. Force Augmentation Planning andExecution System (FAPES). FAPES is beingdeveloped as a military manpowermobilization decisionmaker’s tool to captureand integrate manpower capabilities for bothdeliberate and crisis situations. FAPES willassist the decisionmaker in determiningwhether force augmentation is necessary tosatisfy time-phased requirements specified indeployment, employment, and sustainmentplanning. Monitoring the status and progress

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of mobilization is key to this process. FAPESwas used during Operations DESERTSHIELD and DESERT STORM to generatereports on the status and progress ofmobilization for the Joint Staff.

c. Medical Planning and ExecutionSystem (MEPES). The Joint Staff, J-4, istasked to coordinate the HSS mission for thetheater of operations and CONUS sustainingbase. MEPES is programmed to be themedical module in JOPES. It is an operationalinformation management system that providesthe Joint Staff, combatant commands, andcomponent commands the capability toanalyze and evaluate alternative courses ofaction (COAs) for allocation of health serviceresources. MEPES aids the Services withmobilization and provision of HSS servicesand the commanders who are responsible fordeployment and employment of health serviceresources. Each level of command hasspecific and separate health servicemanagement and information requirementsand responsibilities. Each level within theJOPES process has the ability to provideappropriate information to any other level.With this information, joint and Service healthservice planners support the other levels. Thecurrent description of MEPES identifies twocomponents:

• Medical Planning Module (MPM)(Phase I). The MPM is designed toforecast the theater HSS resourcerequirements based on the warfightingscenario. The forecast includes:

•• The different spectrum of patients bycategory and sector of employment in thetheater.

•• Selected HSS requirements across thebattlefield as well as within the afloatbattle groups.

•• Assistance in the development of theHSS force structure.

•• Projections of the aeromedicalevacuation lift requirements.

•• Planning parameters for processingpatients at different echelons of care,logistic region, and zone of operation.

•• Baseline values for determiningconsumption rates and flow patterns forClass VIII supplies.

• Medical Mobilization Planning andExecution System (MEDMOB) (PhaseII). MEDMOB serves as the integratorof both MEPES components. As aconventional planning and executioninformation system, MEDMOB is theintegrator and interface modulewithin the Reconstitution-Mobilization(RECMOB) System to provide:

•• The integrated time-phasedrequirements versus capability analysisfor manpower, Class VIIIA (medicalsupplies), Class VIIIB (blood),deployable hospitals, and medicalevacuation assets.

•• The capability to monitor the status,progress, and medical readiness ofmobilizing units.

•• The time-phased availability of DOD,host nation, and allied HSS.

•• The assessment information needed tointegrate the CONUS HSS planningprovided by the Services, DVA, andNDMS.

d. Joint Industrial MobilizationPlanning Process (JIMPP)

• JIMPP is the generic term for theplanning and analytic process to be usedby the Services, Defense agencies, andJoint Staff to:

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Automated Tools

•• Prepare industrial mobilization planslinked to deliberate and crisisa c t i o n p l a n n i n g p r o c e d u r e s ,development, and execution.

•• Provide the analytical framework toperform the industrial analyses requiredby the Joint Strategic Planning Systemand OSD.

•• Establish base line national industrialbase capability assessments tied topotential military demand.

• JIMPP is used during deliberate planningto conduct capability and riskassessments, emergency procurementbudget mechanisms, time-phasedrequirements lists, and narrative COAs.Output may be forwarded to OSD andother Federal agencies for use in broaderindustrial mobilization planning. As ananalytical tool, JIMPP allows plannersto address what if questions from boththe supply and demand sides. Expectedoutputs of the process include supply-side option summaries for GR, estimatesof a mobilizable force, and assessmentsof plan feasibility. JIMPP consists ofthree components: a RequirementsModule (REQMOD), which producesweapons and munitions requirements,associated shortfalls, replacement oflosses, and consumption rates; a Vendor-Level Module for specific options andcapabilities (compares each itemrequirement with its production rate andproduces surge and mobilizationrequirements and shortfalls); and anIndustry-Level Module for amacroeconomic sectoral-level analysis ofmobilization requirements andcapabilities for 240 industrial sectors.

e. Key Asset Protection Program(KAPP). DOD Directive 5160.54, 26 June1989, “DOD Key Asset Protection Program(KAPP),” provides policy guidance for

planning to protect key assets, assignsresponsibilities for administering KAPP, andauthorizes the publishing of the Key AssetList (KAL) as part of the KAPP. DOD policyrequires actions to protect key assets that areincluded in military contingency plans formilitary support to civil authorities and landdefense of CONUS. The functional purposeof KAPP is:

• To support and assist the Secretary ofDefense, the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff, and Commander in Chief,US Atlantic Command in the continuingreview of the KAL in preparation for war.

• To facilitate the employment of militaryand civilian resources to ensureprotection of key assets.

• To promote the security of key assetswithin the United States and in USterritories and possessions by providingto the owners or managers of such assetsappropriate advice, guidance, andplanning assistance on the application ofphysical security and emergencypreparedness measures.

• To provide to the NCA guidance anddirection concerning the priority of keyasset protection missions upon executionof plans that support KAPP.

f. Logistic Sustainment Analysis andFeasibil ity Estimate (LOGSAFE).LOGSAFE provides planners the capabilityto estimate the logistical requirements of anOPLAN and to determine logisticsupportability for various COAs. LOGSAFEperforms a series of three activities: generategeneral and sustainment requirements plussupply buildup, compare sustainmentrequirements with available stockages forlogistical sustainability assessment, andprovide decision aid outputs and interface ofsuitable data for various transportationmodels.

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g. Joint Engineering Planning andExecution System (JEPES). JEPES providesa common automated system for the civilengineer planners at the unified commandsand their components to determine thefeasibility of the civil engineering force,construction material, and facilities to supportOPLANs. Further, it is used to:

• Generate t ime-phased fac i l i tyrequirements based on an OPLAN.

• Analyze and assess engineeringsuppor t by compar ing fac i l i tyrequirements to in-theater facility assetsand host nation, contract, and troopengineering capability.

• Provide facility feasibility assessment,manpower, materiel, and nonunit cargorequirements for other processes.

h. Joint Flow and Analysis System forTransportation (JFAST). JFAST providesrapid analysis of the transportation feasibilityof OPLANs and COAs before scheduling bythe transportation component command.

i. Defense Emergency AuthorityRe t r i eva l a n d Ana l ys i s Sys tem(DEARAS). DEARAS is a specializedcomputer-assisted legal research system foritems such as statutes, regulations, and judicialdecisions that defines DOD legal authority toact in an emergency.

j. Joint Interoperability of TacticalCommand and Control SystemsAutomated Message Preparation System

(JAMPS). JAMPS provides automated aidsto reduce operator training times for creationof tactical messages, reduce errors in messagecreation, and speed message generation andtransmission. Message preparation andformats are standardized in order to expeditemessage traffic across the Services.

k. Status of Resources and TrainingSystem (SORTS). SORTS is an informationmanagement system designed to support thedecisionmaking process of the NCA andChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. SORTSsupports the registration of units, reporting ofbasic unit identity elements, monitoring of unitstatus, and distribution of unit informationthroughout the JPEC. Distributed informationincludes unit location, strength, readinessfactor, and category levels for equipment andpersonnel. Individual units update the SORTSdata base by a Defense Information SystemsNetwork communications link. The systemconstitutes the single automated tool formaintaining and updating unit status.

l. Joint Pub 1-03, Joint ReportingStructure (JRS). The JRS contains approvedreporting structures for informationinterchange between military commanders. Itprescribes formats, codes, data elementdefinitions, and reporting procedures.

m. Dynamic Analysis and ReplanningTool (DART). DART is an integrated set ofautomated data force and processing tools anda data base management system that providesjoint operators and planners the ability torapidly edit and analyze TPFDDs for dataaccuracy.

APPENDIX CMOBILIZATION ESTIMATE

C-1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Originating OrganizationPlace of IssueDate-Time Group, Month, Year

Mobilization Estimate Number ___________________

References: a. Maps and Charts. b. Other Pertinent Documents.

1. ( ) Mission. State the combatant commander’s missions, taken from the mission analysis,planning guidance, or other statements. (Look specifically for Reserve component missions;e.g., offload the maritime pre-positioned ships, civil affairs, psychological operations, andother appropriate items.)

2. ( ) Situations and Considerations

a. ( ) Assumptions

b. ( ) Mobilization Situation

(1) ( ) Availability of Manpower(2) ( ) Transportation(3) ( ) Equipment/Materiel(4) ( ) Health Service Support(5) ( ) Facilities(6) ( ) Industrial Base(7) ( ) Training Base(8) ( ) Communications(9) ( ) Host-Nation Support(10) ( ) Environment(11) ( ) Legal Authorities(12) ( ) Funding

3. ( ) Mobilization Analysis of Courses of Action. Make an orderly examination of themanpower, equipment/materiel, transportation, health service support, industrial, trainingbases, communications, and legal authority resource areas that affect the proposed courses ofaction to determine the manner and degree of that effect. The objective of this analysis is todetermine whether the mobilization requirements can be met and to isolate the implicationsthat should be considered by the combatant commander in the commander’s estimate.

a. ( ) Analyze each course of action from a mobilization point of view.

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b. ( ) The mobilization factors in subparagraph 2b are the factors to be analyzed for eachcourse of action under consideration. Examine these factors realistically from the standpointof time-phased requirements versus actual or programmed capabilities that may affect themobilization course of action.

c. ( ) Throughout the analysis, keep mobilization considerations foremost in mind. Theanalysis is not intended to produce a decision. It is intended to ensure that all applicablemobilization factors have been properly considered and to serve as the basis for comparisonsin paragraph 4.

4. ( ) Comparison of Courses of Action

a. ( ) List the effect that manpower mobilization (for each level, including PSRC) has onthe other resource areas from a J-4’s point of view.

b. ( ) Develop a work sheet that identifies decisions that must be made in all resourceareas based on the mobilization decision.

5. ( ) Conclusions

a. ( ) State whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from a mobilizationstandpoint.

b. ( ) State which mobilization course of action can best be supported from a transportation,equipment/materiel, and health service support standpoint.

c. ( ) Identify the major resource area deficiencies that must be brought to the attention ofthe combatant commander. Provide recommendations from the Services as to the methods toeliminate or reduce the effects of those deficiencies.

(Signed) _________________________

APPENDIX DADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

D-1

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to theJoint Warfighting Center, Attn: Doctrine Division, Fenwick Road, Bldg 96, Fort Monroe,VA 23651-5000. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency,and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics, J-4.

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4-SMED/J7-JDD//

Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans andInteroperability (J-7), JDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, thatdirectorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal.The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7,Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes

CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTEDNUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

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4. Distribution

a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through Service publication centers.

b. Only approved pubs and test pubs are releasable outside the combatant commands,Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any joint publication to foreign governments or foreignnationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office) to DIAForeign Liaison Branch, C-AS1, Room 1A674, Pentagon, Washington D.C. 20301-7400.

c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrativesupport responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 1 November 1988, “Support of theHeadquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.”

By Military Services:

Army: US Army AG Publication Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2898

Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center2800 Eastern BoulevardBaltimore, MD 21220-2896

Navy: CO, Navy Aviation Supply OfficeDistribution Division (Code 03443)5801 Tabor AvenuePhiladelphia, PA 19120-5000

Marine Corps: Marine Corps Logistics BaseAlbany, GA 31704-5000

Coast Guard: Coast Guard Headquarters, COMDT (G-REP)2100 2nd Street, SWWashington, D.C. 20593-0001

d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications mustbe in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R.

GLOSSARYPART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

GL-1

AC Active componentADP automated data processingAMC Air Mobility CommandAOR area of responsibilityARC Air Reserve ComponentARNG Army National Guard

C4 command, control, communications, and computersCAP crisis action planningCFR Code of Federal RegulationsCHAMPUS Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed

ServicesCIL critical items listCINC commander of a combatant commandCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCOA course of actionCONPLAN operation plan in concept formatCONUS continental United StatesCORE Contingency response programCRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet

DART Dynamic Analysis and Replanning ToolDCS Defense Communications SystemDEARAS Department of Defense Emergency Authorities Retrieval and

Analysis SystemDFAS Defense Finance and Accounting ServiceDHHS Department of Health and Human ServicesDISA Defense Information Systems AgencyDLA Defense Logistics AgencyDMA Defense Mapping AgencyDOD Department of DefenseDOT Department of TransportationDPA Defense Production ActDPAS Defense Priorities and Allocation SystemDPG Defense Planning GuidanceDVA Department of Veterans Affairs

EIS environmental impact statementEPA Environmental Protection Agency

FAPES Force Augmentation Planning and Execution SystemFEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GR graduated response

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HNS host-nation supportHSS health service support

ING Inactive National GuardIRR individual ready reserve

JAMPS JINTACCS Automated Message Preparation SystemJEPES Joint Engineer Planning and Execution SystemJFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System for TransportationJIMPP Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning ProcessJMPAB Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation BoardJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJPEC Joint Planning and Execution CommunityJRS Joint Reporting StructureJSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

KAL key assets listKAPP Key Assets Protection Program

LOGSAFE logistic sustainment analysis and feasibility estimator

MC&G mapping, charting, and geodesyMEDMOB Medical Mobilization Planning and Execution SystemMEPES Medical Planning and Execution SystemMMG Master Mobilization GuideMPM medical planning moduleMTMC Military Traffic Management Command

NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNCA National Command AuthoritiesNCS National Communications SystemNDMS National Disaster Medical SystemNPS nonprior serviceNSC National Security Council

OPLAN operation planOPM Office of Personnel ManagementOPORD operation orderOSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

PIM pretrained individual manpowerPPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting SystemPSRC Presidential Selected Reserve Callup

RC Reserve componentRECMOB Reconstitution-MobilizationRRF Ready Reserve Force

GL-3

Glossary

SECDEF Secretary of DefenseSECTRANS Secretary of TransportationSOP standing operating proceduresSORTS Status of Resources and Training SystemSRP Sealift and Readiness ProgramSSS Selective Service SystemSWA Southwest Asia

TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data

UN United NationsUSAR United States Army ReserveUSC United States CodeUSCG United States Coast GuardUSCINCTRANS Commander in Chief, United States Transportation CommandUSMC United States Marine CorpsUSNR United States Naval Reserve

USPHS United States Public Health ServiceUSSOCOM United States Special Operations CommandUSTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

VTA Voluntary Tanker Agreement

activation. Order to active duty (other thanfor training) in the Federal service.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02)

active duty. Full-time duty in the activemilitary service of the United States. Thisincludes members of the ReserveComponents serving on active duty or full-time training duty, but does not include full-time National Guard duty. Also called AD.(Joint Pub 1-02)

availability date. The date after notificationof mobilization by which forces will bemarshalled at their home station ormobilization station and available fordeployment. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

C-day. See times.

D-Day. See times.

demobilization. The process of transitioninga conflict or wartime military establishmentand defense-based civilian economy to apeacetime configuration while maintainingnational security and economic vitality.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02)

Delayed Entry Program. A program underwhich an individual may enlist in a Reservecomponent of a Military Service andspecify a future reporting date for entry onactive duty in the Active component thatwould coincide with availability of trainingspaces and with personal plans such as highschool graduation. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

draft. The conscription of qualified citizensfor military service. (Approved forinclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02)

F-Hour. See times.

Federal service. A term applied to NationalGuard members and units when called intothe service of the United States underArticle I, Section 8 and Article II, Section2 of the Constitution and 10 USC 12401-12408. (Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

force module. A grouping of combat, combatsupport, and combat service support forces,with their accompanying supplies and therequired nonunit resupply and personnelnecessary to sustain forces for a minimumof 30 days. The elements of force modulesare linked together or are uniquelyidentified so that they may be extractedfrom or adjusted as an entity in the JointOperation Planning and Execution Systemdata bases to enhance flexibility andusefulness of the operation plan during acrisis. Also called FM. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force shortfall. A deficiency in the numberof types of units available for planningwithin the time required for theperformance of an assigned task.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02)

home station. The permanent location ofActive units and Reserve component units(location of armory or reserve center).(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02)

health service support. All servicesperformed, provided, or arranged by theServices to promote, improve, conserve, orrestore the mental or physical well-beingof personnel. These services include, butare not limited to, the management of healthservices resources, such as manpower,monies, and facilities; preventive andcurative health measures; evacuation of the

GL-4 Joint Pub 4-05

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

wounded, injured, or sick; selection of themedically fit and disposition of themedically unfit; blood management;medical supply, equipment , andmaintenance thereof; combat stress control;and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory,optometric, medical food, and medicalintelligence services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or militaryassistance rendered by a nation to foreignforces within its territory during peacetime,crises or emergencies, or war based onagreements mutually concluded betweennations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Inactive National Guard. Army NationalGuard personnel in an inactive status notin the Selected Reserve who are attachedto a specific National Guard unit but do notparticipate in training activities. Uponmobilization, they will mobilize with theirunits. In order for these personnel to remainmembers of the Inactive National Guard,they must muster once a year with theirassigned unit. Like the Individual ReadyReserve, all members of the InactiveNational Guard have legal, contractualobligations. Members of the InactiveNational Guard may not train for retirementcredit or pay and are not eligible forpromotion. Also called ING. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02)

individual mobilization augmentee. Anindividual reservist attending drills whoreceives training and is preassigned to anactive component organization, a SelectiveService System, or a Federal EmergencyManagement Agency billet that must befilled on, or shortly after, mobilization.Individual mobilization augmentees trainon a part-time basis with these organizationsto prepare for mobilization. Inactive dutytraining for individual mobilizationaugmentees is decided by component

policy and can vary from 0 to 48 drills ayear. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Individual Ready Reserve. A manpowerpool consisting of individuals who have hadsome training and who have servedpreviously in the Active component or inthe Selected Reserve and have some periodof their military service obligationremaining. Members may voluntarilyparticipate in training for retirement pointsand promotion with or without pay. Alsocalled IRR. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

industrial mobilization. The transformationof industry from its peacetime activity tothe industrial program necessary to supportthe national military objectives. It includesthe mobilization of materials, labor, capital,production facilities, and contributory itemsand services essential to the industrialprogram. (Joint Pub 1-02)

industrial preparedness program. Plans,actions, or measures for the transformationof the industrial base, both government-owned and civilian-owned, from itspeacetime activity to the emergencyprogram necessary to support the nationalmilitary objectives. It includes industrialpreparedness measures such asmodernization, expansion, and preservationof the production facilities and contributoryitems and services for planning withindustry. (Joint Pub 1-02)

M-day. See times.

mobilization. 1. The act of assembling andorganizing national resources to supportnational objectives in time of war or otheremergencies. See also industrialmobilization. 2. The process by which theArmed Forces or part of them are broughtto a state of readiness for war or othernational emergency. This includes

GL-5

Glossary

GL-6

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-05

activating all or part of the Reservecomponents as well as assembling andorganizing personnel, supplies, andmateriel. Mobilization of the Armed Forcesincludes but is not limited to the followingcategories:

a. selective mobilization. Expansion of theactive Armed Forces resulting from actionby Congress and/or the President tomobilize Reserve component units,individual ready reservists, and theresources needed for their support to meetthe requirements of a domestic emergencythat is not the result of an enemy attack.

b. partial mobilization. Expansion of theactive Armed Forces resulting from actionby Congress (up to full mobilization) or bythe President (not more than 1,000,000 fornot more than 24 consecutive months) tomobilize Ready Reserve component units,individual reservists, and the resourcesneeded for their support to meet therequirements of a war or other nationalemergency involving an external threat tothe national security.

c. full mobilization. Expansion of theactive Armed Forces resulting from actionby Congress and the President to mobilizeall Reserve component units in the existingapproved force structure, all individualreservists, retired military personnel, andthe resources needed for their support tomeet the requirements of a war or othernational emergency involving an externalthreat to the national security. Reservepersonnel can be placed on active duty forthe duration of the emergency plus sixmonths.

d. total mobilization. Expansion of theactive Armed Forces resulting from actionby Congress and the President to organizeand/or generate additional units orpersonnel beyond the existing forcestructure, and the resources needed for their

support, to meet the total requirements of awar or other national emergency involvingan external threat to the national security.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization base. The total of all resourcesavailable, or which can be made available,to meet foreseeable wartime needs. Suchresources include the manpower andmaterial resources and services required forthe support of essential military, civilian,and survival activities, as well as theelements affecting their state of readiness,such as (but not limited to) the following:manning levels, state of training,modernization of equipment, mobilizationmateriel reserves and facilities, continuityof government, civil defense plans andpreparedness measures, psychologicalpreparedness of the people, internationalagreements, planning with industry,dispersion, and standby legislation andcontrols. (Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization site. The designated locationwhere a Reserve component unit orindividual mobilizes or moves to aftermobilization for further processing,training, and employment. This differsfrom a mobilization station in that it is notnecessarily a military installation.(Approved for inclusion in the next editionof Joint Pub 1-02)

mobilization station. The designatedmilitary installation to which a Reservecomponent unit or individual is moved forfurther processing, organizing, equipping,training, and employment and from whichthe unit or individual may move to an aerialport of embarkation or seaport ofembarkation. (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities. ThePresident and the Secretary of Defense ortheir duly deputized alternates or

GL-7

Glossary

successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub1-02)

Presidential Callup. Procedures by whichthe President brings all or a part of the ArmyNational Guard or the Air National Guardinto active Federal service of the UnitedStates under section 12406 of title 10 U.S.C.and Chapter 15 of title 10 USC. (Approvedfor inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub1-02)

Presidential Selected Reserve CallupAuthority. Provision of a public law (10USC 12304) that provides the President ameans to activate, without a declaration ofnational emergency, not more than 200,000members of the Selected Reserve for notmore than 270 days to meet therequirements of any operational mission.Members called under this provision maynot be used for disaster relief or to suppressinsurrection. This authority has particularutility when used in circumstances in whichthe escalatory national or internationalsignals of partial or full mobilization wouldbe undesirable. Forces available under thisauthority can provide a tailored, limited-scope, deterrent, or operational response,or may be used as a precursor to anysubsequent mobilization. Also calledPSRC. (Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

ready reserve. The Selected Reserve,Individual Ready Reserve, and InactiveNational Guard liable for active duty asprescribed by law. (10 USC 10142, 12301,and 12302). (Approved for inclusion in thenext edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

reserve component category. The categorythat identifies an individual’s status in areserve component. The three reservecomponent categories are Ready Reserve,Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve.Each reservist is identified by a specific

reserve component category designation.(Joint Pub 1-02)

Reserve Components. Reserve Componentsof the Armed Forces of the United Statesare: a. the Army National Guard of theUnited States; b. the Army Reserve; c. theNaval Reserve; d. the Marine CorpsReserve; e. the Air National Guard of theUnited States; f. the Air Force Reserve; g.and the Coast Guard Reserve. (Joint Pub1-02)

Retired Reserve. All Reserve members whoreceive retirement pay on the basis of theiractive duty and/or Reserve service; thosemembers who are otherwise eligible forretirement pay but have not yet reached age60 and who have not elected discharge andare not voluntary members of the Ready orStandby Reserve. (Approved for inclusionin the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02)

Selected Reserve. Those units andindividuals within the Ready Reservedesignated by their respective Services andapproved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as soessential to initial wartime missions thatthey have priority over all other Reserves.All Selected Reservists are in an activestatus. The Selected Reserve also includespersons performing initial active duty fortraining. See also ready reserve. (Joint Pub1-02)

standby reserve. Those units and membersof the Reserve Components (other thanthose in the Ready Reserve or RetiredReserve) who are liable for active duty onlyas provided in 10 USC 10151, 12301 and12306. (Approved for inclusion in the nextedition of Joint Pub 1-02)

times. (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hoursUniversal Time (zulu time) and are assumedto be 24 hours long for planning.) TheChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

GL-8

Glossary

Joint Pub 4-05

normally coordinates the proposed date withthe commanders of the appropriate unifiedand specified commands, as well as anyrecommended changes to C-day. L-hour willbe established per plan, crisis, or theater ofoperations and will apply to both air andsurface movements. Normally, L-hour willbe established to allow C-day to be a 24-hourday. a. C-day. The unnamed day on which adeployment operation commences or is tocommence. The deployment may bemovement of troops, cargo, weapon systems,or a combination of these elements using anyor all types of transport. The letter "C" willbe the only one used to denote the above. Thehighest command or headquarters responsiblefor coordinating the planning will specify theexact meaning of C-day within theaforementioned definition. The command orheadquarters directly responsible for theexecution of the operation, if other than theone coordinating the planning, will do so inlight of the meaning specified by the highestcommand or headquarters coordinating theplanning. b. D-day. The unnamed day onwhich a particular operation commences oris to commence. c. F-hour. The effectivetime of announcement by the Secretary of

Defense to the Military Departments of adecision to mobilize Reserve units. d. H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at whicha particular operation commences. e. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at whicha deployment operation commences or isto commence. f. M-day. The term used todesignate the unnamed day on which fullmobilization commences or is due tocommence. g. N-day. The unnamed dayan active duty unit is notified fordeployment or redeployment. h. R-day.Redeployment day. The day on whichredeployment of major combat, combatsupport, and combat service support forcesbegins in an operation. i. S-day. The daythe President authorizes Selective Reservecallup (not more than 200,000). j. T-day.The effective day coincident withPresidential declaration of NationalEmergency and authorization of partialmobilization (not more than 1,000,000personnel exclusive of the 200,000 callup).k. W-day. Declared by the NationalCommand Authorities, W-day is associatedwith an adversary decision to prepare forwar (unambiguous strategic warning).(Joint Pub 1-02)

Assess-ments/

Revision

CJCSApproval

TwoDrafts

ProgramDirective

ProjectProposal

J-7 formally staffs withServices and CINCS

Includes scope of project,references, milestones,and who will developdrafts

J-7 releases ProgramDirective to Lead Agent.Lead Agent can beService, CINC, or JointStaff (JS) Directorate

STEP #2Program Directive

l

l

l

The CINCS receive the pub andbegin to assess it during use

18 to 24 months followingpublication, the Director J-7, willsolicit a written report from thecombatant commands andServices on the utility and qualityof each pub and the need for anyurgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions

No later than 5 years afterdevelopment, each pub is revised

STEP #5Assessments/Revision

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Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staffto fill extant operational void

J-7 validates requirement with Services andCINCs

J-7 initiates Program Directive

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STEP #1Project Proposal

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchyas shown in the chart above. is in the series of joint doctrine publications.The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

Joint Pub 4-05 Logistics

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT PUB 1-0 JOINT PUB 3-0 JOINT PUB 5-0 JOINT PUB 6-0

JOINT PUB 0-2

JOINT PUB 1

UNAAF

JOINTWARFARE

JOINTDOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff

Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makesrequired changes and prepares pub forcoordination with Services and CINCS

Joint Staff conducts formalstaffing for approval as a Joint Publication

STEP #4CJCS Approval

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Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority(PRA) to develop the pub

PRA develops two draft pubs

PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services,and Joint Staff

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STEP #3Two Drafts

ENHANCEDJOINT

WARFIGHTINGCAPABILITY

JOINT PUB 2-0 JOINT PUB 4-0

C4 SYSTEMSPLANSLOGISTICSOPERATIONSINTELLIGENCEPERSONNEL

andADMINISTRATION