Journal of the Federation of The Real Terrorist Missile ... · PDF fileBy Walter E. Parham, Ph.D. Over the past few years, the highest levels of China’s government ... * Julius Axelrod

The Real Terrorist MissileThreat and What Can BeDone About ItBy Robert Sherman

The past year has seenintense speculation on whyearly signs of the World TradeCenter attack were notdetected. Historians willforever dispute whether theFBI was negligent in failing torecognize that somethingconsequential was in the offingas Arab students with poor flying skills asked to learn how to flyjumbo jets without learning how to take off or land.

But today the civilized world faces a threat many times moreserious than 9-11. The evidence of the threat is not subtle or

In This Issue1 The Real Terrorist Missile Threat

and What Can Be Done About ItRobert Sherman

1 Science-based Workshop forLeaders of Environmental NGOsand GONGOs in ChinaWalter E. Parham, Ph.D.

9 Meeting Natural Gas Demand:Infrastructure is Important,Technology is KeyJohn Riordan

15 Curbing the Illicit Trade in SmallArms and Light Weapons inLatin AmericaMatthew Schroeder

18 Hiroshima Survivors Visitthe FederationSharon Gleason and Ivan Oelrich

19 The Learning Federation:Progress ReportKendra Bodnar

22 Report on the Board MeetingSarah J. Mason

23 Staff News

25 Leaving a Legacy of Peace

26 FAS Announces Sponsorship ofBioSecurity 2003

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Volume 56, Number 3Autumn 2003

Continued on page 11

Journal of the Federation ofAmericanScientists

Located on the web atwww.fas.org

Science-Based Workshop forLeaders of EnvironmentalNGOs and GONGOs in ChinaBy Walter E. Parham, Ph.D.

Over the past few years, the highest levels of China’s governmenthave talked candidly about the serious environmental/naturalresource problems plaguing China today. They’ve been clear thatmany of the problems were caused by human activities and are notmerely “natural disasters.” China’s current Five-Year Plan states

P u b l i c I n t e r e s t R e p o r t

Photo courtesy of the Government of Columbia

SA-18 Igla (needle) man-portablesurface-to-air missile

FAS Public Interest Report / Autumn 2003

ambiguous. It sits right in front of usin plain sight.

Suppose that, within the space ofone month, terrorists usingshoulder-fired missiles shoot downtwo 747s and two regionalpassenger aircraft. Examination ofsuch a scenario leads inexorably tosix conclusions:

1. The socioeconomic cost wouldbe immense.

2. Terrorist intent to use missilesagainst commercial aircraft isclear.

3. Weapons now widely dispersedaround the world are capable ofsuch an attack.

4. A variety of countermeasures canbe implemented to significantlyreduce the probability of asuccessful attack. While thesecountermeasures are not cheap,their cost is trivial compared tothe cost of allowing terroristcounter-airliner attacks tosucceed. Yet in most cases theyare being pursued half-heartedlyor not at all.

5. Major policy changes areimperative.

COST

One successful large-airliner shoot-down would be viewed as a freakishtragedy. But two successful attacksspread over a few days or weekswould be viewed as a pattern,an indicator of things to come.Statistically, one might argue thatair travel remained safer thanautomobile travel regardless ofwhether there had been zero,one, two, or five successful attacks.But the psychological impact of

serial shoot-downs would likelybe extreme.

Immediately, the flying public wouldconclude that commercial aviationis unsafe.

Insurers would sharply increasetheir projections of the riskof commercial flight. Hull andliability insurance could becomeunavailable or prohibitivelyexpensive. Passenger ticket salescould fall catastrophically becauseof fear and a sharp increase in ticketprices. Consider, for example, aworld in which the cheapest coachseats are priced higher than today’sunrestricted first-class seats.

The very survival of all air carriers,aircraft manufacturers, and theirsupporting industries would beendangered, as would thoseindustries whose operationsdepend on air transportation.Civilization’s ability to move peopleand goods rapidly over longdistances could be lost.

Direct casualties from downing ahandful of passenger jets would bein the hundreds, well under those of9-11. But the socioeconomic costwould be far greater, deep in thehundreds of billions of dollars atleast, depriving the world of rapidtransportation, and probablytriggering a worldwide recession ordepression from which recoverycannot be predicted.

It is true that although the totalnumber of civilians killed by terroristuse of shoulder-fired missilesagainst smaller aircraft to dateapproximates the passenger load ofa large airliner, the socioeconomic

The Real Terrorist Missile — Continued from page 1

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About FASThe Federation of American Scientists (FAS),founded October 31, 1945 as the Federationof Atomic Scientists by Manhattan Projectscientists, works to ensure that advances inscience are used to build a secure, rewarding, environmentally sustainable future for allpeople by conducting research and advocacyon science public policy issues. Currentweapons nonproliferation issues range fromnuclear disarmament to biological andchemical weapons control to monitoringconventional arms sales and space policy.FAS also promotes learning technologies andlimits on government secrecy. FAS is a tax-exempt, tax-deductible 501(c)3 organization.

* Sidney Altman* Philip W. Anderson* Kenneth J. Arrow* Julius Axelrod* David Baltimore* Baruj Benacerraf* Paul Berg* Hans A. Bethe* J. Michael Bishop* Nicolaas Bloembergen* Norman Borlaug* Paul BoyerAnn Pitts Carter

* Owen ChamberlainMorris Cohen

* Stanley Cohen Mildred Cohn

* Leon N. Cooper* E. J. Corey* James Cronin* Johann Deisenhofer

Ann Druyan* Renato Dulbecco

John T. Edsall Paul R. Ehrlich George Field

* Val L. Fitch* Jerome I. Friedman* Robert Furchgott

John Kenneth Galbraith* Riccardo Giacconi* Walter Gilbert* Donald Glaser* Sheldon L. Glashow

Marvin L. Goldberger* Joseph L. Goldstein* Roger C. L. Guillemin* Herbert A. Hauptman* Dudley R. Herschbach* Roald Hoffmann

John P. Holdren* David H. Hubel* Jerome Karle

Carl Kaysen

* H. Gobind Khorana* Arthur Kornberg* Edwin G. Krebs* Willis E. Lamb* Leon Lederman* Edward B. Lewis* William N. Lipscomb

Jessica T. MathewsRoy MenningerMatthew S. Meselson

* Franco Modigliani* Mario Molina

Philip MorrisonStephen S. Morse

* Ferid Murad* Joseph E. Murray

Franklin A. Neva* Marshall Nirenberg* Douglas D. Osheroff* Arno A. Penzias* Martin L. Perl

George Rathjens* Burton Richter* Richard J. Roberts * J. Robert Schrieffer

Andrew Sessler* Phillip A. Sharp

George A. Silver* Richard E. Smalley* Robert M. Solow* Jack Steinberger* Joseph Stiglitz* Henry Taube* Charles H. Townes* Daniel Tsui

Frank von HippelRobert A. Weinberg

* Steven Weinberg* Torsten N. Wiesel

Alfred YankauerHerbert F. York

* Nobel Laureate

BOARD OF SPONSORS

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHAIR: Frank von HippelVICE-CHAIR: Steven FetterSEC’Y-TREASURER: Jonathan SilverPRESIDENT: Henry Kelly

MEMBERS:Bruce Blair Judith ReppyRosina Bierbaum William RevelleRichard Garwin Shankar SastryLawrence Grossman Maxine SavitzKenneth N. Luongo Gregory SimonHazel O’Leary Lynn SykesTara O’Toole Steven WeinbergJane Owen

EX OFFICIO:Carl Kaysen Robert Solow

2

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impact of these attacks has beenminimal. Similarly, many morepeople died in previous shipwrecksthan in the sinking of the Titanic, butit was the latter that stimulated suchobvious steps as requiring liners tocarry enough lifeboats to hold allthe passengers. The difference ispsychological. Small numbers oflarge airliners carry a psychologicaland political salience that largernumbers of smaller aircraft do not.

TERRORIST INTENT TO ATTACKAIRLINERS

Recent history finds ampleevidence of accelerating terroristattempts to attack passengeraircraft with shoulder-fired missiles.The most notable incidents include:

1994 — A Falcon-50 executive jetcarrying the Presidents ofRwanda and Burundi is shotdown, igniting massive ethnicviolence.

1997 — Rebels shoot downa Yugoslav governmenttransport, killing five.

1998 — A Congo Airlines 727airliner is shot down by rebels,killing all 40 aboard

1999 — Rebels in Angola shootdown a United Nations C-130transport, killing 14.

2001 — Rebels in Angola hit, butfail to destroy, a UnitedNations 727 cargo aircraft.

2002 — An expended surface-to-airmissile launch tube is foundnear Prince Sultan Air Base inSaudi Arabia.

2002 — Two missiles are fired at anIsraeli chartered 757 with 271on board as it takes off fromMombasa, Kenya. The

missiles are seen by the pilotas they fly by and miss.

2002 — A young man openlycarrying a fully functional late-model Russian shoulder-firedanti-aircraft missile is arrestedon a street in St. Petersburg.He had found the missile on ashooting range and was takingit home to show his friends.

2003 — At least two missiles arefired at US Air Force aircraftlanding at Baghdad airport,but miss.

2003 — Three arms dealers arearrested in a sting in NewJersey for attempting to sell thefirst of 200 Russian SA-18missiles to an apparentSudanese terrorist explicitly foruse against American airliners.Fortunately, the apparentsupplier of the missile was aRussian counter-terroristagent; the missile wasintentionally inoperable; theapparent Sudanese terroristbuyer was an FBI agent; andthe arms dealers are now incustody and awaiting trial.

THE WEAPONS

An accurate count of shoulder-firedanti-aircraft weapons is impossible,but worldwide they appear tonumber in the mid to high hundredsof thousands with most, of course, inthe hands of national militaries. Thenumber of terrorist organizationsknown to possess them appears tonumber in the low teens.

Fire and forget missiles

Shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weaponstypically use fire-and-forget infra-red

guidance, homing at supersonicspeed on the heat signature of thetarget aircraft. All are capable ofbeing carried and fired by one man,although operation usually consistsof a two-man crew with two missiles.Typical system weight is about 35pounds. All are about the size of atrombone. All can be readilyconcealed and fired withpreparation time of a few seconds.Generally they are “woodenrounds,” requiring no maintenance.

Because of their lightweightwarheads, a direct hit is required todo significant damage, and fusing isby contact with the target.Probability of kill per hit should beassumed to be high, but is a subjectof considerable debate. C-17advocates, for example, claim that adirect hit on one of the four C-17engines would cause that engine tobreak away, leaving the aircraftcrippled but flyable. This should betaken with a grain of salt; thelocation and precise effect of amissile hit is unpredictable.

Fire and forget missiles of concernhere include, in order of increasingcapability:

SA-7a Strela 2SA-7b Strela 2MSA-14 Strela 3SA-16 Igla 9K-31-0Stinger BasicSA-18 Igla 9K-38Stinger POSTStinger RMP

(SA-XX is the NATO designatorfor surface-to-air missiles of theformer Soviet Union. Stingers areUS missiles.)

The most widely-deployed of thesemissiles is the SA-7b, which was

4



Continued on page 5

probably the weapon used in all theattacks listed above. UsingVietnam-era technology, its nominalrange is about 3 miles and nominalaltitude about 10,000 feet, but itseffective footprint is somewhat lessthan that. Its speed is about Mach1.6, its maneuverability about 6G,and its maximum flight durationbefore self-destruct is about 15seconds. Its seeker technologygenerally limits it to operating in tail-chase mode.

Moving down the list, the missilesprogressively increase in range,altitude, speed, and maneuverability.A step increase in effectivenessbegins with the Stinger Basic, whichhas a superior seeker capable ofdetecting and tracking aircraft engineheat from any aspect, thus radicallyincreasing its attack opportunities.

Another step increase is foundbeginning with SA-18, which uses atwo-color seeker. This enables themissile to distinguish and respond tothe spectral differences between theemissions of an engine and those ofa conventional pyrotechnic flare.

Several thousand Stinger Basicswere given to the mujaheddin to helpresist the Soviet occupation ofAfghanistan. It appears that two orthree hundred of these Stingersremain unused and are in the handsof Al Qaida remnants, or of similarsub-national entities that bear no lovefor Western civilization. Thesemissiles are old, more than twicetheir rated storage life of elevenyears. While their reliability isuncertain, they must be considered ahighly significant threat tocommercial aviation — as are theseveral thousand SA-18s and the

much larger number of their earlierbrothers dispersed around the world.

Laser-guided shoulder-fired anti-tank missiles

Some commentators havesuggested that laser-guidedmissiles such as the BritishBlowpipe are particularly dangerousbecause they are relatively immuneto countermeasures. But theyrequire the operator to hold a laserspot on the target throughout theflight of the missile. This is a highlydemanding task and would probablydeter or defeat terrorist use of laser-guided anti-aircraft missiles.

Anti-tank missiles used againstaircraft

Because of the use of RPG light anti-tank missiles against hoveringhelicopters in Somalia, dramatizedin the motion picture “BlackhawkDown”, there is some public concernabout possible RPG attack againstairliners. While freak events canhappen, basically this concern ismisplaced. The RPG is an unguided,

rifle-sighted missile with rangelimited to a few hundred meters. Itsshort range denies it a useful tail-chase or head-on opportunity, andits unguided nature renders a shotfrom the side almost certain to miss.

On the other hand, although thishas not been demonstrated, a verysmart anti-tank missile such as theUS Javelin might be effective in ahead-on shot.

WHAT CAN BE DONE

There is no silver bullet. No singlecountermeasure can shield allairliners from all shoulder-fired missiles under all conditions.But there are a varietyof countermeasures that, incombination, can provide significantrisk reduction.

Controllable enabling

It is now possible to retain usecontrol of shoulder-fired missileseven if physical possession is lost.Missiles can be designed with achip-level feature that requiresenabling by an electronic passwordbefore the missile will activate.

This does not mean that a soldierwith a hostile aircraft or tankbearing down on him will have tolook up a password in a code bookand type it in before he can defendhimself. On the contrary, thepassword can be entered by radiosignal or various other automatedmeans, and the missile can remainenabled for whatever duration thecommand chooses, be it twominutes or two years. But after thepassword expires, the missile will

No single

countermeasure

can shield all

airliners from

all shoulder-

fired missiles

under all

conditions.

5


Continued on page 6

never again enable unless thepassword is re-entered.

This solution would not be a disablersuch as a trigger lock. A disablercould be removed, leaving themissile operable. Rather, it would bea controllable enabler, built in aspart of the missile’s highest-techcircuitry. Removal of the enablercircuitry could only be done byremoving key components withoutwhich the missile could not operate.

Similar features, called PermissiveAction Links, have been used inmore elaborate form in US nuclearweapons for many decades. A low-cost consumer version has longbeen used in some automobileradios. If the radio is removed fromthe car, it goes dead and will neveragain operate unless it receives acode held by the manufacturer. Sothese radios have no value if stolen.

Since controllable enabling wouldbe built in at the chip level, it wouldadd no weight and no measurableproduction cost for new missiles.There would be design cost but thiswould be small.

Irreversible retrofit of existing missileswould be technically challenging andmuch more expensive. The keyproblem would be to prevent non-controlled components from beingre-installed as retrofits, replacing thecontrollable enabler. But tamper-proofing and other safeguards canprobably render this beyondterrorists’ capabilities.

That being said, of coursecontrollable enabling can’t beapplied to missiles already inhostile hands.

WHAT IS BEING DONE

For a decade and a half, someagencies of Government havepressed hard for controllableenabling of shoulder-fired missiles.Regrettably, the US Army was notamong them.

Controllable enabling wasmandated by Congress in the 1988Defense Appropriation Bill. TheAppropriations Committee reportspecifies that “$4 million....only maybe used to develop without delay adevice to neutralize any divertedStinger missiles. The Committee isconcerned that the Army has notassigned sufficient priority to thiseffort in the past.”

The following year, theAppropriations Committee made asimilar recommendation withrespect to the Javelin anti-tankmissile, reflecting concern that itcould present a severe threatagainst any ground target includinga Presidential limousine. And in1995, the Arms Control andDisarmament Agency sought tointerest the Army in buildingcontrollable enabling devices intoall of its shoulder-fired missiles.

In all cases the Army’s responsewas, in essence, “We could do thisbut we won’t. It’s not our job.”

While the Army’s recalcitrance wasin a sense irresponsible, in anothersense it was understandable.Both Stinger and Javelin werepushing the limits of technology.Their designers’ task was to giveAmerican soldiers missiles to dowhat no soldiers had everdone before. The last thing the

designers wanted was an additionalrequirement not part of theircore mission.

9-11 was a wake-up call in this, as inmany other respects. TheDepartment of Defense nowunderstands the need to safeguardshoulder-fired missiles. But noprogram for controllable enablinghas yet emerged.

Airport monitoring and patrolling

Intense surveillance of the airportarea, including the use of helicopterpatrols, requires no new technologyand has the advantage of beingable to be ramped up relativelyquickly. For airports surrounded bywater or barren terrain, this can bequite effective, particularly againstshort-range missiles such as theSA-7. But Stinger and SA-18footprints can be larger than 150square miles and typically includelarge highly built-up areas thatcannot be policed.

Active defense of commercialaircraft

Since the infra-red guidancesystems on shoulder-firedmissiles are passive, emitting noradiation of their own, detecting andtracking an incoming missile isinherently difficult.

The traditional military defenseagainst heat-seeking missiles hasbeen the use of pyrotechnic flares,released preemptively when theaircraft is in a threat area. A flare’sstrong point-source of light causesthe missile to go for the flares ratherthan the airplane. But the penaltiesof dropping incendiary flares on


6


populated areas near airports areprohibitive. Two active defensesystems, using sharply differingtechnologies, are now in wide use.

The Northrop Grumman Large-Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure(LAIRCM) detects and tracksthe missile by a staring ultra-violetdevice which has full-circlecoverage in the downwardhemisphere. It then attacksthe missile’s seeker with an infraredlaser, modulated to distort theflight path of the missile. It isinternally installed in about 150US and UK military aircraft of 20different types including the C-17,MC-130 and MH-53. Accordingto press reports, is it also in AirForce One and Air Force Two.For commercial airliners it wouldbe retrofitted in a small pod addedto the rear lower fuselage.

The Israeli Aircraft IndustriesFlight Guard uses a pulse Dopplerradar to detect and track anincoming missile by its motion. Thesystem then automaticallydispenses “safe flares” which arecharges of hot gas rather thanburning solids, and are claimed toleave no residue falling to theground. Six antennas give all-aspect coverage. The system isinstalled on about 150 aircraft, andis claimed to have successfullydefended against an SA-18attack. This implies that, unlikeconventional pyrotechnic flares, thegas flares simulate jet engines wellenough to deceive a two-colorseeker. The system has beencertificated for use in airliners by theIsraeli government, but in the USthe explosive flare canisters appearto be creating a safety concern.

Passive defense

Modifications can reduce the infra-red signature of commercial aircraft.For example, non-reflective paintcould help significantly. Flat paintadds aerodynamic drag and looksdirty. But according to a recentCongressional Research Servicereport, the airlines’ primary aversionto flat paint is that it would openlyacknowledge the threat andthereby upset passengers. Thisattitude is inexcusable. Failing totake countermeasures, in a futileattempt to pretend the threat is notthere, will needlessly increase therisk to passengers.

Flight tactics

Abandoning noise-abatementrequirements and using maximum-climb departures would significantlyreduce the footprint of shoulder-fired missiles, at the expense ofgreatly increased noise in the areaclose under the takeoff path. Insome cases, presently pleasantneighborhoods could becomeunsuited for residential use.

Similarly, missile footprints could befurther reduced by altering thelanding approach. Militarytransports flying into known threatareas such as that now aroundBaghdad airport maintain altitudeabove missile reach until theyare close to the airport, and thenexecute a sharp spiral descent.Adapting this for commercialairliners would create safety issues,would require upgrading thelanding systems at most airports,and would reduce the number oflandings that could beaccommodated per unit time. A

more moderate solution would besimply to stay higher longer andthen descend more sharply, to theextent that this can be done withoutcreating excessive airspeed.

One commentatori has arguedthat “Successful evasion is alow-cost, near-term solution to thethreat. A trained pilot can bevery effective in evading missiles.”This is nonsense and should notbe pursued. An airline pilot haszero vision to his rear hemisphere;the first he would know of amissile attack would be when hefelt the impact. If he were tobe warned by an external source,it would still not be credibleto attempt to outmaneuver amissile. Even the SA-7 is capableof 6G maneuvers, while an airlineron takeoff would be in severedistress at 3Gs. Transientmaneuverability (the abilityto quickly roll, pitch, or add Gs)of airliners is weak. An airliner isnot intended to be an F-16, whichcan flick into a vertical-bankhard turn in the blink of an eye. Andeven an F-16 would not win manymaneuverability contests againsta Stinger.

Export controls

The traditional method ofcontrolling such weapons is torestrict sales and to require end-useagreements. We only transfer themto our friends, we ask that they berigorously guarded, etc. Certainlythis is essential; otherwise Al Qaidacould simply buy Stinger RMPsover the counter. But exportcontrols are a partial solution,porous even under the best ofcircumstances. Weapons are not

Continued on page 7


7


always perfectly guarded inpeacetime. In wartime they can bedropped on the battlefield, pickedup by the other side, and used orsold without restriction.

Cooperative Destruction

Many governments realize that theyhave more shoulder-fired weaponsthan they need. They are willing todestroy them, but are concernedabout cost and other issues. TheState Department is currentlyworking with these governments todevelop plans under which theUnited States will give technicaland financial help with destroyingthe missiles.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THEUS GOVERNMENT

1. Recognize the urgency of theproblem and respond withManhattan-project priority

We have heard many governmentstatements such as that by BrianRoehrkasse of the Department ofHomeland Security that “These

weapons pose a threat, but there isno specific credible evidence thatthey are in the hands of terrorists inthe United States or that they plan touse them to shoot down airliners.”

For US policy-making purposes,whether these weapons are now inthe United States doesn’t matter.Nor does it matter if at this momentterrorists do not have plans to shootdown airliners. Terrorists have theweapons, and can bring them intothe United States within days. Theterrorist motivation exists, and planscan change in minutes. But most ofthe solutions will take months oryears to implement. If we wait untilthe threat stares us in the face andthen reach for solutions, the mosteffective ones won’t be there. Wewill have let our adversaries operateinside our decision loop, very farinside. Civilization will likely lose,and lose badly.

In absolute terms, an urgent drivefor solutions costing billions or tensof billions of dollars will not becheap. But relative to the cost offailure, it will be very cheap.

2. Recognize the breadth of theshoulder-fired missile problem.

It is not confined to anti-aircraftmissiles. It includes advanced anti-tank missiles. Thus, the commonterm MANPADS (Man-Portable AirDefense Systems) is too narrow.

3. Rapidly develop and beginproduction of controllableenabling devices for Stinger andJavelin.

4. Immediately stop work on allfinal assembly and upgrade of

shoulder-fired missiles, and on allsub-assemblies (usually theseekers) on which controllableenabling should be installed.

Resume production whencontrollable enablers can beincluded. This will be disruptiveand costly. But that very fact willsend a persuasive message toother governments that we are veryserious about preventing terroristuse of shoulder-fired missiles.

5. Immediately negotiate withother producer nations aboutinstalling controllable enablers intheir shoulder-fired missiles.

Consider sharing the technologywherever possible. Controllingshoulder-fired missiles is in the self-evident interest of every non-terrorist government.

6. Significantly augment airportpatrols.

Sen. Boxer recently describedwalking up on the roof of an airportbuilding and standing unobservedwithin easy SA-7 range of departingairliners. This is an experiment mostof us could probably repeat, inmany variations and with littledifficulty. Augmented patrols areone step that doesn’t take newtechnology and can be done rapidly.

7. Establish a governmentprogram of aircraft hull andliability insurance.

Rates should be higher thanpresent commercial rates, so theprogram would not be used unlessand until there were a successfulattack. But it would be immediately

If we wait until

the threat

stares us in

the face and

then reach for

solutions, the

most effective

ones won’t

be there.

Continued on page 8


8


available if commercial rates wereto zoom, or coverage to vanish,after an attack. The purpose of theprogram would not be per se tocompensate victims of futureattacks. It would be to enablecommercial air operations tocontinue and thereby avoideconomic disaster. Morefundamentally, it would send amessage to terrorists that shootingdown airliners would not causeeconomic collapse. The very act ofsending this message couldremove much of the motivation foran attack.

Establishment of such a programwill require many months asthe Administration developsits plan, the House and Senateeach modify, debate, and passtheir separate versions, andthe differences are resolvedin conference. Therefore it needsto be done preemptively, in thenear term, so it can be on theshelf ready for immediate use if theoccasion arises.

8. Fund the acceleratedproduction and installation of

both active and passive airlinerdefense equipment.

A bill by Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA)and Rep. Steve Israel (D-NY)provides for government funding toinstall active defenses in the 6800existing jet airliners on scheduledservice. This should be done,beginning with the largestwidebodies. Large freight and charteraircraft should also be included. TheBoxer-Israel bill also provides forinstallation to begin in December ofthis year. That is too quick; the goalis good but the engineering can’t bedone that soon. The Administration’sprogram, in contrast, would probablylead to first deployment in 2006. Thatis unnecessarily slow, in light of thefact that two systems are alreadyoperating successfully in militaryaircraft. This schedule should besubstantially accelerated. Passivemeasures including nonreflectivepaint can be installed within monthsat low cost.

9. Evaluate the cost and benefitof more rapid climb and descentfor airliners in light of theshoulder-fired missile threat.

10. Vigorously pursuenegotiations, many of which arenow ongoing, with foreigngovernments on controllingproliferation of shoulder-firedweapons and on destroyingsurplus missiles.

11. Sting, sting, and sting again.

The recent spectacular successof the US and Russian governmentsin catching an arms dealer hopingto sell SA-18s for fun and profitshould be the first of many suchoperations. Critics have accusedit of merely proving that ifsomebody wants to sell missiles,he can always find a buyer. Thismisses the point. On the contrary,it proves that if somebody triesto buy missiles illegally, he canexpect to spend the rest of his life inprison. If this is demonstratedrepeatedly, the number andenthusiasm of buyers can besignificantly impacted.

12. This above all things: Inmaking any decision on shoulder-fired missile policy, fullycontemplate the price of failure.

Author’s note: Robert Sherman, a principalin the consulting firm of Carr ShermanMinjack, was formerly the Directorof the Advanced Projects Office atthe Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency and Director of the StrategicSecurity Project at the Federation ofAmerican Scientists.i “Facts About the Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat”,

James Jay Carafano, and Jack Spencer, Heritage

Foundation WebMemo #328


Controlling shoulder-fired missiles

is in the self-evident interest of

every non-terrorist government.

9



When the Chairman of the FederalReserve testified before Congress,we got a realistic assessment ofthe natural gas dilemma thiscountry faces. Last June’s messagefrom Chairman Greenspan onCapitol Hill was loud and clear: thenation has to increase its suppliesof natural gas or face theeconomic consequences.

Let me first point out that, warningsaside, the US is not running outof natural gas. In fact, we haveabundant gas reserves. At today’sconsumption rates, our 1400 trillioncubic feet of technically recoverablereserves would translate into almost60 years of supply. The problem:We have essentially “cherry-picked” the inexpensive gas andneed new ways to affordably meetgas demand.

There are three key ingredientsto increasing gas supply. First, weneed an expanded infrastructure,specifically to move Alaska’s gasto the lower 48 via pipeline, as wellas to enable increased imports ofliquefied natural gas. Second,we need to re-visit federal policiesand Congressional moratoriathat have placed much of ourpotential gas supply off limitsto production. Finally — and toooften undervalued — we needto promote the research that willhelp us develop our abundantdomestic natural gas reserves.

Technology was not, however,undervalued by ChairmanGreenspan. It was, in fact, a keysubtext of his testimony. He notedthe value of technology to gassupply in observing that “dramaticchanges in technology are makingexisting energy reserves stretchfurther while keeping long-termenergy costs lower than theyotherwise would have been.” Newtechniques allow far deeper drillingof promising fields, especiallyoffshore. He went on to highlightsome of those technologies, alongwith their specific natural gas supplyimpacts. He noted that in the RockyMountain region, “technologies arefacilitating production of tight sandsand coalbed methane. Marketedproduction in Wyoming, forexample, has risen from 3.4 percentof total US output, in 1996 to 7.1percent last year.”

Meeting Natural Gas Demand: Infrastructureis Important, Technology is KeyBy John Riordan

Photos courtesy of the Gas Technology Institute

10


Meeting Natural Gas Demand — Continued from page 10

The development of technologies toproduce gas from unconventionalresources– tight gas sands,coalbed methane, gas shales – wasnot serendipitous. Rather, it was aresult of government and industrycollaboration: a focused researcheffort, combined with criticalproduction incentives, to enable theaffordable production of resourcesthat now represent over 20% of ourdomestic gas supply.

Unfortunately, trends in bothgovernment and industry areworking against this need.Government funding for gas supplyR&D has not exceeded $15 milliona year for a decade. Also, federalfunding for oil and gas supplyresearch is often viewed ascorporate welfare. The problem

with this view is that there is nothingin deregulated energy markets thateither incentivizes or compelsprivate R&D investment, in spite ofthe significant public policyramifications associated withsupply shortages and price spikes.

On the industry side, one of theunintended victims of deregulationof the production sector of thenatural gas industry has been R&D.Company research budgets, foundalmost exclusively in the super-majors or in large servicecompanies, have been declining forthe last ten years. Also, majorintegrated oil and gas producershave largely moved offshore oroverseas. This has left onshoreproduction increasingly in thehands of small independentproducers who lack the resourcesto conduct R&D.

Finally, collaborative industryresearch and development funding,paid for through a pipelinesurcharge for the last 25 years, isslated for extinction in 2005. Thisfee funded a significant portion ofthe research that has enabled us toturn coalbed methane from a safetyhazard into over 7% of our domesticproduction, or tight gas sands froma known but inaccessible resource,into17% of our supply.

Significant – but expensive – gasreserves are found on federal landsin ultra-deepwater provincesoffshore and in unconventionalbasins onshore. Congress shouldconsider investing a portion of thefederal oil and gas royalty monies

currently going into the generalfund into the research programsnecessary to affordably producethese vast reserves. Analysisconducted by the Bureau ofEconomic Geology at the Universityof Texas, indicates that such aninvestment would result substantialnew gas supply, as well as asignificant overall increase inrevenues to the Treasury in the formof royalties on new, technology-enabled production.

Chairman Greenspan is correct innoting that, in addition totechnology, we need additionalinfrastructure. We need responsibleaccess to public lands currentlyopen for production. But thepolitical will may not be there toexploit these options. Infrastructureadditions always encounter localresistance. Opening up offshoreCalifornia, Florida or East Coastmay — or may not — evermaterialize. Also, the imports ofnatural gas in the form of LNG raiseserious geopolitical issues, similarto those we currently have with oil.

Investing in developing thetechnologies we need to affordablyproduce our domestic gasresources in environmentally soundways is critical, it is possible, andhas been proven effective time andtime again. We should heedChairman Greenspan’s entreaty onthe need for gas supply and investin the technologies we need torespond to this wake-up call.

Author’s Note: John Riordan is Presidentand CEO of the Gas Technology Institute.

Photos courtesy of the Gas Technology Institute

11


Science-Based Workshop ... in China — Continued from page 1

that they now have a target of“halting the deteriorating trend ofenvironmental degradation” and aseries of concrete actions areunderway to address thechallenges that environmentalproblems have created for China’seconomy and its people. FAS hasbeen working for several years toforge better links between scientistsin China working on this problemand to strengthen relationships withscholars in the US. A workshop inGuangzhou represents a significantnew step in this work.

Land degradation is central to manyof these problems. Widespread soilerosion, destruction of agriculturalland, loss of the natural vegetativecover, destruction of biologicaldiversity, damage of wildlife habitatsand extinction of wildlife species,contamination of water resourcesand food crops, carelessdevelopment are widespread (seewww.fas.org/china_lands for SouthChina examples). Reversing theeffects of land degradation andreversing the effects of existingdamage will help create new jobs,prevent flooding, protect keyhabitats, and sequester largeamounts of carbon dioxide as soilsare rebuilt.

FAS and the South ChinaAgricultural University (SCAU) in

Guangzhou will conduct aone-week field workshop(November 8-16, 2003) inGuangdong Province for leadersof 25 to 30 environmentalNon-Governmental Organizations(NGOs) and environmentalGovernment Organized Non-Governmental Organizations(GONGOs). Support for the fieldworkshop is provided by TheInternational Foundation (US),and the Guangdong NaturalScience Foundation.

Chinese NGOs function much asNGOs in the west. GONGOs, on theother hand, are initiated by thegovernment to function more asresearch centers for governmentagencies. Some are evolving tolook more like NGOs and some ofthe GONGOs and NGOs cooperatein environmental activities. Abouttwo-thirds of the organizationsattending will be environmentalNGOs and the remaining one-thirdwill be environmental GONGOs.

These Chinese environmentalorganizations can provide a keyeducational link to the generalpopulation by explaining the natureof the problems, their causes andadverse effects, and solutions to theproblems. In addition, they canprovide the needed “grass roots”source of valuable information to

help assure that well-intended,remedial actions taken by thegovernment or others to addressthe environmental/natural resourceproblems do not themselves lead toadditional problems. Lastly, NGOs,through their fund-raising activities,can provide a small but criticalresource to complement theChinese government efforts.

The field-workshop approach willintroduce environmental leadersfrom all over China to some ofSouth China’s importantenvironmental/natural resourceproblems, help them identifycauses, and illustrate someworkable solutions. It is intended toprovide new environmental leaders,who may be in the formative stagesof developing their environmentalagendas, with a unique educationalopportunity to interact directly withnatural resource/environmentalscientists in field settings wheredevelopment is progressing rapidly.

Guangdong Province provides anexcellent field setting whereenvironmental leaders can learnfirst hand about environmental/natural resource problems that arecommon to South China and otherparts of China as well. Manycommon environmental/naturalresource problems have their rootsin social and economic issues as

These Chinese environmental organizationscan provide a key educational link

to the general population by explainingthe nature of the problems, their causes and

adverse effects, and solutions to the problems.


12




well as in the biological, chemical,and physical world. Discussionswill focus on how interdisciplinarysolutions were developed inthis province, and how otherinterdisciplinary solutions couldbe developed to deal with China’s

emerging environmental/naturalresource problems here andelsewhere in China. On theworkshop’s completion, theenvironmental leaders shouldbe able to transfer and adaptthis learning approach to other

parts of China by cooperatingwith concerned scientists in theirhome regions.

Below are representative examplesof field sites the workshopparticipants will visit. Ample time will

Map courtesy of www.chinapage.com

13



be available at each site forquestions and discussion. In theevening, a leader from each of theenvironmental organizations willpresent background on his or herenvironmental organization anddescribe how the organization dealswith degraded land issues at home.

Qi’ao Mangroves

Qi’ao Island, in the Pearl River nearZhuhai, once was an islandsurrounded by mangrove forestsbut became severely damaged byfire-wood cutters. Originally, a largepopulation of white egrets inhabitedthe mangroves. However, firewoodcutting damaged their habitat andthe egret population declined. Inaddition, local people receivedpayments from Chinese fromTaiwan and Hong Kong byencouraging them to come to Qi’aoto shoot the egrets for sport.

More recently, restoration of themangrove forests from 20 hectaresto 180 hectares slowed shore-lineerosion, improved habitats for fishbreeding, and increased thenumber of the local egretpopulation. Today, hunting isprohibited here but many touristscome to the island to watch thebeautiful, large flights of egretscome and go in the evening andmorning. Ecotourism has increasedthe local income.

Now, however, authorities areplanning to connect Zhuhai toHong Kong by bridges that willcross the Pearl River. Bridge andhighway construction will destroyQi’ao’s mangroves and wetlandenvironment. Only a small patch ofendangered mangrove in Zhuhai

just west of Macau may survive.Local fishing in the Pearl River willbe adversely affected once again.

Dinghushan Biosphere Reserve

The last remnant of South China’stropical, broad-leaf monsoon forestoccupies a few square kilometers inthe hills about 50 km west ofGuangzhou. The site is onerecognized by the United NationsMan and the Biosphere program forits uniqueness. Scientists conductresearch here to learn how theforest functions ecologically andalso to learn how this kind of forestmight someday be reestablishedwidely in South China.

The rapid growth of tourismthreatens the remainingDinghushan forest. Each year, morepeople flock to the cool forest andmountain streams and ponds ofDinghushan bringing the harmfuleffects of automobile pollution.Without meaning to, crowds ofpeople also damage the nativeplant life. Visitors will see evidenceof and hear about the growingadverse effects of uncontrolledtourism on such important sites.

Using City Wastes for OrchardFertilizer

Some lychee/longan growers usecity wastes as fertilizer whenplanting fruit trees. The wastegenerally consists of a mixture oforganic matter, coal ash, plastic,glass, and metal. Low-cost citywaste, hauled to tree-planting sites,is deposited in the holes for treeplanting in amounts of 5 to 10 kgand then covered with soil.Many orchard farmers keep the

soil surface clear of vegetationbeneath the fruit trees to avoidthe competition of underlyingvegetation’s use of nutrients andwater that farmers want reservedfor their fruit trees. Because mostorchards are on hillsides, watererosion removes the soil, thusuncovering the city waste. Someof the city waste is carried downslope by running water and someis scattered across the land bythe wind.

In some cases, the city waste is infact medical waste. Nevertheless,it is used as fertilizer. Handlingmedical wastes could be hazardousto orchard workers during plantingand the scattering of the medicalwastes by wind and water canwiden the potential for serioushealth problems. These once-damaged hill slopes need fertilizerto grow fruit trees but the currentpractice of using “low cost”medical-waste fertilizer may leadto unintended, serious healthproblems in the countryside.

Zhuhai Reservoir Erosion

Severe erosion existed all aroundZhuhai’s water reservoir in 1989. Agraduate geography studentexperimented with four differentsystems of vegetation restorationon four hectares of land adjacent tothe reservoir. The researcherplanted many exotic, fast-growingtree species and various nitrogen-fixing grasses.

Within one year after planting,springs flowed again and erosionnearly stopped. Rainfall run-offslowed, thus replenishing thegroundwater. After ten years, a


14


mature vegetative cover blanketsthe test sites, a well developed littercover exists on the floor of thewoods, and groundwater is 1.5 to 2meters higher during the dryseason than at the start of the work.However, few wildlife species havereturned to live in the wooded site.Native birds do not like the berriesand seeds produced by the exoticplants and go elsewhere. Smallanimals, other than occasional rats,mice and cobras, avoid the site.The experiment demonstrates thatrapid land repair is possible butalso shows the need for usingnative plant species to encouragewildlife to live there. Birds areresponsible for about 80 percent ofseed dispersal in tropicalGuangdong Province. Nativewildlife can help expand the forestcover at little cost to local citizens ifa variety of native plants exist in therestoration site.

Guanming Farm

This is a large, modern dairy farmreclaimed from severely degradedland. The farm now producesabout 75 percent of the milk sold inHong Kong. The liquid cattle wastegoes back to the fields to providefertilizer to help grow cattle feed.The solid animal waste producesbiogas that, in turn, is used togenerate all of the farm’s electricalpower. The solid residual wasteafter gas production becomes avaluable organic fertilizer. Soilerosion essentially stopped on the

farm; now the hills support ablanket of lychee trees and fast-growing, exotic, nitrogen-fixing,typhoon-resistant trees. Nocommercial pesticides are used onthe farm; pest control is achievedthrough biological control agents.The farm illustrates that degradedlands can be improved usingenvironmentally friendly methodsand that the economic benefits canbe large.

Golf, hunting, and game farm ondegraded lands

Tourism activities are expanding inSouth China. One of these, theprivate Pine Valley Sports andCountry Club, situated on 290hectares of degraded lands inZhuhai, has country-club, golf-course, gun-club, boating andfishing, and game-farm facilities forits members. The land once wascovered by a moist tropical forestbut became degraded by pastdamaging agricultural practices sothat the land only supported scrubvegetation and scattered trees. Thenatural wildlife had been severelydepleted as well.

The owners’ aim was to design thefacilities carefully and thoughtfully toprotect the environment. Theybelieve that the environmentaloperations will benefit the Club andthe environment over the long run.They have constructed a lake, andintroduced water treatment, wastetreatment, and the repopulation

of native game birds to the greaterarea of the local township wheresuch knowledge and understandingwas lacking. The workers atthe Club’s facilities, hired fromthe local population, receive class-room training on environmentalmanagement. Native game-birdspecies such as wild pheasants andpartridge are continually raised onsite for release to the countryside.The bird population is intended tomove freely from the Club into thesurrounding countryside.

Author’s note: Dr. Parham has conductedresearch on degraded lands in HongKong since 1967 and in South China since1986. In addition to his affiliation withthe Federation of American Scientists, Dr.Parham is an Honorary Professor of theSouth China Agricultural University inGuangzhou, an Honorary Research Fellowof the Kadoorie Agricultural ResearchCentre of the University of Hong Kong,a Research Fellow of Duke University’sCenter for Tropical Conservation, anda Research Associate with the BotanicalResearch Institute of Texas and withthe Bishop Museum in Honolulu. Hereceived his Ph.D. in geology/claymineralogy from the University of Illinois,was an Associate Professor of Geologyand Geophysics at the University ofMinnesota, a Physical Science Officerwho worked on developing countryenvironmental issues with the Agency forInternational Development/US Departmentof State, and directed studies for the USCongress on agriculture and renewableresources at the Congressional Office ofTechnology Assessment.


15



Over the past year, fitful but intensecoverage of the threat posed byshoulder-fired missiles to civilianaircraft has awakened theindustrialized nations to a securitythreat that the rest of the worldwas already painfully aware of —the global scourge of illicit smallarms and light weapons.Numbering in the hundreds ofmillions, these weapons take thelives of an estimated 500,000 livesper year, stunt economic growth,and perpetuate the lawlessnessupon which terrorists and othercriminals thrive.

Nowhere are the ill-effects of thisscourge more apparent than inLatin America. Weak exportcontrols, porous borders and anoverabundance of small arms andlight weapons have transformedCentral and parts of South Americainto a giant arms bazaar that fuelsinstability and criminality. The four-decade civil war in Colombia, for

example, is sustained by thethousands of illicit weapons andmillions of rounds of ammunitionthat seep into the country throughits porous borders. The weaponsare used by the guerrilla groups —the Revolutionary Armed Forces ofColombia and the NationalLiberation Army — and the Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)to wage war on the government,protect coca operations, commithuman rights abuses and engage inkidnapping and murder. Moneygenerated via kidnapping andnarco-trafficking conducted fromrebel and AUC-controlled territoriesis then used to purchase (or isbartered for) more weapons andsupplies which, in turn, sustainoffensive operations against thegovernment and deny it controlover much of the countryside.

The Colombians undoubtedly sufferthe most from this self-perpetuatingcycle of violence and lawlessness.

Nonetheless, its impact is feltthroughout the Hemisphere,including the United States. Overthe past decade, more than 50American journalists, aid workersand civilian military contractorshave been kidnapped and/ormurdered by the guerrillas whileworking and traveling in Colombiaand the neighboring states.i Equallypernicious are the thousands oftons of Colombian narcotics thatflood the United States each year.These drugs sap the US economyof hundreds of billions of dollarsand wreak havoc in the lives of thenation’s 4.7 million cocaine andheroin users.ii

Transoceanic shipment of theseweapons is another security threatthat deserves more attention. Whilethe terrorists and insurgents thatstock their arsenals with looseweapons from Latin America areprimarily homegrown, there isanecdotal evidence that armstraffickers from other continents,including some with ties to Islamicterrorist organizations, procureweapons from Latin America. Themost unnerving of these cases isalso the one that best illustrates thetranscontinental nature of the tradein illicit weapons. In January 2001,Aziz Nassour, a Sierra Leonean armsand diamonds trafficker of Lebanesedecent, emailed a list of weaponsthat he hoped to obtain for his“friends in Africa” to Shimon

Curbing the Illicit Trade in Small Arms andLight Weapons in Latin AmericanBy Matthew Schroeder

Photo courtesy of the Government of ColumbiaVarious assault rifles seized from the Columbian guerrillas

16


Curbing the Illicit Trade — Continued from page 15

Yelenick, an Israeli arms dealeroperating out of Panama. Nassourhad many “friends in Africa” whowere responsible for untoldsuffering, including Charles Taylor’scorrupt and brutal regime; theRevolutionary United Front in SierraLeone, which gained notoriety in thelate 1990’s for hacking the limbs offcivilians; and even Osama binLaden’s network, whom Nassourhad helped to convert millions ofdollars stashed in vulnerable bankaccounts into conflict diamonds.

Nassour’s list — sniper rifles, man-portable surface-to-air missiles,anti-tank weapons, etc. —constituted a veritable arsenal ofterrorist tools. The list ultimatelyreached the Nicaraguan army but,according to Nassour, the weaponswere never delivered. If that isindeed the case, it is not becauseNicaraguan export controls are airtight. Less than a year later, Yelenickduped the Nicaraguan army intoselling him 3000 AK-47s which heclaimed were for the Panamanian

National Police but ultimately wereshipped to Turbo, Colombia, wherethe AUC took possession of them.iii

Regardless of whether the weaponswere ever shipped to Africa, theattempt itself is significant. The factthat an arms dealer operating out ofWest Africa - which is awash in smallarms and light weapons — chose toshop in Central America attests tothe region’s potential as a source of

weaponry for brutal dictators, blood-thirsty insurgent groups and globalterrorist organizations.

Like many of today’s most pressingsecurity threats, the small arms andlight weapons problem defies quickand easy solutions. The durability,ease of use and versatility of theseweapons ensure that the market forthem will remain large and lucrative.As they are relatively small andnonperishable, they are easy tosmuggle across national borders.Finally, they are ubiquitous.According to the Geneva-basedSmall Arms Survey, there are 600million small arms and lightweapons in existence today.iv

Nonetheless, there are many ways inwhich the international communitycan begin to rein in the illicit trade insmall arms and light weapons.Strengthening and harmonizing armsexport controls and procedures;increasing cooperation, information-sharing, and the provision oftechnical and legal assistance


... rein in the

illicit trade in

small arms and

light weapons.

FAL assault rifles seized from the Columbian government Photo courtesy of the Government of Columbia

17


between national law enforcementagencies; and destroying excessstockpiles of weapons top the list. InLatin America, a framework forachieving all of the above exceptstockpile destruction is provided inthe form of the Inter-AmericanConvention Against the IllicitManufacture of and Trafficking inFirearms, Ammunition, Explosive andRelated Materials, otherwise knownas the OAS Firearms Convention.

The OAS Firearms Convention isthe only legally binding internationalinstrument that focuses solely oncontrolling small arms and lightweapons. It requires member statesto, inter alia, criminalize offensesassociated with firearms smuggling,establish a system of licensingfirearms transfers, exchangeinformation that will aid in theinvestigation and prosecution ofarms traffickers, and improveborder controls. The Conventionenjoys broad support among theOAS member states, 20 out of 34 ofwhich have ratified it, and hasprompted several changes to theirlaws and practices.

The United States was an activesupporter of the OAS Conventionduring its drafting, and continuesto participate in the meetingsof the Convention’s ConsultativeCommittee. Nonetheless, theConvention has languished in theSenate Foreign Relations Committeefor years despite the fact that theUS is largely in compliance withits requirements.

US ratification is important notbecause of the changes to USpolicies it would require — which are

minimal — but because of the UnitedStates’ diplomatic influence in thehemisphere. Diplomats interviewedfor a forthcoming report on the USand the Convention commentedseveral times that US ratificationwould provide a discernable boostin the Convention’s credibility.Conversely, continued refusal by theUS to ratify the Convention will erodeits influence and subsequentlyundermine efforts to achieve fulland universal implementation ofits provisions.

Ratification of the Convention wouldalso allow the US to use it asleverage when dealing with countriesin the region that have not taken allthe steps necessary to control illicitarms trafficking. A good example ofhow the Convention can be used inthis manner is the impact of a reporton the November 2001 diversion of3000 Nicaraguan AK-47s to theColombian paramilitaries. The report,compiled by an OAS investigativeteam, provided a detailed summaryof how the states involved in thediversion failed to adhere to theConvention. Immediately followingthe publication of the report, aNicaraguan government officialsubmitted to the head of theinvestigative team an outline of thesteps his government would take toprevent similar transfers.v The factthat the OAS investigative teamfound no evidence that national lawswere broken suggests that theNicaraguan government wasresponding directly to the stigmaassociated with failing to comply withtheir obligations under theConvention. Combined with theUnited States’ unparalleleddiplomatic influence, this stigma

could be used with great effect by theUnited States but only if it becomes afull party to the Convention.

Halting the trade in illicit small armsand light weapons in the WesternHemisphere requires a multi-faceted,multilateral strategy implementedby all the states in the region. TheOAS Firearms Convention is agood vehicle for developing andimplementing such a strategy, andas such deserves the full support ofall OAS members, including theUnited States.

Author’s Note: Matthew Schroeder is aResearch Associate with the Arms SalesMonitoring Project at the Federation ofAmerican Scientists.i Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere

Affairs Otto Reich testifying before the Subcommittee on

the Western Hemisphere, International Relations

Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 107th

Congress, 2nd Session, http://fas.org/terrorism/at/docs/

2002/Reich-ColombiaTerrorism.htm.

ii Office of National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office

of the President of the United States, “Drug Facts:

Cocaine,” 5 September 2003, http://www.whitehousedrug

policy.gov/drugfact/cocaine/index.html and Office of

National Drug Control Policy, Executive Office of the

President of the United States, “Drug Facts: Heroin,” 5

September 2003, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/

drugfact/heroin/index.html.

iii For more information, see Ambassador Morris D. Busby,

Report of the General Secretariat of the Organization of

American States on the Diversion of Nicaraguan Arms to

the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia, OEA/Ser.G,

CP/doc. 3687/03, (Washington, DC: OAS, January

2003), http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/smallarms/

OAS_Otterloo.htm.

iv Graduate Institute of International Studies, Small Arms

Survey 2003: Development Denied, (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2003), 57.

v “Nicaragua: Loopholes Foment Arms Smuggling,” EFE

News Services, 28 January 2003, http://www.web.lexis-

nexis.com.

Curbing the Illicit Trade — Continued from page 16

18


The Federation of AmericanScientists was founded byManhattan Project scientists whohad helped develop and build thefirst atomic bombs. It wasappropriate and moving then, whensurvivors of the Hiroshima bombingvisited the FAS offices on the 58th

anniversary of the atomicbombings. Every year on theanniversary of the first, andthankfully so far only, use of atomicweapons in war, survivors come toWashington. To raise awareness ofthe realities and horrors of nuclearwar, they visit the offices ofmembers of Congress, make publicappearances, and talk to the press.

Nuclear war is so horrifying in itsreality that talk of it often flees to avocabulary that is abstract, evenmathematical, technical, and sterile.We are left with PSI, CEPs, and

“overkill.” During the Cold War, asmall industry grew up creatingcomputer models that calculatedthe optimal allocation of nuclearweapons against military targetsand against “value” targets. “Value”targets was the name given to thosethings that a society values andthreatening them will, so the theorygoes, deter them from usingnuclear weapons themselves.Ultimately these value targets arethe people of the society, the homesthey live in, the industry thatprovides their livelihood and keepsthem warm and clothed and fed. Itis all too easy to forget the humanface of these targets whencalculating a “laydown.”

So what a shock to meet a real fleshand blood person who, on themorning of August 6, 1945, wasasleep on a cot less than two

kilometers from the epicenter of theHiroshima atomic bomb blast.Masakazu Saito is the president ofone of the local groups of hibakushaor atom bomb survivors. He wasnineteen at the time, and describedhow his arms, back, and head wereburned. He was able to escape thewooden barracks where he hadbeen sleeping before it wasengulfed in flames. In the chaosafter the bombing, cleanup activitiestook place. Soldiers quickly piled upcorpses to be burned, afraid that theradiation would somehow spreadfrom these bodies. Assumed to bedead, Mr. Saito managed to crawlaway from those slated to beburned. He saw sights that were toohorrific for words.

Today, although near 80, he is inremarkable, vigorous good health.He has produced a series ofshocking yet eerily beautifulwatercolors of his experience. Eventhrough a translator, his experiencemade real to all of us the horrors ofactual use of a nuclear weapon.

An estimated 280,000 peoplesurvived the atomic bomb. Groups,like Mr. Saito’s, have beenorganized to represent the interestsof the survivors, who findthemselves in a peculiar position inJapan. Not only did they suffer inthe bombing, but even later theywere ostracized as sick, damagedand prone to producing geneticallydeformed babies. The survivorswere not seen as desirable mates,partners or workers in a society thatbelieved creating a family andworking hard were the key to

Hiroshima Survivors Visit the FederationBy Sharon Gleason and Ivan Oelrich

FAS member photo


Ivan Oelrich with two survivors of the atom bomb

19


rebuilding Japanese society. Evennow, decades later, they meet withvarious forms of discrimination.They are often denied healthinsurance, and employers aresometimes hesitant to take themon. Many survivors keep theirexperience secret to avoid thestigma of having been exposed toatomic radiation.

The hibakusha also, of course, havea very personal involvement innuclear disarmament. They

understand the reality that is oftenmasked by analytical discussions of“mini-nukes” and “bunker busters.”Their visit reminded us all why theFederation of American Scientistswas founded, and what our missionis, and why we work so hard forwhat remains one of mankind’smost important goals: to makecertain that those two bombs,dropped decades ago, are the last.The hibakusha are welcomed backeach anniversary because wecannot be reminded too often.

Nuclear war isso horrifying

in its reality thattalk of it often

flees to avocabulary thatis abstract, evenmathematical,

technical,and sterile.

Hiroshima Survivors Visit — Continued from page 18

The Learning Federation: Progress ReportBy Kendra Bodnar

The explosive growth in informationand the growing complexity ofscientific and technology problemsthat need to be addressed require adramatically new approach to howwe teach, learn, and conductresearch. Our InformationTechnologies project is workingwith national experts in academia,industry and government toarticulate a national research planand form communities ofresearchers to build the tools andinfrastructure needed to enableradically improved approaches toteaching, learning, and sharingresearch. We’ve made measurableprogress in a number of key areas.

ROADMAPS FOR LEARNINGSCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGYRESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

After eighteen months of hard work,FAS staff have completed

development of a Learning Science& Technology R&D roadmap,or research plan. A series of fiveroadmaps was developed. Eachroadmap details how specificlearning technologies could bedesigned and implemented intoour teaching systems and forecastswhat could be accomplished inthe near future with appropriatefunding. These roadmaps willfacilitate efficient and effective useof the research funds by strategicallyprioritizing attention to gaps in theknowledge-base, encouraginginterdisciplinary research that mightotherwise be overlooked andcoordinating research projects.Each component roadmapaddresses a critical learning scienceand technology R&D focus area:

Instructional Design for NewTechnology-Enabled Approachesto Learning

Understanding how people learn,how experts organize information,and the skills of effective learners

Learner Modeling and Assessment

What to measure, when to measureand how to use the information

Question Generation andAnswering Systems

How to take advantage of thebenefits offered by emergingtechnologies to facilitate inquiry

Building Simulations and VirtualEnvironments

How to build complex virtualenvironments that accuratelyreflect current understanding ofphysics, chemistry, biology, andmathematics that permit exploration-based pedagogy


20



Integration Tools for Building andMaintaining Advanced LearningSystems

Engineering strategies for usinglearning system tools to buildlearning systems

The component roadmaps werepresented in a July RoadmapIntegration Workshop conducted bythe FAS at the Institute for DefenseAnalyses in Virginia. The workshopbrought together many of the keyauthors and consultants who haveworked on the roadmaps to discussintegration of the componentroadmaps into a final research plan.These discussions led to beneficialfeedback and ideas. Leaders in thefields of cognitive science, andinformation technology were inattendance, each having dedicatedsignificant time and effort todevelop these roadmaps.

The LS&T R&D Roadmap can playa critical role in shaping the nationaldebate on the need for expandedlearning technology research. Itshould be particularly valuable toExecutive Agencies, Congress, andresearch institutions. The roadmapsare available on the website athttp://www.learningfederation.org/.

Major funding support for theroadmap developed was madepossible through a Federalappropriation to the Federation ofAmerican Scientists for the DigitalOpportunity Investment Trust. Wealso gratefully acknowledge thefunding support of the organizationsthat helped sponsor this work andmade possible the roadmap:Microsoft Research, NationalScience Foundation, Hewlett

Packard, Department of Defense,DDR&E, Carnegie Corporation ofNew York, and Hewlett Foundation.

SPECIAL EDITION OF THEASSESSMENT JOURNAL FOREDUCATION

The Learning Federation has beeninvited to co-edit a special issue ofEducation Assessment, an Erlbaumjournal. Several presenters from theLearning Federation workshop onLearning Modeling and Assessmentwill be writing articles that discussthe research presented at theworkshop, including: StudentModeling; Linking CognitivePsychology and Assessment;Learnome — a framework that canbe used to standardize andautomate task analysis, assessmentdesign and use; Assessment forFeedback; Technology SupportedAssessment Design; Assessmentpractices to encourage transfer; andAffective Measurement inTechnology Environments. HenryKelly, President of FAS, and RandyHinrichs, Group Research Managerfor Learning Science andTechnology group at MicrosoftResearch, will write the preface forthese articles. The edition will makean important contribution to the fieldof educational technology and weare thankful to all the contributors.The date of publication will beposted on our website.

A REPORT TO CONGRESS

The Federation of AmericanScientists and the DigitalOpportunity Investment Trust (DOIT) are partnered together to revamp

learning technologies in thehumanities and sciences. DO ITand FAS have made great progressin being granted a hearing on‘Digital Dividends and OtherProposals to Leverage Investment inTechnology’ which will be held in theHouse of Representative’s Energyand Commerce Subcommittee onTelecommunications and theInternet in this Congress. Thehearing had originally beenscheduled for September 3rd buthas been postponed temporarily.Witnesses from a variety of fieldsutilizing digitalization andtechnology for educationalpurposes will testify. Please keepon eye on our website or the DigitalPromise website http://www.digitalpromise.org/ for more details.

The FAS also worked with theDigital Promise Project to write areport to Congress entitled “TheDigital Opportunity InvestmentTrust: Transforming Rural andUrban Education, Learning andTraining.” It outlines the essentialneed for changing our traditionaleducation system by integratingtechnologies designed for learning.The report will inform our legislatorsabout what learning technologiesare and their potential to makelearning more engaging, moreproductive and more accessible toall Americans. This report showsthe necessity for the digitization ofour Nation’s resources in museumsand libraries. FAS, the LearningFederation and the Digital PromiseProject have brought together awealth of information pertaining tohow learning technologies couldrevitalize learning in a variety offields such as humanities, science,medicine, and manufacturing.

Learning Federation Progress Report — Continued from page 19

21


Learning Federation Progress Report — Continued from page 20

FAS has launched

a new

Learning Federation website

wwwwww..tthheelleeaarrnniinnggffeeddeerraattoonn..oorrgg

Exemplars of our latest learning anddigitized systems are reported. Thereport addresses every age group-K-12, higher education, workforcetraining, and lifetime learning. It is auseful and timely report for so manydifficult fields and seeks to haveenormous ramification oneducation policy in our nation. Weexpect the report to be publishedlater this autumn.

NEW WEBSITE- A TECHNOLOGYAT ITS BEST

To coincide with the publication ofthe Learning Federation’sLS&T R&D Roadmap, FAShas launched a new LearningFederation website! The website

will provide easier accessto information on previous andupcoming events and importanttimely news and reports abouteducational technology. The‘updates’ section will alert youto future events that The LearningFederation is participating in;our ‘news’ section will help tokeep you up to speed on theevents of the Ed Tech field andpolicies or politics related tothis field; in addition the ‘whatyou can do’ section will tell youabout relevant events or legislationand how you can take action.The special report section willarchive all of the critical reports fromThe Learning Federation, ourworkshops, other documents thatare important to learning

technologies, and our otherprojects. One of the most excitingand eagerly awaited features isthe ‘discussion boards’. This part ofour website will provide anelectronic forum for communicationbetween anyone who is interestingin our project. Participantsmay interact with some of the majorplayers in this field and can watchhotly debated topics be playedout electronically. Please log on andvoice your opinion and expertise athttp://www.thelearningfederation.org/.

Author’s note: Kendra Bodnar is the newmanager of the Learning TechnologiesProject at FAS.

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On Friday, August 8, the Federationof American Scientists held its finalFY03 Board of Directors meeting atits office in Washington, DC. The2003, 2004 and 2005 classes ofDirectors gathered together for thesecond time this year to review thestate of the organization and sharetheir visions of its future.

Informal morning sessions gaveBoard members an opportunityto meet with FAS Project Directorsin small groups and to discussthe issues most relevant to theirwork and personal interests.Chairman Frank von Hippel led theformal meeting in the afternoon.The Board reviewed FAS’ progressduring the past six months andfocused on plans for the futureoutlined in FAS’ final Strategic Plan(www.fas.org/stratplan). During thismeeting they focused on reviewingFAS work in nuclear and biologicalweapons areas in the StrategicSecurity program (Ivan Oelrich ledthe discussion helped by staff

members Stephanie Lorangerand Matthew Schroeder), andon the Learning Federation andDigital Opportunity InvestmentTrust projects (Kay Howell ledthe discussion).

Dr. Richard Sprott, of the LarryEllison Medical Institute, spokeabout his perspective on successfulNGO boards with an insightful,and occasionally hilarious,description of successful andunsuccessful boards he’s watchedin action (and inaction). It set upan energetic discussion on how tomake the FAS Board as productiveas possible.

The meeting concluded with atribute and thanks to Frank vonHippel, whose second term asBoard Chair came to a close in2003. The Board and staffrecognized his spectacularcontributions to FAS over manyyears, including service on theBoard. (See tribute on page 23.)

Later that evening, the FAS Board ofDirectors and Staff reconvened for adinner hosted by Secretary-Treasurer Jonathan Silver andhis family at their house inGeorgetown. The group washonored to hear from guest speakerDan Singer, who served asFAS General Counsel from 1960-1970. Dan and his wife Maxinehelped define the ways civilianscientists can play a constructive,and powerful role in shapingnational policy that continuesto guide FAS today.

The next Board of Directors meetingwill take place in December2003, and will be the first to includethe class of 2006. We thank allthe Directors and other guestswho helped to make the August2003 meeting a success, and welook forward to working with themthroughout the year.

Author’s note: Sarah Mason is FAS’Organization Manager.

FAS Holds Board MeetingBy Sarah J. Mason

Next Board Meeting

December 2003

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FAS BOARD CHAIRMAN, FRANKVON HIPPEL STEPS DOWN

FAS would like to acknowledgehow immensely grateful we are toFrank von Hippel for hisunparalleled contribution to FASover many decades.

In addition to serving as Chairmanof the FAS Board from 1979-1984 and again from 2000-2003,Frank provided the intellectualfoundation for what the organizationhas done in many areas,particularly in our core work tocontrol the continuing — andincreasing — danger of nuclearweapons and nuclear materials.He has helped provide vision,energy, and courage in the face

of political debacles — bothexternal and internal — andsteadfastly guided the organizationthrough some of its greatesttriumphs and its most difficult times.

Von Hippel has inspiredgenerations of young scholars bydefining what a “public interestscientist” can achieve throughcareful analysis of challengingproblems, through creative andpractical policy proposals, andpersistence. As Professor of Publicand International Affairs and Co-Director of the Program on Scienceand Global Security at the WoodrowWilson School at PrincetonUniversity and formerly as assistantdirector for national security inthe White House Office of Science

and Technology, he has madesignificant contributions to policyresearch in nuclear arms controland nonproliferation, energy,and checks and balances inpolicymaking for technology.

Frank’s work, and ours, is farfrom finished. But his unwaveringcommitment to bringing truth tothe public process, and hisastonishing record of success inthe face of terrible odds, continuesto give us an important measureof hope. We’ve gained enormouslyfrom Frank’s leadership and wehope that he’ll continue to bea close advisor and counselor toour organization for many yearsto come.

Election results for the FAS Boardof Directors will be reported inour December 2003 PIR issue.

FAS BIDS FAREWELL TOMARIANNE BAKIA, DIRECTOR OFTHE LEARNING TECHNOLOGIESPROJECT

Marianne Bakia served asthe Learning Technologies ProjectDirector for two and a halfyears, during which time she playeda vital leadership role that advancedthe aims of both the LearningFederation and the Digital PromiseProject. Marianne’s expertise,skills, energy and enthusiasmcontributed greatly to our researchplan to stimulate research anddevelopment in learning science

FAS Staff News


FAS member photo

Former Board Chairman, Frank von Hippel

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and technology. Working withnational experts, she helped toproduce several of the carefullydesigned component researchroadmaps that we hope will leadto a national initiative to realizevastly improved training andeducation for all Americans. Herpersistence and gentle coachingresulted in the quality documentswe have today.

We also appreciate the skilland energy she brought to helpforward the Digital Promisecoalition. Her ability tobalance the demands of the DigitalPromise project with the LearningFederation tasks allowed bothprojects to move forward ata remarkable pace. Throughouther time at FAS, we’ve benefitedfrom her calm in the most vexingfire drills, her strength of purpose,creative thinking and willingnessto face difficult challenges. Whileit is hard to say good-bye to sucha valuable team member, wewish her much success in hernew endeavors and look forwardto working with her in the futurein her new position at SRI.

FAS WELCOMES KENDRABODNAR

Kendra Bodnar joined the FAS team in August 2003 as theManager for the LearningTechnologies Project. At FAS, shewill work to raise awarenessof the opportunities emergingtechnologies create for educationand training and promote anational plan for a focused R&Dprogram in learning sciences andinformation technology.

Kendra received her B.S. in biologyat Duquesne University and wasawarded the Richard King Mellongrant to work on a research projectstudying evolutionary genetics. Shereceived her M.Sc. from BostonCollege where she examinedimmune cell development and shereceived her Ph.D. from theUniversity of Pittsburgh School ofMedicine with a concentration inMolecular Virology andMicrobiology. Her work has beenpublished in Infection and Immunity,Tuberculosis, and was highlightedin the American Society forMicrobiology’s News. During

graduate school Kendra wasinvolved in many aspects ofteaching. She was a teachingassistant and lecturer for variousclasses and laboratories. Inaddition, she participated inorganizing scientific workshops,lectures, and laboratories at theUniversity of Pittsburgh, CarlowCollege, and the Carnegie ScienceCenter that were designed tointerest young children andwomen in science and to pursuerelated careers.

Kendra’s research and teachingexperiences in graduate schoolfueled her interest in sciencepolicy. After graduate school,Kendra received the AmericanSociety for MicrobiologyScience and TechnologyCongressional Fellowship andworked on Capitol Hill in theoffice of Representative EdwardMarkey (D-MA), a senior memberof the House Energy andCommerce Committee. Duringthe year-long fellowship, sheworked on a variety of healthcare,biosecurities, and science andtechnology issues.

Staff News — Continued from page 23

WIIS-FAS NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION PANEL

The Federation of American Scientists and Women in International Security are co-sponsoring acolloquium on nuclear non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. An expert panel will examine thedifferences between these approaches and will debate their effectiveness as means of controlling thespread of nuclear weapons.

Monday, November 17, 5:30 pmThe Elliott School of International Affairs

George Washington University1957 E Street, NW, Room 602

We will provide additional information about the panel when the list of speakers is finalized. Check ourwebsite www.fas.org for updates or direct inquiries to Jaime Yassif at 202.454.4688, [email protected].

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FAS counts on members like you tosupport our efforts to advancesound science in public policy forgenerations to come. You can helpby encouraging others to join FASas members. Tell your friends, co-workers, family members about ourwork and urge them to become FASmembers. New members can joinusing our website www.fas.org, orby writing to the FAS office.

We also encourage you to considera gift donation. There are manyways to make a gift, includingoutright donations, gifts ofsecurities or other personal assets,and planned gifts. FAS is a tax-exempt, tax-deductible, 501(c)3organization. Every gift, no matterthe amount, counts as vital support

for FAS programs. The amount thatyou give is the amount that’s rightfor you.

As we move to the end of 2003,you, like many others, may bereviewing your long-term estate andfinancial plan. Please rememberthat your will, life insurance policies,retirement accounts and otherplanned giving vehicles may offerexceptional opportunities forleaving the lasting legacy of peace.

With your support, FAS willcontinue its work to secure a safe,healthy and rewarding future for allpeople. Donate now using oursecure online contribution form orplease contact Sharon Gleason [email protected] or 202.454.4680.

Leaving a Legacyof Peace

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HARVARD, RAND, JANE’S TEAMA G A I N S T B I O T E R R O R I S MResearch community joins lawenforcement, defense for criticalsummit

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Researcherswho must prepare for and respondto biological and chemical threatsare encouraged to attendBioSecurity 2003 (http://www.biosecuritysummit.com), organized byHarvard Medical International,Harvard Medical School andHarvard School of Public Health, inconjunction with the RAND Centerfor Domestic and InternationalHealth Security and Jane’sInformation Group.

Attendees will learn from leadingexperts how to best protect theircommunities from, and respond tobiological or chemical eventsinvolving anthrax, smallpox, SARSand more. In addition, the latestadvances from the lab will bepresented in conference andabstracts sessions.

The three-day summit, October 20-22 in Washington D.C., will bringtogether leaders in research,medicine, public health, lawenforcement, first response,defense and policy to shareintelligence, techniques andlessons learned from thebiosecurity trenches. Interestedparties should Register now at(http://www.biosecuritysummit.com/registration) to ensure their place atthis important gathering. FASmembers, please use priority code

BioSecurity 2003 Conference


The emergence of global terrorists potentially armed withbiological weapons necessitates a dramatic shift in how thebiological research community views its role andinvolvement with national security policy and decision-making. Furthermore, the lack of awareness of biosecurityrequirements and concerns among bioscientists in theacademic research community is a national securityvulnerability that must be addressed to avoid misuse ormisappropriation of dual use biological researchknowledge for bioweapons development. The policychallenge requires balancing science and security withoutcompromising national security or scientific progress.

With that goal in mind FAS is pleased to be a FoundingSupporter of BioSecurity 2003, a conference dedicated topractical problem solving for global biosecurity.

OCTOBER 21 - 22, 2003Washington, DC

FAS members receive a registration.

REGISTER NOWTo ensure your spot at this important event,

please register now atwww.biosecuritysummit.com/registration

using priority code FASBIO1to receive a $300 discount on an

All Access or All Access Plus pass.

For more information,visit http://www.biosecuritysummit.com

or contact Ben Sullivan at 323.954.6078.

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FASBIO1 when registering toreceive a $300 discount on an AllAccess or All Access Plus pass.

RECEIVE CONTINUING MEDICALEDUCATION CREDIT

The Harvard Medical School isaccredited by the AccreditationCouncil for Continuing MedicalEducation (AACME) to sponsorcontinuing medical educationfor physicians. Harvard MedicalSchool designates this educationalactivity for up to 24.75 hoursin category 1 toward the AMA/Physician’s Recognition Award.Each physician should claimonly those hours of credit thathe or she actually spent in theeducational activity.

Application has been made fornursing contact hours.

TOOLS AND TECHNOLOGY

In addition to three days ofintensive, hands-on conferencesessions and workshops,BioSecurity 2003 will feature anexhibit of the latest tools,technology and services availableto biosecurity professionals. Apartial list of past exhibitorsincludes: Agilent, Batelle, CitigateGIS, FDA, Jane’s, NACCHO, NIAID,PAHO, Pfizer, Quidel, SAIC andothers. Organizations interested inexhibiting their products shouldcontact: Curtis Chiu at [email protected] or David [email protected] formore information.

BioSecurity 2003 — Continued from page 26

BIOSECURITY 2003 SPEAKERS AND ADVISORY BOARDMEMBERS INCLUDE:

Anthony Fauci — Director, National Institute for Allergy and InfectiousDisease

Barry Bloom — Dean, Harvard School of Public HealthDavid Heyman — Exec. Director, Communicable Diseases, World

Health OrganizationDennis O’Leary — President, Joint Commission on Accreditation of

Healthcare OrganizationsGeorges Benjamin — Director, American Public Health AssociationJames Kvatch — Chief Scientist, Defense Intelligence Agency, Armed

Forces Medical Intelligence CenterJohn Marburger — White House Office of Science and Technology

PolicyJoseph Martin — Dean, Harvard Medical SchoolLawrence Kerr — Director of Bioterrorism Research and Development,

U.S. Dept. of Homeland SecurityLester Crawford — Deputy Director, U.S. Food and Drug

AdministrationLt. Martin Ryczek — Chicago Police DepartmentSylvie Beaudoin — Montreal EMS, Urgences-santéZarnaaz Rauf — National Association of County and City Heath

Organizations

BIOSECURITY 2003 TRACKS AND SESSIONS INCLUDE:

Changing Priorities of Disaster ResponseFood and Agro TerrorismGlobal HealthLessons Learned from Anthrax AttacksLiving and Working With SARSManagement Analysis of a Catastrophic EventOperational, Prototype and Next Generational Biosecurity Science

and TechnologyPublic Health Preparedness Today, TomorrowPublic Mental HealthSmallpox: A Case StudyStress, Terror and CommunicationsSyndromic Surveillance: Outbreak Detection & Disease MonitoringThe Hospital Emergency Evaluation Tool

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FASPublic Interest Report

1717 K Street NW, Suite 209, Washington, DC 20036(202) 546-3300 [email protected]

Autumn 2003, Volume 56, Number 3

The FAS Public Interest Report

The FAS Public Interest Report (USPS 188-100) is published quarterly at1717 K St. NW Suite 209, Washington, DC20036. Annual subscription is $50/year.Copyright©2003 by the Federation of American Scientists.

Archived FAS Public Interest Reports areavailable online at www.fas.org or phone(202) 546-3300, fax (202) 675-1010, oremail [email protected].

EDITORIAL STAFF

EDITOR: Henry Kelly, PresidentASSISTANT EDITOR: Michelle Lucey-Roper,

Special Projects Coordinator

ADDRESS SERVICE REQUESTED

NON-PROFIT ORG.FIRST CLASS

U.S. POSTAGEPAID

PERMIT #273ANNAPOLIS, MD

Attention FAS Members!

In our continuing effort to provide FAS members with livelyand timely articles in national security policy and otherareas of science and technology policy, we are invitingmembers to submit proposals for articles in areas ofinterest to FAS members (maximum 1000 words).Selection of the articles is at the discretion of the Editor.Completed articles will be peer reviewed.

Proposals should be sent to the Editor, PIR, Federation ofAmerican Scientists, 1717 K St. NW, Suite 209,Washington, DC 20036, or to [email protected]. Please provideus with your full address including email in allcorrespondence.

Documents

Journal of the Federation of The Real Terrorist Missile ... · PDF fileBy Walter E. Parham, Ph.D. Over the past few years, the highest levels of China’s government ... * Julius Axelrod