Joseph M. Farley, Unit 1, Enclosure 1, Updated Seismic ...report submits the entire body of the report, Attachments 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 (which are revised ... This required the opening

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report

Enclosure I

Licensing Summary of Walkdown Report

Enclosure 1 to NL-14-0249Licensing Summary of Walkdown Report

LICENSING SUMMARY OF WALKDOWN REPORT

The report objective is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at the Joseph M.Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 in response to the NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter datedMarch 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic". The scope of the walkdownswas to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to theseismic licensing basis. The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRIReport 1025286 (Reference 2), which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. This finalreport submits the entire body of the report, Attachments 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 (which are revisedfrom Version 1 submitted November 27, 2012), and new Attachments 7 and 8 added by Version2 of this report.

SNC submitted its original walkdown report for FNP Unit 1 on November 27, 2012, inaccordance with the March 12, 2012, NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter. During that initial walkdown,some equipment was identified as not being accessible, as noted in Table 7-1 of SNC'sNovember 27, 2012, response. This equipment could not be accessed because of one of twoconditions: (1) plant operating conditions, or (2) component inspections required the opening ofcabinet/panel doors which was not permitted by plant Operations personnel during the time ofthe walkdowns. Consequently, walkdowns had to be deferred until the outage. Additionally,supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse seismicconditions was received after the FNP Unit 1 walkdowns were complete. Consequently,walkdown of equipment affected by this guidance was deferred until after SNC's Novemberresponse and was included in Table 7-1 of the November 27, 2012, response. Walkdowns ofthis equipment along with the equipment originally deemed as inaccessible have beencompleted. Table 7-1 has been updated to show this equipment as complete with thecompletion date noted.

During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of fourteen (14) Unit 1 Potentially AdverseConditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. Eleven of these wereidentified and included in Version 1.0 of the FNP Seismic Walkdown Report while 3 wereidentified during the most recent walkdowns. It has been determined that none of these as-found conditions would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions as definedby Reference 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified duringthe walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative totheir seismic licensing basis. This table has been updated to provide the status of these areas.

During the most recent walkdowns, one item was deemed inaccessible and was removed fromthe Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) 1. Item 34 in Table 7-1 was not inspected as theanchorage was not completely accessible without extensive disassembly. This change to theSWEL is acceptable since an adequate number of similar component walkdowns that satisfy theminimum SWEL component types for this category were performed. The number of samples tobe included in the SWEL as required by Reference 2 of this letter is still met.

In conclusion, the Seismic Walkdowns at FNP Unit 1 in response to the NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f)letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are complete. FNPUnit 1 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warrantmodification to the plant. FNP Unit 1 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs fromperforming their required safety functions.

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit IUpdated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report

Enclosure 2

Updated Farley Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution ofFukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic

NO. SNCF164-RPT-01

PROJECT REPORT VERSION 2.0COVER SHEET Page 1 of 58

Farley Unit I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC432467

For

Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic

Prepared by:

James Dovel

Date:

Reviewed by:

Approved by: (ENERCON)

Pioject Manager or Designee

Date:

Date:

2- Is- wZ0j

2- (z-'

Approved by:

(SNc)Technical Lead or Designee IPea- Review Team Leader

Approved by:

(SNC)Project Manager or Designee

Date:I Melanie Brown

/7

2 / .7 26WLTe 7ryQ Mitchell

Date:

FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01FOR

RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 2 OF 58

TABLE OF CONTENTSSection Title Pave

EX EC U TIV E SU M M A R Y ............................................................................................................ 31.0 SC O PE A N D O BJECTIV E ................................................................................................... 42.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH .................. 53.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS SUMMARY ....................................................................... 6

3.1 SAFE SHUTDOW N EARTHQUAKE .......................................................................................................... 6

3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND M ETHODS ........................................................................................ 8

4.0 PER SO N N EL Q U A LIFIC A TIO N S ..................................................................................... 9

4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................................................................ 1i

4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUM M ARIES (Report Version 1) ............................................................................ 12

4.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUM M ARIES (Report Version 2) ............................................................................... 17

5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING ..................................................................... 196.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT ................................. 20

6.1 DEVELOPM ENT OF SW EL I ............................................................................................................................ 21

6.2 DEVELOPM ENT OF SW EL 2 ............................................................................................................................ 24

7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS ...................................................... 26

7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEM S ..................................................................................................................................... 28

8.0 R ESU LTS .................................................................................................................................. 35

8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISM IC CONDITIONS ................................................................................. 35

8.2 EQUIPM ENT OPERABILITY ............................................................................................................................ 47

8.3 PLANT CHANGES .............................................................................................................................................. 47

8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS ......................................................................................................... 48

9.0 PEER R EV IEW ........................................................................................................................ 49

9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS .................................................................................................................................. 49

9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS SUMM ARY ........................................................................................................ 49

10.0 RE FERE N C ES ......................................................................................................................... 5711.0 A TTA C H M EN TS ..................................................................................................................... 58



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Seismic Walkdowns at Farley Unit I in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012,"Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are complete as all items on the Seismic WaikdownEquipment List (SWEL) have been inspected. The walkdowns were performed using the methodology

outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term

Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report 1025286). Plant Farley Unit 1 had nosignificant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to theplant. Plant Farley Unit I had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their

required safety functions.

FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01FOR


1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE

The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at Farley Unit 1 inresponse to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3:Seismic" (Reference 10.1).

The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2),which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify

potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.

The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Farley Unit 1 are complete as all items on the SWEL have beeninspected. This is the final report and documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and AreaWalk-bys. This final report submits the entire body of the report, Attachments 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 whichare revised from Version 1 submitted November 27, 2012, and the new Attachments 7 and 8 added byVersion 2 of this report.

FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCFI64-RPT-01FOR


2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH

The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC

endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance withReference 10.2, the following topics are addressed in this report:

" Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the Systems, Structures and Components(SSCs) in the plant (Section 3.0);

* Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);

* Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the

Individual Plant Examination for External Events IPEEE program (Section 5.0);

" Selection of Seismic Category I SSCs that were inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);

• Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);

" Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases

(Section 8.0); and

* Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).

Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions wasreceived on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and

switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening thecomponents was not required to be able to inspect the anchorage. At the time of this supplementalguidance/clarification, the Farley Unit 1 walkdowns were complete for the items that were consideredaccessible. However, the components affected by the supplemental guidance were identified and havebeen re-inspected with component doors opened. The walkdowns for all components are nowcomplete. Further discussion is given in Section 7.0.



3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS SUMMARY

This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems,

and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-

specific seismic licensing basis requirements.

3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE

The criteria for determining the adequacy of Seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment

for the Farley Nuclear Plant are described in various areas of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

(UFSAR) (Reference 10.14). In some cases the criteria are specified in general terms to require

verification by tests or analyses. In other cases, more specific criteria are specified such as verification

in accordance with IEEE Standard 344-1971. At the time of the original design and licensing of the

plant the requirements were changing to the use of IEEE 344-1975. These two separate programs wereused to verify the seismic adequacy of Farley's mechanical and electrical equipment.

By letter dated February 19, 1987, the NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 87-02, (Reference 10.4). On

May 22, 1992, the NRC issued GL 87-02, Supplement I (Reference 10.8). As documented in NUREG-

1211 (Reference 10.9), GL 87-02 is applicable to Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1, since Unit 1 hadnot previously been audited by the NRC's Seismic Qualification Review Team (SQRT). Southern

Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) replied to GL 87-02 by letter dated September 10, 1992. The SNC

letter included a commitment to use the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) methodology as

documented in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for the resolution of seismic issuesidentified in GL 87-02 for FNP Unit 1. The SQUG methodology is based on application of earthquake

experience data to verify the seismic adequacy of equipment. The seismic evaluation for FNP Unit 1was completed, and the results were documented in a document entitled, "Unresolved Safety Issue A-

46 Summary Report." This document was submitted to the NRC by letter dated May 18, 1995, as a 10

CFR 50.54(f) response. SNC received an SER dated July 9, 1998, concerning FNP Unit I UnresolvedSafety Issue (USI) A-46 resolution and it stated that SNC's USI A-46 program implementation resulted

in safety enhancements beyond the original licensing basis and SNC actions provide sufficient basis to

close the USI A-46 review at the facility.



Geologic and seismologic surveys of the site have been conducted to establish two "design

earthquakes" with different intensities of ground motion. These are the 50 percent SSE ('/2 SSE) and

the SSE with different intensities of ground motion. The ½/2 SSE, sometimes referred to as theoperating basis earthquake (OBE), is postulated to be the earthquake that could be expected to occur atthe site during the operating life of the plant. The SSE represents the strongest earthquake that is

hypothetically postulated to occur during an infinite period. The intensity postulated to occur at thesite for both the V2 SSE and SSE is defined from the history of seismic activity in the area around thesite.

The /2 SSE and SSE are specified in terms of a set of idealized, smooth curves, called the designspectra because they specify a range of values for two of the important properties of an earthquakeground motion, i.e., the maximum ground acceleration and the frequency distribution. The SSEproduces the vibratory ground motion for which Category I structures, systems and components are

designed to remain functional.

The ½ SSE and SSE spectra are each developed for 0%, 0.5%, 1.0%, 2.0%, 3.0%, and 5.0% of criticaldamping, with a horizontal ground peak acceleration of 0.05 g and 0.10 g, and vertical groundacceleration of 0.033 g and 0.067 g, respectively.

POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASIS

Seismic Category I structures, systems and components are designed so that stresses remain withinnormal code allowable limits during the ½2 SSE and to ensure they will perform their required safety-related functions during and after an SSE.

MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS

The horizontal and vertical OBE and SSE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the

seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity ofSeismic Category II SSCs, where required. In addition, systems supported by more than one structure

shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements between the supporting structures.

The seismic analyses of safety related systems, equipment, and components are based on either theresponse spectra method, the time-history method, or the equivalent static method.

Although original seismic qualification was done to IEEE 344-1971, the USI A-46 Program verifiedthat the original seismic qualification was adequate to support the seismic qualification of theequipment to the later requirements of IEEE 344-1975. Seismic qualification for new and replacement



equipment is therefore based on the guidelines of IEEE 344-1975. Any new, replacement or changesto electrical and mechanical equipment are evaluated to the guidelines contained in IEEE 344-1975.

Damping values are provided in UFSAR Table 3.7-1.

3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS AND METHODS

The design codes and standards for seismic qualification are listed throughout Section 3.0 of theFarley UFSAR (Reference 10.14). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used in

the original design of Farley Unit I are listed below.

" ACI 318-71, Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete

* American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), Manual of Steel Construction, 7 th

Edition

* ASME III Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1968 Edition

* ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Pumps and Valves for Nuclear Power.

" ASME VIII Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1968 Edition

" ANSI B31.1 Power Piping

* ANSI B3 3 .7 Nuclear Power Piping

* BC-TOP-4, Seismic Analysis of Structures and Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,

September, 1972

" IEEE 317-1976, Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in ContainmentStructures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations

* IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class 1 E Equipment for Nuclear Power

Generating Stations

* IEEE 344-1971 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IEEquipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Methods include both analysis and

testing.

" IEEE 344-1975 Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IEEquipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Methods include both analysis andtesting.



4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per the EPRI Report1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 identify the Peer Review Team members and

responsibilities for Versions I and 2 of this report, respectively. Section 4.1 provides an overview of

the project responsibilities. Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 include brief experience summaries for allproject personnel in alphabetical order.

Table 4-1 Project Team Members and Responsibilities

Site Equipment Seismic Licensing

Name Point of Selection / Plant Walkdown BasisContact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer(POC) Reviewer (SWE)

William Arens X X

Nikole Arrant X X

Maggie Farah X X

Ryan Harlos X X X X

(See Note 3)

Crystal Lovelady X X

Laura Maclay X X

Paul Miktus* X X

Ronald Miranda* X X

Alan Mullenix X X

Brian Nelson X X X

(See Note 3)

Scott Walden* X X

Robert Wood X X

Taylor Youngblood X X X

Stephen Yuan X X



Table 4-2 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities

(Report Version 1)

Name

Robert Ashworth*

Melanie Brown*

Richard Starck*

Kenneth Whitmore*

Table 4-3 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities

(Report Version 2)

Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal

Name Review Peer Peer Basis Peer Report PeerTeam Reviewer Reviewer Reviewer ReviewerLeader

Melanie Brown* X X X X X

Richard Starck* X X X X

Notes (Table 4-1, Table 4-2 and Table 4-3):

1) * Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer

2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plantCorrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of enteringthe condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the conditionwith respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performedas discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel notdirectly involved in the walkdowns.


RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHiMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE11OF58

3) Brian Nelson was named Site Point of Contact subsequent to the completion of the

walkdowns required for Version 2. Prior to this, Ryan Harlos was the Site Point ofContact.

4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES

The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with thesite equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization. The site POCcoordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such asinspection equipment and support from plant operations. The POC was responsible for development ofthe walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.

Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for theSeismic Walkdowns. The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, andassociated SSCs. The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program. For this project, site engineersand plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection. The ESP also performed theresponsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers. The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scopeincluded a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs Seismic WalkdownEquipment List (SWEL) and Base List to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in avariety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown.Plant Operations Personnel also assisted in obtaining access to components and component internalsand helped to coordinate with plant maintenance. For the Farley Unit I project, the Plant OperationsPersonnel were either former or currently licensed Senior Reactor Operators.

The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained inthe EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs who had previously completed the SeismicWalkdown Training Class developed by the SQUG were not required to complete training on theNTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities andactivities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.

The Licensing Basis Reviewers were responsible for determining whether any potentially adverseseismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing BasisReviewers have knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation forthe SSCs at Farley.


RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE12OF58

A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of

the walkdowns. The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design andqualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience. The PeerReview Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program

satisfied the guidance in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES (Report Version 1)

Listed below are the experience summaries of the personnel who contributed to Version 1 of this

report.

William Arens (SNC)

Mr. Arens is the Licensing Supervisor at Farley Nuclear Plant. He earned a B.S. in MechanicalEngineering from the University of Oklahoma in 1980. Mr. Arens served for eight years as an officer

in the U.S. Navy nuclear submarine force. He has been employed at Farley Nuclear Plant since 1988,

obtaining a Senior Reactor Operator License in 1991. His experience at Farley includes serving as aMOV engineer, Shift Support Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, Operations Superintendent, and ShiftManager.

Robert Ashworth, SCE (MPR)

Mr. Ashworth is a structural engineer with MPR and has more than six years of experience withproviding engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems.

His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition,

structural modeling and analyses, and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry

standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has

completed the training course for the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance and is also a SeismicCapability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of US[ A-46.

Melanie Brown, SCE (SNC)

Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been

serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification

Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activitiesassociated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including:

" Management of the seismic design bases,

" Seismic equipment qualification,

FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCFI64-RPT-01FOR


* Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components,

* Design documentation and configuration management.

She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants. Ms. Brown is

a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of USI A-46.

Maggie Farah, SWE (ENERCON)

Ms. Farah is a Structural Engineer with a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the New Jersey Institute ofTechnology and currently pursuing a Master's degree in Structural Engineering. Ms. Farah has beenemployed as a structural engineer at ENERCON for more than four years and has extensive

experience in performing seismic equipment evaluations and structural analysis. She has performednumerous plant walkdowns as part of seismic design and modifications and had extensive on-site

experience at Humboldt Bay and at the Metropolis Works fuel processing plant. She has been involvedin various plant modifications, including design of dry fuel storage installations. Ms. Farah completed

the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a SWE.

Ryan Harlos, SWE (SNC)

Mr. Harlos is a mechanical engineer in the Farley Engineering Systems Department at SouthernNuclear Operating Company and has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Auburn University. Hehas been employed in the nuclear industry for approximately three years and has extensive experiencein the design, operation, and monitoring of systems with respect to their applicable design bases. Hisprimary experience is with SSCs on the Primary Side of PWR nuclear operating plants. Mr. Harlosalso worked as a co-op employee for Southern Company for more than a year, while in college, priorto joining the staff at Farley Nuclear Station as a full-time employee. Mr. Harlos completed the EPRItraining on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns.

Crystal Lovelady, SWE (SNC)

Ms. Lovelady is a civil engineer in the Fleet Design Engineering Mechanical/Civil group at SouthernNuclear Operating Company. She has a B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University of Alabama,Huntsville. She has more than five years of experience in structural analysis and design of structures in

the power industry. She has additional experience as a member of the structural monitoring team atPlant Hatch and. Plant Farley. Ms. Lovelady completed training on Near Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns to qualify as a SWE.



Laura Maclay, SWE (ENERCON)

Ms. Maclay has over three years of experience as a structural engineer with ENERCON. Her taskshave ranged from assisting with the development and preparation of design change packages to

performing design calculations and markups, comment resolutions, and drawing revisions. She workedon-site at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant for a year preparing structural evaluations of SSCs for anExtended Power Uprate (EPU). She designed safety related supports for computer and electricalequipment for the Turbine Digital Controls Upgrade package and other similar packages. Herresponsibilities also included the review of calculations, drawings and vendor documentation for theseismic evaluation of the Unit 3 Palfinger Crane inside containment and new platforms in the HighPressure Turbine enclosure. Recent work includes Fukushima flooding walkdowns at Limerick

Generating Station. Ms. Maclay recently completed the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown TrainingCourse and was qualified as a SWE.

Paul Miktus, SCE (ENERCON)

Mr. Miktus, P.E., has over 35 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design, construction andoperation of nuclear power plants and process/industrial facilities retrofits. Mr. Miktus held positionsof responsibility in a number of supervisory and management positions for ENERCON for clientsincluding Florida Power and Light, Southern Company and Entergy. His design experience includesstructural steel design (including anchorages); suspended systems (piping, ductwork, raceways)supports; seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; rigging and scaffolds; piping stressanalysis; and concrete slabs, beams and foundations. At River Bend Station, while with Entergy, Mr.

Miktus was Engineering Supervisor for many large projects and completed the SQUG WalkdownScreening and Seismic Evaluation Training and the Seismic IPEEE Add-On Training Courses.

Ronald Miranda, SCE (ENERCON)

Mr. Miranda is a member of the ENERCON Senior Technical and Management staff with 40 years ofexperience in the Nuclear Power Generation industry. He has held various engineering andmanagement positions in the industry, holds a MS degree in Civil Engineering and is a SCE certifiedby the SQUG. Mr. Miranda is experienced in structural steel and reinforced concrete design,

anchorage to concrete, identification and assessment of degraded structural conditions, evaluationsusing SQUG methodologies, and the management of large, complex, and high-visibility projects. Mr.

Miranda is currently the ENERCON Dry Fuel Storage Product Line Manager responsible for the

development and the design of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations at power generatingfacilities under static, dynamic, and flooding conditions compliant with 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 72


RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMiA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE15OF58

regulations and industry standards. Mr. Miranda is recognized as an expert within the dry fuel storage

industry.

Alan Mullenix, SWE (ENERCON)

Mr. Mullenix is a Registered Professional Engineer with over five years of Civil/Structural experience.He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering and a Master of Science degree in Structural Engineering. Hisprimary responsibilities include structural design, seismic design, and Design Change Package

development. Mr. Mullenix assisted with 10 CFR 73.55 Nuclear Plant Security upgrades, IndependentSpent Fuel Storage Installations, and other design changes at Plant Farley, Plant Hatch, Brunswick,Crystal River, and Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations. Mr. Mullenix completed his training on Near TermTask Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)

Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic

qualification of nuclear plant equipment. He is the principal author of the EPRI Seismic WalkdownGuidance Document (Reference 10.2) and developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3

Seismic Walkdown Training Course to over 200 engineers. He provided technical oversight of workfor various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr. Starck developed for SQUG the genericguidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG GIP, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and theSQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE andhas performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical

equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program. This work included equipment

qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operabilitydetermination.

Scott Walden, SCE (SNC)

Mr. Walden is a senior engineer in the Fleet Design Analysis / Civil department at SNC. He has a B.S.in Civil Engineering from Mississippi State University. Mr. Walden has more than 33 years of

experience in structural analysis and design of structures for electric utilities, including extensive

experience in seismic analysis of nuclear power plant structures and seismic qualification of

equipment. He has extensive experience in the area of analysis of supports and also worked indeveloping the response spectra curves for Plant Hatch. He also has extensive experience in the

Structure Monitoring Program (SMP) for Maintenance Rule and is responsible for oversight of the



SMP for Plant Farley. He successfully completed the SQUG training course, is a Seismic CapabilityEngineer and participated in the original IPEEE/SQUG walkdown for Plant Farley and the

conduit/cable tray SQUG walkdowns for Plant Hatch. He is a registered Professional Engineer in thestates of Alabama and Mississippi.

Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)

Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic

design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a SeismicCapability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification

of nuclear plant components. Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developedthe SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peerreview of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdownsat Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations atnumerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of

the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismictests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components. Mr. Whitmore hassignificant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience inperforming plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr. Whitmore completed his EPRItraining on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Seismic Walkdowns as a SeismicWalkdown Engineer (SWE) in June 2012.

Robert Wood (SNC)

Mr. Wood is the Farley Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds BS degrees inPhysical Science, Mathematics, and Chemistry from Troy State University. Mr. Wood has over 37years of experience at operating nuclear plants, was licensed as a SRO and served seven years on shift

as Shift Support Supervisor and Unit Shift Supervisor. He has supervisory experience in chemistry,work management, strategic analysis and major project management.

Taylor Youngblood, SWE (SNC)

Mr. Youngblood is a Site Projects Lead at Plant Farley working primarily in major projects. He has a

B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Mr. Youngblood has 12years of civil engineering experience with more than four of those years spent at Plant Farley in the

areas of civil/structural design. His design experience includes evaluations and calculations forseismically qualifying various supports and structures. His specialties are in the areas of concrete and



earthwork, and he has developed an expertise in lifting and rigging evaluations. Mr. Youngblood is aregistered Professional Engineer in the State of Alabama. Mr. Youngblood completed the EPRItraining on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3.- Plant Seismic Walkdowns in June 2012.

Stephen Yuan, SWE (ENERCON)

Mr. Yuan, P.E., is a Senior Civil Engineer in ENERCON's New Jersey office. He has over 20 years ofexperience in structural modeling, design, upgrading, electrical facility structure analyses andmaintenance of industrial installations and nuclear power plants, including significant experience atPerry, Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee Plant. Mr. Yuan was one of the key civil engineers in support ofthe transformer replacement project at Perry Nuclear Power Plant. He holds a M.S. in Civil

Engineering from the City University of New York. Mr. Yuan recently completed the NTTF 2.3Seismic Walkdown Training Course and was qualified as a Seismic Walkdown Engineer (SWE).

4.3 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES (Report Version 2)

Listed below are the names of personnel who contributed to the work addressed by Version 2 of thisreport. The personnel shown worked on Version 1 as well as Version 2 unless noted otherwise.Experience summaries for personnel who only worked on Version 2 are provided below. Experiencesummaries for the others are provided in Section 4.2. The experience levels of personnel listed inSection 4.2 have not been updated for Version 2.

William Arens (SNC)

Nikole Arrant, SWE (SNC) [Version 2 Only]

Melanie Brown, SCE (SNC)

David Hall (SNC) [Version 2 Only]

Ryan Harlos, SWE (SNC)

Laura Maclay, SWE (ENERCON)

Alan Mullenix, SWE (ENERCON)

Brian Nelson, SWE (SNC) [Version 2 Only]



Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)

Taylor Youngblood, SWE (SNC)

Nikole Arrant, SWE (SNC)

Ms. Arrant is a civil engineer in the Farley Mechanical/Civil Design Department at Southern NuclearOperating Company. She has a B.S. in Civil Engineering from Florida State University and has beenemployed in the nuclear industry for approximately four years, all of which have been spent in the

Plant Farley Mechanical/Civil Design Department in the area of civil/structural design. Her designexperience and specialties include evaluations and calculations for seismically qualifying varioussupports and structures. Ms. Arrant completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns in February 2013.

David Hall (SNC)

Mr. Hall is the Farley Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds a B.S. in NuclearScience Management from Troy State University. He has over 35 years of experience at operatingnuclear plants. He was licensed as an SRO for 30 years and served on shift as Shift Foreman. He hassupervisory experience in Operations, Training and major project management.

Brian Nelson, SWE (SNC)

Mr. Nelson is a Mechanical Engineer in the Farley Site Design Department and has a B.S. in

Mechanical Engineering from Auburn University. He has been an employee with Southern NuclearOperating Company at Plant Farley for approximately four years and has extensive experience indesign of components and systems relative to their design basis. His primary experience has been inthe area of mechanical design, but has performed calculations for the qualification of supports in thearea of seismic design. Mr. Nelson completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task ForceRecommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns in February 2013.



5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING

Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program is reported in

Attachment 5. Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or otherfindings. For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also provides a description of the action taken toeliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability.

Plant Farley completed modifications for all non-relay items on or before December 31, 1995, and forall relays on or before December 31, 1996. The Equipment Selection/IPEEE Reviewers (see Table 4-1)reviewed the IPEEE implementation documents and final report to determine the list of itemsidentified as having vulnerabilities and the required modifications.

The SWEL for Farley Unit I included 28 components for which seismic vulnerabilities werepreviously identified during the IPEEE program. During the walkdowns, the walkdown teams verifiedthat the recommended resolutions to the IPEEE vulnerabilities associated with these 28 items were

resolved.

FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01FOR I


6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT

A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Farley systems and components developed

the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided inSection 4.0 of this report. The equipment selection personnel used a SNC-template to ensurecompliance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.

Two SWELs were developed (SWEL 1 and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in the EPRI Report1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL I consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the

reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286(Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of

the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant.Attachment I provides the final SWEL I and SWEL 2.

In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with

equivalent components. These changes were made when it was determined during the SeismicWalkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve duringa walkdown. For example, components located very high in the overhead were replaced withequivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding. All such changes meet the provisionsof the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Attachment I in Version 1 of this report contains theSWELs after all changes were incorporated (at the time of Version 1 report submittal).

Under Version 2 of this report, Attachment I also contains the final SWELs resulting from thecompleted walkdowns (items indicated in Table 7-1).



6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL I

SWEL I was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

Screens 1 through 3

These screens were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that does not undergo regularinspection but support the five safety functions described in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference10.2). Page 3-1 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) lists three screens for use in selecting theBase List 1 if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plantevaluations. Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised ofSeismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions listed in the EPRIReport 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

In accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), page 3-3, Screens 1 through 3 can besatisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the SeismicReview Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Farley IPEEE Report for Unit I(Reference 10.6), Appendix A-Seismic Report, was used as the Base List for the development ofSWEL 1.

The intent of the Base List 1 was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down thereactor and maintain containment integrity following a SSE. The specific guidance used to create theIPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear PowerPlant Seismic Margin", (Reference 10.13). The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE - Seismic was checked and

verified to meet the intentions set forth in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

As stated in EPRI Report 1025286, the equipment on the SWEL must include equipment required toperform the following five safety functions:

* Reactor reactivity control

* Reactor coolant pressure control

* Reactor coolant inventory control

* Decay heat removal, and

" Containment function.


RESOLUTION OF FUIKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 22 OF 58

The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.0.2 of the IPEEE - SeismicReport. Specifically, one preferred and one alternate path capable of achieving and maintaining a safe-shutdown condition for at least 72 hours following a Plant Farley Safe Shutdown Earthquake wasselected for each unit. Further, it was assumed that a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident(SBLOCA) had occurred and as such, the paths were also selected as being capable of mitigating a

SBLOCA following an SSE. Plant Operations' input resulted in the inclusion of swing components notlisted on the original IPEEE SSEL. Other suggestions by Plant Operations for inclusion in the SWEL,

such as instrumentation stanchions and piping components, were determined to be covered by existingplant programs. Based on this, samples of those component types were not required to be added to the

SWEL.

Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List, it was determined that the list did satisfy therequirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which is a list comprised ofSeismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the aforementioned five safety functions that areused to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment cooling integrity.

Base List 1 is presented in Attachment 1.

Screen 4

Screen 4 provides the sample considerations used to select components that make up the SWEL fromthe components contained in Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL I was developedthrough an iterative process that ensured a representative sample of components was included in theSWEL. Various drafts of SWEL I were provided to Farley licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SROs)for review and input. The SROs identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipmentimportant to plant operations.

The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1:

" Variety of systems

" Major new or replacement equipment

* Classes of equipment

* Variety of environments

" Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program

" Risk Significance


RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC I

________________ _____________________jPAGE 23OF 58

Variety of Systems - The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that equipment from a

variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base Listwere reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.

Maior New and Replacement Equipment - Major new or replacement equipment installed within theprevious 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipmentfrom input from plant personnel familiar with plant modifications and from the Probabilistic RiskAssessment (PRA) group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.

Variety of Equipment Classes - A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on theSWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The final SWEL

contains a wide variety of components and includes a representative sample of components from eachequipment class except classes 11, 13 and 19. The SWEL does not contain Class 11 or 13 components

since it was developed from the SSEL associated with the IPEEE as described previously which doesnot contain Class 11 or 13 equipment. This is consistent with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference10.2) for development of the SWEL.

Equipment Class 19 is not in scope for SWEL 1. The only Class 19 components on the Base List areReactor Coolant System (RCS) RTDs installed on the RCS Piping. This is also consistent with theEPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which states, "The major pieces of equipment in the NSSS thatare located inside the containment are excluded from the scope of this program. Also excluded are thesupports for this equipment along with all the components mounted in or on this NSSS equipment".

Variety of Environments - The EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that the SWEL contains componentslocated in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and hightemperatures. SWEL I includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g.Containment Building, Main Steam Valve Room), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Auxiliary Building), andOutdoors/Intake Structures (e.g. Valve Boxes, Service Water Intake Structure).

IPEEE Vulnerabilities - SWEL I includes equipment identified as having seismic vulnerabilities asreported in Farley IPEEE Report for Unit 1 (Reference 10.6).

Risk Significance - Information from the Farley Unit 1 PRA and the Maintenance Ruleimplementation documentation were used to determine whether items were risk significant. A

representative sample of Risk Significant items are included on the SWEL. As stated, plant SROsreviewed the SWEL to ensure that equipment important to plant operation were included on the list.



6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2

SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment 1.

Screens 1 through 2

The equipment selected through Screens I and 2 provide Seismic Category I components associatedwith the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also accessible for a walkdown. For Farley Unit 1, the onlySeismic Category I equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Cooling and PurificationSystem. The Seismic Category I SSCs in the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System that are

accessible and available for a walkdown comprise Base List 2.

Screen 3

Screen 3 is the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment is included in

SWEL 2. These considerations include:

" Variety of systems

* Major new or replacement equipment

* Classes of equipment

* Variety of environments

Using the Base List 2 developed from the SFP System, the following criteria were used to select asample of the SFP Seismic Category I equipment and systems:

* Variety of systems - Only one system comprises Base List 2

" Major new or replacement equipment - No major new or replacement equipment installations

with the past 15 years.

* Classes of equipment - There are only 3 types of equipment in Base list 2: manual valves, Ipump per train, and I heat exchanger per train. Additionally, one heat exchanger was included

on SWEL I and therefore this selected heat exchanger was not chosen on SWEL 2 but appliesto the SWEL 2 variety of equipment to prevent duplicates. The reason for the inclusion onSWEL I is due to Component Cooling Water (CCW) being the cooling medium for the SFPHeat Exchanger which requires the heat exchanger to maintain structural integrity during a

seismic event for both SFP Cooling and CCW.



Variety of environments - All SFP components are located in a mild environment and are not

submerged.

The Farley SFP System has a very basic system design with very limited component types and the

system contains only one active component in each train; the SFP Cooling Pump. Since 3 of the 4objectives for selecting the sample consideration of items for SWEL 2 did not have any variance, theonly remaining criteria to satisfy the sample objectives was to ensure that a component from each

category was chosen and these selected equipment varieties were used to comprise SWEL 2.

Screen 4

Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include

any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

For Farley Unit 1, the SFP Cooling and Purification System contains three penetrations; two SFP pumpsuctions and one pump discharge. Neither the discharge line nor the suction line penetrations arelocated within 10 feet of the top of the fuel assemblies. However, the SFP discharge piping terminatesapproximately 6 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies in the SFP. Due to this, the discharge pipinghas a '/" hole on the bottom side of a 1800 bend at elevation 152'-0". This hole acts as a siphon

breaker and is located approximately 23 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies. Since there are nopenetrations within 10 feet of the fuel and since the design of the anti-siphon hole in the SFP dischargepiping prevents water from being siphoned through this piping, no rapid drain-down of the pool can

occur.

Therefore, there are no components associated with rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool included

on SWEL 2.



7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS

Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined) SWEL. A Seismic WalkdownChecklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) wascompleted for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs can be found inAttachments 3 and 7 while the AWCs are provided in Attachments 4 and 8, for Version I and Version

2 of the report, respectively.

The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown guidance.Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders thatcontained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEEwalkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings). Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for

the walkdowns. Organization included assignment of specific components to the walkdown teams,review of the walkdown packages, development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdowns/AreaWalk-bys and familiarization with the plant.

The second week on site began with the peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing anoverview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for

the walkdowns were discussed and questions answered. After this overview, each walkdown team

performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by in the presence of the other teams and atleast one peer reviewer. The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between theteams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potential adverse seismic conditions and to allow

team members to ask questions and provide and obtain feedback.

Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns andArea Walk-bys. Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians and engineering) was obtained,as required, to access equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components. All Component

Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively. The finalstatus of all SWCs and AWCs indicates one of the following statuses:

" "Y" - Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions,

" "N" - No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition, or

" "U" - Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipmentinaccessibility and the condition is not known.



The walkdowns focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for

other potentially adverse seismic conditions. Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage tothe structure. This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steeland welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks andcorrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were notconsidered to be anchorage. These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismicconcerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions."

As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components were evaluated toverify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation. The document that provided the

anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to theinformation on this referenced document. Reference documents for anchorage verifications included

plant drawings as well as Screening and Evaluation Worksheet (SEWS) packages created duringIPEEE walkdowns of the plant. In some cases, equipment anchorages were verified to be inaccordance with SEWS but it was also determined that some equipment had been modified or replacedsince the completion of the original accessible walkdowns during which the SEWS were developed.Anchorage checks performed under these conditions duly verified that anchorage evaluationsperformed under the IPEEE program were still applicable, appropriate and adequate.

In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e.g. where the anchorage was inside a cabinet thatcould not be opened except during an outage), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U"(Undetermined) and deferred until an outage when the piece of equipment would be available for

inspection. However, as of the issuance of Version 2 of this report, all inspections have beencompleted and the results are documented on the SWCs (see Attachment 7).

In cases where the Seismic Walkdown team members identified a potential adverse condition, the

condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a Condition Report (CR) was written todocument and evaluate/resolve the condition. As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminarylicensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns. Additionally, detailedlicensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required. Conditions that

were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why

the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.



Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns. For cases in whichthe room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area

Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures,systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on

the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachments 4 and 8.

SWEL I Walkdowns

Credit was taken for a total of 114 component inspections that were completed during the combinedwork performed as documented in Versions 1 and 2 of this report. This is the total number ofcomponent inspections required for Farley Unit 1.

A total of 115 component inspections were originally scheduled to be performed as documented in

Version 1 of this report. Of these 115 component inspections, 3 were delayed due to inaccessibility,while 42 others were required to be scheduled for re-inspections based on additionalguidance/clarification regarding the opening of cabinets to inspect for other adverse conditions.

As documented in Version 2 of this report, the walkdowns of the 3 previously inaccessible components

were completed. However, only 41 of the 42 planned cabinet re-inspections could be completed.During the inspection of Q1R42B001B it was found the anchorage was not completely accessiblewithout racking out the breakers. Therefore the item was removed from the SWEL. Table 7-1 isupdated to show the completion of 44 out of 45 items. It is also updated to indicate QIR42BOOIB wasnot completed and therefore removed from the SWEL. Removal of QIR42BOOIB from the SWEL

does not invalidate the conclusion in Section 6.1 that the screening requirements specified in the EPRIReport 1025286 (Reference 10.2) are met. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL wereincluded in the Area Walk-bys.

SWEL 2 Walkdowns

A total of six component walkdowns were performed. All areas of the plant that contain items on theSWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.

7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS

Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns. Theseitems are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys werenot completed for these items during the initial phase of walkdowns. These items have been inspectedas documented in Version 2 of this report as discussed in "SWEL I Walkdowns" above.

FARLEY UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RPT-01FOR I


Inaccessibility of equipment or plant areas, as originally determined during efforts for Version 1 of thisReport, occurred due to one of two conditions: (1) plant operating conditions, or (2) component

inspections required the opening of cabinet/panel doors which was not conducted, or not permitted by

plant Operations personnel during the time of the walkdowns. Items listed in Table 7-1 associated withItem 2 above include those that required walkdowns in accordance with the supplemental guidance, toopen cabinets to inspect for other adverse conditions as discussed in Section 2.0.

Based on the above, 45 components were originally determined to be inaccessible. These items arelocated throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys for 44 of theseitems were performed before and during the Unit 1 outage, IR25 in October 2013. Note 4 following

Table 7-1 addresses the remaining component.

Note that in Version 1 of the report, the majority of the checklists associated with the componentsdetermined to be inaccessible based on condition 2 indicated that the walkdowns of these components

were complete. The supplemental guidance on opening cabinets was received after thesewalkdowns/checklists were complete. Since the anchorage of these components was accessible withoutopening the cabinets, cabinet internals were not included in the inspections performed during thewalkdowns for Version 1 of the report. The supplemental inspections of these components focusedprimarily upon those aspects that were not reviewed originally, i.e., the internal inspections. Thosechecklists were revised to include information from both walkdowns as documented in Version 2 ofthe report.



Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)

Reason forRemaining Walkdown Completic n

Item No. Description Inaccessibility Scope (See No te )4(Nt )Scope (See Note In)

Reactor Trip Switchgear (2) Inspect panel internals CompletedQICII1E004BNo. 2 10/9/13

2 QI El I LQ3594B Ctmt Sump Level (2) Inspect panel internals CompletedTransmitter Power Supply 1/30/13

3 QIQEI IMOV8701B RHR Inlet Isolation Valve (I) SWC and AWC for CompleteContainment El. 105' 9/30/13

Aux Safeguards Cabinet (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(4 QI H1INGASC2506C C171C 1/7/13

5 QIHIINGB2504J BOP Instrumentation (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(Cabinet J 8/9/13

6 QIHI INGNIS2503A NIS Excore Detector (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(Cabinet 1/7/13

Process Control Cabinet (2) Inspect panel internals CompletedChannel 2 1/7/13

8 QIHI INGR25041 Radiation Monitor Panel (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(1/7/13

Solid State Protection (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(9 QI HI INGSSP2506GInput Cabinet 9/20/13

4.16KV Switchgear IG (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(Local Cont Panel 1/7/13

11 QIH2lE5O5 4.16KV Switchgear IJ (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(Local Cont Panel 1/7/13

4.16KV Switchgear I K (2) Inspect panel internals Completed12 Qi H2P 1E506Local Cont Panel 10/16/13



Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope (see Note 1)Reason for

Remaining Walkdown Completi n# Item No. Description Inaccessibility Scope (See Note(Note 2)

Diesel Generator I B (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(Local Cont Panel 10/9/13

14 QIH21NBAFP2605A Hot Shutdown Panel A (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(1/25/13

15 QIH22LOOIE Multiplying Relay (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(Cabinet IE 1/25/13

16 QI H22L002 Transfer Relay Cabinet 1 (2) Inspect panel internals Completed1/25/13

Diesel Local Relay Panel (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(17 Q1 H22L503IB 1/7/13

(!) Complete SWC after Complete(removal of insulating 10/16/13

material from around theSteam Generator 1 A18 QINI 1 PT0476 ScharGePessur instrument. This was not

Discharge Pressure allowed by PlantOperations at the time

the SWC was performed

Containment Purge (1) SWC and AWC for Completed19 QIP13HV2867D Isolation Inside Ctmt Containment El. 129' 9/30/13

Valve

20 QIPl6G5I7B Turb Bldg SW Iso Valve (2) Inspect panel internals CompletecRelay Box 1/30/13

21 Q1R15A504 4.16KV Switchgear Ii (2) Inspect panel internals Completec1 / 10/14

22 QI RI16006 600V Load Center I D (2) Inspect panel internals Completed2/11/13


RESOLUTION OF FUKUSjIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 32 OF 58


Reason for Remaining Walkdown Completi nItem No. Description Inaccessibility Scope (See Note(Note 2)In

23 QIR17BOOI-A MCC IA (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(10/16/13

24 QlRI7BOO2 MCC lB (2) Inspect panel internals Completed2/5/13

25 Q1R17B504-A MCC 1K (2) Inspect panel internals Completed10/17/13

26 Q1R17B507-A MCC IN (2) Inspect panel internals Completed1 Q10/16/13

27 QIR18B029 Power Disconnect Switch (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(2/11/13

28 QIR18BO31 Circuit Breaker Box (2) Inspect panel internals Completed2/11/13

29 Q1R18B035 Circuit Breaker Box (2) Inspect panel internals Complete1/30/I131

30 QI R21BOOIA Vital AC Breaker Box (2) Inspect panel internals Complete1/30/13

31 Q I R21 E009C Inverter I C (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(9/20/13

32 Q1R36A511 4.16KV Switchgear IL (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(Surge Arrestor 2/12/13

33 cR1L00IB 125VDC Distribution (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(Panel IB 8/9/13

34 QIR42BOOIB 125VDC Bus 1B (2) Inspect panel internals See Note

35 QIR42EOOIA Aux Bldg Battery Charger (2) Inspect panel internals CompletedIA 2/11/13




Reason for Remaining Walkdown Completi• nItem No. Description Inaccessibility Scope (See No te )

(Nt )Scope (See Note In)(Note 2)

36 QIR43EOOIA Sequencer BIF (2) Inspect panel internals Completed2/11/13

37 Sequencer B IF Aux (2) Inspect panel internals CompletedRelay Panel 2/12/13

Diesel Gen I-2A Local (2) Inspect panel internals Completed38 QSH21E525 Control Panel 10/25/13

Diesel Generator IC (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(Local Control Panel 8/9/13

Service Water B Train (2) Inspect panel internals Completed40 QSH21L503B Battery Room HVAC 2/6/13

LCS

Diesel Local Relay Panel (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(41 QSH22L5021-2A 9/26/13

42 QSR42B516A UI Service Water Battery (2) Inspect panel internals Complete(Fuse Box Train A 2/12/13

43 SW Battery NO. 3 or 4 (2) Inspect panel internals CompleteDetection Cabinet 2/8/13

44 SW Building A Train (2) Inspect panel internals CompleteBattery SEL SW 2/12/13

45 Svc Water Bldg Battery (2) Inspect panel internals CompletedCharger No.2 (Standby) 10/16/13

Table notes:

1) Farley Unit I has one transformer (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL 1. It was inspected to the

extent practical. All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected. The anchorage for thetransformer was visible without opening the component. To inspect the transformer further would



require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection. Theinspection of this transformer meets the requirements of the guidance document and the 50.54(0Letter. The subject transformer is: MPL #QIRI 1B004, LC TRANSFORMER ID

2) Entries in Table 7-1 under column heading: "Reason for Inaccessibility" refer to the condition

for inaccessibility discussed in Section 7.1.

3) 44 of 45 walkdowns were completed. See Note 4 for additional information.

4) Table 7-1, Item 34 (QIR42BOOI B, 125VDC BUS IB) was deleted from the SWEL during theperformance of the walkdowns as the anchorage was inaccessible.



8.0 RESULTS

This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the

NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic". As

potentially adverse conditions were identified, condition reports were initiated in the Plant's CorrectiveAction Program (CAP) and evaluated. The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and

evaluations.

8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS

All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the Plant's CAP per SouthernNuclear expectations in a timely fashion. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were

performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a

detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286. Consequently, the as-

found conditions in Table 8-1 do not necessarily indicate that SSCs are deficient or not in conformancewith their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low

threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.

SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Farley Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Farley seismic

qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures forentering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic

conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the

CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis,and any required plant changes.

During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 14 Unit I Potentially Adverse Conditions were

identified and entered into the CAP. In addition, another 3 were entered that are common to both UnitsI and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns

and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensingbasis.


RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PACE 36 OF 58

Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions

Comp/ Brief Description of CR # Brief discussion of Action StatusArea Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned (In

Condition to ProgressAddress/Resolve /Closed)

the Condition

Area A cable from tray 504947 Although this has been WO SNC428446 Closed121' Piping Pen BHMS06 was found to marked as a potential created - CableRoom 223 be overhanging the edge adverse seismic needs to be placed

of the tray in several concern, the seismic back in trayplaces. At one location, walkdown team hasthe cable rested on a concluded that it issharp edge where it unlikely for the cable tocrosses the boundary of be damaged to the pointthe tray. The tray is - 9' that it would notin the overhead behind perform its intendedthe cubicle wall of the function during aroom entrance. The seismic event.cable needs to be placedback in the cable tray.

Component Breaker racking tools 505403 Seismic walkdown Breaker racking ClosedU 1 4160V were found hanging personnel determined tools have beenSwitchgear IG from a 4" long rod - 3' damage to the cabinet removed which(QIR15A007-B) from the UI 4160V would not occur in the eliminates theBreaker Cabinet Switchgear I G event that the tool adverse seismic

(Q I R 15A007-B) struck the cabinet, interactionBreaker Cabinet 7 in Rm However, there is condition.233. During a seismic potential to damage theevent the tool will relays located on thepotentially fall from the front of the switchgear.currently staged location The effect of the impactand strike the on the components inswitchgear. the cabinet should be

evaluated and/or thetool relocated oradequately secured ifany adverse impacts aresuspected.






the Condition

ComponentQIPI 8C002B

The Seismic WalkdownTeam observed apotential seismicinteraction hazard on theUnit I Train BEmergency AirCompressor in Room 189(Q IP I 8C002B). TheSeismic Walkdown teamobserved a small gap ofless than 0.5" between a0.25" dia stainless steelcompressor instrumenttubing and an insulatedpipe. The quarter inchinstrument tubing islocated directly on top ofthe compressor at eyelevel and has beenidentified as the constantspeed unloaderinterconnecting line. TheWalkdown Team judgedthat the insulation couldimpact the tubing sincethe lateral displacementof the insulated pipeduring a seismic eventcould fill the 0.5" gap.The Seismic WalkdownEngineering Team judgedthe instrument tubing istoo soft to tolerateinteraction with thepiping.

505553 An initial assessment ofthe condition wasperformed and there areno immediateoperability concerns.The constant speedunloader is used toprevent overloading thecompressor and isactuated when thereceiver pressureexceeds the pre-setpressure for theauxiliary valve spring.When the auxiliaryvalve opens, air isrouted to the constantspeed unloaders andforces them open. If theinterconnecting line islost, the auxiliary valvewill still mitigateoverloading of thecompressor by relievingpressure to atmospherewhen pre- set values areexceeded.

WO SNC428541removed theadverse SeismicSpatialinteraction. WOclosed.

Closed


RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHiMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 38 OF 58




the Condition

Area: UI A Loose bolts were found 507934 The Gaitronics speaker All actions are ClosedCharging Pump in the mounting could become a concern completed toroom (Room hardware of the if the mounting prevent the181) Gaitronics system inside hardware was to loosen adverse

the U I A Charging further. interaction.Pump room (room 181 ).

Component A 1 1/2" dia. conduit is 508376 Ops Shift Supervisor WO SNC429765 ClosedMultiplying within 1/4" of the side of Review: The cabinet created. TERelay Cabinet Multiplying Relay and conduit are installed 540860 evaluatedI E, Cabinet I E per design. No the condition andQIH22LOOIE (QIH22LOO1E). The indication of missing found the

conduit spans - 10' and hardware is evident, condition of thepasses the relay panel Installation of stiffening conduit near theabout mid-span, and is hardware to minimize Multiplying Relaytherefore very flexible. potential for contact Cabinet asThe conduit must be between the cabinet and acceptable as is.moved away from the conduit in the event of a WO SNC429765panel or supported near seismic event will be voided.the panel to reduce any pursued via theinteraction effects corrective actionduring a seismic event, process.An immediate solutionis to clamp the smallconduit to the adjacentlarger conduit to restrainit from the relay cabinet.(AB, 139', rm. 318). It'spossible that nosensitive equipment is inthe panel, in which casethe interaction effectsare credible butinsignificant. Thewalkdown team couldnot make thisdetermination.




Comp/Area

Brief Description ofPotentially Adverse

ConditionI

CR# Brief discussion ofAnalysis/Conclusion

ActionTaken/Planned

to

Address/Resolvethe Condition

Status(In

Progress/Closed)

ComponentQI H21NBAFP2605A

While performing SAMNTTF 2.3 SeismicWalkdowns for FarleyUnits I & 2 in the AuxBldg, Room 254, therear door of HotShutdown Panel A(QI H21NBAFP2605A)was found unlatched,but should be latched tominimize impact to thepanel from the doorduring a seismic event.

508387 The panel was re-walked down on10/26/12 and identifiedto be closed. Latch isoperable but hard tooperate based ondiscussions withOperations. WO hasbeen created to fully fixthe latch.

WO SNC429766created.

Closed




Comp/Area

Brief Description of

Potentially AdverseCondition


ActionTaken/Planned

toAddress/Resolve

the Condition

Status(In

Progress/Closed)

AreaRoom 184

While performing SAMNTTF 2.3 SeismicWalkdowns for FarleyUnits I & 2 in Room184, the seismicwalkdown teamobserved a flexible cableattached to the IAIsolation Outside CTMTValve with limitedflexibility. The flexcable is routed to thevalves upper limitswitch.

508690 This configuration hasbeen compared againstthe original IPEEEScreening EvaluationWork Sheet (SEWS)which was performedby qualified SQUGEngineers. The SEWSpackage shows that theflex cable was in thesame configurationduring this evaluation atthe area whereflexibility is limited.This seismic interactionhas previously beenevaluated as acceptable.This condition waspresent duringSQUG/1PEEwalkdowns performedin 1993 and isdocumented in theSEWS package forQPI19HV361 1.

The originalIPEEE SEWspackage did notspecifically referto the flex conduitbut using picturesthe valve and flexconduit wasidentified to be inthe same state.Based on this notbeing called outas an issue duringthe originalwalkdown, nofurther actions areneeded.

Closed






the Condition

Component While performing SAM 508692 This same configuration TE 509140- DCP ClosedQIPI7HV3096A NTTF 2.3 Seismic was observed during the has been

Walkdowns for Farley Farley SQUG/IPEEE confirmed toUnit 1, one of the walkdowns back in the remove theseismic walkdown teams mid 90's and there were adverse Seismicnoted two (2) potential no identified Condition.seismic concerns with discrepancies on thethe 3096 A valve Seismic Evaluation(QIP17HV3096A): Work Sheets (SEWS)1) Rigid conduit within concerning inadequate'/" of pressure gage. flexibility of linesDuring a seismic event, attached to the 3096 Athe worst credible valve. Additionally, thefailure would result in SEWS package did notbreaking the pressure mention any concern forgage glass. the conduit in close2) Insufficient flex in proximity of thecables to the upper and pressure gage. 3096Alower limit switches. also has difficulties inOne of the questions of operating and the valvethe seismic walkdown is already jacked closed,packages is "Do declared inoperable, andattached lines have is being replaced duringadequate flexibility to I R25 so no impact.avoid damage?"

FARLEY UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCF164-RiPT-01FOR





the Condition

Component A permanent ladder was 508694 This configuration was The condition was ClosedQIEl IMOV881 installed in contact with compared against the verified against2A the Containment Sump original IPEEE the SEWS whichRoom 131 to RHR Pump IA Screening Evaluation shows the ladder(El. 83') Isolation Valve Work Sheet (SEWS) and valve in the

(Q IE 11MOV8812A). which was performed same position andThe seismic walkdown by qualified SQUG configurations.team that performed the Engineers. The SEWS This was notwalkdown has package for evaluated as adetermined that this is a QI E I MOV8812A Seismic Concernpotentially adverse performed during the on the SEWS andseismic condition the SQUG/IPEE thus the condition8812A. walkdowns in 1993 is SAT.

visually shows that theladder and valve were inthe same configurationduring performance ofthe SEWS. Thiscondition was not calledout as an adverseseismic interaction onthe SEWS.




Comp/ Brief Description of CR # Brief discussion of Action

Area Potentially Adverse Analysis/Conclusion Taken/Planned

Condition to

Address/Resolve

the Condition

ComponentQIPI6F501A

Seismic Walkdown teamidentified corrosion on aService Water StrainerIA (QIPI6F501A) holddown bolt.

515693 This condition is similar tothe condition of a SW strainerbolt identified during 1 R24(CR:442339 and MDCSNC387300) showingexcessive corrosion. The nutwas cleaned and a torqueapplied to fully seat the nut.The nut was apparentlycocked/cross threaded andcould not be moved further.The torque applied was inexcess of i000ft-lbs provingthe bolt was sound. Aftercleaning the nut, the materialcondition showed littlesurface degradation. Thisreference is provided todocument that thedegradation for this strainerhold down bolt is exacerbatedby the wet environmentwhich typically causes thecorrosion layer to swell andlook significantly worse thanthe actual sound materialcondition. Based on knownpre and post cleanedcondition of one of thestrainer anchor bolts/nut, theseismic walkdown team isconfident that the strainerbolt is sound and is capableto perform its intendedfunction. The team membersare qualified to useengineering judgment tomake the Seismic Evaluationbased on being qualifiedeither through SQUG orEPRI training for SeismicEvals.

WO SNC432772created - Cleanand coat the bolts.




Comp/Area

Brief Description ofPotentially Adverse

Condition


ActionTaken/Planned

toAddress/Resolve

the Condition

Status(In

Progress

/Closed)

4-

ComponentQIP18CO02B

While reviewing AWBsperformed by theSeismic WalkdownTeams, it has beendiscovered that one ofthe four anchor bolts forthe UI Auxiliary SteamCondensate Tank is bentand has beendocumented as anadverse seismic concern.

539901 Based on initial reviewfrom the site POC forthe SeismicWalkdowns, thiscondition is not ofconcern during aseismic event. The nuton the affected anchorbolt appears to beinstalled correctly withno gap between it andthe concrete pad whichresults in negligibleimpact to the loadbearing portion of thebolt. Also, theremaining 3 anchorbolts are SAT with nofurther discrepanciesidentified. The initialreview has alsodetermined that there isno effect on the currentseismic design basissince the component isclassified as non-seismic, Crit-N.

TE 540855created toevaluate thecondition. Bentbolt was found tobe acceptable. TEhas been closed.

Closed






the Condition

Component Seismic Walkdown team 716676 This condition was Repair existing InQI H2 IE527 found that grout needs to originally noted in the grout around the Progress

be placed around all SEWS package dated existing anchors.anchor bolts on the 5/24/94. Subsequent WO SNC 526618south side of the panel. evaluation showed this created.

condition is not anoperability concern.Enhancements havebeen made to theanchorage including:shimming between thepanel and grout pad;adding additionalanchors to the Northside; welding on a newplate to the South sideand installing two newanchors. Therefore thiscondition is not aseismic concern.






the Condition

Component While performing the 719207 This condition has been The evaluation InQlR17BOOI-A NTTF 2.3 Seismic evaluated for the 2A that addresses the Progress

Walkdown for Farley MCC and it has been condition foundUnit 1 for IA MCC, determined that the on 2A MCC isthere were two instances current mounting attached to TEidentified where configuration does not 640206(Closed).seismically qualified adversely impact the WO SNC527527Agastat Relays were functionality of any of and SNC 527528installed with only 3 of the relays in any of its created.4 required mounting operating modesscrews. (before, during, and

after a DBE). The U2evaluation has beenreviewed and isbounding for theconditions found on UII A MCC. Therefore,the condition does notbring into question theoperability orfunctionality of therelays.

Component While performing the 722630 This is not considered to WO SNC528556 InQIR17B507-A NTTF 2.3 Seismic be an operability created to replace Progress

Walkdown for Farley concern or a seismic the missingUnit I for IN MCC, one concern due to the mounting screw.of the terminal strips in minimal weight of theFNBI was found to be strip.missing a lowermounting screw.

During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of aseismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are warranted.These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.



CR 539958: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3

Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to storing tools and equipmentthroughout the plant. Several events were documented where tools and equipment (e.g. breaker rackingtools, hot sticks) were stored in such a way that they had the potential to fall and strike nearby

equipment (e.g. Switchgears) during a seismic event. The extent of condition should be investigated bythe groups that use the tooling, all further conditions corrected, and actions put in place to prevent

future recurrences.

CR 539961: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3

Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to maintaining the coating on

components subject to corrosive environments. Several events were documented where anchorage andassociated supports were corroded due to a lack of coatings and preventive maintenance to protect thematerial. The extent of the damage varied from minor surface corrosion to more significant wastage of

the components. The extent of condition should be investigated and appropriate corrective actions putin place to promote the long-term sustainability of anchorage, support, and components subject to

corrosive environments.

CR 539962: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3Seismic Walkdowns, an adverse trend was identified with regards to maintaining the housekeeping of

cable trays and their cables. Several events were documented where cable trays had damaged panels or

cables overhanging the cable tray. The extent of condition should be investigated and appropriatecorrective actions, as needed, put in place.

8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY

Plant Farley Unit I had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing theirrequired safety functions.

8.3 PLANT CHANGES

There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions. Plant changes are any planned

or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the

Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.



8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS

Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic

adverse conditions. All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were

generated as necessary. These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash,etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the Plant's CAP process and are not

specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.


RESOLUTION OF FuKUsHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 2.0TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE49OF58

9.0 PEER REVIEW

9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS

The peer review for the NTTF Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance

with Section 6 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluationof the following activities:

" review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are included in the

Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);

" review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;

* review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic

conditions in to the Plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and

" review of the final submittal report.

This report provides a summary of peer review results as well as the results of the above peer reviewactivities. In Section 9, "Version 1" describes the work completed during the initial evaluation and

submitted in November 2012. "Version 2" describes the subsequent work completed since that timeand transmitted in this final submittal.

9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS SUMMARY

9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development - Version 1

The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to Section 3 of the EPRI Report1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the seismic walkdown were selected as

described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the PeerReview Team, which consisted of the peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Teammembers independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on theSWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the

SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from Reference 10.2 were met.

Specifically, the Peer Reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL 1 and 2 were Seismic Category Icomponents that do not undergo regular inspections. Specific considerations for the peer reviewprocess are described below for SWEL I and SWEL 2. The peer review checklist of the SWEL is

provided in Attachment 2.



For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of theequipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified in the EPRI Report

1025286 (Reference 10.2):

* Reactor Reactivity Control;

" Reactor Coolant Pressure Control;

* Reactor Coolant Inventory Control;

* Decay Heat Removal; and

* Containment Function.

For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation

of items having the following sample selection attributes:

" Various types of systems;

" Major new and replacement equipment;

" Various types of equipment;

" Various environments;

* Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE; and

* Risk insight consideration.

The final SWEL I contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified in the EPRI

Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safetyfunctions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list. SWEL 1

contains components from all applicable classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of the EPRI Report

1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for equipment classes 11, 13 and 19, where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major newand replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in

various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and riskfactors were considered in development of the list.



For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related itemscomplied with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool coolingsystem at Farley Unit I are Seismic Category I and all different types of components are representedon the SWEL 2. No items that could cause rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool for Farley Unit 1were identified. Therefore, SWEL 2 does not contain any components associated with potential rapid

drain down of the pool. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding itemsassociated with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with the

EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

In summary, all of the peer review comments made during development of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 wereresolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed by the Peer ReviewTeam and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed. The SWEL was determinedto incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.

During the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removedfrom the list and, in some cases, equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added.

The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these changes

had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELs with respect to the provisions contained in the EPRIReport 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed theSWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of the EPRIReport 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

The Peer Review Checklist for development of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.

9.2.2 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development - Version 2

The Peer Review Team was consulted as necessary during the walkdowns to ensure that no equipment

substitutions (due to equipment availability, being energized, etc.) would conflict with the EPRI report

requirements. One SWEL item was listed as inaccessible in Table 7-1 of the Version 1 walkdown

report. Component no. Q1R42B001B 125v DC BUS IB was removed from the SWEL for Version 2

since the item could not be inspected without extensive disassembly. Removing the item from the

SWEL I did not invalidate any of the EPRI report requirements such as variety of systems, variety of

classes of equipment, variety of environments, etc.



The final SWELs are provided in Attachment I and reflect completion of all seismic walkdowns ofequipment. The Peer Review Team reviewed the final SWELs and concluded that both SWELs (fororiginal walkdowns and the outage walkdowns) met the requirements in Section 3 of EPRI Report1025286 (Reference 10.2).

The Peer Review Checklist of the final SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.

9.2.3 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys - Version 1

The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns andArea Walk-bys. The Peer Review was performed as follows:

* Each of the walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area

Walk-by while being observed by the other teams and at least one member of the walkdown

Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered

questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams.

" During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team

individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team

conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review Team confirmed

first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-

bys as described in Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A member of the

Peer Review Team accompanied each of the four walkdown teams on at least one full day of

walkdowns. SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to carry a copy of Section 4

of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it, as necessary, during conduct of

the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

" Finally, the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by

packages completed during the first week to ensure that the checklists were completed in

accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review

Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent,

thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area

Walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.



The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for SeismicEquipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability toidentify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction,and other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications,where applicable. The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced floodinginteractions and seismically-induced fire interactions. The SWEs documented the results of theSeismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRIReport 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

The Peer Review Team inspected all the checklists completed during the first week of walkdowns,

representing approximately 40% of the total number of checklists. Peer review of the SeismicWalkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances wherecomments in the checklists required additional explanation and information. Mr. Ashworth and Mr.Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly. The SWEsunderstood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer ReviewTeam.

Since the peer review occurred at the start of the walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to providecomments at the early stages of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for allpackages. Subsequently, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdownpackages reviewed to be appropriate. In addition, all members of the Peer Review Team, including Mr.Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during theentire Walkdown process.

9.2.4 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys - Version 2

The Peer Review Team was available by phone and email for consultation to the Plant Farley SWEs

for the scope of walkdowns covered by Version 2 of this report. SWEs that were involved with work

transmitted under Version 1 of this report (particularly Mr. Youngblood, Mr. Harlos, Mr. Mullenix,

and Ms. Maclay) performed many of the walkdowns documented in Version 2 of this report.



Plant Farley also trained additional SWEs to support completion of the remaining walkdowns. ThePeer Review of the new SWEs was performed as follows:

" The new SWEs completed the EPRI NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course onsite atPlant Farley. The instructor of this session of the course Ken Whitmore had attended the June

12, 2012 session of the EPRI-sponsored Seismic 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training course and

used the training materials provided by EPRI. The Peer Team Leader/SNC Seismic TechnicalLead, Ms. Brown, attended the training session in order to share Lessons Learned from theprevious walkdowns.

* Before the new SWEs performed any walkdowns on the SWEL items, Peer Team MemberMs. Brown as well as Mr. Ashworth (who was part of the Peer Review Team under Version 1of this report) traveled to Plant Farley to witness the new SWEs perform practice walkdownsin the site Protected Area. Each of the new SWEs performed practice equipment SeismicWalkdowns and Area Walk-bys under the observation of the other new SWE team members,Ms. Brown and Mr. Ashworth just as was done during the initial walkdowns (see section9.2.3). Ms. Brown and Mr. Ashworth interviewed the new SWEs to verify their

understanding of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown objectives and their ability to identifypotentially adverse seismic conditions. They provided suggestions for performing walkdownsand answered questions raised by the new SWEs. Each of the new SWEs completed practicewalkdown checklists which were reviewed and critiqued on site by Ms. Brown and Mr.Ashworth.

Ms. Brown and Mr. Ashworth concluded that the new SWEs were performing walkdowns andcompleting checklists in a manner consistent with that witnessed/performed in support of Version 1 ofthis report. The new SWEs are familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and AreaWalk-bys. Additionally, the SWEs adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverseseismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditionsrelated to anchorage. They also performed anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable.The new SWEs also demonstrated their ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactionsand seismically-induced fire interactions. They documented the results of the outage SeismicWalkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRI Report1025286 (Reference 10.2).

Of the new SWEs trained at Plant Farley, Mr. Nelson and Ms. Arrant performed walkdowns at PlantFarley Unit 1, which are addressed by Version 2 of this report. To be conservative and to ensureconsistency, all checklists prepared and provided in Attachments 7 and 8 of this report were reviewed



by two Peer Review Team members (Ms. Brown and Mr. Richard Starck). This Peer Review ofchecklists is in addition to the "10 to 25% requirement" that was met during Version 1 of the report.Verbal and written comments were provided by the Peer Review Team and incorporated by the SWEs.

It is noted that the checklists for Version 2 include several pictures that show the overall condition ofthe equipment. Having numerous pictures was an efficient way to document resolution of the checklist

questions. In addition, the checklists often "retyped" previous information that was handwritten (andwas provided in Attachments 3 and 4 in Version 1 of the report) for clarity and consistency purposes.Preparation of these "retyped" checklists relied upon the results of the inspections from the original

checklists.

The Peer Review Team members (Ms. Brown and Mr. Starck) concluded that checklists were

completed in a manner consistent with the requirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

9.2.5 Licensing Basis Evaluations - Versions 1 and 2

All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP forfurther review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the SeismicWalkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations performed for theCAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive andacceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the SeismicWalkdowns.

9.2.6 Submittal Report- Version 1

The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer ReviewTeam to provide guidance and input and to verify that the submittal report met the objectives andrequirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was activein ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate. The final version of the submittal reportincludes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.



9.2.7 Submittal Report - Version 2

Similar to the process for Version 1, the Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittalreport. This allowed the Peer Review Team to provide input and to verify that the submittal report metthe requirements of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the drafts and was active inensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate. The final version of the submittal reportincluded all necessary elements of the Peer Review and met the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.



10.0 REFERENCES

10.1 10 CFR 50.54(0 Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations 50.54(0 Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term TaskForce Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012

10.2 EPRI Report 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-TermTask Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012

10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events(IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities

10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and ElectricalEquipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46

10.5 Not used.

10.6 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit I and Unit 2, Individual Plant Examination of ExternalEvents - Seismic.

10.7 RER SNC432467, SAM NTTF 2.3: Seismic, Unit 1 and 2 Walkdowns at Plant Farley,

(Recommendation) 2.3 - Seismic

10.8 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Supplement 1 to Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanicaland Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46

10.9 NUREG-121 1, Regulatory Analysis for Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-46, SeismicQualification of Equipment in Operating Plants

10.10 NUREG-0 117 Supplement No. 5 dated March, 1981 Safety Evaluation Report

10.11 Not used

10.12 Not used

10.13 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant SeismicMargin

10.14 Farley Nuclear Plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Rev. 24, August 2012

(Version 1) and Rev. 25, December 2013 (Version 2).

10.15 NMP-GM-033-GLO1 Ver. 1.0, SAM NTTF Seismic Walkdowns Guide



11.0 ATTACHMENTS

ATTACHMENT I - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS (Version 1 and

Version 2)

ATTACHMENT 2 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLISTS FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 (Version 1 and

Version 2)

ATTACHMENT 3 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (Version I and Version 2)

ATTACHMENT 4 - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (Version 1)

ATTACHMENT 5 - IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION (Version 1 and Version 2)

ATTACHMENT 6 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS (Version 1and Version 2)

ATTACHMENT 7 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (Version 2)

ATTACHMENT 8 - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS (Version 2)

Southern Nuclear Operating CompanyRegulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence and NL-006-F03

SOUTHERN, Affairs Version 2.0COMPANY VerificationE.,W,.S-Y .. ,Wo,, Form .II Page 1 of 4

NL Letter Number: NL-14-0249 Due Date (if applicable): 2/24/2014Subject: Farley Updated Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown ReportRLI / Extension: R. Wittschen 7234CR/TE (if applicable) / Database (C/F/H/V):

SECTION I - CORRESPONDENCE SCREENING (to be completed by RLI) YES NO

1.1. Does this letter affect the FSAR or any other License Basis Documents? If YES, rcomplete 1. 1.a. If unsure, obtain peer review from 10 CFR 50.59 qualified individual.

I.1.a .Has Section III been completed to update each: documentF 1 YES rl- NO:i

1.2. Does this letter require posting per 10 CFR 19? If YES, ensure posting after submittal. f7 W

1.3. Does this letter contain Safeguards Information? If YES, do NOTscan to SNCIntranet. Enter Special Handling Instructions below and review with the RA 17 PAdministrative Assistant (AA).

1.4. Does this letter contain information to be withheld from public disclosure (e.g.,Proprietary or Non-Safeguards Security-Related Information)? If YES, do NOT scanto SNC Intranet. If Proprietary, include appropriate affidavit. Enter Special HandlingInstructions below and review with the AA.

1.5. Does this letter contain sensitive, limited access or distribution items? If YES, enter F FSpecial Handling Instructions below and review with the AA.

Special Handling Instructions for AA

Administrative Assistant Date

1.6. Oath or Affirmation Required? If YES, verify proper letter template is used. TW F

1.7. Verification Required? If YES, use the guidance of NL-006-GLO4. FW I

1.8. External Affairs and General Counsel Consultation Required? If YES, obtain r rwconcurrence signature in Section II.

1.9. Engineering Independent Technical Review (ITR) Required? If YES, obtain W, 1concurrence signature in Section II.

1.10. Challenge Board Required? If YES, complete 1. 10.a. 1 7.IlO.a Has Section III been completed to document results? r. YES ,i N

1.11 RLI Signature: _ Date: ,,,,1.12 Licensing Peer Review Signature: Date: 2-/i ' 2o '1--

Southern Nuclear Operating CompanyA Regulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence and NL-006-F03

$W I4 Affairs Verification Version 2.0Form.I,, Page 2 of 4

SECTION II - DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW

NOTE: The purpose of Section Il is to document support departmental concurrence andverification regarding the accuracy and completeness of Information provided for submittal ofthis SNC regulatory correspondence. A concurrence signature In Section II means that thesignatory has assured that the submittal is appropriate and consistent with SNC policy,applicable Commitments are approved for implementation and supporting documentation forsubmittal completeness and accuracy has been prepared.Letter concurrence and AGREEMENT to perform action(s) required to meet Commitments isperformed In Section IV.

Su t R e N e -

Support Reviewer Name (Print). Statements Verified Referenced/Department/Group Reviewer (Signature) I (list numbers) Attached Documents

DateSAM Program David Hall Letter NL-14-0249Digit.lly dned by Dal D Ha

Manager / Farley David D Ha ° and Enclosure 1

Project Manager Terry Mitchell Letter NL-14-0249and Enclosure 1

Principal Engineer Melanie Brown Letter NL-14-0249Seismic and Enclosure 1

External Affairs &General Counsel

(if applicable)

Section III - CRITE Assignment (Obtain agreement of recipient before assignment)

ASSIGNED RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENTCR / TE DUE DATE LEVEL* and/or

NUMBER INDIVIDUALClick here to enter a date.

Click here to enter a date.

*NOTE:TEs to meet commitments (regulatory or non-regulatory) are Level 3 (minimum). Notethe following verbiage in the TE:

"THIS TE ADDRESSES AN ACTION(S) DEFINED IN SNC CORRESPONDENCE TO THENRC. BEFORE ANY EXTENSION OF THE TE COMPLETION DATE IS APPROVED, AREGULATORY AFFAIRS MANAGER MUST BE CONTACTED TO DETERMINE IF NRCNOTIFICATION IS NEEDED."

ReglatrySo-uthern Nuclear Operating Company N-0-0RegulAfators Licensing Action, Concurrence and VrinL 2.00-3,,

COMP11111 Verificationft,.,,._.,,.,, Form IPage 2 of 4

SECTION 11 - DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW

NOTE: The purpose of Section II Is to document support departmental concurrence andverification regarding the accuracy and completeness of information provided for submittal ofthis SNC regulatory correspondence. A concurrence signature In Section II means that thesignatory has assured that the submittal is appropriate and consistent with SNC policy,applicable Commitments are approved for implementation and supporting documentation forsubmittal completeness and accuracy has been prepared.Letter concurrence and AGREEMENT to perform action(s) required to meet Commitments Isperformed In Section IV.

Support Reviewer Name (Print) Statements Verified Referenced/Department/Group Reviewer (Signature) I (list numbers) Attached Documents

DateSAM Program David Hall Letter NL-14-0249Manager / Farley and Enclosure 1

Project Manager Terry Mitchell Letter NL-1 4-0249and Enclosure 1


Farley Seismic Point Brian Nelson Letter NL-14-0249of Contact • . and Enclosure 1


(if applicable) ....

Section III - CR/TE Assignment (Obtain agreement of recipient before assignment)

ASSIGNED RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENTCR / TE DUE DATE LEVEL* and/orNUMBER _______ ______ __IINDIVIDUAL

Click here to enter a date. INDIVIDUAL

CIick here to enter a date.

*NOTE:TEs to meet commitments (regulatory or non-regulatory) are Level 3 (minimum). Notethe following verbiage In the TE:



SOUnuRIA Affairs LcnigAtoadVersion 2.0COMPANY Verification_FMS,_r._.•. Form Page 2 of 4


NOTE: The purpose of Section Il is to document support departmental concurrence andverification regarding the accuracy and completeness of information provided for submittal ofthis SNC regulatory correspondence. A concurrence signature in Section 11 means that thesignatory has assured that the submittal is appropriate and consistent with SNC policy,applicable Commitments are approved for implementation and supporting documentation forsubmittal completeness and accuracy has been prepared.Letter concurrence and AGREEMENT to perform action(s) required to meet Commitments isperformed in Section IV ...

Support Reviewer Name (Print) Statements Verified Referenced/Department/Group Reviewer (Signature) i (list numbers) Attached Documents


Project Manager Terry Mitchell Letter NL-14-0249and Enclosure 1

Principal Engineer Melanie Brown ,q- 1q 4 L( Letter NL-14-0249Seismic 4 and'Enclosure 1


(if applicable)


ASSIGNEDCR/TE

NUMBER


"THIS TE ADDRESSES AN ACTION(S) DEFINED IN SNC CORRESPONDENCE TO THENRC. BEFORE ANY EXTENSION OF THE TE COMPLETION" DATE IS APPROVED, AREGULATORY AFFAIRS MANAGER MUST BE CONTACTED TO DETERMINE IF NRCNOTIFICATION IS NEEDED."


SOUTHERNA Affairs Version 2.0COMPAN Verif ication

F-,,..-Y-%br, Form V Page 2 of 4


NOTE: The purpose of Section Il is to document support departmental concurrence andverification regarding the accuracy and completeness of information provided for submittal ofthis SNC regulatory correspondence. A concurrence signature in Section II means that thesignatory has assured that the submittal Is appropriate and consistent with SNC policy,applicable Commitments are approved for implementation and supporting documentation forsubmittal completeness and accuracy has been prepared.Letter concurrence and AGREEMENT to perform action(s) required to meet Commitments isperformed in Section IV.

Support Reviewer Name (Print) Statements Verified Referenced/Department/Group Reviewer (Signature) / (list numbers) Attached Documents


Project Manager er Mitchell Letter NL-14-0249

KJ.,).. ) itr',, and Enclosure 1



(if applicable)


ASSIGNED RESPONSIBLE DEPARTMENTCR / TE DUE DATE LEVEL* and/or

NUMBER INDIVIDUALClick here to enter a date.

Click here to enter a date.



Southern Nuclear Operating CompanyRegulatory Licensing Action, Concurrence an NL-006-F03

SOUTHrRN. Affairs Version 2.0COMPANY Verification

moS,, F Page 3 of 4

SECTION IV - FINAL REVIEW AND APPR AL

(Mark "NA" for signatures that are not re ir n lu in in ividual signing letter)

RA Manager, Supervisor or Designe .Date: Lza 2zo21 4

NL Director: (_5 zo,/'o 9- Date:

FNP Vice President: Date:_

HNP Vice President: Date:_

VEGP Vice President: Date:

Vice President -

Engineering_ Date:

Vice President - RA: Date:_

Executive Vice President: Date:

YES NO

IV.1. Does this letter contain Commitments? If YES, complete 1.a. r r

'iVw .a, Has Section III,.been comrpleted for each Commitment? r..YES ,.I NO ...

RLI Final Review:

AA (final distribution):

Date: <//a-•'lq

Date: /.2o //


SOUTHERN, Affairs Version 2.0COMPANY Verification

,.,=.5Y•. Wo,, Form I Page 4 of 4

SECTION V - VERIFICATION

This checklist is to be completed by the RLI. Check all applicable boxes and assemble relateddocuments into the verification package.

NOTE: This list is not all inclusive. Include addition verification documentation if appropriate.

j[• Verification and Validation copy of letter, if required, per NL-006-GLO4.

[• Pre-job discussion, preparation and development notes (refer to guidance in NL-006-003, "Outgoing Regulatory Correspondence," Section 6.2).

DJa D Copies/references of regulatory precedent, previous submittals, etc.

[] Completed form NL-006-F03, "Licensing Action, Concurrence and Verification"

Il I Copies of relevant CRs and TEs, including Level 3 TEs to meet stated commitments.

NOTE:TEs to meet commitments (regulatory or non-regulatory) are Level 3 (minimum).Note the following verbiage in the TE:

"THIS TE ADDRESSES AN ACTION(S) DEFINED IN SNC CORRESPONDENCETO THE NRC. BEFORE ANY EXTENSION OF THE TE COMPLETION DATE ISAPPROVED, A REGULATORY AFFAIRS MANAGER MUST BE CONTACTED TODETERMINE IF NRC NOTIFICATION IS NEEDED."

/v'fh Ii Relevant email correspondence, including emails with any regulatory agency.

IF Relevant telephone or face-to-face conversation notes, including conversations withany regulatory agency.

0I Correspondence from and/or with the NRC, such as RAIs, Orders, etc.

ov/4 El PRB/Licensing Subcommittee Meeting Minutes, if applicable.

LI1 Challenge Board comments/notes, if performed.

fr/v/ LI Other supporting documentation (DOEJs, calculations, vendor reports, 50.54(q)s, etc.)

Note: It is permissible to only include the cover sheet of the supporting documentationif the volume of material is too large to include.

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0

ATTACHMENT 1

UNIT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS

NO. SNCF164-RPT-01

Equipment List Paues

Unit 1 -Base List 1 2-21

Unit 1 - SWEL 1 (Version 1.0) 22-26


Unit 1 - Base List 2 33-34



Page 1 of 40


ATTACHMENT 1


NO. SNCF164-RPT-01

Equipment List Pages



Unit I - SWEL 1 (Version 2.0) 27-32




Page 2 of 40


APPENDIX ASEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)FARLEY UNIT I

Page No. I

"LINENO. CLASS

C.n.... *USCCUC(1) (2)

20

20

20

20

20

2018

20

07

07

07

0707

23

21

21

21

18

18

19

19

19

19

19

19

07

0

18

18

MARK NO.

AITBOOl

AITBOO6

A1TSOO2

9178003

NIE21LIO112-3

NIHI1NGNCS2500A-AB

NI1P8PCV2885A

N1P1SPCV28B5B

N1P18PCV2885C

N1P19PCV2228A

NIP19PCV222SS

QilIHOOIi

Q1821NCOOA

QIB21HOO01B

Q1821I4001C

Q1B21PT0402-Pl

Q1821PT0403-P4

Q1B21TE0410-P2

QIB21TE0413-Pl

Q1B21TEO42O-P2

Q1B21TED423-PI

Q1821TE0430-P4

Q1821TE0433-P3

QIB31IIV8028-A

QIB31KO01

Q1B31LT0459-PI

Q1831LT0460-P2

SYSTEM/EQUIPMENTDESCRIPTION BUILDING

un~nsffn....n..a.......faf.., .W~ls

(4) (5)

TERMINAL BOX AS

TERMINAL BOX As

TERMINAL BOX AS

TERMINAL BOX AS

TERMINAL BOX As

TERMINAL BOX AS

VCT LEVEL INDICATION AS

MAIN CONTROL BOARD SECTION A AS

PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE AS

PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE As

PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE AS

PCV TO PORV BACKUP AIR SUPPLY BOTTLE As

PCV TO PORV BACKUP AIR SUPPLY PRESSURE AsCONTROL

REACTOR VESSEL CB

STEAM GENERATOR 1A Co

STEAM GENERATOR 18 CS

STEAM GENERATOR IC CS

RCS LOOP 3 WIDE RANGE PRESSURE CS

ELEV.Q..0000

(6)

100-00

100-00

121-00

121-00

100-00

100-00

121-00

155-00

100-00

100-00

100-00

121-00

121-00

129-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

105-00

105-00

105-00

105-00

105-00

105-00

105-00

105-00

121-00

ROOMC-S.of .ma

(7)

0189

0194

0223

0235

0190

0192

0218

0401

0189

0189

0189

0218

0218

C11T

CTNT

CTNT

CiTM

CTNT

CTNT

CTNT

CTINT

CTMT

ClNT

CTNT

CTNT

0223

CIT

CINT

CINT

RCS LOOP I WIDE RANGE PRESSURE

RCS LOOP 1 COLD LEG RMD

RCS LOOP 1 HOT LEG RTD

RCS LOOP 2 COLD LEG RTID

RCS LOOP 2 HOT LEG RID

RCS LOOP 3 COLD LEG RTD

RCS LOOP 3 NOT LEG RID

PRESSURE RELIEF TANK ISOLATION OUTSIDECTIT VALVE

RCS PRESSURIZER

PRESSURIZER LEVEL (CONTROL ROOM)

PRESSURIZER LEVEL

CBC8

CBCS

CS

CB

CB

AS

CBCB

CB

155-00

132-00

132-00

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38Sort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0

Page 3 of 40


APPENDIX ASEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)FARLEY UNIT 1

Page No. 2

I""INENO.(1)

CLASS MARK NO.(2) (3)

SYSTEM/EQUIPMENTDESCRIPTION

a .... Mae ... W.00---.----------------a...

(4)

18 Q1B31LT0461-P3

O0A Q1B3IMOVS00OA-A

08A Q1831NOV8008B-8

07 QIB31PCV0444B-B

07 QI131PCV044SA-A

18 Q1831PTO455-PI

18 Q1B31PTO456-P2

18 Q1R31PT0457-P3

02 Q1C1IEOO4A-AB

02 Q1ClIEO04B-AB

18 Q1C22LT0474-PI

18 Q1C22LTO475-P2

18 QlC22LT0476-P3

18 Q1C22LT0484-PI

18 QIC22LT0485-P2

18 Q1C22LTO486-P3

18 QIC22LT0494-PI

18 Q1C22LT0495-P2

18 QIC22LT0496-P3

0 Q1C51LOO1B-1

0 QICS5NEOO48-A

20 Q1C5SNMOO4S-A

08A Q1EIIFCVO602A-A

08A QIEIIFCV0602B-8

18 Q1E11FIS602A-A

18 Q1E11FIS602B-B

18 QIEI1FTO6SO5A-2

18 QlElIFT0605B-4

PRESSURIZER LEVEL

PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE

PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE

PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF VALVE

PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF VALVE

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE



REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR NO. I

REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR NO. 2

STEAR GENERATOR 1A NARROW RANGE LEVEL

BUILDING(5)

CI

CB

C8

CSCB

C8

CB

AD

AB

CB

CB

CB

CB

CS

CB

CB

C8

CB

CB

AB

ELEV

(6)

STEAM GENERATOR

STEAM GENERATOR

STEAM GENERATOR

STEAM GENERATOR

STEAM GENERATOR

STEAM GENERATOR

STEAM GENERATOR

STEAM GENERATOR

1A NARROW RANGE LEVEL

iA NARROW RANGE LEVEL

19 NARROW RANGE LEVEL

1B NARROW RANGE LEVEL

1B NARROW RANGE LEVEL

1C NARROW RANGE LEVEL

IC NARROW RANGE LEVEL

IC NARROW RANGE LEVEL

ROOM

(7)

132-00

175-00

1)5-00

155-00

173-00

165-00

166-00

166-00

121-00

121-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

129-00

139-00

139-00

83-00

83-00

83-00

83-00

87-00

CINT

CTMT

CTNT

CTMT

CTNT

CTMT

CThT

0235

0235

CTNT

CT1T

CTNT

CTNT

CTNT

CTlT

CTNT

CTMT

CTNT

C1lT

CT1T

0332

0128

0122

0128

0128

0120

NIS NEUTRON DETECTOR BOX 18 (41A & 418)

ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN NEUTRON FLUX DETECTOR

ALTERN SHUTDOWN NEUTRON FLUX MON SIGNALAMPLIFIER

R14R PUMP MINI FLOW VALVE

RHR PIMP MINI FLOW VALVE

RHR PUMP FLOW INDICATING SWITCH

RHR PUMP FLOW INDICATING SWITCH

RHR HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE FLOWTRANSMITTER

RHR HEAT EXCHANGER DISCHARGE FLOWTRANSMITTER

AD

AD

AS

AS

AR

A8 87-00 0120

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /Sort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0

02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 4 of 40


APPENDIX A Page No. 3SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)FARLEY UNIT I

L INENO. CLASS MARK NO.

a.==am n==usn *tmmuflmanSC====S==(1) (2) (3)

21 Q1E11HOOIA-A

21 QE1IHO0O1B-B

20 QIEIILQ3594A-A

20 Q1E11LQ3594B-B

18 Q1E1ILT3594A-A

18 QIEIILT3594B-B

08A Q1ElMOV8701A-A

08M QIE11MOV8701B-B

C8A QIEIIMOV87O2A-A

0SA Q1E1IMOVe702B-8

CM. QIE11NOVS706A-A

08A Q1E11MOV8706B-B

CBA Q1E1IMOV8809A-A

08A QIE11MOV8809B-B

OCA QIE1INOV8811A-A

OBA Q1E11MOV8811B-B

C8A QIE1UMOVSS12A-A

0SA QIE11NOVS812B-B

08A Q1E11MOVS88A-A

CSA Q1E1JMOV8S8SB-B

06 Q1EI1POOIA-A

06 Q1E11PCO1B-B

18 Q1E13PT095O-PI

18 QIEI3PTO9S1-P2

18 Q1E13PTO952-P3

18 Q1E13PTO953-P4


CSU UU * so. .... waScaUSS*08 m0y mu

(4)

RNR HEAT EXCHANGER IA

RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 18

CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY

CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER SUPPLY

CTMT SUMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER

CTMT SUIMP LEVEL TRANSMITTER

RHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE



PHR INLET ISOLATION VALVE

RMR LOOP NO. I DISCHARGE TO CVCS

,HR LOOP NO. 2 DISCHARGE TO CVCS

RWST TO RNR PUMP IA SUCTION

RWST TO PHR PUMP 19 SUCTION

RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT TRAIN A

RHR PUMP SUCTION FROM CONTAINMENT TRAIN 8

CONTAINMENT SUMP TO RHR PUMP 1A ISOLATION

CONTAINMENT SUIMP TO RHR PUMP 18 ISOLATION

LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG

LHSI TO RCS COLD LEG

RHR PUMP IA

,HR PUMP 18

CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTIONTRANSMITTER




CHG/MSI PUMP ROOM COOLER IA (TRAIN A)

CHG/HHSI PIMP ROOM COOLER IC (TRAIN B)

BUILDING

(5)

AS

AS

ABAS

CB

CB

CBCS

CB

CB

AS

AS

AD

AS

AS

AS

AS

AS

AS

AS

AS

AS

AS

ELEV(6)

83-00

83-00

139-00

139-00

116-00

116-00

105-00

105-00

105-00

105-00

83-00

83-00

83-00

83-00

83-00

83-00

83-00

83-00

121-00

121-00

83-00

83-00

121-00

ROOM.asses....

(7)

0128

0128

0318

0318

CmTl

CTNT

CTNT

CINT

CTNT

CTMT

0128

0128

0131

0129

0131

0129

0131

0129

0223

0223

0131

0129

0223

AS

AS

AS

AB

AS

121-00 0223

121-00 0223

121-00 0223

10

10

QIE16HOOIA-A

Q1E16H0OIC-B

100-00

100-00

0181

0173

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /Sort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O

02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 5 of 40



Page No. 4

LINENO.

w-waftoCLASS MARK NO.

..mmi m ... m ....................

SYSTER/EQUIPI4ENTDESCRIPTION

............. fl* .... nowac

BUILDING ELEV ROOM

(5) (6) (7)(1) (2)

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

18

(3)

Q1E16HOO3A-A

QE1E6HO038-B

QE1E6HO04A-A

Q1E16HOO4B-B

QIE16HOOSA-A

Q1E16HOO5B-B

Q1E16HOO6A-A

Q1E16IIO06B-B

Q1E1614007-A

Q1E16IIOO8A-B

QIE16HCOSB-B

QIE16HO09-A

QIE16HO10-8B

QIE21FT0940

RHR

RHR

CCV

CCV

AUX

PUMP ROOM

PUMP ROOM

PUMP ROOM

PUMP ROOM

FEEDWATER

(4)

COOLER 1A

COOLER 1B

COOLER TRAIN A

COOLER TRAIN B

PUMP ROOM COOLER IA

AUX FEEDWATER PUMP ROOM COOLER IB

BATTERY CHARGING ROOM COOLERS

BATTERY CHARGING ROOM COOLERS

14CC IA ROOM COOLER

MCC 10 ROOM COOLER

MCC 1B ROOM ACU

600V LOAD CENTER 1D ROOM COOLER

600V LOAD CENTER IE ROOM COOLER

HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOWTRANSMITTER

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AS

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

83-00

83-00

100-00

100-00

100-00

100-00

121-00

121-00

139-00

121-00

121-00

139-00

121-00

77-00

0131

0129

0185

0185

0190

0192

0245

0244

0332

0209

0209

0339

0228

o111

18 QIE21FT0943

0 Q1E21HOO2

21 Q1E21HOO3

21 QIE21HOO4

07 Q1E21HV8149A-A

07 Q1E21HVB149B-A

07 Q1E21IV8149C-A

07 QIE21HV8152

07 Q1E21HV8942-A

07 QIE21HV8945A-A

O0A Q1E2ILCVOIISB-A

08A QIE2ILCVOII5C-A

GSA QIE21LCVO115D-B

08A Q1E21LCVO11SE-B

18 QIE21LT1I2-3

HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION FLOW ABTRANSMITTER

REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER CB

SEAL WATER HEAT EXCHANGER AD

LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER AB

LETDOWN ORIFICE ISOLATION CB



CVCS ISOLATION OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT VALVE AD

BORON INJECTION RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE AB

BORON INJECTION SURGE TANK VALVE AB

RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION VALVE AB

VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE AB

RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION VALVE AB

VOLUME CONTROL TANK OUTLET ISOLATION VALVE AB

VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER AD

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBFSort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O

100-00 0175

105-00

100-00

100-00

105-00

105-00

105-00

100-00

100-00

121-00

100-00

121-00

100-00

121-00

121-00

CTNT

0170

0170

C1NT

CTNT

CTNT

0184

0186

0222

0172

0216

0172

0216

0217

/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 6 of 40



Page No. 5

"'LINENO. CLASS MARK NO.

aesefn. Dow==.f a===fl amflCC

(1) (2) (3)

18 Q1E21LT115-1

08A QlE2INOVSLOO-B

08A QIE21MOVS1O6-A

0SA Q1E21OV8107-A

GSA Q1E21NOVS108-B

GSA Q1E21MOVSL09A-R

GSA Q1E21MOV8109C-B

GSA QIE21MOV8I12-A

08A QIE21MOV813OA-A

08A Q1E2IMOVSI3OB-B

OBA QIE21MOVOI31A-A

GSA Q1E21MOVB1318-R

GSA Q1E21MOV8132A-A

08A QIE21MOV8132B-B

OBA QIE21MOVS133A-A

GSA QIE21MOV81338-8

SYSTEM/EQUIPMENTOESCRIPTION

(4)

VOLUME CONTROL TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER

RCP SEAL WATER RETURN ISOLATION

CHARGING PUMP MINIFLOW ISOLATION

CHARGING PUMP TO RCS ISOLATION

CHARGING PUMP TO RCS ISOLATION

CHARGING PUMP P002A MINIFLOW VALVE

CHARGING PUMP POO2C NINIFLOW VALVE

RCP SEAL WATER RETURN ISOLATION

CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLATIONVALVE

CHARGING PUMP SUCTION HEADER ISOLAYIONVALVE



CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATIONVALVE



CHARGING PUMP DISCHARGE HEADER ISOLATION

VALVE

BORON INJECTION TANK OUTLET ISOLATION

BORON INJECTION TANK INLET ISOLATION

ACC. DISCH. VALVE

ACC. DISCH. VALVE

ACC. DISCH. VALVE

HHSI TO RCS COLD LEG ISOLATION

CHARGINGA/HSI PUMP P002A TRAIN A

CHARGING/HHSI PUMP P002C TRAIN B

BORON INJECTION TANK

RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER

BUILDING

(5)

AB

AS

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

CB

AB

ELEV ROOM(6) (7)

121-00 0217

121-00 0223

100-00 0170

121-00 0223

121-00 0223

100-00 0181

100-00 0173

129-00 CT1T

100-00 0181

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AS

100-00 0175

100-00 0175

100-00 0172

100-00 0181

100-00 0175

100-00 0175

100-00 0173

08A

GSA

08A

08A

GSA

OSA

05

05

21

18

QIE21MOVSBOIA-A

Q1E21MOVBSO3A-A

Q1E21NOVSSOSA-A

QIE21MOVS8080-8

QIE211MOV890SC-A

QIE21MOV8SSSS-B

Q1E21PO02A-A

Q1E21P002C-B

QIE21TOO6

QF1F6LTO5O1I-A

AB

AB

CB

CBCB

AB

AB

AB

AS

YD

121-00

100-00

105-00

105-00

105-00

100-00

100-00

100-00

100-00

155-00

0223

0172

CTMT

CTNT

CT4T

0184

0181

0173

0172

YARD

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBFSort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS '5')Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0

/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 7 of 40



Page No. 6

LINENO.

ca770-c(1)

CLASS(2)

18

21

07

MARK NO.

Q1F16LTOS02-B

Q1F16T0501

QIG21HV3376-B

07 Q1G21HV3377-A

07 QIG21HV7136-B

07 QIG21LCV1003-A

07

07

07

21

21

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

QIG24VO03A

Q1S24VO03B

QIG24VO03C

QIG31IIOOIA-B

Q IG31HOO18-A

QIHIINGASC25O6C-8

QIH11NGASC2SO6D-A

QlHllNGB2SO4J-A

Q1H11NGB25O4K-B

Q1H11NGCCM2523A-A

Q1H11NGCCN42523B-B

QlH11NGNIS25O3A-1

QINIINGPIC250SA-1

Q1H1NGPIC2SOSB-2

QIHIIZNGPIC25O5C-3

Q1HlINGPIC25O5D-4

QIH11NGPIC250SE-1

QIH1I NGPIC25O5F-2

QlIHNGPIC25O5G-3

QlI~I NGPIC2S5I4H-4

QlHlINGR25041-AB

Q1IH11NGSSP25O6G-B


(4)

RWST LEVEL TRANSMITTER

REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

RADIOACTIVE DRAIN ISOLATION INSIDE CTMTVALVE

RADIOACTIVE DRAIN ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTNTVALVE

WASTE PROCESSING ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTNTVALVE

WASTE PROCESSING ISOLATION INSIDE CTNTVALVE

SG IA SLOWDOWN ISOLATION

SG IB BLOWDOWN ISOLATION

SG 1C SLOWDOWN ISOLATION

SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN B

SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN A

AUX SAFEGUARDS CABINET C

AUX SAFEGUARDS CABINET D

BOP INSTRUMENTATION CABINET J

BOP INSTRU4ENTATION CABINET K

ICCHS PROCESSOR CABINET TRAIN A

ICCMS PROCESSOR CABINET TRAIN 8

NIS EXCORE DETECTOR CABINET

BUILDING(5)

YD

YD

CI

AB

AS

CB

AS

AB

AS

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AS

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AS

100-00 0184

100-00 0184

105-00 ORB

ELEV

(6)

155-00

155-00

105-00

ROOM

(7)

YARD

YARD

CTMT

121-00

121-00

121-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

0223

0223

0223

0445

0467

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

0416

PROCESS

PROCESS

PROCESS

PROCESS

PROCESS

PROCESS

PROCESS

PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL




CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 1



1

2

3

4

PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 4

RADIATION MONITOR PANEL

SOLID STATE PROTECTION INPUT CABINET

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBFSort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O

/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 8 of 40



SINENO. CLASS(1) (2)

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

18

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

07

07

07

07

0707

18

18

M4ARK NO.

(3)

QH1HINGSSP2506J-B

Q1H11NGSSP2506K-A

QIHIINGSSP2506N-A

QIH21EO04-A

Q1H21EOO5-B

QIH2IE504-A

Q11421E5O5-S

Q1H21ES06-A

Q1N21E507-B

QIH21ES27-8

Q1H21NBAFP26O5A-A

QIH21NBMER2619-B

Q1H22LOOIE-A

Q1H22LOO1F-B

Q11422L002-A

Q11422L003-A

Q11422L004-B

Q11422L503-B

Q1N23S5448-S

QIH25LOOB-A

Q11H25L029-B

QN11HV3369A

QlN111HV3369B

QINIIHV3369C

QIN11HV337OA-B

QlNlIHV33708-B

Q1N11HV337OC-8

QlNllLT0477-A

QINIILT0487-A


(4)

SOLID STATE PROTECTION TEST CABINET

SOLID STATE PROTECTION INPUT CABINET

SOLID STATE PROTECTION TEST CABINET

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IF LOCAL CONT PANEL

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IG LOCAL CONT PANEL

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IH LOCAL CONT PANEL

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IJ LOCAL CONT PANEL

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR 1K LOCAL CONT PANEL

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR iK LOCAL CONT PANEL

DIESEL GENERATOR 18 LOCAL CONTROL PANEL

HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL A

STEAM GENERATOR IC WIDE RANGE LEVEL MCBISOLATOR

MULTIPLYING RELAY CABINET 1E

MULTIPLYING RELAY CABINET IF

TRANSFER RELAY CABINET I

TRANSFER RELAY CABINET 2

TRANSFER RELAY CABINET 3

DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL I1

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 15 HVAC LCS

TERMINATION CABINET

TERMINATION CABINET

MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE



MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE



STEAM GENERATOR 1A WIDE RANGE LEVEL

STEAM GENERATOR 18 WIDE RANGE LEVEL

BUILDING ELEV(c5)anum-0 (6)0swas(s) (6)

AS

AS

As

AB

AB

DB

Sw

Sw

DS

AB

AB

AB

AS

AB

AB

AB

DB

0I

AS

AS

AS

As

As

AB

AS

AS

CB

CB

155-00

155-00

155-00

139-00

121-00

155-00

155-00

188-06

188-06

155-00

121-00

121-00

139-00

139-00

139-00

100-00

139-00

155-00

IS5-00

139-00

139-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

129-00

129-00

ROOM

(7)

0416

0416

0416

0343

0233

0056A

0056C

0072E

00728

0058

02S4

0227

0318

0318

0347

0190

0334

0058

00S8

0318

0318

0241

0241

0241

0241

0241

0241

CTNT

C714T

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBFSort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O

/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 9 of 40



Page No. a

LINE

NO. CLASS(1) (2)

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

18

07

07

07

085

088

089

18

18

18

18

18

07

MARK NO.

QINIILT0497-B

Q1N11PT0474-P2

Q1N11PT0475-P3

Q1N11PTO476-P4

Q1N11PTO4S4-P2

Q1NI1PTO4S5-P3

QINIIPT0486-P4

Q1N11PT0494-P2

QIN11PTO49S- P3

Q1N11PT0496-P4

QlI~i PT337 lA-A

Q1N11PT3371B-A

QINIIPT337IC-A

QiNI 1PV3371A-A

QINIIPV337IB-A

QlNlIPV337IC-A

QlNllSV3369AC-A

Q1N115V336g5C-A

QlNlISV3369CC-A

QIN23FI3229AR-A

QIN23FI3229C-8-

QlN23FT3229A-A

QlN23FT3229B-A

Q1N23FT3229C-B

QIN23HV3227A


=cm.=mc.=m mm.=n==~...s.~mmmm(4)mmmm csm(4)

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

STEAM

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

GENERATOR

IC WIDE RANGE LEVEL

IA PRESSURE

IA DISCHARGE PRESSURE

IA DISCHARGE PRESSURE

1B DISCHARGE PRESSURE

1B PRESSURE

IB DISCHARGE PRESSURE

1C DISCHARGE PRESSURE

1C DISCHARGE PRESSURE

1C PRESSURE

1A PRESSURE

lB PRESSURE

1C PRESSURE

MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE



SOLENOID VALVE

SOLENOID VALVE

SOLENOID VALVE

FEEDWATER INTAKE FLOW INDICATION

FEEDWATER INTAKE FLOW INDICATION

AUX FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER



MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAMGENERATOR IA

MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAMGENERATOR 1B

MOTOR DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER TO STEAMGENERATOR IC

SERVICE WATER ISOLATION VALVE TO AUXFEEDWATER

BUILDING

(5)

CB

AB

AS

AB

AS

As

AS

AS

As

AS

AS

AS

AS

As

AS

AS

AS

AS

AB

As

AS

AS

AB

AB

AS

As

As

AS

129-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

100-00

100-00

100-00

100-00

100-00

121-00

CTMT

0462

0462

0462

0462

0462

0462

0464

0464

0464

0462

0462

0464

0241

0241

0241

0241

0241

0241

0190

0190

0190

0189

0194

0241

ELEV ROOM

(6) (7)

07 Q1N23HV32278

07 Q1N23HV3227C

08A Q1N23MOV3209A-A

121-00 0241

121-00 0241

100-00 0191

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Oata Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38Sort Criteria: ID NutberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0

Page 10 of 40



Page No. 9

CINENO. CLASS MARK NO.

accfno .l.===an awasmansfav a ....

(1) (2) (3)

0SA QIN23MOV3209B-B

OA Q1N23MOV321OA-A

08A QINZ3MOV3210B-B

05 QIN23POOIA-A

05 Q1N23P0O1B-B

18 QIPIILTOS15-A

18 QIPIILTOS16-B

21 QIPIITOOl

07 Q1P13NY2866C-A

07 QIP13HV2866D-B

07 Q1P13HV2867C-A

07 QIPI3HV2867D-B

07 QlPlSHV3103-A

07 Q1P5INV3105-B

07 QlP15HV3106-B

07 Q1PI5HV3332-B

07 Q1P15HV3333-B

07 Q1PI5HV3765-A

0 QIP16FSO1A-A

0 Q1P16FSO1B-B

07 QIP16FV3009A-B

07 QIPI6FV3009C-A

20 QIP16GS17A-A

20 QIP16G517B-B

GSA Q1P16MOV3149-A

06 Q1P16POOIA-A

SYSTEN/EQUIPMENTDESCRIPTIONmaum mmmJommmmmnmmmmmmniuSmnmlm uauS m~u ma m

(4)

SERVICE WATER ISOLATION VALVE TO AUXFEEDWATER

SERVICE WATER TO AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 1AINTAKE

SERVICE WATER TO AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 1BINTAKE

AUX FEEDWATER PUMP IA

AUX FEEDWATER PUMP 18

CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER

CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL TRANSMITTER

CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION OUTSIDE C1TTVALVE

CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION INSIDE C11ITVALVE

CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION OUTSIDE CTMTVALVE

CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION INSIDE CTMTVALVEPRESSURIZER LIQUID SAMPLE LINE ISOLATION

VALVE

RHR HX A SAMPLE VALVE

RHR HX B SAMPLE VALVE

PRESSURIZER SAMPLE

RCS HOT LEG SAMPLE LINE ISOLATION VALVE

RCS SAMPLE

SW STRAINER IA

SW STRAINER 1B

CCW HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE

CCV NEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE

TURB. BLDG. S.W. ISOL. VALVE RELAY BOX

TURB. BLDG. S.W. ISOL. VALVE RELAY BOX

BLOWDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER ISOLATION NOV

SERVICE WATER PUMP 1A

BUILDING ELEVummuuuwum=== .m06000

(5) (6)

AB 100-00

ROOMmaaw.ufl..

(7)

0192

AD

AS

AB

AB

YD

YD

YDAB

CB

AD

CD

CB

AB

As

AD

AB

CB

SW

SW

AB

As

DB

DB

AB

SW

100-00 0191

100-00 0192

100-00

100-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

121-00

0191

0192

YARD

YARD

YARD

0223

129-00 C7TMT

121-00 0223

129-00 CTMT

129-00 CT1T

77-00

77-00

121-00

121-00

126-00

167-00

167-00

100-00

100-00

155-00

155-00

121-00

188-06

0128

0128

0223

0223

CTNT

0072A

0072A

0185

0185

0060

0056C

0223

0072A

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /Sort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'IS)Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0

02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 11 of 40


LINENO.

am--a--(1)


SYSTEM/EQUIPMENTCLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM

. -c---- -.. m bwas.a.. fl w•wwomcoml Ummm nmmmm flmmmS*

(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

06

06

06

18

18

0BA

QIPIGPOOIB-A

Q1P16POO1D-B

QIP16POOIE-B

QIP16PDS620-A

Q1P16PDS62I-B

QIP16V514-8

OSA Q1P16VS15-A

08A QIP16V516-B

08A QIPI6V517-A

GSA Q1P16V538-8

08A QIP16V539-A

08A Q1P16VS45-B

08A QIP16V546-A

07 QIP16VS62-B

07 Q1P16V563-A

07 QIP16V577-A

07 Q1P16VG78-AB

07 QIP16V579-B

21 QIP17HOOIA-B

21 QIP17HOO1B-AB

21 QIP17HO01C-A

07 Q1P17HV2229

07 Q1P17HV3045-A

07 QIP17HV3067-B

SERVICE WATER PUMP 1B

SERVICE WATER PUMP 10

SERVICE WATER PUMP 1E

DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH

DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SWITCH

SERVICE WATER TO TURBINE BLDG ISOLATIONVALVE




SERVICE WATER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION TOPOND

SERVICE WATER EMERGENCY RECIRCULATION TOPOND

SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE FROM AUXILIARYBUILDING

SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE FROM AUXILIARYBUILDING

SERVICE WATER DILUTION BYPASS PRESSURECONTROL

SERVICE WATER DILUTION BYPASS PRESSURECONTROL

A TRAIN SERVICE WATER MINIFLOW

A-B TRAIN SERVICE WATER MINIFLOW

B TRAIN SERVICE WATER NINIFLOW

CCW HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN B

SWING CCW HEAT EXCHANGER

CCW HEAT EXCHANGER TRAIN A

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUPPLY TO SAMPLECOOLERS

CCW RETURN FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIERISOLATION

CCW RETURN FROM EXCESS LETDOWN

SW

SW

SW

YD

YD

YD

YD

YD

YD

YD

YD

YD

YD

YD

YD

SW

SW

SW

AB

AS

AB

AB

AB

AB

188-06

188-06

188-06

155-00

155-00

155-00

0072A

0072A

0072A

YARD

YARD

ISVBi

155-00 1SVB1

155-00 1SVBI

155-00 1SVB1

155-00 1SV82

155-00 ISVB2

155-00 1SV84

140-00 ISVB4

155-00 ISVB2B

155-00 1SVB2A

188-06

188-06

188-06

100-00

100-00

100-00

100-00

0072A

0072A

0072A

0185

0185

0185

0162

121-00 0223

121-00 0223

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBFSort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.0

/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 12 of 40



LINENO.

(1)


07 QIP17HV3095-B

07 Q1P1714V3096A

07 QIP17HV3096B

07 QlPl7HV3184-B

07 QIP17HV3443-A

08A Q1P17NOV3046-B

08A Q1P17MOV3O52-A

OSA QIP17NOV3182-A

08A QIP17NOV318SA-A

OBA Q1P17NOV3185B-B

05 QIP17PO0IA-B

05 QlPl7PO0IC-A

07 Q1PI7PCV3404A


..........c=U=-= n.US====..=.=..USU=U

(4)

CCW SUPPLY TO EXCESS LETDOWN HEATEXCHANGER

CCi NON-SAFETY ISOLATION

CCi NON-SAFETY ISOLATION

CCW RETURN FROM RCP THERMAL BARRIERISOLATION

CCW RETURN FROM EXCESS LETDOWN HEATEXCHANGER

CCW RETURN FROM RCPS

CCW TO RCP THERMAL BARRIER ISOLATION

CCW RETURN FROM RCPS

CCV INLET TO RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO. I

CCW INLET TO RHR HEAT EXCHANGER NO. 2

CCV PUMP IA TRAIN B

CCV PUM IC TRAIN A

CCW RHR PMP 1A SEAL HEAT EXCHANGER PRCONTROL

BUILDING ELEV(S) (6)

AB 121-00

ROOM(7)

0223

0161

0161

CTNT

AS

AS

CB

CB

100-00

100-00

129-00

129-00 CThT

CB

AS

AS

L AS

* AS

AB

AS

PESURE AB

130-00

121-00

121-00

83-00

83-00

100-00

100-00

83-00

CTMT

0223

0223

0128

0128

0185

0185

0128

07 QIP17PCV3404B CCV RHR PIMP B SEAL HEAT EXCHANGER PRESURE ASCONTROL

83-00 0129

21

12

12

07

07

21

21

04

04

04

04

04

04

Q1P17TOOl

Q1P1SCOO2A-A

Q1P1SCOO2B-B

QIP19HV2228-8

Q1P19KV3611-A

QIP19NCYL-A

Q1P19NCYL-B

QlRlIB004-A

Q1R11BOO5-B

Q1R11B503-A

QlRllB504-A

Q1R1115O5-8

QIR11B507-B

SURGE TANK (CCW)

TRAIN A EMERGENCY AIR COMPRESSOR

TRAIN S EMERGENCY AIR COMPRESSOR

PRESSURIZER PORV BACK-UP AIR SUPPLY VALVE

INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION OUTSIDECONTAIPN1ENT VALVE

NITROGEN CYLINDER

NITROGEN CYLINDER

LC TRANSFORMER 10

LC TRANSFORMER lE

LC TRANSFORMER 1R

LC TRANSFORMER 1K

LC TRANSFORMER IL

LC TRANSFORMER IS

AS

AS

AS

AS

AS

AS

AS

AS

AB

DS

Sw

SW

DB

179-00

100-00

100-00

121-00

100-00

121-00

121-00

139-00

121-00

155-00

188-06

188-06

155-00

0506

0189

0189

0223

0184

0218

0218

0335

0229

0056A

0072E

00728

0056C

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /Sort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEM v0.0

02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 13 of 40



Page No. 12

,ý.1INENO.

-770.~CLASS MARK NO..a a c.00U000u0 .......

DESCRIPTION

(4)

BUILDING ELEV(5) (6)=== nn.mflan(5) (6)(2)

03

03

03

03

03

03

02

02

02

02

02

02

01

01

01

01

01

01

01

01

(3)

QlRlSA006-A

QI1RISAD7-8

Q1R15A503-A

QIRISA504-8

Q1R15A5OS-A

Q1R15A506-B

QIR16BO06-A

Q1R16B007 -B

Q1R16B506-A

Q1R16B507-B

Q1R16B508-A

QIR168509-B

QIR17B001-A

QIR178002-0

Q1R17BODO-A

QIR178009-B

Q1R17B5O4-A

Q1R17B505-B

Q1R17B507-A

Q1R17B$O8-B

Q1R17B5O9-A

QR1R78510-B

QlRl8B029-A

QIR18B030-A

QIRIS6031-A

Q1RISB032-A

QIR1BB033-B

QIRIBB034-B

QlRlBB035-B

QIRIBB036-6

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IF

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IG

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IN

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IJ

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IK

4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IL

600V LOAD CENTER ID

G00V LOAD CENTER 1E

600V LOAD CENTER lK/2K

600V LOAD CENTER 11/2L

600V LOAD CENTER 1R/2R

600V LOAD CENTER IS/2S

MCC IA

MCC 1B

MCC 1U

1CC 1V

MCC 1K

MCC 1L

MCC IN

MCC iP

MCC iS

MCC IT

POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH


CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX

CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX



CIRCUIT BREAKER BOX


AB

ABDB

08

SW

SW

AS

AB

SW

SW

DB

AB

AB

AB

ABSwAS

ASSW

DB

DB

DB

ABAB

AB

AB

AB

AB

AS

AB

139-00

121-00

155-00

155-00

188-06

188-06

139-00

121-00

188-06

188-06

155-00

155-00

139-00

121-00

139-00

139-00

188-06

188-06

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

139-00

139-00

139-00

139-00

139-00

139-00

139-00

139-00

ROOM

(7)

0343

0233

0056A

0056C

0072E

0072B

0335

0229

0072E

00728

0056A

0056C

0332

0209

0347

0334

0072E

0072B

0060

0057

0061

0058

0332

0332

0332

0332

0322

0322

0322

0322

01

01

02

02

14

14

02

02

14

02

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBFSort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0

/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 14 of 40



Page No. 13

L INENO.(1)

CLASS MARK NO.SON.. ....n..5;...

02

02

02

02

02

02

14

14

14

14

16

16

16

16

16

16

14

14

14

14

14

14

03

03

03

03

14

14

14

14

QIR18BO38-A

Q1RISBO39-A

Q1R18B040-A

QlR1SB041-B

Q1R18042-B

QIRISB043-B

QLR21BOO1A-1

Q1R21BOO1B-2

Q1R216001C-3

Q1R21BOO1D-4

Q1R21EOO9A-1

Q1R21EO09B-2

Q1R21EO09C-3

Q1R21EOO9D-4

Q1R21EOO9F-A

Q1R21E009G-B

QLR21LOO1A-1

Q1R21LOO1B-2

Q1R21LOO1C-3

Q1R21LOO1D-4

QIR21LOOSA-A

QIR21LOOSB-B

QI1R36ASOI-A

Q1R36A502-B

Q1R36A510-A

QIR36A511-B

Q1R41LOO1A-A

QIR41LOOIB-A

QIR41LOOIC-A

QIR41LOO1D-B

SYSTEM/EQUIPMENTDESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM

UMwMeM.M....mmMMmMMM m mm..=n= am..O. mammas as .. MsMsm

(4) (5) (6) (7)

NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0332


NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AS 139-00 0332


NOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH AS 139-00 0312


VITAL AC BREAKER BOX AB 155-00 0416




INVERTER IA AB 121-00 0224

INVERTER 1B AB 121-00 0224

INVERTER 1C AB 121-00 0226

INVERTER ID AB 121-00 0226

INVERTER IF AS 121-00 0224

INVERTER IG AS 121-00 0226

VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IA AS 155-00 0416

VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL lB AS 155-00 0416

VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IC AB 139-00 0318

VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL ID AD 139-00 0318

120V VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IJ AS 121-00 0224

120V VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IK AD 121-00 0226

4.16KV

4.16KV

4.16KV

4.16KV

125VDC

125VDC

125VDC

125VDC

SWITCHGEAR 1K SURGE ARRESTOR

SWITCHGEAR IL SURGE ARRESTOR

SWITCHGEAR 1K SURGE ARRESTOR

SWITCHGEAR 1L SURGE ARRESTOR

DISTRIBUTION PANEL IA

DISTRIBUTION PANEL 15

DISTRIBUTION PANEL IC

DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1D

SW

SWD8OBDB

AB

AB

AS

AB

188-06

188-06

155-00

155-00

155-00

139-00

139-00

155-00

0072A

0072A

0056A

0056C

0416

0343

0312

0416

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBFSort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0

/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 15 of 40



LINENO.(1)


14 Q1R41LOO1E-B

14 QIR41LOOIF-B

02 QIR42BOO1A-A

02 QIR42B001B-B

16 QIR42E001A-A

1i QIR42EO01B-B

15 Q1R42EOO2A-A

is QIR42E002B-8

17 Q1R43AS02-B

20 QIR43EO01A-A

20 QIR43EO01B-B

20 QIR43EOO2A-A

20 QIR43E002B-8

20 QIR43ESO1A-A

20 Q1R43E501B-B

0 QlR43E502B-B

20 QIR43G510-B

21 Q1R43TS02-B

21 QIR43T503

21 Q1R43T504

09 Q1V47CO12A-A

09 QIV47CO12B-B

05 QIY52PS02B-B

21 Q1Y52T502

20 QSHI1NGEPB2508-AS

20 QSH21ES25-A

20 QSH21ES28-A

SYSTEM/ERUIPMENTc~c~ms~uinau...uIuN om

(4)

BUILDING.unn~mum•n=

(5)

ELEV ROOM=.som.. (?o)c.sms

(6) (7)

125VOC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1E AS

125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IF AB

125VDC BUS 1A AS

125VDC BUS 1B AS

AUX BLDG BATTERY CHARGER IA AS

AUX BLDG BATTERY CHARGER 1B AS

AUX BLDG BATTERY IA AS

AUX BLDG BATTERY 1B AS

DIESEL GENERATOR 1B (SKID) DB

SEQUENCER BIF AS

SEQUENCER BIG AS

SEQUENCER BIF AUX RELAY PANEL AS

SEQUENCER BIG AUX RELAY PANEL AB

SEQUENCER BUS 1H DB

SEQUENCER BUS 13 DO

DIESEL GENERATOR 1B NEUTRAL GROUNDING OBRESISTOR

DIESEL GENERATOR 16 CT JB D8

FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1B DB

DIESEL GENERATOR 1B STARTING AIR RECEIVER DBTANK

DIESEL GENERATOR lB STARTING AIR RECEIVER DBTANK

AUXILIARY BLDG A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM ABEXHAUST FAN

AUXILIARY BLDG B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM ASEXHAUST FANDIESEL GEN 1B FUEL OIL STORAGE TRANSFER YDPUMP

FUEL STORAGE TANK 19 YD

EMERGENCY POWER BOARD AS

DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A LOCAL CONTROL PANEL DB

DIESEL GENERATOR IC LOCAL CONTROL PANEL CB

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

121-00

155-00

139-00

121-00

139-00

121-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

0233

0209

0224

0226

0224

0226

0214

0212

0058

0335

0229

0343

0233

0056A

0056C

0058

Co58

0063

0058

155-00 0058

175-00 0501

175-00 0501

155-00 YARD

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

YARD

0401

0061

0060

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: U1MASTER.DBF /Sort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O

02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 16 of 40



Page No. 15

'LINENO. CLASS MARK NO.

=*Donsa.uva ssu awa * ... W.a.u..wcao(1) (2) (3)

20 QSH21LSO3A-A

20 QSH21LSO3B-B

20 QSH22LS02-A

20 QSH22L504-A

20 QSH23S544D-A

20 QSH23S544E-A

01 QSRI7BOO6-A

01 QSR17BO07-B

14 QSR19LO02A-A

14 QSR19LO02B-B

14 QSR41LS04-A

14 QSR41L5O5-B

20 QSR42BS16A-A

20 QSR42B516B-B

20 QSR42B52OA-A

20 QSR42B520B-B

15 QSR42B523A-A

15 QSR42B523B-A

is QSR42B523C-B

15 QSR42B5230-B


(4)

SERVICE WATER A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM HVACLCS

SERVICE WATER B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM HVACLCS

DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL 1-2A

DIESEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL IC

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM IC HVAC LCS

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1-2A HVAC LCS

MCC IF

NCC IG

120V AC CONTR. PWR. PANEL 1R

120V AC CONTR. PWR. PANEL IS

125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IN

125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IN

UNIT I SERVICE WATER BATTERY FUSE BOXTRAIN A

UNIT 1 SERVICE WATER BATTERY FUSE BOXTRAIN 0

SW BATTERY NO. 1 or 2 DETECTION CABINET

SW BATTERY NO. 3 or 4 DETECTION CABINET

125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO.I

BUILDING

(5)

SW

ELEV

(6)

188-06

ROOMwau...mm.

(7)

00720

SW

OB

OB

DB

DO

AB

AB

AB

AB

SW

SW

SW

SW

SW

SW

Sw

188-06 0072C

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

188-06

188-06

188-06

0061

0060

0060

0061

0409

0409

0409

0409

0072E

00720

0074

188-06 0073

188-06

188-06

188-06

0074

0073

0074

20

20

16

QSR42BS52SA-A

QSR42B525B-B

OSR428526A-A

125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. SW2

125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. SW3125 VDC SERVICE WATER BUILDING BATTERY NO. SW4

SW BUILDING A TRAIN BATTERY SEL SW SW

SW BUILDING B TRAIN BATTERY SEL SW SW

SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. I SW(NORMAL)

SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 2 SW(STANDBY)

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBFSort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O

188-06 0074

188-06 0073

188-06 0073

188-06

188-06

188-06

0074

0073

0072D

16 QSR42BS26B-A 188-06 0072D

/ 02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 17 of 40



Page No. 16

'LINENO.

=8776=*(1)

CLASS MARK NO.*fl.Ms cow-oo .ff. Mon.==(2) (3)

16 QSR42B526C-B

16 QSR42B526D-B

17 QSR43A501-A

17 QSR43A503-A

0 QSR43E502A-A

0 QSR43E502C-A

20 QSR43G509-A

20 QSR43LOO1A-A

20 QSR43LOO1C-A

21 QSR43T501-A

21 QSR43T503-A

21 QSR43TS07

21 QSR43T508

21 QSR43T511

21 QSR43TS12

20 QSV49HS3313AB-A

20 QSV49HS3313BB-8

10 QSV49KOOIA-A

10 QSV4gKOOLB-B

18 QSW41B51SE-B

18 QSW41B515F-A

18 QSW418592B-B

18 QSW419592D-A

09 QSW41CSO5A-B


.--- moac-ema(4)csu(4)rMr-"rnrTT-rr|Ta I'll -1- 1-1B

BUILDING(5m)a..sfl(5)

ELEV ROOMznow..a= mowns...as

(6) (7)

188-06 0072C

188-06 0072C

SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 3 SW(NORMAL)

SERVICE WATER BLDG BATTERY CHARGER NO. 4 SW(STANDBY)

DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A (SKID) 0B

DIESEL GENERATOR IC (SKID) DO

DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A NEUTRAL GROUNDING DBRESISTOR

DIESEL GENERATOR IC NEUTRAL GROUNDING DBRESISTOR

DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A CT J8 D0

DIESEL GEN 1-2A DC CONTROL PWR AUTO XFER DSSW (ATS)DIESEL GEN 1C DC CONTROL PWR AUTO XFER SW D0(ATS)

FUEL OIL DAY TANK 1-2A Do

FUEL OIL DAY TANK IC D8

DIESEL GENERATOR IC STARTING AIR RECEIVER DBTANK

DIESEL GENERATOR IC STARTING AIR RECEIVER 06TANK

DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A STARTING AIR DBRECEIVER TANK

155-00

155-00

155-00

0061

0060

0061

155-00 0060

155-00

155-00

0061

0061

155-00 0060

155-00

155-00

155-00

0066

0065

0060

155-00 0060

155-00 0061

155-00 0061DIESEL GENERATOR 1-2A STARTING AIRRECEIVER TANK

CTRL RM A/C LOCAL CONTROL STATION A

CTRL RN A/C LOCAL CONTROL STATION B

CONTROL ROOM PACKAGE A/C UNIT

CONTROL ROOM PACKAGE A/C UNIT

SERV WTR BATTERY ROOM FIRESTAT




SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATORA

DO

As

AB

AB

AB

SW

SW

SW

SW

SW

155-00

155-00

175-00

175-00

1B8-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

0416

0416

0501

0501

0073

0074

0073

0074

0072A

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /Sort Criteria: ID NwuberFilter Criteria: (Eva). Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.0

02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 18 of 40

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO, SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0

APPENDIX A Page No. 17SEISMIC REVIEW SAFE SHUlDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST (SSEL)FARLEY UNIT I

lINENO. CLASS(1) (2)

MARK NO.Samoa ... 57 -00...


ese.l...........a.. ..lnl.amsfltb..lfln lb

(4)

BUILDINGm-mnolm..sfl

(5)ELEV

(6)

ROOM

(7)

09 QSW41CS05B-B

09

09

09

09

09

09

09

09

09

09

09

09

0

0

0

0

0

0

09

09

QSW41C505C-B

QSV4IC5O5D-A

QSW41C5O5E-A

QSW4IC5S5F-A

QSW41C5O6A-0

QSW41CSO6B-B

QSW4IC5O6C-A

QSW41CS060-A

QSW41C5O7A-B

QSW41CSO7B-B

QSW41C507C-A

QSW41C507D-A

QSW4IC5I3A-8

QSW41 C513B-8

QSW41C513C-A

QSW41CS13D-A

QSW41C514A-B

QSW41C5I4B-B

QSW41C514C-A

QSW41C514D-A

SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SWB

SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SWC

SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SWD

SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SWE

SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM EXHAUST VENTILATOR SWF

SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM SWEXHAUST FAN

SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM SWEXHAUST FAN

SERVICE WATER A TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM SWEXHAUST FAN

SERVICE WATER A TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM SWEXHAUST FAN

SERVICE WATER B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST SWFAN

SERVICE WATER B TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST SWFAN

SERVICE WATER A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST SWFANSERVICE WATER A TRAIN BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST SWFAN

SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM INTAKE LOUVER SW


SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM INTAKE LOUVER Sw


SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWGR ROOM INTAKE SWLOUVER

SERVICE WATER B TRAIN SWGR ROOM INTAKE SWLOUVER

SERVICE WATER A TRAIN 51R ROOM INTAKE SWLOUVER

SERVICE WATER A TRAIN SWGR ROOM INTAKE SWLOUVER

188-06 0072A

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

167-00

167-00

167-00

167-00

188-06

188-06

188-06

188-06

0072A

0072A

0072A

0072A

00728

0072B

0072E

0072E

0073

0073

0074

0074

0072A

0072A

0072A

0072A

0072B

0072B

0072E

0072E

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38Sort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEM vO.O

Page 19 of 40

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS -. NNO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0


Page No. 18

LINE SYSTEM/EQUIPMENTNO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION BUILDING ELEV ROOM

=..We. .uwu2)S --------------- (fm..s)e now..= .. .... sc7)=(1 2)()(4) (5) (6) (7)

0 QSW41C515A-B

O QSW41C515B-B

O QSW4IC515C-A

O QSW41C515D-A

18 QSY41R53ZA-B

18 QSY4IBS32C-A

18 QSY41B532D-A

18 QSY418616A-B

18 QSY41B616B-B

18 QSY4IR616C-B

18 QSY4166160-B

18 QSY41B616J-A

18 QSY41B616K-A

is QSY41B616L-A

is QSY41861614-A

18 QSY41B6I6N-A

18 QSY41B616P-A

18 QSY41B616Q-A

18 QSY41B6I6R-A

09 QSY41C5O7A-B

09 QSY41C5O7B-B

09 QSY4ICSO7E-A

09 QSY41C5O7F-A

09 QSY41C5O8A-A

09 QSV41CSOBB-A

09 QSY41C5I LA-A

SERVICE WTR B TRAIN BATTERY CHGR RN INTAKE SWLOUVER

SERVICE WTR B TRAIN BATTERY CHGR RN INTAKE SWLOUVER

SERVICE WTR A TRAIN BATTERY CHGR RM INTAKE SWLOUVER

SERVICE WTR A TRAIN BATTERY CHGR RM INTAKE SWLOUVER

DIESEL GEN. ROOM 18 FIRESTAT 09

DIESEL GEN. ROOM 1-2A FIRESTAT DO

DIESEL GEN. ROOM 1C FIRESTAT DB

DIESEL GEN. ROOM 10 FIRESTAT DO

DIESEL GEN. ROOM 18 FIRESTAT DB

DIESEL GEN. ROOM 18 FIRESTAT DR

DIESEL GEN. ROOM 18 FIRESTAT Do

DIESEL GEN. ROOM 1-2A FIRESTAT DB

DIESEL GEN. ROOM I-2A FIRESTAT DB

DIESEL GEN. ROOM 1-2A FIRESTAT DB

DIESEL GEN. ROOM 1-2A FIRESTAT Do

DIESEL GEN. ROOM IC FIRESTAT DB

DIESEL GEN. ROOM IC FIRESTAT DB

DIESEL GEN. ROOM IC FIRESTAT DO

DIESEL GEN. ROOM IC FIRESTAT DO

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 15 EXHAUST FAN DO

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 18 EXHAUST FAN DB

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1-2A EXHAUST FAN Do

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1-2A EXHAUST FAN OB

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM IC EXHAUST FAN DB

DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1C EXHAUST FAN DB

DIESEL BLDG A TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM DOEXHAUST FAN

DIESEL BLDG A TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOM DBEXHAUST FAN

188-06 0072C

188-06 0072C

188-06 00720

188-06 0072D

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

0058

0061

0060

0058

0058

0058

0058

0061

0061

0061

0061

0060

0060

0060

0060

0058

0058

0061

0061

0060

0060

0059A

09 QSV41CSIIB-A 155-00 0056A

Reprt Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF /Sort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Name & Version: SSEN vO.O

02/27/95 / 16:00:38

Page 20 of 40



Page No. 19

LINENO.(1)

CLASS(2)

MARK NO.(3)

SYSTEM/E5UIPMENTDESCRI(TION

(4)BUILDING

(5)DB

ELEV ROOM

(6) (7)

155-00 0056C09 QSY41CSU1C-B

09 QSY41CSIID-B

0 QSY41CS13A-B

0 QSY41CS13C-A

0 QSY41CS14A-A

0 QSY41C521A-A

O QSY41CS2IB-A

0 QSY41CSZIC-B

0 QSY41C521D-B

06 QSY52P5O1A-A

06 QSYS2PSO3A-A

22 QSYS2T501

22 QSY52T503

DIESEL BLDG B TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOMEXHAUST FAN

DIESEL BLDG B TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOKEXHAUST FAN

1B DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM MOTOR OPERATEDLOUVER

1-2A DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM MOTOR OPERATEDLOUVER

IC DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM MOTOR OPERATEDLOUVER

DIESEL GENERATOR A TRAIN SWITCNGEAR ROOMINTAKE LOUVER

DIESEL GENERATOR A TRAIN SWITCIGEAR ROOMINTAKE LOUVER

DIESEL GENERATOR B TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROOMINTAKE LOUVER

DIESEL GENERATOR B TRAIN SWITCHGEAR ROMINTAKE LOWER

DIESEL GEN 1-2A FUEL OIL STORAGE TRANSFERPUMPDIESEL GEN IC FUEL OIL STORAGE TRANSFERPUMP

FUEL STORAGE TANK 1-2A

FUEL STORAGE TANK IC

DB

D8

DB

OR08

DB

DB

DB

YD

YD

YD

YD

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

155-00

0056C

0058

0061

0060

0056A

0056A

0056C

0056C

YARD

YARD

YARD

YARD

Report Date/Time: 02-27-95 / 16:25:33Data Base File Name/Date/Time: UIMASTER.DBF / 02/27/95 / 16:00:38Sort Criteria: ID NumberFilter Criteria: (Eval. Type CONTAINS 'S')Program File Nane & Version: SSEN vO.O

Page 21 of 40


ATTACHMENT 1


NO. SNCF164-RPT-01








Page 22 of 40


UNIT I SWEL 1

SWEL Revision Date - 9/18/12

ýY-ýOriginator: Zqo.,• ,r6

Originator: \?OEaf/r Wooi, l•- vJL..

Reviewer: -7r~l4(oL Y/0 ~ 19:10a

Date:' 6 If.Jt-

Date: ..- I 11L

Date: .1/1-

Date: A" Iq-!_-

Date:'/O -2 /'-/Y.1,

Ops Reviewer: so1.Ar-ev. ,IvA .-t

~~IPeer Reviewer;

Peer Reviewer:l,ý .O Akro.,w•- Date: / -,Y-I

Peer Reviewer: r Date:

Peer Reviewer: Gl, G. • Date: (O 2-

Page 23 of 40

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOVN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0

A TTACHMENT•J NW I: SE MN0 R

P.8P22(107 1201028 0POR24872, 3J S02y POU00 Bu2 0/0624N 9 A82280.-2.I0t 'i0,,2552 0200 x.0259

2 01S120000l P7EAS'J7I 50 T O•P l ISOG eLO7NO. 2 2202 Ad B0.la224 120 /022S *S 4 1122 *0-.2201'235 8 X III UURP-• UTO. L OA AE

WE12F2,1 0203 0H5 OAP MLA 0LOW AILV3 Ad Mild,n, 4832010• * 5 2 22? 0 AAAI3(2013 3 4 II)

AE131 LA3294B .230902091304 270EL 2S0902T07 POWER 02001 004 0 td.,.' 0l7/0120 IB 8 A1 10 AB.239'02002 S

71 A1102092 8 [N POX 0900 VMild 03302 B I K E11 B• EBMT.1l' 8 E [1

13: A2P2B091 2,ldH22I OJUPOM 20020 1212000 A2 3Ž, 51,l0,4 1oo2A2 A 3 2 8 hAz 1 0*,o00E ASZ•0B 8 8 X.AA,1APO PO.AAT- RAACEIc 20- PER AP WA-1630 (00

26 AEIP61-1 0 00 PPPA F~ OOM21 POOMPER2M202B 30 5Ž MOJl,n 220101200 A B X2 B 20 *5.205'0120 8 X K 201. PO.TU0R 2LASI ATAC G 3 1L TO2

IS 0210 2I09EA 09W IBPOOMCV0E RJ ~ AL.¢~£R M=JO~l. 122 2000 B N ElO B 20 5.11209 8 001- OOBEO1.AAE20006d3BOI

*• AOEd12 F•0 0d 010 HEAD SA3E23 lLE CTJO N2LtOW TO4A 09dlT Ad M •Ild,,. 0773201220 2 1201 20 0 7'0022%/I 0 J[ 9.022 DP 050122 0122WO12509•224

01 0IP221 00E0 0 • •S% 001202009 VAAL00 8, Mi,•n 20208 K l E 5 2 12 7 *010021• 8 8 I12 K

24 O)EOIPOI 20T002218209090091N E• MaEd. 102082 0 8 K 12• S 0.200 81 N 3 •)

2501001 200 SOTdEL 2306 RMA 7*00 255 * x E 4 5 223 18 090255' 0 8 10E4E.C 0R POLOSA W 4E 3LACOR0AEI

)12G2A 1201 00520 POLOP HAT 8ACPN3APT35A., ALA Mild.• 2120231 * 4 3 All12 *0.0201 8

A021.0050 OI 090.0000

O i005l200010 00PI250MPTMO•ATAN 0N J E•d~ i• 255 / 920 A I 10 .0502 48I0E.PO2T 9AL I0 ERAIO001W 0555200

JA0, RS-SUR LVE- R RRSr0 A 005000 0V O M I /)

4l 0Q09ll.103 1 •OTE I N! F ix0- 040607i0.3001 090 A 507303

0 t HI012bRN5AI•,•• 09U0 10MN3E pRO0 0AEiLN N TAb A~zEfdM inP 153290 *06 8 H02 0O 0-1532'104 x S . EEE. POIP0NTL•I0505507102300E001E

7EX RI1 -71 R I. - 10N x Ox Ell A~k wGPl Dpt

RAMIMNIS 0207107709020,55091I3G

1 Q2 0S1H- 3&0 111,.N 1202 2203 A _ x A 4 I 0-121'0=20

0VE R9LAD .*- , *0NANDA *N7

Page 24 of 40

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOIN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. r.NCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0

3' 21- ' ,--'.. - -. .-*,~**o I .. I *W.-~, FII T T T 1x-T I I - I I W-1200070I IiN T 1 T 1 I - IPEE 60603 TI 20*l76NTERACI03WITH0767L1.

JOIT RESOLVE 61 RT INI- H 0 5D

- -*H0tE27 NE-LGEA-RATOR 18 LCALCO6T FNELL A1I521N11L03*0 0.8 N N N N 12 20 6615"2038 A I F1E -:SOTENT3L116TERA1T.O.WI f0EF.EA.UGHT AID INAMIDU*te -NC R E; RES0LVEllý REETR.I.IN .. [ -•A -GT AND

AOrID NG ANcm-A~

03 036216030320 A 1N C7S121161162262l 2116100 •22200031 * N N 10 2 0 121'/oVE2 N 2 2006.03012222027322 lOV ISO207 S 0I

I• -£ -oe 1-1. IN - I A

41 Q0 221032 .T00 NS10 R -22y 11NI1 I it* i2in2 10i0n 327 * 032 A0 1HD00-07 x A I212. PNEL6N*T0 OL7EDTOS-OIII1NTA MO;

43 QINI103770A -3 1T103,NI -I.AnD N 1U6VE 2 *i133 12 0221 N I N 711 7 11202021 _ _ 11I1

201621tP032220 6*26ST20 LIEnE tr oCHR E0300372260 R03 2J1 6

u0

l,*7 1* 10062* N N1 x z K 621 N5-57111'02 l• 412 r 71030*2RAR 1 .* 1CA507U R717I O U ND211

M•107-1 IND TRN F-RNID TO2R1 1-15 1N PER -6C 1071-60* 21

6 Q1711-3VE710 MlN I -1 - ETMOS0777RC REUEFVAISO0E N.1 6 1210 A .1 7 *. A X42 N16I3W2 C SOLQ- - - - D .22 22010241 N A x e E, ' ILI-**018 132-7 B FE012015 I -W INDO ION 22 1020 26.1, / 1 931*0 B x N23 1. 2fI A 100C I4* 01N-36 2A FEE ATEI - F -0W A* R 1,*lld0 103006190 * 1. GI01. x

Q¢ IN2-EV3 A MTRDV AXFEEDIIIATER TO -STONI A ,Eldr 11J04 B X N.3 7 - 1-/21- A 11) X

E2 2 2 23- -* FEE Ar0 R IUM NP *1 01 10 0.17 El,6 1001T H23 A-1 -2 ASI 016110016 JO0DENSATE 0311 T3E6 M R A 10311060 6 . N 7,17 1x 101x5" E _ __ -_ P _7.1-_172 _ _

-IHO•l 5, A-ND-.VE55 0221 70316 .0*2072021261 11.002lT, IT0 -061',t

Q10 3- I10321 HX A SON*0 F VALVE 0 0l- 77 00 6 N x 15 7 1A077'f0O S X x [E57 11M6001*A SW I7NER71A 10W 167 2 W- A x A -77 0 l2r172A A x62 E1 0-001701 W ** - EHANr GR SE - t,6017 20001*3 N * 2 716 E 7 A0620212 A1 (*1 1 - -l 03a701 l0272o 02N DJ 22612

s 7 1T1297 R* 2 -0 2 S0 O 3 V60621762 r.x* 60s12D1 121 02 * A

61160 011 SEF-E WATER-PU IC1W6 -*/.7. S 2 N 7 N 6 IW-16'072 6 N 02317571101 WO0101577110,I0R326

621D1P7 14 * S1E-EWATERFTO2TUNEI -DGT TION 71103 155 A * 7620 36 *1'

6310P16-071 07 6AN SE 60C WATER M01IFI.OW 5036 180/ DO7-3 6 • * 0 1* 7 -1.'30072A x 11 0PEEE: POTENTIAL INTER-TSO N *03 LOO0 E

6 01227101 100C H0EAT DCSOR T A 03160,7 1-W- 015 A I * M7 21 A-100010 x __xe Q-7- o5 F-N K~JR R gp THERMA BARRIER -U Bfd,r• in1 A2 x x1• -2-- x~IO x (1)

0QP177 O0 RCCVI FROM N M 7 LETDOWN 6, 0 i2i. 1 .100223 E N *17 7 061 2201 1 1'02

*7217P1T0 6A CM NON 0 AF3 03 TIO6 • , •l Oln, 1030161 11 x A 17 7 61030011 x 10 I0 7N770003 C(7wTO RCp7T1 R00L 6E2R1570110[ 36N ild 111ý02 I - A AN126'M A AN(1

-1 - 11 -tI• 3• IN-TO R.R HEAT -HANGERN 0 l[ 3/ai•a a x X 8A-3-1/0128 A 41)• x01 0171700600 0016 I•IG 1N2i00R00n03000*62 0*6,0 070115 6k N N •71 N A6.1N10'8I I

712 7I1 .016 r N 8 ENE-E020 1 R E03 R 0l* 60101 10001 A 12 AN- A - 09 6 2210(0186

7-1 -11 .* :70V30 AD3C620R ID 03603L, 17100203 8 N 71 A 660l01 A760 .1 .0A0AI0-/•L •E I1 A0C11 3 0 00TE Q000311.01.3.0A7IT 703 4 :.2301-360

770160 6000201171 0060101,2 103023 1. . 16 3 1 -000 x A 6PE 17666.03*60030311*6162070703*00619 AID10 - 7 -,-.0S -300031

V1- ;;:.E 1-L--11-M-A- l-~- 1 - - I - I I-I11I6I--I-I I' 1 21 /1- 1 ,:I I I . x .t 1 1 I' . I tIPE AEAEAN NTERAI I -1

0I03 M71 A0D 6*7A1 E70 031WTADOeUAT. ETcnEt•rmv

ýý=. EýN Goe•OInnEUlNG WCc

Page 25 of40

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOAN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0

87~~~PEE DTR-1 I ,i•T- 11 1 1:oN ..O Ný

•NET; I-RL E . RK.- ceRET

EN~~~ ~ 0343~E AEVEAEA EEOA LEEL A mi A. 1E R.1-'EEE A_____ A AIN i4Bd01 o.12D6 AI I , Rum.,r x2J.) .X R2• .12,/0221 x x

E. REREA O AUXD A DGL EAN TERAAP ARG ED RIL ALA ALAC= LEE M2 A A A A E( M -E-EV'V2 E REVEEEE: 1 ux AUXERG RATTE RR c- N

11 IRO UeLOI 2• xx xE• xI• xSl x DC -1 987 WO NUR-30./o R E 7 H9 EED4ERELAOZ ; fE G'OU ESCE OR 1 TAEF •RRCI% ARE ALEA.PI EEDEDEAN(• A A A I PEE EL. DA.EDESS'S~ A ItA

E SELIEN E*A RALILE Sn E A A x A maE A. D10E/0 1 x x IET I NE R

-• RF A

n ,kR .O T

3I I G A A •EED ED-VE IENELEEDS AETUDE RELL EPANEL FA D DE L

FUELO-1~•OUIN UI'll E. N - L A ýD.VE LA REIOLERE" UNPL AV

I-EL~~~~~~~•N GENEATO IR9IGILTCRxx21D

. Q1152-AE.L .1. DRLE-IEARRI-1 AE1E5 APx

DDoNN.N T RRER •ANEL

LE U 2E - E GELANERERAT CRN NTO PANEL EL WW 1RP/LS I R N A A A k DE, A R-I7 x IEEEEDCSOEG-SIOEDLOCER PAELI PNAE A

LEE -1.2LRA APCELANERETREY P CNRANEL E.ELARL.AI..S 15R51EL A A A "IL RE DEESRAI PED EE: DENTIELINEO A K - NONE

EVE RNEARLE UOL NELREEEATDDEEEDDANPEOAECEN EA EDAREE A P WA AE REERE-EE PAAEP,

CNCERE REN RESOLENG A WNON APNE

INDANDATE~~GOIN UNEC DE;RSLV RPANELPAEIALRE

REAAATRLCOOMPOIV[ REPI A•JlVrlELAN EN75 N A A0 A A ALA A O ED DA-NEERR AR EEE;R 'EROLAVO E LACRTNENVAT ,

P AN PRN CRLA RESOLV REELACEA

V1NELPANCA ESDRTNW EAD '-AD LEE. ONE AAC T;

EL -NRVE WDI 'PL R P A TR I ERN Y - O E . IA/-4 A I A I A4RD E-EW7V I P

DL VENEA IDEO AREVI E A,PSPVRPEVE PPEPL S T E EL' R N RESSO7 P/07 A = A AN DL ERE 6s'CED7S P A

Page 26 of 40


ATTACHMENT 1


NO. SNCF164-RPT-01








Page 27 of 40


UNIT 1 SWEL 1 Version 2.0

SWEL Revision Date - 02/13/14

Revlewer:-aW MMoOps Rviewe. r:Lo e--o..oo: l

Date: zj- ,,

D a te:

Date: 15

Date: -13

Date: 02/13/2014

Peer Reviewer: ,zl.et"

Peer Reviewer:0j. ZA2r

Page 28 of 40


..~116IWII - RE,1 -REP-.1221

MIII 11101811 011~~~~-1211 1262In 1114(12111 1624 10 .404

22.2R 11,, -11 U... -,,OI. I - - 1 . 2 1.2 12'. -21,. l E1 V- -, .* - -2=2.

L LPEES 4EA P2 o 'I .1 1 111KP All UPPLYVPRESSURE A.8,21, 110218 N x PI, AF- /.DI212111~

I 2261212*I1 PRSSF RELIUEF T1110111 II111NIOUTSIDE CTI AI 211R,121, .2l2 I 1 x '1113 1 IR 1221

I LOIC1111 6IRCTIR1TRIP SW---1221 41. 1 A.6111 .1/0.,I AB 11 A. II j .2 . x x1 R P i RESOU1162211TION. Q171O1111121111

O1E11FCVItR]QA RUNP M1 N IFLOW ILv AU, 1-21 111(1121 I X_____x________1__________

VAR PTO112N NUI11 INTI PUMPR1 - ON A-1112 BI - ER3/03 A Ell 011122, 0242012:

1 1 1H1 1O2RCS 11111 COLD LEG 111121 11-2W...4 L2-(02 0 A x 1 4I B II 11212110223 El 24 11II81111211221111

1111 -1.1 .12111111 1 UP 1B 4118211, 211 R111- B x xI 1I ILL6 -10129 x

112211123PTS ICTNY 10111 116111,1,1 PROTECTION URNAI R A dn 11-211 x F1 I112 02211DEVHEE 2I1211IIPUMPROO 1,1n1152.ICIOOLER LA IT- A) A1011.1 Ellll N IR_____1___....,xx EUCE N PE N, W

11 0I11I1,110 1,,,11110011124,01 _1 81112. 1241118 N, I I I 6-22

F21 611106 IIIINN 0S1A.,1211

16 CEUROYRA AUXEEDWTERU PROMCOLERA /1B: K 1116ID .- 2.1l OE - .16966 IWO -BEDE01)11

IN~~~~~~~~~~~~ x k'; *2151002 20,110102, 01112, 2 11 6** l. 1 _____ 0 _____tL tflii.1

______

Page 29 of 40

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOVVN EQUiPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0

ETIS HAVE ARE VDE•W E CNRP1ANTEL OINLBUILEING .1/- 1 xl N2A A A ;pEEE: PO• ENW l IHNFRHM NWERHER.BY . EN. N OIRCEH CONUIIA RE LVE

__ U•NG HVREAD .... WAN. AnD

H1 V ENCE0 4 A6RE 5WnCHAH-RER IHK LONALAONT PANEL A .S 1E /HNE A x X X II D WE AK IpEEE. POHTRAL INRATLHONHWITH HOER/HEO

JGH

RN -1E 7 DIIELGNENRTCOR I1 LO L CONE PANEL DEESLL BUILDNG L1E CEH x x 2 N IH- NE xN / PEAI PORENHL INTERACION WHH OVERCNDLCHT AND INADEQUAU E ANCHORAGE; RMLVEBY REWTRAINNl r H•UH N

3N, L.HRRNNPOiEBOA NOT $HHOL WN PANELA HRN . AECAN * N Hl A0 R R01" HOE EOPOH75• E TOO S )I~AL NEW /POWER SUPLES tN IDP

RC -LEHLWIE HULTIILHLNGAELAHCHNWINE WE EA., -03111REN A N 2_____________ OAR. HOW.SOR _____AR ORHLA I AEN RELAY CABINH R A L ETL N A LE2 10 I --L 'i/347 A 2 IPEEH PANEL NOT BOLTEH 10 ACLAEN1 MCC;

R-L~t BY OOLTING 70 ADMIET MCC PANEL

42 IH22LL 03 DIEHEL LOCAL RELAY PANEL 1B 1)-,' 1 -1 1 1 - I x x PEEE: POLENTNAL INTERA00ION WVAN OAERN HAD

CL 11NHVLA ER A MAIN .N SNHAOTE A RN R 0 N All A_ _ __2NE A RtHt'SOa X_RH CNl.- 7 .• . . t-LINE 5D I..N VEL 1211t0241 B .2 1t 1 AB-1'21 1 /o~di x C( 0727 1 -AIR -INDC R REPLACEMENT

REl DEDEEL 7 CHEEGENERTOR 1A DRSCLARGE EMORE H• , R, A N l D'A'/.R12 SS HE M PONARY MODHFICATION PERFORMIEE UNDER

Io I~ Gs PER M. 1.71.1• •e0r

QIN IM 37!~zc MAN STEAM ATMOSPHEREREIE VAIVF -w _If,e H 121021 A'. x 1- 7 AIW- 102to41 A III

4:•N1 LV39• KAFNCID AVI. iudr 12110241 A .11 a AB.121't(141 x I1,

48 N-1FI3-1 F•EFWATFR INTAIE •O NZTO mB-,, LEE, • W. X W. A. LED'I.- x R

RN PRN2 2E . HAX FEESAINER FLOA A ER REAR R TO ISm A A x W. A--C NO A X NNSAHO -HES 6RYEREPLA'CED TPRASDIITER

wC CWTH.C M07R DREVEA N R AD AWE ER 1 NEEMAA. N- E A H11 Q4 IH 7 _12_'/_241 _ p

i: HO HEvl CANE R NERVN ACEe A HEN AR To OCR HRO,,N IWO E REW uCED

5N EPENREN'IB SRRVFEWCHA pUMA EC AAAN FE - 110. C O g2 A N PER N A HOP1oH2Ax/RW AE I~~ WEE EAR/ E TS K L-L 7lESOMAEA YARD E ELA x1 E1-EE -AROP R971-9172 (WA H.OB-EEN

OPO C EWCANE A E HOARDV VAE.IAHI 1 0 I WED•AA.I C VAE.9ER3A N AMWILLEO T.RAW~uO TILE pRE.TCTICIRFER.

11 AHHO E TITLE AND COHER

SS OEP13L TD CONTANMENT PI RGEE P - T ER A W, x VAR13 7 ICME EMA ",0 -'=qRA/HVE A bA EEmC APd.-, E A -VA-

1 PCsHEiEoE RHR H0 A 1MPL0 VALVE V7 R•Q,, ElI E A XEC 7 AR-ENE/C7 X XA 1AC HCPEOSDA ONSW SR.NVF N RN RI 111 H/7E A x xR N P I CR_ ./IEEE N X

ELPR W OI HEAT C EX T CHAO P ERM ERVICE WATER DICHA GE RAN W I X X I AAN ' ONE A A E N C E N NP A

HO VtEP 10 TURC PUM E LC E RELYAPUD DIESEL BUILDING E /S A AR6 A AL 2CA /HAS N N6C CPI6MO- 19 BLOWE I N HX -C1RMRACIEdl 12NN.R1/E2 N A HIDE -A1-1/Al3 A NE L EIT C iP1R DOC PEAPAR OVWA IEVP RRUMP IC AVDN E I /07R AB PER x _W $W-__'I_7 / Np A171101 WO - 1 ) REPLACE

CEI Ips-14 SE• W-D A0 P.I(S TN y o S S x) x x (1)

TV CIRIERWI V TREJNSECRDIEWATRH INEO SWRIIDAR CIA/DEAR A ____ _______11 7 ER-EColN . A1 __________o______________________

IA BNA MACN DAN NWANCR E /Hl N A TEE PH AIEEE. POTENTALINIEACTI. FRI. ,- I

I ~ ~COEODLB AENVA; RESOLVE BYR3R N- OS AL

A LP17HUlC CCI HEA7 ECHANGE R N A & ln l OB A =721 I-eioo/oB, A

6 L' :l7.ZV34 S C R FT = FRM CP T ERMALEBRRIER A. E~dn 10. /o2 x - /-3 x x .o(1)

661- 7- 1• CCI KR-Rn FROM I~C LEIOOWN AM B .ld- 121 / D223 B x IP17 17 Ax2'/2 R l

6: ]Pwi7•oB CCW NO -S T ISO LAUDH -I -md-, I./ 100 Otx Ip" 1 7 ABZO/Itx T'll

F•3 z7O3'2 CM TO RCP MHERMA BARER1OLAT1ON -~q Bud• 121/02 Pi -1 ,•17CO12 3 K X(1)

69 - P17- 18.511S CM INFY70 11R H T EA1EC ER 10 2 1, ]015. W, B AR 17 & 3 12 ( X

IT LP17POIB CM PUMP 1B SWIG PUMP A.B,,• uw/om -- mi x P517 I A.-'R A5 X

I]!tpT OQ SU1G770K01C AIW ud, n W - -1 PS6 / 17 21 A- 79'/056 x

Dip e TRI M G•AIR pisR• x Im "iclol A •Z z [ x 111 O111211• RIEP-1D UNDERI ED

Tj IP19H•Z- P7R PORV RAKUP A!IR SUPPLY VALVE W, ,•, I 121/OZ B x P 7 A1 tt 't223 x xlTI A

74 Clip WHVT61j INSTRUMENT AIR IDOLt•ION OhqCJe CIE VALV[ UJIRdl 1. 0101 A x 1.9 7 ,A.B-I0l .1,, x ITl) x

LRII-514 LC TRANSFORMER To AIT'ds 3/03 A FIT1 4 AI- T,' 011• x

.VH AND EARRy PLATFORM. RFO VC BY

RE STRINING OVERHIAD -1H AND , 1UIBIN

IT QTR - 6DOLOAD CE IER ID T.1R, I3/03 W, A A x 16 - '•335 P IEEE" CINO ORAGE A;RIE OFLEICURER.

Rl7 X JPEEE: INA0EQUATE ANC1OkAE IN T HE FEAR OF

TIlE MCC AND AD.,ACENT MCC BAYS NOT

MoDiFYiNGANC0O -ANDOCHNECinGNECIC

Page 30 of 40


A TTACHENT :RU, S•EISRi WAKOVI EUPMN LSTS, NO./0NCFI6A-RPT-0A VERSION 2.0

RIID AU .IC U.KE A/OE A A I X 's BI:

E1 UEDDAEOEO- ScAL OI1N DCDIE C-A AEU-N 5 IGADEEL A x ..S..Xx.I .

SELSEOEO IESA SCAD EC -HD.OA EEEŽ;L S A3IG3 AA AB _/EELD.. X OUd ADLL, I.

ES ODRESADE 4 DRAGAWETCAHGU 1kLSURGEN ASS R DIESEL BUILOAG ES/WASE B X B -SEA LBLB/SEDE X PEEES PODEROLL IASE-SOIDN ROM NEARED

E1 1R4DEL•S B UVCA DEFRIA l ON ANDEL SC AL EllC DA /OIn S A R. 14 AA 1A7DIE2 DO

D1 ,D4AED B US SLA DEy -S ADA BREAAAR BOXED B E S A 'S ES A&SCA/LA S B B DEPOS SEESEWO M139) RSEp DC ZE

SE R4OE AS AUDDODE SEE AL BUIAALDII S/EES G ES 15B A/D AD AX EE21 An I/- X X

iAER4DAD USEL SAN D DISE BUlLING LAD/W B - P A N3 ED 1B ________AX' ___1_1.__ X _

TI 1

ISUGR. -SA OISSELDGEAS-TDSDRBSCFARSIS SE AAISE A155 SULUS DO/BS B6 NAS1S0R2A

ED1O-4-211U AUXIDUSAGA B 5)5B~DDRAMTR COUDD ADA -R.LAL EDE1 D S R N .2 LIDII O- IBW MOID )RLE

AS DAYSPO DISELGEN 0 1 SUEL DIE DIORAGE BS PUMp YARD D D 1.2 B SSD E A

ESN, D LP.S3 SGESE PWINERATOR DS AB N ESEEES A S S S E ED' PASS DSE: DOTN I RCT OANI SD OB- CDASEN RSAWEW SO RE PA CED

ID7 OSCEDOO DIESEL LOCA RBFELA DAME S-CNAG DRASFE PUM EIDON G DOSAD 0 A B DIE - -O PEE AAABE LNXSSD RMO OA

DA DAROABP.B ISIS ERUCAWEBATT NERD SOAB A BSN . D.AD EU/AD A. N R S -A AE FFF-1 - - S - A

L•T BOUTS MISSINGAT ýINET 'U'MRT

CGOS UNDESRDANEL: RSL RDE LS RESEADAD

ANH D • GACU SN UNDER PANEL;R L B

SAD OS-ESASIS ADICE, GEASES I SLAG R~lRCONTRGO .PANL DEL BUILDIN ED/ A R R N RA R0 ERSXSUEO PELED TASEDAIG ISSIERACIONDFROM DODERC

RL UE;RET SOLVE O RDESSDAIDA GLCUO

L1TAD-UNDER P AIIP-L1

DE' NINIAG OVGERHEAD E SGEE AND ERESUTING

AD0 A N DESS -W ADED RAGELA A E D CAGES BUILDING .E/-1 A X S N GWALALEM-ONPROMOVERH

EDT G A ESEE B C I SER CE W A TER BS A TERDG FU S RA G ES E I RDR A O I S L E/ 7 A A A A 1 " 2. SW -'1-B4 A I

EOl 'ODAR NRAý`_FýTV C 2ROAN ESS GAA ADDDSS AAU LES ;__ 1.3 N PE

1.~~DC GINAGESGU FDR LURI ;WILF UN 7

__1C& 39421525A - 1IN A-16 SF SnER -• I•AS UEE I A A Xi 20 -WDO 18. 1 7. A

-1 C S.W4C..8 S-RVC WATE R ELGBATPJ WTE•G•RY C RGE O. 2 '•/s U&I[O7B XAA X W 41 X US . U8/R-• X X RE:PTNI.NE` NFOMLD R

ANAEA.

C5 1 -43• LBD/LGENERA70E•R I-- (SI)DESEL BUILCING 6I/_3 X X A ýPE 2tETAITE- I FRO OVERHEADx

Page 31 of 40

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOIM EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0

2i-T,,dL N- -TfI.d T- - - ... .~b.h~LW .Wt,.-vT ~ ~ p I ~ hQR4I'p 4k6F5I,

Page 32 of40


ATTACHMENT 1


NO. SNCF164-RPT-01








Page 33 of 40

ENERCATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-O1, V'fW18P~d'PT"l

Farley Unit 1 SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related ItemsNTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns

Variety of Environments Variety of

types ofMajor new equipment

MPL # System/Equipment Description or (21 Classes

Variety of Not replcmnt from

Systems Submerged Submerged Other equpmnt Appendix B) Location

Class #

1 QIG31HOO01A SPENT FUEL HEAT EXCHANGER 1A G31 X 21 AB-155'/0445

2 Q1G31H0001B SPENT FUEL HEAT EXCHANGER 1B G31 X 21 AB-165'/0013

3 Q1G31P002A 1A SFP PUMP G31 X 5 AB-139'/0342

4 Q1G31P002B 1B SFP PUMP G31 X 5 AB-139'/0342

5 Q1G31V001A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION ISO G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342

6 QIG31VO01B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION ISO G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342

7 QIG31V002A 1A SFP HX INLET ISO G31 X 0 AB-155'/0455

8 Q1G31V002B 1B SFP HX INLET ISO G31 X 0 AB-155'/0423

9 QIG31V003A 1A SFP HX OUTLET ISO G31 X 0 AB-155'/0455

10 Q1G31V003B 1B SFP HX OUTLET ISO G31 X 0 AB-155/0423

11 Q1G31V004A 1A SFP COOLING LOOP TO SFP PURIF G31 0

INLET ISO X AB-139'/0342

12 Q1G31V004B 1B SFP PUMP COOLING LOOP TO SFP G31 0

PURIF INLET ISO X AB-139'/0342

13 Q1G31V005 SFP PURIF OUTLET TO SFP G31 X 0 AB-1SS'/0455

14 QIG31V006 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN (KEY Z- G31 0

225) X AB-139'/0342

15 Q1G31V007 DW TO SFP ISO (KEY Z-335) G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342

16 Q1G31V008A 1A SFP PUMP DISCH PI-652B ROOT G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342

17 Q1G31V008B 1B SFP PUMP DISCH PI-652D ROOT G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342

18 Q0G31V009A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION PI-652A ROOT G31 0X I_ AB-139'/0342

19 Q1G31V009B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION PI-652C ROOT G31 0

X AB-139'/0342

20 Q1G31V017 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN DRN G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342

21 Q1G31V018 1B SFP COOLING LOOP DRN G31 X 0 AB-139'/0307

22 Q1G31V019 SFP COOLING LOOP RETURN VENT G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342

23 Q1G31V021A 1A SFP PUMP CASING VENT G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342

24 Q1G31V021B 18 SFP PUMP CASING VENT G31 X 0 AB-139'/0342

25 Q1G31V022A 1A SFP PUMP CASING DRN G31 X 0 AB-139'/0345

26 Q1G31V022B 1B SFP PUMP CASING DRN 631 X 0 AB-139'/0345

27 Q1G31V023A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION DRN G31 X 0 AB-139'/0345

28 Q1G31V023B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION DRN G31 X 0 AB-139'/0345

29 QIG31VO24A 1A SFP PUMP SUCTION VENT G31 X 0 IAB-139'/0345

30 Q1G31V024B 1B SFP PUMP SUCTION VENT G31 K 0 IAB-139'/0345

31 Q1G31V025 SFP HX HIGH POINT VENT G31 I 0 .AB-165'/0013

Page 34 of 40


ATTACHMENT 1


NO. SNCF164-RPT-01








Page 35 of 40

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01. VERSION 2.0

Originator: I-omt6 L~, l.J6A&

Originator: ?2X ( T 1d,~

Reviewer-,~Z& /~~~toO~

Ops Reviewer- i i;I j 4A e.cLm

.JIL. -&-,

Date: w

Date:

Date: 9 ?i t2-

Date:

Date: ..- Y-I.

Date: to

Date:

Peer Reviewer: 1'L-- Aj.-~

Peer Reviewer: K

Peer Reviewer,~ cV-IeAS1ýý?~ ~

Peer Reviewer;, fIclkeri (.$16r t ~ ,z Date; ____

Page 36 of 40

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOVN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164RPT-01, VERSION 2.0

Farley Unit I SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items - Revision Date 9/18/12NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns

Screen #3 Screen #4

AnchorageVariety of check

MPL# System/Equipment Location types of Variety of environments required?Description Major new equipment (50% of

or (21 Classes Column B)Variety of replcmnt fromSystems equpmnt Appendix B) Rapid Drain-Down Comments

Hydraulic lines connected to the SFPand the equipment connected to

Class # Submerged Not Submerged Other Yes No those lines

Q1G31H0001A SPENT FUEL HEAT AUX BLDG / 155'/ 04451 EXCHANGER 1A G31 21 X X

2 QIG31PO02B 1B SFP PUMP AUX BLDG/ 139' / 0342 G31 5 X X

QIG31VO01A 1A SFP PUMP AUX BLDG / 139' / 03423 SUCTION SO G31 0 X X

4 Q1G31V003B 1B SFP HX OUTLET AUX BLDG / 155'/ 0423ISO G31 0 X X

QlG31VO04A 1A SFP COOUNG AUX BLDG/ 139' /0342 031 0 I XLOOP TO SFP PURIF

5 INLET ISO _ __ _

6CO.G31V006 SFP COOLING LOOP AUX BLDG / 139' / 0342 0316 RETURN (KEY Z-225)

Page 37 of 40


ATTACHMENT 1


NO. SNCF164-RPT-01








Page 38 of 40


UNIT 1 SWEL 2 Version 2.0

SWEL Revision Dat - 11/07/13

Revtewer: Y7.f- ,- gW400

ops Reviewer: L~ I1

Daft: J'L2.!ALL

Date:,

Daft:

• /*

Pe er &M ~welA ••2/ Žir f i ii

Richard G. Starck II

Peer Reviewer:_ S*' 4h S 4=a Date: 2/14/2014

Page 39 of 40

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOMN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCF164-RPT-01. VERSION 2.0

Farley Unit 1 SWEL 2 Spent Fuel Pool Related Items - Revision Date 11/07/13

NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns

Screen #3 Screen #4

Anchorage

Variety of checgcheck

MPL # System/Equipment Location types of Variety of environments required?

Description Majornew equipment (50% ofor 121 Classes Column B)

Variety of replcmnt fromSystems equpmnt Appendix B) Rapid Drain-Down Comments

Hydraulic lines connected to the SFP

and the equipment connected to

Class # Submerged Not Submerged Other Yes No those lines

Q1G31HOO01A SPENT FUEL HEAT AUUX BLDG /155' / 0445I EXCHANGER IA G31 21 X IX

2 QIG31P0028 1B SFP PUMP AUX BLDG/ 139 / 0342 G31 5 X X

QIG31VOO1A IA SFP PUMP AUX BLDG / 139 / 03423 SUCTION ISO G31 0 X X

4 Q]G31VO038 18 SIP HX OUTLET AUX BLDG /155'/0423ISO G31 0 X X

QIG31VO04A L'A SFP COOLING A1UX BLDG / 139- / 0342 G31 0 X X

LOOP TO SEP PURIPS INLET ISO

Q1G31VO06 SFP COOLING LOOP AUX BLDG / 139' / 0342 G31 0XI6 _ RETURN (KEY Z-225) I 1 01 1 1 __ II

NOTE - The number of zeros following the system identifier (eg. B31) and before the unique numbering of a component may vary from field, SWC, or SWEL Labeling. This is a unique historical issue related to component identifications at Plant Farley and does not imply adifferent component, For example, "QIR3SA50I and Q1R36AOS01 are representative of one component in the plant and can be used interchangeably".

Page 40 of 40

ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0

ATTACHMENT 2

UNIT 1 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2

(Version 1.0 and Version 2.0)

NO. SNCF164-RPT-01

Page 1 of 6

ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0Sheet 1 of 2

Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Farley Unit 1

Instructions for Completing ChecklistThis peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List(SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist shouldbe used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may havechanged to address those findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documentingother comments.

1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL I selection? YN Nil

SWEL 1 for Farley Unit I meets the requirements of having 90 to 120 items andaddresses allfive safety functions. Many components provide safetyfunctionsformultiple systems, and/or are part offrontline support systems. Allfive safety functionsdiscussed in EPRI Report 1025286 are well represented in the SWEL 1.

2. Does SWEL 1 include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selectionattributes:

a. Various types of systems? Yi NEIItems included on the SWEL comprise a variety of systems such as EmergencyDiesel Generators and Auxiliaries, Service Water System, Component CoolingWater System, Automatic Depressurization, Residual Heat Removal System, VitalA/C and DIC systems.

b. Major new and replacement equipment? YO NEINew and replacement components are identified in SWEL 1.

c. Various types of equipment? YZ NEISWEL 1 includes at least one example of each of the 21 classes of equipment, exceptClasses 1) (chillers), 13 (Motor Generators) and 19 (Temperature Sensors). Thesecomponents did not meet the screening criteria for incorporation in the SWEL asdiscussed in Section 6 of the submittal report.All other equipment classes were well represented. In general, the number ofcomponents in each class is proportional to the number of safety-relatedcomponents of that class in the plant as a whole, except that the number of in-linevalves is proportionally smaller than anchored equipment. Anchored equipment ismore vulnerable to seismic loads.

d. Various environments? YN N[IThe SWEL contains components in mild, harsh, and outdoor environments. Thecomponents are located in different buildings, rooms, and/or on different buildingelevations. The SWEL also includes components located inside primarycontainment.

e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program? YN Nil]The SWEL included equipment that had been modified as a result of the IPEEEprogram. Section 5 and Attachment 5 of the submittal report provides informationon resolution of the IPEEE findings. The SWEL and individual componentchecklists provide information about the IPEEE modifications and verification ofmodification incorporation.

Page 2 of 6



f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL I? Y0 NolSWEL 1 includes high risk components based on risk significance in the plantprobabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. Section 6 of the submittal reportdiscusses the risk insights used for SWEL development.

3. For SWEL 2:

a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in YN NEISWEL 2?

SWEL 2 includes components for maintaining cooling of the SFP, which areSeismic Category I components.

b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not Y0 NElincluded in SWEL 2?

Section 6.2 of the submittal report provides the justification for excluding items onSWEL 2. There were no components identified that could contribute to rapid SFPdrain down. Note that there were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems thatwould have affected equipment that meets the screening requirements to beincluded on SWEL 2.

4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.

The peer review team reviewed the initial SWEL I and SWEL 2 and provided comments and suggestionsfor enhancement of the SWELs. Comments included suggestions to include additional electricalcomponents and more equipment mounted to the structure, since such equipment has shown morepotential to be adversely impacted by seismic loads than in-line mounted components. In addition,comments were made suggesting that certain equipment classes contain more components and thatexplanations be provided for not including certain equipment (e. g. there are no safety-related orSeismic Category I components in that equipment class installed in the plant). The peer reviewersensured that the SWELs met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Changes deemed necessaryduring the walkdown due to inaccessibility were reviewed by the peer reviewers to ensure that thechanges did not impact the level of compliance to the EPRI report. The final SWEL meets allrequirements of EPRI Report 1025286.

5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL? YZ NEI

r Zý44ýPeer Reviewer #1: Robert Ashworth Date: 11/05/2012

Peer Reviewer #2: Melanie Brown• •rI.,,A,/ . .Date: 11/05/2012

Page 3 of 6

ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCF164-RPT-01, VERSION 2.0

Sheet 1 of 3


Version 2 (Final)

Instructions for Completing Checklist

This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List(SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist shouldbe used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may havechanged to address those findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documentingother comments.

1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL I selection? YZ NI]

SWEL 1 for Farley Unit I meets the requirements of having 90 to 120 items andaddresses all five safety functions. Many components provide safety functions formultiple systems, and/or are part offrontline support systems. Allfive safety functionsdiscussed in EPRI Report 1025286 are well represented in the SWEL 1.

2. Does SWEL I include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selectionattributes:

a. Various types of systems? YJR NEItems included on the SWEL comprise a variety of systems such as EmergencyDiesel Generators and Auxiliaries, Service Water System, Component CoolingWater System, Automatic Depressurization, Residual Heat Removal System, VitalA/C and DIC systems.

b. Major new and replacement equipment? YZ NEINew and replacement components are identified in SWEL 1.

c. Various types of equipment? YO NEISWEL 1 includes at least one example of each of the 21 classes of equipment, exceptClasses 11 (chillers), 13 (Motor Generators) and 19 (Temperature Sensors). Thesecomponents did not meet the screening criteria for incorporation in the SWEL asdiscussed in Section 6 of the submittal report.All other equipment classes were well represented. In general, the number ofcomponents in each class is proportional to the number of safety-relatedcomponents of that class in the plant as a whole, except that the number of in-linevalves is proportionally smaller than anchored equipment. Anchored equipment ismore vulnerable to seismic loads.Version 2: Item QIR42BOOIB (125vDC Bus IB) was listed in SWEL I for VersionI ofthe walkdown report, but removed for Version 2 since the item could not becompletely inspected during the outage walkdowns without excessive disassembly.However, the anchorage and internals were inspected to the extent possible.Removing the item from the SWEL Ifor Version 2 of the report did not invalidateany of the EPRI Report requirements such as variety of system2 variety of classes

of equipment. variety of environments. etc.

Page 4 of 6



Version 2 (Final)

d. Various environments? YN NIlThe SWEL contains components in mild, harsh, and outdoor environments. Thecomponents are located in different buildings, rooms, and/or on different buildingelevations. The SWEL also includes components located inside primarycontainment.

e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program? YI Ni]The SWEL included equipment that had been modified as a result of the IPEEEprogram. Section 5 and Attachment 5 of the sdbmittal report provides informationon resolution of the IPEEE findings. The SWEL and individual componentchecklists provide information about the IPEEE modifications and verification ofmodification incorporation.

f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL 1? YZ NI]SWEL 1 includes high risk components based on risk significance in the plantprobabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. Section 6 of the submittal reportdiscusses the risk insights used for SWEL development.

3. For SWEL 2:

a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in Y! NEISWEL 2?

SWEL 2 includes components for maintaining cooling of the SFP, which areSeismic Category I components.

b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not YZ NI]included in SWEL 2?

Section 6.2 of the submittal report provides the justification for excluding items onSWEL 2. There were no components identified that could contribute to rapid SFPdrain down. Note that there were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems thatwould have affected equipment that meets the screening requirements to beincluded on SWEL 2.

Page 5 of 6



Version 2 (Final)

4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.

The peer review team reviewed the initial SWEL I and SWEL 2 and provided comments and suggestionsfor enhancement of the SWEJs. Comments included suggestions to include additional electricalcomponents and more equipment mounted to the structure, since such equipment has shown morepotential to be adversely impacted by seismic loads than in-line mounted components. In addition,comments were made suggesting that certain equipment classes contain more components and thatexplanations be provided for not including certain equipment (e. g. there are no safety-related orSeismic Category I components in that equipment class installed in the plant). The peer reviewersensured that the SWELs met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Changes deemed necessaryduring the walkdown due to inaccessibility were reviewed by the peer reviewers to ensure that thechanges did not impact the level of compliance to the EPRI report. The final SWEL meets allrequirements of EPRI Report 1025286.

Version 2: The peer reviewers reviewed the final report f&r completeness., accuracy. and compliance withthe requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Comments were provided on the body of the report as wellas various attachments and were incorporated. The Linal report meets all requirements of EPRIReport 1025286.

5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL? YIEi NEI

Peer Reviewer #l: e 6 - Date: 692- -/1. "-3 V

Peer Reviewer #2: • ' • Date: 02/13/2014

Page 6 of 6