JosÃ© de EscandÃ³n: The Classical Creation of a Conquistador · WORLD HISTORY REVIEW / Fall 2003 JOSé DE EScaNDóN: THE cLaSSIcaL cREaTION Of a cONquISTaDOR by Mario A. Cárdenas

� WORLD HISTORY REVIEW /Fall2003

JOSé DE EScaNDóN: THE cLaSSIcaL cREaTION Of a cONquISTaDOR

byMarioA.Cárdenas

Spain’s final thorough colonization in North America occurred onthenorthernfringesofitsempire.Themanwhocarriedoutthisgreat effort was José de Escandón, Spain’s last conquistador in New Spain. Escandón not only pacified the Sierra Gorda in north-central Mexico,heexplored,conquered,andcolonizedtheareaofnortheastMexicoandSouthTexasknownastheSenoMexicano.Hislifere-flected the ideal career path of an 18th century peninsular in the New Wolrd.Buildinguponfamilyconnections,Escandónembarkedonamilitarylifethatleadtoprosperouscareersincommerce,thecolonialbureaucracy,andcolonization.Hesuccessfullycarriedoutmilitaryandcolonizationcampaignswhereothersfailed,employingthedualprinciples of generosity and iron-willed discipline. The pacification of the Sierra Gorda and the colonization of the vast Seno Mexicano weregreatfeats,yethistorybookstypicallymentionJosédeEscan-dónandhisaccomplishmentsonlyinpassing.�TheimpressionisthatEscandónappearedfromnowhereandwasalmostirrelevant.Inreality,hiseffortsbeganaprocessthathasresultedinthecreationofwhathasbecomeoneofthemostdynamicregionsinTexas.HereisamanwhosepreviouseffortsinroyalserviceandforpersonalgainpositionedhimtoconquerSouthTexasandnorthernMexicoonbehalfofhisCrown,ChurchandfellowSpaniards.Intheend,Escandón’spersonalandpublicsuccessdidnotmakehimimmunefromafatethatbefellmanyoftheconquistadorswhoprecededhim;thetrinityheservedfaithfullyturnedagainsthim.

Bythebeginningoftheeighteenth-centurySpain’spowerwasinsteadydecline.AninabilitytokeepitsAmericanwealthinSpaincombinedwithpressurefromEuropeanrivalstocausetheformerIberian powerhouse the loss of some of its New World territorial claims.England,FranceandHollandgainedfootholdsintheAmeri-cas by force, diplomacy, and interloping. Nevertheless, the Spanish monarchs,burdenedandoverstretchedwithterritorialresponsibilities,

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Cárdenas: José de Escandón

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003

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continuedtouseallmeansavailabletokeeptheirAmericanposses-sions.� Despitethestruggletomaintainoverseaspossessions,theSpanishCrownsuccessfullycontinuedtheexpansionofitsAmericanempire. Contemporaneousdefenseanddevelopmentwasnoeasytask.TooverseetheseeffortstheCrownreliedbothonawell-estab-lishedbureaucracyandopportunisticindividualswhohopedtogainwealthandstatusfortheirservices.�

Spanishexpansioninthisperiodfollowedthesamepatternasinearliercenturies.TheCrownentrustedexploration,conquest,con-version,anddefensetoanumberofmenandorganizations.Theseactivities reflected the Spanish mission of territorial, religious, and commercialexpansion.Inattemptingtoachievethesegoalssomewereextraordinarilysuccessfulwhileotherswereabjectfailures.Twocenturies after the initial conquest the same difficulties existed. Insuf-ficient manpower, religious intolerance, and lack of finances hampered Spanishplans.Exacerbatingmatterswerepoliticalbickering,poorleadership,andcorruptionamongtheindividualsandorganizationstheCrownchargedwiththeseduties.Moreover,thedrainofcolonialriches to finance Spain’s meddling in European and African affairs furtherdebilitatedefforts.4Escandóntoowasplaguedbysomeofthesameproblemsthathamperedtheearlyconquistadors.

AlongthewaytobecomingSpain’slastconquistador,Escandónforgedaplaceinhistoryforhimselfbyhavingseveralcareersthatledthewaytoglory,riches,andprominenceinastrict,butdynamic,hierarchalsociety.5Escandónwasnotatypical;hiscareerresembledtheexperienceofmanySpaniardsofhis time. Hearrivedwithafamily connection that provided a firm foundation for advancement. Heachievedprominence,however,throughhisintelligentandskilledservicetotheCrown,whichallowedhimtomeetandmarryintothelocal elite. Escandón benefited from a keen intelligence, but nature alsogracedhimwithanoddstreakofluckderivedfromthedeathof others.That luck consistently ushered in political, social, andeconomicadvancement.Unfortunately,hislegacyofsuccessdidnotfollowhimindeath.Historyhasbeenlessgeneroustothismanwhodefeatedhisenemyincombat,reinforcedhiskings’territorialclaims,andassistedtheChurch’sconversionofnativepeoples.HistorianshavegivenasecondaryroletoEscandón,favoringotherbetter-known

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figures and events. Yet, Escandón, an enterprising man with lifelong service,devotion,andloyaltytotheCrown,aidedindefending,pro-tecting,andexpandinghisking’sterritorialreachathisownexpensewhileSpain’sworldwasonthewane.Theimpactofhiseffortsstilllives,astheborderlandsofmodernSouthTexasandnorthernMexicoexplodewithpopulationandeconomicdevelopmentincommunitieshedirectlyand indirectlyestablished. EscandónwasSpain’s lastconquistador and colonizer in the New World, but his personal life andpreviousachievementsremaininrelativeobscurity.6

JosédeEscandónyHelguerawasbornonMay�9,�700inthetownofSotolaMarinanearthecityofSantanderintheCamargoValleyofSpain’sBurgosmountains.Hisparents,JuandeEscandónydeRumorosoandFranciscade laHelguerayde laLlata,werewelloffmembersoftheminornobility,asocialstatusthatallowedEscandóntoattainaformaleducation.7ItisuncertainwhyEscandónleft Spain, but in 1715, at the age of fifteen years, he embarked to the New World; a teenager by current standards but an adult in his world. Sailingonthesameshipwasthenewlyappointedgovernorandcap-tain-general of Yucatán, Don Juan José de Vertiz y Hontañón, a man whoplayedamajorroleinEscandón’slaterlife.EscandónarrivedinCampecheonDecember�,�7�5andmadehiswaytoMérida,Yucatán where he joined the local militia that his uncle Antonio de laHelgueracommanded.8 He served the next five years, at personal expense,asacadetwiththeCompaniadeCabellerosMontadosdeMérida.9 During this timeEscandónprovedhismilitaryskills indefendingtheregionagainstEnglishaggression.�0

Around the middle of the 1700s the Yucatán became the focus of attention for Spain’s enemies. The Yucatán was heavily forested withvaluablenaturalresources,especiallyBrazilwood.Europeandemandforthewoodincreasedbecauseofthenaturaldyeinseveralhuesdrawnfromthetree.��Sincethemid-�500sSpainhadbeenthesolesupplierofthisraredyesource.��Becauseofthepeninsula’sforbiddingdensejunglesanddisease-riddenenvironment,theSpanishdidnotestablishpermanentsettlementstoprotecttheresource.��Thediscoverybynon-SpaniardsofBrazilwoodinthepeninsulaofferedasourceofrevenue,andEnglishinterlopersquicklytookadvantage.

British loggers first established logwood sites in the Cape Ca-

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tochearea,butSpanishpressureforcedthemtothecoastalforestsaroundasmalllagooninCampecheBayknownastheLagunadeTérminos.Theloggersalsosetupasiteononeofthebay’sislandswhich they called Trist. These sites worried Spanish officials because theyeffectivelycreatedastrategicpresencebetweenthevitalcitiesofVeracruzandMérida.Asaresult,theSpanishorganizedseveralmilitarycampaignstoousttheEnglishloggerswhocalledthemselves“Baymen.”�4

Leading the militia were peninsular officers, one of whom was cadetJosédeEscandón.WhileservingwiththeCabellerosMontadosde Mérida, Escandón participated in the final ouster of the British loggers. Not only did he gain military skills that he applied later in his career but he was also influenced by some of the civil aspects of the overall campaign strategy. Governor and Captain-General Don Juan José de Vertiz y Hontañón’s lack of military experience forced him to rely on subordinate officers for a plan to remove the English in-terlopers.�5AparticularplansubmittedbyJuanFranciscodeMedinayCachón,alocalalcalde,offeredaholisticsolutiontotheproblemthathadaprofoundeffectonEscandón.TheplancallednotonlyfortherecaptureoftheLaguna,buttheeconomicdevelopmentandde-fenseofthebayaswell.Priortothistimeattemptstodealwiththeproblemwerepurelymilitaryaffairsthatleftnoinstructionsbeyondsimpledefense.Cachón’splanenvisionedanewadministrativeunitinwhichCampecheBaywouldformanewjurisdictionwithChiapasandTabasco.Thisnewunitwouldhaveitsownpoliticalandmilitaryidentity.Cachón’splanforbadetheloggingofBrazilwoodinordertocreate a more diversified economy and population. Under the plan, monopolieswereillegalandcommercialgoodsandmilitaryhardwareweretobeproducedlocally.Toavoidproblemswithacclimation,manpower had to come from Yucatán, Tabasco, and Chiapas.�6

Althoughtheloggersreturnedonacut-and-runbasis,theyneveragainhadthesamepresenceintheCampecheBayarea.Thismultipleapproachtodefeatingenemiesanddevelopinganareaeconomicallyinfluenced Escandón’s approach to dominating and settling other weakly controlled areas of New Spain.

Northwest from the Gulf Coast and deeper into the interior existed along-standingthreatthatkeptSpanishgovernmentandmilitaryof-


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ficials in a constant state of preparedness. Situated closer to the seat of New Spain’s colonial government was a indigenous threat. In this ruggedterrainlivednativetribesthatdidnoteasilysuccumbtoSpan-ish steel and the word of a Catholic God. Raids physically threatened establishedmunicipalitiesanddisruptedexpansionnorthward.ThenomadicIndiansSpainencounteredintheinteriormountainrangeswere far more formidable and difficult to conquer than the devel-opedIndiannationsofcentralMexicoandSouthAmerica.Anearlyconstantstateofwarensuedfromtheearlydaysofconquesttothemid-eighteenthcentury.

Northeast of the city of Querétaro is a mountainous region known astheSierraGorda.ItwasaregionwhereseveralresilientIndiannations resisted Spanish penetration and influence. The mountains formednaturaldefensesthatslowedSpanishcolonization,Christian-ization,anddevelopmentbyturningtheruggedareaintoaharborforautonomoustribescollectivelyreferredtoastheChichimecas.Althoughlabeledasonenation,theChichimecaswerecomposedofanumberofdifferenttribes,suchasthePames,Guamares,Guachi-chiles,andZacatecos, whom the Spanish found difficult to placate andevenharder toconquer.�7 Conflict was intense, as both sides wagedcampaignstocontroltheregionanderadicateeachother.Fortwohundredyearsstrifeclaimedthousandsoflives,withbothsidescommittingatrocities.

As theSpanish conquered anddeveloped territories, defeatedIndiansbecamelaborpoolswhowereforcedtoassimilateintoSpan-ishculture.Partoftheprocessinvolvedtheuseofcongregas,anabusivesystemthatallowedaSpaniardtherighttousethelaborofIndians from specified areas.18 As a result, many Indians fled into themountains,returningonlytoexactrevengeforabuseanddestroythepropertybothofSpaniardsandacculturatedIndians.Religiousconversionsalsosuffered,astribesrefusedChristianizationoraban-donedbothmissionariesandmissions.Thethreatofattackcreatedasenseofdangeranduncertaintyfortheseisolatedmissionariesandconverted Indians. With each successful attack theChichimecasbecamebolderandmoreaggressive,endangeringtheexistenceofSpanishandassimilatedIndianpopulations.InretaliationSpaniardsundertookexpeditionstoexterminateand/orenslavetheirenemies.

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Attimestheyattackedacculturatedtribesoutoffrustrationandanger.Efforts to remove these threats proved difficult for those commis-sionedtocarryoutthetask.�9

Fightingunconventionallyanddisplayingamasteryofthebowand arrow, theChichimecas fully terrorizedboth civilian and themilitary.EspeciallyshockingtotheSpanishwastheIndiancustomoffighting in the nude. The primitive Chichimecas, who were still Stone Age people, proved difficult to conquer. Fighting out of a mountain-ousregionborderingQuerétaro,Guadalajara, Durango, and Saltillo, theIndiansemployedhit-and-runtacticssuitedtotheenvironment.The nearly impenetrable mountain harbor, the tactics, and the fighting skillsoftheIndiansmadelongdelayedconquestandpeacealmostimpossible.AlthoughattimestheSpanishwereabletopurchaseatemporaryshakypeacethroughbriberywithsomenations,theyneverobtainedconsistentsecurityfromalltribes.Theresultwasovertwohundredyearsofinstabilityfortownsintheregion.�0AswiththeEuropeanchallenge,ittookdecadesofeffortbyseveralindividualsto remove the threat. The viceroys of New Spain had to wait until the eighteenth century and José de Escandón before the Sierra Gorda was finally brought under total control. A treaty signed early in the seventeen hundreds temporarily ended the violence, but by 1718 a new cycle of conflicts arose as the competition for living space led bothsidestoviolatethetreaty.��ItwasatthisjuncturethatJosédeEscandónagainservedhiskingwithdistinction.HisparticipationintheoffensivesagainsttheBritishcampsaroundCampecheBayhadbroughtprogresstohiscareer.HiscourageandskillinbattleearnedEscandónpromotion to lieutenant, an advancement that launchedhis career. With the promotion military officials ordered the twenty-one-year-oldEscandóntothecityofQuerétaroin�7��.WhileinQuerétaroEscandónoccupiedhimselfwithtwomajorprojects:thesubjugation of Chichimeca tribes in the Sierra Gorda and the reorga-nizationoftheregion’sChristianizationefforts.Hecompletedbothsuccessfully,earningbothmilitaryhonorsandsocialprominence.

BytheendAugust�7��Escandónwasa lieutenant inQueré-taroassigned toan infantryandcavalry regimentcommandedbyCaptainAlejandrodeEscorza.��RenewedwarwiththeChichimecatribesknownasthePames,Jonases,andOtomiesprovidedhimthe


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opportunitytoearnmorepromotions.��WhenEscandónarrivedinQuerétaroIndianinsurrectionshadbeeninfullswingaroundtheSi-erra Gorda and its surrounding region for some time. Attached to a companyfromthecity’sregimentalmilitia,Escandónagainservedathispersonalexpenseandworkeddiligentlyforthenextseveralyearsinbringingthewarringtribesundercontrol.�4HefacedthenationsthattheSpanishwerenowlabelingasthe“ChichimecaLeague.”Healsofacedother“indiosbarbaros”thatroseupinarmsforthesamereasonsasdidtheChichimecas.�5ButEscandónearnedhisreputa-tionwellbeforebeginninghiscampaigntoremovethe“manchóndeignominia” in the Sierra Gorda by waging war against rebellious IndiansintheCeleyaarea.�6

EscandónrescuedanumberoftownsfromthethreatofIndianattack.In�7�7LieutenantEscandónreceivedorderstoproceedtoCelayatoquellarevoltthatbeganoverrumorsofSpanishplanstoestablishninenewtownsintheregion.Hismilitarygeniuswasclearlyevidentwhenwithaforceofeightymenhelaunchedasurpriselight-ningoffensivethatoverwhelmedtheIndiansbeforeheevenarrivedinthetowntotakeuphispost.Therapidityofhisvictorystunnedcity officials who were unaccustomed to such quick action.�7Thisaccomplishment so satisfied the viceregal government’s quest for a quickpeacethatwhenthesecondincommandof theQuerétaro’smilitia died in August 1727, Escandón filled the vacancy and was promotedtotherankofsergeantmajor.28 Thiswasastartofase-ries of deaths of his superiors officers and his wives that consistently benefited Escandón in more than one way.

In Querétaro he accomplished what no other officer had done; he defeatedthelocalOtomíes, thereby ending sixteen years of conflict withthisgroup.�9

Newly promoted, Escandón began the pacification of the Sierra Gorda.�0Inhisnextexcursionhetookonthechallengeofanotherbranch ofChichimecas, the Jonases.�� By �7��SergeantMajorEscandón secured the towns of Real de Minas de Guanajuato and Irapuatofromthisgroup.AcoupleofyearslatertheSanMiguelelGrande district fell under the threat of a force of ten thousand Indi-ans.��Afterreceivingthealarmingnewsfromthealcaldemayor,Escandon rushed out within twenty-four hours with five cavalry

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companiesandcapturedmore than fourhundredprisoners. Withthisfeatherestoredthepeace,whichallowedthereturnofresidentswho had fled the danger.��TheseexploitsearnedEscandónfameas a successful Indian fighter and a reputation as the man to seek out whenever therewereIndiantroubles. Itwasthedeathofanothersuperior officer, however, that allowed Escandón to advance again. Thesesuccessfulrescuesandconfrontations,andanotherprofession-ally beneficial death, aligned Escandón for his next promotion. The deathofJosephdeUrtiaga,CoroneldelasCompañiasMilicianasdeQuerétaro,leadtoEscandón’spromotiontothatpositiononFebruary��,�740.�4 In that role Escandón finally ended the Chichimeca threat in the Sierra Gorda.

TheSpanishcontinuedtheirstruggleagainsttheChichimecasinvariousregionsforthenexteightyears.�5BytheendofthedecadeEscandón’s forces defeated and pacified the Jonases. With the deci-sive battle of Media Luna in 1748, Escandón overcame the last great strongholdoftheJonasesnation,ahillcalledSanCristóbal.�6ThebattleoftheMediaLunaresultedinthecaptureofmorethanonehun-dredIndianswhomEscandónsenttoobrajesinQuerétaro.Jonaseswarriors and their families who escaped capture fled to a nearby hill nearMoral,ahighlydefensible localewhere theyeventuallysuc-cumbedtoEscandón’sgreaternumbersandsuperiorweapons.�7TheJonaseswasthemosttroublesometribeand,withtheexceptionofafewminoruprisings,theirdefeateffectivelyendedtheChichimecathreattoSpanishexpansion.38

Although Escandón’s reduction campaign was less bloodycomparedwithotherSpanishvictories,itwashislenienttreatmentofIndianprisonersthatearnedhimtherespectofhisenemieswhocalledhim“elCapitanGrande”forhisgenerosityandgifts.�9Somehistorians,however,disputethisgenerousviewofEscandón,arguinghe was just as ruthless as others. Mexican writer Gabriel Saldivar claimsEscandón’scampaignagainstthePamesledtothenickname“Exterminator of thePamesofQuerétaro.”40 Others cite his useofslaveryexpeditionsagainstIndianvillagestosupplyhis textilefactorieswith laborers. AfterFranciscanefforts toachievepeacethroughconversionandassimilationshowedmixedresults,Escandónremovedthemissionaries’chargesandsentthemtotextilefactories


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inQuerétarotopreventthemfrombecomingathreattotheswellingSpanishpopulation.4�TheFranciscansnotedthatEscandónandhismendisplayedworsebehaviorthanthenatives.4�HisruthlessnessagainsttherealandperceivedIndianthreatwaswhatearnedhimthenotorious appellation “Exterminator of thePames ofQuerétaro.”WhilethereisanelementoftruthinthisdepictionofEscandón,itisnotentirelyaccurate.AlthoughruthlessinbattleagainsttheIndians,he was often generous to them in defeat. Reflective of his dual ap-proachindealingwiththeIndianpopulationwashispolicyof“comoamigosconmanosuaveycomoenemigosconrigorimplacable.”This policygainedhim the respect and reputation as a fairmanfromhisformerenemies.4�ThisdualtreatmentofIndiansrevealsthecomplexityofamanwhoattimesdisplayedextremecharacteristics.Inthisregardhewasamanofhistimeswhoexhibitedthetraitsoftheconquistadorswhoprecededhim.

Regardlessofthelabelsappliedtohim,Escandón’sactionsat-tracted the favorable attention of government officials and prominent families. Hissuccessfulmilitarycareer inIndiancampaigns,andthe 1741 death of his superior Lieutenant-Captain General Don José deVillapandoyCenteno,ledViceroyPedrodeCastroyFigueroa,Duque de la Conquista y Marqués de Gracia Real, to give Escandón the title of Lieutenant Captain-General of the Sierra Gorda, its Mis-sions,Presidios,andFrontiers.44ThispositionmadehimtheViceroy’srepresentativewithnearlyequalauthorityinthosedesignatedplaces.UnderthisauthorityEscandónachievedhissecondmajorgoal,thereorganization of Christianization efforts in the Sierra Gorda.

TheCatholicChurchplayedamajorroleincolonialexpansionfromthebeginningofSpanishexplorationsintotheAmericas.Inspreading the word of God the various missionary orders carved out territoriestopursuetheirresponsibilitiestothenativesandtotheirbrotherhoods.Thesemissionarybrothersaggressivelydefendedtheirjurisdictionsfromcivilandreligiousrivals.45 Anychangescouldresultinthelossofallphysicalpropertiesandincomesderivedfromthemissions,andfromstate-paidsynods.46Sometimesthemission-ariesspentmoreenergydefendingtheirjurisdictionsthantheydidconvertingtheirnativecharges.Inaddition,thedangersinherentinworking in the hostile Sierra Gorda and the breakdown in missionary

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disciplinehamperedthespiritualconquestoftheregion.Christianiza-tion efforts in the Sierra Gorda had little success since missionaries first arrived in the region in the late-sixteenth century. Conversions werefewandseldompermanent.Thedismalrecordwastheresultofavarietyof reasons.ThepreviouslyunconqueredChichimecaspreyedonthemissionaries,disruptingtheireffortsformanyyears.Membersofthereligiousorderwerealsotoblameforthefailure.Someoptedtolivelikehermits,maintainingminimalcontactwiththepeoplewhomtheyweretoconvert.Others,muchlikethecongregaowners,becameabusiveandusedtheirpositionandauthorityfortheirown benefit and enrichment. Originally, there were three religious orders equally responsible for the Sierra Gorda but authorities later narrowedittojustonepredominantandtwosubordinateorders.TheFranciscans,Augustinians,andDominicansalltargetedtheSierra,competingagainstoneanotherandotherindividualswithdifferentgoals.TherewasalsoaJesuitpresenceinthemountainrange,butforthemostpartitremainedaminimaleffort.

However,acenturyofconversioneffortsintheSierrafailedtoalter the religious practices of a sufficient number of local indigenous people. As the individual responsible to the vice-roy,LieutenantCaptain-General, Escandón toured the Sierra in 1743 to evaluate the missionaries’effortsandconcludedthatreorganizationandrestruc-turingofclericaleffortsandresponsibilitiesweredue.

Thelongstandingfailureoftheorderstoestablishapermanentpresence in the Sierra Gorda mountains stirred Escandón’s interest. TheviolenthindrancebytheIndianspreventedthecompleteconver-sion/pacification of the Chichimecas. Moreover, earlier reports by his predecessorsindicatedthatsomemissionarieshadliedaboutthestateofmissionaryefforts.Missionsreportedasestablisheddidnotexistinfact,andmissionarieswereoftenabsentfromassignedlocales.Assupervisorofthemissionsintheregion,Escandóndecidedtoreviewtheir status in an attempt to find new solutions to old problems. In January 1743 Lieutenant General Escandón undertook a journey to discoverthetruestateofreligiousaffairs thatwastohavelastingconsequences.47Escandón’spreliminaryevaluationsduringtheini-tial stages of his tour of the Sierra Gorda revealed discrepancies that calledforathoroughauditofreligiousactivitiesinthemountains.


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Toundertakethisnew,broadertask,Escandónaddedassistantstohisinspection.ThroughoutthemonthofJanuarytheinspectionteammarchedfromoneendoftheSierratotheotherreviewingthecon-ditionsand inventoriesof themissions,measuring theconversionprogress,andtakingacensusofallthemissions’population.48

EscandónandhistroupebeganattheDominicanmissionatSori-anaonJanuary7,�74�andendedattheJesuitmissionofSanLuisdelaPazonthelastdayofthemonth.Inalmostthirtydayshetraveledseveralhundredmilesandexaminedandauditedeverymissioninthe Sierra Gorda. During the trip he witnessed first hand the dismal stateofmissionaffairs,whichlefthimwithanegativeviewoftheChristianizationstrategy.49ThemissionatJalpanespeciallymadeEscandónrealizethatareorganizationwasnecessary.

Themission inJalpanfunctionedunder the leadershipof frayLucasCabezadeVaca.UnderhisguidancewasamotleygroupoftribescomposedofdifferentChichimecanations,Mexicanos,andaclassofSpanishgentederazón.50CabezadeVacareportedthatIndiansatnearbyrancherias,towns,andhaciendasalsofellunderhisjurisdiction.ThepopulationservedbytheJalpanmissiontotaledalmostfourthousandsouls.FrayCabezadeVacaadmittedthatthelargeareaandhugenumberofIndiansweregreaterthanheandhismission’sability toprovide religious training toall. IndiansalsocomplainedtoCayetanodelaBarreda,oneofEscandón’sauditors,ofextrafeesforreligiousservicesandforcedlabor,aswellasthelackofbasicreligioustrainingfromtheregulars.Escandónconcludedthatthe unsuccessful conversion\pacification efforts in the Sierra Gorda weretheresultofthefailureofthemissionaryorderstoinculcatetheIndianswitheitherreligioustrainingorknowledgeofSpanishlaws.5�CabezadeVacaappearedtobeoverpoweredbytheimmensityofhisjurisdictionandtasks,andseemedresignedtoacceptingthepovertyandmiseryofJalpan.5�

Escandón’sevaluationofthestateofthemissionaryeffortscriti-cizedtheordersforfailingtopenetratefurtherintothemountainsandfortheabusestheyheapedupontheIndians.However,henotedthatthefriars’jurisdictionsweretoolargeforthemtobeeffective.Hisreportalsoproposedmajorchangesthataimedtoensurethattheterritory came under the full authority of New Spain with the conver-

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sion/pacification of the Indians of the Desplobado. Three months laterviceregalauthoritiesacceptedEscandón’sreportandproposalwith only minor modifications.5�

Hisproposalcalledforthereassignmentoftheregularorders;the reestablishment of abandoned missions, and the creation ofnewonesundertheleadershipoftheFranciscansofSanFernandoCollege; public notification of land distribution in the surrounding communities;andlandallocationstothosewillingtomigrateintotheSierra.Theproposalalsosuggestedthereductionoftroopstolessentensionswhileatthesametimecallingforthe“exortación,”orgovernmentsupportofthemilitarythatremainedintheregionaftertroopreductions.54ThisproposalencompassedideasEscandónhadbeen exposed to years earlier in the Yucatán. His implementation of theproposal,combinedwithhisearlyexperience,helpeddevelophisapproachtotheSenoMexicanolater.UndertheescortofonehundredmountedmenandanumberofFranciscanfriarsfromSanFernandoCollege, and empoweredwith viceregal orders,Escandón set outfromQuerétaroonApril5,�744toimplementhisplan.55Despitecarryingroyalauthority,Escandónfacedbothmilitaryandreligiousopposition. In his first stop at the presidio of San José Vizarrón in thetownofCadereítaheencounteredoppositiontohisplannedtroopremovalwhenthepresidiocommanderarguedthattwohundredmenwere needed for defense. Nevertheless, Escandón’s will prevailed. 56ResistancefromtheAugustinianmissionariesprovedtobeevenstronger.

ByAprilnineteenth theAugustinianmissionsofToliman,Pa-chuca,andPaculahadbeentransferredtotheFranciscans.WhenEscandónreturnedtotheoverburdenedJalpanmissionandCabezadeVacahefacedstrongopposition.Otherthantheinitiallegalchal-lengefromtheorder’shigherechelons,theAugustinianwastheonlyotherseriousresistanceEscandónencountered.ThefrayunderstoodEscandón’sordersbutbasedhisreluctanceontheargumentthathehadnoknowledgeofthetransferarrangementsandrequestedanex-tension.Healsorefusedtoturnoveranypropertywithoutordersorapprovalfromhissuperiors.57Thefray’sstubbornnessandargumentwonhimatemporaryreprieve,asEscandónleftthepremises.Thevictorywasshortlived;thenextdayEscandónreturnedandunder


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theeyesofagrowingmissioncrowdremindedCabezadeVacaoftheviceregalapprovalofhisplan.58 Knowinghewaschallengingagreaterauthority,CabezadeVacachangedtacticsandattemptedtobargainwithEscandón.HewaswillingtoallowtheFranciscanstoestablishtheirmissionbuttheyhadtoprovidetheirownneces-sitiessincehewouldnotreleaseanyitems.59EscandónforcefullyremindedCabezadeVacathathewasarguingfornothingmorethanstrawcoveredjacales,whichbroughtthefriartohissensesandthetransferwascompleted.TheFranciscansensuredtherewouldbenoharboringofresentmentbyofferingtoreturnunusedsynodspertain-ingtotheformerorder.60

EscandónfacednomorechallengestohisreorganizationofthemissionsandcompletedhistaskinMay.Incompletingthisassign-ment Escandón established a firm Franciscan presence and secured the Catholic Church deeper in the Sierra Gorda. The Indian threat, howeverdidnotend,butlaterinfractionswerenotasorganizedorassevereaspastthreats.Withthereorganizationofthemissionsandhisearliersuccessfulmilitaryconquests,JosédeEscandónsetinplacethe conditions that ensured the total domination of the Sierra Gorda anditsfullentranceintotheSpanishdomain.Franciscians,suchasJuniperoSerra, laterextended theirpresencefromthisstrongholdnorthwesttowardCalifornia. Meanwhile,inMexicoCityanothergreatprojectthatwasyearsbehindscheduleagainreceivedgovern-ment attention. The pacification of the Sierra Gorda left one great areaofthenorthernSpanishempiretobeconquered.ConquestofthelandknownastheSenoMexicanowould be the final achievement andtheultimatedestructionofSpain’slastconquistador.

AdistinguishedarmycareerdidnotnecessarilyensureEscandónasteadyandrichincome.Theroyaltreasurywasalwaysshortoffunds,as revenue was directed back to Spain. Colonial military officers wereeitherunpaidorunderpaidand,therefore,searchedforwaystosustain a lifestyle reflective of their perceived positions in society. Whilemilitarytitlescametorepresentanoccupation,inrealitytheywere more honorary than financially sustaining. Senior officers in Querétarodidnotenjoyhugelandedestates,politicalpower,and/orsocialstatus.6� Economic mobility and financial stability were achievedthroughmarriage,mining,andcommerce.6�Forexample,

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inQuerétaroamajorityof textileownerswereoriginallymilitaryofficers.6�Escandón,whohadbeenservingathisownexpense,wasnodifferentandfollowedthecustomofcourtinglocalelitefamilieswithmarriageabledaughtersorwidows.

ThegoalofalmosteverySpaniardwhocametotheAmericaswastoobtainwealthandthestatusitconferred.ThecustomarypathforaSpaniardtosecureandmaintainwealthandstatusafterarrivingintheNew World was to enter into a strategic marriage, become a valuable memberofthein-law’sbusiness,andthendiversifyintohisownruralandurbanindustries.64JosédeEscandónwasaclassicexampleofthis pattern; two marriages provided him with the financial means to springboardintooccupationsotherthanthemilitary.

Besides a blooming military career, José de Escandón alsopossessed the best advantage of a Spaniard in New Spain, status asapeninsular. Thispositionmadehimdesirable tofatherswithmarriageable daughters, andEscandón took full advantageof thesituationwhenherelocatedtoQuerétaroin�7��.OnDecember9,1724 Escandón married Doña María Antonia de Ocío y Ocampo, the daughter of a wealthy superior officer. In so doing Escandón made aclassicalcareertransitionwhichcontinuedthepatternofpreviousconquistadorswhotookadvantageoffavorablemarriagestobecomewealthybusinessmen.65

There is some confusion, however, regarding Escandón’s first marriage. American andMexican authors dispute the identity ofhis first wife. Carlos Castañeda argues that Escandón sailed back to Soto la Marina in 1727 to marry Doña Dominga Pedrajo, a childhood friend.FlorenceScottJohnson,however,citesamarriagedocumenttodisprove thisclaimandasserts that itwasEscandón’syoungerbrotherJuanJoséwhomarriedPedrajo.66 Yet, 1735 and 1736 nota-rizedtestamentsbytheolderEscandónthatlistfamilymemberslackanymentionoftheexistenceofabrotherorbrothersineitherSpainor New Spain.67IfindeeditwastheelderEscandónwhomarriedPedrajo,thenthelastconquistadorwasliving“lavidamala,”orthelifeofabigamist.68 Regardless,marriageintotheOcíoyOcampofamilysecuredEscandón’sentranceintoQuerétaro’ssystemoffam-ily-ownedenterprises.ThedowryhereceiveduponmarryingMaríaAntoniaallowedEscandóntoinvestinthelocaltextileindustry.Ob-


14




rajes,ortextilefactories,wereoneofthemoreimportantindustriesin thecityandcolony.69 AsanobrajeownerEscandónfaced thelaborshortageproblemcommontoallinthatindustry.Escandón,however,wasinabetterpositionthanmosttosolvehisdilemma.ThemaelstrominthenorthernfrontierallowedhimtheopportunitytoobtainIndianslaves,andmanyoftheIndiansEscandóncapturedin the Sierra Gorda ended up in Spanish-owned obrajes.

Sincethe�500sSpaniardshadmadealucrativebusinessprac-ticeofcapturingIndiansforforcedlaborintextilefactoriesandforsaletoothers.Althoughroyaledictsforbadethispractice,SpanishcolonistsargueditsnecessityandEscandónwasnoexception.Thereasonmostcitedtosupportslaveraidswasthepressurefromcon-tinuousroyalcédulascallingforexpansionandcolonizationofland.SpanishcolonistsarguedthattheyweretoofewandforsuccessfulcolonizationtooccurIndianlabor,forcedorotherwise,wasnecessary.LongbeforeEscandónbeganhisconquestoftheSenoMexicano,heparticipatedinslaveraidstosupplytheQuerétaroandMexicoCityobrajes,includinghisown,withIndianslavelabor.70SolucrativewasthebusinessthateventheCatholicChurchbought,sold,andusedthelaborofIndianandAfricanslaves.7�Escandónregularlypurchasedsuch slaves who had once been owned by Church officials.7� Hisventuresintothetextileandslaveindustriesmarkedaself-determinedtransitionforthewarrior.Henowbegantoidentifyhimselfnotonlyasasoldierbutalsoasanobrajeownerandamercador(merchant).7�Thetransitionwasnotinnameonlybutinpracticeaswell.Muchlikeamodernbusinessmen,Escandónandtheotherobrajeownersfacedcompetitionfromnumeroussmallshops(trapiches)thatproducedthesameproducts.74InamovetoensurethequalityoftextilesinhisQuerétaroobrajesand,therefore,maintainalargershareofthemarket,EscandóntrainedanapprenticeasanOficial de Calidad.75Applying quality control to increase profits reflected Escandón’s sophisticatedbusinessacumen,forheincreasedhiswealthwithhisslave-operatedobrajes.

Escandóndidnot limithisbusinessventurestothemakingofcloth.HissuccessinthetextileindustrypermittedhimthemeanstoengageintherealestatebusinessinQuerétaroandthesurroundingareas.Inthemid-�700sQuerétarowasagrowingcitywithmorethan

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twothousandhousesliningthenearlythreehundredstreetswithinitslimits.76 In any expanding city, real estate is a profitable venture and Escandón took advantage of his locale and financial position to enter intorealty. Investmentinthisbusinessalsoaddedtohisgrowingfortune.Interestingly,Escandóncombinedhissaleofpropertywiththesaleofhumans;inonesaleforahouseheincludedtheservicesofthreenearbycongregasofChichimecas.77

Escandón’s business ventures brought greatwealth but couldnot staveoffpersonal tragedy. OnMay�4,�7�6hiswifeMaríaAntonia died, leavinghim two small children and a considerableinheritance.78 Escandón’s first children, Ana María and José de EscandónyOssio,bothlaterjoinedreligiousorders,leavingtheirfatherwith nograndchildren. MaríaAntonia’s death bequeathedEscandónalargefortunesheinheritedfromherparents.79 Now in his mid-thirties,Escandónwasagainavailabletobringpurityofbloodandlegitimacy,nottomentionwealth,toanotherdistinguishedfam-ily.Onecanonlyimaginethediscreetstaresandhushedwhispersamongtheladiesatsocialfunctionsandthevisionsoffatherswithunmarrieddaughters.Aunionwiththewealthyandwell-positionedEscandónwouldbeagreatassettoanelitefamilylookingforasuit-ableson-in-law.Itisnosurprisethathequicklyfoundanotherwife.As in his first marriage, his second wife also came from a wealthy family, which proved beneficial to Escandón. On January 3, 1737, lessthaneightmonthsafterthedeathofMaríaAntonia,hemarriedDoña María Josefa Llera y Baises. The second marriage added to Escandón’s already considerable wealth and increased his influence ingovernmentalcircles,forhisnewfather-in-lawservedasregidor(councilman)inQuerétaro,apositionofimportanceintheSpanishbureacraticchain.80 WiththissecondmarriageEscandónalsocreatedanewfamily,fatheringsevenchildren,andgarneredevengreaterwealthandsocialprestige.81

Escandón’sskillsandabilities impressedhissecondfather-in-law,whochosetheseasonedveterantohandletheimportantaffairsofhisnewfamily.Whenhisfather-in-law,SantiagodeLleraRu-valcuva,decidedtoformalizehiswill in�749,hegaveEscandónnearlyauthorityoverfamilymatters.DeLlerapassedoverhisadultbiological sons, Joseph Ignacio and Thomas Geronimo de Llera, and


16




madeEscandóntheexecutorofthewill.Interestingly,deLleraagainbypassedhissonsbynamingasecondson-in-lawastheexecutorinthecaseofEscandón’sinabilitytocarryoutthetask.82 ItisuncertainastowhydeLleraignoredhistruesonsinfavorofEscandón,butitisreasonabletoassumethattherewasabeliefthathisskillsandpositionwouldservetopreservethefamilyfortunebetter.

De Lera’s confidence in his son-in-law was not misplaced. When the family patriarch died he left Escandón two hundred fifty-six thousand,ninety-eightpesosandcompleteauthoritytomanageallbusinessoftheestate.WiththesebroadpowersEscandónpaidfortheburialexpenses,manumittedaloyalblackslavewoman,andis-suedthebequeathedmoniesandpropertiestotheremainingfamilymembers.83

RunningthebusinessaffairsofhisownandthedeLlerafamilieswhilecontinuinghispubliclifeoccupiedEscandón’sattentionandmayhavehadastrongimpactonhisfamilylife.Hemaybeenanabsent father to the offspring from his first marriage, because of the demandsofnegotiatingmultipleprofessions.84 BothhissonJoséandhisdaughterAnaMaría,wholaterenteredintothereligiouslife,wereleftinthecareoftheFranciscanfrayVicenteSantaMaríaatthe convent of Valladolid in Michoacán. While it was not unusual forthesons,andespeciallythedaughters,ofwell-to-doSpaniardstoenter the monastic life, it is significant that Escandón’s first children did so at an early age. Nevertheless, their social status remained high eventhoughcloakedintherelativelyclosedenvironmentofreligion.For example,Escandón’swealth allowedAnaMaría to purchasemembershipintheeliteVeloNegrogroupinalocalconvent.85 WhilehispersonalbusinessdealingsearnedEscandónwealthandsocialprominence,hispublic lifecontinued tobring recognition,honor,and more missions to fulfill. Escandón was becoming an important manincolonialsocietyashis record talliedonesuccessafteran-other,eachofwhichcapturedtheattentionoftheroyalgovernment.Crown officials soon called again on Escandón to carry out on the northernfrontierwhatwastobecomeoneofthelastgreatcolonialaccomplishment ofSpain in theAmericas. Fewknew thatwhenKingFelipeIImarkedtheboundaryoftheSenoMexicanoin�579andapprovedthecreationofanewprovincecalledtheNuevoReino

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�9

deLeón,itwouldleadtothelastSpanishconquestandcolonizationeffort in North America.86

The Nuevo Reino de León encompassed an area that extended two hundred leagues north from the Pánuco River and another two hundred leagues west from the Gulf of Mexico coastline. Nuevo León,asitisbetterknown,stretchedfrommodern-daySanAntonio,TexasintothepresentMexicanstatesofZacatecas,Durango,SanLuisPotosí, Nayarit, Sinoloa, and Chihuahua.87 PartofthenewprovinceincludedtheSenoMexicano.

The conquest of the Sierra Gorda provided a starting point to enter the Seno Mexicano, another territory that was also difficult to bringundercontrol.ThisareawasaharshlandthatincludesmuchofwhattodayisnortheasternMexicoandSouthTexas.Theterritoryhad boundaries that started at the mouth of the Pánuco River near Tampico,stretchednorthwardtothemouthoftheSanAntonioRiverandborderedtheSierraMadrerangeinthewest.88 The Rio Grande wasconsideredthedividinglinebetweenthenorthernandsouthernportionsoftheSeno.ThecoastalplainwaslabeledLaCostauntilitwasrenamedtheWildHorseDesertbyAmericansettlersinthenineteenthcentury.89 The Nueces River, with other nearby rivers and motas,cametoberecognizedasthehomeofthedreadedApacheandComanchetribes,bothofwhichhadamajorimpactonSpanishcolonizationattempts.90Theweatherinthislandischaracterizedbysweltering, humid summers, droughts, flash floods, and nortes,orbluenorthers,appearingsuddenlyinthefallandwinter.9�Therewasnoshortageofwildlife,asbears,wildcats,andotheranimalsroamedtheuntamedcountryandwaterways.9�Itwasaphysicallyoverpoweringenvironmentinwhichtheclimate,land,andindigenousinhabitantsmade Spanish development difficult.

TheSenowasalsothemostconvenientgatewaytoSpain’snorth-easternoutpostsbutslaveraidsinthe�6thand�7thcenturieshadcreatedahostileenvironmentthatpreventedadirectroutethroughthecoasttoeastTexas.9�TheonlytownofanysubstancewastherelativelypoorandunderpopulatedSanAntonio.However,theregionhadstrategicimportancetoaSpainleeryofFrenchintrusionsfromtheeast.Inaddition,theSenopossessednaturalresources,suchassalt,that offered profitable opportunities for enterprising persons coura-


18




geousenoughtoentertheregion.However,theperceiveddangertoroyalterritoryforcedtheCrowntobetterdevelopTexasandnorthernMexico.Asaresult,inthe�690stheSpanishviceregalgovernmentbeganestablishingaseriesofnewmissionsandpresidiostodeteranyFrenchpenetrations.94

In 1736 Antonio Ladrón de Guevara, a vecino from Nuevo León, requested permission and financial assistance from the viceroy to colonizetheSeno. Heclaimedpersonalknowledgeof theregionand familiarity with the Indian tribes there. Guevara’s plan was to recruitcolonistsfromhisprovincewiththeattractionoftheawardoffuerosandcongregas.Theviceroy’sdenialoftherequestdidnotdiscourage Guevara; he bought a passage to Spain and presented his projecttotheCounciloftheIndiesinMadrid.Toenhancehischanceof success, Guevara added two new clauses that asked for a share of profits from salt mines located in the region and that the governers of Coahuila and Nuevo León provide assistance. Guevara received noassurances,fortheCouncilwasreviewingalternativecoloniza-tionproposals.95

In Spain at the same time, Narciso Barquin de Montecuesta, the formeralcaldeof theVillaofValles,submittedaproposalfor thecolonizationofthesouthernregionoftheSeno.Hisplanincludedgeneroussubsidiesforhimself.HerequestedfourteenmillionpesosforgarrisonexpensestoprotectfuturemissionsandvillasthatweretobepopulatedwithpeoplefromVilladeVallesandTampico,ap-provaltousecongregas,acommissionworthyofhisfuturepositionwithanannualsalaryoffourthousandpesos,andaninterestinanysaltminessetasideforroyaluse.96

Back in New Spain a third party was proposing yet another plan. José Fernandez de Jáuregui, Governor of Nuevo León, suggested he beallowedtocolonizetheSeno.Submittingaplannodifferentfromtheothertwo,heusedpropheticthreatsofforeignoccupationofthelandiftherewasnotaSpanishpresenceestablishedquickly.And,according to de Jáuregui, he was the man to protect Spanish interests intheregion.97 De Jáuregui was not far from wrong, for Spain’s en-emies indeed gazed hungrily at the northern frontier. Years of neglect andminimalpresenceledtheFrenchandtheEnglishtobelievetheyhaddiscoveredanothersoftentryintotheSpanishcolonialmainland.

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��

Settlement of this frontier region of New Spain would serve as an additionaldefenseagainstEuropeanintrusions.Settlementalsoof-feredtheadvantageofshorteningtheroutefromcentralMexicotoSan Antonio. French and English pressures in the first half of the seventeenhundredsgaveurgencytotheSpanishdesiretoconqueranddeveloptheSenoMexicano.

InJuly�7�9theKingissuedaroyalcédulacallingfortheex-plorationandpermanentcolonizationoftheregionandestablishedboundariesofanewprovinceinwhichtheSenoMexicanowaslo-cated. The cédula established a junta of high-ranking officials in New Spain to choose one of the three plans. Since Guevara’s plan was favoredbytheSpanishcourt,theothertwocontendersdroppedtheirbids. In an effort to impress the junta and ensure success, Guevara gavetitlestoseveralIndianstousethemasproofofhisacceptanceamong the natives. In addition, Guevara, believing he simply had togothroughaformality,boldlypressedhisluck,askingtoserveas Sergeant Major, Captain of War, Governor and Captain General. Hiseffronteryputoffthejuntamemberschargedwithmakingthedecisionand,asaresult, theyoptedtowaituntil thenewviceroyassumedpower,therebybuyingtimewiththepracticeof“obedezcopero nocumplo.”98 Also affecting the junta’s decisionwas theirunhappinessovertheproposeduseofcongregas,whichhadcausedso much damage in the Sierra Gorda. Nor was the junta impressed with Guevara’s ploy of titled Indians; the junta stripprd them of their positionsanddismissingeachwiththreehundredpesos.99

Stunned, Guevara protested directly to the court in Madrid of the inactionandinsubordinationofthejuntaanditstreatmentofhisallies,anddemandedthathebeawardedtherighttoestablishhiscolony.Guevara’s meddling in government decisions and imperious behavior incurredthewrathofboththeCounciloftheIndiesandtheKing.In 1743 the Crown issued a second cédula that rejected Guevara’s planandprohibitedhimfrominterferingingovernmentaldecisionsand pacification programs. However, the Crown honored the titles Guevara bestowed upon the Indians.�00AlthoughtheCrown’srejec-tion ended Guevara’s immediate involvement in colonization plans, thepersistentSpaniardeventuallyenteredtheSenointheserviceofJosédeEscandón.


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Though the 1743 cédula ended Guevara’s participation it did notnegatetheoriginalcallforthecolonizationoftheSeno.Inthetimebetweenthetworoyaldecrees,juntamemberJuanRodríguezdeAlbuerne,theMarquésdeAltamira,researchedthehistoryoftheentradas into the Sierra Gorda to determine the best method of colo-nization.Escandón’srecordintheSierraconvincedtheMarquésthatabettermanwasavailablefortheproject.Whenthenewviceroy,Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, Conde of Rivallagigedo, arrived theMarquéspersuadedhimthatJosédeEscandónwasbestsuitedto fulfill royal orders. Perhaps even more important to the Marqués wasthatEscandón’sachievementshadcomewithoutcosttotheRealHacienda.TheMarqués’discoveryofEscandónmayhavecomeatno better time, since under the reign of Felipe V New Spain financed therejuvenationoftheartsandscienceacademies,therebuildingofthemilitary,andtherestructuringofthebureaucracyinSpain.TheCrownorderedthecolonytosendonehundredthousandpesoswitheveryshipgoingtoSpainuntilasumofonemillionpesoshadbeenaccumulated.�0�

OnSeptember�,�746Escandónaccepted theappointmentasLieutenantoftheViceroyontheCoastoftheSenoMexicanoandConquistador and Governor of the Province and the Seno Mexicano. This broad authority was unparalleled in New Spain, making Escan-dónsecondonlytotheviceroy.Escandónapproachedtheprojectwiththesamediligenceheputintopreviouschallenges.InpreparationhespenttheremainderoftheyearconsultingwiththeAudienciainMexicoCityandwithotherindividualsexperiencedintheterritory.ByDecemberhewasreadytoundertakehisgreatestchallenge.Inundertaking the pacification and colonization of the Seno Mexicano Escandónappliedall thelessonshehadlearnedduringhis transi-tionfromsoldiertobusinessman.WhenselectedfortheconquestoftheSeno,EscandónwasdeterminednottofallpreytoproblemsthathamperedeffortsintheTexasprovince.HetookprecautionstofacilitatethesuccessofhisventureintheuncharteredSenoinlightof dismal Texas colonization results. The first problem he faced wasdealingwith an environment farmore challenging than thatfacedbyhispredecessorsinEastTexas.ThelandbetweentheRioGrande and the Nueces River was an unchartered region of mystery.

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��

OccupyingtheareawereanumberofsmallnomadicIndiantribeswhose languages were unidentifiable. Some were hostile while others were more pacific.�0�ThemorehostiletribesoftenattackedandkilledSpanishshipwrecksurvivorsalongthecoastline.PartofEscandón’sdutywastopacifytheIndiansoftheregionandpopulateitwithSpaniards.�0�

WhereSpanishcolonizationefforts in favorableenvironmentsstruggledtoexist,Escandón,guidedbyhispastexperiences,orga-nized his more difficult sector efficiently. His strategy incorporated the best aspects of the development of the Yucatán and the reorgani-zation of the Sierra Gorda’s missions and pacification of its Indians. Previousexperiencesledhimtoconcludethatthemission-presidiosystem was not the appropriate method for pacification and coloniza-tion.Escandónwasoneoftheveryfewwhoarguedthattheresultsdidnotjustifythehighcostofpresidioandmissionmaintenance.Histime chasing the nomads around the Sierra Gorda taught him that a stationarydefensivefortdesignedtoprotectmissionsandborderswas ineffective. Like some frontier officers, he believed the use of companiavolantesofferedthebesttacticalapproachonthehostilefrontier.Healsobelievedthatpresidiosoldiers’abuseofmissionaryIndianscausedmanyoftheproblems.Therewerealsotheissuesofefficiency and corruption, as some captains overcharged the govern-mentforsuppliesandabusedtheirmen.�04Inaddition,presidioswereoften undermanned and staffedwith prisoners,whowere usuallyunder-suppliedandsufferedfromlowmorale.Impoverishedmarriedsoldierswhosefamilieslivedonorneartheirpostssufferedgreatlyunder abusive officers, often starving to death.�05

The missions were in no better shape than the presidios. Not de-signedtocreateapermanentsettlementpopulatedonlybySpaniards,missionsemphasized religiousconversionand trainingof Indianswiththegoalofmakingthemsedentarypeoplewhowouldlaythefoundations for villas and pueblos. Crown officials gave the regular ordersaten-yeardeadlinetoaccomplishthetaskbeforetransferringcontroltosecularpriests.ThesystemresteduponthewillingnessofIndianstoacceptclericalguidanceorconversion.FewinTexasconverted,however,becauseofabuseatthehandsofthesoldiersandmissionaries.TheIndiansthatstayedwereforciblydetained.Another


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reasonIndiansrefusedSpanishtutelagewasduetodisease.MuchlikeotherindigenoustribesthroughouttheAmericas,thesenomadicIndianshadnoimmunitytothebarrageofviruseswithwhichtheycameintocontact.Smallpoxandmeaslesdecimatedthemuchsmallerfamilytribesofthenorthernfrontiersandsurvivorsofthedreadeddiseases fled the missions. Moreover, those who survived venereal diseasecontractedfromtheSpanishandsufferedtheresultantsterilityfurtherreducedpopulationgrowth.�06

Escandónrecognized that thepresidiosystemwas inappropri-ateforcolonizingwithSpaniardsandconceivedanapproach thatcombined civil, religious, andmilitary settlements. His formulaforsuccessresembledJuanFranciscodeMedinayCachón’splanofmakingLagunadeTérminosmoreindependentandstable.Es-candónalsorevertedtotheoriginalSpanishapproachtoexplorationandexpansion.RatherthanrelyonIndiansforthepopulationbase,heensuredthathisentradawascomposedofSpaniardswhowere“equippedwitheverythingneededtotransplantEuropeanlife:peopleofmanytradesandestates,seeds,plants,andanimals.”�07ToavoidthemistakeotherentradasintoTexasmadeinbringingpeopleunac-climated to theenvironment,Escandónwashighlyselective. HiscolonistscamefromtheprovincessurroundingtheSeno.Healsorefusedtoincludeparasiticbureaucrats,aristocrats,andhigh-rankingmilitary officials.

Escandónalsousedhisunlimitedpowerstoobtainthemanpowerandsuppliesfortheinitialentrada.Underthepresidiosystem,thecommonsoldierwasexpected toprovidehisownequipmentandprovisions.EscandónrecognizedthatthismethodusuallymeantthatsoldierswereillpreparedforthecolonizationtaskandwerepronetoabuseIndians.Toavoidthissituationheorderedthegovernorsof Nuevo León, Coahuila, and Texas to provide the necessary men, provisions, and equipment. For example, the governor of Nuevo León ,VicenteBuenodelaBorbolla,wasresponsibleforpreparingmorethantwohundredmenwiththreetofourmonthsofsuppliesprocuredfromthelocalpopulationandhaciendas.108 ByJanuaryallthemen,equipment,andprovisionsnecessaryforthemulti-directionalentradawereassembled.Inall,oversevenhundredmenfromthroughoutnorthernMexicoandTexasparticipatedinthe�747inspection.

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�5

Originallyplanned to lastonlyamonth, thewhole inspectionprocesstookninetydays.Otherthantheextendedtimeframe,theonlymajorfailureEsacndónexperiencedwastheinabilitytosoundandexplorethebaysandriversthatdottedthecoastline.Escandónhad ordered the alcaldes of Tantoyuca and Guachinango to provide twobarkstoconducttheoperation,butdespiterepeatedrequeststhealcaldes implemented the customary“obedezcoperono cumplo”andfailedtosendtheships.�09OnecommandstrictlyfollowedwasthepolicytowardIndiansduringtheinspection.Escandónforbadeoffensiveattacksagainstanynativeswithwhomthepartiescameincontact.ThemenweretotreatIndiansinafriendlymannerandcouldonlyuseviolenceindefense.Thispolicyresultedinsuccess-fulcontactwithnumeroustribes,someofwhichwerepersuadedofthepeacefulmissionwithtrinketsandfood.ThemultiplepointsofentryalsomayhavegiventhetribestheillusionofanoverwhelmingSpanishforceandconvincedthemthatpeacewasthebestapproachatthistime.Escandón’suseofalocalcaciqueasaguidemayhavefacilitatedpeacefulrelations.��0

During the three-month inspection tripEscandón’sparties ex-ploredandmappedapproximatelytwelvethousandsquaremilesthatincluded the land between the Guadalupe and the Pánuco Rivers and about one-half of the Rio Grande in Texas. Incredibly, although the partiestraveledthroughdesert,wetlandsandterribleweather,andsufferedfromthelackofwater,therewasnolossoflife.��ThislatterfactalonemadeEscandón’sfeatamajoraccomplishment.

Escandón took seven months to finalize his report, submitting it on October 26, 1747 to New Spain’s Fiscal de lo Civil, Pedro de Vedoya yOsosio.ThereportwentwellbeyondasimpledescriptionoftheSenoMexicanoandofferedafullcolonizationplantobecarriedoutunderhisguidance.TheproposalrequestedauthoritytoestablishfourteencoloniesintheSenowithtwoonthenorthsideoftheRioGrande. Of the latter two, Escandón proposed establishing one along the banks of the Nueces River near modern-day Corpus Christi and anotheronefurthersouthalongthelowerSanAntonioRiver.TheChurchalwaysplayedaroleinSpanishcolonizationeffortsandthisplancontinueditspresence,butinasomewhatdifferentmanner.Theplancalledfortheestablishmentofmissionsineachcolonywiththe


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Franciscan Colleges of San Fernando de Mexico and Guadalupe de Zacatecasprovidingthemissionarystaff.Whilethesemissionsweretoconductthenormalconversionprocess,Escandón,adeeplyreli-giousman,didnotenvisionpopulatinghiscolonieswithneophytes.Instead,hewantedtopopulatetheregionwithSpaniardsinthebeliefthatcivilsettlementswithmissionswouldcreateamorestableandpermanentpresenceinthefrontier.��ToattractSpanishcolonists,heproposedthatsettlersbeexemptfromcivilandreligioustaxation,freelandafteraperiodofcommunaluse,andmilitaryprotection.Thecolonistswerealsotoreceiveaone-timesubsidyofbetweenonehundredandtwohundredpesostooffsetrelocationexpenses.��

Themilitarywasalsoincludedbutnotinthetraditionalsense.Escandónviewedpresidiosasineffectiveandacostliability,espe-cially against thenomadic Indians in the region. Thenature andsizeofthesmalltribesmayhaveledhimtobelievetheywouldbenomajorthreat.Thecharacteristicsofthemilitarypresencewerealso redefined by limiting service to two to three years and providing soldierswith land toassist their transition tocivilianmembershipinthevillas. Escandónbelievedthismethodwouldpreventthemfrompreyingon the local Indianpopulation. HecametobelievethepresidiowasamajorsourceoftroubleforlocalIndiansanditsabsencewouldplacatetumultuousrelations.Heproposedthattheexisting presidio at La Bahía be relocated to present day Goliad and eventuallyclosed.AccordingtoEscandónthewholeprojectwouldcost the Crown only fifty-eight thousand pesos.��4

InDecemberFiscaldeVedoyayOsosiosenthisremarkstoVice-roy Guëmes y Horcasitas along with a request for a Junta General to meetandvoteontheproposal.TheFiscalpraisedEscandón’splanona number of points, suggesting that the Kings’s cedulas would finally be fulfilled, souls saved, unchartered lands populated, and mining developed.ThesubmissionofthereporttotheViceroywasjustpartofthe approval process. Again, the power and influence of the Marqués deAltamiraresurfaced,ashisopinionwasrequestedbytheViceroy.AsthepersonwhonominatedEscandónforthetask,hecontinuedhissupport,approvingtheplanandsuggestingtheacceptanceofthepeninsular’s proposal. On May 12, 1748 the Junta General voted to accept the plan with only one modification; the Junta rejected the

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�7

relocationof theSacramentopresidio. TheJunta thendecided tocreate a new province named Nuevo Santander, in which the Seno was located, and selected Escandón as Governor, Captain-General, andPersonalRepresentativeoftheViceroyofthenewadministrativeunit.AlongwiththetitlecametheresponsibilitiesofpacifyingandcolonizingtheSenoMexicano.��5

Escandónknew that colonization of thewild region requiredtough,hardypeopleifitwastosucceed.Asaresult,hewashighlyselectiveinchoosinghiscolonists.Herecognizedthattheofferoffreeland and financial assistance would attract many of the wrong types ofpeople,sohefocusedhissearchforcolonistsonlyintheprovincesof Querétaro, Nuevo León, and Coahuila. The new governor also calledonmanyofhisoriginalentradaleaderstorecruitcolonistsintheirprovinces.Escandónrejectedparticipationbyprominentciviland military officials and citizens. Of the over seven hundred families that wished to go, only five hundred fifty-four were selected. The recruitmentandorganizationofthecolonizationphasewastobethepinnacleofEscandón’sskillsandpubliccareer.��6

OncecolonizationbeganEscandónreturnedtoQuerétarotoor-ganizethesecondphaseoftheprojectandtoreceiveaknighthoodandtitleofnobility.InOctober�749theKingawardedEscandónthetitle of Count of the Sierra Gorda and installed him as a Caballero in theOrderofSantiago,Spain’smostprestigiousmilitaryorder.��7Asabonus,theKingexemptedEscandónfromhavingtopaythenormalMediaAnataandLanzafeestypicallyassociatedwiththehonors.118 AnyjoyEscandónexperiencedwasshort-lived,however,aspartsofNew Spain erupted in economic and social turmoil.

Querétaro suffered a food shortageproblemcausedby a lackofrain.Cropproductiondroppedaslowasone-tenthofthenormalyield,andpeoplewerecrowdingintotheurbancenters.Distribu-tionofcropsenteringthetownwasuneven,cominginunpredictablequantities.Starvationincreasedandcrimeskyrocketed,andevenwildanimals wandered the streets in search of food. By November social ordercollapsedinQuerétarowhenfoodriotsbrokeoutinresponsetoescalatingmaizeprices.Angryandstarvingtextileworkersstormedthecitygranary.Escandóninterruptedhisrecruitmentofcolonistsandorganizedadefensetorescuethecityfromfurtherdestruction


26




bytherioters.��9DealingwiththechaoscostEscandónsixmonths,butoncethesituationwasundercontrolheagainconcentratedonorganizinghisvillas.

Escandon’scolonizingeffortsperforcerequiredcloserelation-shipswiththethreepillarsofhissocietythatheservedloyally.Ironi-cally,theChurch,Crown,andCitizenplayedandimportantpartinthedemiseofamanwhoseeffortsontheirbehalfrarelywereequaledin colonial history. Entrusted with power and influence given to few individuals,Escandónwasbetrayedbythoseheserved.Asisoftenthecase,inachievingsuccessheopenedhimselftoseverecriticismfromthoseheassistedandwhoeventuallydisgracedhimandbroughtabouthisdownfall.

Escandón’ssuccessincarvingoutanewprovince,creatingnu-merousvillas,andpopulatinganisolatedregioncreatedabacklashofresentmentandjealousy.TheFranciscansfromtheCollegeofSanFernandocriticizedthesharingofmissionaryactivitieswiththeCol-lege of Zacatecas and submitted an official protest to the Viceroy that attemptedtodiscreditmuchofEscandón’sclaimsaboutthenewprov-ince.EvenwhenEscandónawardedtheSanFernandoFranciscansthemostproductivesitesandallowedthemtheprivilegeoflivinginthesettlementsasratherthanwiththeirIndianscharges,theydidnotrelent.TheFranciscansaccusedEscandónofbeingacrueldespoticleader not afraid of God or the devil.��0 The Fiscal at first sided with theSanFernandofriars,butEscandón’sbenefactortheMarquésdeAltamira,continuedhissponsorshipanddefendedhim,hisapproach,andthecomplexityofthetaskhehadundertaken.��

Atthesametime,theZacatecanFranciscanscomplainedthattheyhadnotreceivedgoodassignmentsorland,protestingthedisparityinthequalityofthelandsandtheirpoorlocationbyleavingtheirmis-sions.TheFrancisciansalsoclaimedEscandónpaidtoomuchatten-tiontotheneedsofthecolonistswhilemaintaininganIndianpolicythatwasextreme.��Alwayskeepingthetribesundervigilanceandpermittingonlylimitedfreedom,Escandónmadesuretheydidnotengageindangerousactivities.HeofferedthemtheopportunitytoacceptChristianityorfaceawarofextermination.Later,hebribedthemwithtrinketsandprovidedthemwithfoodtokeepthepeace.Indiansthatwentastraywerequicklyandseverelypunished,almost

27



�9

to thepointofcruelty. The Indianscomplainedof this treatmentand the friars maintained that their pacification had the lofty goal ofsavingsoulswhileEscandón’ssimplyaimedtoinsureeconomicdevelopment. In retrospect, themissionaries’ argument seems toreflect classic rivalries rather than concern for Indian welfare, for more Indians died in the first five years after Escandón’s removal from office than during his nineteen-year tenure.��

Theintrepidconquistadorcontinuedtotakeabatteringwhenhisowncolonistsattackedhim.Escandóndictatedandmoldedthecul-tureandcharacterofhisprovince.Asgovernorhebothmacroandmicro-managed Nuevo Santander. He established and/or approved settlement sites and selected the exact location for administrativeandreligiousbuildings,andassignedacaptainasheadineachvilla.Micro-management of these tasks took longer than the colonistsanticipated.EspeciallyirksomewasthelengthoftimeittookEs-candóntoparceloutthelandpromisedtothecolonists.��4Undertheoriginal agreement land was to be used communally at first to prevent amonopolizationoffavorableterritory,toensurethesafetyandde-velopmentofindustries,andtofullyestablishthepopulation.Whenthosegoalswere reachedEscandónwoulddivide the landamongthecolonists.However,thecolonistsgrewtiredoflanddistributiondelays.Escandón’sownprejudiceagainstcriollosandthelackofpeninsularSpaniardsledhimtodelaytakingaction.Hefelttherewere insufficient men of good quality to properly administer land distribution and he was unsatisfied with handing out administrative duties to those with minimum qualifications.��5CountEscandón’sprohibitionfromtheprovinceofalltypesofalcoholicbeveragesandgamblingalsoangeredthecolonists.��6

Complaints fromcolonists, Indians,missionaries,andmilitaryofficers soon began arriving in Mexico City. So numerous were the reportsofmisconductthatin�757theviceroy,theMarquésdeLasAmarillas,orderedaninspectionoftheprovince.��7Asaresult,JoséTienda de Cuervo and Agustín López de la Cámara Alta, a military officer and an engineer, visited every villa in the province and recorded statistical informationongeography, industries, civil andmilitarypersonal,Indians,landhistory,andtransportation, andconductedpersonalinterviewswiththesettlers.128 Therecommendationsthey


28




made to the viceroy reflected not only a response to the complaints againstEscandónbuttogreaterchangeinSpain’scolonialpoliciesthatgrewoutoftheBourbonReformsaswell.

The “enlightened despotism” of the Bourbon kings (1700-1788) soughttorestructurethepoliticalandeconomiclifeofSpainanditscolonies.Theso-calledBourbonReformsaimedtomakecolonialadministrationmoreeffectiveandtogeneratemorerevenuebyenlarg-ingtheeconomyandmakingoverseascoloniesmoreproductive.��9Escandón’stax-freecolonywasanobstacletoachievingtheReforms’objectives.In�760anewviceroyarrivedwithseveralquestionsforEscandónfromtheKing.TheCrownworriedaboutseveralthings:WasitfeasibletomaintaintownsintheSeno,wheretherewerenomining nor commercial bases, without them becoming a financial burden?; If the settlements survived, would they ruin New Spain’s commercesincetheyweresoclosetoFrenchLouisiana?;WerethesettlementstooclosetoFrenchterritory?;andWerethereanygoodportssincetherewasnoformalreportaboutthem?ViceroyJoaquínde Monserrat, the Marqués de Cruillas, also asked for maps of Nuevo Santanderbeforeandaftercolonization,theactualcostsoftheen-tireproject,andtheresultsofportexplorationsandsoundings.TheKing also instructed the viceroy to halt provision of funds to Nuevo Santander, except for themissionaries’ expenses. Incredibly, theKingordered thewithdrawal of theCounts’ title of nobility untileverything was verified.��0

Escandónunderwent a lengthy investigation thatworsened in1769 when colonists who did not receive their financial assistance furtheraccusedhimoffalsifyingrecordstohidethetheftofrelocationsubsidiesandoftheannualmilitarypayrollintheamountoffortythousandpesos.��Althoughheclaimedtohavepersonallypaidforsomeofthecolony’sexpenses,thelargepropertiesandhomeEscan-dón kept in Nuevo Santander did not help his argument. In his defense he presented financial records to prove his innocence. Unfortunately, Escandónnever livedtohear theroyalverdictof thecharges.OnSeptember�0,�770EscandóndiedinMexicoCity.ItwaslefttoManueldeEscandónyLlera,hiseldestsonfromhissecondmarriage,to petition for a final decision. Shortly after his death, new evidence provedEscandón’sinnocenceandhewasexoneratedofallcharges.

29



��

Histitlesandpropertywererestored.�� Thus, after fifty-five years of glorious service that benefited his nation, accusations of theft and poorleadershipbroughtdownaSpanishpatriotwhogavemorethanhereceived.Inachangingworldbroughtonbytheneedformoremoneyandthenaturaltendencyofjealousy,Escandón’scareerandpersonallifewereshattered,asadendingtoalifeofroyalserviceandpersonalaccomplishment.

1. Archival records in Querétaro show Escandón signing his first name as JosephbutmodernscholarshavereferredtohimasJosé.Thisarticlewillfollowtheshortenednametofacilitatereading.

�.WilliamDavidStetzekorn,Formerly British Hondurus: A Profile of the NewNationofBelize(Athens:OhioUniversityPress),��9.

�.ForagooddescriptionoftheSpanishcolonialbureaucracyseeMarkA.BurkholderandLymanL.Johnson,ColonialLatinAmerica (New York: Oxford UniversityPress,�990),7�.

4.ManuelRiveraCambas,LosGobernantesdeMexico,TomoI(México:Joaquin Porrua S.A. de C.V., 1981), 341.

5. John C. Super, “The Agricultural Near North: Querétaro in the Seven-teenthCentury,”inProvincesofEarlyMexico:VariantsofSpanishAmericanRegionalEvolution,ed.IdaAltmanandJamesLockhart(LosAngeles:UniversityofCalifornia-LosAngelesLatinAmericanCenterPublications,�976),�4�,�44,248, and 250.

6. North American historians note Escandón’s role in borderland colonization butfailtodetailhisearliersuccessfulventuresthatprovidedthefoundationforhiseffortsinthenorthernfrontier.MexicanscholarsgivemoreattentiontohisachievementsbutfailtoofferacompletepictureofEscandón’slifeandcareer.

7. Toribiode laTorreyCoautores,HistoriaGeneraldeTamualipas,�nded.(CiudadVictoria:UniversidadAutónomadeTamualipasparaelInstitutodeInvestigaciónes Históricas, 1986), 55.

8. Juan Fidel Zorrilla and Carlos González Salas, Diccionario Biográfico deTamaulipas,(CiudadVictoria:UniversidadAutónomadeTamaulipasparaelInstituto de Investigaciones Historicas, 1984), 135.

9. Primo FelicianoVelázquez, BajoelDominioEspañol,TomoII,HistoriadeSanLuisPotosi (Mexico D.F.: Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística, �947),456.

10. Gabriel Saldivar y Silva, “Don José De Escandón,” en LecturasHistóri-casMexicanas,TomoV, ed. Ernesto de la Torre (México: Universidad Nacional AutónomadeMéxico,�994),69.

��.Setzekorn,FormerlyBritishHonduras,��.Pirateshadlongusedthelogwoodforfuel,butitwastheaccidentaldiscoverybyashipcaptainwhosoldhis surplus of wood in Europe that revealed its value. See Narda Dobson, HistoryofBelize(London:LongmanCaribbeanUnlimited,�97�),54.


30




��.Dobson,HistoryofBelize,5�.��.Setzekorn,FormerlyBritishHonduras, 128.�4.Dobson,HistoryofBelize,56and60;andAliciadelC.Contreras,“Elpalo

tinte, motivo de un conflicto entre dos naciónes, 1670-1102,” HistoriaMexicana37 (July-September 1987): 51.

�5.Ibid.,�94-�96.16. Ibid., 298-299.�7.PhilipWaynePowell,Soldiers,Indians&Silver,TheNorthwardAdvance

ofNewSpain1550-1600(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.�969),��.18. A congrega may be identical to an encomienda. An encomienda is an

encomendero’sright tousethelaborofIndiansinexchangeforprotectionandChristianity.SeeBurkholderandJohnson.ColonialLatinAmerica,��7.Thisviewis supported by Gabriel Saldivar who claims that “Lacongregaeraunpobladodeindiosmandadoporunespañolcontítulodeprotector,quienseencargabadeinstruiralosindiosenelcurtivodeplanrasalimenticiasyenelcuidadoycríadelosganados.” See Gabriel Saldivar, HistoriaCompendiadadeTamaulipas(Mexico:Editorial Jus, S.A. de C.V.. 1988), 69.

�9.Powell,Soldiers,Indians&Silver,��.�0.Ibid.,�5.21. Lino Gómez Canedo. SierraGorda;UnTípicoEnclaveMisionalEnEl

CentroDeMéxico(SiglosXVIIyXVIII)(Querétaro:DirecciónPatrimonioCultural,Secretaría de Cultura, Bienestar Social, 1988), 49-50.

��.PrimoFelicianoVelazquez.HistoriadeSanLuisPotosí,TomoII(México:Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística, 1947), 456.

��.Villar,LecturasHistóricasMexicanas, 69; and Velázquez, HistoriadeSanLuisPotosí, 456. Author Manuel Septian y Septian states that Escandón first servedasasergeantandwasthenpromotedtolieutenant.SeeManuelSeptianySeptian,HistoriadeQuerétaro:Desdelostiemposprehistóricoshastaelaño1898(Querétaro: Ediciónes Culturales del Gobierno del Estado Querétaro, 1967), 96. However,noevidenceexiststosubstantiateSeptian’sclaim.

24. Velázquez, HistoriadeSanLuisPotosí,456.�5.JamesLockhartandStuartB.Schwartz,EarlyLatinAmerica(Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1989), 292; and n.a., “Escandón, José de.” DiccionarioPorrúa:DeHistoria,Biografía,yGeografíadeMéxico,5thed.(México:EditoialPorrúa S.A., 1986), 998.

�6.SeptienySeptien,HistoriadeQuerétaro,96.Manchóndeignominiareferred to the Spanish belief that the Indians of the Sierra Gorda had humiliated thesupposedEuropeansuperiority.Thetermtranslatesintothe“stainofhumili-ation.”

�7.Ibid.Mexicanauthorsdisagreeovertheexacttownrescuedbythiseighty-manforce.TheycitebothCelayaandQuerétaroastherescuedtown.ThefactthatEscandón was ordered to Celaya and city officials were the ones mentioning the relieffromthethreatseemstoindicatethatitwasCelayaratherthanQuerétarothat benefited in this instance.

31



��

28. Velázquez, HistóriadeSanLuisPotosí,456.�9.Villar,LecturasHistóricasMexicanas,70. 30. Secretaria de Gobernación, EstadoGeneraldelasFundaciónesHecha

porD.JosédeEscandónen laColoniadelNuevoSantander:CostadelSenoMexicano:DocumentosOriginalesquecontienenlaInspeccióndelaProvinciaEfectuadaporelCapitandeDragonesDonJoséTeindaDeCuervo,delMismoalVirreyyunApendiceconLaRelaciónHistóricaDelNuevoSantander,porFr.VicenteSantaMaria (México: Talleres Grafícos de la Nación for the Publicaciónes del Archivo General de la Nación, 1929), 303.

��.Septian,HistoriadeQuerétaro,96.��.Saldivar,HistoriaCompendiada, 70. Saldivar’s figures for the number

ofIndiansmaybeincorrect.SourcesthatdealwithotherIndianthreatsusuallyspeakofsmallernumbers.SinceSaldivardoesnotcitethesourceofhisinforma-tionitisimpossibletodetermineifEscandónfacedtenthousandwarriorsorafarfewernumber.

��.Secretaria,EstadoGeneraldelasFundaciónes,�04.�4.Septian,HistoriadeQuerétaro,96;OctavioHerreraPérez,AnalesYTes-

timoniosDelCantaro(CuidadVictoria:UniversidadAutónomadeTamaulipasporel Instituto de Investagaciónes Históricas, 1986), 25; and Zorrilla and González Salas,Diccionario Biográfico de Tamaulipas,��6.

35. Gabriel Rincón Frías, José Rodolfo Anaya Larios, and Ma. Isabel Gómez Libardini,BreveHistoriadeQuerétaro(Querétaro:DireccióndePatrimoniaCul-tural, Secretaria de Cultura y Bienestar Social, Gobierno del Estado de Querétaro, 1986), 48.

�6.Septian,HistoriadeQuerétaro,96.�7.Ibid.,96-97.38. Ibid.; and Frías, Larios, and Labardini, BreveHistoriadeQuerétaro,

48.�9.VicentedeSantaMariaO.F.M.,LecturasHistóricasMexicanased.Er-

nesto Villar de la Torre , Tomo II (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México,�994),9.AcontemporaryofEscandón,SantaMaríalearnedofthistitlefromIndiansthelastconquistadorhaddefeated.

40. Gabriel Saldivar, HistoriaCompendiadadeTamualipas(CiudadVictoria:Dirección General de Educación y Cultura, 1988), 80.

4�.Canedo,SierraGorda:UnTípicoEnclave, 31 and 68.4�.Ibid.,69.4�.Saldivar,HistoriaCompendiadadeTamaulipas, 78.44.delaTorre,HistoriaGeneral,55. 45. Peter Gerhard, TheNorthFrontierofNewSpain(Princeton:Princeton

University Press, 1982), 20 and 22-23.46.Canedo,SierraGorda:UnTípicoEnclave, 81-85.47.Ibid.,6�.48. Ibid., 77. 49. Ibid., 77-78. 50.Ibid.


32




5�.Ibid.,77-�09.5�.Ibid.53. Ibid., 81.54.Ibid.55.Ibid. 56. Ibid., 82.57.Ibid. 58. Ibid.59.Ibid.60. Ibid., 82-83.6�.IdaAltmanandJamesLockhart,eds,ProvincesofEarlyMexico:Vari-

antsofSpanishAmericaRegionalEvolutionLosAngeles:UCLALatinAmericanCenterPublications,�976),�45.

62. D.A. Brading, “Government and Elite in Late Colonial Mexico,” HispanicAmericanHistoricalReview5�(August�97�):�9�.

6�.JohnC.Super,“QuerétaroObrajes:IndustryandSocietyinProvincialMexico, 1600-1810,” HispanicAmericanHistorical Reveiw 56 (May �976):198.

64. Burkholder and Johnson,ColonialLatinAmerica, �67; andBrading,“Government and Elites,” 396.

65.FlorenceJohnsonScott,HistoricalHeritageoftheLowerRioGrande:AHistoricalRecordofSpanishExploration,Subjugation,andColonizationoftheLowerRioGrandeValleyandtheActivitiesofJosédeEscandón,CountofSierraGorda togetherwith theDevelopment of Towns andRanchosUnder Spanish,Mexican,andTexasSovereignties1747-1848(Waco:TexianPress,�966),�76;andZorillaandSalas,Diccionario Biográficio de Tamaulipas,��6.

66. Carlos E.Castañeda, OurCatholicHeritageinTexas1519-1936,vol.3,TheMissionEra:TheMissionsatWork:1736-1761(Austin:VonBoeckmann-JonesCo., 1938; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1976),138 (page reference is to reprint edition);Scott,HistoricalHeritageoftheLowerRioGrande,�76-�77;andZorillaandSala,Diccionario Biográfico de Tamualipas,��6and�55.

67.TestamentodeJosédeEscandón,inUniversidadAutónomadeQuerétaro,CentrodeInvestigaciónesyEstudiosHistóricos,DocumentosIneditosparalaHis-toriadeQuerétaroTomoVIII(Querétaro:TalleresPraxis,�990)�7�and�76.

68. La vida mala was the abuse of spousal power and was considered defile-ment of marriage vows. Bigamy would be an example of such defilement. See AsunciónLavrin,SexualityandMarriage inColonialLatinAmerica (Lincoln:University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 20-21. Richard Boyer, LivesoftheBigamists:Marriage,Family,andCommunityinColonialMexico(Albuquerque:Universityof New Mexico Press, 1995) offers an in depth examination of bigamy in colonial Mexico.

69.AltmanandLockhart,eds.,ProvincesofEarlyMexico,��6-�40;andBer-nardo Garcia Martínez, HistoriaGeneraldeMéxico,TomoII.(México:ColegiodeMéxico,�976)�46.

70.Saldivar,HistoriaCompendiada,65.

33



�5

7�. ForabriefexaminationofAfricanslavery inMexicoseeMichealL.ConniffandThomasJ.Davis,AfricansintheAmericas:AHistoryoftheBlackDiaspora (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 109-112; and Herman Konrad, AJesuitHaciendainColonialMexico:SantaLucía,1567-1767(Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press, 1980), 246 and 252.

72. Protocolo 7, 12 September 1747, notario: Antonio Fernández del Rincón, Archivo General del Estado de Querétaro (hereafter cited as AHQ); and Protocolo 2, 9 September 1727, notario: José Cardoso, 1727-1728, AHQ.

73. Protocolo 2, notario: José Cardoso, 24 November 1728, AHQ. It should benotedthatEscandónalsoutilizedapprenticesinhisobrajes.

74.JohnC.Super,“QuerétaroObrajes,”�00.75. AHQ Protocolo 2, Cardoso, 1728: 373, Querétaro 24 November 1728.76.AltmanandLockhart,ProvincesofEarlyMexico,��. 77. Protocolo 4, 3 April 1739, Fernández, 1739-1742, AHQ; Protocolo 5,

16 November 1743, Frenández, 1743-1744, AHQ; and Protocolo 7, 8 September 1748, Frenández, 1747-1748, AHQ.

78. Scott, HistoricalHeritageoftheLowerRioGrande,�77.79.Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid., no page number given, refer to Genealogical Chart on last page; and

ZorillaandSalas.Diccionario Biográfico de Tamaulipas, 138-139. 82. Protocolo 4, 7 October 1741, Fernández, 1739-1742, AHQ. 83. Ibid. 84. Fray Vicente Santa María, theology lecturer, at the convent of Valladolid

ofMichíocanwasentrustedwithEscandón’schildren.SeeMaríadelCarmen,“LosApachesysusLeyenda,”HistoriaMexicana�4(October-December�974):�7�.

85. del Carmen, “Los Apaches y su Leyenda,” 172; Universidad Autónoma deQuerétaro,Documentos Ineditos,�77;andScott,HistoricalHeritageof theLowerRioGrande, �77. Conventshad three social classesofwhich theVeloNegro was the highest. Women in that class came from wealthy elite families and broughtdonationsanddoweriesintotheorder.TheVeloBlancowasthesecondtierandwasmadeupofthosewomenwhocamefromfamilieslowerontheso-cio-economicscale.Thesewomenservedasthehousekeepersoftheconventandassumed tasks considered below the position of the Velo Negro. At the bottom werethepoorcastasthatservedthesecondclassmembers.SeeBurkholderandJohnson,ColonialLatinAmerica,9�-9�.

86. Donald E. Chipman, SpanishTexas1519-1821(Austin: UniversityofTexasPress,�99�),5�-5�.

87. The northern province jurisdictions overlapped due to indistinct borders. SeeChipman,SpanishTexas, 52-53; and Gary Starnes, “The Spanish Borderlands ofTexasandCoahuila,”Texana�0(Winter�97�):��-��.

88. Lawerance Frandis Hill, JosédeEscandónandtheFoundingofNuevoSantander:AStudyinSpanishColonization(Columbus:TheOhioStateUniversityPress,�9�6),40.

89. Ibid.


34




90.bid.9�.Hill,JosédeEscandón,45.9�.Ibid.,46,andArmandoC.Alonzo,TejanoLegacy:RancherosandSettlersinSouthTexas,1734-1900(Albuquerque:Universityof New Mexico Press, 1998), 23. 93. Robert S. Weddle, “North Toward Texas: Spain, The Middle CorriderandtheFrenchConnection,”JournalofSouthTexas 8 (Winter�995):�.94.Chipman,SpanishTexas,��and��9.95.Hill,JosédeEscandón,56.96.Ibid.,57.97.Ibid. 98. Robert A. Calvert and Arnoldo de León, TheHistoryofTexas(ArlingtonHeightsIL:HarlanDavidson,Inc.,�990),��.99.Hill,JosédeEscandón,57. 100. Ibid., 57-58.�0�.Cambas,Los Gobernantes de Mexico,�65.�0�.Hill,JosédeEscandón,�4. 103. Juan Francisco de Guëmes y Horcasitas, “Decreto para la fundación de las Missiones del Seno Mexicano, 1748” TMs [pho-tocopy],p.90,OldSpanishMissionsHistoricalResearchCollec-tion,St.FlorenceLibrary,OurLadyoftheLakeUniversity,SanAntonio.�04.Chipman,SpanishTexas, 128; Max L. Moorhead, ThePre-sidio:BastionoftheSpanishBorderlands (Norman: University of OklahomaPress,�975),�5-�6.�05.CalvertanddeLeón,TheHistoryofTexas, 14-15, 24 and 28; Gerhard, NorthernFrontiers,��;andMoorhead,ThePresidio,�� 106. Gerhard, NorthernFrontiers,�9,��9and�40;andHill,JosédeEscandón,�9�.�07.LockhartandSchwartz,EarlyLatinAmerica,6�-6�. 108. Israel Cavazos Garza, NuevoLeónylaColonizacióndelNuevoSantander(Monterrey:EditorialdelaSeccion��DelSyn-dicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación, 1994), 29.�09.Scott,HistoricalHeritage,64-66;andCalvertanddeLeón,TexasHistory,��.��0.Scott,HistoricalHeritage,�5-�6.

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�7

111. Castañeda, OurCatholicHeritage,�4�and�50;andChip-man,SpanishTexas,�6�.��.JuanFidelZorilla,reviewofElPoderColonialenNuevoSantander, by María del Carmen Velásquez, in HistoriaMexicana27 (January-March 1978): 479-496. 113. Chronicler Israel Cavazos Garza, interview by author, 19 August�997,Monterrey,penandpaper,MunicipalArchivesofMonterrey,Monterrey;HerbertEugeneBolton,TexasintheMiddleEighteenthCentury:StudiesinSpanishColonialHistoryandAdministration(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPublicationin History, 1915), 293; Castañeda, OurCatholicHeritage,�9�;Cavazos Garza, NuevoLeón,��;Chipman,SpanishTexas,�67;andHill,JosédeEscandón,68. 114. Castañeda, OurCatholicHeritage,�5�&�5�;andChipman,SpanishTexas, 168. There are suggestions that one hundred fifteen thousandandsevenhundredpesoswastheoriginalamount.SeeSeptianySeptian,HistoriadeQuerétaro,�5�.��5.Alonzo,TejanoJourney, 29; and Castañeda, OurCatholicHeritage,�5�-�54.��6.Scott,HistoricalHeritage, 19; and Castañeda, OurCatholicHeritage,�56. 117. Protocolo 6, 28 June 1745, notorio:Antonio Fernandez del Rincón,AHQ;andCastaneda,OurCatholicHeritage,�55. 118. Castañeda, Ibid. ��9.BrianR.Hamnett,RootsofInsurgency:MexicanRegions,1750-1824 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 109-��0.��0.Saldivar,HistoriaCompendiada,�04and��4. 121. Castañeda, OurCatholicHeritage, 88.��.Zorilla,reviewofElPoderColonial,�04.��.delaTorre,LecturasHistóricas,7�-7�;andSaldivar,Histo-riaCompendiada, 108. ��4.Alonzo,TejanoLegacy,�9;andScott,HistoricalHeritage,6�.��5.Alonzo,TejanoJourney,�5.��6.Saldivar,HistoriaCompendiada, 108.��7.delaTorre,HistoriaGeneral,�0,��.


36




128. Scott, HistoricalHeritage,47-5�. 129. Allan J. Kuethe and Lowell Blaisdell, “French Influence and theOriginsoftheBourbonColonialReorganization,”HispanicAmericanHistoricalReview 71 (August 1991): 588; Lockhart and Schwartz,EarlyLatinAmerica,�6�;andHerreraPaz,AnalesyTestimonios,�9.��0.JoséAntonioCalderonQuijano,LosVirreyesdeNuevaEspañaenelReinadodeCarlosIII(Sevilla:EscueladeEstudiosHispanoAmericanosdeSevilla,�976),�:�5-�6. 131. Cavazos Garza, NuevoLeón,�9;andScott,HistoricalHeri-tage,��0-��. 132. Secretaría de Gobernación, EstadoGeneral,309;andScott,HistoricalHeritage,112.

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