Jordan in the 1967 War

8/8/2019 Jordan in the 1967 War

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Cambridge Middle E ast Library

Jordan in the 1967 war


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Cambridge Middle East Library

Editorial BoardR O GE R O W E N , E D M U N D B U R K E , S E R IF M A R D I N , W A L ID K A Z Z I H A ,A V I S HLA IM , BA S IM M U S A LLA M

Also in the seriesMedicine and power in Tunisia, 1780-1900NANCY ELIZABETH GALLAGHERUrban notables and Arab nationalism: the politics of Damascus, 1860-1920PHILIP S . KHOURYThe Palestinian Liberation Organisation: people, power and politicsHELENA COBBANEgypt in the reign of Muhammed AliAFAF LUTFI AL-SAYYID MARSOTWomen in nineteenth-century EgyptJUDITH E. TUCKEREgyptian politics under SadatRAYMOND A. HIN NEBUSC HNomads and settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800-1980NORMAN N. LEWISIslam and resistance in AfghanistanOLIVIER ROYThe Imamate tradition of OmanJOHN C. W ILKINSONKing Abdullah, Britain and the making of JordanMARY C. WILSONThe Ottoman Empire and European capitalism, 1820-1913SEVKET PAMUKMerchants of Essaouira: urban society and imperialism in southwestern Morocco,1844-1886DANIAL J. SCHROETERThe birth of the Palestinian refugee problem, 1947-1949BENNY MORRIS


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PUBL ISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVE RSITY O F CAM BRIDG EThe Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United KingdomC A M B R ID G E U N IV E R SIT Y PR E SSThe Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK40 West 20th Street, New York NY 10011 -4211, USA477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, AustraliaRuiz de Alarcon 13,28014 Madrid , SpainDock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africahttp://www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 1987This boo k is in copyright. Subject to statu tory exceptionand to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,no reproduction of any part may take place withoutthe written permission of Cambridge University Press.First published 1987Reprinted 1989First paperback edition 2002A catalogue record or this book is available from the British LibraryLibrary of Congress Cataloguing in Publication dataMutawi, Samir A.Jordan in the 1967 war.(Cambridge Middle East library)Bibliography.Includes index.1. Israel-Arab war, 1967 - Jord an.2. Jordan - Foreign relations.I. Title. II. Series.DS127.9.J6M88 1987 956'.046 87-33451ISBN 0 52134352 6 hardbackISBN 0 52152858 5 paperback


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To all those I lovemy parents, my wifeand my childrenwithout whose support and lovethis book would not have been


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Contents

Preface page ixAcknowledgements xiMap I. Th e Hashem ite Kingdom of Jordan xiiMap 2. Operations on the Jordanian Fr on t, 5-7 June 1967 xiiiMap 3 . Th e Campaign in Jerusalem , 5-7 Jun e 1967 xiv

1 Th e decision-making process in Jordan 12 Th e principles and practice of Jordan ian foreign policy 193 Frien ds and enemies: Jordan in inter-Arab affairs 464 Samu 695 Th e gathering crisis 856 On the brink of war 1087 Th e war 1228 Th e war in perspective 1419 Th e aftermath 163

10 Conclusion 181Appendix: Timetable for the movement of Iraqi forces to Jordan 186Biographical notes 187Notes 191Bibliography 213Index 218

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Preface

Th e seeds of the idea for this book , and indeed the seeds of the war itself, weresown at the first Arab summit conference in Cairo in 1964. Like many fellowArab journalists, I was excited to be covering an event that marked, for allintents and purposes, the beginning of a new era of Arab politics, and moreimp ortan tly, of joint Arab action. I had grown up in the 1950s and early 1960swith feelings of great frustration over the fragmentation of Arab opinion on th ePalestinian question and the total lack of understanding of Jordan's legitimatedefence problems against Israel.To most Arabs, the summit represented a real opportunity of overcoming

these problems, particularly as Nasser himself had called for the conference.Nasser was seen at that tim e, by the A rab masses and intellectuals alike, as theonly leader capable of uniting the Arabs in their common goal of facing up tothe Israeli danger.While talking to some officials who had attende d the closed sessions, I haddiscovered that the Syrian head of state had accused the Arab leaders ofcowardice because they refused to confront Israel. He claimed that Palestinecould be liberated in six hours if they did decide to fight. Even with my littleknowledge of military logistics, this exaggeration was difficult to swallow. Todrive a car from Safad in the no rth to Gaza in the sou th, would probab ly req uiretwice as long. How then, I thought, could an Arab leader think he couldoverrun Israel in six hours? I left Cairo with grave dou bts , despite the generaleuphoria surrounding the summ it.This unease remained with m e, and on the morning of 5 Jun e 1967 it provedfully justified. I was in London working for the BBC Arabic Service as aproducer of current affairs pro gram mes. Although the news of the outbreak ofthe war was not totally unexpected, it stillfilledme with apprehen sion. M y firstduty was to try and treat the events as dispassionately as possib le, in conformitywith the BBC's code of objectivity and professional conduct. I had to putaside my own feelings as a Jordanian whose hometown, Jerusalem, had beencaptured by the Israelis. I did survive the next six days, but have failed toovercome the war's traumatic effects to this day.

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PrefaceThe June 1967 war was, arguably, the most shattering event in recent Arabhistory. While the 1948 war lost the Palestinian Arabs the larger part of theirhomeland, they did at least retain an area that included such vital cities asJerusalem, Nablus and Hebron. The three days of fighting on the Jordanianfront between 5 and 8 Jun e 1967 left all this area under Israeli occupation, andforced another huge wave of frightened refugees to run for their lives. ForJorda n, the results of the war were equally catastrophic - the army and air forcehad been decimated, leaving the East Bank defenceless; half the country hadbeen lost to Israel; the economy had been shattered beyond any short-termrepair; and a new wave of refugees had arrived on the East B ank. I returne d toAmman shortly afterwards to see all this for myself, but nothing had preparedme for the chaos that confronted me.My immediate reaction was that if this was the price that Jordan had to payfor its commitment to Arab solidarity and brotherhood, then it was a terriblyexpensive price. My second reaction involved questions that have haunted meever since. Why did it happen? How did it all start? Could it have been averted?Were only Arab leaders to blame or were Arab masses just as guilty?In this book I have attempted to answer some of these questions, exploringthe motives behind Jordan's decision to enter the war, and its positionimmediately before the outbreak of hostilities. While Jordan's unreservedparticipation in the war came as a surprise to most ob servers, it did not su rpriseJordan's decision-makers. No effort, therefore, is complete without the maindecision-making institutions being examined and the prominent role of KingHussein being stressed. This is thoroughly examined in chapter 1, and thevalues and images of the K ing 's formulation of foreign policy are fully analysedin chapter 2. In chapters 3 and 4 the outbreak of war is placed against thebackground of inter-Arab rivalries, which dominated the Arab world in theyears prior to 1967, and Jordanian perceptions of Syria's role in encouragingArab-Israeli conflict in the immediate period before. In subsequent chapters Ihave examined in some detail the events of the war itself, including an accurate

restructuring of all that went on in the operations room and in the field minuteby minute. I have also looked at Jordan's position in the post-war period,including the rebuilding of the Jordanian armed forces and the Jordanian-Israeli confrontation in the Jordan valley town of Karameh in M arch 1968.I have interviewed all the surviving Jordanian participants, politicians,military commanders, intelligence personnel, and most importantly, HisMajesty K ing Hussein . I was also given permission by the Army Com mander-

in-Chief, General Sharif Zaid Ben Shaker (himself commander of the 60tharmoured brigade in the June war), to research all the relevant armydocuments.I have restricted my study to Jo rdan 's role in the 1967 war because I felt thata tragic misunderstand ing of Jordan's inten tions by both Arabs and Israelis was


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Prefacea major cause of the war, and indeed a continuing source of friction. Fi rst,as to the reasons behind Jordan's policy of non-confrontation with Israel, andsecondly, as to the depth of Jord an's comm itment to the A rab cause and to thecause of Palestine.I also wanted to correct, in some way, the imbalance in the literaturecurrently available on the 1967 war. There are many detailed accounts ofIsrael's role in the war, but none of Jordan's. I do not know whether this isbecause of a lack of information from the Arab side, the natural disinclinationof the defeated to talk about the war, or as some would claim, a generalprejudice against the Arabs . I hope this book does convey the balanced p icturethat I have tried to achieve.

AcknowledgementsI am truly grateful to H. M . King H ussein, whose kind and detailed answers tomy questions enriched my experience and knowledge of the crucial period ofJord an's h istory this book covers. My sincere appreciation also goes to GeneralSharif Zeid Ben Shaker, Com mander in Chief of the Jordanian A rmed Force s,for permitting me to research army records and documents related to the 1967war. Brigadier Fawzi Ebeidat, Com mander of the Royal War College, deservesa special thank you for his directions to me on military and strategic issues.Prime Minister Zeid Rifai, Adnan A bu O deh, M inister of the Royal Cou rt,Marwan Al-Kassem, Chief of the Royal Diwan, and other politicians andmilitary commanders were very helpful, not only in responding patiently andobjectively to my questions but also in contributing invaluable comments andviews. I wish to record my sincere appreciation to all of the m. T he same goes toProfessor Peter Cam pbell, Dr Avi Shlaim and D r Peter Woodw ard who guidedmy efforts while I was preparing my thesis at Reading University.To all these and others who con tributed their expertise and knowledge to themaking of this book , I say a special healt-felt thank you.

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Prefacea major cause of the war, and indeed a continuing source of friction. Fi rst,as to the reasons behind Jordan's policy of non-confrontation with Israel, andsecondly, as to the depth of Jord an's comm itment to the A rab cause and to thecause of Palestine.I also wanted to correct, in some way, the imbalance in the literaturecurrently available on the 1967 war. There are many detailed accounts ofIsrael's role in the war, but none of Jordan's. I do not know whether this isbecause of a lack of information from the Arab side, the natural disinclinationof the defeated to talk about the war, or as some would claim, a generalprejudice against the Arabs . I hope this book does convey the balanced p icturethat I have tried to achieve.

AcknowledgementsI am truly grateful to H. M . King H ussein, whose kind and detailed answers tomy questions enriched my experience and knowledge of the crucial period ofJord an's h istory this book covers. My sincere appreciation also goes to GeneralSharif Zeid Ben Shaker, Com mander in Chief of the Jordanian A rmed Force s,for permitting me to research army records and documents related to the 1967war. Brigadier Fawzi Ebeidat, Com mander of the Royal War College, deservesa special thank you for his directions to me on military and strategic issues.Prime Minister Zeid Rifai, Adnan A bu O deh, M inister of the Royal Cou rt,Marwan Al-Kassem, Chief of the Royal Diwan, and other politicians andmilitary commanders were very helpful, not only in responding patiently andobjectively to my questions but also in contributing invaluable comments andviews. I wish to record my sincere appreciation to all of the m. T he same goes toProfessor Peter Cam pbell, Dr Avi Shlaim and D r Peter Woodw ard who guidedmy efforts while I was preparing my thesis at Reading University.To all these and others who con tributed their expertise and knowledge to themaking of this book , I say a special healt-felt thank you.

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Map 2. Operations on the Jordanian Fron t, 1400 hrs. 5 June - 223 0 hrs. 7 June 19 67.


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c-A' JORDAN

Ma p 3. Th e Cam paign in Jerusalem , 1400 hrs. 5 June - 2200 hrs. 7 June 196 7.


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Chapter i

The decision-making process in Jordan

Th e position of leader in the Arab worldIn contrast with many Western nations where the political party plays aprimary role in determining a nation's policies, in many Middle Easterncountries the personality of the leader is of over-riding importance. There areseveral reasons for the dominating role played by one individ ual, includ ing theabsence in the Middle East of a popular consensus on the nature of politicalprocesses, the close relationship between the ruler and the means of coercion,and the absence of a historical tradition of popu lar participation in political life.Historically, traditional Arab society has always reserved a place for a singledominating figure in social, political and religious affairs. Sharabi points outthat the Arab w orld's triba l pattern of strong civil or political leadership was inexistence before the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, who lived in the seventhcentury A.D.1 Th e establishment of Islam strengthened this tradition throughthe institution of the Caliphate. T he Caliph is the supreme leader of the Muslimumma or nation and combines in his person religious and political leadership.Even though the Caliphate died with the Ottoman Empire, the tradition ofreverence surrounding the position of leader is still strong at every level ofcontemporary Arab society.

The assumption that there should be a leading figure in religious, civil andpolitical affairs remains implicit in many Arab comm unities. In many coun triesof the Fertile Crescent, including Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, the mukhtar(village head) and tribal leader have positions of considerable authority.This pattern of according a prominent role to religious and other leaders isnot necessarily conducive to the development of nations. The Middle East is apatchwork of different ethnic and confessional com mu nities, and the existenceof parochial attachments is antagonistic to the development of loyalty to thestate which transcends these. The tragic experience of Lebanon stands as anexample of the destruc tive effect of num erous religious and ethnic gro ups, eachwith its own leader.

Although the position of leader in Muslim society is often the result ofinheritance or descent from the Pro ph et, the influential leader must also prove


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Jordan in the 1967 warthat he possesses the necessary qualities. Hudson points out that 'the leadermust demonstrate his personal competence if he is to earn the traditional oathof allegiance'. Equally important is the fact that in such societies 'personalleadershif^plays a legitimizing ro le'. Accordingly, in all Arab monarchies, 'theking, amir, shaykh or sultan does not merely reign but rules'.2 This point isparticularly relevant to Jordan where the monarch is the supreme arbiter andchief executive. King H ussein explains: 'T o me, rule was not merely a crown ora mace but an honourable service.'3 King Hussein sees his role as not merelytitular but one of responsible decision-making. Ever since Jordan came intobeing , the main feature of Hashem ite leadership has been its highly centralizedcharacter and the m onarch 's role as the nation 's chief executive.

Although some political theorists have considered monarchies an anachro-nism in the modern world, they are forced to observe that 'those that havesurvived in the Arab world have proved more resourceful and adaptable thanpolitical theory would indicate'.4 Hudson points out that the most legitimateform of mon archy in the Middle East is that of 'an Islamic theocracy governedby the ablest leaders of a tribe tracing its lineage to the Pro ph et'.The ruler should adhere to the ethics of Islam and patriarchal consultativeprocedures of tribal decision-making.5 To some extent the Hashemites ofJordan meet this ideal type. They are direct descendants of the ProphetMuhammad, they profess adherence to the ethics of Islam, and they allow forpatriarchal consultative procedures of tribal decision-making through theinstitution of the Royal Hashem ite Diwan. How ever, while the Hashem ites areaccepted as the legitimate rulers within Jordan, these factors have failed toprovide them with legitimacy in the region as a whole. This can be attributed tothe following factors: neither King Hussein nor King Abdullah attempted toestablish an Islamic state whose laws are based on those of Islam; m any sectionsof society no longer regard blood descent from the Prophet as an authenticcriterion of leadership; and many regard tribal patterns of decision-making asobsolete, archaic and irrelevant to the needs of a modern nation-state.

The decision-making eliteA political elite is generally recognized as a group of people who either directlyexercise or are in a strong position to influence the exercise of political power.In political theory the meaning of the term elite has been the subject of longdebate. In this particular context the term refers to a small, identifiable groupof people whose preference may som etimes prevail in cases of differences overkey political issues. The share of power enjoyed by this group is considerablygreater than that available to other groups within the state. 6

The Jordanian political elite is made up of a principal decision-maker, aruling elite and a peripheral elite.


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The principal decision-makerJorda n's principal decision-maker is indisputably the m onarc h, particularly inthe spheres of inter-Arab affairs and foreign policy. Th is view is unanimouslyconfirmed by Jordan's political leadership.7 For exam ple, Abd ul Munim Rifaiconceded 'without hesitation' that King Hussein dominates Jordan's foreignpolicy.8 Since first ascending the throne the King's role as principal decision-maker has grown steadily. Nussaibah explains that 'up to 1957 and evenbeyond that to 1963-5 liberal democracy was developing and was extremelyimpo rtant. But then there was a definite shift in the location of decision-m akingin favour of the K ing '.9 By 1967 the King 's position as suprem e decision-makerwas a well-established fact. Before the de par ture of the British the K ing 's rolein the formulation of policy was limited. For examp le, King H ussein admitsthat until his Arabization of the army, every important decision taken by theruler was made in close consultation with either Glubb Pasha, the BritishAmbassador or other British officials.10 Nevertheless, even after the Arabi-zation of the army, power was not concentrated in the hands of the King.Nussaibah describes how, during the Suez crisis of 1956, King Husseinordered the army to march from Jenin into Israel in support of Egypt.However, 't he cabinet was then the centre of power and it refused to heed theKing's order'.11 The struggle between King Hussein and Prime MinisterNabulsi ended with the reins of power firmly in the grip of King H ussein, andby the 1960s he was involved in policy formulation at almost every level.

Hudson points out that while the office of monarch generates a certainstructural legitimacy, where King Hussein is concerned, 'the performance ofthe incumbent is more im po rta nt ' . u In th e Middle E ast the qualities which theleader should possess are an astute sense of the socio-political climate and adeductive capacity supported by an impeccable talent for synthesis andcourage. Of these qualities the most prom inent in Kin g H ussein are those ofcourage and an ability to respond to the prevailing socio-economic climate.From the start of his reign King Hussein has developed the image of acourageous leader who has no fear of death .13 He frequently declares that sincethe timing of one's death is preordained there is no point in fearing it. Forexample, he explains that his grandfather taught him 'the unimportance ofdeath and the inner peace granted to those who do not fear death'. 14 KingHussein dem onstrated his willingness to place himself in physically dang eroussituations by visiting the army camp of Zarqa in 1957, when rebellion wasbrew ing, and by his many visits to the front-line dur ing times of crisis. His loveof exhilarating sports such asflyingand racing add s to the impression that he isa courageous man. Such an image endears him to his subjects and has alsoimpressed W esterners. Some of the decisions taken by K ing Hu ssein show thathe also has the courage to make difficult decisions. H is dismissal of Su leiman


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Jordan in the 1967 warNabulsi's nationalist government in April 1957 and his confrontation with thePLO in September 1970 were actions which were bound to meet with fierceopposition from important sections of Arab society, but which the King felthad to be taken.King Hussein's sensitivity to the demands of the prevailing socio-politicalclimate is one of the factors which has he lped h im to stay in pow er. H is desire tokeep in touch with th e prevailing popu lar mood has been particularly impor-tant. Nussaibah explains that throughout the King's rule 'even though publicopinion and the factors that influence people are not formally included in thedecision-making process, they are taken into account and are present. Theyhave influenced every decision which King Hussein has taken'.15 The King'swillingness to respond to popu lar feeling was evident in his decision to dismissGlubb Pasha and to Arabize the army in 1956; his recognition of the PLO in1964; and his decision to form a military alliance with N asser shortly before theJune 1967 war. In each of these cases King Hussein recognized that failure toreact positively to the popular m ood would jeopardize the co ntinued existenceof the state.

Other factors have contributed to King Hussein's prominent position. Hestrives to make his rule appear as an expression of popular will by seeking tominimize the gap between himself and his subjects. For example, he prideshimself on his close relationship with his so ldiers16 and does his best to appearas a person with few privileges. Th e title of one of his boo ks, My Profession as aKing, emphasizes that he regards himself as an ordinary man w ith a very specialjob. In it he describes how he makes his own tea and lives a life which is not sodifferent from that of his subjects.17King Hussein also used public speaking as a means of communicating withhis subjects. Between January 1962 and December 1967 he delivered 154speeches - an average of two per m on th. Of these only eleven were addressedto parliament; forty-six were delivered at public rallies and twenty-nine werebroadcast on the radio. His speeches to the public generally seek to generatesupport and to reaffirm loyalty and allegiance to his person. They becomesignificantly more frequent in times of crisis. For example, on average KingHusse in speaks at public rallies aboutfive imes a year, but in 1963 and 1966 thenum ber increased to twelve a year. These years saw the war of words against theHashemites of Jordan by Syria, Egypt and the P LO . Th e increased nu mb er ofspeeches indicates that King Hussein responded by appealing directly to hispeople.In these speeches King Hussein addresses the nation as 'his Jordanianfamily' and refers to himself as the custodian of the Jordanian people. Thisreflects his attem pt to develop a populist ideology in which h e portrays himselfas the father of the nation who is responsible for the welfare of the Jordanianpeople. Hudson explains that, like other monarchs in the Arabian peninsula,


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The decision-making process in JordanTable I Speeches by King Hussein, January ig62-December ig6j

Year of speech196219631964196519661967Total

Parliament141212

11

Rallies5

1259

123

46

LocationRadio852545

29

Army431345

2 0

Foreign policy3498

101448

Total2 12818273i29

154

King Hussein has sought to legitimize the monarchy through 'the tradition ofKingsh ip . . . and an ideology emphasizing religious rectitude and kingshipobligation'.18 His use of a patriarchal style of authority is congruent with aculture in which 'the family is so central and revered and in which the fatherenjoys a high degree of deference from other members'. 1 9

It is useful to utilize the concept of three circles to describe the three majorareas in which King Hussein is actively involved in the Jordanian decision-making process. These are the local circle, the Arab circle and the foreigncircle. According to Abu Odeh the monarch is invariably involved in both theformulation and implementation of policy decisions in each of these areas. 20The extent of his involvement in the pre-decisional and post-decisional stagesvaries with each of the spheres.

In addition to the three circles, figure 1 shows four institutions whichtogether form the inner executive grou p. Th ese are the Prime Minister's office,the Royal Hashemite Diwan, the Cabinet and the Foreign Ministry. They areclassified on the basis of their position and influence in the ruling hierarchy.Th e army is a separate category and its position and influence w ill be dealt within the discussion of the subordinate institutional structure of the ruling elite.

The local circleThis is the area of internal affairs where theoretically the Prime Minister andhis Cabinet have full control over the formulation and execution of policy.However, from 1957 onwards King Hussein's influence over policy formula-tion in domestic affairs grew considerably. By the 1960s policy formulation inthe local circle was the result of consultations between the King, the PrimeMinister and the King's advisers. However, policy implementation remains thesphere of the government of the day. One way for the King to exercise hisinfluence over policy formulation is his Letter of Royal D ecr ee, w hich is issued


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Jordan in the 1967 war

KINGHUSSEIN

A R M Y

Direct relations- - Indirec t relations or occasional involvement

Figure 1. The three circlesby the Prime Minister at the beginning of each new government's period ofoffice. This Letter is the result of consultations between the incominggovernm ent and th e King and lays down policy guidelines. In m oments of crisisthe King m ay also take direct responsibility for decisions in the local circle. F orexample, he states: 'In 1966 I took into my own hands the personal responsi-bility of administering the Jordanian governm ent. No one else but me decidedto close down th e PL O offices in all of Jord an 's dis tric ts'. 21 How ever, even thisdecision was taken in consultation with the Prime Minister of the time, WasfiTa l. T hus , it would be true to say that in the local circle policy formulation isthe result of a liaison between the King and his government. The extent towhich each side predomina tes dep ends on the personality of the Prim e M inisterand the importance of the decision. Responsibility for policy implementationusually lies exclusively with the governm ent.


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The decision-making process in JordanTh e influence of the Prim e Minister and his Cabinet over the army is almostnegligible.22 They have no institutionalized authority over it and are notperm itted to interfere in its affairs in questions of policy, training or strategy.For example, the decision to allow an Egyptian General to command theJordanian forces a few days before the June was entirely King Hussein's. Asimilar situation prevails in relation to the security policy, although theexecutive is involved in the implem entation of the K ing's decisions throug h theMinistry of the Interior.

The Arab circleThe nature of King Hussein's involvement in inter-Arab affairs is closelyrelated to his status as a Hashemite . He sees himself as standing at the vanguardof 'the Arabs' great march in their sacred revolution under the leadership oftheir knight and pioneer Hussein Ben Ali'. He believes that 'from the minutethat the martyr-builder King A bdullah raised his standard high in the sky thiscountry became the focus of the aspirations and d reams for which the hearts ofthe Arabs have beaten over the y ears'. 23An Arab leader with such a strong sense of identity and such a belief inhis heroic role must inevitably find himself and his regime actively involvedin regional Arab affairs. This is reflected in the active role King Husseintook at the meetings of the Arab League and the summit meetings, whichwere the main forums for Arab affairs in the period between 1963 and1967.Th e extent to which K ing H ussein participates in the Arab circles dependson several factors. Abu Odeh points out that it is 'subject to variationdepending on the nature of the issue with which he is dealing'. It also dependson the 'particular Prime Minister in power and the nature of his relationshipwith the Kin g'.24 According to Abu O deh , in affairs relating to the Arab circle,the relationship between the King and his Prime Minister is 'more of aninteraction than a one-way system' at both the pre-decisional and post-decisio-nal stages. For example, while the decision to attend the summits initiated byNasser in 1963 was exclusively the K ing 's it was of direct concern to the Prim eMinister and his Cabinet at the post-decisional stage. The summits sawJordan's acceptance of the creation of a Palestinian entity (the PLO) and thePrime Minister, Bahjat Talhouni, became Jordan's representative at thefollow-up committee formed to implement this and other summit decisions.W here policy decisions in the A rab circle relate to b ilateral relations, the role ofthe Prime Minister and the Cabinet at the pre-decisional and post-decisionalstages is generally greater.The relationship between King Hussein and his executive in the Arab circleis highlighted by the experience of Wasfi Tal. In March 1967, as Arab-Israelitension grew, King Hussein found it imperative to move closer to Egypt. At


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Jordan in the 1967 warthat time T al was again Prim e Min ister. Since he represented an obstacle to therappro chem ent with Nasser, King Hussein removed him from office, replacinghim with Saad Juma'a who was more likely to be able to effect the requiredreconciliation. This example illustrates that if the Prime Minister is a strongfigure he is allowed considerable influence over the Arab circle. However, attime of crisis it is the K ing w ho is the final arbiter.The foreign circleAccording to Abu Odeh the area of foreign policy decision-making is 'almostentirely dominated by the K ing '.25 Th e exten t of his activity in this sphere fromthe 1960s onwards is illustrated by the fact that the monarch's foreign policyspeeches between 1962 and 1967 outnumbered those of every other category(table i). 2 6 One of the most important reasons for the emphasis King Husseingives to the formulation of foreign policy is that as the head of the state hisforemost concern is its survival. Since Jordan has always been heavilydependent on other nations, the survival of the Kingdom is closely tied toforeign affairs. Throughout his reign King Hussein has strived to maintain adialogue with both Western and Arab nations, and to establish good relationswith them . Since coming to the thro ne h e has developed his role as a diplom at,and by the mid-1960s the international press referred to him as 'the officialspokesman of the Arab world'. 27A second reason for the King's domination of the foreign circle is that hisposition as head of state since 1953 has allowed him to establish directcontact with leaders throughout the world. His long rule has resulted in anexpert knowledge of foreign affairs and he is therefore in a better positionthan any Jordanian politician to pursue J orda n's foreign policy aims. N um er-ous foreign policy decisions stem directly from the King, including thedecision to support Nasser in the 1956 Arab-Israeli war; the acceptance ofAmerican military aid in 1957; the calling in of British troops in 1958following the revolution in Iraq; the decision to sever relations with theFederal Republic of Germany in 1965; and the acceptance of United NationsResolution 242 in November 1967.Th e period after the 1967 war saw K ing H usse in's foreign policy activity atits height. At that time the King believed that the only way in which he couldhope to regain the West Bank was through diplomacy. Accordingly he visitedtwenty coun tries between th e end of Jun e and Novemb er 1967, travelling twiceto Europe, twice to America, and three times to Egypt 28 with the aim ofestablishing a Jordanian foreign policy which would take into account thepost-Ju ne w ar situation. His visits resulted in the formulation of five principlesthat constituted the basis of Jordan's foreign policy and played an influentialpart in the eventual formulation of United N ations Security Council Resolution242.8


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The ruling eliteZaid Rifai explains that 'Jordan has a highly personalized system of govern-ment in which decisions are made by the King, through the influence of theKing's advisers and in some cases by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. It isnot an institutionalized process. It is a fact of political life in Jo rdan that we donot have an institutionalized process of decision-m aking '.29 One of the reasonsfor this is tha t, in general, Jordan's ruling elite has been composed of the Kin g'smost trusted friends and aides. Th e influence of the Jord anian elite is based no ton office but on the personal influence its members have on the King. In AbuOdeh's view 'the Jordanian elite exercises the constraints that are usuallyexercised by institutions'.30 Its members operate as advisers and thus have aconstraining effect on the Jordan ian decision-making process which is compar-able to that exercised by parliament, pressure groups and Governmentalagencies in the West. In Jordan the main institutions in which these people arefound are the Prime Ministership, the Cabinet, the Royal Hashemite Diwan,the Foreign Ministry and the army. Each of these institutions is considered inturn below. The Crown Prince, the Kin g's shrewd and well-educated broth er,who belongs to this category since he is considered responsible for the cou ntry'seconomic and social development policies, is also regularly co nsulted by K ingHussein and acts as Regent in the K ing's absence.

In Jordan the participation of the subordinate authority (the state organs) inthe decision-making p rocess is limited to prov iding information and advice inthe pre-decisional stage and implem entation in the post-decisional stage. A ideswho are close to the King are generally influential at the pre-decisional stage.According to M arwan Al-Kassem, K ing H ussein debates the issue in questionwith his advisers, then gathers together the various points of view, evaluatesthem and finally decides what course of action to take .31 Th e final and ultimateauthority remains, all the time, with the central and dominant figure. KingHussein has initiated all of Jordan's major policies. Demands on the politicalsystem have been made directly to him and in general he has also fulfilled them .Nevertheless, the ruling elite has considerable importance as an instrumentof the state because of its ability to modify decisional outcomes through thecontrol of information, its advisory role to the m onarch and its influence as aresult of a particular method of decision-implementation.

The Prime MinisterWh en King H ussein first came to the thron e the Prime M inister had consider-able influence over Jordanian decision-making. Prime M inisters such as TawfiqAbul Huda, Samir Rifai, Ibrahim Hashim and Said Al-Mufti influenced thedecision-making process at pre - and post-decisional stages. Since they played avital part in the consolidation and preservation of Hash emite ru le following th e


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Jordan in the 1967 warassassination of King Abdullah, they were highly regarded by King Hussein.However, in the late 1950s the situation changed and the King played anincreasingly influential role. By the 1960s key decisions were invariably madeby him. This is not to say that from this time the Prime Minister's role wasreduced to that of executor but that his influence varied according to hispersonality, expertise and the importance of the decision. There is little doubtthat wh en Tal was Prim e Minister his strong personality had a powerful impacton the decision-making process. In the 1970s and 1980s a number of peoplewho had been the King's political advisers became Prime Ministers, includingZaid Rifai and Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf. Both these men had extensiveexperience in foreign affairs and consequently exercised considerable influenceover policy formulation at the pre-decisional stage. For example, the closerelations with Syria which were forged following the formation of Zaid Rifai'ssecond Cabinet in No vem ber 1974 culmina ted in formal negotiations for unionbetween the two countries. King Hussein and President Assad met severaltimes and the two states decided to form a unified political leadership whichwould co-ordinate political, economic and military affairs. This developmentwas strongly influenced by Zaid Rifai w ho sou ght to maintain the H ashem ite'straditional role of promoting Arab unity.

On e of the principal means by w hich th e Prime M inister exerts his influenceis the Cabinet Statement, which he delivers before parliament and whichoutlines the policies with which the government will concern itself. The morevital the decision the more likely it is that the influence of the King will beparamount. For example, in the spring of 1967 King Hussein becameincreasingly con cerned that the A rabs were heading for a military confrontationwith Israel. Accordingly, in April 1967 he placed in power a man who wouldpursue the foreign policy aims he desired. In a sense Juma'a gained officebecause of his willingness to im plem ent the K ing's desire to bring Jordan backinto the mainstream of Arab politics, which at that time meant aligning thenation with Egypt.The CabinetTh e paramount role of the King in the formulation of policy mea ns that the roleof the Cabinet is essentially executive. Its function is particularly curtailed inthe sphere of inter-Arab affairs. This is illustrated by the decision that Jordanshould join forces with Eg ypt at the end of May 1967. Nu ssaibah explains thatin reaching this vital decision 'constitutional institutions played a minimal -almost negligible - role. If I remem ber correctly, the Cabinet acceptedwhatever was said to it without much questioning. Its members thought theywere doing the right thing because they themselves were not properly briefedabout the military situation or had perhaps been misled by false information,either deliberately or out of ignorance.' 32

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The decision-making process in JordanIn the past, recruitmen t into the Cabinet was based on tradition. A part froma brief period between 1956-7 and the early 1960s Cabinet m embers tende d tobe drawn from families which had always been pro minent in the political, tribaland social spheres, and which had a tradition of loyalty to the monarch. At thetime of Ta i's first Cabinet in January 1962 this patte rn changed to one based onmerit rather than inheritance. Tal began to initiate into political life a numberof young, specialized technocrats who often lacked political experience. Theywere brou ght directly into political life at the level of Min ister by virtue of the irspecialized knowledge and skill. Their role was not one of policy formulation,which they had little control over, but one of policy execution. 'While theylacked the political expertise needed to formulate policy, King Hussein'sdirections to the Prime M inister were sufficient to set them on the right tra il.' 33Tal was particularly dem anding and those who did not meet his requ irementssoon found themselves out of office. In August 1962 he reshuffled his Cabinetand four ou t of the ten newly appointed ministers were replaced by six differentme n. Both K ing Husse in and Ta l showed a willingness to try out fresh person-nel and their impatience with the pace of development in the d epartm ents ofthe outgoing ministers illustrates the emphasis they placed on achievement.Qualities of specialized knowledge and proven administrative ability wererequired , although candidates still had to demon strate loyalty to the thron e.In the absence of political parties, those who are recruited into the executivebranch of the governm ent stay there because they accept their muted functionin the formulation of policy. Th is ensures that at the level of the executive thereis little conflict over broad policy outlines since its membersh ip is not involvedin their creation.The relationship between the Cabinet and the Prime Minister varies accord-ing to the personality and status of the latter. Th e experience and stron g leader-ship qualities of Prime Ministers such as Ibrahim Ha shim , Tawfiq Abul Hu daand Samir Rifai mean t tha t their C abinets enjoyed considerable influence overall aspects of policy formulation. Th is was accepted as normal by the m onarchfrom the time of King Abdullah to the early years of King H ussein's ru le. T henew generation of Cabinet Ministers lacked the same experience in the field offoreign affairs, particularly when compared with that enjoyed by KingHussein. Consequently, from the early 1960s Prime Ministers tended to limitthe role of their Ministers at the pre-decisional stage and instead concen tratedon their executive function. Th is trend has helped to create a special relation-ship between the King and the P rime M inister on the basis of the latter's abilityto offer the King advice at the pre-decisional stage in his individual capacity as aclose adviser rather than as the representative of a collective bod y. Th is was thecase with most Prim e Ministers of the 1960s and 1970s, including Bahjat T al-houni, Sharif Hussein Ben Nasser, Wasfi Tal, Saad Juma'a, Zaid Rifai andSharif Abdul H amid Sharaf.

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Jordan in the 1967 warThe Royal Hashemite DiwanPolitical observers of Jordan usually fail to examine the Royal HashemiteDiwan, although it can be as influential as the Cabinet. No comparableinstitution exists in the West. T he princ ipal function of the Diw an is to monitorpolicy implemen tation in the local circle. It also plays an importan t 'med iatingrole between [the monarch] and the Cabinet' 34 and has an advisory functionwhich is similar to that of the office of the White House Chief of Staff inAmerica. Depending on the personality and experience of the Chief of theDiwan, advice may be offered on domestic and foreign affairs at the pre-decisional stage.

The role of the Diwan as an executive council in a vital sector of domesticaffairs is one of its most important functions. The key personalities in theDiwan tend to belong to Jordan's traditional ruling families and are oftendrawn from prominent bedouin clans and tribes and social groups whichensures that the Diwan is an important source of support for the throne.Amongst the bedouin, King Hussein's image as patron-ruler has penetrateddeeply and he continues to fulfil the role established by his grandfather as a'super-tribal' leader, particularly over the tribal inhabitants of the East Bank.This is illustrated by the example of Talhouni who was Chief of the Diwan inthe late 1950s. When Nab ulsi's government challenged the status quo T alhounibrought together those groups which remained loyal to the throne in order toreaffirm their fealty to the King and to express their opposition to thenationalist pro-Nasser tren d led by N abulsi.In order to facilitate this function the D iwan con tains a department called theTribal Council whose task it is to liaise between the monarchy and the bedouin .Its importance is reflected in the fact that for many years it was led by theKin g's bro the r, Prince M uhamm ad. Trib al leaders consult its officials as oftenas once a week and King Hussein pays many visits to the tribal districts. TheCouncil serves to promote the loyalty of the bedouin and ensures that theCrown is in constant touch with events in the rural areas of the East Bank.Leaders of bedouin tribes also make frequent visits to the Diwan for variousreasons. F or examp le, they may want to reaffirm their allegiance to the King ormake requests for assistance or greater government attention to their tribe ordistrict.Th e Diwan also allows the monarch to keep in touch with even ts taking placein rural areas and with the mood of important sections of the population.Ordinary people are also able to visit the Chief of the Diwan in order to talkabout their problems, and they may even request an audience with the King.Generally, the Chief of the Diwan is available to anyone who wan ts to see him .Such people include individuals from all walks of life who may wish to talkabout events in their sect, tribe or kin-group. As a result of this liaison th e K inghas succeeded in establishing a special relationship with the rural p opulation to

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The decision-making process in Jordanthe extent that the inhabitan ts have an almost personal affection for him . T hisis reflected in the fact that m any do no t call the Kin g by his name or title but byan endearing adaptation of the Islamic sobriquet 'Sayyidna', which may betranslated into English as 'Sir'.It is obvious from this that the position of Chief of the Royal HashemiteDiwan is influential since the incumbent is the main aide to the King.According to Abu Odeh 'the Chief of the Diwan acts as a bridge between theKing and the Prime Minister'. 35 This means that he is in close contact withboth men and forms a close relationship with them. He also gains insight intothe role played by the Prime M inister. C onsequently the Chief of the Diwan isalways a potential candidate for th e Prem iersh ip. Since the early 1960s most ofthose who have been Chiefs of the Diwan have gone on to become PrimeMinisters and vice versa. This was the case with Bahjat Talhouni, Wasfi Tal,Saad Juma'a, Sharif Hussein Ben Nasser, Ahmed Louzi, Zaid Rifai, SharifAbd ul Ham id Sharaf and others. Each of these men played an influential role inthe formulation of policy at the pre-decisional stage, particularly in domesticaffairs. In some cases the Chief of the D iwan has ex tended his role into foreignaffairs if he is particularly well qualified in that sp here . T his w as the case withMarwan Al-Kassem who had been Foreign M inister and Sharif Abdul H amidSharaf who had been Jordan's Permanent Representative at the UN.

It should be noted th at the framework of the D iwan also includes the post ofthe Minister of the Royal Cou rt. T he occupant of this post is usually a mem berof the ruling elite who acts as a trusted and senior aide to the King. In thiscapacity he serves as the main political adviser to the King and carries out acertain amou nt of diplomacy as his delegate. H e may carry impo rtant letters ormessages to other heads of state. He is therefore an influential figure at thepre-decisional stage of policy formulation and is often concerned with foreignaffairs.The Foreign MinistryTh e Foreign Ministry of Jord an does not function as an advisory institution inthe formulation of foreign policy bu t as an executive organ of the G overnmentand the King. Zaid Rifai explains that Jordan depends on diplomacy for theformulation of its foreign policy and 'this is done through the person of theKing. He is our chief diplomat and our foreign policy is dominated by him'.36According to Abdul M unim Rifai, who was Foreign Minister for a num ber ofyears, 'at the pre-decisional stage the King directs the Minister in theformulation of policy and the Minister then implements it'. 3 7

The F oreign M inistry's limited role is reflected in the fact th at in the criticalyears of the summits between 1964 and 1966 it barely participated in the majordecisions. King Hussein was the most active participant and formulator offoreign policy. Many of his decisions were not the result of consultations w ith13


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Jordan in the ig6j warhis advisers but were made on-the-spot at the summit conference table. Suchdecisions included recognition of the PLO, recognition of the republicanregime of Yemen, and Jordan's participation in the Unified Arab Command.Th e same patte rn occurred after the 1967 war when K ing Hussein travelled theworld in search of a peace formula which would result in the retu rn of the WestBank to Jordan.Unlike many developed nations where the appo intment of Ambassador is th eresponsibility of the Foreign Minister, in Jordan they are appointed by KingHu ssein. T his weakens the influence of the Foreign M inister and increases thatof the King. Ambassadors' reports are sometimes sent directly to the Kingrather than to the Foreign Ministry, which further dilutes its influence.Although the K ing does not necessarily examine these repo rts himself, they fallout of the orbit of the Foreign M inistry.

A large proportion of Jordan 's information gathering activity is conducted byagencies other than the Foreign M inistry. Nussaibah explains that the F oreignMinistry 'competes with other agencies as a specialized institution for thedissemination of information'.38 These include the General IntelligenceDe partm ent , which is concerned with security, the monitoring service of RadioJordan, the reports of Ambassadors and army commanders, and the dailybulletins of the information service of the Royal Hashemite Diwan. Theexistence of these diverse sources of information dilutes a fundamental functionof a foreign ministry - the research, analysis and distribution of information.One of the most important of these rival institutions is the Ministry ofInformation. Abu Odeh explains its role:

The Ministry of Information deals with public information and public material. Anyinformation reflecting new political trends or ind ications relating to Jo rdan or the regionin general is reported by the Ministry through the Minister of Information to the PrimeMinister, the Cabinet, the Royal Hashemite Diwan, and in some cases, directly to theKing. At the Ministry there are direct telephone communications to Governmentinstitutions, the Royal Hashemite Diwan and Army GHQs. If the matter is not veryurgent than it may be reported through a written report to some or all of the above. Forthis reason, the role played by the Ministry and the Minister has an important politicalcontent.39

King H ussein appoints personnel outside the F oreign M inistry to engage indiplomacy or other activity which is normally the domain of the ForeignMinistry. For example, when the King was anxious to effect a reconciliationwith Nasser in May 1967 he did not send h is Foreign M inister to Cairo but hisChief of Staff. Th e K ing may sometimes use the Chief of the Royal Hashem iteDiwan or the Minister of the Royal Court to conduct similar diplomatic tasks.It is important to note that the role of the Foreign M inister in Jordan dependson the personality of the Foreign M inister and his relationship with the K ing aswell as the policy objectives of the period. If the Foreign Minister is highly14


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The decision-making process in Jordanrespected by the King or possesses certain qualities he may have considerableinfluence on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. AbdulMunim Rifai explains that these qualities may be those of 'special knowledge,expertise or experience, which are highly regarded by the King who at timesseeks the advice of the Foreign Minister'. 40Abdu l Mun im Rifai's experience as Foreign Minister between 1967 and 1970provides an example of the way in which the Foreign Minister sometimesinfluences th e formulation of foreign policy. Rifai explains that in this period inwhich negotiations with the UN M ediator, Gunar Jarrin g, over the implemen-tation of Security Council Resolution 242 were taking place, the ForeignMinister and the Prime Minister 'had full authority and exercised considerableinfluence over the formulation of policy. Th e K ing used to be informed of whatwas happening and we reported to him or asked for his directions, bu t we didnot refer to him for the details'. 41 This illustrates that the influence of theForeign M inistry is subject to three factors: the issue at ha nd , the status of theincumb ent and the trend prevailing at the time.

Zaid Rifai points out th at 'T he Minister has access to the King who listens tohim. He can argue his case. But the degree of influence he has depends on hiscalibre. This is why the success or failure of Governments here is a highlypersonal ma tter'.42 One of the reasons why the system works is that the F oreignMinister is almost invariably draw n from the top levels of Jordanian society andtherefore tends to share the same outlook as King Hussein. This means thatthere is often a strong coincidence of views.Th e role of the F oreign M inister also depends on the political requiremen tsof the day. For example, in 1966 when Jordan was in need of friends in the A rabworld Akram Zu'aiter was chosen for the post of Foreign Minister. His taskwas to carry the King's messages and to establish closer links with Arabnations, particularly those in North Africa.

The armyIn systems w here elites, ideologies, institutions an d social processes have beeninstitutionalized over a long period of time, the oscillation between legitimateauthority and coercive control is limited. In democratic, constitutional andpluralistic states the possibility that the state will have to revert to the use offorce to impose its authority is remote. Dekmejian explains that 'in consti-tutional systems such as the USA and B ritain th e likelihood of a major declinein the legitimacy variable in relation to tha t of force is almost negligible, exceptin rare mom ents of great crisis'. 43 On the other han d, the frequency, m agnitudeand consequences of a fall in elite legitimacy in many developing nations aremore common occurrences because of the weakness of new or importedideologies, institutions and social processes. Some of these weaknesses can berelated to problems of poverty; class and racial divisions; ethnic differences;15


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Jordan in the ig6j warregional variations; poor com munications; and th e absence of an efficient civilservice, which hamper the process of social integration necessary for thebuilding of a nation in the Third World.44 For this reason in such countriesforce is often used as a means of controlling and in many cases, ma intaining , theintegrity of the state. A case in point is Jordan's experience of the civil war in1970. Dekmejian p oints out that 'the force com ponen t is held in reserve to pu tdown marginal opposition elements if the need arises'. 45 This has occurred anumber of times in Jordan, for example, after the Nabulsi Cabinet crisis of1957 and after the Israeli raid on the village of Samu in 1966.

Because of its critical role in the maintenance of the state, Jordan's rulershave always ensured that m embers of the army enjoy privileged status. 46 By the1960s the army had an extensive welfare service, including education, housingand m edical facilities and the provision of generous financial allowances. 'Th earmy ... receives generous patronage, salaries and other benefits and theregime makes a special effort to emphasise [its] potential status by giving [its]representatives privileged access to the palace'. 47 King Hussein has alwaystaken a special interest in the army and had m ade every effort to build on thepre-existing loyalty of its troops. Lt General Amer Khammash points out thatthe K ing displays 'a large degree of camaraderie and addresses every soldier byhis first nam e as if he know s them all '.48 In retu rn th e soldiers address him as'Sayyidna'. K ing H ussein makes frequent visits to army u nits where he meetsmany of the soldiers. He is also in close contact with senior army personnelthrough visits to army GHQs, where he is kept informed of all relevantdevelopments.

As Supreme Comm ander King H ussein has complete control over the army.In domestic affairs this control is exercised in consultation with his GeneralStaff, bu t in foreign affairs decisions affecting the army are made by him alone.The most striking example of this was at the end of May 1967 when KingHussein agreed to place the army und er th e comm and of the Egyptian G eneralAbdul M unim Riad. A lthough the army is the mainstay of the government itsofficers do not determine policy. This coalescence of political leadership andcontrol of the means of coercion is one of the reasons for the stability ofHashemite rule in Jordan. Army officers may act as executors of governmentpolicy but they do not formulate it.

Recruitment into the army and promotion of senior personnel up itshierarchy may be subject to the approval of the m onarch. Th e H ashemites ofJordan have generally favoured bedouins because of their loyalty to the Kingand they form the hard core of the army. Even in the 1960s loyalty was a keyqualification of recruitment and promotion, and if a candidate was exception-ally competent but his loyalty was in doubt he found his path blocked.Promotion to the highest echelons of the army has always been dependent onthe will of the K ing. Th us , the rise to power of Ali Abu Nuwar from Major to16


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The decision-making process in JordanMajor General and his appointment as Chief of Staff was at King Hussein'sinstigation. The importance of loyalty is also reflected in the fact that some ofthe King's most senior and highly trusted army Generals never retire frompublic service, except for reasons of age. A number have been absorbed intopolitical service through the Royal Hashem ite Diwan or the H ouse of Notables(The Senate). For example, in 1967 Habes Majali was appointed Minister ofDefence and later became a member of the House of Notables. After the 1967war Sharif Nasser Ben Jamil and (in 1979) Lt General Muhammad Idriss wereappointed military advisers to the King in the D iwan. Oth ers serve the K ing ashis close advisers. For example, Khammash was Minister of the Royal Courtfor m any years. Because the Kin g's relatives are assumed to be loyal supportersof the throne they tend to rise in the army's hierarchy swiftly. Sharif NasserBen Jamil, the uncle of the King, was Commander-in-Chief of the army formany years, and the presen t Com mander-in-Chief, his cousin Sharif Zeid BenShaker, is considered to be one of his close advisers.

The political elite (the peripheral elite)Th e influence of the political elite is exercised e ither ind ividually or collectivelyin a consultative capacity and frequently expresses trends in public opinion.This group includes members of the House of Deputies (Parliament), theHouse of Notables (the Senate) and religious, social and tribal leaders.Although the parliamentary system of Jordan appears to be structurallysimilar to those of W estern dem ocracies, the power of the Jordan ian parliamentis limited by the power of the monarch to summon, prorogue and dissolveparliament, and to rule by decree for limited periods. The existence of theUpper House (the House of Notables) also enhances the power of the Kingsince its members are appointed by him . Its mem bers are generally the leadersof tribal, social and religious communities as well as ex-Prime Ministers,ex-M inisters, retired army comm anders and civil servan ts. Their duties includeparticipating in ceremonial occasions, such as welcoming visiting dignitaries,and travelling as representatives of the Jordanian parliament to foreign n ations .They also debate issues and policies of the day, although they have noinstitutionalized power to implement their conclusions.Th e abo lition of political parties in 1957 has also meant tha t most members ofthe House of Deputies who are elected are already members of the estab-lishment who support the status quo. They are elected on the basis of theirtribal, family, sect or ethnic allegiance or on their prom inent econom ic, socialor academic position. Their interests are therefore tied to those of the rulingelite to which they either belong or with which they have extensive ties. Forthese reasons the influence of the Jordanian parliamen t on the formulation andimplementation of foreign policy is limited. Instead it operates as a platform for

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Jordan in the 1967 warthe discussion of important issues and presents opinions which tend to reflectpublic feeling and by this m eans influences the nation's leaders.

Within these limitations, the Jordanian parliament has certain spheres ofinfluence. The Jordanian Constitution enables parliament to conduct votes ofconfidence in the Government and provides for the impeachment of Ministers.Thus, on 20 April 1963 Samir Rifai's new Cabinet failed to gain a vote ofconfidence and was forced to resign the following day. There have also beenoccasions when the King and his Prime Minister have had difficulty inimplementing their policies. For example, Wasfi Tal's support of the deposedImam of Yemen against the Egyptian-supported republican regime wasopposed by the majority of parliamentarians. Parliament's view reflected thatof public opinion and Tal had considerable difficulty in gaining parliamentaryconfidence. Accordingly, on 1 October 1962, less than eight months after theformation of his first Cabinet, Tal was forced to ask the King to dissolveparliament because of non-co-operation between the legislature and theGovernment. Parliamentary opposition was one of the factors behind KingHussein's apparently abrupt reversal of Jordan's policy in Yemen in 1964.

Parliament also possesses som e financial control over the Governm ent's fiscalpolicies. All appropriations of Government Ministries and Departments arestrictly controlled by parliament through its specialized finance com m ittee. Itshould also be noted that in spite of parliament's limited control of theexecutive the fact that the monarch and his ruling elite have gone so far ingiving the country a constitutional and parliamentary system is an indication ofthe importance attached to democratic values. The ideology of popularparticipation is strong in Jordan and cannot be ignored. King Hussein'sattempt to liberalize the political system soon after he came to the thronereflects his recognition of the need to democratize it as much as possible,although this proved impossible without threatening the survival of the state.Th is is particularly the case in dom estic affairs as the issue of Sam u was to sh owat the end of 196 6. Popular sentiment expressed through parliament and p ublicdisturbances played a significant role in influencing the decision that Jordanshould participate in the 1967 war.

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Chapter 2

The principles and practice of Jordanian foreignpolicy

King Hussein's values and images and their relationship w ith Jordan'sforeign policy aimsIn view of the central role played by King Hussein in the formulation ofJordan's foreign policy throughout the period leading up to the 1967 war it isuseful to examine the values and images which influence him. These are: hisHashemite heritage; his commitment to Arabism; his commitment to Arabsolidarity and co-operation; his commitment to the cause of Palestine; hiscommitment to the West and antagonism to communism. A further pointexamines Jordan's foreign policy aim of survival, which at times overrides allothers because without the survival of the state all the other values aremeaningless.King Hussein's Hashemite heritageIn a sense all King Hu ssein's values can be seen to be rooted in his Hashe miteheritage. The Hashemites have stood for, inter alia, Arab unity and co-operation, comm itment to the needs of the Palestinian people and comm itmentto the W est. All of these have been central elements of Jord an 's foreign policyaims from the time of King H ussein's accession to the throne until the presentday. K ing H ussein's image of himself as a Hashemite and great-grandson of theman who instigated and led the G reat Arab Revolt is therefore one of the keys tounderstanding the objectives behind Jord an's attitude to other Arab cou ntries.King Hussein was strongly influenced by his grandfather King Abdullah andwas 'brought up to believe in the manifest destiny of the Hashemite family'. 1Prime Minister Zaid Rifai and Nussaibah confirm that the King is acutelyaware that his heritage has imposed on him a total commitment to the ideals forwhich his family has strug gled.2 According to Zaid R ifai the K ing believes histask 'is not limited to the service of his Jordanian people but encompasses alarger Arab ro le'.3 Abu Odeh also points out that King Hu ssein's awareness ofhis Hash emite heritage is coloured by a sense of his family's tragic misfortune.Sharif Hussein was driven out of the Hijaz, King Faisal was executed in Iraq

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Jordan in the ig6j warand King Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem. The King feels that as thelast ruling H ashem ite the b urden of fulfilling the values they stood for rests onhis shoulders.4Desp ite his Hashem ite heritage King Hussein has not automatically receivedlegitimacy as a ruler, particularly in relation to other Arab states, nor has itguaranteed the survival of his regime. On the co ntrary , it has been th e cause ofconsiderable criticism and suspicion by radical Arab states and was a majorfactor behind political instability from which Jordan suffered in the periodprior to the 1967 war. King Hussein came to power at a time when Arabnationalist feeling and antagonism to Western imperialism was becoming anincreasingly potent force. H e found himself in a position of dependency on theWest yet a vociferous element of his population demanded an end to thatdepen dency . I t was an age of revolution in which the Jordanian regime was inopposition to the m ood of the time.

The Hashemites have traditionally stressed the need for moderation in thepolitical arena and this is something th at has been continued by King H usse in.At Arab political meetings, particularly at summits, he has exercised amoderating and stabilizing influence that helped shape final decisions andserved to temper calls from radical Arab states for sharp provocative actionagainst Israel. King Hussein has maintained that this attitude of moderation isessential if the Arab world is to maintain its integrity. 5In the 1950s and early 1960s the King's moderate stand, his regime'sdependency on the West and the rebellious mood of the times, together withthe claim tha t Jordan was unviable as a state, were used by the Ba'ath regime inSyria and Nasser in Egypt as the basis of their propaganda campaign againstKing Hussein. C ertain Arab leaders even went so far as to regard the ov erthrowof King Hussein as a necessary preliminary step before the liberation ofPalestine could be contemplated.6 This acted as a major constraint on theability of the King to implement Jordan's foreign policy.

Commitment to ArabismThe concept of Arab unity covers many different forms and although mostArab leaders shared a com mitment to the ideal, they differed over the methodby which it should be realized. K ing H ussein believed that the Arab world has'as its objective a broader nationalism which, w hile preserving the integrity ofthe various Arab states, looks towards the eventual amalgamation of them into alarge wh ole',7 bu t he saw this as a slow evolution in which political unity wasthe last step.The King envisaged an initial period of close co-operation in the cultural,economic and military fields between the four Arab geographical units of theFertile Crescent, the Arabian p eninsula, the N ile valley and the M aghreb. His20


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Jordanian foreign policyidealism was mingled with a conviction that his regime could not exist inisolation from the Arab world; this gave him a realism that was not alwaysacceptable to the more radical Arab leaders, who advocated an immediateorganic unity at the p olitical, social and economic levels.King Husse in believed tha t all activities aimed at achieving th is goal shouldbe undertaken 'through an active, respected Arab League in which equalityand sincerity of joint purpose would be assured and in which danger ofdomination by any member of the family would be elim inated'.8 His belief tha tthe Arab League was the anvil on which Arab nationalism must be forgedreflects his pragm atic approach as mu ch as his desire to preserve his regime inthe face of the revolutionary tide .

Until the early 1970s Arab differences over how Arab unity should beachieved were the cause of considerable strife in Jo rdan. Radical states such asEgypt, Syria and Iraq argued that Jordan's dependency on the West wasincompatible with King Hussein's commitment to Arab unity, and he wasaccused of being 'a force actively working to underm ine radical Arab na tionalistcauses'.9 This claim formed one of the major constraints on Jordan's foreignpolicy activity in the period leading up to the 1967 war, even though itconflicted with the way in which King Hussein quickly accepted Nasser's callfor an Arab summit in 1963.Arab solidarity and co-operationAs a short-term foreign policy objective King Hussein has always regardedArab solidarity as the best means of serving the interests of the Arab people.Jordan's vulnerable geographical position has made its ruling elite acutelyaware of the dangerous effects of inter-Arab conflict. Jordan has the longestborder with Israel and its military capability is considerably weaker thanIsrael's (see table 6). For this reason, under King H ussein the ruling elite triedto follow a policy of relying on 'joint A rab action and on being part of a largerregional body to enable [Jordan] to survive'.10

However, Jordan's ability to implement this policy was limited. Althoughvirtually every Arab leader in the 1950s and 1960s professed his comm itment tothe ideal of Arab un ity the reality was different. Th e A rab world was split notonly between radical and reactionary camps, but within those camps them-selves. No genuine movement of regional co-operation emerged and on thewhole Jordan remained isolated.In sp ite of these problems K ing Hussein co ntinued to emphasize the need topursue the ideal of Arab co-operation and his foreign policy activities con-stantly demonstrated his desire to achieve this. This is illustrated by hisresponse to Nasser's appeal that Arab nations should sever diplomatic relationswith the F ederal R epub lic of Germany in retaliation for its arms deal with Israel

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Jordan in the 1967 w arin 1965. Nussaibah, who was Foreign Minister at the time, explains thatalthough the King was 'vehemently opposed' to such a move his desire toco-operate with his Arab brethren eventually led to his decision to agree toNasser's request.11 Th e same pattern occurred at the Arab summ its of 1964 and1966 when King Hussein accepted many changes in Jordan's foreign policy.More than anything else, inter-Arab co-operation through the summitconcept came as a total vindication of King Hussein's evolutionary view ofachieving the ultimate goal of Arab unity. He sought to achieve fraternalrelations , full Arab co-operation, support for the Arab L eague and to safeguardthe right of every Arab country to organize its internal affairs and choose thesocial system that suits its own circumstances and national interests. TheGuardian newspaper went so far as to describe the King as the 'most diligentapostle of the spirit of inter-Arab co-operation to which [the Cairo summit]gave birth'.12

The King's commitment to inter-Arab co-operation was well rewarded bythe establishment of the Unified Arab Command to which Jordan subscribedwith enthusiasm. This was part of a programme for the mobilization andintensification of Arab efforts to arrive at the necessary position of strength fordecisive action on the q uestion of Arab rights in Palestine. T o Jordan th e mainbenefit resulting from the establishment of the UAC was the plan which gaveJordan the opportunity to build up its military capability and the power toenable the Jordanian armed forces to resist armed aggression.Com mitment to the cause of PalestineThe creation of the state of Israel at the expense of the Palestinian people randirectly against the Hashemite call for Arab self-determination and unity. ToSharif Hussein and his descen dan ts, Palestine and Transjordan were one entitywhich together constituted part of Greater Syria. In King Hussein's view theSharif 'practically abdicated his throne ... because he could not bring himselfto accept an alienation of Palestine from the rest of the A rab hom elan d'. 13 Froman early age King Hussein learn t to view the issue of Palestine as one of the mostimportant and serious of his concerns. The search for a solution favourable tothe Palestinians became an integral part of his value system.

Th e K ing's intense involvement with the issue of Palestine was also the resultof the incorporation of the West Bank into Jordan. This had far-reachingrepercussions on Jordanian society which could not be ignored. The refugeeproblem was enorm ous. In May 1967 there were 722,687 registered refugees inJordan. While the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)provided them with some of their needs, it was far from adequate. TheAgency's 1965-6 report candidly states that its ration scales 'provide abouttwo-thirds of the normal intake of a poor Middle Easterner'.14 Consequently22


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Jordanian foreign policythe refugees became dependent on Jordan 's meagre economic resources. The rewere also many refugees without refugee status whose plight was even moredesperate. In the two decades following the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 theJordan ian K ingd om 's failure to integrate fully the Palestinian refugees into thenation resulted in an insoluble problem for the government. Their miserablestate and subsequent bitterness made them susceptible to the propaganda ofradical Arab states such as Egypt and S yria, with resulting sporadic civil un rest.

There were also important ideological differences between King Hussein'sinterpretation of a just solution to the problem and that of other factions in th eArab world. T he H ashem ites' espousal of the Palestinians had been based noton Palestinian self-determination but on Arab self-determination. It thereforedid not preclude the absorption of Palestine into a larger Arab entity such asJord an. Th is view was in contrast with that of the radical Arab states and someelements of the Palestinian people who were dedicated to establishing aPalestinian state.Despite these disagreements, from the start of his reign King H ussein madeconsiderable efforts to help the Palestinian people living in Jordan. Upontaking up his constitutional duties in 1953 he carried out an extensiveprogramme of visits to all parts of the country, including refugee centres,particularly on the West Bank. The purpose of these visits was to meet hisPalestinian subjects and to learn about their needs and aspirations. AbdulRaouf Fares , the late MP for Na blu s, recalls that the King was appalled at theplight of the Palestinian refugees and was determined to help them as mu ch ashe could. He remembers that at almost all meetings with West Bank leadersand refugee representatives at the Royal Palace and elsewhere the King made apoint of hearing about the problems the refugees faced and how the variousgovernment bodies were dealing with them .15 Where possible he tried to findan immediate solution to problems that had appeared intractable. For example,at that time Palestinians wanting to travel to other Arab countries, such asSaudi Arabia, had difficulty in obtaining visas, particularly when they were

either known as, or suspected of being, political activists. W hen the K ing learntof this he instructed the Minister of the Interior to make it possible forPalestinians to obtain work abroad with the minimum of bureaucratic pro-cedure.Fares also confirms that King Hussein's visits to Gulf states have helped tofacilitate and ease recruitment procedures for his subjects who have soughtemployment there.16 For exam ple, before the King 's intervention, Jordaniansof Palestinian origin had to include in their applications for employment a'Certificate of Good Conduct and Behaviour' as a precondition for beinggranted a residence or work p erm it. In effect this amounted to the screening ofall Palestinians who wished to travel to the Gulf states. As a result of the King'sefforts, the General Intelligence Department, whose task it was to issue these

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Jordan in the 1967 warcertificates, limited its strict control pro cedures to those Palestinians who wereknown to be a security risk.However, these attempts to ease the lot of the Palestinians were over-shadowed by the conflict that resulted from their desire to fight for theirhomeland. The fact that many of the refugees were within striking distance oftheir usurped homes and land made raids on Israeli territory inevitable. Israelrespond ed with a policy of massive retaliation which caused deep d istress to theinhabitants of Jordan. There was also the ever-present fear that Israel wouldinvade the West Bank if it felt that these incursions had reached an intolerablelevel.For these reasons King Hussein was sometimes forced to take a repressivestand against his Palestinian sub jects. Th is happened in 1955, 1957? 1963 and1966 when h e used the arm y to impose law and order by force .17 Despite this,his desire to find a just solution to the Palestine problem continued and was oneof the reasons for his acceptance of the creation of the P LO at the Cairo summ itin 1964.Anti-communist and pro-Western stanceKing Hussein has demonstrated his commitment to the West many timesduring his reign. H is antagonism to communism has been as pronounced as hiscommitment to the West. In his open letter to Prime Minister Nabulsi inFebruary 1957 the King issued a warning that he would not tolerate pro-communist activity. It was followed shortly afterwards by a ban on all forms ofcommunist literature. King Hussein believed that the communist bloc had along-term strategy to destroy small and vulnerable countries such as Jordanbecause of their strategic value to the West.

The Hashemites' tendency to lean towards the West has its roots in SharifHussein's battle against the Ottomans on the side of the Allied Forces in theFirst World War. This pattern was continued by his sons. Both King Faisaland King Abdullah were allies of Britain and generally co-operated with theWestern pow ers. Although the collapse of the Ottom an E mp ire led to a strugglefor power in the Middle East which brought the Hashemites into conflict withthe British, they eventually compromised with them and were ultimatelysupported by them in Transjordan and Iraq.The second reason for King Hussein's positive attitude to the free world ishis adherence to the religion of Islam. H is faith in Islam makes him antagonisticto communism because of communism's denial of the existence of God. Heargues that 'the re can be no life for Arabism under the alternative to freedom -local or world-wide communism' because 'communism denies all faiths andthus the very principle on which Arab nationalism is based '.18 Sharif Hussein'sfervent belief in the teachings of Islam formed the foundation of his leadership

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Jordanian foreign policyof the Great Arab Revolt and of his refusal to accept the Ottomans as therightful heirs to the Caliphate. As the Sharif's direct descendant it is onlynatural that King Hussein should believe that the future of Arabism cannot beisolated from the values and teachings of Islam.Finally, King Hussein's pro-Western attitude has been reinforced by thepoor state of Jordan's economy, its vulnerability to Israeli attack and itsisolation from its powerful Syrian and E gyptian ne ighb ours. These factors havemade it dependent on external military and financialsupp ort. Because the Arabworld has never been able to provide Jordan with the support it needed, theHa shem ites' traditional association with the West made King H ussein turn to itfor aid.SurvivalJordan's vulnerable position is such that its survival is the principal foreignpolicy objective to which all the above aims are subject. Many of the valuesenshrined in its foreign policy aims have been forced aside at various po ints as aresult of threats to Jordan's existence. For example, Jordan's alliance with theWest in defiance of the K ing 's com mitment to Arab solidarity was the result ofthe state's need for financial and military support. Even at the height ofanti-British feeling King Hussein was reluctant to end the treaty with Britainbecause he feared that it would deprive him of the British subsidy at a timewhen no alternative was available.

Th e same principles of Arab un ity and co-operation were cast aside in favourof Western support when King Hussein called in the British in 1958. With thedestruction of the Hashemite regime in Iraq, King Hussein was left without anally in the Arab world. In the circumstances h e had no choice but to tu rn to theWest for support. In 1964 King Hussein's antagonism to communism wasoverlooked when he joined the non-aligned movement. Support for the Westwas cast aside when Jo rdan formed a military alliance with Egypt at the end ofMay 1967. In September 1970 King Hussein's opposition to the PLO led tocivil war when radical Palestinian organizations began to threaten the existenceof his regime. It is apparen t from these examples that survival lies at the heart ofKing Hussein's foreign policy objectives and the weight given to each one isjuggled according to the realities of the situation.The underlying reason for this unfortunate situation is Jordan's precariousposition. This was particularly the case before the June war. Until 1967, inaddition to its financial problems, Jordan was hemmed in by hostile neigh-bours. In the 1950s and 1960s it was threatened by Israel, Egypt and Syria.After 1958 it was threaten ed by Iraq and prior to that by Saudi Arabia. If theJordanian governm ent allowed raids into Israel to take place, it risked massiveretaliation and the possibility of invasion. If it weighed too heavily on the

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Jordan in the 1967 warPalestinians and failed to respond aggressively to Israe l's threats it was subjectto violent propaganda campaigns by radical Arab states which were designed toundermine its leadership and lead to revolution. If it failed to co-operate withthe Arab world the risk of revolution increased, yet if it did co-operate therisk of Israeli invasion increased. Heavily dependent for its survival on subsi-dies from the Western world Jordan could not afford to align itself too closelywith the revolutionary Arab regimes, yet neither could it afford to alienatethem. Such has been Jordan's position and it is against these conflicting,contradictory and tempestuous forces that its foreign policy activities shouldbe placed.

The pursuit of Jordan's foreign policy aimsAmong the instruments used by countries to pursue their foreign policy aimsare those of diplomacy, clandestine activities, propaganda, the threat of forceand the use of force. This section examines Jordan's use of these mechanismsbetween 1955 and 1967.DiplomacyDiplomacy is a central instrument used by countries to implement theirforeign policy. It is particularly important to Jordan because the nation'simpoverished state means that it has few alternative instruments of foreignpolicy implementation. In many cases, for example, when seeking financialaid, diplomacy has been the only instrument available to it. For this reasonKing Hussein has always laid great emphasis on diplomacy and over the yearshas developed his diplomatic role to the full. Zaid Rifai remarks that 'becauseof the constraints upon our country and geographical position, because of therelative weakness of the country compared to most of its neighbours, wedepend mostly on diplomacy and this is done through the person of theKing'.19

King H ussein has consistently sought to keep open the channels of comm u-nication between himself and his critics within the A rab world. H is willingnessto meet other Arab leaders and to attend conferences has been demonstratedthroughout his reign and has contributed to the survival of his regime becauseit has minimized the extent to which Jordan is isolated. As the King'sbehaviour at the summ its of 1962-6 illustrated, his diplomatic activity displaysaflexibilitywhich has enabled him to effect rad ical policy changes when failureto do so might have resulted in a serious threat to Jordan's political stability.King Hussein's diplomatic activities have become increasingly importantover the years. In 1964 the Guardian described the monarch as the 'diplomatistextraordinary of Arab brotherhood - and on the international as well as the

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Jordanian foreign policyArab front'.20 By developing his diplomatic role to the full the King haspursued his desire to serve as an advocate for the Arab cause.Since his first visit to America in 1959 King Hussein has dealt with eightAmerican Presidents and he visits the USA at least once a year. Zaid Rifaibelieves that in the 1960s the King 'appeared to the Americans as the young,courageous, sporting, and what was most important - moderate - King,surrounded by an ocean of extremism, radicalism and hostility to the West.This made him the odd-man-out in the Arab world and the Americans couldidentify with that'. However, Rifai goes on to argue that 'when it came to thecrunch and Jo rdan sought su ppo rt against Israel, for exam ple, all these factorssimply vanished'.21

In the previous chapter it was explained that although the role of Jordan'sambassadors is often limited to routine bureaucratic w ork and th e gathering ofinformation, they are sometimes of vital importance in bilateral relations. Forexample, in the mid-1970s the then-ambassador to Syria, Nabih Nimr, wasinstrumental in implementing Zaid Rifai's policy of re-establishing cordialrelations between the Jordan ian and Syrian gov ernm ents. N im r's efforts playedan important part in terminating the long-running feud between the twocountries and in the establishment of an unprecedented level of co-operation.As a result King Hussein paid several visits to Damascus and also re

Documents

Jordan in the 1967 War