Jonathan Battat Oleg Alifanov, Robert Braun, Edward ... · Capparelli, Peter Davison, Alessandro Golkar, Bradley Steinfeldt There is an international need to define a concrete strategy

65th International Astronautical Congress, Toronto, Canada. Copyright ©2014 by the International Astronautical Federation. All rights reserved.

IAC-14.D2.8-A5.4.2 Page 1 of 14

IAC-14.D2.8-A5.4.2

COOPERATIVE SCENARIOS FOR HUMAN EXPLORATION BEYOND LOW EARTH ORBIT

Jonathan Battat

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA, [email protected]

Oleg Alifanov, Robert Braun, Edward Crawley, John Logsdon, Lev Zeleny, Mariel Borowitz, Emanuele

Capparelli, Peter Davison, Alessandro Golkar, Bradley Steinfeldt

There is an international need to define a concrete strategy and plan to implement that strategy for the initial human

exploration missions beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Across all stakeholders, there is a growing consensus that the

long term objective of global human space exploration is the long duration presence of people on the Martian surface.

Along the pathway between current activities in LEO and eventual Mars outposts are a variety of preparatory

exploration missions and intermediate goals. Over the last decade several different initial steps along these pathways

beyond LEO have been proposed. It is important to build international consensus on such a plan soon because future

missions require near-term investments for new capabilities with no single nation committing resources to achieve all

the steps of an ambitious program on its own. The goal of this work is to enumerate and evaluate scenarios for

cooperative missions beyond LEO that achieve incremental development of human exploration capabilities. Towards

the goal of generating scenarios for cooperative missions beyond LEO, proposed missions and capabilities from a

variety of international actors have been assessed. Presented in this paper are results of a survey of proposed missions

and a series of interviews with industry experts knowledgeable about both the technical and geopolitical issues in

forging a sustainable path towards Mars. There are four realistic proposals for initial human exploration beyond LEO:

a cis-Lunar habitat, asteroid redirect, Mars flyby, and a Lunar surface sortie. In the absence of top-down agreements,

such as those governing the International Space Station, that specify partnership responsibilities and privileges, ad-hoc

exchanges within individual development projects or for specific mission capabilities is most likely to facilitate

international cooperation in the coming years. General LEO transportation logistics and habitation functions are shared

by many actors and allow for exchange of services and utilization of exploration assets if designed into the critical

path. Given the early stage of readiness, it is possible that subsystem-level coordination could be pursued for an

advanced habitation element. Other technologies are either niche (robotics) or have national sensitivities (in-space

propulsion) that make them less desirable for subsystem-level coordination.

1. PLANNING AN INTERNATIONAL

ENTERPRISE

Future human spaceflight programs need to be

designed with sustainability in mind. A program that is

both ambitious enough to foster broad support yet sized

for realistic budgets will have to leverage international

partners for cost and risk sharing. While there is a debate

over the additional costs associated with international

coordination and integration as compared to its cost-

sharing and program sustainability benefits, the world’s

space agencies have said meeting the ultimate goal of

Mars surface missions must be an international effort*.

As individuals pursue the planning and execution of an

exploration pathway from LEO towards Mars, they must

consider both the technologies and the institutions that

will bring humanity to this long term goal.

In August 2013 the International Space Exploration

Coordination Group (ISECG) released an updated Global

Exploration Roadmap (GER) [1]. The work of 12 space

agencies, this roadmap provides a vision of the long-term

* Along with the ISECG, multiple experts groups and

state policies have called for the necessity of international

partners in future exploration programs. Some of these

goals and objectives for human space exploration. The

GER details a number of missions that are preparatory

for eventual sustained presence of humans on the Martian

surface. Most importantly this roadmap reflects a

cooperative relationship between several agencies that

must work together to achieve any ambitious future

exploration program. In the roadmap, the ISECG notes

that the GER is published in the hope of eliciting a

response from the “broader community.” The specific

contribution of the ISECG’s work is intended to advance

planning activities for international missions that will

occur along the roadmap. The ISECG includes a set of

missions that may be achieved in an international way,

but stops short of suggesting how these missions will be

coordinated and executed.

Towards the goal of building a sustainable

exploration enterprise, we propose scenarios that trace

mission technology needs to the capabilities of

participating actors and the rationales for such

contributions.

statements are found in the following references: [2], [3],

[4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]


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2. WHERE WE WILL EXPLORE

Proposals for human exploration missions between

Earth and Mars include a variety of destinations and

astrodynamic considerations. Proposed missions

generally fall into one of three arenas distinguished by

delta-v and mission duration. These are two of the

primary mission requirements driving major architectural

considerations for both transportation and habitation

systems as shown in the figure below. Each arena may

have several potential exploration destinations and

associated missions to each destination. The resulting

time of flight and orbital energy requirements for each

exploration arena drive system mass, cost, and

complexity. Between LEO and Mars lies a range of

opportunities to pursue, incrementally proving out the

capabilities needed for Mars. A strong development

strategy will see evolution from one arena to the next,

adding modest technical challenges at each step, but

providing a consistent cadence of new exploration

returns.

Lunar Surface

Lunar surface return was the focus for the exploration

community through the 2000s and remains heavily

supported by some individuals in the planetary science

community as the appropriate next step in human

† The Review of Human Spaceflight Plans Committee

documented the mismatch between exploration goals and

allocated budget [15]. ‡ While “cis-Lunar” often refers to the physical space

between the Earth and the orbit of the Moon, in this

exploration. Given the technical and programmatic

challenges NASA encountered in the Constellation

Program†, initial Lunar surface missions would likely

involve a simplified architecture for sortie missions at

near-equatorial regions to minimize design requirements

on the lander. However surface presence may evolve to

longer duration extended stay missions with increased

surface access such as polar regions, depending on future

budget commitments and technology developments.

Cis-Lunar Region

The cis-Lunar region extends between geostationary

orbits and just beyond the Moon’s orbit‡. Human or

robotic infrastructure can be sent to halo orbits around the

Earth-Moon Lagrange points 1 and 2 and other

trajectories such as a lunar Distant Retrograde Orbit

(DRO). These locations provide nuanced differences in

exploration benefits but have similar delta-v

requirements as compared to the other exploration

arenas. Specific missions include the Asteroid Redirect

Mission (ARM) and a cis-Lunar habitat with

incrementally evolving capability for eventual long

duration deep space habitation.

context the definition is expanded to refer to orbits in the

Earth-Moon system accessible at energy levels between

Earth’s gravity well and that of the Moon, including

Lagrange points and Lunar Distant Retrograde Orbits.

0

5

10

15

20

0 200 400 600 800 1000

ΔV beyond LEO (km/s)

Mission Duration (days)

LEO

Cis-Lunar

Deep Space

Lunar Surface

Mars System

Figure 1 Exploration arenas distinguished by delta-v and mission duration


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Deep Space

This class of missions includes those that require

escaping the Earth-Moon system on a heliocentric

trajectory. In addition to increased delta-v and time of

flight requirements, the lack of abort and contingency

operations represents increased operational risk.

Missions in this category include a Mars Flyby mission

and asteroid rendezvous missions.

Mars System

Missions that require entering the sphere-of-influence

of the Mars system include Mars orbit missions,

rendezvous with one of the Martian moons, and various

Mars surface missions. While some or all of these

missions are likely to be accomplished along the pathway

to Mars, they are the most technically challenging class

of missions and are not considered as potential next steps

in human exploration.

By categorizing proposed missions into possible

options for next steps beyond LEO, and those

intermediate missions that will come between next steps

and the surface of Mars, a consolidated view of missions

on the roadmap to Mars is provided below.

Current Mission Capability: ISS (LEO)

Next Steps: Cis-Lunar Habitat, Asteroid Redirect,

Lunar Surface Sortie, Mars Flyby

Intermediate: Mars Moons, Mars Orbit, Asteroid

Rendezvous, Lunar Surface Extended Stay

Goal: Mars Surface

3. EXPLORATION STRATEGIES

While there is general agreement on the need to

define a roadmap from LEO to the surface of Mars, the

pathway and strategy to traverse that roadmap is where

opinions vary. Without trying to provide a

comprehensive enumeration of theoretically possible

sequenced missions, four strategic pathways begin with

the four different “Next Steps” mission options. A more

complete view of the pathways through various missions

on the way to Mars is provided in Figure 2.

The missions in Figure 2 are organized according to

two criteria. The vertical axis represents missions of

increasing Technical Risk as measured by parameters

such as delta-v, time of flight, and operational hazards. In

the horizontal direction, missions are ordered by the

number of technology developments they require that

will not be used for eventual Mars exploration. Between

missions the incremental unique development projects

required to advance to the next mission are noted. For

example the most direct and incrementally developing set

of missions towards Mars represented are those on the

left side of the figure (ISSCis-Lunar HabitatMars

FlybyMars Surface). Pursuing these missions will

produce new technology elements, all of which are used

in eventual Mars Surface exploration. While an extended

stay on the Lunar surface helps prove out several systems

for Mars, it also requires a number of elements that will

not directly support Mars exploration such as Lunar

descent and ascent capabilities and so is located further

to the right on the figure.

It is important to note that it is not necessarily

“better” to pursue a pathway along the left side of the

figure. Longer pathways to Mars will have more science

return, and technology developments will reduce the risk

of eventual Mars missions. There is a tension between

following a plan with concrete milestones based on a set

Mars transportation architecture, and maintaining the

flexibility to incorporate technological improvements

over time. A good example of this is that Solar Electric

Propulsion (SEP) may not currently be specified as part

of a minimalist architecture to Mars, but pursuing a path

that develops SEP could demonstrate that it enables Mars

architectures superior in performance and cost to

reference designs based on current technology.

Using this view of potential pathways between LEO

and Mars, we can look at the current set of human

missions described by the ISECG Roadmap. The current

GER outlines NASA’s planned asteroid mission, the

general international interest in Lunar surface missions,

and Cis-Lunar activities to develop deep space habitat

capabilities. The GER makes no specific mention of

human missions between Cis-Lunar space and eventual

humans at Mars, although they do mention robotic

precursors and technology demonstrators. It is unclear if

the ISECG believes Lunar Surface missions and a deep-

space habitat will provide sufficient risk reduction for

Mars surface missions, or if they intentionally allow for

uncertainty of mission selection as future technology

challenges become better defined over time. Casting the

current ISECG roadmap onto Figure 2 demonstrates a

significant technical gap between Lunar Surface missions

and Mars surface missions that could be filled by asteroid

rendezvous or Mars orbital missions.

4. SUMMARY OF CAPABILITIES

To move towards evaluating contributions for

international cooperation, a framework is provided to

assess the likelihood of a nation’s contribution to an

exploration program. By reviewing literature and

surveying industry experts two major contributing

factors were assessed: the technology readiness for a

given nation, and the expected political commitment to

that capability. These factors are intended to capture the

industrial know-how and resources committed to

completing development projects. The highest rating

represents a capability that is available, while the lowest

rating represents a capability not likely to be pursued for


IAC-14.D2.8-A5.4.2 Page 4 of 14

a given country in the near term. Six national actors§ are

considered: USA, Russia, Europe, Japan, Canada, and

China, each of which have operational human spaceflight

programs. Other nations are developing new capabilities

and could play a role in future exploration efforts, but it

remains to be seen exactly what capabilities they will

develop in the coming years. A summary of the capability

evaluation rubric is provided in Table 1.

§ In the context of the presented analysis national

actors are an abstraction that includes the space agency,

domestic contractors, research institutions, and political

decision makers within a single nation. This level of

abstraction is intended to capture the appropriate level at

which major international agreements are set in motion.

Following are the evaluated capabilities of each

nation as they relate to each of the four “next step”

missions. Brief findings and observations follow for each

of the missions. Initial Operating Capabilities (IOC) are

required for initial deployment of the mission, while

value-added capabilities represent elements that would

increase the return of the mission, but are not part of a

minimum viable system. Expected national contributions

For the same reasons “Europe” is referred to as one of the

six nations considered, as it is expected the relevant

industry stakeholders will engage in international human

spaceflight partnerships predominantly through the

organization of the European Space Agency (ESA).

0 1 2 3

Mars Flyby

Mars

Surface

Lunar

Surface

Extended

Stay

Lunar

Surface

Sortie

Asteroid

Rendezvous

Cis-Lunar

Hab

Asteroid

Redirect

ISS

Mars

Moons

Mars Orbit

Low

Technical

Risk

High

Deep Space Hab (+0)

# of Development Projects not required for Mars Surface

Robotic Capture (+0.5)

SEP 50 kW (+0.5)

Lunar Descent/Ascent (+1)

Lunar Surface Hab (+1)

Lunar

Surface

Infrastructure (+1)

Earth Departure (+0)

Ast. Rendezvous (+1)

Soft Dock/Land (+0.5)

Earth Departure (+0)

Mars Capture (+1)

Soft Dock/Land (+0.5)

Mars EDL (+0)

Mars Ascent (+0)

Mars Surface Hab (+0)

Crew Vehicle (+0)

Heavy Launch (+0)

Figure 2 Enumerated likely mission milestone pathways through to Mars


IAC-14.D2.8-A5.4.2 Page 5 of 14

and the rationale for the mission are included after the

breakdown of capabilities.

Cis-Lunar Habitat

Multiple concepts for a human-tended facility in the

Lunar vicinity have been proposed for missions ranging

in duration from several days to year-long profiles [2],

[3]. The concept of the facility would most likely

maintain a semi-autonomous predeployed habitat that has

periodic crew visits (unlike the constant human presence

on the ISS). A typical reference mission used has a crew

of four for a 30 day stay; however, the capability of the

facility could be scaled down or up as necessary due to

program cost and schedule constraints. The concept for

the facility would be to develop and prove out advanced

life support systems for eventual long duration missions,

while operating in a location that supports other activities

such as telerobotic Lunar exploration and allows for

quick return in abort scenarios.

Likely contributions for a cis-Lunar habitat include

crew transportation systems from the USA and Russia.

Logistics capabilities (delivery of propellant, cargo, and

consumables) are available from USA, Russia, Europe,

Japan, and China; however, the increased requirements

on in-space transportation will require new in-space

propulsion developments to deliver crew and cargo to the

cis-Lunar habitat. The most significant opportunity for

new technology development is in advancing the state of

Rating TRL Range Readiness Description Expected Commitment

● 8-9 Flight ReadinessAchieved capability,

resources already spent

6-7 Subsystem IntegrationLikely capability,

significant resources committed

4-5Concept Validation and

Component Development

Early developments, some resources

committed or strong strategic interest

○ 0-3 Concept DevelopmentUnlikely without increased resources

and changed priorities

Table 1 Capability evaluation rubric

USA Russia Europe Japan Canada China

Crew vehicle 11+ km/s re-entry ○ ○ ○ ○

Crew-rated launch ● ○ ○ ●

50-70 mt launch ○ ○ ○

Crew vehicle service module ● ○ ●

Large in-space propulsion (EDS) ○

Automated rendezvous & docking ● ● ● ●

Pressurized hab & cargo ● ● ● ● ○ ●

Advanced ECLSS ○ ○ ○

Advanced radiation protection ○ ○ ○

Human lunar landing ○ ○ ○

Robotic lunar landing ○ ○ ●

SEP 400 kW class ○ ○ ○ ○

Cryo storage & handling ○

Artificial gravity facility ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

In-space robotic manipulation ○ ○ ● ●

Planetary surface robotics ● ●

Onboard science utilization ● ● ● ● ○

Airlock/EVA ● ● ○ ○ ○ ●

Value-Added Capabilities

Initial Operating Capabilities

Table 2 Cis-Lunar Habitat Capabilities by Actor


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ECLSS (environmental control and life support systems)

and advanced radiation protection techniques. Advanced

ECLSS with increased autonomy and system closure is

in early development stages in USA, Russia, and Europe.

Developing these systems will be a critical-path item on

the way to Mars. Given the early stage of readiness, it is

possible that subsystem-level coordination could be

pursued for an advanced habitation element. Due to the

cis-Lunar habitat’s flexibility in operation, there are more

opportunities for value-added activities from

international contributors for the cis-Lunar habitat than

any other next step mission. It is worth noting that half of

the surveyed experts believed the cis-Lunar habitat

should be the next mission pursued after the ISS.

The cis-Lunar habitat aligns well with the goals of

multiple agencies, as it directly provides access or

develops capability towards other future missions

including both the Lunar surface and Mars missions. The

cis-Lunar habitat also provides the most direct extension

of both technology and organizational elements of ISS of

all the proposed missions. One of the greatest challenges

to developing the cis-Lunar habitat is communicating the

benefits that lie in engineering development, as opposed

to the exploration of a tangible rocky destination. In

particular, while the cis-Lunar habitat may satisfy

incremental developments towards national space

exploration objectives, no current national space policy

highlights this engineering development milestone as

desirable to pursue on its own merits.

Asteroid Redirect

The Asteroid Redirect Mission (ARM) was made

popular in recent years by a Keck Institute study on the

feasibility of such a mission [4]. The overall concept is

for an initial robotic retrieval mission that is linked to

future human exploration. A solar-electric propelled

(SEP) spacecraft will capture a small asteroid (or piece

of one) and return it to cis-Lunar space (a Lunar DRO).

Once there, it will provide a planetary surface that can be

visited by a crew vehicle with lower delta-v penalty than

any other rocky body. Recently NASA has engaged in a

concerted architecture design effort to reduce some of the

uncertainties of the mission implementation [5], [6].

The ARM is currently in development as a NASA

mission, without planned partnerships at a level that

would influence mission architecture. However, an

agreement is already in place for ESA to provide

NASA’s crew vehicle service module that would be used

for this mission. Other opportunities for ad-hoc inclusion

of international partners are most likely to center on the

Japanese and Canadian expertise in in-space robotic

manipulation.

NASA’s adoption of this mission presents a strategy

focused on technology development. One of the most

significant outcomes of this mission would be the

realization of a 50 kW class SEP capability. Advancing

state-of-the-art SEP will provide benefits to exploration,

commercial, and defense communities. While low thrust

propulsion has never been particularly attractive for crew

transfer, larger SEP capability will provide great returns

for cargo and logistics transfer for future deep space

missions. Since the USA has the largest investments in

future technologies, the mission has fewer opportunities

for inclusion of international partners on the critical path.

While the mission engages multiple stakeholder

communities including planetary defense and some




50-70 mt launch ○ ○ ○



SEP 50 kW class ○ ○


In-space robotic manipulation ○ ○ ● ●

Asteroid capture ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

Planetary surface EVA ○ ○ ○ ○ ○


SEP 400 kw class ○ ○ ○ ○




Table 3 Asteroid Redirect Mission Capabilities by Actor


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planetary scientists, there has been little stated interest

from policy makers from other human spaceflight

nations. Participants of the industry survey did not see

many opportunities for international participation in the

mission and were more supportive of asteroid redirect as

an added capability to a pre-existing Cis-Lunar Habitat.

Mars Flyby

The Mars Flyby reference mission is based on the

architecture described by the Inspiration Mars

Foundation [7], [8]. This mission involves two astronauts

going on a 500 day deep-space mission with a single

close approach of Mars. In terms of exploration return the

crew of two will have 10 hours observation time within

100,000 km of Mars. The overall concept of the mission

is a demonstration of advanced deep-space capability.

The returns are in system development for deep-space

human exploration and the milestone of actually putting

humans in the Mars vicinity as an inspirational

achievement.

The Mars Flyby mission represents the largest

increment in deep-space exploration capability of all the

next-steps missions considered. The published concept is

conceived primarily as a NASA mission designed around

SLS and Orion however the habitation requirements may

look similar to an evolved version of the previously

described cis-Lunar habitat. Development of such a

module could provide opportunities for partnership for

the ECLSS subsystems or habitat module.

Overall, the rationale for this mission is to accelerate

the Mars program. With an accelerated development

timeline to execute the mission within a five to ten year

timeframe, the mission would likely require an increased

development budget. In the survey of industry experts,

the support for this mission among the international

human spaceflight community exceeds that of the

asteroid redirect; however, it is unclear what roles the

international community may play. The simplicity of the

mission profile results in fewer unique elements to

distribute among partners. Furthermore, those supporting

this mission as a next step believe it requires an increase

in available budget to be feasible.

Lunar Surface Sortie

While a range of human Lunar exploration

architectures have been proposed, as a “next step”

mission the focus would be on a minimalist return. The

rationale behind the mission would be to prove out

exploration techniques for future Mars surface missions

and initial developments would specifically avoid costly

permanent infrastructure. A recent NASA architecture

study describes the differences between short duration

sortie missions and extended stay missions [9].

A minimalist Lunar Surface mission would provide

short duration sortie missions at near equatorial landing

sites. The US has had significant development for such a

mission from both the Apollo and Constellation

Programs. While the crew vehicle and heavy launch

programs remain under development from the

Constellation program in the USA, developments for

landing systems never progressed beyond subsystem

prototyping and concept development level. As a result,

the elements required for in-space transportation, landing

systems, and surface equipment would all be available as

opportunities for contributions for international partners.

Due to the decades of development work, and

opportunity for planetary science and commercial

utilization, there is a large international advocacy for

Lunar surface exploration. Due to the number of

elements required for initial operating capability, the


Crew vehicle 14+ km/s re-entry ○ ○ ○ ○ ○


100+ mt launch ○ ○ ○




Pressurized hab and cargo ● ● ● ● ○ ●

Advanced ECLSS capability ○ ○ ○

Advanced radiation protection ○ ○ ○

Artificial gravity facility ○ ○ ○ ○ ○





Table 4 Mars Flyby Capabilities by Actor


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Lunar surface provides the most opportunities for critical

path contributions at the international scale. At the same

time, development of all these elements result in a cost

and risk profile unlikely to be supported by near-term

budgets. Pursuing lunar surface missions would require

efficient allocation of contributions across partners, and

sustained if not increased development efforts from those

partners.

Capabilities Summary

Figure 3 shows a summarized view of the capabilities

required for each of the proposed missions and the

aggregated readiness of those capabilities for each actor.

Overall the cis-Lunar habitat and Mars Flyby missions

require incremental advancement of existing

transportation and habitation capabilities. Meanwhile the

asteroid redirect and Lunar surface missions require

significantly more new development projects.

Currently Russia and China are the only two nations

with capability to put humans in LEO. It is expected that

the USA will regain that capability in the next two to four

years. Canadian and Japanese expertise in robotics are

unique, and provide the capability for critical elements

for in-space operations. These capabilities may extend to

planetary surface exploration as developments to support

cis-Lunar activities or Lunar surface exploration. In

terms of human spaceflight, European contributions are

focused on the habitable structures and logistics required

for long duration missions. It is important to note that

accounting for number of capabilities required is a proxy

for the difficulty of development activities, but does not

reflect the inherent risk associated with each mission. For

example the number of technologies required for a cis-

Lunar habitat is the same as that of a Mars Flyby mission,

but the operational risk of the Mars Flyby is much greater

than that for the cis-Lunar habitat considering the

drastically different crew radiation exposure and abort

opportunities.

Figure 3 demonstrates that there are significant gaps

between current exploration capabilities and those

needed for any next steps missions. To meet any of these

challenges a significant amount of development work

must take place. However there are limited development

efforts for beyond LEO capabilities at an advanced stage

in any actor other than the US as shown in Figure 4.

Despite leading in technology development, NASA’s

budget is unlikely to support more than one or two new

major human spaceflight developments to completion

beyond the crew and launch systems already in progress.

While international contributor’s budgets may increase

provided appropriate justification, their contributions are

more likely to evolve from existing capabilities than to

begin new development projects from the ground up.

Unlike most other actors, the Russian budget is expected

to continue seeing moderate increases. Russia is currently




50-70 mt launch ○ ○ ○

Human lunar landing systems ○ ○ ○




Pressurized hab & cargo ● ● ● ● ○ ●

ISS class ECLSS ● ● ● ○ ○


Planetary surface EVA ○ ○ ○ ○ ○


100+ mt launch ○ ○ ○

Robotic lunar landing systems ○ ○ ●

Cryo storage & handling ○

Advanced ECLSS ○ ○ ○





Table 5 Lunar Surface Sortie Capabilities by Actor


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undergoing a national space industry reformation and is

investing heavily in ground infrastructure developments.

As such, it is unclear what development budget will be

available for new technologies for human exploration

beyond LEO.

While still a developing program, Chinese crew and

transportation capabilities could offer crew-access

redundancy and cost sharing in future projects. Large

scale integrated collaboration for human spaceflight

seems unlikely with the Chinese in the near term, as the

Chinese program has an independent strategy for a LEO

space station. However, opportunities for developing

cooperative relationships in space should be pursued in

smaller space missions to develop the working

relationships that will open up more opportunities for

integrated exploration activities. To date, European and

Russian officials have opened discussion of collaborative

efforts with China. While current US policy prevents

NASA from coordinating with the Chinese, exploration

advocates have begun to call for a change to these

policies including specific guidance from the US

National Research Council to consider US collaboration

with China [10].

A sustained and robust beyond LEO human

exploration program requires several large technology

development projects that no single nation can develop

in a reasonable timeframe. While Russia and China have

independent human spaceflight capability, it is unclear

that either program is committing significant resources to

develop capabilities for beyond LEO exploration.

Meanwhile the US program is investing in future projects

but has yet to complete any capabilities that operate

beyond LEO. A successful beyond LEO program

requires some amount of cooperation between these

independent human spaceflight programs.

5. ORGANIZING COOPERATION

The current organizational structure of the ISS has a

hierarchy of agreements corresponding to coordinated

efforts between governments, space agencies, and

contractors. Overall cooperation agreements between

governments are established through an

Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) that defines the

overall nature of the partnership. One level down, agency

coordination is executed through a series of memoranda

of understanding (MOU). The MOUs are organized

between NASA as a central entity and the other primary

agencies dictating specific contributions, roles, and

responsibilities. Other agency-level implementation

specifics are coordinated on an ad-hoc basis through

implementing agreements drafted as necessary. At the

element level, development of specific modules and

operations are coordinated through various contracting

mechanisms by each participating agency within its own

country.

The current framework in which ISS partners work

together represents a decade of organizational

development. There is broad agreement that human

exploration beyond LEO should build on the

relationships, experience, and institutions of ISS, but

there remains a significant amount of ambiguity as to

what specific aspects will most benefit future programs.

In addition to extending previous experience, it is likely

that future programs will have to be more flexible to

incorporation of new actors. China is developing

capabilities that may soon intersect with the needs of

other partners beyond LEO, and other countries such as

India, have stated their intent to pursue independent

human spaceflight capability. Furthermore, several

private companies have stated intentions to participate in

future exploration efforts that could add a layer of

complexity in new partnerships between state-run and

private programs.

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

ISS Cis Lunar Habitat ARM Mars Flyby Lunar Sortie

AggregateReadinessby Actor

USA Russia Europe Japan Canada China # of Required Mission Capabilities

Figure 3 Summary of capabilities for each mission by nation


IAC-14.D2.8-A5.4.2 Page 10 of 14

While some literature exists describing different

paradigms of cooperation in space exploration [11], there

remains a need to consider how to categorize the

organization of coordinated efforts for future human

exploration beyond LEO. General discussion of building

from experience at the ISS requires details of the

agreements and organizational aspects that will or will

not be useful beyond LEO. Furthermore, there are

technical differences in exploration beyond LEO that

may motivate a change in the organization of future

programs. For example increased requirements in delta-

v make mission feasibility much more sensitive to overall

system mass. As a result, having multiple redundant and

independently developed systems is unlikely to be

feasible beyond LEO (as it has been for the ISS). In

addition to reduced redundancy, there will be reduced

frequency of flight opportunities and an increased risk

environment requiring tightly coordinated system

development and integration. Four possible

organizational strategies are described below.

Independent Programs

Independent programs require nations to develop

entire missions with domestic capabilities. While

multiple nations have developed domestic programs in

LEO, it seems unlikely that any nation will afford a

sustained beyond LEO program without international

contributions.

Ad-Hoc Exchanges

In the absence of top-down management and

intergovernmental agreements that specify partnerships

with responsibilities and privileges, ad-hoc exchanges

** ESA’s Orion Service Module is based on their

Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and is part of the

barter agreement with NASA covering a portion of ISS

within individual development projects or for specific

mission capabilities is most likely to facilitate

international cooperation. Ad-hoc exchanges best

describe many efforts in robotic exploration missions

where specific contributions are designated for a mission,

and must be negotiated on a case-by-case basis. The

European service module for the NASA crew vehicle is

the first example of a cooperative agreement that builds

on an ISS obligation to fulfill a beyond LEO capability**.

It remains an open question if a human spaceflight

enterprise can be sustainable without a higher level of

coordination. For example, as exploration continues with

ad-hoc exchanges, an organization such as the ISECG

may have to evolve to play a more significant role in

planning the missions that will be pursued as opposed to

their current role where its work reflects mission

decisions already made by national agencies.

Integrated Agreement Structure

An integrated agreement structure for exploration

beyond LEO would replicate or adapt the hierarchy of

agreements in place that organize the ISS. This would

involve an agreement between governments of the

overall exploration goals and partnering nations, and

cooperation between agencies as to the responsibilities of

each nation. One of the largest changes in moving to

beyond LEO exploration is that future mission

capabilities and destinations are uncertain and will

change from one mission to another as compared to a

LEO facility with consistent system architecture. While

individuals argue for defining a set pathway of missions

towards Mars, the reality is that engineering development

is uncertain, and the exact roadmap between LEO and

operating expenses through 2020. This involves both an

agency-to-agency and company-to-company agreement.

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10


Capa

bilit

ies

# of Current Capabilities # of Capabilities in Development

Figure 4 Summary of capabilities for human exploration beyond LEO by actor


IAC-14.D2.8-A5.4.2 Page 11 of 14

Mars can not be established with certainty. An integrated

framework for cooperation beyond LEO requires a

mechanism to adapt planned contributions as milestones

are met and capability needs evolve.

Multinational Entity

Just as ESA coordinates space efforts from across

Europe, a multinational intergovernmental entity could

collect resources to implement the global human space

exploration enterprise. This level of integration and loss

of autonomy for national agencies is unlikely to occur as

the decision to commit to exploration budgets is a

national process tied to many domestic concerns. At the

national level decision makers are unlikely to give up the

ability to control their space budget because they have

rationales that may not align with those of a multinational

entity. ESA has addressed this problem by having some

mandatory contributions and separate elective programs

in which nations can choose to participate††.

6. SCENARIOS

Scenarios that dictate what may be accomplished in

the next steps of human exploration beyond LEO are

driven by two factors: resource commitment and the

cooperative environment of human spaceflight.

Following are some of the factors that will result in a low

or high level of resource commitment, and a low or high

level of cooperation on beyond LEO exploration.

The most likely scenario is that major national human

spaceflight budgets remain fairly flat. If budget increases

are lower than inflation, there is a consistent loss of

purchasing power over time. Even when interest in

government spending on space is high, it is difficult to

justify the long-term uncertain returns of human

spaceflight developments as compared to the concrete

benefits of ground infrastructure improvements and

programs with more commercial interest relating to

navigation, earth observation, and telecommunications

services. For example while Russia has committed to a

multi-year increase in overall space spending, it remains

to be seen what specific developments will be supported

for human spaceflight beyond LEO. A more optimistic

scenario would see government spending increase as part

of a commitment to a robust human exploration program.

Alternatively, resources could become available from

private-sector entities that decide to start spending

significant resources on human exploration beyond LEO.

The current cooperative environment for space is

dynamic and uncertain in the future. Development and

operation of the ISS has succeeded in part due to the

ability of participating agencies to work together. Despite

recent geopolitical tension outside of the space industry,

†† Note that projects within ESA might be better

categorized as “ad-hoc exchanges” or “integrated

agreement structure.” These categories provide a way of

all currently operating projects in space science and

human exploration continue, seemingly unaffected by

these external factors. However individual politicians

have made statements indicating space cooperation could

be limited in the future. While no operating cooperative

agreements have been hindered, at a practical level this

political tension may make it more difficult to engage in

the early discussions and planning required to create

proposals for future cooperative efforts. Aside from the

geopolitical issues, cooperation could be limited by

differing goals. While all agencies have agreed on Mars

as the eventual goal, China and Russia have both clearly

stated they intend to pursue Lunar surface exploration

first. Meanwhile the USA has pursued an asteroid-

centered exploration strategy on the way to Mars. The

third issue that could make cooperation difficult, is the

desire for nations to maintain fully independent-

operating exploration capabilities. In the case of the ISS,

having independent crew systems allowed for a design

with redundancy. However for more technically

challenging missions beyond LEO, it may prove cost

prohibitive for two nations to provide independent

transportation and habitation capabilities.

Four scenarios are described as a set of possible

outcomes dictated by the levels of resources committed

and the cooperative environment.

Scenario A: Low Resources, Low Cooperation

The current stated plans of the USA, Russia, and

China reflect a reality of limited cooperation and flat or

modestly increasing budgets. The USA is pursuing the

asteroid redirect mission. While ARM is still being

formulated, international partners have not yet been

engaged in early rounds of goal setting and mission

architecture design. If development is delayed too long

or suitable targets are not identified, the USA will have

to resort to flying short duration Orion missions with

little opportunity to practice astronaut-conducted science

operations. Russia and China will continue to slowly

develop their independent efforts towards Lunar surface

exploration. Europe, Canada, and Japan will continue to

contribute niche elements to other human spaceflight

programs, however if milestones are not met or astronaut

flight opportunities are not available in return, they may

lose political support and redirect their human

exploration budget to endeavours with more quantifiable

return on investment.

Scenario B: Low Resources, High Cooperation

With modest resources available, human spaceflight

programs will seek to build off the developments of ISS.

In a highly cooperative environment, the USA, Russia,

thinking how nations may collaborate but are not

necessarily strictly implemented within a single category.


IAC-14.D2.8-A5.4.2 Page 12 of 14

Europe, and China could all contribute to development of

a cis-Lunar habitat facility. Pursuing this platform does

not have to be mutually exclusive from the USA pursuing

the ARM on its own; it would depend on the available

budget and the specific role outlined for the USA in the

habitat project. If both ARM and a cis-Lunar habitat are

planned to be operational at the same time, they can be

designed to be mutually beneficial. A redirected asteroid

would provide a location for astronauts to practice new

EVA techniques, with the opportunity to develop

operations over longer duration missions coming from

the cis-Lunar habitat. Meanwhile it is possible that the

ARM’s SEP spacecraft bus including power, propulsion,

and thermal subsystems could in fact support the cis-

Lunar habitat as primary or backup modules in future

operations. To enable this vision of integrating the ARM

and cis-Lunar habitat, planning would need to occur in

the near future, before the system architecture of ARM is

defined.

Scenario C: High Resources, Low Cooperation

With a drastically increased budget, the USA can

pursue ARM while developing a large upper stage for

SLS and possibly a deep-space habitat. The date of initial

operating capability would be sensitive to the size of the

budget increase and corresponding schedule

advancement. Meanwhile China and Russia will commit

large resources to the lunar surface and these programs

will develop with little ability to interact or interface.

Europe, Japan, and Canada may provide elements to the

other three programs in exchange for astronaut time and

scientific equipment utilization.

Scenario D: High Resources, High Cooperation

In the case where funds are available and multiple

nations are contributing to a coordinated program, more

ambitious missions are possible. With multiple nations

committing to develop new technology elements, it may

become worthwhile to pursue a coordinated effort to the

Lunar surface so that commercial and scientific interests

can reap benefits while later on engineering development

continues on deep-space habitation and transportation.

This scenario can only be realized if nations commit to

providing costly development projects that are

interdependent on each other on a strict schedule.

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The ISECG activity provides a valuable arena for

developing common understanding of future exploration

initiatives. The GER includes expected missions from

national efforts and a set of milestones that may be

accomplished with international support, but stops short

of suggesting how these milestones will be achieved. To

benefit from international cooperation, nations seek to be

responsible for elements that are in the critical path and

are integral to the success of a sustained program with

frequent highly visible milestones. Coordinating those

international efforts requires concerted and authoritative

planning activities at the international level.

There are four realistic proposals for initial human

exploration beyond LEO: a cis-Lunar habitat, asteroid

redirect, Mars flyby, and a Lunar surface sortie.

Summarized rationales and challenges of each mission

are provided in Table 6.

The contributions of new development projects from

each participating nation will be limited and sensitive to

future budget allocation. While the USA currently has the

largest portfolio of investments for beyond LEO

capabilities, it is unable to afford development of all

capabilities required. Planning now can help increase the

cost sharing for future integrated exploration efforts.

Given the early stage of readiness, it is possible that

subsystem-level coordination could be pursued for an

advanced habitation element. Other technologies are

either niche (robotics) or have national-interest

sensitivities (in-space propulsion) that make them less

desirable for subsystem-level coordination. General LEO

transportation logistics and habitation functions are

shared by many actors and allow for exchange of services

and utilization of exploration assets if designed into the

critical path.

In the absence of top-down management and an IGA

that specifies partnerships with responsibilities and

privileges, ad-hoc exchanges within individual

development projects or for specific mission capabilities

is most likely to facilitate international cooperation in the

coming years. In particular future exploration institutions

should be flexible to adapt contributions depending on

what is learned from early missions to prove out deep

space systems. Furthermore future programs will benefit

from having the flexibility to incorporate new state and

private actors.

It is unlikely that development for human exploration

beyond LEO will receive drastically increased resources

in the near future. Given the modest development budget

available globally, nations must plan now for closely

integrated mutually beneficial projects. If the USA

pursues the ARM, mission planners must coordinate with

potential partners so that the spacecraft development

provides value as part of an ongoing program to develop

deep space capabilities.


IAC-14.D2.8-A5.4.2 Page 13 of 14

SOURCES

[1] ISECG, "The Global Exploration

Roadmap," August 2013.

[2] M. Bobskill and M. Lupisella, "The Role of

Cis-Lunar Space in Future Global Space

Exploration," in Global Space Exploration

Conference GLEX, Washington, DC, 2012.

[3] J. B. Hopkins, R. d. Costa, M. Duggan, S.

Walther, P. Fulford, N. Ghafoor, F. Bandini, M.

A. Perino, N. Bryukhanov, K. Ogasawara and

L. Soccani, "International Industry Concepts

for Human Exploration from the Earth-Moon

L2 Region," in International Astronautical

Congress, Beijing, China, 2013.

[4] J. Brophy, F. Culick, L. Friedman and e. al.,

"Asteroid Retrieval Feasibility Study Final

Report," Keck Institute for Space Studies,

California Institute of Technology, Jet

Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA, 2012.

[5] NASA, "Asteroid Redirect Mission

Reference Concept," NASA, 2013.

[6] NASA, "Asteroid Redirect Crewed Mission

(ARCM) Reference Concept," NASA, 2013.

[7] D. A. Tito, G. Anderson, J. P. Carrico, J.

Clark, B. Finger, G. A. Lantz, M. E. Loucks, T.

MacCallum, J. Poynter, T. H. Squire and P. S.

Worden, "Feasibility analysis for a manned

mars free-return mission in 2018," in

Aerospace Conference, IEEE, Big Sky, MT,

2013.

[8] Inspiration Mars Foundation, "Architecture

Study Report Summary," Inspiration Mars

Foundation, 2013.

[9] R. P. Mueller, J. C. Connolly and R. J.

Whitley, "NASA Human Spaceflight

Architecture Team: Lunar Surface Exploration

Strategies," in Global Space Exploration

Conference, 2012.

[10] Committee on Human Spaceflight,

"Pathways to Exploration - Rationales and

Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human

Space Exploration," National Research

Council, Washington D.C., 2014.

[11] D. A. Broniatowski, M.-A. Cardin, S. Dong,

M. J. Hale, N. C. Jordan, D. R. Laufer, C.

Mathieu, B. D. Owens, M. G. Richards and A.

L. Weigel, "A framework for evaluating

international cooperation in space exploration,"

Space Policy, vol. 24, pp. 181-189, 2008.

[12] ISECG, “The Global Exploration Strategy:

The Framework for Coordination,” 2007.

[13] D. A. Mindell, S. A. Uebelhart, A. A.

Siddiqi and S. Gerovitch, “The Future of

Human Spaceflight: Objectives and Policy

Implications in a Global Context,” American

Table 6 Overview of “Next Step” strategies

Next Step

MissionSummarized Rationale Summarized Challenges

Cis-Lunar Habitat

Continue habitation developments from ISS

Provide access/developments for all other

destinations

Hab developments are required for Mars

Provides opportunity for contributions from all

partners

Not stated in existing policy

Poor perception of mission without a

rocky destination

Science returns only possible with

coordinated efforts on the Moon (or a

redirected asteroid)

Asteroid Redirect

Advance solar electric propulsion (SEP)

capability for many customers (not just

exploration)

Potentially engages planetary science & defense

stakeholders concerned with asteroids (opinions

vary)

Provides highly visible exploration firsts

No developments that build on ISS

habitation capabilities.

Unclear if developments are useful for

Mars.

Few feasible targets identified.

Few opportunities for non-US on the

critical path

Lunar Surface

Sortie

Strongest science engagement

Strongest supported destination among non-US

stakeholders (and some groups in the US).

Best place for surface operations prep

Requires the most new (and costly)

developments before initial operating

capability.

Feasibility is unclear without increased

international contributions.

Unclear if Lunar developments are on

the critical path to Mars.

Mars Flyby

High profile achievement to foster increased

support

Fastest path to Mars surface

Limited science return

The highest level of overall development

and operational risk.


IAC-14.D2.8-A5.4.2 Page 14 of 14

Academy of Arts & Sciences, Cambridge, MA,

2009.

[14] Review of U.S. Human Spaceflight Plans

Committee, “Seeking a Human Spaceflight

Program Worthy of a Great Nation,”

Washington, DC, 2009.

[15] B. Obama, “National Space Policy of the

United States of America,” Office of the

President of the United States of America,


[16] Committee on NASA's Strategic Direction,

National Research Council, “NASA's Strategic

Direction and the Need for a National

Consensus,” The National Academies Press,


[17] Roscosmos, "Principles of State Policy of

the Russian Federation in the field of space

activities for the period up to 2030 and

beyond," 2013.

[18] ESA, "Resolution on the European Space

Policy," 2007.

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