10thAnnualStrategicMulti-LayerAssessment(SMA)

Conference

JointlyheldwithDHS,NCTC,DNI/NIC

FromControltoInfluence?AViewof—andVisionfor—theFuture

JointBaseAndrews25-26April2017

Preparedby:NSI,Inc.

gpopp@nsiteam.comscanna@nsiteam.com

npeterson@nsiteam.com

Thisreportrepresentstheviewsandopinionsoftheconferenceparticipants.Thereportdoesnot

representofficialUSGpolicyorposition.

Table of Contents

ExecutiveSummary.................................................................................................................1ConferenceBackground...................................................................................................................1ConferenceOverview......................................................................................................................1

ConferenceIntroduction(Mr.MartyDrake,USCENTCOM)......................................................3

OpeningSessions....................................................................................................................3MajGenCharlesMoore(JS/J39)......................................................................................................3Dr.CharlesPerkins(PrincipalDeputy,DeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefense,EmergingCapability&Prototyping)....................................................................................................................................3

NIC’s2017GlobalTrendsReport(Mr.DanFlynn,DNI/NIC).....................................................4Discussion.......................................................................................................................................7

Panel1:RethinkingControlandInfluenceintheAgeofComplexGeopoliticalSystems...........8COL(ret)ChuckEassa(SCO).............................................................................................................8Dr.ValSitterle(GeorgiaTechResearchInstitute)............................................................................8Dr.NickWright(UniversityofBirmingham).....................................................................................9Dr.BobToguchi(USASOC)...............................................................................................................9Discussion......................................................................................................................................10

Panel2:FromFailuretoSuccess:InformationPowerandParadigmaticShiftsinStrategyandOperationalArt.....................................................................................................................11

Dr.EmileSimpson(Harvard)...........................................................................................................11LTC(P)ScottThomson(OSD-P)........................................................................................................12Ms.PriscillaGuthrie(IDA)...............................................................................................................12Dr.IanMcCulloh(JohnsHopkinsUniversityAppliedPhysicsLaboratory)........................................13Dr.SpencerMeredith(NDU)...........................................................................................................13Mr.JamesFarwell(KingsCollegeLondon)......................................................................................13Mr.MichaelLewis(MarineCorpsCommandandStaffCollege)......................................................14Discussion......................................................................................................................................15

Panel3:GrayZonetoGrayMatter…ANeurocognitiveRevolution.........................................16Dr.NickWright(UniversityofBirmingham)....................................................................................16Dr.AmyKruse(PlatypusInstitute)..................................................................................................16Dr.WilliamCasebeer(LockheedMartin).........................................................................................17Dr.DianeDiEuliis(NDU).................................................................................................................18Dr.JamesGiordano(GeorgetownUniversityMedicalCenter)........................................................18Dr.JasonSpitaletta(JohnsHopkinsUniversityAppliedPhysicsLaboratory)....................................19Discussion......................................................................................................................................20

Panel4:TheNeurocognitiveScienceofPersuasion...............................................................20Dr.JamesGiordano(GeorgetownUniversityMedicalCenter)........................................................20Dr.ChristopheMorin(FieldingGraduateUniversity)......................................................................21Dr.IanMcCulloh(JohnsHopkinsUniversityAppliedPhysicsLaboratory)........................................21Dr.WilliamCasebeer(LockheedMartin).........................................................................................21Dr.NickWright(UniversityofBirmingham)....................................................................................22Discussion......................................................................................................................................22

Panel5:AnticipatoryIntelligence..........................................................................................24Mr.DaveGauthier(NGA)................................................................................................................24Dr.GwynethSutherlin(GeographicServices,Inc.)..........................................................................25Dr.PeterSuedfeld(UniversityofBritishColumbia).........................................................................25Dr.JeffFriedman(Dartmouth)........................................................................................................26Ms.ReginaJoseph(NYU)................................................................................................................26Discussion......................................................................................................................................27

Panel6:MetaphorforaNewAge:Emergence,Co-Evolution,Complexity,orSomethingElse?.............................................................................................................................................27

Dr.ValSitterle(GeorgiaTechResearchInstitute)...........................................................................27Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois(NSI)..................................................................................................28Dr.CoreyLofdahl(SoSACorp).........................................................................................................29CAPT(ret)ToddVeazie(NCTC)........................................................................................................30Discussion......................................................................................................................................32

Panel7:SocialMedia…FatigueorHeretoStay?....................................................................32Dr.RandyKluver(TexasA&M)........................................................................................................32Dr.JenZiemke(JohnCarrollUniversity).........................................................................................32Dr.DaveWarner(MindTel).............................................................................................................33Dr.DavidBroniatowski(GWU).......................................................................................................33Dr.LauraSteckman(MITRE)...........................................................................................................34Mr.EmersonBrooking(CouncilonForeignRelations)....................................................................35Discussion......................................................................................................................................35

KeyNoteSpeaker(LTGMichaelNagata,NCTC).....................................................................36Discussion......................................................................................................................................37

KeyNoteSpeaker(LtGenCharlesBrown,USCENTCOM).......................................................38

Panel8:NetAssessment:ImplicationsforHomelandSecurity...............................................41Ms.GiaHarrigan(DHS)...................................................................................................................41Dr.ErikDahl(NPS)..........................................................................................................................41Mr.TimMoughon(NCTC)...............................................................................................................42COLWilliamEdwards(USSOCNORTH).............................................................................................42Dr.GinaLigon(UniversityofNebraskaOmaha)..............................................................................43Mr.NawarShora(DHS)..................................................................................................................43Discussion......................................................................................................................................43

Panel9:FromConceptstoCapabilities:ImplicationsfortheOPSCommunity.......................44LtGen(ret)Dr.BobElder(GMU)....................................................................................................45CAPTPhilKapusta(USSOCOM).......................................................................................................45Mr.JasonWerchan(USEUCOM).....................................................................................................45Mr.MartyDrake(USCENTCOM).....................................................................................................46Mr.MarkSisson(USSTRATCOM)....................................................................................................46Dr.BobToguchi(USASOC)..............................................................................................................46COLSethSherwood(USNORTHCOM)..............................................................................................47MajGenEricVollmecke(JointStaff,J5,USAFRICOM).....................................................................47Discussion......................................................................................................................................48

ClosingRemarks(Dr.HriarCabayan,JS/J39/SMA).................................................................50

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Executive Summary Conference Background

The StrategicMulti-Layer Assessment (SMA) office hosted the 10th Annual SMAConference on 25-26April2017atJointBaseAndrews.Thisyear’sconference,formallytitled“FromControlto Influence?AView of—and Vision for—the Future,” brought together a multidisciplinary group of participants toconsiderhowtheUSanditsalliescanmoreeffectivelycountertheinfluencethatrecentlyre-emerging,capable states (suchasChinaandRussia) andnon-stateactors (suchas ISIS)exerton theirneighborsand/orthirdpartiesthroughmultipleelementsofpower.The rise of Anti-Access Area Denial capabilities and the economic ascendance of China lead some toarguethatwearemovingtowardbecomingamorepluralized,multipolarworld inwhichmilitaryandeconomicsourcesofpowerarewidelydistributed.Technologies(e.g.,theInternetandrapidmeansofmassmigration)aremakingnationstatesincreasinglymoreporous,andaresurgenceofnationalismandotherformsofethnicorreligiousidentitypoliticshassolidifiedsomestatesandweakenedothers.ThecontinuanceofthesefactorsmaychangethewaythattheUS,itsallies,anditsadversariesconsiderandprioritizeinfluence,bothwithinthestateandacrossinterstateborders.Thisconferenceexaminedthesetrends,andexploredpossibleimplicationsforhowsuchfactorsmaynecessitateanexplicitfocusupon“influence”ratherthan“control”andhowinfluencecouldexerteffectsonnational,regional,andgloballevelsoverthenext30years.

Conference Overview

Manyoftheconference’spanelstouchedonthehumandimensionofthechallengesandopportunitiestheUnitedStatesGovernment(USG)faces inthe21stcentury.Thehumanelement isanewaspectofcompetition and conflict that is not in the physical realm where the military typically feels mostcomfortable, but it is an environment that the military (and, more appropriately, the whole ofgovernmentandwholeofnation)mustbecomemorecomfortablewith.Operating in this new world requires forms of mental agility that cannot be ordered on Amazon ordevelopedinamilitarylab;itmustbedevelopedandnurtured.Societiesmustbecomemoreresilient—toattacks,tofakenews,tounreasonablefears,andtoreasonablefearsaswell.CreativityandsurprisewillbecomemoreimportantelementsofUSstrategythansimplyoverwhelmingmilitaryforce.Wemustalsodoabetter jobofcraftingandexplainingourvision for the future internationalsystem,as this isanotheressentialelementofsuccessfulUSstrategy.Peoplewillmattermore in this newworld,whichmeans a successfulUS strategymust integratenotonlywholeofgovernment,butwholeofsocietytoincludeindustry,communitygroups,etc.Conflictisnolongersolelyinthemilitarydomain.Partlybecauseofthis,unclassifiedinformationwillincreasinglydominateintelligenceanalysis.Warfare has always reflected new developments in society. Given the empowerment of individualsfueled by the information revolution, this has several implications for how theUSG understands andinteractswithpopulations(notjustleaders).First,physicalmightisnotgoingtoalwaysachievestrategicaims.Wemustuseasoftpower/influence/informationstrategy.Second,perceptionsmatter.Wehaveahardtimeacceptingoracknowledgingthevalidityofothers’perceptions,especiallyifwedisagreewiththem.Thishampersoureffectivenessincommunicatingourstrategy,influencingothers’behaviors,and

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responding to threats.Third,TargetAudienceAnalysis (TAA)shouldnot justbeaMilitary InformationSupportOperations (MISO)process.Actions influence justasmuch,orevenmore, thanmessagesdo.Fourth,peoplearenotpersuadedbyfactsandlogic.Neuroscienceresearchshowusthathumansmakedecisionsbasedonemotionsfirst,andlogiclater.Astheconferenceshiftedfromdefiningnewchallengesbroughtbythechangingenvironment,itsfocusturnedtotryingtounderstandhowtheCommandsaredealingwiththesedevelopments.Thechangingenvironmentthemeisnotnew—ithasbeenafocusofSMAconferencesforthelast10years.Butwhenweaskourselveswhatexactlyissoalarmingaboutchange,itisnotonlythattheworldischanging,butthat parts of the US paradigm or strategy no longer work. The USG can no longer prevail by sheerapplication of overwhelming force. However, the US defense paradigm has not properly evolved oradaptedtothechangingenvironment.ConferenceparticipantssuggestedthattheUSGneedsanewsetof rules thataremoreadaptive tonewandevolvingenvironments. It isdifficult for abureaucracy tochange,sothischallengeshouldnotbeunderestimated.Ultimately,paradigmsmatter.Thewayweperceiveandframeachallengeconditionsand/orlimitsourresponses.Weclearlyhaveblind spots.Forexample, theUSG tends toapply thekineticmetaphor toinfluenceoperations.However,wecannot“win”intheinformationspacebyapplyingtheequivalentofoverwhelmingforce.Instead,wemustunderstandthemotivationandintentionsofothers,understandtheenvironmentinwhichtheylive,and—mostimportantly—understandourselves.

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Conference Introduction (Mr. Marty Drake, USCENTCOM) Mr.MartyDrakewelcomedparticipantsonbehalfoftheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense(OSD),JointStaff (JS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), andDirector of National Intelligence (DNI) and National Intelligence Council (NIC) to the 10th AnnualStrategicMulti-LayerAssessment(SMA)Conference.Mr.Drakeemphasizedthatoverthepast10years,theSMAteamhasprovidedsignificantsupporttotheCombatantCommandsinaddressingcoreCOCOMproblemsandinterests.AccordingtoMr.Drake,oneofthemostvaluableaspectsofSMAisthatitbringstogetheranarrayofpeopleandperspectivesfromacrossacademia,thinktanks,andgovernment,whichgeneratesauniqueexpertisethatisofsignificantutilitytotheCombatantCommands.Mr.DrakestressedthattheCombatantCommandsaregratefulforallofthesupportthattheSMAteamhasprovidedoverthepastdecade.

Opening Sessions Maj Gen Charles Moore (JS/J39)

MajGenCharlesMooreemphasizedtheinvaluablerolethattheSMAteamplaysinprovidingplanningsupport toCommandswithcomplexoperational imperatives requiringmulti-agency,multi-disciplinarysolutions that are not within core Service/Agency competency. SMA solutions and participants aresought acrossUSGandbeyond, andSMA is acceptedand synchronizedby Joint Staff/J-39DDGOandexecutedbyASD(R&E)/EC&P/RRTO.Maj GenMoore presented the theme of this year’s SMA Conference: “From Control to Influence? AViewof—andVisionfor—theFuture.”Morespecifically,theconferencewasdesignedtoexaminehowtheUSand itsalliescancounterthe influencethatrecentlyre-emerging,capablestatessuchasChinaand Russia, and non-state actors, such as ISIS, exert on their neighbors and/or third parties throughmultiple elements of power. The rise of anti-access area denial capabilities and the economicascendance of China lead some to argue that we are moving toward becoming a more pluralized,multipolarworldinwhichmilitaryandeconomicsourcesofpowerarewidelydistributed.Technologies(e.g., the Internet and rapid means of mass migration) are making nation states increasingly moreporous, and a resurgence of nationalism and other forms of ethnic or religious identity politics hassolidifiedsomestatesandweakenedothers.ThecontinuanceofthesefactorsmaychangethewaythattheUS, itsallies,anditsadversariesconsiderandprioritizeinfluence,bothwithinthestateandacrossinterstateborders.Thisconferenceaimedtoexaminethesetrends,andexplorepossibleimplicationsforhow such factors may necessitate an explicit focus upon “influence” rather than “control” and howinfluencecouldexerteffectsonnational,regional,andgloballevelsoverthenext30years.

Dr. Charles Perkins (Principal Deputy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Emerging Capabil ity & Prototyping)

Dr.CharlesPerkinsbeganwithastoryofhowhemetDr.HriarCabayan(JS/J39/SMA)about20yearsagowhileworkingwiththeJ39.Drs.PerkinsandCabayanweregivenaprojecttotagtheheroincomingoutof Afghanistan so that theUS could find it once itmade itswayout into the international system. Itseemedthattheobvioussolutiontothisproblemwastotagtheheroinwithsomeradioactivetracer;however, eventually it was realized that this could not be done because the FDA required that the

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heroinbetaggedwithsomethingsafe.Eventually,asolutiontothisproblemwasfoundbyusingasafermaterialfortagging.WhentheAfghanwarstarted,itquicklybecameevidentthatwedidnotunderstandthesocialaspectsoftheconflict,andtherewasaclearneedforarichcontextualunderstanding.Assuch,Drs.PerkinsandCabayanbegana“richcontextualunderstanding”effort tohelpprovideunderstandingof theculturaland social issuesdriving the conflict inAfghanistanand Iraq. Itwasnot longbefore they realized theneedtoengagewithsocialscientists.ThisrichcontextualunderstandingeffortiswhatbeganSMAasweknowit.Today, in addition to the focus on social interactions,we have also seen the impact of socialmedia.Understanding social media, like social interactions, is critical to the counter-ISIS fight, critical tounderstanding gray zone conflicts, critical to understanding how to create stability in Iraq and theregion, and critical to understandinghowwebring inwhole of government solutions to someof ourproblems.ThegrowinginterestinSMAhasbeenclear.Overthepast10years,SMAhasgrowntocompriseabout3,000individuals,95USuniversities,14USdefensegroups,and8foreignmilitarygroups.Thereareatleast30SMAprojects thatareeitherongoingor fullycompleted.ThisAnnualSMAConferenceallowstheSMAteamtoextenditsnetworkandgainmoreexpertiseandunderstandingintohowtobestmakeuseofsocialsciencesandsocialmediatodosmart,innovativethings.

NIC’s 2017 Global Trends Report (Mr. Dan Flynn, DNI/NIC) TheNational IntelligenceCouncil (NIC)producedthe6theditionof itsGlobalTrendsReport in January2017. The Global Trends Report provides a framework for thinking about possible futures and theirimplications.Thefree,unclassifiedreportispublishedevery4yearstoinformincomingAdministrations.The 2017 Global Trends Report focused on the paradox of progress. Power is evolving in the worldtoday. Evolving power makes governing harder and raises the risk of instability and conflict, whichmeansthatthereisnowapremiumonpolicychoicesandresilience.Ultimately,internationalorderisinthebalance.Theparadoxisthattheworldhasgottenbetterinmanywaysformanypeopleinmanyplaces—peoplearelivinglonger,healthcareisgettingbetter,thereismoreaccesstotechnology,lesspeoplearelivinginextreme poverty, etc.—yet the world feels more dangerous than ever. Despite the positive globaltrends, there seems tobemoreuncertainty aboutwhere theworld is headed. This is theparadoxofprogress.Thepositive global trendshavenotbeen spreadequally. Forexample,when it comes to themodernglobaleconomy,therehavebeenbigwinnersandbiglosers.Thebigwinnershavebeen1)themiddleclassesinChina,India,andotheremergingeconomiesand2)theveryrich.Thebiglosershavebeen1)the very poor, in Africa and elsewhere, and 2) citizens of the OECD countries, plus much of thepopulationof the formercommunistcountries.Thekeyquestiongoing forwardwillbehowthesebigwinnersandbiglosershandlethesetypesofshifts.

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Theseshiftsinglobalwinnersandlosersaremakinggoverningmoredifficult.Fourkeytrendsstandoutinexplainingwhygoverningandcooperationwillbecomemoredifficultgoingforward.

• Anincreasingnumber,complexity,andspeedofissues.• Anincreasingnumberofstatesthatcanexertgeopoliticalinfluence.• An empowering of individuals and small groups to act like states, altering once established

patternsofbothgovernanceandconflict.• Achanginginformationenvironmentthatproducescountlessperceivedrealities,undermining

cooperationanddemocracy.Insuchaworld,powerisnotwhatitusedtobe.Forgingnewpatternsofcooperationbecomesessentialbutalsomoredifficult.Leadershipandthecoordinationofindividual,group,andstatechoicesismoreimportantthanever.In the near term, there is a rising risk of instability and conflict as global trends converge. Withincountries, problemsare likely to arisebecauseof economic, demographic, technological, and societalfactors.Betweencountries,problemsare likely toarisebecauseof increasinggeopoliticalcompetitionand the changing character of warfare. Globally, problems are likely to arise because of terrorism,environmentalfactors,andhealthfactors.KeyTrend:ChangingCharacterofConflictThecharacteroffutureconflictwillbediffuse,diverse,anddisruptive.

• Diffuse:Greateraccessibilitytoinstrumentsofwarwillempowerstates,motivatedindividuals,andnon-stategroupstoengage inconflict.Withthegrowingprivatizationofviolence,greaterfirepower is wielded by smaller groups. The high-tech lone-wolf terrorist is a future threat.Private military corporations, mercenaries, and even companies may be involved in futureconflict.

• Diverse:Themeansofwarwillvaryfromnuclearandadvancedconventionalweaponstocyberandothernonmilitarycapabilities.

• Disruptive: Increasingemphasis inconflictswillbeondisruptingcritical infrastructure,societalcohesion,governmentfunctions,andleadershipdecision-making(i.e.,paralyzeoperations).

The changing character of conflict is highlighted by four notable strategic trends in warfare: thedistinctionsbetweenpeacetimeandwartimewillcontinuetoblur;non-stategroupswillbecomemorecapable of greater disruption; there will be an increase in stand-off and remote attacks; and newconcernsaboutnuclearweaponsandotherWMDswillarise.TheInternationalOrderintheBalanceThe post-ColdWar, unipolarmoment has passed, and the post-1945 rules-based international ordermay be fading too. As power diffuses globally, aspiring powers and non-state actors are seeking toadjust the rules and norms to favor their interests. Waning of existing security commitments,reinterpretationofnorms, and theerosionof international institutions create the conditions for “a lacarte”internationalismandgreaterglobaldisorder.Long-TermScenarios

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Toexplorelong-termpossibilities,theGlobalTrendsReportpresentedthreepossiblescenariosforthelong-term future: an islands scenario, an orbits scenario, and a communities scenario. These pathsdependalotonwhatthelevelorprimeorganizingunitswhereordermightbefosteredwillbe.Theislandspathwayinvestigateshowlongperiodsofslowornoeconomicgrowthmightchallengebothtraditional models of economic prosperity and the presumption that globalization will continue toexpand.Inthisscenario,governmentsfacechallengesinmeetingsocieties’demandsforbotheconomicand physical security and managing between populism and inclusion as popular pushback toglobalization increases, emerging technologies transformwork and trade, and inequality and politicalinstabilitygrows.Suchdevelopmentsleadsomestatestoturninward,reducingsupportformultilateralcooperationandencouragingprotectionistpoliciesthatfurtherreduceglobaltrade.Overthelong-term,themost successful statesare those that findways to leveragenewsourcesofeconomicgrowthandproductivity by exploiting local manufacturing and technology advances, such as biotechnologies,robotics,andartificialintelligence.Theorbitspathwayexploresafutureoftensionscreatedbycompetingmajorpowers,particularlyChinaand Russia, seeking their own regional spheres of influencewhile attempting tomaintain stability athome. In this future, rising nationalism, changing conflict patterns, emerging disruptive technologies,anddecreasingglobalcooperationcombineto increasetheriskof interstateconflictandthreatentherules-based international order. The scenario highlights the importance of reassuring allies andpreventing gray zone conflicts from undermining international norms and from escalating into awarbetween major powers. The scenario portrays how the deployment of new capabilities, such ashypersonic weapons, autonomous systems, counter-space weapons, and cyber operations, mightintroduce new—and notwell understood—escalation dynamics, increasing the risk ofmiscalculation.Growinggeopoliticaltensionsthatproducedestabilizingeventsandincreasethedangersforallinvolvedmightprovideincentiveforrivalstofindcommongroundiftherisksofmiscalculationandescalationaremanaged.Thecommunitiespathwayexamineshowtheenormityoffutureeconomicandgovernancechallengesmighttestthecapacityofnationalgovernmentstocope,openingthespaceforlocalgovernmentsandprivateactorsingovernance.Informationtechnologyisthekeyenabler,andinthisfuture,companies,advocacy groups, charities, and local governments prove nimbler than national governments indelivering services to sway populations in support of their agendas.Governments that adopt policiesand processes for encouraging public-private partnerships with a wide-range of actors—city leaders,non-governmental organizations, and civil societies—will be more resilient in coping with emergingchallenges.Liberaldemocracieswithexperience inencouragingdecentralizedgovernanceandprivate-publicpartnershipswillbebestsuitedtooperateinthisworld.Othergovernments,however,mightnotfareaswell,leadingtoavarietyofoutcomes,includingincreasedauthoritarianismandstatefailure.OpportunitiesGoing forward, resilience will be crucial. In the emerging global landscape, rife with surprise anddiscontinuity,thestatesandorganizationsmostabletoexploitsuchopportunitieswillbethosethatareresilient,enablingthemtoadapttochangingconditions,persevereinthefaceofunexpectedadversity,andtakeactionstorecoverquickly.Theywillinvestininfrastructure,knowledge,andrelationshipsthatallowthemtomanageshock—whethereconomic,environmental,societal,orcyber.Similarly,themostresilient societies will likely be those that unleash and embrace the full potential of all individuals—whetherwomenandminoritiesorthosebatteredbyrecenteconomicandtechnologicaltrends.

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Discussion

Canyoutalkaboutthereport’smethodology?Mr.Flynnnoted that this is the6theditionof theGlobalTrendsReport,and foreachedition, theNICbegins with a clean sheet of paper. The NIC puts significant effort into challenging the report’sassumptions, and part of this effort includes reaching out to subject matter experts to challengeassumptions. TheNICalsoutilizes simulations to support thedevelopmentof the report’s trendsandscenarios.TheGlobalTrendsReportisalsopeerreviewedwithintheNationalIntelligenceCouncil(NIC).Whatkindofdatadoesthereportuse?Mr.Flynnstatedthatthereport’sdatacamefrombothsecondarysourcesandpeopleontheground.Thereportincorporatesonthegroundinsightsfrompeoplefromalldifferentwalksoflife,whichhelpstoensurethatthestudyhasacross-cuttingsocietalrepresentation.Doesthereportaddressshiftsintheenvironmentandshiftsinhumanuseofresources?Mr.Flynnnotedthatthereportdoesaddressenvironmentalshiftsmoregenerally.Forexample,shiftsinthe environment and in temperatures will put increased stress on areas throughout the world.Additionally, shifts in human usage of fossil fuels will certainly put pressure on economies that arelargelydependentonfossilfuelsandnotdiversified,whichagainshowstheimportanceofresilience.AretherefindingsfromtheGlobalTrendsReportsfrom4or8yearsagothatarenolongerrelevant inthisyear’sreport?Mr. Flynn stated that one big change in this year’s report is howwe think about power. Traditionalmetricsofpower(thingslikeGDP,militaryspending,etc.)nolongerseemtoreallyexplainwhatisgoingonintheworld.AnenemylikeISISisabletoreallychangethings,andtheyarenotastateactoratall.Itisclearthatthereareotherelementsofpowerthatweneedtobetterunderstand.The informationalaspect is important andwasmissing inprior versionsof the report. Theothernew,notableaspect isresilience.Ultimately,though,thewaywelookatpowerhaschangedoverthepast4to8years.Doesthereportlookatpopulationdensityandmegacities?Mr. Flynn noted that the report looks into factors like urbanization and numbers of people living oncoastlines.Doesthereporttalkaboutrelationshipsandallegiancestocommunities,whicharenotablyevolvingandstrengthening?Mr.Flynnstated thatascommunities strengthen, sodoallegiances to thatcommunity.Strengtheningallegiancetothecommunitymightmeanweakeningallegiancetothestate.Wehavealreadyseenthishappeninginmanyplaceswherecommunitiesarelookingtocity leaderstohelpsolvethecommunityproblems.WehavealsoseenthisontheadversarialsidewithgroupslikeISISbutalsowithRussiaanditsallegiancestoRussianspeakersinothercountries.

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Doesthereportmakeanypolicyrecommendations?Mr. Flynnnoted that the report is aUS intelligenceproduct so it does not explicitlymake anypolicyrecommendations.Theclosestthereportcomestomakingarecommendation iswith itsemphasisonresilience. The Global Trends Report has typically been used by incoming Administrations as thefoundationforstrategydocuments,anditisthehopethatthisnewAdministrationwillusethereportinasimilarfashion.

Panel 1: Rethinking Control and Inf luence in the Age of Complex Geopolit ical Systems Panelmembers:

• COL(ret)ChuckEassa(SCO),moderator• Dr.ValSitterle(GeorgiaTechResearchInstitute)• Dr.NickWright(UniversityofBirmingham)• Dr.BobToguchi(USASOC)

COL (ret) Chuck Eassa (SCO)

COL(ret)ChuckEassaemphasizedthatwhatitmeanstocontrolandinfluencehaschangedastimehasprogressed.Whenwe thoughtaboutcontroland influence in1945,we focusedonUSmilitarypower(i.e.,personnelandweapons).Whenwe thoughtaboutcontroland influence in1986,we focusedonthenumberof soldiers in theNATOconsortium, levelsofdedication tonation stateswith clear ideasabout defense of territory, and capability and capacity levels with things like technology, space, andcommunication.Whenwethinkaboutcontrolandinfluencetoday,nationstatemilitariesnolongerleadthe research—corporations like Google, for example, are now ahead in building and utilizingtechnologies, and NGOs are operating throughout the world with their own spheres of influence.Ultimately, power has been diffusing—we are now competing for influence. The problem we face,though, is that our planners still operate using war frames and criteria for declaring war, while ouropponentsareworkinginthegrayzone.

Dr. Val Sitterle (Georgia Tech Research Institute)

Dr.ValSitterlewonderedwhatitmeanstohaveacapability.First,sincewedonotgettodecidewhatthe future operating environmentswill be or look like,wemust understand control and influence asbothopposingandinteractingstatespaces.Intoday’sage,controliscomprisedofthreeprimaryfactors:the ability to compel, the ability to coerce, and the ability to influence. In themilitary sense, controlmeansbeingabletoregulateforcesandbattlefieldconditionstomeetthecommander’sintent;whileinthetechsense,controltendsmoretowardinfluenceandrequiresinteractionwithmedia,information,andideastoimpactpopulationsacrossamorphousspacesandmultidimensionalenvironments.Giventhatwecanno longercontrol the intersectionof theoperationaland informationspaces,whatshouldwedo?Manysuggestproactiveapproachesto influence,pushing ideasandeven“inoculating”againstoneswebelieveareharmful.UnderstandingwhatweseektoinfluencebasedonwhatwewanttoachievewilldefineourpersonalOvertonWindowandwhatwearewillingtodotoachieveit.ThistiesintothematerielspacebyunderstandingwhataCommanderneedstoknow.Materielsolutionsalone

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cannotaddressthisspacecompletely.Forexample,successmustintegratecomplexinteractionsacrosskineticandnon-kinetic,militaryandcivilian,stateandnon-state,economicsandideology,etc.We need understanding that goes beyond our traditional linear and kinetic lenses. Sometimes thetechnological systems themselves—how they are perceived and used operationally—can alsosignificantlyshapeoratleastchangethelocalenvironment,addingtheirowncontributiontoinfluencedynamics. Notions of non-control such as those in strategically engineered autonomy of materielsystemshelpusseehowimpactfulinfluencecanbeand,critically,howunboundeditsanalysiscanbe.Ultimately,what itmeans tohaveacapability ischanging.Wemust findnewapproaches toevaluatesystemsandtheimpactofactionsaswecannolongerbruteforceeithercapabilitydevelopmentoritsanalysis.

Dr. Nick Wright (University of Birmingham)

Dr. Nick Wright wondered what is influence? Influence is affecting the behaviors, attitudes, orperceptionsofothers(e.g.,deterrence,escalationmanagement).Toeffectivelyinfluence,weneedtobeabletoanticipatehowagivenaudienceisgoingtodecide.Thus,whatweknowaboutdecision-makingiscriticaltounderstandinginfluence.Threekeyaspectsofdecision-making stand out in particular. First, we have learned a lot about how humans makedecisions—not just mathematical models about how people should make decisions, but how theyactuallydomakedecisions.Forexample,wehavelearnedthatpeopleactuallytypicallyonlythinkoneor two steps ahead, not all theway through. Second,we should think about the typesof things thatpeopledopoorly.Peoplearenotverygoodatthinkingoutside-in(e.g.,whatdoestheaudiencewant,andhowdotheymakedecisions?).Ifwewanttoinfluence,weneedtolistentothosewearetryingtoinfluence. Third, we need to get smarter about howwe use evidence.We have learned a lot abouthumanmotivation, soweshould try toprogress inhowwepresentevidenceso thatweareproperlycapitalizingonthatknowledge.

Dr. Bob Toguchi (USASOC)

Dr. Bob Toguchi remarked that ongoing advances in society structure the character of war (e.g.,democratization prior to the Napoleonic Wars, the first industrial revolution prior to WWI,mechanizationpriortoWorldWarII,thenuclearage,andtheeraofdigitaltechnologies).Aswemoveforward,warfare is likely to reflectwhat is going on in society.Given this,what is going onwith theacceleratingpaceofchange in the informationage, insociety today, that ischangingthecharacterofwarfare?First,thereisaubiquityofinformation.Wearedrowningindata—notonlydatacreatedbyhumans,butalsodatacreatedbymachines.Itisestimatedthatweareonlyanalyzingabout.5%ofallavailabledata.Goingforward,everyoneisgoingtohavedata,whichmeansthattherewilllikelybeanaccelerationinourpaceofchange.Thiswillcreatesignificantchanges incapabilities for individuals,non-stateactors,andnearpeercompetitors—informationwillcreatepower.Second, our adversaries are adapting—they are learning our playbook and looking for otherways tocompete.Thespacebetweenpeaceandwar,inparticular,isanewbattleareathatouradversariesaretargetingforvulnerabilities.Wemustrealizethatwecannotexpecttoplaythesamewargamesofthepastandgetthesameresults—ouradversariesareadapting,andsoareourconflicts.

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Third,wearemastersofmaneuveringinthephysicalspace,butwelagfarbehindwhenitcomestothecognitivespace.Wedonotevenhavedoctrineforthecognitivespace.Atpresent,ouradversariesareout-maneuveringusinthecognitivespace.Weneedtobemoreknowledgeableabouthowothersaremaneuveringinthecognitivespaceandabouthowwecanimproveourcapacityinthisarena.Thiseffortneedstostartfromthegroundup—beginningwithoureducationsystem,wherecognitivemaneuverisrarelyeventaught.Ultimately,weareverygoodwhenitcomestophysicalobjectivesbutverybadwhenitcomestocognitiveobjectives,andthisneedstochange.

Discussion

Howdoyouinoculatepopulationsagainstfalsenews?Dr. Toguchi responded that we must condition populations to expect false news and then alsoconsistentlypresentwhatactuallyhappened.Thereisalsoaneedforalternativemeansofgettingnewsandverifying the factson theground.One tacticmightbe tostartbyshowingpeople thatwhat theyhaveseeninthepast,onarepetitivebasis,fromaparticularadversary,isactuallyfalsenews.Areyouseeinganevolutioninhowwemeasuresuccessandwhetherornotwearemakingpopulationsmoreresilient?Dr.Toguchinotedthattherehasbeenprogressinvisualizingthecognitivespace.Thingslikesentimentanalysisandartificialintelligencehavecontributedtothisprogress.Dr. Wright added that the main blockage is not that complex—ultimately, we do not do enoughevaluation.Cognitivemaneuverincorporatestheterm“warfare”verynebulously—oneofthestrugglesseemstobethatthemilitaryisdesignedtokillandbreakthings,sowhendoesthisbecometheresponsibilityoftheStateDepartmentand/orothers?COL(ret)Eassanotedthatthemilitary isdesignedtomeetnationalsecurityobjectives,not justtokillandbreakthings.Dr.Toguchistatedthatoperatinginthecognitivespaceshouldbeateameffort.Tooperateinthisspaceeffectively,wemustworkwiththeInteragencycommunity,shareinformationwidely,andsupporttheinvolvementofallinterestedagencies.COL(ret)Eassaaddedthatdefenseacquisitionisfocusedonphase3.Unfortunately,theabilitytoshiftsomeofthattotheleft—thusempoweringtheCOCOMstofocusmoreonunderstandingtheirAORs—hasnotbeendoneyet.Howdoweknowwhatthedecisionstrategiesandstylesofouradversariesare?Dr.Wright noted that understanding cross-cultural differences is very important. For example, thingslikecaringaboutbeingtreatedunfairly,trust,status,etc.aretypicallyimportanttoeveryone,butsomeculturesmight express themor value them slightly differently.Weneed to identify core elements ofdecision-makingandwhatwethinkwillcrosscultures,sothatwecanusethoseinsightsasabasis.

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Whatcanthetechnologyrealmdowithrespecttoadvancingourunderstandingandcapabilitiesintheinfluencearena?Dr.ToguchinotedthattheUSASOCG9Directoratehasworkedwithafewsimulationtoolstovisualizesuccess in thecognitivespace.Tools suchasAthenaandSenturionhavebeenhelpful in this sense tounderstandthecognitiveimpactofselectedcoursesofaction.

Panel 2: From Fai lure to Success: Information Power and Paradigmatic Shifts in Strategy and Operational Art Panelmembers:

• LTCScottThomson(OSD-P),moderator• Dr.EmileSimpson(Harvard)• Ms.PriscillaGuthrie(IDA)• Dr.IanMcCulloh(JohnsHopkinsUniversityAppliedPhysicsLaboratory)• Dr.SpencerMeredith(NDU)• Mr.JamesFarwell(KingsCollegeLondon)• Mr.MichaelLewis(MarineCorpsCommandandStaffCollege)

Dr. Emile Simpson (Harvard)

Dr. Emile Simpson began by noting the conceptual problem that the panel would address: whenadversariesoperatebelowacertainthreshold,itmakestheconceptofvictoryirrelevant;thus,whataretheinstrumentsinthecommanders’toolkits?Therearetwoscenariosinwhichanadversaryfrustratestheuseofmilitaryforcetosecurevictory:scenario1)whentheadversarylimitsoperationstobelowathreshold,andscenario2)whentheadversaryisadispersednetwork.Scenario 1 is exemplified by Russia inUkraine. A state operates through proxies to use violence in alimitedway(i.e.,gunboatdiplomacy,raidsagainstrebelsinanotherstate,etc.).These“measurersshortofwar”havefallenabitoutoffashion.ButasrecentlyasGeorgeKennan’saddressoftheSovietUnion,theseideasarestillanimatingdiscussion.Thegoaloflimitedviolenceistopreventescalationtoachieveasmallbattlefieldobjective.Limitedviolenceisalsoinformationaimingtosendapoliticalmessage,orinotherways,influence.In conventional war, the idea is that victory on the battlefield ultimately translates into politicalinfluencefromthevictory’spolicygoals.Heretheprimarymeansofsharinginformationisperformanceonthebattlefield. Inmeasuresshortofwar,thepoliticalmessagefromviolenceisusedinsuchawaythat thebattlefield isbypassedandadirectmessageto thetargets isconveyed—economicsanctions,cyber attacks, routine political action, etc. are examples of this. Themoreonemoves toward limitedconflictshortofwar,themoreviolenceisaboutinformationandinformationalsignals.The more one bypasses the battlefield, the less victory on the battlefield should create politicaloutcomes.Youcannothavevictory inwar ifyouarenot inawar.Thepoliticaleffectsofforces inthegray zone is directly woven into the fabric of routine political operations. Management of violence,

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ratherthanvictory, istheparadigm.Wehavemadeafetishoftheideaofdecisivevictory,evenwhentheconditionsforvictoryarenotthere.Inscenario2,weareremindedofthewaragainstterroristgroups.ItisinconceivabletoexplaintheriseofISILwithouttheinformationrevolutions.Unlikemeasuresshortofwar,thismodelofconflictdoesnotfittheClausewitzmodelofwar.Thatmodelofwarpresumesahierarchyorcentralorganizationoftheadversary.Thishierarchalarrangementallowsforviolencetocreatepoliticaloutcomes.Inthelooseconfederationthatareterroristgroups,actionsagainstabasewillnotdefeatthenetwork.Thenetworkcanalsoplayonexistinggrievancestoexploititself.Thereareparallelsbetweentheuseofforceagainstanetworkadversaryandinmeasuresshortofwar.One, there isnodecisivevictory.Two, themanipulationof information to influence itsgoals iskey tosuccessfulmanagement.There are differences too. Membership in a network is subjective; increasing the importance ofinformation operations to slow recruitment. Through audience analysis, one can disaggregate thesupportive populations of an insurgency. Local political intelligence becomes very important. Forexample,the2013interventioninMaliallowedFrenchforcestotargetalQaedawithoutalienatingtheTuaregs.

LTC(P) Scott Thomson (OSD-P)

LTC(P) Scott Thomson highlighted the importance of properly integrating information into planningpractices. Moreover, the challenge we have with information operations and persuasion is that it isintangible.So,howdowehelptheinstitutionadopttheseideasaspractice?LTC(P)Thomsonnotedthatfor20years,asamaneuverofficer,hehadthoughtthatsuccesswasaccomplishedattheendofagun.Onlylateinhiscareer,withatransitiontobeingaPSYOPofficer,didherealizethisthinkingwaspatentlyfalse.Wetendtomakealotofassumptionsabouthumanbehaviorandassumethatifweuseenoughforce,wewillgetwhatwewant;however,theproblemisinherentlyinformational,despiteourtrainingmostlybeingaboutvictoryinbattle.

Ms. Prisci l la Guthrie ( IDA)

Ms. Priscilla Guthrie highlighted frustration at our lack of progress in dealing with information andinformationtechnology. Wearetrappedbyour taxonomyandthewordsweuse—particularlyacrossthe technical,policy/legal,andoperationalcommunities.Whyareweallowingvocabulary toseparateourcommunitiesandtolimitourprogressandeffectiveness?Informationwarfarehasbeenaroundfora longtime.Socialmediahasbeenusedtofomentrebellionandpeoplearenowharnessingittogovern.Unlesswefigureouthowwewanttousetechnologyandleverage information, we are likely to find ourselves at a “technological” disadvantage. And, whilemachinesworkingwithhumanscanoftendobetterthanahumanworkingalone,thechallengeisnotjustpairinghumanswithcomputers.WeneedtoharnesscomputersandinformationasintegralpartsoftheC2structure. Indoingso,wewillbeable improvemissioneffectivenessby:1)providingthe forcewithinformation-rich(e.g.,data-finds-the-data)situationalawarenessandaccesstohigh-quality,timely,multi-domainoptions(someofwhichmaybenominatedbymachines)and2)enablingdeliverywiththedirectnessandscaleofourhierarchicalmilitaryforceandtheagilityandspeedofsmallcells.

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Dr. Ian McCulloh (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory)

Dr.IanMcCullohwonderedhowmanyplannersunderstandmodelsofbehavioralchange.Itisimportantthatwehave senior leaders thatunderstandhow to linkbehavioralmodels toourpolices to achieveoutcome.WehaveseenalQaedafight informationalcampaignswithsupporting lethal fires.Wehaveseen the Russian military declare that information operations are their main effort. While we haveexperienced similar success in the pastwith programs like the Strategic ProgramsOperations Center(SPOC) inIraq;wearenolongeroperatingeffectively inthisarena.Therefore,goingforward, itwouldbenefit us immensely to 1) capture and communicate the lesson of SPOC in Iraq, 2) improve ourprocesses forcollectingandsharingdata,and3) further incorporate these lessonsandprocesses intotheCommander’splanningspace.

Dr. Spencer Meredith (NDU)

Dr.SpencerMeredithemphasizedtheimportanceofcommunicatingmeasuresforthings.Wetalkaboutnarratives,attitudes,behaviors,andcognition,buthowarewemeasuringthesethings?Likewise,howdowemeasurethemobilizationpotentialofsociety,whetherourown,aneutral,oranadversary,andhowdowefindtherightnessofengagement?Dr.Meredithnotedthatwearenowbeginningtotalkaboutlearningthesametypesofapproachesouradversaries currentlyuse.Whenwe thinkaboutphase1and strategicmessaging, thatmeanswewillneedourhandinalotofpies,whichwillbeexpensive.Weneedtobetterunderstandhowallofthesethingsmix.Dr.Meredithconcludedthatthemostsuccessfulpartnersarethosethathavebuy-in.WhatifwechangeourparadigmfromtheUSasleader,totheUSasaclient-statemodel?Wedopartnercapacityverywell,so this kind of paradigm shift might present a model that offers us a beacon of opportunity goingforward.

Mr. James Farwell (Kings College London)

Mr. Farwell emphasized that neither USG nor the military has a coherent doctrine of informationwarfareandthatthemilitarytendedtogiveinformationwarfareshortshrift.Thatwasdangerousinaworld inwhichengagementsandconflicts tookplaceamongcivilians rather thanona setbattlefield.TheeraofJenaorIraq2003is,withinevitableexceptions,over.Everyblockinacity,everyvillage,everytelevision setor cellphone inaglobal landscapecouldconstituteadimensionofwhathasbecomeaglobalbattlespace.Sometimes kinetic action may prove most critical to achieving a desired end-state. At other times,informationwarfareandcommunicationstrategymightmattermore.Eitherway,successfuloutcomesrequiredintegratingkineticandcommunicationstrategy,operations,andtactics.Anysuccessfulstrategyrequiresfirstdefiningthedesiredend-state.Inshort,whatconstituteswinning?From completionof that task flow thedeveloping and implementationof strategy, plans, operations,tactics,andmetrics.

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Communicationstrategyand informationwarfare isabout influencingbehavior.Behavior ismotivatedby emotion and values. The Clausewitz trinity of will, chance, and passion for a cause matters ascentrally to informationwarfare as to kinetic action. Information strategy needs to understandwhattargetaudienceshearandfeel.ToooftenUSGstrategyseemstoflowfromthepremisethatthemorecritical question is making certain that target audiences hear what the US wants to say. That’ssecondary. Success requires understanding whether or how to ensure that target audiences areinterested inwhatwearedoingor saying. Theyneed tounderstandwhatwearedoing,howwearedoing something,whywe are doing it, and how it affects their interests.We should seek to convertopponentsorfortheunconvertible,neutralizethem.HowpopulationsperceiveUSactionsiscriticaltosuccess.Itaffectsourabilitytoinfuseouractionswithlegitimacyandtoseizeandmaintainthemoralhighground.ConsiderthefirstbattleofFallujahin2004:despite kinetic success by Marines on the ground, that battle was lost after insurgents won theinformation war, persuading the Coalition Provisional Authority and ultimately President George W.Bush that blowback from Iraqis and amongworld opinion required halting offensive operations. TheNovember battle was won because Commanders successfully integrated kinetic and communicationstrategy. Informationwarfaremadeadifference in thatoutcome, althoughonenotes that thebattlewasasuccessonlyatthetacticallevel.Atthebroaderstrategiclevel,thebloodshedandviolence,fueledby insurgentpropagandanowspearheadedbyanemergingAlQaeda in Iraq, ledtowhatbecamethemost violent year in Iraq because the battle did not properly take into account vital strategicconsiderationsthataffectedtheemotionsandattitudesofIraqis.ThepictureshiftedonlyafterMarinesandtheCIAsuccessfullycametotermswithIraqicultureandthepolitical dynamicsof Sunni tribes inwestern Iraq—and informationwarfarenotionsproved critical tosuccess in forging winning coalitions and turning the tide of battle against violent extremists like AlQaeda.Informationwarfareisvitalaswellinachievingadesiredend-statebecauseunlessanenemyrecognizesits defeat, it is not defeated. Iraq offers again a good example. Coalition forces toppled the Saddamgovernment.ButneitherSaddam’salliesnorother insurgentsagreedthattheCoalitionhadwon.Thatledtoaprolongedinsurgency.TheUSmilitaryleadershipbelatedlyrecognizedthatyoucannotkillyourway to success. Warfare is, as Clausewitz properly observed, about achieving political objectives.Realizationofthatgoalrequiresunderstandinginformationwarfare,developinganactionabledoctrinethat does not yet exist for theUS, althoughRussia andChina are fast developing and resourcing thecapabilitytofightinformationwars.Indeed,China’sapproachtovictoryeschewskineticengagementinfavor of informationwarfare. Sadly, theUS lacks not only a doctrine or strong sensibility among themilitary that is, ironically, common in US political and corporate communication campaigns, forcommunicationstrategy.Itlacksamechanismtodeveloporimplementone.As one considers the types of conflicts and engagements that seem likely to define the threatenvironment lookingoverthehorizon,theUS ignorescorrectionofthisstrategicdeficiencyat itsownperil.

Mr. Michael Lewis (Marine Corps Command and Staff College)

Mr.MichaelLewisnotedthatmoreandmorewearehearingthingslike:“yournewsisfake;mynewsisreal.”Thistypeofconversation isdrivenbyperceptionsbutalsoreflectsunderlyingsystemsofsense-

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making.Mr.Lewisarguedthatwearedyinginaseaofmetaphorsandourdiscussionsarenotnew—wecontinuetorepeatthingswehavebeentalkingaboutforever.Problemsarise fromnotbelieving that there areotherperspectives, or narratives.Narratives are thewaywemakesenseoftheworldandexplainorpredicttheoutcomesofouractions.Thisunderstandingshapes thewaywe interpretdataandmake theoriesofaction,victory,and rolesand responsibilities.Therearechallengestonarrativesthatleadtomoralconflictwithintheindividualresultinginaformofcognitive dissonance that provides an opportunity for consideration of other perspectives. Notably,strategyisanarrative,butthosenarrativesareconstrainedbythesystemsweusetodevelopplansandoperations. We are teaching cognitive tools and critical thinking as part of our professional militaryeducation,butwhenconfrontedwithaproduct-orientedplanningprocess,problem-framingbecomesproblem-freezing. Consequently, when a problem emerges that challenges our assumptions and thevalidityofourplans,werevert topreconceivedsystemsofunderstanding thatareoftenatoddswithempiricalevidence.Ourresilientnarrativesandtheassumptionsthatserveastheirfoundationcontinuetodriveourplansforactionandtheoriesofvictory.Ultimately,weneedtoreflectonourownnarrativeofhowweseetheworldandhowtheworldseesus,understandingthatthesetwonarrativesmayoftenbeinoppositionandthatthetruthreallyisintheeyeofthebeholder.

Discussion

Someofyouhavementionedlookingatouralliestoshapewhatwewanttoachieve.Howmuchdoyouthink there is leftover narrative from the Cold War about democracy that complicates a client-statestrategy?Peoplearenotmovedbyfactsandlogic,theyaremovedbyemotion.Wearethecommercialnottheshow.Thesefactshavenoappealandprolongthediscussion,creatingexposurefortheenemy.Dr.McCulloharguedthatitisnotwisetogroupnation-statesintosingleactormodelswhenitcomestoinfluencingtheirbehavior.There isageneralpopulationandanelitepopulation,whichhavedifferentbeliefs,knowledge,attitudes,etc.Dr.Meredithaddedthatwhenthinkingaboutwhatbindstheseentitiestogether,wecanusesomethinglike “responsivegovernance” tomovebeyond“democracy”asa label. These labels can facilitate self-reflection.Mr.Farwellhighlightedhisconcernregardingformulasthataretoobroad.Weshouldstartwithwhatwewant to accomplish and then focus on the audiences that are effected by our actions. In today’sworld,therearemultipleperspectivesoutthere.Ourgovernmentisnotsetuptodealwiththevagariesofinformationwarfare.Themilitarydoesnotthinklikeaprofessionalcommunicationsshop.Mr.Farwellrecommended“persuasionandpower”withrespecttocommunicationsstrategyandwarfaredoctrine.LTCThomsonnotedthatoneof theproblemsof targetaudienceanalysis is that it isan intelproblemthatoccursatahigherlevel.Believing isseeing,nottheotherwayaround.Reality isconstructed,butthatconstructionoccursatopbehavior.Dowehaveagreementonthequickestwaytoeffectbehaviortochangebeliefs?Dr.McCullohrespondedthatthisisonemodelofbeliefchange.Thereareothermodels,likecognitivedissonanceorshiftingsentiment.Weneedtousetheappropriatemodel.Forexample,weareableto

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incorporatemeasuresof social strain toseehow ISISwasable togainpurchase in Iraq,whichhelpedextractthestrainsthatturnedtheSunnisagainstISIS.Dr.Meredithaddedthattheideathattheworldisconstructedisfarfromsettled.Therearepartsoftheworldwhererevelationistheprimarymechanism.Ultimately,therearefundamentallydifferentwaysofengagingwithrealityoutthere.Mr.Farwellnotedthatvaluesdifferfromculturetoculture,andthereisnotriedandtruemethodfordoingthat.Thereisnoall-encompassingformula.Whatarethepsychologicaleffectsofhumansinteractingwithcomputers?Howdoesthemilitarythinkaboutthisinteraction?Ms.Guthriewondered ifwewouldknow if they (therobots)are followingreasonable rules.Wehavenot gotten past that kind of question. There is great power in using information, but we needexperimentationtofigureoutwherethelinesare.Dr. McCulloh noted that volume, speed, digitization, and cost have changed; how we processinformationhasnot.Technological innovations in communicationshavecaused increased informationproduction in the past. The military has become less directive and prescriptive. We can give aCommander’sintenttorelativelyautonomousunits.However,wehavenotbeenabletocommunicatetheCommander’sintentintheinformationwarfarespace.

Panel 3: Gray Zone to Gray Matter…A Neurocognit ive Revolution Panelmembers:

• Dr.NickWright(UniversityofBirmingham)• Dr.AmyKruse(PlatypusInstitute)• Dr.WilliamCasebeer(LockheedMartin)• Dr.DianeDiEullis(NDU)• Dr.JamesGiordano(GeorgetownUniversityMedicalCenter)• Dr.JasonSpitaletta(JohnsHopkinsUniversityAppliedPhysicsLaboratory)

Dr. Nick Wright (University of Birmingham)

Dr. Nick Wright pointed to a number of advancements in neuroscience and a constellation oftechnologiessurroundingitoverpast20years, includingbigdata, influencetools,biologicaltools,andweapons. Furthermore, this constellationof technologies is nowbeing connected throughdeepdata;forexample,Googlehasemployedneuroscientiststoactuallylookatbrainsandtechnology.

Dr. Amy Kruse (Platypus Institute)

Dr. Amy Kruse emphasized that there have been huge changes in neuroscience in the past 3 years,somethingofaneurocognitiverevolution.Thereisanewfocusonthefusionoftechniquesforlookinginto the brain and changing behavior, and the scale and scope is huge, now including big datatechniques,stimulationtechniques,DIYneurocognitivetrials,andnewandchangingtechnologies.

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Thisneurocognitiverevolutionimpactsdefenseandsecurityinfourprimaryareas.

1. Optimization and repair: The new knowledge and technologies impact things like prostheticsrepair,memoryresearch,andtheoptimizationofindividuals,notjustappendagesorparts.Thisprogresshasbeenclearlyvisibleinsports.

2. Influence:Thecommercial industry isdelving into influencevianeuralmarketing,butdefenseneedstocatchup.

3. Integration with AI: The development of autonomous systems is an area of major interest,particularlywhenrelatingtodefenseandsecurityconcerns.

4. Disruption and Defense: We are increasingly learning about the defense of neurocognitivesystemsinordertodisruptcognitivefunctioning.

Unfortunately,challengesfordefensestillexist.Theareaisstillunderfunded,andweareunderinvestingin neurocognitive research. Additionally, themarket is disorganized. There is little penetration in thedefenseindustry.Dr.WilliamCasebeer(LockheedMartin)isagoodexampleofsomeonegettinginandapplying this in the defense area. The dual use nature of neuroscience research is also problematic.Applicationscanbeusedinmultipleways,includingpurposefulalternativeapplications.Ultimately,neuroscienceisofglobalandinternationalinteresttotheextreme.Thedefenseindustryhasfailedtoconvertandgetintothefield,whileindustriesoutsideofbiotech,likeFacebookandElonMusk,areoutthereinvesting.Thedisorganizednatureofthemarketisahurdleforthedefenseindustry,butitisclearthattheneurocognitiverevolutionisathand.

Dr. Wil l iam Casebeer (Lockheed Martin)

Dr.WilliamCasebeernotedthatbyputtinghumansandmachinesintoaclosedlooprelationship,wegetintothenatureofreasoninginwhichmachinesaddressproblemsolving.Somenotableexamplesofthishuman-autonomyinteractioninclude:

• System for Accessing Complex Contextual Attention and Dynamic Engagement (SACCADE) isdesignedtoimproveindividualperformancebygoingfromanormativemodeltoonewheretheoperator is actually placing their attention. SACCADE is using cognitive neuroscience andbehavioralmeasurestoseewheretheeyeballisonthescreenandwhereinthebrainisactuallypayingattentiontowhereeyeballisat.

• AprogramnamedCAMP-TMisavarietyofcognitivemodelsbaseliningasa teambycheckingworkingmemory, reaction times,and recall. Then,autonomously in thebackground,personaltaskadaptationtohumanteammatesisbrokendowntoboostoverallteamperformance.

• AprogramnamedAHMP-SETisasetofsystemengineeringtoolsforrealtimemonitoringofthetimeittakesforhumanstocompleteandcharacterizeatask.Thisbooststeamperformanceanddynamicallyrecomposeshuman-machineteams,anditchangesteamsandmachinesontheflytomaximizeperformance.

Thereisdangerinneglectingtheautonomyofthesocio-cognitivestate.Humansandmachinesneedtointeract, andwe need to treat humans andmachines the sameway (see DARPA explainable humanintelligence).Beyond just theoryofmind,weneed tounderstandhow teammates thinkand thenweneed toapply thisunderstanding towardsadversariessowecanbetterunderstandhowtoget thingsdone.

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We face several vulnerabilities. First, the importance of the training set cannot be understated—thedata that is fed into the network is largely important—so we remain vulnerable to corrupted data.Second,thereisworkbeingdonetobuildcapacitytoconfuseautonomy(e.g.,facerecognitionspoilers).Third,vulnerabilitiesexistinothermethodsofdiffusingrecognitionthroughphysicalmaterials.Fourth,vulnerabilities exist via higher order cognition jamming (e.g., wearables that facial components and,therefore,messwiththefacialrecognitionalgorithm).Finally,deeplearningexplorationrepresentationswithindeeplearningnetworkscouldbevulnerable.Ultimately,humansandautonomousmachineswillbeincreasinglyintegratedinthefuture.Wecannotneglectthis,sowemuststarttakingacognitivesystemsintelligenceanalysisapproachtoourproblems.

Dr. Diane DiEuli is (NDU)

Dr. Diane DiEuliis remarked that over the past decade, we have begun to see the purposefullyengineeringof biology in both research realms and tomake consumer and commercial products, thenovelgeneeditingtool,CRISPR,hasbeenresponsibleforenablingthisrevolution,andsynthesizingDNAis becoming more routine. The ramifications of this have been dominating bioethical conversations.Geneticmanipulationcapabilitiessuchasthesearenowbecomingavailabletoamuchwidergroupofactors,includingthosewhoarenottrainedbiologists.The manipulation of agents for use as bioweapons is potentially possible given the advent of newbiotechnology tools. In the neurobiology realm in particular, aswe learnmore about genotypes andphenotypesthatgovernthebrain,itisconceivablethatwecanmanipulateagentsthatworkdirectlyonthe brain. This means that we could directly act on those genes that control proteins and cellularpathwaysthatcontrolaspectsofhumanbehavior.Thatis,bioweaponsmaybedeveloped,notfor“massdestruction” and lethality but to rather control individuals’ behavior. Given this, it would not beoutlandishtopresumethatouradversariesmaybelookingtocreatemassdisruptionvianeurobiologicalagents.TheDoDhasdonehumanperformance research for a long time—wehavealwaysbeen interested inoptimizingwarfighterperformance,evenwithfairlysimplemethods likeuseofcaffeinetokeeppilotsawakeinthecockpit.Today,theHumanPerformanceresearchportfoliohasconsiderablyadvanced,andemergingbiotechnology isapotentialtoolaffectsuchthingsasmood,performance,providinggreaterconcentration,lessfatigue,etc.However,itisimportanttorememberthedualusesideofneuroscienceinthatouradversariesarelookingforthesamethingstouseagainstus—todegradeperformance.So,whilewemayhaveethicalconstraintsagainstanygeneticmanipulationofwarfighters,ouradversariesmaypursuesuchagentsandweneedtobepreparedtodefendagainstthem.

Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown University Medical Center)

Dr. James Giordano noted that theOxford Dictionary defines the term “weapon” in twoways: 1) assomething designed or used for inflicting harm or damage and 2) as ameans of contending againstothers.Dr.Giordanoexplainedthatneuroscienceandtechnologiescanbeusedasweaponsineitherorboth of theseways. For example, brain science can be used to foster power,which can be variouslyleveraged:fromeconomictourism,toprovidinginformationandtoolstoaffectengagementsbetweenagentsandactors,toovertdevelopmentofmethodsandinstrumentsthatcanbeemployedinconflictand warfare. But, brain sciences can also be employed to disrupt such enterprises, by providinginformation and tools to mitigate aggression, violence, and warfare. For example, we may employ

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neuralandcognitivesciencesasadjuncts tohumanandsignal intelligence (HUMINTandSIGINT).Thisapproach,termed“neuro-cognitiveintel”orNEURINT,canservetofosterdeepenedunderstandingandinsighttohumanpsychologicalandsocialprocesses,soastobothfortifyintelligenceassessment,andtodevelop approaches to alter individual and group thought and actions. While such methods areprimarilyorientedtowardpreventingtheescalationofviolence,brainsciencecanalsobeweaponized,and there is increasing concern about dual use applications of the neural and cognitive sciences todevelopmoreovertformsofweapons.Suchneuroweaponsincludedrugs,microbes,toxins,anddevicesthatcanassessandaffectthebrain,andthe(relativelynew,stillincipient,butsteadilydeveloping)useofsmall scaleneurotechnologies thatcan interactwith insects’nervoussystemsandremotelycontroltheir movements, in order to create “cyborg drones” that can be used in surveillance or infiltrationoperations.Dr.Giordanosummarizedbyassertingthatthebraincanbeseenasthenextbattlespace.Inthislight,hestressedthatitwillbeimportanttoposeandaddresstwoimportantquestions.First,towhatextentcan these technologies be leveraged to exert power in political,military, andwarfare domains? Andsecond,givensuchconsiderations,howshouldresearchanduseoftheneurosciencesbebestengaged,guided and governed? Giordano stressed that these questions are ever more pressing, as majorneuroscientific developments are being achieved internationally in spans of 5-10 years, and dual-useand direct-to-military applications of brain science, inclusive of the weaponization of neuroscientifictechniquesand technologies,are thereforeadvancing inyears,notdecades.Ofparticularnote is thatsuchenterprisesarealsobeingundertakenbynations–andgroupsofnon-stateactors– thatdonotshare the interests or intents of the United States and its allies. This represents a clear and presentthreat to internationalbiosecurity.Dr.Giordanoclaimedthatasimpleprecautionaryprinciplewillnotwork in light of the current palette, scope and pace of international activities in the brain sciences.Rather,hecalledforastanceofpreparedness,andtheimportanceofsoundethicalfootingaswemeetthechallengeofdual-useandevermore likelymilitary, intelligenceandpoliticalemploymentofbrainscienceonthe21stcenturyworldstage.

Dr. Jason Spitaletta (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory)

Dr.JasonSpitalettahighlightedthattheAsymmetricWarfareGroup(AWG)isdoinganexceptionaljobatapplyingconceptsfromthesocialandbehavioralsciences intonarrativeanalysisandengagementandadvancingneurocognitiveinsightsandtoolstotheoperationalenvironment.However,theUSneedstodo more development along with test and evaluation in order to improve our ability to influenceadversariesanddeterpotentialadversaries.TheUS needs to leverage an asymmetric advantage in neurocognitive science in order to create andexploit an operational asymmetric advantage. There are two areas, in particular, that the US shouldprioritize: influenceandcredibilityassessment.Weneed tobetteruseandapplyourunderstandingsfrom social, behavioral, and/or neurocognitive science to our influence operations.We should createinterdisciplinary research designs and examine howneuroscience could be applied operationally. Thesecondareathatneedsimprovementisourcredibilityassessmentcapacity.Thisisalawenforcement,intelligencecommunity,andmilitaryrequirement.Thereisagrowingbodyofscientificliteratureonthepsychophysiological and neurocognitive detection of deception from countries like Russia, China, andIran,andthuscredibilityassessmentresearchanddevelopmentshouldbenotonlyaresearchbutalsoascientificandtechnologicalintelligencepriority.

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Discussion

In response todefeating facial recognition,are theremoresubtleways toshowthatyouare trying tohide?Dr.Casebeerrespondedthathiddenrepresentationsarebeinginterwovenintovisual imagesandmaynotbedetectableby thehumaneye.So,while theobvious thingsare there,peoplearechoosing thecovertoptions.Whatisthepotentialforsomethingreallybadtohappeninanuncontrolledenvironment?Dr.KrusenotedthatthereisopportunityforbioterrorandissuesofbiosafetyinDIYlabsandcommunitybiological laboratories.Peopleare increasinglyplayingwithbiology, soweare seeingdevelopmentofbiosafety guidelines, including things like outreach from the FBI to engage with the DIY labs andcommunities. The DIY community says it will not go beyond the dangerous stuff, but this is only apromiseandmaynotbeadheredto.Arethereanyexamplesofneurocognitiveworkthatadversarialnationsaredoingthatwearenot?Dr. Giordano noted that China has its own version of DARPA, which is trying to specialize inneurocognitivesciences,drugdeliverysystems,andmilitaryAIsystems.Chinesemedicaluniversitiesarealso looking to neurotoxin research, and China has lifted its moratorium on the use of non-humanprimateforbrainresearch—whichmayhavesignificantdual-useimplications.Dr. DiEullis added that China is making an effort to acquire genetic data and sequence information.Somesaythatweareinanarmsraceforgeneticdata.Dr. Kruse noted that there could also be similar research going onwithout ethical oversight thatwewouldnotbeawareof.

Panel 4: The Neurocognit ive Science of Persuasion Panelmembers:

• Dr.JamesGiordano(GeorgetownUniversityMedicalCenter),moderator• Dr.ChristopheMorin(FieldingGraduateUniversity)• Dr.IanMcCulloh(JohnsHopkinsUniversityAppliedPhysicsLaboratory)• Dr.WilliamCasebeer(LockheedMartin)• Dr.NickWright(UniversityofBirmingham)

Dr. James Giordano (Georgetown University Medical Center)

Dr. James Giordano moderated the panel. Dr. Giordano stressed that the neurosciences are makingnotable progress in understanding the structure and functions of the brain, and this panel aims tohighlight how we can employ knowledge from the neurocognitive sciences to address how to bestinfluenceindividualandgrouppsychologyandbehavior.

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Dr. Christophe Morin (Fielding Graduate University)

Dr.ChristopheMorinunderscoredthatweneedtopayattentiontowhat isgoingon inthebrainasafirststepinanymessagingactivities.Wehavenowwastedincredibleamountsofmoneyonproducingmessages to persuadepeople that are completely ineffective because theydisregardhowpersuasionworksinthebrain.Wecannowshowempiricallythattheeffectsonthebrainsofpeoplereceivingmostofthemessagesweproduceisnegligible.Thebrainhasevolvedovertimeandinlayers.Predictionsandjudgementsareperformedinthefrontallobe,whichisthelastpartofthebraintohaveevolvedandtomature.Thecortexisofcoursecritical,but what lays below the cortex—what Daniel Kahneman referred to as “system one” and othersreferredtoasthe“crocodile”or“reptilian”brain—wasthefirstpartofthebraintoevolveandisinfactwherepersuasiontakesplace.Asaresult,tobemaximallypersuasive,ourmessagesmustappealtothelessevolvedportionsofthebrain.

Dr. Ian McCulloh (Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory)

Dr.IanMcCullohemphasizedthatinmakingdecisionstobehaveonewayversusanother,peopledonotrespond to logic-based arguments; they respond emotionally and then rationalize the data tocorrespondwithandsupportouremotionalresponses.Whenwehear informationthatdiverges fromwhat we already believe, it simply is not credible to us and/or is discounted. As a result, a countermessagethatrespondstoanoriginalmessageisalmostbydefinitionpresentingdiscordantinformation,andpeoplewillnotbelieveit.Thus,thequestionis:howdowebreachthis?Weknowalotaboutthebrain.Dr.McCulloh’srecentworkinJordanwithDr.MunqithDagher(IIACSSResearch)hasmeasuredtheactivityintheareasofthebrainassociatedwithpersuasionandinfluencewhenpeopleviewedpublichealthandothersocialmarketingmessages.Theresearchfoundthattherewasno significant cross-culturaldifferencebetween these subjectsandwhatWestern-based researchhas shown about persuasion and the brain. Specifically, research indicating the system 1 basis ofpersuasionwasrobustatleastinthecaseofpeopleinJordan.

Dr. Wil l iam Casebeer (Lockheed Martin)

Dr.WilliamCasebeerwonderedhowcanweoperationalizewhatweknowabout thebrain?Howcansomefindingsfromneuroscienceresearchhelpusbuildbettermodelsofinfluenceandpersuasion?Pascal’sWagerwasa consequence-basedargument forwhyone shouldbelieve inGod.Basically, therisks of not believing in God and beingwrong far outweigh the effort of believing in God and beingwrong.IfyoukeepreadingPascal,however,henotesthatthistypeofrationalargumentisnotgoingtoaccomplishbehaviorandbelievechange.Rather,achangeinbehaviororbeliefmorefrequentlyoccurswhenyoucanputyourself inacontext inwhichyoucanbelieve. Forexample, ifyouarequestioningreligiousbelief,youmaystartbyputtingyourselfinplacesofworship—inachurch,thehighceilingsanddaismayhaveaneffectonyourbrainorbeingaroundotherswhobelievemayhelpchangeyourbelief.So,Pascal’s argument is reallyabout the importanceofboth social andplace-basedmechanisms thatimpactbeliefandthusbehaviorchange.Arationalargumentjustwillnotdoit.Fourgeneraltypesoftheperceptualheuristicsweusecontainbothsocialandplace-basedaspects. Infact,thehumantendencytodescribeandinterpretevents inpsychologicalandemotivewaysiswiredintoourbrains;itisaresultofthesocialnaturesofourbrainswhichcomeswithitsownbeliefsystems.

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Thereasoningandaffectivenetworksinthebraininduceustosocializeandtheorizeaboutnon-textualstimuli. A lot of themost effective radicalization information andmessaging that we see online usetechnologytointeractwiththissocialnatureofthebrain.Weknowfromneuroscienceresearchthatthesocialaspectsofhowourbrainsworkrequirethatweincludesocialinteractionsinourmessagesifwewantthemtobepersuasive.Forexample,youcan influencesomeonetobelieveamessagebytellingthemthattheirpeersbelieve,andweknowthatradicalizingphenomenatakeplaceinthepresenceofinfluentialleaders.

Dr. Nick Wright (University of Birmingham)

Indiscussinghowwemightoperationalizedecisiontheoryandthetheories relatedtopersuasionandinfluence,Dr.NickWrightbeganbyasking,“Whatdoweknow,andhowcanweknowit?”Robert Jervis said you can find a historical example to back up any contention youwant tomake ininternationalrelations,andit isbasicallythesamecaseinpsychology.Canwebesureofthescientificevidencewehavenowaboutwhatwethinkimpactspersuasion?First,weshouldbeawareof thereplicationcrisis in thescientific literature in thisarea. Inonlyabouthalfofthestudiesinpsychologycanthefindingsofstudiesbereplicated.Thismakesitverydifficulttoreadtheacademicliterature,andevenamongacademics,peoplewilltendtoattributecredibilitytotheresultsofevenasinglestudybasedonthereputationoftheauthor.Thisisnotgoodscience.Second,inordertoaccumulaterobustscientificknowledgeaboutthefactorsthatinfluencepeople,weneedto focusonempirical findingsthat1)havebeentestedandreplicatedand2)providesourcesofcorroborating information and convergent evidence. In addition,we should be careful not to simplyapply findings fromneuroscience laboratoriesandothersettings to the realworldwithout testing.Aswetrytomovetowardascienceofpersuasionandinfluence,wearegoingtohavetostopreferencingindividualstudiesanddowhathappensinmedicinetocorroborateandreplicate.Third,thereisalevel-of-analysisproblem.Toconsiderinfluenceandpersuasion,youhavetothinkaboutmultiple levels simultaneously (e.g., about the regional level, the state level, and the level of thepopulations).Theevidenceyouhaveatonelevelisnotthesameas,anddoesnotapplyto,otherlevels,soyouhavetoaskyourselfaboutthenatureoftheevidencethatyouhave.Itistruethatwedohavealotofgoodevidence,sohowdoweorganizeit?Weshouldthinkintermsofclassifyingthestrengthofevidencebehindeachcontention—aswasdoneintherecentSMAGrayZoneCognitiveReport.

Discussion

Howdoweoperationalizeanduntanglerationalityfromemotionalresponse?Dr.McCullohnotedfrustrationinthewaythatwespendmoneyonsocialmediaagainstDa’esh,which,in fact, serves Da’esh, not us. By focusing on counter messaging, we are actually adding to popularperceptions of Da’esh’s influence. All people have to do is believe that others believe, and that willaffecttheirbehavior.Thisisthemajorityillusioneffect,althoughitdoesnothavetobethemajorityofthepeoplethathaveinfluence.Wetendtocomeatcountermessagingwithfactswhenweshouldbetryingtoimpactemotion.Persuasioninvolvestheareaofemotioninthebrain.Itisfrustratingthatwe

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areattemptingtousefactsandlogicasourcountermessagetodefeatDa’esh.What istheemotionalappealthatweareusingagainstDa’esh?Thereisnotone.Dr.Morinaddedthatpersuasionhasapathandaspeed.Emotionsarechemicals.Whatneurosciencehasallowedustodoismeasuretheactivityinthebrain.Theadvertisementsthatmovepeoplemostarethosethathavetodowithprimalnetworks in thebrain (system1),whicheventodaydominates.Weneedtoamplifytheemotionalappealofourmessages.The Saudi educational system is specific about Day of Judgement punishments from the very lowestgrades.Isthereresearchontheimpactofthisonthebrain?Dr.Casebeerstatedthatthedevelopmentofanadultbrainincludesbreakpointsinthedevelopmentofsystems1and2 inourbrain.Both systemsare important,andwecan inducepathologies indecisionmakingbydisruptingeither.Thetargetaudienceofmuchofourmessagingeffortsisadolescentmales,whounfortunatelydonotyethavestrongconnectionsbetweenlogicandemotiveresponse.Thismakesitallthemoreimportantthatweincludeemotionalcontentinourmessages.Dr.Morinaddedthatwehavestudiedtheeffectofpublichealthmessagesonteenagebrainsandfoundthatageabsolutelydoesmatterwhen itcomestothebrain.Differentnarrative factorshavedifferenteffectsonthebrainsofpeopleofdifferentages.Messagingtoyoungpeople—likepotentialISISrecruits(18-25yearolds)—isdifferentthanitistoolderpeople.Forexample,thebrainsofyoungmenseekoutandrespondtothrills,somethingthatadultbrainsdonot.IfyouwanttopersuadeorinfluencepeoplefromtheMiddleEast,youshouldstartwiththeirhearts,nottheirminds.IntheUS,whenyoustartnegotiationsyoustartwithfactstopersuadepeople.IntheMiddleEast,youhavetostartwithemotionsandemotionalappealinordertothenreachthefacts.IfyouwanttoinfluenceDa’eshorcounterDa’esh,thenemotionsarethemostimportant.InJordan,thepeopleweresearched demonstrated more brain activity when they watch counter-terror advertisements. InCalifornia,peoplerespondtoandcaremoreaboutanti-smokingads.Thepointisthattheenvironmentwithinwhichpeoplearelivingreallyimpactshowtheycanbepersuaded.Dr.McCullohnotedthatUSCENTCOMInformationOperations isdoingsomeof this typeofemotionaloutreachinvideosthatitcreates.Dr.Wrightadded that there is somuch research in somanyareas. Forexample, foremotions, if youinducemoderatelevelsoffearinpeopleyoucanmoderatetheirbehavior,buthigheramountsoffearcanbecounterproductiveunlessyouprovideanalternativebehavioraloption.Wecanbesomuchmoreeffectiveifwetakeaccountofthesescientificfindings.Wecanidentifyalotofthingsofwhichwearerelativelycertainandusechecklistsandsimpleandmorecomprehensivewaystodocommunications.Canyoucommentonvideogamesandtechnologyasplatformsforpersuasion?Dr.McCullohstatedthatoneofthethingsthatavideogamecando iscreatean immersionnarrativeeffect. If there is a counter message going around in the game, you know you have reached someindividuals.However,wereallyhavetoaskwhyweareusingthevideogame?Havewedeterminedthatthe game is appropriate to the question or the objective thatwe are after, or is it just a fadwherepeoplesay,“Otherpeopleareusingvideogames,solet’suseonetoo?”

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Dr.WrightaddedthatthereisnoempiricalevidencethathavingSkypeinteractionsisbetterthantextoremail conversations. It depends on the context and the environment. Additionally, one of the keyfeaturesofamessengeriswhetherornottheyaretrusted,soweshouldbefindingandcreatingtrustedmessengers.Dr.McCulloh noted that there is a dearth of DoD funding for social neuroscience. There is a lot onenhancinghumanperformance,but thebignational security challenge iswhetherDa’eshorRussia isusing cognitive methods against us to disrupt operations and cause strategic effect, yet DoD is notfundingneuroscienceresearchthatisrelevanttothoseissues.Thereisatimeindecisionmakingwhenemotionrecedesandrationalitykicks.Ifthiswerenotthecase,wewouldnevergetanythingdone in society.Are there studies that lookatpeoplewho can separateemotionfromfactversusthosewhocannoteverseparatethem?Dr.Casebeerrespondedthattherearedifferencesbetweenpersonalitytypethatarereflected inhowmuchweightsystem1and2aregiveninthebrainindecisionmaking.Videogamesandvirtualrealitygive someone an opportunity to impact these systems andmanipulate them. Video games probablymanipulatesystem1,butthathasadownstreameffectonsystem2andbehavior.

Panel 5: Antic ipatory Intel l igence Panelmembers:

• Mr.CollinAgee(ArmyG2),moderator• Mr.DaveGauthier(NGA)• Dr.GwynethSutherlin(GeographicServices,Inc.)• Dr.PeterSuedfeld(UniversityofBritishColumbia)• Dr.JeffFriedman(Dartmouth)• Ms.ReginaJoseph(NYU)

Mr. Dave Gauthier (NGA)

Mr. Dave Gauthier discussed the need to move from activity-based intelligence to anticipatoryintelligence. Activity-based intelligence focuses on identifying targets and activities known to haveoccurred. This is problematic because analysts are spending their time confirming things we alreadyknowandthereforenotaddingvaluetomissions.Anticipatoryintelligence,ontheotherhand,involveslookingforthingswedonotknowexistbutareyettocome.Discoveries have to become part of a community database. NGA is currentlyworking on cataloguingdiscoveries and thenusing this information to dopredictivemodeling.However, this is still not goodenough.Analystshavelivedincomfortbecausetheycouldaffordtomakelow-riskjudgments.Low-riskjudgmentsare likelytobetrue,butmayberelativelyself-evidentandthereforeaddrelatively littletoour understanding. If wewant to anticipate what will occur, there is a need to reorient intelligenceanalysissothatitisacceptableforanalyststomakeriskierpredictions,whichwill,bydefinition,oftenbewrong. Ineffect,weneedtobe“preparedtogetpunched intheface”once inawhile.Makingriskierpredictionswillplaceanalystsinanenvironmentofstressandriskthatwillforceadaptationandchangehowtheydobusiness.

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Dr. Gwyneth Sutherl in (Geographic Services, Inc.)

Dr. Gwyneth Sutherlin discussed how influence and control are understood with human geographyanalysis.Shedescribedaconceptoftheinformationspaceasonethatismadeupofthehumansthatcreate and share information. By understanding the information space, and the associated analyticchallenges as human geography, we are able tomap this information as groups and individuals thatproduce information and consume it. These groups and key individuals are connected across alandscape both online and offline. The attributes of these groups, their values and beliefs can bemappedandunderstoodatalocalizedlevelpermittingfine-grainedactivitybasedintelligenceanalysis.Themechanisms through which influence and control flow from one individual or group to anotherbecomesvisiblethroughhumangeographymethods.Forexample,politicalunits,likeastate,aremadeofkeyinfluencerswithrelationships,andthesearewhatwecanaffect.Wecanmapthesepeopleandrelationships.Thisnetworkcanbecomeafoundationtointegratebigdatathroughsocialmediaornewsandeventsinameaningfulway.Finally,wemustnotforgetthattheinformationalcuesweareanalyzingrely on multilingual and culturally specific cognitive schema. Human geography analysis provides aframeworktoleveragelinguisticandculturalvariablestoenrichanalysisinalocalizedmanner.

Dr. Peter Suedfeld (University of Brit ish Columbia)

Dr. Peter Suedfeld discussed decision making under stress. Dr. Suedfeld began by noting Tetlock’soriginalresearchonexperts,whichfoundthatonaverage,expertswereonlyslightlybetterthanchance;however, in theGood JudgmentProgram,asmallgroupof superforecasterswere30%moreaccuratethan average. The characteristics of the super-forecasters, as describedby Tetlock, closely resembledthefeaturesofhighintegrativecomplexity(IC).Thisisprobablynotcoincidental.ICisameasureofhowan individual or group processes information and makes decisions. High IC is marked by flexibleplanning, extensive information search, adaptive change, open-mindedness about others’ beliefs, andtoleranceofdisagreementandcognitivedissonance.ThedrawbacksofhighICdecisionmakingarethatitisslow,susceptibletooveremphasisonfalseortrivialinformation,andmayappearwishy-washy.IC analysis draws a distinction between differentiation (recognition of different perspectives) andintegration (appreciating the relationships between differentiated viewpoints). IC demands a highcognitiveload,andopennesstotechnicalresourcesandexpertisehelps.Disruptivestressleadstodropsin IC, such as when cognitive load is too high or is sustained for too long. Studies have shown thatexcessivecognitiveloadoftenleadstoadrasticsimplifyingresponse:sometimestoanattempttosolvetheproblembyviolence,ortoenditbysurrenderingorgivingin.Researchoninternationalpoliticalandmilitaryleadersreliablyconfirmsthesepatterns;leaderstypicallyexhibitadrop in IC2to3monthsbeforeconflict. Intermsofgrayzoneresearch,Dr.Suedfeld’steamnoted drops in Israeli IC prior to heightened violence of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza,assassinationsof Iranianscientists,andtheStuxnetcyberattacksonIranianfacilities.Dr.SuedfeldhasalsofoundthattheICofsuccessiveUkrainianpresidentsdroppedaftertheRussianincursioninCrimea,but thatPresidentPoroshenko’s IC roseduring theFallof2014negotiationswithRussia, in the sametime period as Ukraine’s parliamentary elections, and again during the Spring of 2015, the time ofnegotiationsbetweenUkraineandanumberofotherentities, including (butnot limitedto)Russia. Inlooking at Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Dr. Suedfeld has found that Assad’s IC increased ahead of Russianairstrikes,appearingasthoughRussianaidalleviatedAssad’sstressandcognitive load.Otherresearchhasfoundthathistorically,someleadersactuallyshowedincreasedICwhentheywereunderstress,andDr.Suedfeldconsideredwhethertheycouldhavequalifiedassuperforecasters.

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In summary, IC can alert analysts to possible changes or absence of change in leadership decisionmakingandthereforehaveananticipatoryeffect.

Dr. Jeff Friedman (Dartmouth)

Dr. Jeff Friedman focused on assessing subjective probability. Most important judgments are highlysubjective;however,when judgmentsare toosubjective, it ishard foranalysts toparse them(i.e., toestimatetheprobabilitieswithprecision).Therearetwomainconcernsregardingsubjectivejudgments:1)decisionmakersmaynotbereceptivetosubjectiveestimatesand2)quantitativeestimatescanleadtofalseconfidenceandfalseaccuracy.Dr. Friedman referenced the IARPA Good Judgment Project in which analysts provided 1 millionforecasts, and forecasterswere asked toprovideprobabilities. Theseprobability estimateswere thenchecked against the record of what really happened. Forecasters were able to parse outmeaningfulprobabilities in 10% units on average, with exceptions for super-forecasters, who could parse theirprobabilitiesmore finely.Therefore, it seemsanalysts can likelyparseoutusefulprobabilities,andbynotdoingso,weloseinformation.In another study, decision makers responded to subjective probabilities based on 1,000 officerssurveyed on decisions under risk. The study found that decision makers were quite sensitive tosubjectiveprobabilities.Moreprecisely,thestudyfoundthatpresentingdecisionmakerswithestimatesdidnotleadtofalseconfidence,butdidmakethedecisionmakersmoreinterestedintheestimatesandfurtherinformation.These studies, taken together, seem to illustrate that analysts are better at parsing probabilityestimates,anddecisionmakersaremorerespondentandfluentinassessingprobabilityestimatesthanwethought.

Ms. Regina Joseph (NYU)

Ms.ReginaJosepharguedthatamultidisciplinaryapproachlendswelltointernalizingdifferentcognitiveabilitiesandstyles.It isalsoimportanttobeawareofthestochasticnatureoftheworld.If individualsand systems accept randomness (and with it, the potential for human fallibility), more resilientanticipatoryintelligencestrategiescanresult.Whenstructuredcarefullyandpairedwithasophisticatedunderstanding of information and human cognitive behavior, technical forecasting formats withinanticipatoryintelligenceprogramscanbecentraltopreservinganasymmetricedge.Ms.Josephexplainedthatfourvectorsoftheinformationera(veracity,volume,variety,velocity)createaparadox: informationoverload is inevitable,butwithinthatdatadominance landscape liesignificantopportunities for forecasting. Currently, our approach to asymmetric advantage focuses onmanufacturedtechnologiessuchasrobotics,automatedsystems,andUAVs;butthesehardlyprovideanadvantage,giventhatmanufacturedmaterialscanbereplicatedbyadversaries—andinsomecases,likedrones,theUSdoesnotenjoyunchallengeddominanceintheirmanufacture.Trueasymmetricpotentialmay rest in how information and its distribution differ between Western societies and others.Advancements such as publically available and easily accessible open source information, databases,news,socialmedia,etc.,provideunprecedentedpotentialfortheforecastingrealm.Interestingly,liberalsocietieswithfreespeechandpressofferanasymmetricadvantagethatauthoritariansocietiescannot.

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Societies that privilege diversity and allow their citizens freedomof speech and thought can tap that“wisdom of the crowd” intomore accurate forecasting—a potential national security edge. Societiesthat tamp down diversity and suppress information freedom impede their ability to harness thecompletefieldofvisionrequiredforeliminatingstrategicsurprise.However,Ms.Josephwarnedthattoomuchdatacaninduceparalysisonhowtoingestitall.Also,easeofmanipulationofinformationanddisinformationisaliability;problemscanariseindeterminingwhatisrealandwhatisnot.Ms.Josepharguedthatthereisaneedforstructuredassiststoaidforecastersandthepublictosortthroughandidentifyvalidinformation.Educationiskey,andtheGoodJudgmentProject found that forecasting is a trainable skill that yields statistically significantgains in forecastingability.Peopleneedtobetterlearnhowtoframemeaningfulquestionsthatcanbeanswered.Undoubtedly, facts, beliefs and judgments can be difficult to differentiate. Thus, we should askourselves,howcanstructuredtechniquesandgroupcompositions(suchasgender,femaleteams)helpus improve these tasks? The unclassified nature of the Good Judgment Project was a great aid forexploringinformation,butbureaucracyofgovernmentsometimesfailstooperationalizethingsthatwelearn.Weneed to continue to harness the creativework ofmedia, news, and advertising specialists,sincetheseprofessionalsexcelatmessaging,gaugingsocialbehavioranduncoveringinformation.

Discussion

Howdoyoudealwithforecasteruncertainty?Ms. Joseph responded that forecasters reflect on theirmistakes to build up their base rates throughexperienceandrevisehowquestionsareasked.Bureaucracy is resistant to change and does not allow for risk taking. Are there any experiments orthoughtsonhowwecouldchangethis?Mr. Gauthier noted that NGA is creating an information incubatorwhere it is safe to take risks. Theincubatorishopingtoincludehundredsofanalysts.

Panel 6: Metaphor for a New Age: Emergence, Co-Evolution, Complexity, or Something Else? Panelmembers:

• Dr.ValSitterle(GeorgeTechResearchInstitute),moderator• Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtois(NSI)• Dr.CoreyLofdahl(SoSACorp)• CAPT(ret)ToddVeazie(NCTC)

Dr. Val Sitterle (Georgia Tech Research Institute)

Dr. Val Sitterle moderated the panel. The panel was asked to identify an appropriate metaphor todescribeourworldinacontinuallyevolvingpost-ColdWarsecurityenvironmentandtoevaluatewhattheythinktheoutcomeofthechangesthatweperceive(andthechangesthatwedonot)willbe.The

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speakers were also asked to consider whatmetaphor would describe the coming age and how thatmetaphorcaninformourunderstandingoffuturesecuritychallenges.Dr.ValSitterlemadesomeadditionalremarksontheesotericsubjectofparadigms,whythisdiscussionisimportanttous,andwhyimplementingsystemstoeliminatetheseparadigmsisdifficult.Weusuallysee a simplified viewof how this system that eliminates paradigms is used, andweessentially try tocodify terms into somethingnew.Paradigmsarenormative; theydefinewhat assumptions youmakeandhowyouseetheworld.Manyparadigmconceptslikeaco-evolutionarysystemareincorrect.Theyimply a continuous systemand continuous change, but theworldwe live in is bothnon-uniformanddiscontinuous. Technology, for example, does not just remove spatial barriers to produce enhancedconnectivity and speed of dissemination but also creates filters and echo chambers that serve asdiscretepercolationpointsinfluencingbeliefsandbehaviors.So,whatshouldwedo?Ifweneednewparadigms,istheresufficientcommongroundtodetermineifanewone is better? Or, are any newmetaphors incommensurate,meaning thatwe have insufficientcommonstandardsofdescriptionandmeasurestocomparethem?Therearesomanydifferentlenseswecanapply,weneedtounderstandhowtoreconcilethesechallenges.Thismattersbecauseofhowwetypicallycaptureanduseparadigms,integratingtools,execution,andcontext.Weneedtocreatere-actionableinformation;weneedthepropertools,andweneedtousethosetoolsproperly.Theparadigmsweapplytocreate,characterize,explain,andextrapolatefromourknowledgebaseforany given problem slot the dimensions of that problem into some pattern that in turn guides andconstrainswhatwe lookfor,howwelookfor it,andwhatweexpecttofind.Weneedtoconvertourbodies of knowledge that include textual analyses, exemplarily models, geographically referencedcharacterizations,etc. intoexecutableanalyticalproducts thatconveythepropercontext foreffectiveinterpretation.Itisonething,however,toarticulateanalysesandevenframeworksforanalyses.Itcanbequiteanothertotranslatetheseideasintoexecutablecode,muchlessgeneratecontext.Contexttendstobeabuzzwordthatwetossaroundbecauseweareallawarethatweneedit,butitisnot something that implement seriously. We used many paradigm-based assumptions to create theknowledge base, with no guarantee that everyone was working from the same paradigm of set ofassumptions.Further,assumptionsthatmatterareallgivenunderacertaincontext,andeventhemostadvancedtechnologythatwehavestillcannotinterpretcontextwell.Wedonotknownecessarilywhatgapsinthatknowledgebasewewouldmissduringthecomputer’simplementationorhowthesesgapsshould be treated in constructing insightful responses for users. Consequently, we still need manyhumansintheloopwhendoingthistypeofwork.Somegreat ideas turn intoprogramsof record, and theendproductderived froman idea turns intosomethingthatdescribesacompletelydifferent,unintendedworld.Asourcommunitydevelopsgreatideas and strong, cross-domain knowledge corpi,we need tomature our abilities to incorporate thiswork into efficient, usable tools that offer meaningful contextual insight correctly derived from theknowledge.

Dr. Al l ison Astorino-Courtois (NSI)

Dr.AllisonAstorino-Courtoisbeganherremarksbydefiningaparadigm.Aparadigmcanbedescribedasa lens or pair of eyeglasses for the brain. A paradigm helps others see the world as we do and iscomposedofour theories,ourmodelsof reality,ourassumptions,ourstandardsofwhat isgoodand

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whatisnot,andourstandardsofwhatis interestingandwhatisnot. Italsoconditionswhatdataandanalyticmethodswethinkareimportant.Weoftenforgetthatourmodeloftheworldisnottheunbiasedtruth,butratheritisthetruththroughourlens.Wehavebecomesofamiliarwithseeingtheworldthroughourlensthatitbecomesdifficulttoconsideralternativesortofathomthemsincethesealternativeworldsseemsofaroutoftherealmofpossibilities to us. Our lens can also distort our own reality. On the other hand, having a paradigmprovides an important framework and lens tomake ourselves aware of the assumptions thatwe aremakingandwhatwearedoingintermsofourresearchandfindings.The world has changed, threats have changed, and power has diffused over time. We are seeingdifferenttypesofthreatsthanwhatweareusedto.Wehaveheardthismanytimesbefore,though.So,whydowekeepcommentingonthefactthattheworldissodifferentthanitusedtobe?IntheColdWarera,wehadaveryUS-centricviewofworldevents.Webelievedthatwewereinabipolarworld,and we were interested in other countries’ actions purely because they would impact us. We alsoadopted this sentimentofcoercivepower,and thatbecameourultimatemotivator.Wethought thatwe lived in a splitworld between democratic regimes and non-democratic regimes, andwe believedthatthesourceofconflictswasideological.Nowadays,thecomponentsoftheoperatingparadigmremainthesamewithonlyafewdiscrepancies.Our essential presumptions, for instance, remain the same. We are rationalists, US-centric, andliberalists.Wealsosubscribetopoliticalrealism,whichisthepresumptionthatmilitarycoercivepowerisoverwhelminglyseenastheultimatemotivator.Thisisnottrueinallcasesnow;thereisacurrentlyashiftwhereindividualsdesiretobreakthatpartofourparadigm.We also subscribe to state-centrism. We believe that most global interactions between powers areimportantinfluencesonourthinking,andthereisasignificantchangeintherecognitionthatintra-stateconflicts deserveour attentiondue to the contagion effect. In otherwords, these conflictsmayhavenationalsecurityimplicationstotheUS,sotheydeserveourfocus.Finally,weareinterestedinevaluatingthesourceofconflicts.Ideologyisonecommonsource,butthereis also a much broader implication that nationalism and grievances are a much stronger source ofconflictandhaveimplicationstowardsus(likethebattleagainstISIS).

Dr. Corey Lofdahl (SoSACorp)

Dr.CoreyLofdahlspokeaboutcomplexityandsystemdynamics.JayForrester,aNobelPrizewinnerwhocreated a paradigm modeling simulator at MIT called system dynamics, argued that you can breakcomplexity down into three components: stock flow and integration, time delays, and feedback.Complexity is understoodwith its relationship to cognition.Much of the things thatwe are trying tocomprehend are highly complex; so, when you put them all together, the human mind becomesoverwhelmed.Therefore,weshouldassignthiscognitiveworktoacomputer,whichwillperformthesecomputationsmoreefficiently.Humans,inthemeantime,shoulddowhattheydobest,whichispatternmapping.Systemdynamicscanallowhumanstotestideastodeterminewhetherornotsomethingissignificant.Itallows you to quantify your assumptions and have a group critique them.Decision lessons in systemdynamicsinvolveacombinationofshort-termandlong-termtrade-offs.

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Therearesoftandhardvariableswhenevaluatingaproblem.Thesoftvariablesincludestressandotherattributesofhumanbehavior,butyoucannotputameteronyourbraintomeasurethesevariables.Thehardvariablesaretheattributestowhichphysicallawsorothermathematicalrulesapplywhichcanbeaccurately measured and quantified. We need to have both of these variables when evaluating aproblem.DARPA iscurrently lookingatengineering insightsand thenapplying those insights toasocial sciencemodel.High-leveldecisionmakersareinvolvedintheseexperiments.Arecommendationismadebasedon the system, and then these experts provide counterintuitive insight. So, there is an establishedrelationship between the general and analytic staffs and the computer. There have been someinterestinginteractionsbetweenthegroups,andtheyhaveprovidedtheboardwithsoundinformation.Thereisalsogovernmentresearchbeingdoneonhuman-machineinteractions.Withintheseefforts,thehuman-machineinterfaceshouldbebakedin,notsimplysprinkledon.Ultimately,wemustconsidertheconceptofhierarchyversusdistributedcomplexity.Weneedtopushdecision-makingouttopeoplethatcanactuallydo it,andthere is importantworkcoming inthenearfuturerelatedtothisconcept.

CAPT (ret) Todd Veazie (NCTC)

CAPT (ret) Todd Veazie emphasized that metaphors and paradigms are important. Everyone appliesmetaphorstoenhancecultural,political,economic,organizational,andbiologicalsense-making.Theseparadigms provide us with a mental structure that helps us frame and understand the operationalenvironmentandrelatetotheworld.Tothepractitioner,theyprovideascaffoldtowhichwecantetherourpolicyandplanningassumptionsanddecisions.However,theseareimperfectrepresentationsofareal-world system. Therefore,wehave tounderstand their limitations toavoidmisapplying themandrunningtheriskofoverextendingtheirusefulnessordrawingthewrongconclusionsfromthem.Theirexplanatorypowerrangesfromtacticaltostrategicandthegreaterthecomplexityoftheenvironment,thegreatertheexplanatorypotentialofthemetaphor.Applyingtheclassicexampleofgeeseinflightinwhich three simple rules allow emergent behavior from a random or chaotic system and allows thegeesetoflywithfargreaterefficiencyasacollectivethanasindividuals.Thosethreerulesdescribetherelationshipbetweentheactors(geese)andtheirenvironment,includingtheirfellowgeese.Inthiscasetherulessetbehavioralexpectations.Wecanaskourselvesthefollowingquestion:howdoweapplyasetofrulesinanenvironmentofhighinteractivecomplexity?Atatacticallevel,justlikethosegeeseinflight,highlytrainedspecialoperationsformationsareable tomove, fight,andcompetewithunmatchedeffectiveness in chaoticandhostileurbanenvironmentsthroughrules-basedindividualactiononbehalfoftheunitcollective.Again,thisispossiblebecauseofasharedsetofTTPsandROEsthatdefinetheirrelationshiptooneanotherandtheirenvironment and fosters emergent behavioral patterns that are efficient, effective, and highlyadaptable.Aswe attempt to understand and copewith the global national security environment,wemust alsochallenge our assumptions about legacy paradigms that are underperforming in the face of risinginteractivecomplexity.Howdoweupdateourunderstandingoftherulesofthesystem(s)?Tooverhaulourassumptionsaboutthestate-basedmonopolyonpowertoincludetheexpandinginfluenceofnon-

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stateactors?Tosupplantnotionsofcontrolwiththoseofcredible influence?Allofthismostcertainlyapplies to understanding the interplay between terrorism (red), the US government (blue), and theenvironment(green)inwhichwebothmustoperate.Over-relianceonossifiedstrategicparadigmsareunhelpful andevendangerous. It follows that as strategists andpolicymakers it is also inadequate tomerelystudyandreacttotheterroristthreat(red)inisolationandhopetodevelopeffectivestrategiestocounterit.Weneedtoconsiderinterplaybetweenredandblueinthecontextofgreenasameanstobuildingasharedandholisticappreciationof thecontextualdynamics.This is thenecessarydiagnosisthatleadstoeffectivestrategy.Theabilitytounderstandtheforestandthetreesisthegoalofstrategicnetassessment.So,whenformingupourCTnetassessmentshop,wehostedaworkshoptoexploreusefulmetaphorstoguide our CT net assessment work going forward. We invited leading thinkers from a range ofdisciplines to contribute. Among themwere scientists who apply biologically inspiredmetaphors likeecosystemstoexplainhumanorganizations.Ecosystemsareofcourse,asetofanimateandinanimatenodes that share functional relationships to other nodes in the system. The ecosystemmetaphor isilluminatingwhendiagnosingthepowerdynamicsinplacesliketheMiddleEastbecauseitforcesustoconsider multiple actors and their relationships to one another. Now, even this is an imperfectmetaphorsinceecosystemsarebasedoncompetitionsinnature,andanorganism’sonlygoalistofindfoodtofuelprocreation.So,theflawhereisthattheframingisonlybasedoncompetition,andsolelyfocusing on competition in the past has gotten us to places where we did not want to be. A rivalmetaphor was also introduced during this workshop, and that metaphor involves a cell and thecomponentswithinandbetweencellsthatallworktogethertofightadisease.Thisofcourse,sidestepstheissueofcompetitioninfavorofcooperation.Overall,appliedappropriately,thereisvalueinbothofthesemetaphors.Now,wecantaketheresultsofthisworkshopandseetheirapplicabilitytothesituationweconfrontintheMiddleEast.Wecan lookatareasofhostility.Therearemanydistinctconflictshappeningontheground simultaneously—civilwars, state on state, sectarian, ethnic, andGreat Power conflicts are allpresent.ThisisnotexcludingtheeffectsofthisecosystemonthebroaderecospherethatincludestheUS and Europe. In each of these confrontations, political power relationships are the fulcrum, notterrorism.Theinsightsgainedfromapplyingthismetaphorofanactor-basedecosystemeachwithitsown goals and associated dynamics might lead one to conclude that we do not need a new“counterterrorism” strategy in the Middle East; we need a new Middle East strategy wherecounterterrorismisafeaturenotthedominantorientingprinciple.In themidstof thecurrentAge transition from Industrial to Informationwhere the relational rulesetsaretransformingfundamentally,wemustchallengethepersistentparadigmsandmetaphorsthatdriveourintellectualframingandanchorourdecisionsbecauseincreasinglytheynolongerfit.Forexample,toseethelocusofpowerandleveragepointsinthegeostrategiclandscapeastheexclusiveprovenanceofnationstatesisincreasinglyflawed.Further,itisalsowhollyinadequatetosimplytreatviolentnon-state actors as if they were nation states simply because we have not found a more appropriateparadigm.Itrequiresustorethinkthenatureandderivationofpowertoaccountfor“movements”andstatelessnetworks.CAPT(ret)VeazieconcludedbystatingthatthelegendaryenvironmentalistandsystemsthinkerDonellaMeadows taught us that there are twelve leverage points in any system, and he listed the top five.Theseleveragepointsinclude:5)therulesofthesystem;4)thepowertoadd,change,evolve,andself-

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organize a system’s structure; 3) the goals of the system; 2) the paradigm out of which the systemarises;and1)thepowertotranscendparadigms.

Discussion

Withrespecttonewparadigms,howdowemovepastourcurrentlenses?CAPT (ret) Veazie stated that as humans, we seek meaning and belonging (identity) from our firstbreath,especially in things like religion.So, it isgoing tobeaverydifficultprocess togetaroundthislens.Dr.Sitterlenotedthatasacommunity,weneedtobeabletoconvinceeveryonethatanewparadigmisbetterandnotjustsomethingnew.Dr.Astorino-Courtoisexplainedthattherearebiggerfissuresinourparadigmthanwehaverealized,butthatdoesnotmean thatwehave todiscredit theentireparadigm—wecanmakeadjustments to theparadigmthatwecurrentlyhave.

Panel 7: Social Media…Fatigue or Here to Stay? Panelmembers:

• Dr.RandyKluver(TexasA&M),moderator• Dr.JenZiemke(JohnCarrollUniversity)• Dr.DaveWarner(MindTel)• Dr.DavidBroniatowski(GWU)• Dr.LauraSteckman(MITRE)• Mr.EmersonBrooking(CouncilonForeignRelations)

Dr. Randy Kluver (Texas A&M)

Dr. RandyKluver beganwith a brief discussionof the powerful influence that the Internet and socialmedia have had, including on the 2004 election cycle (with Howard Dean and Meetup.com as oneexample).Othernotabledevelopments include theadventofFacebook in2004, thesocialmovementcreated online in support of Obama, the emergence of Twitter, and the rise ofWeChat (with 800MChineseusers)—thelatterofwhichrepresentsthenextevolutioninsocialmedia.Dr.Kluverposedthefollowingquestiontoeachofthepanelmembers:Whatistheonetake-away?

Dr. Jen Ziemke (John Carrol l University)

Dr. Jen Ziemke discussedways inwhich socialmedia could be useful, including bringing change. Shenotedthattheeraofsocialmediainvolvesinter-generationaldialoguefosteringbi-directionallearning.Youth (18-25) functionassubjectmatterexpertsor“digitalnatives.”Dr.Ziemkealsobrieflydiscussed

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counter-ISIS simulations thatwereconducted,whereemotionalelementswereused,andwhere theyresonatedwithpeople.Whyusesocialmedia?Dr.Ziemkearguedthatforyouth, itcontributescoolandasenseofbelonging,anditsgamingenvironmentisappealing.

Dr. Dave Warner (MindTel)

Dr.DaveWarnerasked,“Howdowedoweaponized information?”Hedescribedanoperation inEastAfghanistan, wherein his teammetwith locals andworkedwith the children there. The ideawas toinfluenceattheentrylevel.Heemphasizedthatweareinacommunicationage,notaninformationage,and thatwe are in factwired to communicate. The Pashtuns, for example, are hyper social. Despitespeculationthattheirteamwouldneedtoteachsocialmediatothechildren,theydidnothavetobetaught.Counter-insurgencymessagingwasenabledinrealtime.Duetosocialmedia,itisnowpossibletogetrapidassessmentsonthegroundofbombing.Thisstandsincontrasttothepriorperiod(andengagementssuchasToraBora).Socialmediacanalsobeusedbythe“bad guys” to spread propaganda about the purpose behind US activities. In the case of the recent“MOAB” bombing, the name is actually more damaging than the blast. Unfortunately, we have nocognitiveagilitytocombatsuchpropagandawithcounter-measuresatanyprecisionlevel.Ultimately,socialmediaischanginghumans—whoaresensors.Thereisinfactagrowingcyberculture.

Dr. David Broniatowski (GWU)

Dr.DavidBroniatowskiindicatedthatsocialmediaisdefinitelyheretostay,continuingontonotethatweareonthecuspofgreaterrigorforhowtostudyit.Akeypoint isthatwemustdevelopthesamerigorousstandardsfortheuseandstudyofsocialmediaaswehavedevelopedforsurveymethodsoverthe past several decades. This comes about through the combined use of statistical techniques, anunderstandingofcultureandnarrative,andtheuseofpsychologicalexperimentation.Some social media are indelible. Because of this, it is useful to track both information andmisinformation/disinformation.Reddit and special interest sites canoperate as conduits for influenceand can be rigorously studied. To date, 71% of adults are on social media. These days, a largepercentage of people get their news from social media. Of these, 30% is from Facebook. Amongmillennials,61%gettheirnewsfrommajorsocialmedia.Social media are especially important when studying misinformative and disinformative narrativesonline (the “Battle of the Narrative”). Narratives establish the reasons for and desired outcomes ofconflicts(FM3-24).Forexample,peoplemightincorrectlyattributesymptomsofautismtovaccinationbecause they occur at the same time, even though there is no causal link. Compelling narratives“connect the dots” between facts and (potentially false) background knowledge to create meaning.However,peopleofteninfercausalitybetweenthesevariouspiecesofinformationwherethereisnone.Dr.BroniatowskiprovidedabriefoverviewofFuzzyTraceTheory(FTT)—aleadingempirically-validatedaccount of mental representation, which predicts decisions, especially those related tomemory andreasoning. According to FTT, peoplementally represent events atmultiple levels of detail—verbatim

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traces (detailed, but brittle, representations) and gist traces (categorical, and memorable,representations).Peopleprefertorelyongistwhenmakingdecisions.OvertheperiodofDecember2014-2015(the“Disneyland”measlesoutbreak),theyperformedatestofthetheory.ConsistentwithFTT,theyfoundthatarticlesexpressingaclear,bottom-linemeaning(“gist”)aboutvaccineswere2.3timesmore likelytobeshared.Ofthese,articlesexpressingsupport forbothsidesoftheargumentbutultimatelyexpressingacleargistwereshared57.8timesmoreoften.Articlesexpressingverbatimstatisticswerealsoslightly(1.3times)morelikelytobeshared.Incontrast,articleswith stories but no gist or verbatim statistics were not more likely to be shared. This means thatnarratives are most likely to be effective if they contain a clear gist and that stories alone are noteffective.Dr.Broniatowskiemphasizedthatthebasicmessagehereisthatwemustcombineallthreeapproaches(methodsfromsurveyresearch,socialmediaanalysis,andempirically-validatedpsychologicaltheory)tocreateamorerigorousapproachtonarrative.

Dr. Laura Steckman (MITRE)

Dr. Laura Steckman similarly indicated that social media is here to stay and presented a complexproblem.Dr.Steckmanpresentedtwoaspectstothisdifficulty.First, the social media industry is very competitive, and products may evolve. With the recentintroductionofFacebookLive,wehaveseensomecontroversy.WhetherFacebookwillstaynumberonein the long-term is unknown. Twitter is being overtaken and has suffered from the constraints of itsmedium.Elsewhere,wehaveseensolutionslikeGoogleHummingbird,whichmayserveasanantidoteleadingtomoreelaboratedandrelevantcontent.Manyplatformsarebeingshapedbasedoncustomerdemand. For example, if a platform does notmeet the needs of a computer scientist in India, thensomethingnewwillevolve.Thebottomlineisthatthereisongoinginnovationyieldingnewtools.Second,thesocialmediaenvironmentisnotthesameacrosstheworld.Wecanlooktoothercountriesor regions.Look, forexample, toZalo inVietnamorKakaoTalk inSouthKorea.Notably,werarelyseetheseplatformsmentionedinUSpapersonsocialmedia.BlackberryMessengerandLinearetwootherpopularplatforms.InNigeria,weseetheuseofindigenousplatforms.Additionally,differentplatformsare used for different purposes—onemay see political talk on Twitter in English but other kinds ofdiscussions in native languages on other platforms. Generally speaking, there is amoving away fromEnglishdiscussions—whichshouldbeexploredfurther.Governmentsarepurposefullytryingtochangehowsocialmediaworksintheircountries.Tostayaheadofthese issues,theUSgovernmentneedstounderstandhowthesedifferentplatformsare used in differentways in different locations (countries). It also needs to understand at themostbasiclevelhowtheyareusingsocialmedia.Dr. Steckman also briefly discussed how socialmedia usagewithin countries can lead to unintendedeffects.Forexample,socialmediacanfurtherdividepeoplewhentheylearnthatothershavedifferentvalues (whicharenowoftenmadeapparent through thismedium).Thus,wenowhavebothadigitalandculturaldivide.

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Mr. Emerson Brooking (Council on Foreign Relations)

Mr.EmersonBrookinghighlighted several keypoints. First, socialmedia is importanteven forpeoplewhoarenotontheInternet,astelevisionandothersgetcuesfromtherapidsocialmediaconversationsthat are now constantly happening. Second, social media moves fast. High school is now thegenerationaldivide.Forexample, in2011wesawtheadventofSnapchat,andthosewhowereoutofhighschoolbythenarelessfamiliarwiththisplatformcomparedtothoseinhighschool.Third,aspectsof socialmedia—such as Instagram likes—have now become a form of currency. The Chicago policediscovered ina recentyear that80%of theviolence theywereencounteringcouldbeattributedtoaspat that started online. In other words, online interactions transitioned seamlessly to offlineinteractions.Fourth,the Internet ismaturing.Datingbacktothe1990s,therewastalkofrapidchurn.We aremoving past that now, however. As concrete examples, consider Facebook and Google—theuniversalplatformthathasbeenwidelyadoptedandispresentlyinvestinginemergingcompanies.Fifth,inthebroadscopeofcommunicationsnetworks,socialmediaisthelatestoftheinventions,followingthetelegraphandthetelephone,amongothers.Ultimately,FacebookandGooglewillpersist.Consequently,peertopeer,adhocnetworkswilldrivetheconversationandwhatishappeningonpublicplatforms.Itseemsasthoughthesepublicplatformsarethebestplaceinwhichtobeinvestingmoneyandresources.

Discussion

Whatdoestheoverwhelmingforceinthesocialmediaworldlooklike?Dr.Warnernotedthatthemostpowerfulforcewouldbefirst,early,andaccurate.Dr.Broniatowskiadded that repetitionofa cleargist,not just verbatim facts, is likely tobeeffective.Decontextualized facts areminimally effective; the gist provided in cultural context ismoreeffective.Gists must be factually accurate, but must communicate the simple meaning of the message in itsculturalcontext.Repetitionof,andexposureto,acleargistislikelytobeeffective.Dr. Steckmanagreed that themessage should get out first and fast and thenbe repeated.Messagesshouldalsobetargetedtospecificaudiences.Forexample,ISIShasdifferentmessagingstrategieswithrespecttodifferenttargetaudiences,whichhasbeenquiteeffectiveinrecruitingvulnerableindividuals.Mr.BrookingnotedthatifyoulookatthemessagingstrategiesofRussiaandChina,theyarenotlimitedbythesamekindsofrulesandlinesthatlimittheUS.Wemaynotwanttocrossthoseethicallines,buttheydolimituswhencomparedtoactorslikeRussiaandChina.Dr.Warneraddedthatitisalsoimportanttogettheinformationinthehandsoftherightpeople(i.e.,themostinfluentialmessengers).Towhatextentshouldwethinkaboutnewplatforms?Dr.Broniatowskistatedthatnewplatformsshouldtargetandtailor.Weshouldunderstandtheculturalbackgroundsoftheusersoftheseplatformsandconstructourmessagesaccordingly.Thiscouldinvolvemultiple platforms with different strengths and weaknesses regarding communicating with differentgroupsanddeliveringdifferentmessages.

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Mr.Brookingadded that thepopularityandsalienceof socialmediahas tobeconsidered inanalysis.Someplatformsmattermorethanothers—evenbeyondsimplynumbersofusersonvariousplatforms.Whatdonarrativeslooklikeonsocialmedia?Mr.Brookingnotedthatnarrativesaredrivenbyvolume.Thenarrativesthatrisethrougharetheoneswiththoughtsthatstayinyourheadandarecontinuouslyshared.AnexampleofviralideasisBuzzFeedanditsinventionofthelisticle.Mostofthesenewsbitsdonottakeoff,buttheonesthatdoreallywork.Dr.Steckmanstatedthatsocialmediadoesnotcomprisethenarrative.Socialmediacanshape,expand,and/orchangethenarrative,butitdoesnotcreatethenarrative.Do you agree that repetition equals penetration, and penetration equals impact, but impact on keyinfluencersismoreimportantthanvolume?Mr. Brooking stated that volume works, but it works better when it includes people who have bigaudiences.

Key Note Speaker (LTG Michael Nagata, NCTC) The National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning’sresponsibilityistoformulateawholeofgovernmentcounterterrorismstrategyandassesshowwelltheUSGimplementsthatstrategy.LTGMichael Nagata’s goal is to convey the necessity of coordinatingwith allies on counterterrorismissuesinthefaceofrapidlyacceleratingglobalchange.Theenvironmentandtheenemyarechangingatafasterratethaneverbefore,anditcontinuestoaccelerate.Anactor’spointofview—or“paradigm”—matters in this rapidlyevolvingworld. If you lookback intohistory, thereare instructiveaccountsof thereactionsof Japaneseobserverswitnessing thearrivalofADM Perry’s black fleet in Japan. The ships were so far beyond the comprehension of the Japanesepeople,thatseveralwitnessesstatedtheycouldnotphysicallyseetheships.Thatposesthequestionofwhether theUSG is consistently able to “see”newphenomenon;particularlywhen radicallydifferentfromexpectednorms.LTG Nagata stated that his own paradigm revolves around defending US interests in this rapidlychangingenvironment.Therearethreequestionswemustcontinuouslyaskourselves:

1. Whatisthenatureoftheadversary?2. Whatisthenatureoftheenvironmentinwhichwecontesttheadversary?3. WhoarewebothasaNationandasaPeople,andareweperhapschangingatthesametime

eitherouradversariesorourenvironmentarechanging?Themostchallengingquestionisthelast,the“whoarewe?”Humansoftendislikelookinginthemirrorforfearofwhattheywillseethere.However,ifonecannothonestlyexamineoneself,thelikelihoodof

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goingastray rises significantly.Morebroadly, there is always somecorrelationbetweenourability toanswerthesethreequestionsandourabilitytoreliablygeneratesuccess.Hereismyownexaminationoftheadversary.First,ourcurrentandfutureadversariesareincreasinglyunconstrained by tradition, custom, or law; while the United States must remain bound by them.Second, power is increasingly moving into the hands of non-state actors (NSAs). Some NSAs havealreadyachievedparity,orhaveexceededparity,withthestates theyreside inorwithnearbystates.This is one areawherewe are sometimes unable to see reality,much like the Japanese peoplewhocould not see ADM Perry’s black fleet. Third, the accelerating pace of advances and ubiquitousavailabilityoftheInternet,smart/connecteddevices,andencryptiontechnologyarecreatingenormousadvantages forNSAs thatwewouldbewisenot todiscount. ISIS ismastering cheap/readily-availablesmalldronetechnologyanditsoperationalemploymentinterroristandmilitaryoperations.ISISisalsodemonstratingunprecedentedabilitytoinspire,motivate,andradicalizepeopletodoitsbiddingacrosstheglobe.Whenthinkingabout theworldenvironment,weare facingapresentanda futurewhereall conflictsand problems will be multi-layered and complex. By way of example, Syria today combines suchelementsasacivilwar,severaltypesofproxywars,asectarianconflict,acounterterrorismstruggle,etc.inwaysthatarealmostbewilderingintheircomplexity.Wearealsoimmersedinaperiodofdisruptivegeopoliticalchange.Forexample,inWesternEurope,weare seeing growing political rivalries and disruptions driven by the impact of large-scale immigrationpatternsfromNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEast.Peoplearebecomingmorewaryofeachother,andthisishavingsignificantpoliticalconsequences.This isbeingcompoundedbydramaticdemographicshiftsfrombothofthoseregions;fuelingthealreadydisruptiveimmigrationpatterns.AnotherdisruptoristherisingpoweroftheindividualandtheNSAthathe/sheoftenbecomesapartof;both of which are increasingly independent of the traditional reliance, state-based sources ofinformationandpower.All of this creates steep challenges for those of us who must grapple with the complex nature ofcounterterrorism…forwecannotandmustnotassumethateithertheadversary,ourenvironment,orwe ourselves are invulnerable to rapid and disruptive change. In fact, wemust do the contrary—wemustembracethecomplexity ifwearetomakesenseof it,andmost important, ifwearetofindthepath to greater effectiveness against terrorist threats and actors. It will require us to constantlyexperimentwith alternative ideas, alternative approaches, and alternative solutions…recognizing thatmanyofthemmayfailorbeunsatisfying.Butitisonlythroughsuchruthlessexperimentationthatwearelikelytofindthepathtolastingsuccess.Onalighternote,Churchilloncesaid,“YoucandependupontheAmericanstodotherightthing.Butonlyaftertheyhaveexhaustedeveryotherpossibility.”

Discussion Howmuchdoesourfocusoncounterterrorismactuallygeneratemoreterrorism?

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LTGNagata stated that he sees no evidence that because the USG exertions against terrorism have,therefore,madeitsignificantlyworseorstronger.Butwearestillstrugglingtomatchwhatwedowithwhatweknow.Wedoknowkineticactionisneverthecompleteanddurableansweragainstthethreatofviolentextremism.KineticactionsdobuytheUSGtimeandspacetoenablelonger-term,mostlynon-kinetic/non-militaryactivitiestosuccessfullytakeplace.Butsometimeswestruggletomakeouractualinvestmentsofresourcesandpolicysupportmatchwiththismoresophisticatedapproach.Wehaveanenormouslystrongarminkineticaction,butarecomparativelyweakereverywhereelse.HastheUSGconsideredpermittingISIStotransformintoalegitimatepoliticalmovement?LTGNagatastatedtheUnitedStatesisveryunlikelytoeverviewISISasalegitimatepoliticalactorgiventheir extreme ideology. But he also rhetorically asked, does itmatter if theUS refuses to see it as alegitimateactorifasignificant(andgrowing)partoftheworlddoesacceptitassuch?Howisourerodingcredibilityexpressed?LTGNagatastatedthattheUScreatedapost-WorldWarIIworldwheremostoftheworldlookstotheUSasthepreeminent leader.Wewanteditthatway,andtheUnitedStateshas inarguablybenefittedfromthatperception.However,itisaperceptionthatrequiresconstantnourishmentandexertionifitistobemaintained.Unfortunately,wesometimesareperceivedtodayasbeing lesswillingtodoeither,andinsteadappeartobesometimessayingthatweexpectouralliesandpartnersto“domore”withoutcommensurate American participation. Whether true or not, we need to remember that this is astruggleoverhowtheUSisperceivedand,asmanyofushavelivedmanytimesinourtravelsabroad,perceptionsometimesisthereality.What makes ISIS more effective in using limited resources than the good guys? Is it because theyunderstandthepopulationbetter?LTGNagatastatedthatfirst,ISISisalearningorganization.ItwasbuiltontheremnantsofalQaedainIraqandlearnedfromtheirfailures.Itlearnedtocounterourstrength.Ithasadaptedtous.Toooften,US and Coalition actors have been less quick to recognize the need to adapt as well. Second, weunderestimatedhowattractiveISIS’visionofapocalypsecanbetothosearoundtheworlditwishedtoinspireandrallytotheBlackFlag.Third,toooftenleadersintheinternationalcommunityhavemistakentemporaryortacticalprogressforstrategicsuccess,andhavedeclaredthatsuccessonlytobetragicallydisappointedby continued ISISattacks.Weneed tomore realistic abouthow longa struggle thiswillactuallybe.

Key Note Speaker (Lt Gen Charles Brown, USCENTCOM) ThetimehorizonofthisSMAConferenceencompassesa30-yearoutlook.However,withtherapidpaceofeventsintheUSCentralCommand(USCENTCOM)AreaofResponsibility(AOR),wealltoooftenmustoperatein30-minuteintervals.This fact, together with today’s agenda—which ranges from neurocognition to social media topersuasion to complexity—illustrates what a substantial and important conference this is. The SMAnetwork offers valuable input to USCENTCOM and provides a framework for future operations,

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challenges,andassumptions.TheSMAcommunityalsohelpsusthinkthroughthelong-termimpactsoftherangeofactionsweundertakeintheAOR.On behalf of General Votel, who has a long and valued relationship with the SMA community, I amincrediblyhonoredtobespeakingtothisdistinguishedgroup.IwouldalsoliketothankourDHS,NCTC,andDNI/NICcolleagues forhosting theconference,and toextendaspecial thankyou toDr.CabayanandMs.Eganfororganizingthisevent.Before Idiscusswhy the topicyouhavechosen for this conference is so relevant to theUSCENTCOMAOR,IwillquicklytouchupontheUSCENTCOM-SMAReachBackCellprocess.Lastyear,theSMAnetworkandUSCENTCOMformalizedourrelationshipandfeedbackprocesses.Theresultingefforthasdrawnupontheknowledgeof164subjectmatterexpertsacrossninecountries,andproducts have ranged from quick studies to literature reviews and simulations, primarily focused onthreemajorthemes:

1. ThemilitarydefeatofISIS2. TheimplicationsofISIS’sdefeatfortheregion3. Driversandbuffersofregionalstability

Whilethesethreequestionsareobviouslyinterrelated,thelastquestion,focusedonwhatweshoulddoto stabilize the region, lends itself most directly to the theme of this conference, “From Control toInfluence:AViewof—andVisionfor—theFuture.”TheconferencethemeparallelsoneofthemajorchallengeswearecontendingwithattheDepartmentof Defense. We have shifted from a Cold War paradigm to an environment characterized by thediffusionofpower,wherestateshaveadecreaseddegreeofcontrolintheinternationalsystem,erodingthedegreetowhichstatescanexerttraditionalcontrol.Asaresult,wefindourselvesinaworldwherewemustinsteadexaminethenatureofinfluence.And,asnotedintheconferenceoverview,whenwelookatinfluence,itrequirestheUSGovernmenttousemultipleelementsofpower.Italsorequiresustoshiftourthinkingabouthowtoassessthreatsandmeasuresuccess.Respondingtotoday’ssecurityenvironmentrequirestheemploymentofafullrangeof levers of power and influence in current and future engagements. Threats and challenges will betrans-regional,multi-domain,andmulti-functional.Tobemorespecific,theChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,GeneralDunford,hasdescribedthat“intoday’s strategic environment five key challenges—Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and ViolentExtremist Organizations—most clearly represent the challenges facing the Joint Force.”1 Further,General Dunford notes that, in this environment, “the Joint Force requires a balanced inventory ofcapabilitiesandcapacitiestoactdecisivelyacrosstherangeofmilitaryoperations.”2Oneofthespacesforwhichwemostneedthisbalancedinventoryisreferredtoasthe“GrayZone.”

1PostureStatementofGeneral JosephDunford Jr.,USMC,19thChairmanof the JointChiefsofStaff,before the115thCongress,SenateAppropriationsCommitteeDefense.BudgetHearing.22March2017.2Ibid.

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TheSMAConferencelastyearfocusedonthistopicanditisaconceptthatGeneralVotelhasdescribed.The conference defined theGray Zone as “a space between normal economic competition and openwarfare,wherestateandnon-stateactorsseek tooperate;aplacewhereunseenhandsdeliver ideasandmessages;whereactors collaborate, compete,andcollide toachieve theirends.”3While ISISandIranareprobably themostvisibleactorswithintheUSCENTCOMAORoperating in theGrayZone,wealsodealwithinfluencefromRussia,China,andNorthKoreaintheregion.The ISIS challengeprovidesanacute illustrationof the conceptsof control and influence. ISIS initiallyexerteditscontrolbytakinganddominatingterritoryin2014.However,thesuccessoftheCounter-ISISCoalition’s efforts has now forced ISIS to focusmore on influence operations as its ability to controldiminishes.ISISutilizestheInternetforrecruitmentandincitementviathe“virtualcaliphate,”whichisbeyondthekineticelementsofourcampaigntocounterentirely.Doingsowillrequireallelementsofnational power—Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic (DIME)—working together to ensureenduring regional stability. This is oneof the key issuesonwhich SMA research forUSCENTCOMhasrecentlyfocused.And,asweworktowardsthegoalofensuringenduringregionalstability,USCENTCOM’soverallstrategicapproachisbasedontheconceptsofprepare,pursue,prevail.

• Preparemeanstobereadyinadvance,whichincludescooperationwithpartnersonsuchissuesasaccess,basing,andoverflight

• Pursuedependsondevelopingamilitarycultureofcommunication,collaboration,andalwayslookingforwaystoseizetheinitiative.

• Prevailmeansweneed towinour current fight andplan towin thenext one. Prevailing is aprotractedstruggle;therearenoeasyvictoriesorparades.Weseektopreserveaccess,sustainrelationships,andpreservedecisionspace—operatingby,with,andthroughourpartners.

The SMA research has helped USCENTCOM in all three of elements of our strategic approach. Forexample,SMA’smost recentworkhashelpedusexaminethenatureof ISIS.SMAcontributionshavehelped us sort through polling for populations favorable to ISIS and what the best approach is toinfluenceandinformaudiences,helpingustocalibrateourmessagingandpreparetheenvironmentforsustainablesecurity.SMA materials have also helped USCENTCOM assess key factors for regional reconciliation andinfluentialunderlyingpoliticaldynamics.ThishashelpedUSCENTCOMvectoreffortstobestprepareafoundationforenduringregionalsecurity.Additionally, the SMA community’s recent work has helped us to better assess the interests andintentions of various countries and regional actors in Syria and Iraq, helping USCENTCOM to pursueopportunities where our interests coincide, creating an environment where long term security canflourish.

3 Strategic Multilayer Assessment Conference Proceedings of General Joseph Votel, Commander United StatesSpecialOperationsCommand,29October2015.

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Further,theSMAresearchhashelpedusunderstandtherolethatvariousgroupswillseektoplayinapost-ISIS environment—which will help us prevail in conflict and define end states that will solidifysustainablegains.In conclusion, as we try to plan for regional security in the post-ISIS environment, your work willcontinuetobecriticalinhelpingusidentifyemerging/developingtrendsandwehavenotyetbeguntothinkabout.Aninitiativelikeourdeveloping“ProjectNoor”withtheSMAnetworkisanexampleofwhatthismightlooklikeinthefuture.Itwillseektoautomateanalysisandvisualizationoflargeunstructureddatasets,helpingtoimproveredteamingefforts,andhelpingtomakedatamoreimmersiveandcontextualized.InorderforUSCENTCOMtobreakfreefromthe30-minutetimecycle,wemustensureoureffortsarescopedwithanunderstandingofthe30-yearsecurityhorizon.TheSMAnetworkplaysacrucialroleinhelpingUSCENTCOMtodothisandwelookforwardtoourcontinuedpartnership.

Panel 8: Net Assessment: Implications for Homeland Security Panelmembers:

• Ms.GiaHarrigan(DHS),moderator• Dr.ErikDahl(NPS)• Mr.TimMoughon(NCTC)• COLWilliamEdwards(USSOCNORTH)• Dr.GinaLigon(UniversityofNebraskaOmaha)• Mr.NawarShora(DHS)

Ms. Gia Harrigan (DHS)

Ms. Gia Harriganmoderated the panel. This panelwas taskedwith addressing two themes. The firstthemewas how net assessment, the practice of considering how strategic interactions between theUnited States, adversaries, and the environment,may play out in the future andmay be adopted toadvance homeland security (especially as related to threats that emerge outside the homeland). Thesecond was how to incorporate evolving understandings of emerging technologies (especiallycommunicationtechnologies),andbetterunderstandingofneurocognitivedevelopments, intothenetassessmentprocess.Dr. Erik Dahl (NPS)

Dr. Erik Dahl stressed the importance of net assessment for both homeland security and homelanddefense.DefinedbyDr.Dahlasanexercisewhereinbothone’sown,andanadversary’s,capabilitiesareclearlydefinedandunderstood,netassessmentsareuncommonintheUnitedStatesgovernment.Dr.Dahl gave a history of the existence of certain net assessment offices within the United Statesgovernment,andbroadenedtheapproachtoincludenotjustappraisalsofkineticcapabilities,butalsounderstandingthetechnologicaldynamics,butalsosocialandpoliticalactors;healsounderscoredthenecessityoftakingalong-termapproachintheprocessofnetassessment.

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Dr.Dahl noted that in addition to evaluating technical capabilities, practitionersmust also assess theimpactofthosecapabilities.Hereferredtothecommentsofaconference-goerinanearlierpanel,whohadnotedthatthesocialimpactoftherecently-usedMassiveOrdnanceAirBlast(MOAB)hadnotbeencarefully considered;Dr.Dahlused thisexample to illustrate thatnetassessmentsapplynot just toahomelandsecuritycontext,butalsotograyzoneconflictsandtraditionalkineticmeasures.Similarly,hepresentedtheneedtothinkproactivelyaboutotherthreats,particularlythosewheretheUnitedStatesmilitary capabilities are deployed, such as natural disasters and potential disease outbreaks. Dr. Dahlconcludedhisremarksbynotingthatonewaytogetabettersenseofnationalcapabilitiesisthroughaprocessofnetassessment.

Mr. Tim Moughon (NCTC)

Mr.TimMoughonfolloweduponafewDr.Dahl’spoints,fromtheperspectiveofsomeonewithinthatorganization, which was given a congressional mandate to conduct net assessments. Mr. Moughonconcededthatwithinthecontextofterrorism,thetraditionalpracticeofnetassessmentsisdifficulttoapply; comparedwithaColdWarcontext,actorsarenotbinary,becauseof the implicitbattlewithincivilianpopulations.DuringtheColdWar,anear-actuarialprocessofcountingweaponsandconstrainingoneselfwithintreatystructureswassufficient,buttoday’soperatingenvironmentismarkedlydifferentandrequiresadifferentmethodology.Mr. Moughon also discussed the difficulty in measuring power, particularly in the context of thedecliningrelativeutilityofkineticaction.Henotedthatkineticactionhasapsychological impact—onethatmessages very clearly (e.g., the impression that the use of theMassiveOrdnanceAir Blast left).Relatedtothedifficultyofmeasuringpoweristhedifficultyinmeasuringinfluence,somethingthatMr.Moughon arguedmight be amore advantageous tool in today’s operating environment, particularlywhen influence is wrapped up in the idea of soft power. National security professionals mustunderstandwithinthesoftpowerconstructthatstatesarelosingmarketsharetonon-stateactors.Thisshifthascriticalramificationsforthosewhoseektoemploystatepowertoachievetheirobjectives.Mr.Moughonunderscoredthepointthattoday’soperatingenvironmentbearslittleresemblancetotheColdWardynamicwhereredactorsandblueactorsinteractedoverapassivesetofgreenactors.Today,he argued, that “green space” is a collage of active participantswhowield a tremendous amount ofinfluence. He concluded his remarks by comparing the present-day paradigm to the stock market,wherein two actors are trading a stock; the best way to influence the perception of the price, Mr.Moughon argued, is to influence the environment, and your counterpart will react accordingly. Hestressedtheneedtoprovidethisbroaderperspectivetopolicymakers.

COL Wil l iam Edwards (USSOCNORTH)

COLWilliam Edwards began his remarks by placing his organization as one that is relatively new toSpecialOperationsCommandandtheDepartmentofDefense.Thiswas importanttonote,heargued,because it required SOCNORTH to fit into an existing Homeland Security and Homeland Defenseoperatingenvironment.Heaskedwhattheenvironment looksatfromabluenetworkperspective.Hementioned supporting law enforcement agencies from a counterterrorist role and the necessity ofconductingsocialnetworkanalysistodisruptanddefeatexistingnetworks.Offthatpoint,hedidnoteexisting cultural differences between organizations in a whole-of-government perspective andapproach. In this context, he posed a series of questions that inform his work that focused on

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information-sharing, collaboration, bridging those aforementioned cultural gaps, and building lastingrelationshipsbeyondindividualtoursandassignments.

Dr. Gina Ligon (University of Nebraska Omaha)

Dr.Gina Ligon startedher remarks by telling the story of AbdiNur, a 20-year old community collegestudent in Minneapolis who was last seen holding a semi-automatic weapon in Raqqa. Dr. Ligonsuggested that influence, specifically leadership influence, ought to become a component of the netassessmentprocess.Shesuggestedthat thereare twobarriers to its inclusion—onepracticalandonepsychological.Theformer,sheasserted,wasthatduetotitleauthoritiesandcollaborationaroundtheDepartment of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security; in short, practitioners are notgettingthewholepicturefromtheexistingdata.Dr.Ligonpostulatedthatthenetassessmentprocesscouldbeavehicletotraversethatdistancebetweenthatwhichnationalsecurityprofessionalscandooverseas anddomestically. Thepsychological barrier,Dr. Ligonargued, existswithin thewaynationalsecurityprofessionalsdehumanizeadversaries theway theydehumanizeus; specifically, the idea thatleadership is a capability of adversaries is uncomfortable for professionals and changes the wayquestionsareframed.Italsoservestohomogenizetheoutgroupinawaythatmakesthemmonolithicandimpervioustoexploitingdifferenceswithinthatgroup.Dr. Ligon presented a way forward, namely by convening concerned individuals to serve on crossfunctionalteams, invitingdomesticandinternationalpartnerstothinkabouttheprobleminthesameway. She underscored earlier points by panelistswho conceded that to countweapons andmeasureterritory iseasy;however,shearguedthatassessing leadership isverydifficultandurgedconference-goerstolookatleadershipasapsychologicalprocess.Dr.LigonclosedherremarksbyharkeningbacktothestoryofMr.Nur,whoshepositsmayreturntoMinnesotawithnewgrievances, capabilities,messages, andwithin the sphereof influenceof leaderswherehewas.Sheaskedtheaudiencetothinkaboutthisscenario,andconsiderwhatitwouldallmean,fromahomelandsecurityperspective.

Mr. Nawar Shora (DHS)

Mr.NawarShorapickeduponDr.Ligon’sdepictionofMr.Nur’scase,andaskedrhetoricallywhatcouldhave been done to convinceMr.Nur to go down a different path. He urged an internal assessment,wherein policymakers assess their own capabilities and tools.Mr. Shora drewonhis ownexperiencewithintheInteragency,asanoperatorontheground,workingwithcommunities.Heremarkedthatthegreatestchallengebeforecontroland influence isa lackof trust thatexistswithin thesecommunitiestowards law enforcement and government agencies. He suggested that this was due to a lack ofcommunicationanda lackofunderstanding, and suggested that thepresenceof these twodynamicswilleventuallyyieldtrust.AnhonestappraisaloftheUnitedStatescapabilities,Mr.Shoraargued,willexposethefactthatmanytoolsarelackingtoaddresssomeoftheissuesfacingthenation.

Discussion

Canyouelaborateontheculturaldifferenceswithinthemilitaryandlawenforcementnexus?

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COL Edwards responded that while all concerned parties see the problem, and aremotivated to acttowards that problem, the challenge existswithin cultural differences thatmake information sharingdifficult.Howeffectivearemetaphors,andhowmighttheybeusefulinassessinginfluence?Mr. Moughon answered by saying that understanding the paradigms are critical, particularly theparadigm that informshowpolicymakers viewpower,which represents a paradigm shift fromotherswithin the United States government. Assessments, he continued, come back to both hard and softpower.Regarding the latter,hereinforcedthenecessityofapowerfulnarrative.Hecontinuedontheidea of narratives, saying that simply fighting an adversarial narrative is insufficient; instead,policymakersmustpresentadifferentsetofprinciplesthatstarvetheotherideaofattention.Ms.Harriganadded thatmemes, forexample, aremosteffectivewhen repeated, and suggested thatprincipleofrepetitionasachallengetothecontentthattheUnitedStatespubliccirculates.HowcanouralliesbetterconnectwithUnitedStatesbureaucraticelementsforcoordination?Ms. Harrigan noted the existence of a memorandum of understanding between the United StatesDepartmentofHomelandSecurityScienceandTechnologydirectorateandtheirSwedishcounterparts,whichhasbeenhelpfulinthissense.Mr.MoughonaddedthattheNationalCounterterrorismCenter is tryingtoexpandtheirpartnerships,both among governments but also beyond them. Noting the growing importance of soft power,Mr.Moughoncontinued,thenthelistofpotentialpartnersforhisorganizationmightalsoincludecorporateandnonprofitentitiesaswell.Netassessmentsarearelativelybroadtool.Arethereanyothertoolsthatallowuserstoobtaingreaterlevelofspecificity?Mr.MoughonnotedthatwhiletheUnitedStatesisgoodatunderstandingredaspects(duetostrengthswithin the intelligence communities) and blue aspects (strategists, planners, and interests areunderstoodwell), thegreenarea iswhere theUnitedStatesgovernment isweakest,particularlywithrespecttotheinfluenceoftheUnitedStatesgovernment.Ifthegoalremainstoinfluencesomeactors,thegovernmentmustunderstandthoseactors.

Panel 9: From Concepts to Capabil it ies: Implications for the OPS Community Panelmembers:

• LtGen(ret)Dr.BobElder(GMU),moderator• CAPTPhilKapusta(USSOCOM)• Mr.JasonWerchan(USEUCOM)• Mr.MartyDrake(USCENTCOM)• Mr.MarkSisson(USSTRATCOM)• Dr.BobToguchi(USASOC)

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• COLSethSherwood(USNORTHCOM)• MajGenEricVollmecke(JointStaff,J5,USAFRICOM)

Lt Gen (ret) Dr. Bob Elder (GMU)

LtGen(ret)Dr.BobEldernotedthatoverthepasttwodays,theSMAConferencehastalkedabouttheimplicationsofchangesinourenvironment,howactorsarecapitalizingonthesechanges,andwhatitallmeansfortheUS.LtGen(ret)Dr.Elderexplainedthatthispanelwouldprovideoperationalfeedbacktosomeofthediscussionthathastakenplacethroughouttheconference.

CAPT Phil Kapusta (USSOCOM)

CAPTPhilKapustapointedoutthatsometimes,evenwhenwehaveallofthebestinformation,westillendupmakingbaddecisions.Thus,weshouldnotoverestimatewhatwecando.Thebestthingwecandoisbeginbydefiningastrategy.Itwouldnothurttohaveagrandstrategytoguideouractions.Intheconflictsoftoday,wedonotendupwithperfectendstates,soitwouldbehooveustotransitionawayfromtheideaofperfectendstatesbecauseinourcurrentenvironment,weareinaconstantstateofbattle.Theterm“nationbuilding”nolongerseemsrelevantbecausewehavenotreally“builtanation”sincethe18thcentury.Furthermore,the concept of traditional partnership has evolved in our current environment—we now increasinglyencounternon-traditionalandadaptivepartnerships.

Mr. Jason Werchan (USEUCOM)

Mr. Jason Werchan noted that Russia is in USEUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR), and Russia isarguably the best nation state at executing what it defines as a strategy of indirect action. Russia’sstrategicobjectivesarenotaproblemsolelyforUSECUOMortheUSDoD,theyareaproblemfortheentireUSgovernment.Unfortunately,wearecurrently failingasagovernment incombattingRussia’sstrategyofindirectactionintheUSEUCOMAOR.WhenRussia invadedCrimeawhilesubsequentlysupportingproxygroups ineasternUkraine,theUSGrespondedwiththeEuropeanReassurance Initiative(ERI)andhassinceobligatedroughly$6billion inERI.ForUSEUCOM,$6billionisalotofmoney—particularlysinceatthetime,USEUCOMwaslookingatRussiaasa strategicpartner.However,muchof the$6billion investment inERIwas spentonkineticactivitiesandcapabilities.Whilethesignificantinvestmentinkineticoptionsdidportraystrength,itdidlittletoadvancetheUnitedStates’informationoperations(IO)capacityintheregion.Thereality is thatRussia isadvancing its strategyof indirectactionbut theUS isnot.TheUSdoesdosomeIOandmilitaryinformationsupportoperations(MISO)intheUSECUOMAOR,butincomparisontoRussia,theUSiscurrentlyfallingshort.Given these shortcomings,whatdoes theUSneed todogoing forward to close thegapwithRussia?PartoftheproblemisthattheUSisnotproperlyorganizedtoeffectivelytakeawholeofgovernmentresponsetowhatRussiahasbeendoingintheUSEUCOMAOR.WhiletherearethingsliketheRussianEngagement Group, the Global Engagement Center, and the Russia Strategic Initiative, the propersolutionmightactuallybesomethingelse.InadditiontotheworktheUSgovernmentisdoinginterms

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ofexaminingRussianstrategyandaggression, itwouldbebeneficial todevelopsomething likea JointAgencyTaskForceinEurope.

Mr. Marty Drake (USCENTCOM)

Mr.MartyDrakeasked,“Howdowetakethehugeamountsofdataandinformationthatwehaveanduse it tomake proper decisions?”We havemore information than ever before, butwe need to getbetteratproperlyanalyzingtheinformationsowecanuseittomakebetterdecisions.Inthissense,wefaceanumberofnotablechallengesandquestions:

1. We need to determine what we can sense. Though, sometimes we can sense far moreinformationthanwecanactuallyuse.

2. Howdowesensethings,andwhatmechanismsdoweuse?3. Whatarewegoingtodowiththeinformationthatiscollected?4. Whoorwhatisgoingtodotheanalysis,andwherewillittakeplace?5. Whatarethequalificationsofthepersonorthing—itdoesnothavetobeanindividual,itcanbe

atechnology—thatisdoingtheanalysis?6. Howlongwilltheanalysistake?7. Doestheanalysismakesense?8. Who needs to know the findings, and how do we ensure we get the proper information to

them?9. Whatarethefeedbackmechanisms?

Providingfeedbackisthehardestthingtodo,buttheworktheSMAteamhasdoneincollaborationwithUSCENTCOMhasbeeninvaluableingatheringandcapturingimportantfeedback.Thedata cycleprocess isessential.Puredataneeds tobe transformed into recognizable information.The information then needs to be used to create knowledge. The knowledge thenmust be used tocreateunderstanding.Theunderstandingwillhelptomakebetterdecisions,whichthenhelpstocreatewisdom.Thepeoplewithwisdomwillbethemostlikelytomakethebestdecisions.Ultimately,thetruechallenge is in takingall of theavailabledataand informationandusing it tomove through thedatacycletowardwisdom.

Mr. Mark Sisson (USSTRATCOM)

Mr.Mark Sisson pointed out that USSTRATCOM is notably focused on strategic deterrence, decisiveresponse,andhavingacombatreadyforce.Toproperlyoperationalize,weneedtoproperlymeasure.First,itisessentialthatweclearlydefinewhatmeasurementis.Second,weneedtoclearlydefinewhatwearetryingtomeasure.Thingslikestrategicdeterrence,decisiveresponse,andhavingacombatreadyforcearedifficulttodefine—oftentimesthesethingsarecontextual.Therefore,weneedaveryflexibletoolsettohelpappropriatelyaddressthesethings.

Dr. Bob Toguchi (USASOC)

Dr.BobToguchiarguedthatinthinkingabouttheideaofcontrolversusinfluence,thesetwoconceptsarenotnecessarilycompetingwitheachother,andtheUSneedstobothcontrolandinfluence.TheDoDis kind of like a large battleship—it does not turn overnight, and it is very slow in changing its basic

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direction. To change thingswithin the DoDwill require time and proper vision. Given this, there areseveralthingsthatcanbedonetocopewiththesechallenges.First, it is importanttousethetypeof languageandrhetoricthatthePentagonunderstands.USASOCG9Directorateusestheterm“maneuver.”TheDoDisverygoodatphysicalmaneuver,butnotasgoodat cognitive maneuver—where influence truly resides. It is important that we expand maneuver—improving capacity with respect to both physical and cognitive maneuver. We need to changedoctrine—andthinkintermsofmaneuveringforcesandideas,fires,andnarratives,toaffectboththeenemyandthepopulation.Second,weneedtochangethemindsetsopeoplewithintheDoDstartthinkingaboututilizingcognitivemaneuver. Changing mindsets starts with education. This education should start with pre-commissioning,basic,andadvancecoursesthroughthewarcolleges.Weneedideasforhowtodevelopcognitiveobjectives,andthenweneedtostartusingtheseideasandobjectivesinthemilitaryplanningprocess—cognitive objectives need to be at the front end of the campaign planning process anddoctrine. They should be a part of the Commander’s Intent and Concept of theOperation. Cognitiveobjectives inmanycasesshouldbethecenterpieceofthefuturemilitarycampaign; fromwhichbothphysicalactivitiesandcognitiveactivitiesareorchestratedtoachieveUSpolicyoutcomes.Third, we need to improve structure. Typically, when you have a hard problem, you assign it to anorganization.Weneedtodevelopanorganizationthatworksasadatarepositoryforalloftheinsightsandlessonslearneddealingwithmaneuverinthecognitivespace.Finally,weneedtobepatient.Makingthischangetoembraceinfluencewillnotbeeasy.However,wecan point to our adversaries and see that they are mastering this space while we are not reallycompetingatall,soweneedtostartimprovingourcapabilityandcapacity.

COL Seth Sherwood (USNORTHCOM)

COLSethSherwoodnoted thatUSNORTHCOMhasadifferentproblemset than theotherCOCOMs—USNORTHCOM has an inverse problem in the sense that while other COCOMs are trying to containproblemsintheirAOR,USNORTHCOMprovideshomelanddefenseandworkstokeepbadthingsoutofitsAOR.Withrespecttoinfluencingandcontrol,USNORTHCOMdoesnothavealotofcontrolovertroopsinitsAOR; however, USNORTHCOM does do a lot of influencing, primarily through military-to-militarycooperationwith partners.USNORTHCOMalso spends a lot of timeworkingwith the Interagency onthingslikehomelandsecurityandhomelanddefense.USNORTHCOMhasaninterestingmissionset.Unfortunately,USNORTHCOM’smissionisnothelpedbythefactthatthereisnotasynchronizedlocalCOCOMthatbringseverythingtogether.

Maj Gen Eric Vollmecke (Joint Staff, J5, USAFRICOM)

Maj Gen Eric Vollmecke noted that the DoD has been working on creating a transregional threatscoordinationcell.ThistypeofcoordinationeffortisreallyhelpfultoUSAFRICOM.Whenyoulookatalloftheproblemsets inAfrica,everythingreallyboilsdowntothefact thattheUS isalwaysgoingtotrail

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behinduntilwecanstartbuildingtrustwithlocalpopulationsandactuallygetlocalstowillinglyflightfortheircountry.TheUSneedstofigureouthowtohelppushchangewithoutcreatingorbecomingpartoftheprobleminAfrica.Wehavetostartinfluencingchangeatthelocallevel.Achievingtheproperbalancetodothiswill requireawholeofgovernmentapproach.Wecannot justwalkawayfromtheproblems inAfrica,butwealsomustensurethatwedonotmakethemworse.Competition for influence is increasing throughout Africa. China, in particular, is putting noticeableeffort intogaining influenceonthecontinent.Chinahasalreadybegunbuilding its firstbase inAfrica,anditwill likelynotbeitslast.About70%ofUSaidinAfricagoestoSOF,whileabout80%ofChineseinvestment in Africa goes to infrastructure. This difference is quite significant. Chinese investment inAfrican infrastructure is paving theway for prolongedChinese influence over the long-term, and thisgivesChinaanoticeableadvantageovertheUSinthecompetitionforAfricaninfluence.TheUSalsoneedstocontinuetoimproveitsrelationshipsthroughoutAfrica.TheUShasanoutstandingrelationshipwithFranceinwestAfrica.Thisrelationshiphasproventhatwithaneffectiveforcethathasagilityandfreedomofmovement,alotcanbeaccomplished.FrancehasthestrongrelationshipsinwestAfricathattheUSlacks. InadditiontoourrelationshipwithFrance,theUSneedstocontinuetobuildandimproverelationshipsacrossAfrica.

Discussion

WhatkindofchangeshaveyouseeninyourCOCOMtodealwiththisincreasingfocusoninfluence?Mr. Drake noted that USCENTCOM has one of the largest IO forces in the DoD. USCENTCOM’s IOWebOPSTeamgetsinformationfromanarrayofsourcesasameansofgaugingsentimentintheAOR,which thendevelops insights that canbe folded into theplanningprocess tohelpUSCENTCOMmakebetter plans and preparations. USCENTCOM’s IO force operates 24/7 and continually pollsUSCENTCOM’sAORtohelpinformUSCENTCOMdecision-making.Dr.Toguchipointedoutthatthereisaproblemwithproperlysharingdata.Thedatasharingprocessisquitestove-pipedandneedstobeimproved.WealsoneedtoimproveourprocessesformeasuringtheimpactofourIO.COLSherwoodnotedthatUSNORTHCOMhasputsignificanteffortintobuildingitsinfluencecapacitybyworkingwiththeInteragency.Mr.Werchan added that COCOMcollaboration is important and something thatUSECUOMhas beenputtingnotableeffortintoincreasing.USECUOMisalsofocusedonworkingwithcountriesthataremostsusceptibletoRussiainfluencetohelpprovidethemwithsecuritycooperationtoensurethattheyareresilientandprepared.Mr. Sisson noted that timing and shaping are critical components. We need to be proactive in ourmessaging.Mr.DrakeaddedthattheSMAteamhasbeenveryhelpful insupportingUSCENTCOMintheplanningsideofitsIOcapacity.

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One of our challenges seems to be that our adversaries can bend the rules, whereas we have strictdemocraticandbureaucraticprocesses.HowdotheCommandsdealwiththis?Mr.WerchannotedthatUSECUOMhasaparticularlyspecificprobleminthissensewithRussia.Russiaisinsanely responsive and is able to act much more rapidly than the US. How do we counter this?USEUCOM’s greatest strength is its European allies. Whereas we have restrictions with respect toauthorityandauthorization,ourEuropeanalliesuniquelyequippedtorespondincertainwaysthatwecannot.Mr. Drake stated that one could argue that if we are doing things correctly, we are not going to besurprised—wewillbeabletopredictwhenaturnmighthappenandbepreparedforit.TheUSseemstobeprettygoodatnotgettingcaughtoffguardorbeingsurprised.Dr. Toguchi emphasized the importance of resilience.We need to build resilience so thatwe can beprepared for surprise. Resilience is more than just the narrative—it is also gained through ourcapabilities. We also need to look more closely at non-traditional indicators and warnings that anadversarylikeRussiawouldnotexpect.Wehavetobemoreinnovativeandcreativewiththingsthatcanprovidenon-traditionalindicatorsandwarnings,thusputtingusaheadofourcompetition.Mr.Sissonnotedthatthisproblemisnotspecificjusttogovernment.Businessessufferwiththistypeofproblemdaily.Whatarewedoingtocontroltheinformationenvironment?CAPT Kapusta noted that it seems like we want to control information. The DoD vastly overvaluesclassifiedinformationandgoesoutofitswaytocontracteffortstoprovideseparateproprietarypoolsofinformation, which ends up leaving us with a bunch of pools of information that do not connect.Meanwhile,thereisahugeoceanofunclassifiedinformationthatwedonotcapitalizeupon.Weneedtostopovervaluingthesehighlyclassifiedproprietarypoolsofinformationandstartputtingmorevalueandfocusontherichsupplyofopensource information.Ultimately, itseemswehavean informationproblem,andtheproblemrequiresaparadigmshifttobesolved.Mr.Drakestatedthatweshouldnotwanttocontroltheinformationenvironment.Weshouldleveragetheinformationenvironmentinanefficientandusefulmanner,onethatgeneratesunderstandingandknowledge.Dr. Toguchi added that we should also listen to our allies and learn how they are leveraging theinformationenvironmentbecausewearenottheonlyonesexploringthisspace.Overthepasttwodayswehaveheardmanygreatideaswithrespecttothingsthatwewishwecoulddo.That said, if you had to name one thing that is themost important thing that needs to be done butcurrentlyisnotbeingdone,whatwoulditbe?Mr.WerchannotedthatwesimplycannotcompeteshortofconflictwithouradversariesbyusingtheDoDon itsown.Wehavetooperateshortofconflictasthe Interagency.Weneedaperson inpowerthatdealswiththewholeofgovernmentresponsetoshortofconflictoperations.

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Mr.Drakestatedthatweneedtoupdateandimprovetheeducationalprocessesusedforyoungsoldiersas they come up through the ranks and start making plans and decisions. Things like informationoperationsandinfluenceoperationsneedtobeinculcatedintoourmilitaryeducationprocesses.Maj Gen Vollmecke stated that we make a lot of promises in places like Africa, but our acquisitionprocess typically slows us down in fulfilling those promises. It would be great for us to improve ouracquisitionprocesssothatitisfasterandmoreefficient.CAPT Kapusta noted that USSOCOM largely focuses on two core functions: working with locals anddirectaction.However,roughly90%ofUSSOCOM’seffortgoesintodirectaction—wehavecreatedtheworld’sbest killingmachine,butwehavenotput thepropereffort intoworkingwith locals,which isultimatelythelonger-termpieceofthepuzzle.Dr.Toguchinotedthatthecyberrealmisarealchallenge—theUSisfallingbehindinsomeofthecyberskillsetsthatweneed.COLSherwoodstatedthatweneedasynchronizedglobalCOCOMplan.Forexample,when lookingattheinfluencethatRussiahasintheArctic,weneedtoalsoknowhowthiseffectsotherthingsliketraderoutes, homeland defense, etc. A synchronized global plan for all of the COCOMs would help withquestionslikethese.

Closing Remarks (Dr. Hriar Cabayan, JS/J39/SMA) Dr.HriarCabayan thankedparticipants forattending the10thannualSMAconference.TheSMAteamgreatly appreciates themoderators, panelists, and participants for the significant effort the put intosupportingtheconference.