JOINT AVIATION AUTHORITIES/ EUROPEAN AVIATION … · not as an integral part of the B777-300ER variant, ... aircraft performance and terminal charts are installed, normal EFB procedures

JAA/EASA JOEB on Boeing EFB

Revision 00 (2) 1 Publication: 15/06/06

JOINT AVIATION AUTHORITIES/

EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY

JOINT OPERATION EVALUATION BOARD REPORT

Boeing/Jeppesen

Electronic Flight Bag

(Rev00.2 – 25 April 2006)



JOEB Assessment Boeing has requested a JOEB process for evaluation of the Boeing/Jeppesen Class 3

Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). Subgroups have been set up and are:

Ø FCL & OPS Subgroup

Ø MMEL Subgroup

The first example of the installation of this EFB was on the Boeing B777-300ER variant.

Initially, the JOEB assessment of the EFB was a sub-activity of the B777-300ER JOEB but,

at an early stage, Boeing requested that the EFB be considered as generic equipment and

not as an integral part of the B777-300ER variant, as it was optional equipment. The request

was granted and a separate Report for the B777-300ER aircraft has been issued that does

not address the Class 3 EFB. Having commenced the evaluation, the B777-300ER JOEB

members were given responsibility for the evaluation of the EFB.

The MMEL for the specific aircraft type or variant in which the EFB is installed is the

document recommended for approval by the JAA.



Publication List

Revision 00 (2) Draft Issue for Comment Period 01/05/2006

Revision 00 (2) Publication 15/06/2006



Table of Contents

Page

JAA Operation Evaluation Board – FCL & OPS Subgroups 5

Preamble 6

Executive Summary 8

Operational Evaluation Board Report Part 1

Purpose and Applicability 9

General Description of the Boeing/Jeppesen EFB System 10

Software Applications Considered Under This Report 12

Operations Manual Procedures For Use of EFB 13

Specifications For Training 14

Specifications For Checking 15

Specifications For Currency 16

Specifications For Training Devices and Simulators 17

Application of JOEB Report 17

Alternate Means of Compliance 17

Miscellaneous 17

Operational Evaluation Board Report Part II

Background 20

Board Composition 20

Applicant’s Proposal and Board Issue/Review Items 20

Summary and Conclusions 21

Attachments

ORI 7



JAA Operation Evaluation Board –

FCL& OPS

and OFCR Subgroups

Captain Graham Sturrock

UK CAA

JOEB Chairman

Recommended for approval by:

Captain Graham Sturrock

UK CAA

JOEB Chairman

Captain Andy Stewart

UK CAA

JOEB Member

Robert-Jan Venema

NL IVW

JOEB Member

Jean Baril

(CJAA - JOEB Co-ordinator)



Preamble This Joint Operation Evaluation has been performed using the following methods:

Ø Review of a CBT-based EFB Training Programme recommended by Boeing

Ø Inspection of the EFB and conduct of functional tests

This Report specifies the requirements for training and operational procedures for the

Boeing/Jeppesen Electronic Flight Bag (EFB)

This Evaluation has been made in compliance with the JAA JOEB Terms of Reference. The

OE was conducted in accordance with the processes detailed in the JAA JOEB Handbook,

dated December 2002 where applicable.

JAR requirements in JAR-OPS 1.135 and 1 .1040 (m) have been considered together with

the material in TGL 36 (Approval of Electronic Flight Bags).

JAA recommends the Boeing/Jeppesen proposed training course and operational procedures

as specified in this report.



This report is issued by Central JAA and is approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency, Certification Directorate:

Note on JOEB Transfer from JAA to EASA:

In accordance with the JOEB Transfer Action plan agreed in 2005, responsibility for the

JOEB Management transferred to EASA in February 2006.

Evan Nielsen

EASA, Certification Directorate

Flight Standards Manager

Hoofddorp, 15 June 2006



Executive Summary

The process of JAA Operational Evaluation (OE) was based, partly, on the United States

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) evaluation and determination which was administered

under the auspices of FAA Advisory Circulars (AC) 120-53 and 120-76A. Functional testing

of the EFB in its initially presented configuration was done in concert with the FAA Flight

Standardization Board (FSB). Subsequent JOEB evaluations of additional software

applications hosted on the same hardware have been partly on the basis of a validation of

the FSB evaluation process and recommendations.

The EFB CBT-based training proposed by Boeing/Jeppesen assumes the applicant has no

previous experience of EFB operations but has experience of large transport aircraft

operations under JAR-OPS 1 or similar.

The JOEB recommends the operational procedures and the proposed EFB training as

published in this Report.



Operational Evaluation Report

FCL & OPS Subgroups

OEB Report Part I

1. PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY 1.1 This JOEB report specifies JAA requirements applicable to operators seeking

operational approval to use the Boeing/Jeppesen Class 3 Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) under JAR-OPS 1. Findings and recommendations made in this report are consistent with the guidance contained in JAA TGL No: 36 and assume that appropriate airworthiness certification for installation and operation of the EFB has been accomplished. The following information related to operational approval is included:

a) A general description of the EFB system considered by this Report.

b) List of software applications currently available and considered by this Report.

c) Operations Manual procedures for EFB use during all phases of flight.

d) A revision process and method that ensures appropriate database accuracy and currency

e) Acceptable training syllabi and courseware

f) Checking and currency standards including specification of those checks that must be administered by the National Authority (NAA) or operator.

g) The role of the EFB Administrator.

h) Configuration of an aircraft performance application.

i) List of documents to meet the recommendations of TGL 36 for operational

approval (Appendix 1). j) Acceptable Initial EFB Training (Appendix 2).



1.2 This report includes:

a) Minimum requirements which should be applied by National Authorities, and b) Information which is advisory in general, but is mandatory for particular operators

if the designated configurations apply and if approved for that operator.

1.3 Various sections within the report are qualified as to whether compliance is required, considering the provisions of JAR-OPS, JAR-FCL and JAA TGL No: 36, or whether it is advisory in nature.

1.4 Provisions of this report are effective until amended, superseded, or withdrawn by

subsequent JOEB determinations. 2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE BOEING/JEPPESEN EFB SYSTEM 2.1 The Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) system provides additional electronic flight deck

displays that maybe used to depict a variety of aviation data traditionally provided in paper form. This system is a dual, independent class 3 EFB system using side-mounted touch-sensitive displays. The EFB system also provides an Airport Map function that depicts own ship position on a digital airport map. The EFB system consists of several devices located in either the flight deck or the E&E bay. Crew interface devices consist of two Display Units (DU) installed in the side display locations, two External Keyboard Ports and one Data Load Port. A typical installation is that for the Boeing 777 series aircraft as shown in Figure 2-1. In addition, the EFB system can interface with existing Cursor Control Devices (CCDs) such as those installed on Boeing 777 series aircraft. Each display unit interfaces with its respective Electronic Unit (EU) located in the E&E Bay.

Figure 2-1 EFB 777 Crew Compartment Interface



Figure 2-2 EFB Display Unit Screen



3. SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS CONSIDERED UNDER THIS REPORT 3.1 The joint FSB/JOEB evaluation considered the following:

Type A applications: • E-Docs (Document browser)

Type B applications:

• Flight Deck Access Video • Aircraft Performance (Takeoff & Landing performance; Weight & Balance)

Type C applications:

• Airport Map (Taxi Moving Map Display) 3.2 Subsequent applications offered by Boeing/Jeppesen and evaluated independently

by the JOEB are as follows:

Type A Applications: • None

Type B Applications:

• Terminal Charts

Type C Applications: • None

3.3 Subsequent applications offered by Boeing/Jeppesen and evaluated independently

by the FSB are as follows:

Type A Applications: • None

Type B Applications:

• Fault Reporting

Type C Applications: • None



4. OPERATIONS MANUAL PROCEDURES FOR USE OF EFB 4.1 Normal Procedures

Depending on the software applications installed, the use of this Class 3 EFB is likely to result in normal EFB operating procedures being integrated into standard aircraft operating procedures (SOPs). Normal EFB operating procedures for each software application installed should therefore be described in the applicable aircraft Operations Manual Part B for each phase of flight. Normal EFB operating procedures should contain guidance on the intended use of each software application together with limitations and prohibitions on their use.

Where software applications that impact safety-critical areas of operation such as aircraft performance and terminal charts are installed, normal EFB procedures should address the need for careful confirmation of its applicability and the cross-checking by both pilots of the data being used. The Operations Manual should establish precedence where alternative sources of information are available from other aircraft systems (e.g. performance data from the FMC).

4.2 Non-Normal and Emergency Procedures There are no non-normal or emergency procedures arising from EFB malfunction.

4.3 Alternate Procedures (MEL) Where alternate procedures (O) are required by the MEL for dispatch with EFB partially or completely inoperative, such procedures must be established in advance and described in the Operations Manual Part B or the MEL. Where an aircraft performance application is installed, any alternate procedure must establish an equivalent level of safety for the cross-checking of data input and output. Where a terminal charts application is installed, an alternate procedure must ensure that each pilot, whilst seated at his station, retains independent and direct access to charts for the departure, destination and destination alternate airfields.

4.4 Suitable EFB Procedures

The Jeppesen Electronic Flight Bag Pilot’s Guide has been evaluated by the JOEB and found to be suitable to form the basis of a technical description of the device and for the establishment of operational procedures for EFB use.

5. EFB DATA REVISION PROCESS 5.1 An acceptable data revision process is to use the Data Distribution and Management

system established by Boeing and Jeppesen. Data will be loaded to the EFB via an ARINC 615 data loader using procedures included in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual. The currency of the EFB database is required to be checked by the flight crew during pre-flight checks.



6. SPECIFICATIONS FOR TRAINING 6.1 General 6.1.1 Assumptions Regarding Flight Crew Previous Experience

Training for the use of the EFB is not intended to provide basic competence in areas such as aircraft performance etc. The provisions of Section 6 of this Report, therefore, apply to training programmes for flight crew who have experience on multi-engine turbojet/turboprop operated aircraft under JAR-OPS 1 or similar and who may be expected to have basic competence in the functions addressed by the software applications installed. For flight crew not having this experience, additional requirements may be appropriate as determined by the NAA.

6.1.2 Programmes Crediting Previous EFB Experience

Training programs for the EFB may take credit for previous EFB experience. For example, previous experience of an aircraft performance application hosted on a Class 1 or Class 2 EFB and using similar software may be credited toward training on this Class 3 EFB. NAAs may approve programmes for operators initially introducing a new EFB system where such programmes are consistent with programmes previously approved. Central JAA should be consulted for information regarding previously approved programs or programs crediting previous EFB experience.

6.1.3 EFB Training Integration

Training required for the grant of an aircraft type rating does not recognise variants within the type nor the installation of particular equipment. Any training for the grant of a B777 type qualification need not, therefore, recognise the installation of the EFB. However, where the operator is the TRTO and training for the issue of the type rating is combined with the operator’s conversion course required by JAR-OPS 1.945, the training syllabus should recognise the installation of the EFB. The EFB is considered to be similar to the Electronic Checklist as installed on the B777. Neither device is essential to the operation of the aircraft and the aircraft may be dispatched with either device inoperative. However, any training or checking conducted without the device installed could not be seen as representative, given the level of integration of the use of each with SOPs. The only difference between the two devices is that the EFB is optional equipment.

6.2 Initial EFB Training 6.2.1 General

Initial EFB training should be accomplished as specified by this JOEB Report at Appendix 2. Initial EFB Training may consist of both ground-based and in-flight training. An operator/TRTO may use many methods for ground-based EFB training including classroom instruction, pictures, videotape, ground training devices, computer-based instruction, and static aircraft training. Ground-based training for EFB use lends itself particularly to CBT-based instruction. In-flight EFB training should be conducted by a suitably qualified person during line flying under supervision or during Differences and Familiarisation Training.



6.2.2 Areas of Emphasis

• The intended use of each software application together with limitations and prohibitions on their use must be emphasised.

• The need to avoid fixation on the Taxi Moving Map Display during taxi operations must be emphasised during both CBT and simulator training (if applicable), and during line flying under supervision.

• If an aircraft performance application is installed, proper cross-checking of data input and output must be emphasised.

• If a terminal chart application is installed, proper verification of the applicability of the information being used must be emphasised.

• Failure of component(s) of the EFB should be addressed

6.2.3 Suitable Ground-Based Initial EFB Training

Jeppesen CBT-based training at Version 1.4 has been evaluated by the JOEB and found to be suitable for ground-based Initial EFB Training.

6.3 Conversion Training Initial EFB training is required when Conversion Training is being carried out under JAR-OPS 1.945 and EFB is installed on the type or variant for which training is being conducted.

6.4 Differences and Familiarisation Training Initial EFB training is required when EFB installation requires Differences or Familiarisation Training to be carried out under JAR-OPS 1.950.

6.5 Recurrent Training

Recurrent training is not normally required for EFB operation provided the functions are used regularly in line operations. Operators are encouraged, however, to include EFB as a component of recurrent Aeroplane/STD Training as required by App1 to JAR-OPS 1.965(a)(2) to the extent practical.

In the case of Mixed Fleet Flying or where the EFB is not installed across the fleet NAAs should consider additional recurrent training requirements.

6.6 Simulator Requirements

Where EFB use is an integral part of standard operating procedures, NAAs must consider the suitability of the simulator when granting a user approval under JAR OPS 1.005 (e).



7. SPECIFICATIONS FOR CHECKING 7.1 General

Appropriate knowledge of EFB and competence in its use should be checked following any EFB training.

7.1.1 Areas of Emphasis The following should be addressed during checks as appropriate:

• Proficiency in the use of each EFB application installed should be demonstrated

• Proper outside visual scan without prolonged fixation on EFB operation should be

demonstrated

• Proper selection and use of EFB displays should be demonstrated, particularly during taxi operations

• Where an aircraft performance application is installed, proper cross-checking of

data input and output should be demonstrated

• Where a terminal chart application is installed, a proper use of the chart clip function should be demonstrated

• Failure of component(s) of the EFB should be addressed

7.2 Check Following Ground-Based Initial EFB Training The check conducted following the ground-based element of Initial EFB Training may be accomplished as an automated component of EFB computer-based training.

7.3 Skill Test & Proficiency Check

Proficiency in EFB use is not shown in the list of contents at App 2 to JAR-FCL 1.240 & 1.295 for the Skill Test for the issue of a type rating following type conversion training and for the Proficiency Check for the renewal of a type rating. However, where the operator is the TRTO and the Skill Test is being conducted following training that is integrated with the operator’s conversion course as required by JAR-Ops 1.945, or where the Proficiency Check is being conducted concurrently with the Operator’s Proficiency Check required by JAR-OPS 1.965, and where EFB use is an integral part of standard operating procedures for the type or variant, proficiency in the use of the EFB should be assessed in the appropriate areas (e.g. item 1.1, item 1.5 etc. in App 2 to JAR-FCL 1.240 & 1.295).

7.4 Operator Proficiency Check

JAR-OPS 1.965(b)(1)(i) requires that flight crew demonstrate their competence in carrying out normal procedures during the Operator Proficiency Check. Therefore, where EFB use is an integral part of standard operating procedures, proficiency in the use of the EFB should be assessed.



7.5 Line Check JAR-OPS 1.965(c) requires that flight crew demonstrate their competence in carrying out normal procedures during the Line Check. Therefore, where EFB use is an integral part of standard operating procedures, proficiency in the use of the EFB should be assessed.

7.6 Simulator Requirements

Where EFB use is an integral part of standard operating procedures, NAAs must consider the suitability of the simulator when granting a user approval under JAR OPS 1.005 (e).

8. SPECIFICATIONS FOR CURRENCY

If EFB use is included in recurrent Aeroplane/STD training and recurrent Line Checks, no unique currency provisions apply to the EFB.

9. SPECIFICATIONS FOR TRAINING DEVICES AND SIMULATORS

(reserved)

10. APPLICATION OF JOEB REPORT

Relevant parts of this report are effective when the report is approved by JAA. 11. ALTERNATE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE

Alternate means of compliance to the provisions of this Report must be approved by the operator’s NAA. If alternate compliance is sought, operators will be required to establish that any proposed alternate means provides an equivalent level of safety to the provisions of JAA TGL No: 36 and this JOEB report. Analysis, demonstrations, proof of concept testing, differences documentation or other evidence may be required.



12. MISCELLANEOUS

12.1 The Role of the Administrator

The operator should appoint a person or persons to the role of EFB Administrator. The role of the EFB Administrator is crucial to the appropriate configuration of the EFB and the maintenance of its currency. The EFB Administrator should have received detailed training in both the hardware and the software applications installed. If an aircraft performance application is installed, this training should include training in performance requirements to an advanced standard of competence. Administration procedures for the configuration of the EFB system, its updating, operational feedback and quality assurance functions should be established by the operator and documented.

12.2 Configuration of an Aircraft Performance Application It is essential, and indeed a legal requirement, that any performance application, if installed, must be configured so that it operates in compliance with the AFM and national legislation. NAAs should consider seeking a compliance statement from operators in relation to the configuration and customisation of any aircraft performance application installed.



APPENDIX 1

List of Required Documents for Operational Approval

1. Aircraft Flight Manual

2. Operations Manual Part A (where relevant depending on software applications installed)

3. Operations Manual Part B

4. Minimum Equipment List

5. Operations Manual Part C (where relevant depending on software applications installed)

6. Operations Manual Part D including a description of the training syllabus and training

courseware for Flight Crew

7. EFB Administrator’s Procedures Manual including: 7.1 EFB Configuration Control Description and Procedures 7.2 EFB Updating and currency procedures 7.3 Qualifications required for the EFB Administrator and support staff 7.4 Training syllabus and training courseware for the EFB Administrator and

support staff 7.5 EFB Quality Control and Quality Assurance Procedures

8. Data Delivery and Management Description and Procedures Note: Requirements for engineering and maintenance functions are not listed here.



APPENDIX 2

ACCEPTABLE INITIAL EFB TRAINING 1. Typical Training Programme

A typical initial EFB training programme will consist of ground-based and flight-based elements. Ground-based training may be conducted by traditional classroom means using courseware such as slides and handouts but EFB training lends itself particularly to CBT-based training due to its interactive nature. Flight-based training should assume a basic knowledge of the system and the software applications and should concentrate on their practical use. In particular, flight training should address CRM and other human factors issues associated with the installation of such a potentially compelling display.

1.1 Ground-Based Training

As a minimum, the ground-training syllabus should consist of the following: 1. System architecture overview 2. Display Unit features and use 3. Limitations of the system 4. Restrictions on the use of the system

a. Phases of flight b. Alternate procedures (MEL)

5. Applications as installed a. Use of each application b. Restrictions on the use of each application

i. Phases of flight ii. Alternate procedures (MEL)

c. Data input d. Cross-checking data input and output e. Use of data output

1.2 Flight Training

Where a suitably equipped and qualified simulator is used, the flight training syllabus should be additionally integrated into simulator training. As a minimum, the flight training syllabus should consist of the following: 1. Practical use of the Display Unit

a. Display Unit Controls b. Data input devices

2. Selection of applications 3. Practical use of applications 4. CRM and human factor considerations

a. Situational awareness b. Avoidance of fixation c. Cross-checking data input and output

5. Practical integration of EFB procedures into SOPs



OEB Report Part II 1. BACKGROUND

The first example of the installation of this EFB was on the Boeing B777-300ER

variant. Initially, the JOEB assessment of the EFB was a sub-activity of the B777-

300ER JOEB but, at an early stage, Boeing requested that the EFB be considered as

generic equipment and not as an integral part of the B777-300ER variant, as it was

optional equipment. The request was granted and a separate Report for the B777-

300ER aircraft has been issued that does not address the Class 3 EFB. Having

commenced the evaluation, the B777-300ER JOEB members were given

responsibility for the evaluation of the EFB.

2. BOARD COMPOSITION

The Board consisted of the following: Capt. Graham Sturrock – Chairman (UK CAA) Capt. Andy Stewart – Member (UK CAA) Mr. Robert-Jan Venema – Member (NL IVW) The Board was assisted by: Mr. Geoff Burtenshaw (UK CAA) Mr. David Law (UK CAA)

3. Applicant’s Proposal and Board Issue/Review Items 3.1 Applicant’s Proposal

The following proposal was received from Boeing after the commencement of the JOEB evaluation of the B777-300ER variant with the Class 3 EFB installed: “Boeing and Jeppesen requests the applicability of the ORI be modified to address the Boeing/Jeppesen Electronic Flight Bag, not the B777, for the following reasons:

a. The airplane specific installation issues are addressed via airworthiness certification, not operational approval

b. The operational use/crew interface of the applications planned for the EFB will not be airplane specific – the data they will use, such as performance, manuals, etc. may be airplane specific but of no consequence to the operational approval process since the method of use will be independent of airplane type.

c. Boeing and Jeppesen see no benefit or reason repeat this approval process at the JAA level for new Type A applications that may be installed by the operator, nor does the AC 120-76A require such a high-level approval.



d. The planned training will be the same regardless of airplane type e. The EFB system will be offered for both production and retrofit on multiple

airplane types” 3.2 Board Issue/Review Items See ORI 7 attached. 4. Summary and Conclusions

At the time of the evaluation, the Boeing/Jeppesen Class 3 EFB was a novel device presenting features such as the Taxi Moving Map Display (TMMD) that were being seen for the first time. The Board had a number of concerns about the device and particularly about the TMMD in terms of the compelling nature of the display. However, in operational use, these concerns were dispelled and the Board came to the conclusion that, when used appropriately, the EFB and the software applications installed enhanced flight crew capabilities and the TMMD made a major contribution to situational awareness. The Board also recognised the importance of the role of the Administrator particularly in relation to applications such as the aircraft performance tool. The Board recommended that the contents of TGL 36 (in draft at the time of the evaluation) be enhanced in this regard and the published version addressed the role of the Administrator in the light of the experience gained during this evaluation. The Board recommends the adoption of its conclusions concerning operational procedures and flight crew training contained in this report.



BOEING/JEPPESEN EFB

OPERATIONAL REVIEW ITEM

Applicability: All Aircraft Types

SPECIAL CONDITION

SUBJECT: Electronic Flight Bag IDENTIFICATION NR: ORI 7 STAGE : 2 REQUIREMENTS: JAR-OPS 1.1040 ISSUE : 1 App1 to JAR-OPS 1.1045 PRIMARY PANEL: B777 JOEB STATUS : Closed SUPPORT PANEL: None DATE : 08 May 2004 1. STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Boeing has applied for the airworthiness approval of an Electronic Flight Bag (EFB). The EFB can electronically store and retrieve documents required for flight operations, such as the AFM, AOM, MEL, Navigation data and other documentation that would otherwise be available on paper in the cockpit. Furthermore the EFB will be able to display a moving map of an airport during taxi operations. The data can be updated via different on board and wireless data loading paths. For the scope of this ORI the following functionalities are presented for approval:

1. Document Browser for Operations Manuals and other Operational Documentation 2. Performance Calculations 3. Flight Deck Entry Surveillance Video System (FDEVS) 4. Taxi Moving Map Display

In a later stage the following functionalities will be presented for approval:

5. Electronic Technical Log 6. Reporting Functions (e.g. trip-reports) 7. Navigation and Approach Charts

Approval is requested for a Class 3 device which will consist of two LRUs in the Avionics compartment and two displays (each on one cockpit side). Both sides will be interconnected and fed with aircraft position and heading from the certified on-board avionics. The system will be powered from the aircraft electrical system. EFB is considered by the team to be a novel design feature. Consequently this ORI has been produced to address the operational issues arising from the installation of such a system. Although it is recognised that Operational and Certification approvals are closely linked, this ORI will only deal with operational issues. As this project is executed as a validation of the operational approval performed by the FAA, the JAA team will focus on the differences with the FAA (comprising the latest change of AC120-76). In this respect, this ORI will introduce the concepts contained within the draft JAA Administrative and Guidance Material Temporary Guidance Leaflet on the “Approval of Electronic Flight Bags”, a copy of which is attached. Flight crew training is an integral part of the operation of the EFB and Boeing is expected to provide a proposal for appropriate training in the use of each of the functionalities presented for approval.



The taxi moving map (taxi awareness) presents different considerations. The Boeing position is that the Taxi Position Awareness function is neither intended to replace the use of outside visual references nor to provide taxi navigational guidance. Although the JAA recognises that the availability of such functionality can be a considerable contribution to safety by the enhancement of situational awareness, it is considered likely that when a crew is taxiing on a relatively unfamiliar airport and/or in difficult visual conditions, such a compelling display might well be interpreted and used as navigational guidance, reducing the need for, and use of, outside references. Hence the operational procedures should be designed to minimise the opportunity for inappropriate use and to reinforce the intent of the function. The Boeing System Description Document (SDD document number D6-82916-1 dated 23 June 2003) states in paragraph 4.2.2, “The Airport Map is intended as a supplemental flight crew aid to provide increased positional awareness to support taxi planning and assist in monitoring taxi progress and direction”. The document goes on to state in paragraph 4.2.3, “crews must use normal procedures and use direct visual observation out of the cockpit window as the primary taxi navigation reference”. The JOEB team concurs with these statements of principle. However, paragraph 4.2.3 goes on to state, “the flight crew is expected to detect any significant difference in displayed and actual own ship position by correlating displayed position with outside visual references (signage, geometry etc.)” The team is of the view that this example of an operational procedure is not consistent with the principles quoted above. Other similar examples can be found where the TMMD display appears to be a primary navigational reference. Paragraph 4.3 shows changes to the existing B777 Operations Manual procedures that describe the use of EFB functions, including the TMMD, where it is suggested that both the Captain and F/O select the EFB Airport Map during the After Start Procedure. The team is of the view that the selection of the TMMD by both pilots is not consistent with the principles quoted above neither with similar principles set out in the FAA’s AC 120-74 (there is no JAA equivalent). After engine start, the simultaneous selection of TMMD by both pilots should be prohibited by means of an appropriate statement in the Normal Procedures or, preferably, should be made impossible by means of a limitation achieved by hardware function. Boeing Position

1. Boeing and Jeppesen requests the applicability of the ORI be modified to address the

Boeing/Jeppesen Electronic Flight Bag, not the B777, for the following reasons: f. The airplane specific installation issues are addressed via airworthiness certification,

not operational approval g. The operational use/crew interface of the applications planned for the EFB will not be

airplane specific – the data they will use, such as performance, manuals, etc. may be airplane specific but of no consequence to the operational approval process since the method of use will be independent of airplane type.

h. Boeing and Jeppesen see no benefit or reason to repeat this approval process at the JAA level for new Type A applications that may be installed by the operator, nor does the AC 120-76A require such a high-level approval.

i. The planned training will be the same regardless of airplane type j. The EFB system will be offered for both production and retrofit on multiple airplane

types

2. We are puzzled by references in the ORI to the Draft TGL, since paragraph 2 B) (3) states “This TGL is applicable to Class 1 and 2 Hardware cases only...” The EFB proposed by Boeing and Jeppesen is Class 3.

3. We agree the FDEVS should not be considered in this document and also propose that

Document Browser, Electronic Technical Log and Reporting functions be left to an operational approval process between the Operator and the appropriate National Authority. These are Type A applications that would not be considered by the FAA at a national level (AEG) so a harmonized point of view would support our request. Further, we propose to assist the FAA and JAA in drafting provisions to a FSB/JEOB report to include language specifying



appropriate and necessary operational measures for operational approval of these type applications.

JAA Position (1) JAA reviewed the Boeing submission during the JOEB team visit to Seattle 18-22 August 2003, during which time the opportunity was taken to assess the EFB in both the engineering CAB and on a B777-300ER aircraft. The evaluation was conducted in conjunction with the JAA flight team, who were assessing EFB under their Certification Review Item, F-18(PTC). The JOEB are grateful for the opportunity to experience the EFB in operational circumstances and for the cooperation shown by Boeing in making information available. The outcome of the JOEB team’s visit was shown in the Debrief Note dated 02 September 2003, previously circulated and attached to this document as Appendix 1 JAA Position (2)

1. JAA accepts the Boeing request that the applicability of the ORI be modified to address the EFB as a generic facility subject to the following conditions:

a) No additional applications are installed b) The function and presentation of exisiting applications are not substantially

changed.

Though the Performance application has a large number of features common to all aircraft types since it is based on the Boeing Laptop Tool, the JOEB consideration of the Performance application was based upon a B777 type specific package and thus the results cannot be considered totally as generic functions other than for certain common features. Full details are included in the section in this document pertaining to the Performance application.

2. Later drafts of the TGL have been expanded to address Class 3 devices and operational issues for all types of EFB remain essentially the same.

3. JAA accepts the Boeing position regarding the FDEVS, Document Browser, Electronic

Technical Log and Reporting functions and is grateful for Boeing’s assistance in determining suitable language regarding operational measures to be included in the JOEB Report.

2. DOCUMENT BROWSER JAA Position (1) The issues regarding the operational aspects of the document browser are addressed by JAR-OPS 1.1040 paragraph (m) and JAR-OPS requires that an acceptable level of accessibility, usability and reliability be assured if the Operations Manual is presented in a form other than on printed paper. The Operations Manual and similar operational documentation is considered to be a Type A application. The draft TGL addresses the associated issues. In order to meet the requirements of JAR-OPS 1.1040 paragraph (m), it must be demonstrated that the Document Browser is capable of presenting the same information in a similar format to that currently contained in paper documents. Provision should be made to enable flight crew and others to ensure that the contents of the system are current and complete. In the case that the Document Browser presents information provided elsewhere on the aircraft (for example within the ECL), procedures should be specified identifying which takes precedence.



Boeing Position

1. The FAA AC 120-76A lists a document browser to be a type A application and is therefore not subject to AEG approval. We request a harmonized treatment of this application by the JAA, consistent with the AC.

2. The Document Browser proposed will handle two types of electronic document file formats:

documents generated in Document Browser DTD-compliant XML and documents generated in Adobe PDF format. All documents will retain the same structure and content as the original paper documents. The Document Browser DTD and corresponding style sheets are designed to display XML documents in a format that supports the accessibility and usability of the electronic document in a manner that is similar to the original paper document. We believe the XML display is more easily readable and is more easily manipulated for font size.

3. The Contents of the Document Browser are easily viewable by the flight crew. Currency of document files will be viewable on the IDENT page.

4. Boeing will suggest wording for the FOEB/JOEB report that will recommend to operators that

procedures contained in an Electronic Checklist (if installed) will take precedence over procedures contained in any other format.

5. Since the Boeing Class 3 EFB consists of two independent systems with approximately

15,000 hour MTBF, the availability of any application will be high. This availability will be confirmed during the introductory period when a full paper backup is carried onboard the aircraft.

JAA Position (2)

1. There was a typographical error in Issue 1 of the ORI that identified the Document Browser as a Type B application. This has been corrected in Issue 2 to show it as a Type A application.

2. JAA accepts the Boeing position in paragraph 2 above. 3. JAA accepts the Boeing position in paragraph 3 above. 4. Boeing has requested that this ORI be amended to address the EFB as a non-type specific

facility and this position has been accepted by JAA. The advice to operators should therefore accommodate all aircraft types and not just those equipped with electronic checklists.

5. The claimed level of reliability is noted.

3. PERFORMANCE CALCULATIONS JAA Position (1) The provision of performance data is a sub-function of the provision of the Operations Manual, but the interactive nature of performance calculations on the EFB defines this as a Type B application. The draft TGL addresses the associated issues. Appendix 1 to JAR-OPS 1.1045 requires that Performance Data be provided within the Operations Manual in a form in which it can be used without difficulty. The same general considerations as those described above for the Document Browser therefore apply. Since this application allows pilots to input data in order to calculate certain aircraft performance criteria for operational use, additional considerations apply. As a minimum, consideration should be given, by means of a risk assessment, to the following:

• The substantiation of the performance data base • The repeatability and accuracy of calculations • The updating of information • The verification of new information



• The corruption of existing data by new software or data • The corruption of existing software by new software or data • The control of software installations to prevent the use of unauthorised data • The availability of the application

A mitigation strategy should be available for each. Boeing Position Basic issues and observations:

1. The ORI and AC120-76A state that Performance calculations are defined as a Type B application.This is in conflict with the TGL which (in Para 5) suggests that Performance is a safety critical function. Boeing disagrees with the TGL assessment. Furthermore, the existing BLT is already in service with many airline operators under operational approval.

2. The TGL is only applicable to class 1 and 2 hardware. 3. Operations Manual performance data is presented in the Document Browser application. 4. The Onboard Performance Tool is based upon the Boeing Laptop Tool, which has been in

use on the flight deck for several years with over 25 worldwide operators including JAA operators.

Specific Performance Calculation Issues:

1. The substantiation of the performance data base. The performance databases and calculation engines used by the Onboard Performance Tool are the same airframe manufacturer’s module in use throughout the world today for airplane dispatch. Suitability of these OEM modules has been accepted for general use.

2. The repeatability and accuracy of calculations. Boeing has produced and will execute a test plan that verifies the repeatability and accuracy of the Onboard Performance Tool interface with the pilot and the manufacturer’s calculation module.

3. The Updating of information. Each customer is given the capability to test and manage all updated data before it is provided for use on the flight deck, to verify its function. The customer has final authority and responsibility for configuration control.

4. The verification of new information. The (OEM) airframe manufacturer will verify the performance calculation engine and airplane database. The airport data provider will be responsible for verification of the airport databases. The (airline) customer will have final responsibility for overall verification of the complete application and integral databases.

5. The corruption of existing data by new software or data. Boeing experience with both onboard and ground performance tools is that corrupted data results in an error that will not allow the program to produce results. If this occurs the pilot would need to acquire the required data by another method.

6. The corruption of existing software by new software or data. Boeing experience shows that corrupted executables will not function. If this occurs the pilot would need to acquire the required data by another method, such as paper.

7. The control of software installations to prevent the use of unauthorized data. Tools are provided to airline staff to control the options available to the flight crew and to limit the options to those authorized by airline policy.

8. The availability of the application. The EFB system design provides a fully dual redundant path to ensure high availability of the onboard performance tool. Alternative means are also available to the pilot to access the required data once enroute. This could include a paper QRH, Electronic QRH, or communications.

Boeing will provide a means to obtain post flight records of performance data used for each flight.



JAA Position (2) Basic Issues and Observations:

1. The latest issue of the TGL shows interactive performance applications to be Type B. Later drafts of the TGL have been expanded to address Class 3 devices and operational issues for all types of EFB remain essentially the same.

2. Since the format of the Operations Manual may be user-defined, the inclusion of performance data in the Document Browser cannot be assured. It is unlikely that traditional tabular takeoff performance data will be contained in the material found in the Document Browser if the Performance application is installed. Instead, the Document browser may only contain such In-Flight Performance data as is normally found in the QRH. The Performance application must therefore present data in a form that retains the same degree of accessibility, usability and reliability as that afforded by its paper equivalent. Following the incorporation of a number of minor enhancements since the intial visit by the JOEB team, JAA accepts that an appropriate level of accessibility and usability in general terms has been met, but certain of the comments in the attached summary of the detailed validation testing of the Performance application related to the display should be noted.

3. The widespread use of the Boeing Laptop Tool is acknowledged. Specific Performance Calculation Issues:

1-2 The JOEB carried out verification testing of the OEM database and calculation engines. The results and the issues that arose are contained in Appendix 2 to this document. JAA accepts the Boeing position for each of these issues but the JOEB Report will indicate where NAAs should require specific conditions to be met before granting operational approval.

3-8 JAA accepts the Boeing position.

4. FDEVS JAA Position (1)

Since the provision on the EFB of the view of the area outside the flight deck door is a security matter dealt with at present under requirements of NAAs and other government agencies, it falls outside the scope of this document.

Boeing Position We agree the FDEVS should not be considered in this document.



5. TMMD

JAA Position (1) See Statement of Issue.

Boeing Position

1. We disagree that the display will be of such a compelling nature that it will cause crews to rely solely on the display for taxi navigation/guidance and therefore create a hazard for the following reasons:

a. We plan to provide a software provision which will reliably remove the airplane

position symbol from display when the calculated airplane symbol position accuracy (95%) exceeds 40m. Further, the airplane position symbol will be replaced by a non-directional circle if heading data is lost. This limits the potential for display of erroneous position or heading data. A 40 meter threshold was selected as a design feature to reduce the probability of erroneous display of aircraft position on, or closer to, a parallel taxiway or runway the aircraft is not actually on.

b. There are no guidance cues provided. The TMMD does not include any cues instructing the crew to steer, turn or stop, rather it provides enhanced positional awareness so the crew may better anticipate what they will observe externally.

c. None of the Boeing or airline pilots that have reviewed the system operation in the

engineering simulator at Boeing have made an incorrect interpretation of the system’s intended use.

d. No revisions to basic taxi procedures are proposed by Boeing, nor is any credit sought for reduced taxi visibility.

e. No information regarding obstacles, vehicles, other airplanes or other temporary conditions are provided. The absence of this information is obvious, and planned training and procedures will ensure that crews understand this information is not provided.

f. Crews will have clear instructions in the Operations Manual on the intended use and limitations of the system. We would be willing to work with the JAA and FAA to ensure these instructions and the associated background information are adequate.

g. Boeing and Jeppesen firmly believe that the use of the TMMD will result in less heads down time, rather than more heads down time when compared to conventional taxi techniques. This is because the moving map is vastly easier to interpret than the paper (10-9) chart it supplements. This ease of interpretation will result in reduced cross-cockpit communication because both pilots have access to the display and need fewer words to convey their understanding and the taxi plan. Data sharing would no longer require both pilots to lean over the center console like they must often do now to resolve position uncertainties using paper documents.

h. Boeing has recent similar experience to support appropriate use of this display. With the introduction of the 777-300 we introduced the Ground Maneuver Camera System (GMCS) , consisting of 3 video cameras, one nose mounted and two mounted on the horizontal stabilizer. The views from these cameras are shown to the crew on any of the 3 multi-function displays on the forward panel or lower center display. There was some initial concern regarding potential mis-use of these displays (fixation) however, with Boeing-provided instructions and appropriate line supervision for initial flights, this has proven to be a complete non-issue.



i. Based on initial B777-300ER testing where the EFB TMMD has been operational, to include demonstration to Boeing, FAA and JAA pilots, we have conclusively determined that the display is not adequate for use as a “primary means” of taxi navigation and would not be interpreted that way by line crews because of the following factors:

1. The largest scale (0.5NM) is not adequate for steering or stopping guidance to the degree necessary to taxi an airplane

2. The system accuracy and position lag, while sufficiently accurate to provide position awareness, are also inadequate for steering or stopping guidance.

j. Boeing accepts the JAA position that the word “correlating” in Paragraph 4.2.3 of the

DD could be missinterpreted. We suggest that the paragraph be changed to read “the flight crew is expected to detect any significant difference in displayed and actual own ship position by cross-checking displayed position with outside visual references (signage, geometry etc.)”

2. Limiting use of the system to one display as a long term limitation or restriction is strongly

opposed by Boeing and Jeppesen for the following reasons:

a. The Boeing/Jeppesen EFB is a totally redundant system using independent GPS receivers for position data. Use of only one TMMD would deny position cross-check by one crewmember, effectively reducing the crew’s ability to detect displayed position errors.

b. This would lead to more use of the (10-9) chart by one crew-member, which is less suited for position awareness that is the TMMD, since it presents the crew with no information about airplane position, depicts airport geometry with less accuracy, may be more difficult to interpret and in paper form could be dropped on the cockpit floor where it may be difficult to retrieve.

c. This would deny positional awareness safety benefit to one of the crew-members and may cause attempts to view the other display across-cockpit.

d. If the JAA would deny use of this application by both crewmembers simultaneously, by the same logic the JAA should deny use of the paper charts by both crewmembers to ensure consistent guidance.

e. Such a proposal would be inconsistent with Boeing recommendations regarding use of the navigation displays during non-ILS approaches. We encourage use of the navigation display on both sides to provide the maximum available situational awareness; using the same philosophy we would encourage use of the TMMD to the maximum extent practical on both sides with one crewmember alternating between the TMMD and10-9 chart as necessary.

f. Such a proposal would also be inconsistent with the far more critical use of displays on a low visibility approach where one pilot is required, nearing minimums, to begin outside observation to acquire the runway environment. There is no attempt or need to remove the navigation display for those conditions.

g. Based on our growing TMMD display experience with a number of different Boeing, FAA and JAA pilots during 777-300ER flight test, this measure is not necessary.

h. Boeing and Jeppesen will consider adding a future provision to the software to

enable a one-button push transfer between the Terminal Charts application and the TMMD.

We will also add language to the CBT program to clearly indicate the intended purpose and limitations of the TMMD.



JAA Position (2) JAA accepts the Boeing position shown in paragraphs (1)(a) to (1)(i) above. Pilot adherance to the intended use of the TMMD is heavily dependant on the establishment of an appropriate “culture” within the operation. This culture would be established by the incorporation of appropriate written procedures in the Operations Manual and the provision of appropriate training. Both operational instructions contained in the Operations Manual and CBT training material should therefore place due emphasis on appropriate operational use. The JOEB report will contain a suitable recommendation to NAAs and the JAA are grateful of the offer of Boeing assistance given in paragraph (1)(f). The change in wording suggested in paragraph (1)(j) is acceptable to the JAA. JAA accepts the Boeing position shown in paragraphs (2)(a) to (2)(h) that for consistency with the use of other cockpit displays, limiting the use of the TMMD to one pilot is not desirable. JAA notes that Boeing will consider providing a “quick transfer” facility between the TMMD and the Terminal Charts application and would welcome such a feature. The position shown above relating to appropriate operational use equally applies to this issue, and JAA welcomes the Boeing proposal to add appropriate material to the CBT training programme. FAA Position JAA Note: It is understood that the FAA do not propose to comment on this ORI. Conclusion All the issues raised by the JAA within this ORI have been satisfactorily addressed and the ORI may be considered to be closed.

Capt. G.D.Sturrock

Chairman – B777 JOEB



Appendix 1

JAA DEBRIEF NOTE

B777-300ER JOEB VISIT – SEATTLE 18-22 AUGUST 2003 1. INTRODUCTION This debriefing note covers the visit to Boeing from 18-22 August 2003 by the JAA B777 JOEB team of Graham Sturrock (Chairman), Andy Stewart and Robert-Jan Venema supported by Geoff Burtenshaw. The purpose of the visit was to evaluate certain operational aspects of the Boeing B777-300ER. (The categorization of items and conclusions presented are those of the above team members, based on the team's observations and evaluations and information presented by the Boeing Company. The team reserves the right to change the conclusions as a consequence of any information and data subsequently received from the company, JAA specialists or a change in the certification basis.) Distribution: External: Mr C. Mussolino Boeing Capt. W. Royce Boeing Mr. K. Patel FAA Mr. J. Neff FAA

Internal: Mr P. Blagden CAA (PCM) Capt. T. Newman CAA Mr. R-J Venema IVW Capt. A. Stewart CAA Mr. G. Burtenshaw CAA

Date: 02 September 2003



2. NARRATIVE The team’s task was to evaluate the following items:

• The draft Pilot Qualification Plan (PQP) submitted by Boeing dated 01 July 2003 • Operational and training aspects of the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB) as described in the

System Description Document submitted by Boeing dated 23 June 2003 and subject to the Operational Review Item (ORI) dated 22 July 2003 but restricted to the following functions: • The Document Browser • The Performance Tool • The Taxy Moving Map Display (TMMD)

• The Overhead Flight Crew Rest (OFCR) facility to be the subject of a future ORI. In respect of the evaluation of the PQP and the TMMD facility of the EFB, each team member was given the opportunity to taxi and fly the B777-300ER aircraft under the supervision of Boeing’s Senior Technical Pilot, Capt. W. Royce. Some team members had previously undergone B777-200 to B777-300 differences training. In respect of the TMMD, Document Browser and Performance Tool the team was given the opportunity for familiarisation and practice in the B777 engineering cab. During the course of the evaluations, the team made a number of minor recommendations for improvement and comments that are not included in this Debrief. A number of issues identified by the JOEB team have been addressed in the Debrief submitted by the JAA Flight Team and these are not repeated here.



3. CLASSIFICATION OF ITEMS UNACCEPTABLE ITEM: an item which fails to comply with

operational requirements and is therefore unacceptable.

RESERVATION: an item where compliance with operational

requirements is not clearly proven and the issue is reserved for later decision. Resolution of these items will require either: 1. A JAA policy ruling, or 2. Additional substantiation.

CONCESSION: an item which does not comply with operational requirements but which can be accepted on the basis that an equivalent level of safety is achieved, or that the specific requirement is inappropriate.

TEMPORARY DEROGATION: an item which, while failing to comply with operational requirements, involves an additional risk small enough to be acceptable for a defined limited period of time.

MAJOR RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVEMENT:

an item which meets operational requirements but where improvement is recommended

RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVEMENT:

an item which meets operational requirements but where improvement is recommended

UNSERVICEABILITY: an item which is temporarily inoperative or performing below its nominal level

COMMENT: Self explanatory



4. FINDINGS 4.1 Unacceptable

Nil

4.2 Reservation 4.2.1 EFB – Retention of Data

When used in a “paperless cockpit” environment with no paper flight records retained, the lack of a data retention facility (either internal or external) could render the EFB non-compliant with the requirements of JAR-OPS 1 Subpart P.

4.2.2 EFB – Precedence of Data With the installation of the EFB, certain data is presented, or could be presented, in more than one location, and in different form, on the aircraft - e.g. paper Operations Manuals might be carried, the Performance Tool presents takeoff (V) speeds in addition to the FMC. Where the potential for differences exists (e.g. between V speeds generated by the EFB and the FMC), no precedence for data has been established.

4.2.3 EFB – Performance Tool The results of the AFM-DPI Verification Test Plan were not presented during the evaluation, thus the integrity of the EFB performance calculations could not be verified.

ACTION: BOEING 4.2.4 EFB – Performance Function (Mass & Balance)

The Mass & Balance sub-function of the Performance function of the EFB did not show the limiting weights or the limits of the CG envelope other than in a limited graphical format. This could render the EFB non-compliant with the requirements of JAR-OPS 1 Subpart J.

4.2.5 EFB – TMMD System Description & Operational Procedures It appeared that certain phraseology used within the System Description and Operational Procedures documents might not support the intent that the TMMD should not be used as a primary navigation aid when taxying. The use of terms such as “validating” or “verifying” might appear to confer a greater authority on the information supplied by the TMMD than intended. See Recommendation for Improvement 4.6.2.

4.3 Concession

Nil 4.4 Temporary Derogation

4.4.1 EFB – Performance Tool The indication to flight crew that MEL penalties were active in performance calculations was inadequate. The icon was small and indistinct.

4.5 Major Recommendation for Improvement Nil



4.6 Recommendation for Improvement 4.6.1 EFB – Computer Based Training (CBT)

CBT training for the EFB was comprehensive but lacked focus. A number of areas of operation that, in practice, were found to be intuitive or that required no detailed instruction were given similar emphasis as more novel features. The text-based instruction often used terms that might not be familiar to pilots or were not relevant to the intent of this training. For example, in an early screen, the text advised that the EFB was a “Class 3 device”. The insertion of data by the student was not accomplished by an interactive method (e.g. by using an actual or virtual keyboard.) Certain questions were asked on features not covered within the instructions. It is recommended that CBT focuses on novel features and avoids the inclusion of unfamiliar or irrelevant terminology.

4.6.2 EFB – TMMD System Description & Operational Procedures It is recommended that the term “cross-checking” be used throughout any System Description or Operational Procedures document that describes the function of the TMMD. This could reinforce the intended function.

4.6.3 OFCR – Positioning of Handrail The handrail mounted on the forward face of the entry vestibule was found to be mounted too low to be usable when descending the staircase from the OFCR. It is recommended that this rail be extended or repositioned upwards. A horizontal handrail above the door opening from the inside is recommended.

4.7 Unserviceability Nil

4.8 Comment 4.8.1 EFB – CBT

CBT for the EFB was found to be in a fairly early stage of development with features such as the audio commentary not yet available. In addition, the formatting of the text-based instruction was inconsistent.

4.8.2 EFB – TMMD The team had some doubt over the validity of the trials conducted in the B777 engineering cab because of the limited visual display available, particularly the lack of aerodrome signage. However, the taxy trials conducted on the aircraft dispelled these doubts to a large extent though the opportunity to conduct taxying trials in low visibility was not available.



5. CONCLUSION The team found no issues with the PQP. The team also found no issues with the document browser function of the EFB. The Flight Deck Entry Surveillance Video System (FDEVS) appeared to meet the requirements of ICAO Annex 6, though the evaluation of this function was beyond the scope of the JOEB team. The team reserves the right to evaluate a fully developed version of the EFB CBT before reaching a position. JAA validations of the EFB and the OFCR will be recommended when the appropriate reservations have been addressed. The team awaits responses from Boeing and the FAA to the ORIs. 6. EVALUATION TEAM

Name Organisation Signature Capt. G.D.Sturrock UK/CAA

Mr. R-J. Venema NL/IVW

Capt. A.Stewart UK/CAA

Mr. G. Burtenshaw UK/CAA



Appendix 2 1. Weight and CG JAA Position (1) The package provided did not have a functional weight and C.G. package, so this feature was not assessed. When it is operational, we are informed that any C.G. output will not be checked against performance alternate C.G. selections. Therefore, there will have to be a 'policy' to ensure that alternate C.G. selections, when available, are consistent with derived C.G.s. Boeing Position Weight and Balance test cases were included in version 1.3 of the verification test plan that was part of the January delivery to the JAA. These test cases are in sections 7 and 8 and the application can be run from the applicable policy folders in the test executables folder. We will follow up with JAA to ensure that they have all of the information they need to validate this portion of the application. When the Weight & Balance package computes takeoff c.g. position, it passes that information back to the main takeoff page. This c.g. position is only valid for, and only used for, the stab trim calculation. It would not be appropriate to use this c.g. position for any performance calculations, as it has not been subjected to any W&B curtailment process. We agree when the alternate c.g. position option is used for the calculation of performance data, it is necessary to check this c.g. position against some sort of company policy that describes the allowable c.g. range for a given selected alternate forward c.g. position. As an example, the documented company policy might state that a c.g. position greater than 22% mac must be achieved to use “Alt Fwd 1”, where “Alt Fwd 1” actually corresponds to a c.g. position of 20% mac. JAA Position (2) Due to installation problems, the weight and C.G. package was not assessed. However, JAA believe that it is likely to be consistent with the BLT and therefore the significant issues are expected to be as detailed above. The JOEB Report will recommend that NAAs should ensure that operators have appropriate policies and procedures in place to ensure that issues involved with the use of derived and alternate C.G. positions are addressed before operational approval is granted. 2. Administrator JAA Position (1) The role of the administrator is possibly even more critical with EFB than it is with BLT. The EFB on the aircraft is now remote from the administrator and he sets up user privileges via the Internet, through Denver and subsequently onwards to the specific airframe. It will be necessary to be both confident in the administrator and the communication path to the individual aircraft. Boeing Position It is agreed that the role of the administrator is important, both for the EFB performance application and BLT. It is also noted that this same essential element is important to the generation of the equivalent paper charts or data for takeoff and landing. The comment above notes that the EFB process uses an internet-based administrator utility through Denver before passing the data to the airplane. This is true, although the same work process takes place in both the EFB and BLT cases. In each case, the process involves setting up the applicable options via some administrative application, assembling a package for the airplane, reviewing that package to ensure that it works and the appropriate options are set, and then distributing that package to the units to be used on the airplane. Essentially, the EFB is no different from BLT in this process and there are steps in the process where the final package is reviewed and signed off by the administrator prior to distribution. To summarize, although the data is assembled in Denver, it is passed to the airline for the final quality assurance check and the airline is responsible for distribution to end-users



JAA Position (2) The JOEB Report will contain advice to NAAs that each operator’s procedures and policies with respect to the role of the Administrator be carefully considered before the grant of operational approval. 3. Alternate CG JAA Position (1) This facility will need to be carefully controlled by the Administrator. It appears that one or more JAA/EASA countries are already exempting their operators from the Certified Flight Manual limitation that restricts the take-off alternate C.G. capability to the normal forward limit plus two defined alternates (alternate C.G. is not cleared for landing on the B777). As a result, an enhanced capability to choose more alternate C.G. options will be available via EFB to these specific operators. Boeing recognizes that this capability is prohibited under FAA/JAA rules so it should not be generally available, but with multi-national European airlines, careful control of this may be needed. Boeing appears to have generated a new C.G. envelope for the model operated by one JAA operator, but have elected to incorporate this into an existing AFM-DPI standard. However, the paper AFM suggests that there is no alternate C.G. capability for this C.G. envelope. Boeing Position The alternate forward c.g. options available to users of the EFB performance application can be restricted by the administrator to comply with any local regulations. Boeing believes it is the responsibility of the local POI, or equivalent, to ensure that only the appropriate number of alternate c.g. options are used by the airline. There is a direct comparison to the generation of paper charts and data in that there are no limits on the amount of paper that might be generated that corresponds to any number of alternate forward c.g. positions. The new c.g. envelope incorporated into AFM-DPI is just another approved c.g. envelope available for the B777-200 and is unrelated to the subject of “alternate” forward c.g. performance. It is common to have several different applicable c.g. envelopes available for any of our airplanes. In AFM-DPI, they are implemented in a manner similar in fashion to any of the configuration options. For instance, if more than one tire speed limit is applicable to an airplane model, it is implemented as a pull-down menu in AFM-DPI just like this variety of c.g. envelopes. Please note that this JAA comment is applicable to AFM-DPI, rather than the EFB performance application. Certified alternate c.g. performance is only shown in the limitations section of a specific AFM, if this option has been purchased by the customer (alternate forward c.g. performance level options are available for all c.g. envelopes). JAA Position (2) The JOEB Report will contain advice to NAAs that each operator’s procedures and policies with respect to the configuration of the Performance application must be carefully considered before the grant of operational approval. It is unusual, if not unique, for there to be multiple C.G. envelopes (not including alternate C.G.s for take-off and or landing) within AFM-DPI. However, it is accepted that this is an AFM-DPI issue that illustrates the potential confusion for the administrator



4. Take-off Performance JAA Position (1) The programme occasionally displays inappropriate error messages. A common message is 'Maximum or requested assumed temperature is same as OAT. No assumed temperature allowed'. This message can often disguise the real problem such as an overweight situation. A case passed to Boeing for comment is as follows: Takeoff at EHAM at maximum weight. If flap 5 is used at maximum weight, the inappropriate 'Maximum or requested assumed temperature is same as OAT. No assumed temperature allowed' message is displayed although no assumed temperature selection was made. If flap is selected to optimum, it uses flap 5 to get a usable output. If AFM-DPI is run, it seems to be possible to run the software successfully at both flap 5 and 15. If flap 15 is selected in EFB, 'No take-off allowed, planned weight exceeds the maximum allowable weight of 295,334 Kg.’ is displayed. Boeing Position The application will not display any data in excess of the maximum allowable. We believe these error messages are appropriate for the conditions quoted above. JAA Position (2) JAA accepts the Boeing position. 5. Status of Advisory Data JAA Position (1) Contaminated runway and auto-brake data generated in AFM-DPI is identified as advisory information. No such warning occurs within EFB. Boeing Position Boeing’s position is that, for dispatch related data, the differentiation between certified and advisory levels of performance are best left to airline policy and training. It is common practice for airlines to consider advisory data when determining the maximum allowable dispatch weights. JAA Position (2) The use of advisory data is a matter for operator policy, NAA operational approval and national legislation. The JOEB Report will contain advice to NAAs that the status of such operational data must be determined to be appropriate before operational approval is granted. Similarly, NAAs may wish to consider requiring that flight crew be clearly advised of the status of such data. 6. Landing Speeds

JAA Position (1) The landing data facility gives a pre-flight maximum possible landing weight for normal operations, for operations following an icing encounter and for low visibility conditions which should be consistent with the factored landing distance information given in AFM-DPI. In the version of the package evaluated, the maximum landing weight is 250,000kgs, but the highest landing weight that the JAA has cleared for the B777-200 is 213,188kgs

Boeing Position In the Boeing test package, a maximum structural weight was used to better test the various limitations applicable to landing performance. With the landing performance available on the 777, an input structural limit of 213 tonnes



would have shown very little but the structural limit as the result. When in use in the field, the administrator will have input the appropriate structural limit and the program will yield the appropriate result. JAA Position (2) JAA accepts the Boeing position. 7. In-Flight Landing Distance JAA Position (1) The package gives in-flight landing distance data information, which is un-factored data and therefore is likely to be based on the 8ft/sec touch-down rates and maximum braking etc. The input page allows for a landing speed increase (default 5 knots) but this has no effect on the pre-flight scheduled landing weight.”

Boeing Position This would be correct. There are no regulations that require the consideration of an increased landing speed to be considered in the calculation of dispatch landing distance. This is what part of what the 1.667 factor covers. This is true of virtually every landing dispatched to and performed as the recommended landing speed increase is a minimum of 5 kts with no AFM speed accountability. JAA Position (2) It appears that this is handled differently in BLT, but JAA accepts the Boeing position that there is no requirement to consider an increased landing speed. 8. Wet Runway Landing Distance JAA Position (1) (a) If a wet runway is selected, the scheduled pre-flight landing weight reduces but there is no effect on the in-flight landing distance. (b) The en-route data could be used to account for a change in runway state (dry/wet) but it does not in fact address this. In addition, the intent of current abnormal landing certification standards is to provide crews with un-factored distance data covering the failure, the failure with a 10 knot over-speed on landing, the failure combined with a landing on a wet runway and finally, the failure with a 10 knot over-speed on landing combined with a landing on a wet runway. The package does not give wet runway information, although it does give slippery runway information, but this has no clear links to a certification standard. If the package is run with wet selected, the following Calculation Error Message is given: "Non-normal landing only allowed for dry or slippery conditions”.

Boeing Position (a) This is true, although it was due to an error on our part in the initial release of the performance application. This error has been corrected and the wet landing distance will now show as one that is 15% greater than the dry calculated distance for en-route calculations. We have created and successfully run a new test case 6.2.3 that addresses this issue in our Performance Application verification test plan. JAA will be provided with these results. (b) The intent of the EFB performance application for en-route landing data is to supply the same information as shown in the paper QRH. From a calculation standpoint, the EFB provides data for a dry runway and for degraded braking performance. In the case of the QRH, this data is labeled “Dry”, “Good”, “Medium”, and “Poor”. The Boeing recommendation for a wet runway is to use the “Good” level. It is entirely up to the EFB administrator, however, to implement this according to their company policy. This might even include showing a separate usable option called “Wet”, which is nothing more than a repeat of the “Good” data.



JAA Position (2) JAA accepts the Boeing positions. However, it must be clear to flight crew that the scheduled landing data (maximum landing weight) takes no account of the speed increase selection, i.e. it is assumed to be zero, and the en-route data does not account for wet runways.” The JOEB Report will advise NAAs that they may wish to require operators to develop a policy for flight crew on the use of appropriate conditions when deriving data for use on wet runways before the grant of an operational approval. 9. Auto-Brake JAA Position (1) If Auto-Brake is selected, there is no change to the maximum allowable landing weight, i.e. the factored/AFM scheduled information, but the un-factored distance increases. The printed output gives no record of the fact that auto-brake has been selected but the en-route landing distances have all increased. One feature of the package is that it will provide landing distance data information with an un-factored distance that is longer than the landing distance available, although there is a brief error message, but this can easily be cleared inadvertently.” Boeing Position Selection of auto-brake settings does not affect the dispatch data that, per regulations, is always based on maximum manual braking. It does, however, affect the en-route data. Although not included in the test implementation, the ability to show selected brake setting in the printed output is available to the company administrator when putting together their desirable output. JAA Position (2) JAA accepts the Boeing position. However, the JOEB Report will advise NAAs that they may wish to require operators to develop an appropriate policy on the display in the EFB output of settings such as auto-brake before granting an operational approval. 10. Low Visibility and Icing JAA Position (1) Though low visibility and performance after an icing encounter are not issues on the B777, with the exception of the effects on climb gradients, they might become an issue on types whose performance configurations and speeds are affected by these conditions.”

Boeing Position These items will be addressed on other models as appropriate. JAA Position (2) JAA accepts the Boeing position.



11. Autoland JAA Position (1) It was noted that the AFM gives an Autoland capability, all engines, with flap 20. Neither AFM-DPI nor EFB schedule data in this flap configuration.”

Boeing Position We believe that this is an AFM/AFM-DPI issue and should be coordinated separately from the EFB ORI. JAA Position (2) JAA accepts the Boeing position.