[Johnson] Who is Aristotle s Citizen

8/2/2019 [Johnson] Who is Aristotle s Citizen

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Who Is Aristotle's Citizen?

Author(s): Curtis JohnsonReviewed work(s):Source: Phronesis, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1984), pp. 73-90Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182188 .

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Whois Aristotle's Citizen?CURTIS JOHNSON

Introduction: The Nature of the ProblemWhenAristotleconfronted he task of defining"citizen"at the beginningof BookIII of thePolitics,the difficulties ndoingso adequatelymusthaveseemed formidable. There was, first, the simple fact of constitutionaldiversity:states differ,and so too, therefore,do citizensin those states.'Further, herewasdiversityof usage:peopledo notalwaysagreewho is tobe called a citizen.2Then there are those anomalouscases of citizenswhoacquireor lose the titleof citizenship n an "exceptionalmanner" uchascitizensby adoption,orcitizenswhohave beendisfranchised.3 nomalousalso are those states in whicheitherpeople not admittedinto a share ofofficearenevertheless alledcitizens the"subject itizen"of 1278a 6-17);orpeoplewho,while theydo haveaccessto certainoffices,stillaredeniedthe title of citizen,as wasthe case,forexample,of someof theofficeholdersat Marseilles 1321a3l).4Finallythere s a fundamentalproblemconcern-ing what is rightor just: regardlessof who citizensare in any particularcase,to whom injusticeshouldthe titleof citizenshipbe given?Should t begivento allwho are alikeand equal,andtherefore o the multitude n moststatesbecause nmoststates he peopleare equalin nature;5 r should t bereserved o the few who trulydeserve o rulepermanentlybecauseof theirsuperiorvirtue?6All of these factorspresentdifficultiesto the philosopherbecausetheaim of defining is to find a common,unchangingessence in a world ofenormousdiversity.ForAristotle,moreover, ince the essenceof an objectis to be foundwithin he actualand existent,a gooddefinition s notfree toignorethe variationand diversityof the world;it mustbe so castas to fiteverycaseyet withoutitself becomingvariedanddiverse.A definition, nother words, must itself be one and yet be capable of covering manydifferent and dissimilarcases. It must, further,be "correct".While itcannotignorecommonusage,whichvariesfromone state to another, tmustnevertheless indwhatever s bestanduniversal n thewaythe titleisused andconferred.7 73


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Who, then, is Aristotle'scitizen?Does Aristotlesucceedin overcomingthe difficultiesand providinga definitionof citizenship hat is everythingthat it shouldbe? In particular, oeshis definitionsucceed,as he evidentlybelieved t should, n identifying hat"commonnature"to koinon)8whichenables t to describewho citizensare in all states alike?We believe thatitcomes close to realizing his goal,but fallsa little short.The natureof thecase, and particularly he different practicesof different city-statesinGreece,made completesuccess mpossible.9We alsobelieve that Aristotleunderstood hisproblem,and accordinglydevoted thefirst ivechaptersofBookIII to showingthe relationof anomalouscasesto his own perfecteddefinition.To understandAristotle'sdefinitionof citizen,therefore, ndtosee how he arrivedat it, is at the same time to illuminatea numberofobscuritiesn BookIII.Part I: The Definition of CitizenshipFirst, et it be observedthatAristotlesets out to definethe citizen"inthecomplete sense" (ton haplos politen: 1275al9), that is, he who lacks noqualification or sharingfully in all of the entitlementsof citizenship.Bythuslimiting hescope of his enquiryAristotleavoidshaving odeal withanumberof difficultcases: thosewho are too young toshare n citizenship,those who aretoo old, and citizenswho have been exiledor disfranchisedeither rightlyor wrongly(1275al5ff).He thereby s able to get directlyatthe questionof who a citizen is "pureand simple".Buteven by excludingthe difficult casesmentioned above, the task is still not free of problems.Aristotlehas still to propose, and then reject,two preliminary efinitionsbeforearrivingat the citizen "in thecompletesense".There are threedefinitionsof citizenin Book III, chapter1. The firstis(III, 1,6 1275a23-24):"a man who shares n the administration f justiceand in the holding of office" (metechein kriseos kai arches). The second is(III, 1.7-81275a33):"thosewho share n indeterminate ffice" politas oushouto [aoristos arche] metechontas); by "indeterminate office" Aristotlemeans, specifically,the offices of judge in the courts and memberof theassembly.The third, final definition is (III, 1.12 1275bl9-20):"he whoenjoys the right of sharingin deliberative and judicial office" (archesbouleutikes kai kritikPs).10 These three definitions are the core of thechapter:everythingelse in it is an attempt o showwhyeachof theearlierdefinitions s inadequate.Let us examineAristotle'saccountof thesein-adequacies.

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Inadequacy of the First DefinitionThe first definition had defined the citizen as one who shares in theadministration fjusticeandholdingof office.But in everystatethere aredifferentkinds of offices.11Citizenship requiresnot participation n allkindsof offices,but only in certainparticularkinds. Thosecertainkinds,for want of a better term, Aristotledecides to call "indeterminate ffice"(aoristosarche). Hence, the first reviseddefinition of citizenis "onewhoshares n indeterminate ffice".This distinctionbetween "offices"(archai)on the one hand, and "in-determinate ffices"on theother,is of someimportance o understandingthe developmentof Aristotle'sthought in this chapter. It is importantespeciallyto remember hat, althoughhe is not here writinga historyofGreek politics,his distinctionsare neverthelessoften drawn from con-temporary ractice.Here n particularAristotle s thinkingof typicalGreekdemocracies,as he himselfsays later.12 n democracies t was possibletoidentify,broadly speaking,two kinds of offices. On the one hand wereofficesproperly o-called, he variousmagistracieso which the namearchewasnormallyapplied.13On the otherhand werethe largepopularbodies,the publicjuries and the publicassembliescharacteristic f democracies.Aristotle's im,in revisinghisfirstdefinition, s toprovidean easymeansofdistinguishingbetween these two kinds of offices. He wished to do thisbecause he wished to show in his definition that citizenship(in demo-cracies) depended not upon occupying(or being entitled to occupy) amagistracy ut onlyupon occupyinganytypeof office,including he officeof assemblymanorjuryman.The difficultyconfrontinghim at this point, then,was how easily andefficiently to distinguishverbally between magistraciesand the largepublicbodies.This taskwasmoredifficult hanit mayat firstappear, incemagistracieswere not alwaysobviouslydifferentfromthese bodies.Bothtypesof officialcouldbe electedby voteor bysortition.'4Bothcarriedoutmany of the same politicalduties, includingdeliberationand judging.15Nor werethe functionsof themagistrates ecessarilymore important hanthose of the other bodies, a point Aristotle makes expressly (Pol.1275a29ff).n addition,magistraciesould, likethe largerpublicbodies,becompositebodies,consistingof manycitizens16althoughoftenthey wouldobviouslybe held by individualcitizens).Andfor many(thoughnot all)ofthe magistracies he requirementsor eligibilitywouldbe identicalto therequirementsor eligibilityfor the popularbodies.17 So the questionforAristotlewas,on whatbasiswere the two typesto be distinguished.

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Two routes ay open. The firstwasto attempt o distinguishmagistraciesfrom other bodies on the basis of theprincipleof "specialization",magis-traciesbeing, in general, ndividually imited to "theconscientiousperfor-mance of a set task",with popularbodies, by contrast,havingwiderscopeand more diverse duties.'8 This division, however, was imperfect; thejudicial function n particular, ven in democracies,had by Aristotle'sdaybecome as specializedas most of themagistracies;'9 nd conversely,manyof the magistracies such as thecouncil)had dutiesas broadand diverseasthoseof the assemblies see note 15).The other principleof division wasmore promising: limitation in tenure for membership.In democraciesespecially, hemagistracieswerestrictlyimited n tenure,bothwithrespectto the lengthof terms commonlyone year,but as short as one day in thecaseof the Atheniancouncilpresident);20 ndwithrespect o the numberof times an office could be held (usually only once, although sometimestwice - not consecutively - and almost never more than twice).21Suchrestrictions n point of tenuredid not existformembershipn thelarge popular bodies, the assembliesand juries. In these bodies citizenscould sit continuously,or at least as often as they were electedorchosen.And membership for one term did not, as a rule, disqualify one formembership second,third,orfourth erm.22 hat s,whileone couldholda magistracy nly once, or, if twice,onlyafteran intervalhadelapsed,onecouldhold membershiponjuries andassembliesas longasone continuedto be selected; therewas for the latterno time restriction.Thedifferencebetweenthe twotypesof offices thus for Aristotlehingedprincipally, at least to this stage of his argument, on the tenurequalification.This wouldundoubtedlyhave been quite obviousto a Greekcitizenlivingin a large democratic tate. Anyonecouldsubmitcandidacyfor jury duty at any time, and the payment for service(as at Athens)ensuredthatthe poorercitizens requentlywoulddo so. Butcandidacy orthe magistracieswould have been limited to thoseonlywho had not heldthose offices previously.23Once one had served his termin office for thespecified ength of time, he would forfeithiseligibility orthatoffice,eitherpermanently rforsomeinterval.Thus,whilestrictly peakingall officesjuries, assemblies,and magistracies were of limitedtenure,the latterwereso in a particular ense. Thejuries andassemblies,whetherconvenedon a regularbasisor only as theneeddemanded,and no matterhowtheywere constitutedorwhattheir engthof tenure,bothalike wereopento allcitizensregardlessof whetheror not theyhad alreadyserved.The magis-tracies,on the other hand, were more like those modernelectiveofficeswhich have fixed tenures.They wereheld for regular ixedlengthsof time,76


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afterwhich thosewho held them became ineligibleforsubsequent enureof them. It was this distinctionwhich led Aristotleto discriminaten hisfirst revised definitionof citizenshipbetween "offlces"on the one hand,whose tenure was fixed in the way described, and "unlimitedoffices",membershipn which wasnot restrictedn thisway.To this point, then, Aristotle has attemptedto define citizenshipindemocracieson the basisof holdingoffice:in brief,citizensare thosewhohold office. But in democracies here aremanyoffices,and it would be amistake to think that one musthold, or be qualifiedto hold, all of theseoffices to qualifyas a citizen.For if this weretrue,many peoplewouldfailto qualifyas citizensbecauseof their neligibility or the magistracies, ratleast forsome of them.But manyof thesesamepeoplewouldbe eligibleforthe offices of assemblyman rjuryman,and the definitionof citizenshouldrecognize hatfact,for theytoo count as citizens.In otherwords,to countas a citizenin democraciesone need not hold or be eligiblefor the magis-tracies althoughto hold suchoffices obviouslywould not disqualify ne asa citizen); one need only serve(or be eligibleto serve) as assemblymanorjuryman.To make this point clear, however,a distinction was neededbetween offices of the latter sort and magistracies.Such a distinctionAristotlefound in the idea of "unrestrictedin point of tenure) office"(aoristosarche),jurymen and assemblymenbeing officials of this sort.Citizenshipin democracy,accordingly,means holding (or eligibilitytohold)unrestricted ffice.24Inadequacy of the Second DefinitionSo much for the first reviseddefinition.Butwe learnin the next sectionofthechapter 1275a34-1275b22) thatthis definition oo is opentocriticism.In particular, t is applicable only to democracies.25But constitutionsdiffer;and one who maybe a citizen under one form,such as democracy,may not be a citizen under another form, such as oligarchy.What isneeded,therefore, s a definitionof citizenwhich is applicable o all formsof constitutionalike.26The problem,as Aristotle states it, is this: publicjuries and popularassembliesare regularfeaturesof democracies.But these institutionsarenot presenteverywhere; hey are absent particularlyn non-democraticstates. In some states, Aristotlesays, thereare no popularassemblies,butonly meetingsspeciallysummoned; the decisionof cases is remittedtospecialbodies. Sparta s an illustration: here, the Ephors, he CouncilofElders,or some other magistracyarche)handlesmost decisions.27Much

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thesame is trueof Carthage.28 ut if citizenshipsdefined,as Aristotlehadalready claimed, in terms of membership n indeterminateoffice (i.e.membership n publicjuries and assemblies),then it would necessarilyfollowthat thereareno citizens n states ike SpartaandCarthage,wherethese large popular bodies are not found. This position, obviously, isuntenable.Therearecitizens n everystate,regardless f whetherone findsindeterminateoffices in them. The definitionadvancedearlierappliesparticularly o democracies,where indeterminateoffices are common.Whatis now neededis a broaderdefinitionwhichincorporatesitizensofdemocraciesand non-democracies like.

Aristotle now finds himself in an interestingdilemma. In order todescribe citizens in non-democracies n such a way as to include all"holdersof office"andno oneelse,hewouldseemto be forced oabandonthe idea of "unlimitedoffice",the democraticdefinition.The reasonforthisis simplythat"unlimitedoffices",viz. urymenandassemblymen, renotalwaysfoundin non-democracies.Butif a retreat romthedemocraticdefinition snecessary,aretreat o where? f he returns othe idea of"officeholder"pureand simple,he runstheriskof excluding romhisdefinitionthose people in democracieswho, while ineligible for offlicesproperlyso-called (the magistracies),29ould still serve asjurorsor assemblymen.Butpreciselyto includethis groupas citizenswas the wholepointof thefirstreviseddefinition.So,it seems,whetherhe chooses o definecitizensas"holdersof office" or "holdersof indeterminateoffice",Aristotlewillexclude from citizenshipsome people in some states who neverthelessoughtto be calledcitizens.Aristotleeschews the obvious way out of this dilemma,which wouldhavebeento definecitizensas thosewhoshare n officesof eithera limitedor an unlimitedtenure.30We shall shortlyspeculateas to why this is so.Instead,he movesto a newpositionaltogether, ne scarcelyanticipatednhis previousdiscussion.To find a trulycomprehensivedefinitionhe nowintroduces he idea of "anofficialdetermined orlimited)byhissphereofauthority".3'Differentofficials,he nowsuggests,havedifferent pheresofauthority.Magistrates(in all states) handle a range of affairs, jurorstypicallydeal with others,and assemblymen wherethey are found)areresponsible or stillothers.Therelevantquestion, hus, n determininghenatureof citizenship, s not essentiallyone of the actualofficesheld bycitizens (since offices vary fromstate to state; in some non-democraciesthereare no popular uriesor assembliesat all). Rather,what countsforcitizenship s the sphereof authorityoccupiedby office-holders.Certainkindsof authorityare moreimportant hanothers n determining itizen78


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status.In particular, itizensare those who exerciseauthority n "deliber-ation"and in "judging".32n democraciesauthorityof thissort would beexercisedby "unlimitedofficials", hat is, by assemblymenandjurymen.But in non-democracies,where these officialsare sometimes not found,thiskind of authoritywouldoften be exercisedby other officials (archai),such as speciallyconvenedcouncils,or theEphorsatSparta,or someotherbody.33It does not really matterwhich kind of official or officials dis-charges the authority; what mattersis the type of authority being dis-charged.And for citizenship t is the deliberativeandjudicial authoritythat is decisive. So, Aristotle concludes, "what constitutesa citizen isthereforeclear from these considerations:we nowsaythat one who sharesin deliberativeand judicial authority s a citizen of the state in which heholdsthatauthority"1275b12-20).This definition s obviouslysuperior o theearlierones,for itsucceeds,asthey do not, in makingcitizenshipdependentupona universalelementinconstitutions,a certain kind of authorityratherthan a certainkind ofoffice. For deliberation and judging are found everywhere,whereasassemblies, uries, and other particularpoliticalbodies are not. Thus, itdoes not matter(for citizenship) if one does not sit on a jury court orparticipaten an assembly; here arestates, .e. non-democracies,wheretodo so is impossible n any case, sincethese offices do not even exist.But itdoes matterwhetherone judges and deliberates, or thesefunctionsoccurin every state.And these are the functionsthat make one a citizen "inthecomplete sense".Onemay wellwonderwhy Aristotleopted to define citizenshipn termsof the possessionof a certainkind of authority, ather hanto fastenuponthe seeminglysimplerexpedientof making t depend uponthe possessionof office of either unlimitedor limitedtenure.I believetwo considerationsmayhaveinfluencedhischoicehere,one of a narrow, echnicalnature, heotherof a broader,morephilosophicalkind.The first, echnicalreasonhasto do with his intention n employing he phrase"unlimitedoffice" n thefirstplace. One may recallthat he invokedthis termnot becauseof theintrinsic mportanceof certain kindsof tenure qualifications or holdingcertaintypesof office. Insteadhe invokedit only as a kindof convenientshorthand:what the office ofjurorand assemblymanhappenedto have incommon(distinguishing hem frommagistracies)was the absence of ten-ure qualifications.But this was merely a convenient circumstance; tpermittedone easily to fasten a commontitle to both officeson the basisofa sharedcharacteristic. he characteristictself,however, .e. the absenceofa tenure qualification,was not the importantpoint. The importantpoint

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was the offices themselves.And the offices themselveswere important otbecause there were no tenurerestrictions, ut because of the duties per-formed by them,viz.deliberatingand judging (as we learn later).34Thus,when Aristotle urnedto non-democracies,whathe found difficultwas notcentrally hat there were no "unlimitedoffices" n them - this was "onlythe question of a name" in the first place.35 What was difficult was that inthem therewereno popular uriesand assemblies.By this time the tenureissue had probably dropped from his mind. In other words, tenure con-siderationsare absentfrom the final definitionof citizen becausethey hadneverbeen centralto that definition n its earlier tages.

Does this mean, then, that citizens need not hold office of unlimitedtenure?Afterall, Aristotlehad earlier aid thatthey must;and his failure oreturnto this point in the final definition, for whateverreasons,may beregardedas something of a loose end. Even granting that sphere ofauthority replaces office as the deciding factor, one is still justified inaskingwhethercitizens are only those who discharge hat authority n an"unlimited"basis, that is, without tenure restrictions n the offices theyhold, whatever hose offices might be. ClearlyAristotlewould answer hisquestion in the negative. Citizens are those who deliberate and judgewhether for unlimited terms or limited ones. Again, the point is that thetenurequestion s not the important ne for him. It serveda convenientuseat one stageof the argument, or one kind of constitution.Butwhentheargumentmoves beyond this stage to incorporateall constitutions, hetenure ssue falls out as irrelevant.36There s a second reason,Ibelieve,whyAristotle hiftedhisground rom"'office" o "authority" n the final definition,one determinedby hisgeneral philosophical aim. His intention in defining things is one ofcomprehensiveness:o includethegreatestnumberof caseswithinasingledefinition. This aim reveals the broad patternof this chapter:each newattemptto define citizenship mprovesupon its predecessorby extendingthecomprehensiveness f theconcept. "Judging ndholdingoffice" s toonarrow because it excludes in certain cases members of juries andassemblies."Sharingin unlimited office" (i.e. membersof junresandassemblies)is too narrowbecause it excludes in some cases citizens innon-democracies wheresuch officesdo notexist)."Sharingndeliberativeandjudicial authority"s the final improvement.Authorityof this typeisexercised n everystate,and those dischargingt can easilybe identified.This is thecitizen"in thecompletesense"and thisis whatAristotlewishedto find.

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Remaining Difficulties ResolvedImportantas thisdefinitionis for constitutional heory,certaindifficultiesremain.It is still necessary o accountfor divergences rom the completedefinitionin the actualpracticesof existingstates.By loose analogyonecould say that Aristotle'sdefinition bears the defects of Max Weber's"idealtypes":bothpresupposeconditionsthatnowhereperfectlyexist.Ina worldthatis everything hatit shouldbe thedefinitionof citizenas onewho shares n deliberationandjudgingwouldbe perfect.Buttheworldisless than it should be. Differentstateshave differentconstitutions, omenearer, omefurtherremoved romthebest.And,asconstitutionsdiffer,sotoo do thecitizenswithinthem.37One must,therefore,not only showwhocitizens are "in the absolutesense";one must also take accountof thevarietyof practices oundin differentstatesand showhow thedifficultiesraisedbythesevariouspractices anthemselvesbe resolvedby reference othe idealdefinition.38FoursuchdifficultiesareidentifiedbyAristotle.Thefirstconcernshow,giventhe fact thatcitizenship n practice is usuallydeterminedby descentfrom citizenparents, he earliest ancestors thosewhose parentagecannotbe traced) will have themselves been citizens.39 The second difficultyconcernsthe statusof those who are made citizensby means of a revo-lution.40The thirdquestionis the famousone aboutthe conditionsunderwhichthe goodnessof a goodmanis thesameasthatof a goodcitizen.41Afinal difficulty centers on the issue of whether the working classes(banausoi) areeverto be countedcitizens.42All of these issuesraiseseriousproblemsboth for the studentof politics,since fundamentalprinciplesoftheoryare at stake,and for the statesman, ince correctanswersto themcould have a great impact upon policy. The "complete"definition ofcitizenis the meansby whichAristotle s able to resolvethem.Indeed,itsusefulnesshelpsexplainwhy Aristotleponderedthequestionof the abso-lute definitionat suchlengthandwithsuchcare.Thequestionabout lineageresolves tselfquickly.Thepracticeof states,according o whichcitizenship s determinedby parentage,s reallyonlyapracticalconvenience. It stipulatescertainconcreteoperationsaccordingto whichadmission o citizenship s determined.But it does not affect thequestionof who in any givencase the citizensare (althoughobviouslyitdoesaffect the questionof whobecomesacitizen).Thedefinition ettlesthequestionof whocitizensare,nowor atanyprevious ime,andso settlesthequestionof whotheoriginalcitizenswere n remotehistorical imesaswell.

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Those are (and were) citizens who share (and shared)in the stipulatedpoliticalfunctions.What about those, though, who become citizensas a resultof revo-lutions?Are they citizenstoo?Thisquestion s no moredifficultthanthefirst theyare,provided hattheyareadmitted odeliberative nd udicialfunctions- but it does raisea new issue of some importance.The realquestionbeing asked here is, are such people rightlycitizens?Using thedefinitionthere s no difficulty n discerningwhothe citizensare.Butdoesthe definitionaffordanyassistancen assessing helegitimacyof theclaimsof citizenshipof anyparticular roup?

This question is extremelycomplex and extremelyimportant.It iscomplex because there is no simple answerto it; any answermust bequalified n certainways.It is importantbecause t is intimately onnectedto the centralthemeof the whole of BookIII:whatis a state?This is thequestion which opens the book, and which is immediatelypostponedbecauseof the need first to define "citizen".43 Citizen"has now beendefined,so that it is now possibleto return o the originalquestionaboutthe identityof the state. It is thusby meansof this "difficulty" bouttherightfulclaims of citizenship that Aristotleconnects the discussionofcitizenshipwith therestof BookIII.On one level,it is obviousthat a citizenwhois not rightlya citizen sstilla citizen,since citizenship s defined as sharing n certainoffices.Peoplewhoshare n theseofficesareobviouslycitizensaccordingo the definition,even if wronglyadmittedto those offices (1276a5-7).But this is a rathersuperficialanswer.Thesignificantquestionhere s not abouta word,butisratheraboutwhat constitutes he rightfulholdingof office.And this is atbottoma questionaboutthe identityof the state.Forthere s an argumentmadeby "somepersons" hatactsdischargedby peoplewho arewronglycitizensare notactsof the state,butactsonlyof a party whetherof one, afew,or many),and thereforeare not binding.The identityof the state,inotherwords, s dependentuponthe rightnessof politicalruleby thosewhoare citizens,or aboutthe rightfulnessof the claimsto citizenshipof thosewho rule. A state is only a state, therefore,at least accordingto thisargument,when the people who are its citizensarerightfullyo. In othercases,althoughone mayspeak ooselyaboutactionsof "thestate", heyareacts of the state only in the same sense as the public acts of a tyrant(1276a17).Andwe knowfrom other passages n thePoliticsthattyranniesarenot properly alled "states" politeiai)at all.The identityof thestate is thusreallya questionabout herightfulness fpoliticalrule. It followsfrom thisthatcitizenship"in thecomplete ense" s82


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more hansimplya matterof sharing n certainpolitical unctions; t is alsoa matterof rulingby right,possessing he kindof virtuewhichentitlesonetorule.This is the meansbywhich Aristotle inallyconnects hediscussionabout citizenshipwith the discussionabout constitution(state): not byshowing simply that citizens are uniquely "parts"which constitutethewhole (had there been no more to the problemthan this, chapters2-5wouldnot havebeennecessary);butratherby showingthat the identityofthewhole (state) is alsoultimatelya questionabout the rightnessof thosewho are the parts.The identityof the state,in short, is a questionaboutcitizen virtue, about the rightness of the rule of those who dischargepoliticalfunctionsof acertaintype.By this route Aristotlereturns to the difficultiesassociated with hisdefinitionof citizen.Since the identityof the statehingesupon a questionabout citizen virtue, it is impossible to say what a state (polis orpoliteia)44 iswithoutan account of citizenvirtue.This is the questionwhichfollows:isthe goodness of a good man the same as that of a good citizen? Thisdifficulty,like the others,depends for its solutionupon a properunder-standing of citizenship"in the complete sense". One may abbreviateconsiderablya complexsubjectby sayingthatthe virtueof a good manisidentical to the virtueof a good citizen only in the case of the completecitizen,thatis, for thecitizenwhorightly hares n politicaloffice, andonlywhen he is ruling(actuallyholding office) in a good (right)state. Thecompletecitizen,in otherwords,entailsthe rightnessof hisholdingoffice;and the rightnessof his holding office, in turn,entails a "right" tate.So,again, while it is possible to speak loosely about a "&citizen"r even a"good"citizeneven in deviantstates,such asdemocraciesandoligarchies,to speakproperlyof citizenship"in theabsolutesense",one mustspeakofthosewhodeserve o rule,thegoodmanwhoholds certainoffices n agoodstate.Of courseone mustnot forgetthat thecitizen"in thecompletesense" s,likeWeber's dealtypes,a limitingcase.It is thattowardswhichcitizenshiptendswithoutnecessarily verreaching hat point in practice.45 o be sure,there are people in every state who dischargethe political functionsofdeliberatingand judging, and who thereforeare pronouncedcitizensinthosestates.As Aristotle ayshimself,"it isclearthatevenpersonswronglyadmittedto citizenship are pronounced to be citizens"(1276a5-6).Andfurther, incethe goodness of a good man is one, whereas hegoodness ofthe good citizenis relativeto the constitution,"it is manifestlypossibletobe a good citizenwithoutpossessing he goodness thatconstitutesa goodman" (1276b34). In short, variations in the meaning and quality of

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citizenship n differentstates do exist.On thispoint Aristotlecould hardlybe moreclear than whenhe says"thecitizencorrespondingo each formofconstitutionwill alsonecessarilybe different" 1275b4-5).But it must also be remembered hat thereis a "primary" nd "secon-dary"natureof things."Now we see", he writes,"thatconstitutionsdifferfrom one another n kind, and thatsome are subsequentandothersprior;for erroneousand divergentformsare necessarilysubsequentto correctforms" (1275a35-1275bl). It follows that the nature of citizenship,dependentas it is on thetypeof constitution,willalsohave a "prior" nda"subsequent" orm. The "complete"definitionis prior;it will have nodefect, belonging to the best constitution.It, therefore,entails one whoholds office "rightly",possessing the necessary wisdom and virtue.Aristotles clearon this point also:"Andalthough he goodnessof onewhorulesand that of one who is ruledare different, he goodcitizenmust havethe knowledgeand the abilityto be ruledandto rule,and the meritof thegoodcitizen consists n havinga knowledgeof the government f freemenon both sides. And thereforeboththese virtuesare characteristicf a goodman" 1277bl3-18).The questionof citizenship s thus complex.On the one hand thereiscommonpracticeandusage. Onecomesclosest to capturing he universalpracticeof states by associatingcitizenshipwith the politicalfunctionsofdeliberatingand judging.But on a different evel one mustnot dissociatecitizenship romquestionsabout therightness f politicalrule.46Whenthisfactor s taken into account,citizenshipsconfinedtothosewho arerightlyadmittedto office. The idea of citizenshipfrom this pointof view entailspossessing he virtuerequisite o rulingrightly.Not everystate,obviously,will followthis model: indeed, few if any will.Yet all stateswill be saidtobe "states"and to have "citizens".And when these conditions are con-fronted by the studentof politics,he will not refuseto call them "states"and "citizens",but will understandn doingso thattheyare "states" nd"citizens"n a secondaryand "divergent"ense fromthe"complete"ense.Thetrue citizen is themancapableof governingrightly.47Thereis only one remainingdifficultyto be overcome: he questionofwhetherthe workingclasses (banausoi)areeverto be counted as citizens.This is a difficultyfor the followingreason.Thesepeople either shareinoffices or they do not. If they do not, then they are not properlycalledcitizens, since citizens are those who share in offices of the state. Thedifficulty n thiscase is, if theyarenot in the class of citizens, n whatclassarethey,since neitheraretheyaliens(metoikoi)or foreignersxenoi).Thisis not a seriousdifficultyfor in this case it is really only a questionof a84


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propername for them.Likechildrenwhoare notyetcompletecitizens, hisgroup too might convenientlybe called "incomplete (atelks) citizens"(1278a1 6).The otheralternativepresentsgreaterdifficulties:when the banausoi readmitted nto politicaloffices.This is a problembecause n one sensetheyare citizens(thosewho share n certainpoliticalfunctions),but in anothersense they are not, becausecitizensin the completesense also possessthecitizen'svirtue,yet the banausoiandhired aborers oo,for thatmatter)donot possess this virtue.They cannot possess this virtuebecause they areoccupied with menial occupations,and people living this kind of life"cannotpractice hepursuitsn whichgoodness sexercised"1278a21-22).Yet the fact remainsthat in some states these classes are admittedintocitizenship. n someoligarchies, orexample,whereholdingofficedependsupon a highpropertyassessment, ich artisans an and do becomecitizens(1278a25).And some democracies,owingto a lack of citizens,even admitforeigners (xenoi) into office (1278a28).Two solutions to these difficulties lie to hand, depending upon thesituation. In those cases where artisans (and other classes) are actuallyadmittedinto office (such as, for example, in oligarchieswhere artisanssucceed in fulfilling the propertyqualifications),one acknowledges hattheyare citizens,but in a deviantsense. They arecitizens n a deviantsensebecause the constitution n which they are citizensis itselfdeviant.In theright forms of constitution these classes would not be admitted, andthereforethey would not be citizens. For in the right forms"honorsarebestowed according to goodness and merit" (1278a20-21); and theseclasses are incapable of goodness in the sense thatqualifiesone rightly orule.In thosecases,on the otherhand,where theworkingclassesareallowedthetitle of citizenwithout beingallowed to share n office,thesolution s tocount them as citizens,but only as "citizenswho are ruled".48Aristotleevidentlyhas in mindhere thosestates, ike Athensbefore the Cleisthenicreforms, in which the classes of the lowest propertyassessment (theAthenianThetes) were barred from politicaloffice but still had certaincivic privileges which were not available to metics, foreigners, and slaves.49These people were not citizens even in the imperfectsense of "holdersofoffice in a deviant constitution",since they were not admitted to anyoffices.But they were,in termsof civic status,somewhatabovethe level ofmanuallaborersand slaves. Becauseof theirintermediate tatus, t wouldbe inappropriate o exclude the name of citizen from them altogether;surelythey were regarded n popularusage as citizens. Butone must also

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qualifytheirdescriptionas citizensby sayingthattheyarecitizensonly inthe senseof thosewho areruled.If the full citizenis one who rulesand isruled in turn, these partial citizens fill half of the equation (the lessimportanthalf at that): they learnthe virtueof being ruled but lack theabilityto rulein turn.And,of course, hey could not be fully virtuousevenin being ruledin any buta rightconstitution. n a deviant stateone couldsaythat this classof citizen s at tworemoves romthecompletecitizen:heis incompletein the sense of lackingaccess to politicaloffice, and he isincompletein lacking the virtueappropriate o ruling and being ruledrightly.

Aristotle dentifiesno furtherdifficultiesassociatedwith the definitionof citizenship.Itcould be contestedperhaps hatother difficultiesremain;for example,how is it possiblethat therearecitizenseven in monarchiesand tyrannies (in which, by definition, offices are held by a singleperson)?50 ut it is doubtful, nview of whathas alreadybeensaid,thatanyadditional difficulties would present great problems.51On the wholeAristotle'sdefinitionis as muchas it can be. It providesa universalstan-dardforidentifyingnotonlywho in any givencaseactually s a citizen,butwho rightfullydeserves o be one. It is thususefulin resolvinga numberoftheoreticaldisputesaboutthetruenatureofcitizenshipaswell as a numberof practicaldisputesarising romconflictingclaimsto citizenship.And,ofcourse,the idea of citizen"in the completesense"providesa significantclue, if not the key, to thecentralquestionof Book111, ndperhapsof thePoliticsas a whole:whatis the state?Lewis and Clark College, Portland

NOTESPol. 1275b4-5:"Hence the citizencorresponding o each formof constitutionwill alsonecessarilybe different".

2 Pol. 1275a2-3:"For thereis often a differenceof opinion as to this:people do not allagreethat the same personis a citizen".Thisdifficultymaywell have been connectedtothe first,the diversityamongstates being the factorresponsible or the varietyin usage,althougheitherdifficultymayhave existed independentlyof the other.3 Pol. 1275a6.4 On the basis of 1278al6-17, Claude Mosse has distinguishedbetween "le citoyencomplet"(haplos poliits) and "le citoyen passif' (archomenos olites) in "LaConceptiondu Citoyendansla Politiqued'Aristote",Eirene6 (1967),pp. 16ff.Similardistinctionsarefound in E. Barker,Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1946),pp. 69-70 (for whom "activecitizenship" means eligibility to elect magistrates,and "passive citizenship" meanseligibilityto hold magistracies);and in H. Kelsen, "Aristotleand Hellenic-Macedonian86


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Policy" n J. Barnes et al.,ArticlesonAristotle,vol. 2 (London, 1977),p. 176,whose viewis the same as that of Mosse.5 Pol. 1261a38ff., where the scheme of Plato's Republicof one class holding officepermanently s criticizedas being unjust;and often.6 Pol. 1332bl7ff.7 W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1887-1902),Vol. 3, p. xxxiv,writes:"His wish evidently is not to deny the names of citizen and constitution to any type ofcitizen and constitution to which these names were given in the ordinaryuse of language,and yet to point to the type of citizen and constitutionwhich best deserve the name". Inhis note to 1275a5Newman adds that the contrast n BookIII ch. I is between citizens "inthe propersense (kurios)"and those who arecalledcitizens "in some other sense than theproper one".8 Pol. 1275a38.9 The first five chaptersof Book III afford the student of political theory an excellentopportunityto make use of the knowledgeof the historianto shed lighton a number oftheoretical difficulties. The nature of the question, as well as Aristotle'sown continualreference to contemporaryGreek practice, make the insights of the historian ndispens-able to sorting out the difficulties confronting the theorist.10 In Athens in the fourth century B.C. there were a large number of magistrates.Aristotle gives a full account of the archai at 1299a2ff.,and again at 1321b1ff.I The council (boule) and precouncil proboule)n democracies, hough the formeroftenand the latter sometimes existed, were consideredmagistracies.Cf. below, n. 16.12 Pol. 1275b6.13 In Book IV(1297b35ff.) where Aristotleclassifiesstatesaccording o the threepartsorsections(moria)constitutingthe political offices,he reserves he termarchaito designatethe magistracies.For the other offices he refers only to "the deliberativefunction"(tobouleuomenon) nd "thejudicial function" todikazonor todikastikon)withoutusingtheword office (arche). In his note to 1275a26ff(vol. 3, p. 136) Newman notes that assem-blymen in democracies would be unlikelyto claimto be magistrates,and that urorsandmagistrateswould also often be distinguished.Ehrenbergnotes that in democracies,"themember of a court of law was not an official; he was no archon.. ." (The GreekState[London, 19691,p. 72).14 At Athens, for example,all magistraciesexcept thoseof strategoiand treasurerswereelected by sortition,as werejurymen and assemblymen.Cf. V. Ehrenberg,op. cit., pp.65-71; and C. Hignett,A Historyof the Athenian ConstitutionOxford, 1952),pp. 221ff.15 Aristotle'sown description of the functionsof the magistrates 1299a25ff)showsthatthey were not, like our modern executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, easilydistinguishablein purely functional terms. For the magistrates, n addition to "issuingorders" their "most characteristicauthority")were also responsiblefor "deliberating"and "judging"(as were, obviously, the "deliberative"and "judicial"partsof the con-stitution).16 The boule (council) in democratic stateswas often called an arche, for example, andhence was only quantitativelydifferent n compositionfrom the assembly.Cf. Ehrenberg,op. cit., pp. 53, 65. Aristotlehimself lists the boul in certainconstitutionsas anarche (e.g.,1299b30ff.).17 Well before Aristotle's own time many of the magistracies had been open to allproperty classes, including the lowest (Hignett, op. cit., p. 157, where Thetes are said tohave not been excluded even from the Council under Cleisthenes; and p. 224).

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18 Ehrenberg,op. cit., p. 65.19 R. J. Bonner, Aspects of Athenian Democracy (New York, 1933), chapter II; andHignett, op. cit., pp. 216-21.20 In addition to the discussions in Bonner, Ehrenberg,and Hignett, see also A. H. M.Jones, Athenian Democracy Oxford, 1957), pp. 100ff.21 Such, at least, was the case at Athens (Hignett, p. 152, etc.). Other democraciesweresimilar cf. R. Sealey, A. Historyofthe GreekCity States ca. 700-338B.C.(Berkeley,1976],pp. 155-156;and Ehrenberg,op. cit., pp. 65-66 and pp. 72-3; and AristotleAth. Pot., ch.62).22 Hignett,op. cit., pp. 232ff; Ehrenberg,op. cit., pp. 55ff. In a sense, of course, hese largepopular bodies, especially the juries, did have limited tenures, since any given jurorwould have been unlikely to serve on a particular ury beyond the time required o try thecase for which he was selected. The lottery would determine the set of jurors for the nextcase, and, considering the size of the citizen pool from which jurors were selected, thechances would have been remote for the same juror to be selected twice. But the point isthat citizens were notprohibitedby law from serving consecutive terms,as was the casewith the magistracies.And in the case of the assemblies, one assumes regularrepeatedattendance by the same citizens. Cf. Aristotle,Ath. Pot., chs. 63-69.23 There were, to be sure, certain exceptions to this rule. At Athens, for example, themore important military magistraciescould be (and often were) held more than once,undoubtedly because of the strategic mportanceof these offices. ButAristotlewas herethinkingof the regularmagistrates, uch as the archons,and these all hadlimitedtenures.24 We have a case here of a definition being selected for its comprehensiveness.Thoseeligible for the magistracieswould have also been eligible for the assemblies and juries,since the requirements or membership n the formerwere either greater han or equal torequirements for membership n the latter. The reverse was not necessarilytrue:therewere some magistracieswhich were not open to all classes. Thus, while every magistratecould have been a juror or assemblyman, not every juror or assemblymancould havebeen any magistrate.And since Aristotlewants to define citizenas broadlyas possiblehenaturallychose juror and assemblyman "unlimitedoffice") as the standard.25 pol. 1II, 1. 10 1275b5ff."We may thus conclude that the citizen of our definitionisparticularlyandespeciallythe citizenof a democracy.Citizens ivingunderotherkindsofconstitutionmay possibly,but do not necessarily,correspond o thedefinition".26 Here Aristotle encounters a major obstacle:as constitutionsdiffer in form,so too dodefinitionsof citizen, each constitution havingits own definition.This problemis takenup below.27 Pol. Ili, 1. 10 1275b9-1 1.28 Pol. III, 1. 11 1275bl2-13.29 Recall that archegenerallyconnotesmagistraciesn Aristotle and generally n Greekusage).See above, n. 13.30 E. Barker, n his translationof the Politics(ThePoliticsofA ristolle,Oxford, 1946) riesto accomodate ust this reading n his translation;but in doing so, he is forced to supplywords that Aristotle did not print, and most othertranslatorsdo not followthe substanceof Barker'sreading.31 Pol. 1275b16: "ho archbn . . hokatatenarchenhorismenos".My readingof thiswholesentenceis: "For in the other[viz.,non-democratic] onstitutions heunlimitedoflicial isnot the juryman and assemblyman [since these officials are often not present in non-democracies);butrather hese officials[i.e.theones innon-democracies orresponding o88


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juryman and assemblyman in democracies]are ones determined by their spheres ofauthority". n otherwords,one can find the official in non-democracies orresponding othe citizen in democracies by firstdeterminingthe sphere of authorityoccupied by thelatter (viz. deliberating and judging), and then finding those dischargingthis sameauthority n the former.32 Pol. 1275b19:archesbouleutikese (or kai) kritikes.33 Pol. 1275b9-12.Cf. also Sealey, op. cit., pp. 73-78.34 That Aristotle is here thinkingprimarilyof the duties(powers)and not of the absenceof tenure qualificationsof thesetwo bodies is shownby the fact thathe refersto themasholding"the greatest powerin the state"(1275a29).And it scarcely requiressaying that"deliberation"and"judging"arenotnamesof certainkinds of offices butof certaintypesof authority.35 Pol. 1275a30.36 A related questioniswhetherthefinaldefinition restricts itizens to those whoactuallyhold deliberativeand judicial authority,or whetherit extends to those who, while notactually holding power today, are neverthelesseligible to hold it on a future occasion.Does Aristotle, in short, distinguishbetween eligibilityand actual possession?I believethat he does not. His aim is one of comprehensiveness see below), and so his mind isalways on the eligible as well as the actual citizen. Though this may be a distinction ofsome importance in political theory,there is nothing in his languagein this chaptertosuggest that his mind was concernedwith this question in defining citizenship.37 "People do not all agree that the same person is a citizen; often somebodywho wouldbe a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen under an oligarchy" 1275a2-3).Also, "Hencethe citizen corresponding to each form of constitutionwill also necessarilybe different"(1275b4-5).38 Indeed, it is no exaggeration, I think, to suggest that the reason Aristotle beginswiththe complete definition is precisely to show how many common difficulties can beresolved by reference to it.39 Pot. 1275b23-26. Cf. especially Ehrenberg,op. cit., pp. 38-43, for a discussion ofadmission to civic rights in the polis and restrictionsupon it. Hignett describes theprocessesused for checking lineage in the Atheniancase, especially pp. 280-97. Under theradical democracy, with the admission of the Thetes to office, birth became lessimportantthan wealth in determiningpolitical rights cf. pp. 394-95).40 Pol. 1275b34ff.Aristotle has here in mind the admission of the Thetes to citizenshipcarriedout by Cleisthenes after theexpulsion of the tyrants,and similarcases.41 Pol. 1276b17ff. For a full discussion of this vexing (if not vexed) issue,see R. Develin,"The Good Man and the Good Citizen in Aristotle'sPolitics", Phronesis,18 (1973), pp.71-79.42 Pol. 1277b33ff.43 Pol. 1274b35; returnedto at 1276a7ff.44 Although these terms sometimes are distinguishable, Aristotle sometimes (as here)uses them almost synonymously, much as one might do with the terms "state"and"constitution".4 The comments of Ehrenberg op. cit., esp. pp. 88ff.) about the natureof the polis arevery illuminating in this connection.He shows conclusively,I think, that the polis tendedby the nature of polis society to be a partnershipamong all adult males in rule andequality, and that, therefore, ts rationalextension (and perfection)was pure democracy.This, of course, did not guarantee that actual states fulfilled this ideal, nor that in

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democraciesall people governed equallywell. But thesewere nevertheless he idealendsof typicalpolis society.46 Newman's note is very useful (vol. 1, pp. 569-70): Aristotle'saim hereis to distinguisha narrowerview of citizen (those capable of rulingwell, those equippedwithphronesis)and a wider one (all citizens includingneo5teroiand thosenot fit to rule).47 Pol. 1277b37.The basic point being made here, that the completecitizenis one whohas the virtue to govern, remainsthe same whetherone readspolites as subject("thecitizen is theone with the capacityto govern")orpolitPsas predicateandhoutosassubject("not all the citizens will have the capacityto govern").In the lattercase the meaningwould be that since thebanausoiare admittedtooffice,and thusare calledcitizens,not allcitizenswill possess the capacityto govern because the banausoi ack thiscapacity.SeeRackham,p. 275 n. 2.48 This is Mosse'sso-called"passivecitizen",discussedabove(note4).49 See the discussion in Hignett, op. cit., pp. 281ff., of the distinction in the radicaldemocracyat Athens betweenthosewho enjoyed"fullcitizen rights"and those who, forvariousreasons, were limited to "partial"rights.This distinctionrecallsan earliertimewhen access to political office was restricted o those who fulfilled a propertyrequire-ment, but when citizenship in a more limited sense was still open to the Thetes (pp.117-119,where Hignett uses the term"half-citizens"). n describingthe constitutionofthe five thousandin AthensAristotledistinguishedbetweenthe astoiand FourHundredpolitai, possibly on the grounds that "unlike politai, [astoildoes not necessarily mplyactive participation n the administrationof the state" (A h. Pol. ch. 31; and the note inK. von Fritz and E. Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts [NewYork, 1950],p. 179).50 Cf. Pol. 1311a6-7; 1314bl2; 1315a40; and Newman's notes on 1275blO-20and1285a26-7.51 We have alreadynoted the "citizen in a subject position",and this idea may easilyextend to monarchies.

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[Johnson] Who is Aristotle s Citizen