John Dewey and the Moral Imagination: Beyond Putnam and Rorty toward a Postmodern Ethics

John Dewey and the Moral Imagination: Beyond Putnam and Rorty toward a PostmodernEthicsAuthor(s): Thomas M. AlexanderSource: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 369-400Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40320424 .

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Thomas M. Alexander

John Dewey and the Moral Imagination:

Beyond Putnam and Rorty toward a Postmodern Ethics

The last decade has witnessed an important series of changes in Anglo-American philosophy, not least of which has been the revi- val of an interest in the classical phase of American philosophy. The work of the pragmatists seems once again to speak to the current philosophical dilemmas. Former "analytic philsophers" like Richard Rorty, Joseph Margolis, and Hilary Putnam now embrace some form of Neo-pragmatism. By and large, however, this revi- val has come in the domain of epistemology and the debate on realism. I would like to show here how a reappraisal of an aspect of pragmatic moral theory may have importance in a relatively promising but still undeveloped topic in contemporary moral theory, the importance of "moral imagination" as a key feature of ethical reasoning and behavior.

The impact of Alasdair Maclntyre's After Virtue and Martha Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness indicates that the dominant assumptions of modern ethical theory are undergoing critique. Both Maclntyre and Nussbaum wish to reintroduce the classical Aristotelian concepts of "character," "happiness," and "virtue," though in very different ways. Maclntyre argues for the need of a general "narrative" view of action to reestablish the idea of character (since Aristotelian teleology, he believes, is impossible to ac- cept). The proper issue for moral philosophy is not judging the moral value of some kind of act per se, but seeing any act, as Aristotle did, as an expression of the more fundamental disposi-

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Summer 1993, Vol. XXIX, No. 3.



370 Thomas M. Alexander

tions of the agent's character, now construed as an on-going narrative which determine the meaning of specific actions.1 Nuss- baum has stressed the tragic contingency of conduct, the artistic nature of ethical judgment and the importance of feeling as crucial in our very ability to understand moral situations, not to mention their importance as essential features of our moral character and actions.2 Both of these thinkers look toward a recon- structed version of Aristotelianism without really coming to grips with the issues any such position must face in a post-Darwinian view of nature. Maclntyre has gone on to take a dogmatic view of the historical development of traditions; Nussbaum has turned more to application of her theory to literature rather than work out what a theory of human essence must mean today.3 One of the advantages of the Deweyan view of ethical theory lies, I con- tend, in successfully accomodating the very features which they wish to salvage while also directly appropriating an evolutionary view of nature, compatible with Darwinism broadly conceived.

Thus, after summarizing the aporias in the modernist theory of ethics, I will examine the idea of a moral imagination in two recent "postmodern" discussions by Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty. Both of their accounts are inadequate as they stand and would benefit from a more robust form of Deweyan pragmatism. After describing how Dewey's own theory incorporates the theme of a moral imagination in a way which surpasses theirs, I will briefly indicate how it goes on to address the two issues which Macln- tyre and Nussbaum have stressed, namely, the idea of a narrative view of character and the importance of the affective-aesthetic dimension of moral perception and action. In this way I wish to indicate Dewey's contribution to the current ethical debate.

I. The Origin of the Problem, in the Modern Era

I have argued in a previous article that the pragmatic tradition represents an important development of the theory of imagination in Western philosophy.4 The two dominant views of imagination



John Dewey and the Moral Imagination 371

were either that of classical philosophy, which saw it as the faculty of producing copies of sensible objects (really a power of "imag- ing"), and the romantic view of it as an irrational, arbitrary, creative power capable of generating entirely new objects, concepts or symbols. The transitional figure, of course, is Kant, who began by regarding imagination as a somewhat mysterious, but necessary synthetic power in linking concepts to percepts and ended by making it a power to modify, perhaps create, concepts.5 While thinkers in the classical tradition, like Plato and Descartes, saw imagination as a source of error or, like Aristotle, at best as a low- er, necessary condition of thought, the romantics and their inheri- tors made it the source of nonnatural insight into the transcendental infinite or the subconscious, archetypal world inaccessible to mere understanding.

Pragmatism, by contrast, treated imagination as the capacity to understand the actual in light of the possible. It was thus intrinsically linked to the view of experience and action as temporally on- going, transformative events. Imagination was a creative exploration of structures inherited from past experience which thereby al- lowed the future as a horizon of possible actions, and so of possible meanings, to guide and interpret the present. Imagination was manifest as the growth and continuity of meaning. It was neither mere copying nor radical creation ex nihilo; it was the transforma- tion or reconstruction of experience in a changing world which nevertheless admitted of general stable features. As a phase of action, imagination was an essential feature of environmentally en- gaged rationality or "intelligence," as Dewey termed it. Needless to say, this had immense consequences for any theory of "knowl-

edge." In effect, it changed the "theory of knowing" into a "theory of learning." It also had fundamental influence on what would constitute moral reasoning and the aims of ethical theory.6

The classical views of imagination and reason naturally affected the nature of these last topics. Moral action was a mimesis, a successful enactment, of a general type of good - this much Plato and Aristotle had in common. For Plato, (as Diotima says in the Sym-




posium) virtue lies in the ability of mortals to "give birth" to copies of Beauty-Itself; the moral life is the mimesis of this Form of Forms, governed by the degree of our recollection of it. (Hence the propriety of Alcibiades1 eulogy of Socrates' virtuous life after Socrates' speech on the theory of virtue.) Aristotle saw virtue as the successful realization of the natural type endorsed by the species; wherever happiness was to be found, it was always human happiness, individually exhibiting the universal features found every- where. At times Plato tended toward seeing moral reasoning as aiming toward a quasi-mathematical exactitude, at least as a purely theoretical science to be then applied to specific circumstances, while Aristotle saw it more as an art or techne relying on well- trained habits developed from healthy natural dispositions. But both men saw moral reason as the means of organizing the whole psyche so that it performed its appointed task, its ergon, well. Vir- tue {arete) was the human being "doing well" (euprattein)y an activity which completed or perfected the individual as much as possible. Any given action was ethically significant in terms of the perfection of character it revealed as its origin and cause.

The modern era, having dispensed with Aristotelian teleology, had to rethink this subject almost from the ground up. A me- chanistic view of nature looked toward universal, abstract "laws" governing each event; the question was to find which law any given phenomenon exemplified. With Bacon, the idea of moral action itself became that of applied physics, a technology of human happiness. His own New Atlantis hints at this futuristic ideal, but it was carried out most dramatically in his disciple's book, the Le- viathan of Thomas Hobbes. The scientific revolution led eventu- ally to a position radically different from that of classical ethical theory, a position which constitutes the underlying paradigm for subsequent theories. That paradigm is of discrete, individual events obeying absolute, universal laws. Whatever the differences, deontological and utilitarian theories have in common the emphasis upon establishing universal moral principles and their application to specific instances. Like his scientific counterpart, the moral




theorist sought the "universal law," natural or nonnatural, which ought to be exemplified in any moral act to be counted as good. Likewise there was now an emphasis upon the moral value of the isolated act as such, considered by itself without any reference to the agent's character or "psyche." A moral life would be simply the succession of events obeying a universal law; the whole question of the importance of "moral feeling" would be dismissed as an irrelevant "psychological question."

Aristotle, for example, would have seen an all-important distinction between one individual who felt genuine empathy with a child he had rescued from drowning and one who may have done the same deed for the sake of duty alone in spite of a loathing for children; Kant would have admired the latter as illustrating the pure force of the categorical imperative without the possibly confusing motives of happiness being implicated; Bentham would find the pleasure experienced by rescuer and child as mere factors in the hedonistic equation. For Aristotle, the act would be important because it revealed the true good-hearted courage and social feel- ings of the agent's character; this is one reason why, he says, one cannot really determine happiness, much less the moral meaning of any given act, without seeing the life of a human being in its entirety. For Kant or for Bentham, the value of the act lies solely in terms of its exemplification of the rule, its conformity either to the categorical imperative or the greatest happiness principle.

For the utilitarian and the deontologist, practical reason must simply correctly determine the proper rule for action and apply it whenever the opportunity presents itself. There is no particular continuity to the life of a human being, considered from the moral

point of view; it is a series of independent actions which reveal the same rule consistently applied or misapplied or not applied at all. There is nothing for the imagination as such to do. Indeed the modernist suspicion of imagination as confusing the senses and reason seems at work here as strongly as anywhere. If it is intro- duced, it is merely to assist the ends of utilitarian calculation or rational intuitionism. Aristotle, it must be noted, doesn't have much




to say about it either, but he does stress the need for practical experience and education of desire in the development of a virtuous character and finds in works of literature a significant mode of moral education precisely because in them we grasp the meanings of human life through the types of characters portrayed.

What is the problem with the rule-oriented approach? It doesn't really allow us to grasp the character of the moral agent, at least in any sense more profound than his or her "reasoning" and motivations at any given time. Maclntyre has even argued that it is impossible to assess the intent of any act by considering it in isolation from its context, which is to say, the agent's life- narrative. But there is a deeper problem lying with the very at- tempt to ground judgments upon rules. How do we really decide whether an act falls under a rule or not? Either this procedure is itself guided by a rule, in which case an infinite regress opens before us, or it is not, in which case we are face to face with some primary intuition that we have applied the rule correctly. It becomes especially problematic when one is confronted with a new situation which is radically different from one's previous experience. This, of course, is one of the most common features in ethical dilemmas. But a deontologist like Alan Donagan can only speak of "unformalized analytical reasoning" supported by a set of core cultural beliefs understood in themselves, at least those core cultural beliefs of the Judeo-Christian tradition, which, he thinks, comes close to getting the concept of morality right.

Legal theorist Steven Winter uses as an example the debate over whether judges, in deciding court cases, merely apply or actually interpret the law. The more the "original intent" literalists in this debate argue, the clearer it becomes, I think, that deciding any case must count as an act of interpretation and therefore of modi- fying the meaning of the law, even if only by rendering a general law more determinate. "Vehicles" are forbidden in certain parks. But should skateboards, items not in existence when the park laws were written, count as "vehicles" or not? Is using a skateboard in a mall like driving your car on a sidewalk? Here I think most of us




agree that the judge tries to use his or her understanding of the various laws about vehicles and the needs of personal freedom to determine a situation which had not been anticipated prior to the invention of the diabolical skateboard. In our courts, it should be noted, judges working in a common law tradition are not merely interested in applying rules, but in establishing a working continuity with previous decisions and the life of the culture itself and know that when they decide the case they have established the basis for precedent. They are, I would say, trying to think in those temporal, historical terms which are so necessary for the concept of character in moral thinking. They are imaginatively extending the meaning of the law in light of resolving a problem in which a number of old values and new have come into conflict.7

II. Moral Imagination in Putnam and Rorty

The problem with the conception of morality as merely getting the rules and instances right indicates, then, that perhaps the role of imagination is worth investigation. With the exception of Dewey there is little or no mention of imagination in the role of moral thinking until quite recently. We have a brief but interesting acknowledgement of the importance of imagination in R. M. Hare's Freedom and Reason, which takes an important step beyond Hume's ethics of sympathy. Unfortunately, as soon as Hare ac- knowledges imagination he qualifies it so much as to make it negli- gible. He notes that imagination assists us in correctly applying the universalizibility principle, because to do so we have to imagine ourselves in the situation under dispute from a number of different

perspectives; this helps us reveal any latent contradictions in our as- sent to the principle.8 With the utilitarian principle in mind, to act so as to realize happiness in others, I must try to imagine what makes them happy, in other words, I must imagine myself to be them, and not merely imagine myself, with my own likes and dis- likes, in their places (FR, 126-27). Finally, Hare argues that imagination serves the cause of liberalism against that of fanaticism inso-




far as literature educates the socially important sympathies of the public. Of course, the fanatic can use works of imagination too. Thus, says Hare, fiction is ultimately bound by truth conditions which only experience can reveal. In a poignant passage, he says:

For story-books, though they help to stimulate our imagination, do not by themselves help us very much, to separate what is really likely to happen from what is not, not to assess the probable frequency of its occurrence. For this, some experience of actual moral perplexities, and of actual consequences of certain moral choices, is a necessity. A few months spent as a coolie building the Burma railway is worth more to one's moral thinking than the reading of a great many novels or even factual reports about underdeveloped countries. (FR, p. 183)

If we merely limit imagination to works of fiction, Hare's appeal to real experience is quite sound. But he has already indicated that part of the value of experience lies in its imaginative use in our reflection upon present problems. Even so, Hare sees imagination as little more than a subjective faculty providing a supplementary "sentimental education" which merely helps us apply rules with greater finesse. Hare cannot say how this is possible.

In The Many Faces of Realism, Hilary Putnam, devoted his third Cams lecture to "Equality and Our Moral Image of the World." Here he rejects the formal, a priori mode of Kantian ethics, yet wants to preserve what it secured, the fundamental values of liber- ty, autonomy and respect for persons. Lacking any foundational principles like the categorical imperative or the idea of rational persons, he appeals to the power of "moral images." Putnam finds, for example, Kant's arguments against fanaticism interesting and successful in a way Kant did not intend:

My claim, then, is that Kant is doing what he would have called "philosophical anthropology", or providing what might be called a moral image of the world. He is not simply providing arguments for the third formulation of




the Categorical Imperative . . . .; he is also, and most im- portantly, providing a moral image of the world which in- spires these, and without which they don't make sense. A moral image, in the sense in which I am using the term, is not a declaration that this or that is a virtue, or that this or that is what one ought to do; it is rather a picture of how our virtues and ideals hang together with one another and of what they have to do with the position we are in. It may be as vague as the notions of "sisterhood and brotherhood"; indeed, millions of human beings have found in those metaphors moral images that could organize their moral lives - and this notwithstanding the enormous problem of interpreting them and of deciding what it could possibly mean to make them effective. Now moral philosophers generally prefer to talk about virtues or about (specific) duties, rights, and so on, rather than about moral images of the world. There are obvious reasons for doing this; nevertheless I think it is a mistake . . . . What we require in moral philosophy is, first and fore- most, a moral image of the world, or rather ... a number of complementary moral images of the world.9

I quote this remarkable paragraph at length because it not only marks an extraordinary advance from Hare's view, but because Putnam has virtually nothing else to say about what a "moral image" is or how it works. Let us analyze what at least he does say. First, a moral image is an image of a worlds not a sentimental identification with some other individual in a particular situation. Second, he claims that without such images our rational arguments don't make sense. Imagination is clearly something more than fine tuning for rationality here. Third, Putnam states that such images organize our moral lives^ however vague they may be by rational standards. They have immense pragmatic value for guiding and illuminating human conduct. Finally, he claims that in moral theory we need several complementary images. Moral




thinking operates within a pluralistic context rather than through a unifocal theoretical stare.

We have to think for ourselves, says Putnam, about what-it-is- to-be-human without having a preordained end, a fixed human essence limiting that freedom, and the way we do this is by imaginatively exploring desirable and undesirable possibilities. For example, Putnam uses Huxley's Brave New World to illustrate by description of a moral image of the world what is intrinsically wrong with the utilitarian project. This shows us, he says, what is wrong with such an outlook far more effectively than any rational argument. Once it has been described concretely enough, we just wouldn't desire that kind of world. This is not simply the old emotivist view that somehow irrational desires have been manipulated by irrational images. Putnam's point is that the moral image is the way we organize our rational responses to the claim of some principle. The novel gives us a world whose meaning of what-it-is-to-be-human is clear; on seeing that world imaginatively, utilitarian arguments don't make sense; this image cannot effectively organize our lives. It is a one-dimensional, not a pluralistic image.

I wish Putnam had said more here, especially about how moral images organize our world and guide rationality in spite of their vagueness, but he has not. If I understand the thrust of his point, the problem of human values is essentially aesthetic and imaginative, especially insofar as we are morally pluralistic creatures. Un- like Hare, Putnam sees the moral imagination playing a vital role in our thinking as well as acting, though he leaves us simply with this tantalizing fragment.

Richard Rorty, however, has said a good deal more in Contin- gency, Irony and Solidarity. Rorty' s main concern in this work is to persuade us that there is not and cannot be a reconciliation in the conflict between our private desire for self-creation and our public sense of moral duty, though this has been the aim of all "moral metaphysicians" from Plato on. Some writers, like Haber- mas and Dewey (to use Rorty's examples) try to show us the val-




ues of solidarity; others, like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, show us what the value of "private perfection" or "a self-created, autono- mous human life" can be.10 Since these two aims cannot be con- joined by theory discovering a rock-bottom human essence, "The closest we will come to joining these two quests is to see the aim of a just and free society as letting its citizens be as privatistic, 'ir- rationalist,1 and aestheticist as they please and as long as they do it on their own time - causing no harm to others and using no re- sources needed by those less advantaged" (CIS, xiv). John Stuart Mill couldn't have put it better: reconcile conflicting desires by reconciling them so they do not conflict!

Rorty wishes to present us with his moral image of liberal society, an ironist utopia which realizes the incommensurability of values, admits its own historical contingency, and yet sticks to the guns of its ideals. Ever since Hegel (and in spite of what Hegel himself said), historicism has cast doubt upon the claim that there is a deep core to the self which is not through and through a product of the weavings and contingencies of history. Thus Hegel (who saw history as the necessary unfolding of the Absolute), for Rorty, is malgre lui the first great ironist: "I use 'ironist' to name the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of his or her most central beliefs and desires . . . Liberal ironists are people who include among their ungroundable desires their own hope that suffering will be diminished, that the humiliation of human beings by other human beings may cease" (CIS, p. xv).

Since appeals to principles and arguments have no function in this brave new world, the role of imagination acquires a dimension previously unknown in Anglo-American moral theory:

In my utopia, human solidarity would be seen not as a fact to be recognized by clearing away "prejudice" or burrowing down to previously hidden depths but, rather, as a goal to be achieved. It is to be achieved not by inquiry but by imagination, the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers. Solidarity is not discovered by reflection, but created. It is created by increasing




our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of people. Such in- creased sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginalize people different from ourselves by thinking, "They do not feel it as we would," or "There must always be suffering, so why not let them suffer? " This process of coming to see other human beings as "one of us" rather than as "them" is a matter of detailed description of what unfamiliar people are like and of redescription of what we ourselves are like. (CIS, p. xvi)

This is why public works of imagination are so important - Rorty includes here TV, movies, the comic book and docudrama, and especially literature. In his liberal utopia, Rorty urges that we move toward narrative and away from "Truth," seeing our culture as simply shifting webs of vocabularies in transition, forever open to alternative descriptions and redescriptions.

It is impossible, says Rorty, to produce a reason which will actually make us care about, much less understand or respect another person. The important thing for the liberal ironist is to notice suffering when it occurs. To be capable of doing this, one needs a trained, sensitive imagination: "For the liberal ironist, skill at imaginative identification does the work which the liberal meta- physician would like to have done by a specifically moral motiva- tion," he says; the liberal ironist wants "to increase our skill at recognizing and describing the different sorts of little things around which individuals or communities center their fantasies and their lives" (CIS, p. 93). I think Rorty is right here, for many - most - societies provide themselves with moral images which prevent ordinary, well-intentioned, ¿food people from noticing suffering in others. The movie "Driving Miss Daisy" was filled with poignant examples of the petty humiliations endured by a good man from a good woman deriving simply from the unno- ticed "moral givens" of their society which encumbered any possibility for genuine friendship between blacks and whites. The




Bhagavad Gita offers an elaborate justification for why the caste system is to be respected and endured - to change it would be to go against the laws of karma. The dominant moral images of women in most societies is another instance; by a tacit acceptance of a "natural order" a dominant sex is prevented thereby from even noticing injustice in social empowerment and inequality of opportunity. A liberal society, then, would stress training in our ability to notice such things, the petty as well as the great.

Imagination here is absolutely central to the Rortian project. Yet in a way it is a retreat from Putnam's position back toward Hare's idea of a "sentimental education," except, since there are no principles, a sentimental education is all one has. For Putnam, the moral image organized our world and gave us a basis for reasoning. The major function of the imagination, for Rorty, is to avoid hurting others, especially by humiliating them. Rorty has projected in his utopia a world in which the major moral problem is how my private aesthetic project may somehow interfere with yours. I do think that Rorty has hit upon an important insight in his insistence that to understand the world of other people, especially people who are very different from us, that the imagination has tools available which reason alone lacks. The key for his society to work is an imaginative education which allows one to grasp different contexts and enter into the standpoint of the other. But there is really nothing more; dialogue aiming at solving problems with the other is not part of Rorty's utopia, simply continuing conversation and the avoidance of humiliation. Nor does Rorty have anything to say about Hare's quiet observation that the ene- my of peaceful liberalism can use imagination too. The Nazis, the Ku Klux Klan, and others have vividly trained people, especially children, to hate individuals they previously would not have no- ticed or known.

Obviously a great deal hangs upon Rorty's concept of language, redescription, and imagination. The first part of this book is devoted to these topics, and I cannot do more than briefly state that his conception of change in language is that of a radical, irrational




shift. The language in place is constituted by a fixed vocabulary; against this the "radical poet" or

" Utopian revolutionary" introduc-

es strong poetic, metaphoric shifts. Initially these are pure ruptures in the field of meaning. Rorty here sides with Davidson's view of the meaninglessness of metaphoric shift. To give Rorty 's discussion:

Davidson puts this point by saying that one should not think of metaphorical expressions as having meanings dis- tinct from their literal ones. To have a meaning is to have a place in the language game. Metaphors, by definition, do not. Davidson denies, in his words, "the thesis that as- sociated with a metaphor is a cognitive content that its author wishes to convey and that the interpreter must grasp if he is to get the message." In his view, tossing a metaphor into a conversation is like suddenly breaking off the conversation long enough to make a face, or pulling a photograph out of your pocket and displaying it, or pointing at a feature of the surroundings, or slapping your interlocutor's face, or kissing him. Tossing a metaphor into a text is like using italics, or illustrations or odd punctuation or formats. (CIS, p. 18)

Everything Rorty says here about the irrationality of metaphors applies to what he says about imagination. If, by definition meaning and rationality are identified with fixed habits in place, anything new is meaningless, until, of course it becomes a fixed habit and ceases, by definition, to be new, and so either imaginative or metaphorical. Rorty's view, like Hare's, reflects the heritage of positivism's radical dualism between cognitive meaning and emotive meaninglessness, only Rorty has given up the cognitive side of the doctrine, leaving him with little but emotivism. He recognizes the need for some kind of viable, humane social order, but he has no way of explaining how a moral imagination is educated or how it works. Creativity is as mysterious for him as for the romantics; the creative shifts in language can only be absurd en- trances into the fixed mechanism of routine speech habits. When




did an absurdism redirect thinking or enlarge vision or help direct action or reevaluate a previously cherished value? Ironically, Rorty's postmodernism plays upon the very conceptual notions in- troduced by modernism.11

But what if thinking were a transitional activity rather than an operation of merely applying rule to case? What if imagination es- tablishes continuity with existing habits, revealing their capacities to grow meaningfully and give fulfillment and direction to them? This sort of irrationalism would collapse. Intelligence would be an art of seeing the actual in light of the possible and of discerning possibilities by developing dynamic structures in experience. It would be imaginative, and imagination would be primarily exhib- ited in the dynamics of social communication and cultural expression rather than in a private, internal subjectivity. This of course is exactly what Dewey's theory of experience offers.

III. Dewey's Theory of Moral Imagination

In this section I wish to indicate some of the ways in which Dewey thought that imagination was absolutely central to the problem of moral intelligence. I might as well say "the problem of intelligence" because Dewey thought that all conduct was "moral" and that drawing a sharp distinction between moral and prudential reasoning was one of the underlying problems in contemporary theory. For Dewey, human beings are cultural creatures caught up in a dynamic interplay with their organic surroundings and their communicative systems. These latter are the cultural symbols and habits which are passed on and developed from generation to generation which so radically transform human existence. It is the human capacity to learn rather than know which so impressed Dewey. Furthermore, the quest for knowledge and for cognitive certainty is not, in his view, the ultimate agenda for human living. We act in order to realize on a deeper, aesthetic level a sense of meaning and value in our very existence. Knowledge may play a crucial role in this, but in the last analysis,




for Dewey, we are creatures seeking a kind of dynamic, embodied fulfillment which goes far beyond generating mere propositional attitudes and other abstractive cognitive needs. As active beings, we are in constant touch with the possibilities of our situations. Indeed, this is Dewey1 s definition of intelligence: to see the actual in light of the possible. This is also his definition of imagination. Imagination is rooted in the organic embodiment of our existence and flowers in our highest consciously articulate moments.

This was why action was such a fundamental issue for the pragmatists. It was not that they wished to glorify utilitarian "practical" activity over against theory; rather, it was that through understanding action as a temporally complex event, an event with actualized past and possible future interweaving in the transitional point of the present, that one managed to show the integration of theory and practice in the process of existence itself. In this analysis, the role of imagination becomes pivotal, for it is a phase of activity, that phase in which possible activities are envisaged in re- lation to our own situations, thereby amplifying the meaning of the present and creating the context from which present values may be criticized, thus liberating the course of action itself. This theme is most emphasized by Dewey's work.

In his analysis of moral conduct, Dewey places an Aristotelian importance upon the role of habit. Habits are dispositions to kinds of activity by marking out general avenues of conduct. They organize our responsiveness to the world, interpreting it in a dynamic, temporal way, so that the world takes on a structure as a field of dramatic meaning for us. We walk into a room, for example; we do not just see "space," but space-through-which-we-can-move. Chairs are seen-as "sitable," and so on. Psychologist James J. Gib- son has built a complex "ecological theory of perception

" around the phenomenon that, in order to act in the world, organisms must grasp objects in terms of their "affordances," or avenues of interaction.12 Habits have an intrinsic developmental structure to them, a narrative structure, I would say, for they are not merely serial operations, but are teleologically organized toward resolu-



John Dewey and the Mordi Imagination 385

tion, giving them beginnings, middles, and ends.13 Habits are not passive tools lying ready-to-hand for our use; they are organized, energetic, primed responses pressing to come into play as the shifting contexts of the world may allow. The consequence is important. "All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity;" says Dewey, adding, "and they constitute the self (HNC, 21).

What Dewey means by this cryptic remark is that the self is no mere contingency of history, as Rorty thinks, but neither is it some complete Cartesian substance. Rather it is a continuous process of organization which develops within a historical context. It does not merely shift from one vocabulary to the next, but ¿rows through the appropriation of possibilities to achieve an integrative way of acting. This is what constitutes character for Dewey. It is a process of continuous growth.

Were it not for the continued operation of all habits in every act, no such thing as character could exist. There would be simply a bundle, an untied bundle at that, of isolated acts. Character is the interpenetration of habits. If each habit existed in an isolated compartment. . . character would not exist. That is, conduct would lack unity, being only a juxtaposition of disconnected reac- tions to separate situations. But since environments over- lap, since situations are continuous and those remote from one another contain like elements, a continuous modification of habits by one another is constantly going on. A man may give himself away in a look or a gesture. Character can be read through the medium of individual acts. (HNC, 29-30)

This is close to Aristotle: the act as such, because it is caught up in a connected process or activity, has significance - moral significance - because of the character it reveals. But instead of a preordained end determining the continuity, there is more of a narrative development, such as Maclntyre deems important. Character for Dewey is not just the sedimented habits of the past, the ex-




pressive actions of the immediate present, or the tendencies toward future action. To be sure, it is all of these: but it is above all the flexible ability to integrate the possibilities of the present by using the organized experience of the past in reconstructing present action. Character realizes its continuity through the moral imagination. In this process it becomes essential to discover new values, especially as older values come into conflict. Thus, character is our moral imagination in action.

Habits are not static or mechanical tendencies to repeat the same action either, according to Dewey. They are expansive and developmental. Having been put into operation in one situation, a habit will be all the more likely to come into play in a wide variety of situations and become progressively linked up with other habits. Imagination emerges as the need for habit to expand and integrate itself with the whole body of behavior. It is our ever- insistent need to anticipate the world by reading it as a disposi- tional set for our actions. In this sense, imagination is temporally complex, an operation in the present, establishing continuity with the past, anticipating the future, so that a continuous process of activity may unfold in the most meaningful and value -rich way possible. Imagination uses educated habits developed in the domain of social interaction.

It is important to note here that imagination is intimately connected to perception, action, and intelligence. Imagination is not the negation of the perceptual present for a fleti cious image. It symbolizes for us the meaning of possible activity. The capacity to interpret a situation in terms of possibilities in turn requires an organized body of experience upon which to draw. The richer the background of habits is, the more nuanced and complex our perception of the world is. The eyes of a child and a naturalist may receive similar light waves, but their worlds have different depth of meaning.14 Habits also help us focus on the highly relevant features of a situation, thus simplifying it. Where a novice chess-player debates dozens of moves at each turn, the grandmas- ter sees two or three. Imaginative extensions develop out of our




understanding of past meanings; they cannot be radical Rortian (or Davidsonian) ruptures. The redirection of a course of action can be meaningful as the growth of conduct. It is illustrative of Dewey's theory that, contra Davidson and Rorty, the kinds of actions mentioned, kissing, pointing, slapping, are meaningful parts of any communicative activity, unless, of course, they are performed by a madman.

Deliberation, an important phase of moral conduct, uses imagination in exploring the possibilities of a situation. These possibilities help determine the meaning of that situation. Thus deliberation helps us disscss and evaluate as well as understand the dilemma at hand.

Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like. It is an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses, to see what our resultant action would be like if it were entered upon. But the trial is in imagination, not in overt fact. The experiment is carried on by tentative rehearsals in thought which do not affect physical facts outside the body. Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to wait the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable. (HNC 132-33)

In effect, imagination constitutes an extension of the environment to which we respond. By reading the possibilities of the present, the present situation is itself transformed and enlarged.15 By looking into the possibilities and responding to them, we come to assess the present on-going situation. It is thereby possible to act so as to effect continuity and development, growth, of the present, rather than simply mark another abrupt shift in the play of redescription of vocabularies.

Imagination thus has the central ability to generate new values,




according to Dewey. It is important to insist again that imagination is a social activity. Just as we learn to talk to ourselves because others have talked to us, so we learn to reflect and deliber- ate before we act because we have been taught to. This is what education aims for, the intemalization of social activities. We have to learn how to take others into our considerations and we do so through a variety of means, of which not the least are stories. The self is born from such a process of "taking the role of the other," as George Herbert Mead put it.16 One of the primary ways in which imagination is used is in understanding oneself in light of the other. By anticipating the responses of the other, we can control our own actions to communicate; gestures can thus become symbols. The personal imagination is a further refinement of the social imagination.

In confronting a situation in which we are faced with compet- ing values, we undertake an exploration of the possibilities of pre- serving both of them before we apply any abstract principle. To hit upon a mode of activity which successfully keeps both values offers the meaningful extension of the situation we are looking for. In this process various rules may certainly be applied. But for Dewey rules legitimately function as tools or devices for project- ing further lines of action or reminding ourselves of the continuity with past action which is important to keep. Rules and principles are ways of keeping experience organized and of picking out certain values which we wish to realize.17

To take a simple, perhaps all too simple example: think of two children fighting over a ball, each insisting that he or she wants to play with it. One way of resolving the situation is the might- makes-right way and letting the stronger child have the ball. An- other would be to apply some abstract principle (such as property: give the ball to the child who owns it). A third would be to try to find an intergrative value which preserves the previous values which have come into conflict (desire for possession of the ball, in this case). Here one might try to persuade the children to learn to play the game of catch. The ball not only is used by each




child, sustaining the original value, but additional values are discovered through the activity: sharing, the joy of the new game, and, above all, friendship. I do not wish to suggest that all moral dilemmas offer such an easy resolution. What I am trying to indicate is that the discovery of new, intergrative values is a primary aim of the moral imagination, an aspect not even acknowledged by the modernist rule-oriented theories of morality.

This leads to Dewey's point that morality is not a fixed code based on some one ultimate value to which all others must be re- duced but is rather the possibility for meaningful growth and development in our conduct:

Morals means growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is conse- quent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct. It is all one with growing. ... In the largest sense of the word, morals is education. It is learning the meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action. The good, satisfaction, "end" of growth of present action in shades and scope of meaning is the only good within our control, and the only one, accordingly, for which responsibility exists. The rest is luck, fortune .... "Present" activity is not a sharp or narrow knife-blade in time. The present is complex, con- taining within itself a multitude of habits and impulses. It is enduring, a course of action, a process including memory, observation and foresight, a pressure forward, a glance backward, and a look outward. It is of moral mo- ment because it marks a transition in the direction of breadth and clarity of action or in that of triviality and confusion. Progress is present reconstruction adding full- ness and distinctness of meaning . . . (HNC, 194-95)

This is the core of Dewey's theory of ethics. It offers a model radically different from those of the dominant traditions: Morality is concerned with the growth of meaning through action. It aims for




a continuous process of integration in which new values can be discovered. This process cannot be guided merely by duty, pleasure, freedom, the universalizability criterion, self-interest, or any other single end. A plurality of values, however incommensurate, must be integrated. That dynamic integration is character. To ac- quire sensitivity to the developmental meanings of events, which define the significance of the situations in which we find ourselves and the values they possess, is what I have called here "the moral imagination." A moral imagination requires experience, a body of developing habits, education, an ability to understand the way other people think and live, and the ideal of discovering through cooperative action solutions to conflicts. It is the ability to see the meanings at issue in a given situation. It is the moral imagination which thus continually strives to create those ideals which offer the possibility of directing situations toward ends which are most fulfilling. This is what it is to have a moral character.

IV. The Moral Self

The moral self, for Dewey, cannot be conceived as some absolutely isolated, unchanging entity, a source of propositional attitudes, free actions, emotive ejaculations, or rational commands. It is a process of growth ecologically connected with its biological and cultural world. Thus its moral life cannot be summarized by merely looking at some given "act" which is then assessed in terms of some absolute "law." Neither can it be judged in terms of a changeless human essence. Still, Dewey can agree with Aris- totle that acts establish the habitual basis for character, and established habits become the conditions whereby future acts tend to be generated. From this process, the self arises. "The self is not a mere means to producing consequences because the consequences, when of a moral kind, enter into the formation of the self and the self enters into them." Consequences and conduct, Dewey adds, "form, reveal, and test the self."18

The nature of moral conduct is analogous to a process of artis-




tic creation. One begins with a set of material conditions out of which the result must be produced, and each step in that process has an integral effect on the final product. If there are meagre conditions or a thoughtless or ignorant process of creation, the chances of a satisfying work are not large. Likewise, for a meaningful self to emerge, it is better for the cultural conditions to be rich, and for the creative process itself- the moral life of the individual - to be cultivated with care. A moral life, in other words, reflects the complex interplay of the cultural world into which one is born constituting the matrix of meanings from which one's life is generated, the natural dispositions and talents one has for understanding and creatively developing those meanings, and the training (or blunting) of that talent by whatever education one re- ceives in the art of moral living. A self may develop which is a careless, arbitrary self for many reasons. The culture may be fun- damentally ignorant of factual matters in its world, deciding, for example, to go to war because of the markings of a goat's liver. The individual may have received no training in the formation of a sense of responsibility born of habits of reflection. Or the person may by temperament have a flighty, erratic disposition, acting irresponsibly no matter. These may all produce arbitrary actions, and the result will be a self (or perhaps a whole culture) in which the integration of meaning becomes difficult or impossible. Alas- dair Maclntyre, and the sociological studies inspired by his work undertaken by Robert Bellah and his colleagues, criticize our culture's vocabulary as morally impoverished, turning people into emotivists, making them live emotivist lives.19

Thus for Dewey, moral conduct must seriously explore the "self at issue" in any decision or general mode of conduct. "In com- mitting oneself to a particular course, a person gives lasting set to his own being. Consequently, it is proper to say that in choosing this object or that, one is in reality choosing what kind of person or self one is going to be. ... Below the surface, it is a process of discovering what sort of person one wants to become" (LW 7: 287). In this sense, then "The self reveals its nature in what it




chooses." The most important theme for moral theory to recog- nize, asserts Dewey, is "the essential unity of the self and its acts" (LW 7:288). This unity is not pre-established, but, to repeat, a on-going process constantly at risk. This is why, on Dewey's view, children are held morally responsible in varying degrees at different times. The young child does not intend to be "selfish," for it is not intending perhaps anything more than to respond to immediate desire. He or she is taught, however, the meaning of types of behavior so that, at a later date, one is held accountable for being selfish or not.

A certain range of virtues opens up as a result of these considerations. If the self is a dynamic process in which culture, education and readjustment to a changing world are conditional features, then those habits, and the ethical theories endorsing those habits, which treat the self either as an independent, nonnatural, fixed entity, or a passive, reactive, arbitrary collection of impulses, are hinderances. Those habits, by contrast, which keep the self open to change, enable it to see itself as a process, allow it to communicate with others, and to attend to the art of experience with care will be highly important.

Except as the out-come of arrested development, there is no such thing as a fixed, ready-made, finished self. . . . Our personal identity is found in the thread of continuous development which binds together these changes. In the strictest sense, it is impossible for the self to stand still; it is becoming, and becoming for the better or the worse. It is in the quality of becoming that virtue resides. We set up this or that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself. (LW 7: 306)

There is a constant interplay, Dewey says, between "the old, habitual self," upon which we can fall back and "rest our oars," and the "growing, enlarging, liberating self" which "goes forth to meet new demands and occasions, and readapts and remakes itself in the process" (LW 7: 307). This tension exists in the society as




a whole as well. This is why a proper continuation of this discussion would turn toward the ideal of the "democratic selP and the "democratic virtues" which Dewey thought important. It would also include the significance for democratic education in training the imaginations of the young to be morally rich. It must be enough for now, however, to note that the core of the democratic virtues lies in the ability to learn the art of living meaningfully, cultivating experience so that society can intelligently act for those consummatory experiences which realize the deepest sense of embodied value and meaning in our existence. These themes are not merely treated in Dewey1 s educational and political work, but above all in his discussions of aesthetic and religious experience: Art as Experience and A Common Faith.

It is important to remark here that Dewey summed up his discussion of the virtues and moral conduct under the term "love."

The mere idea of a catalogue of different virtues commits us to the notion that virtues may be kept apart, pigeon- holed in water-tight compartments. In feet virtuous traits interpenetrate one another; this unity is involved in the very idea of character. . . . Another bad consequence of treating the virtues as if they were separate from one another and capable of being listed one by one is the at- tempt to cultivate each one by itself, instead of developing a rounded and positive character. There are, however, in traditional teachings many reminders of the wholeness of virtue. One such saying is that "love is the fulfilling of the law." For in its ethical sense, love signifies complete- ness of devotion to the objects esteemed good. (LW 7: 258-259)20

Dewey then applies this idea of love as the ultimate integration of the growth of character to the classical virtues of temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice. Love realizes temperance by paying attention to the whole range of interests rather than just some immediate, pressing desire. It promotes courage by evaluating ob-




stacks in light of the ultimate ends we seek. It embraces wisdom as the consideration generated by sympathy for those affected by our conduct. And such a complete interest is the only means to bring about justice insofar as justice is impartially concerned with the common welfare. Love is the ability to guide the self in light of the ideal of those complete, integrated interests which it not so much has as is. Love is the virtue of character itself.

That love is the ultimate function of the moral imagination is brought out in the startling passage concluding Art as Experience:

Shelley said, "The great secret of morals is love, or a¿¡o- ing out of our nature and the identification of ourselves with the beautiful which exists in thought, action, or person not our own. A man to be truly good must imagine intensely and comprehensively.

" What is true of the individual is true of the whole system of thought and morals in thought and action. While perception of the union of the possible with the actual in a work of art is itself a great good, the good does not terminate with the immediate and particular occasion in which it is had. The union that is presented in perception persists in the remak- ing of impulsion and thought. The first intimations of wide and large redirections of desire and purpose are of necessity imaginative. Art is a mode of prediction not found in charts and statistics, and it insinuates possibilities of human relations not to be found in rule and precept, admonition and administration. (LW 10: 351-352)

The key to moral conduct for Dewey is the capacity to discover the aesthetic dimension of human existence. This does not mean simply creating those ideals which by their lure allow people to act cooperatively for mutually fulfilling ends, though that is certainly included. It also means the ability to understand others and oneself in terms of the aesthetics of character, a palpable, concrete insight into the meaningful continuity of our lives. This embraces seeing the possibilities of others and oneself as well as the realized




actualities. To love another includes awareness of that individual's ability to ¿¡row. This is particularly true in parental love of children, but extends into healthy adult relationships as well.

Dewey's theory of character clearly provides those central features of moral understanding which both Maclntyre and Nuss- baum have emphasized, without the limitations their own positions seem to entail. The idea of character as the continuity of a developing process certainly can incorporate the "narrative" context for understanding intent which Maclntyre looks for. But Dewey does not have to retire to the dogmatic view that only self-enclosed "traditions" working out the pre-ordained coherence of their positions provide the context of "rationality." He does not end either with Maclntyre 's belief that we must be fanatically committed to some grand tradition to escape confusion or with his false dilemma of "Nietzsche or Aristotle." Dewey, like Nuss- baum stresses the importance of the contingent and tragic in moral life and that this life must be mutually realized rather than treated as an isolated project of the solitary self. Like her, he sees imagination and aesthetic understanding as primary modes of moral perception and reasoning. But while Nussbaum seems caught in something closely resembling an ethics of sympathy, vaguely urg- ing us to act so long as we feel for the other, Dewey has a robust theory of experimental moral conduct, conflict resolution, and the pluralistic, integrative ideals of the democratic life. While Dewey would entirely agree with Nussbaum fs incorporation of works of literature as prime instances where our moral understanding can be educated, he is not limited to literature. Indeed, at times Nuss- baum seems almost to equate the moral life with reading. Dewey would find in this a tendency to isolate art from life. The thrust of Nussbaum's position, though, points toward a Deweyan integration of art and life.

Much more work, obviously, needs to be done. While Dewey has offered, in my view, the most comprehensive theory of the moral life of any of the "postmodern" thinkers, his account remains vague especially in the notion of habits as developmental




structures which organize experience. A major contribution toward giving this concept a concrete, rigorous articulation has recently been carried out in Mark Johnson's work, The Body in the Mind and, more significantly, Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics?1 Johnson, building on the cognitive semantics of George Lakoff, sees the nature of meaning as inher- ently imaginative, an extension of the creative dynamism of our organic embodiment. There is good empirical evidence that our verbal, cognitive processes are structured by extending and developing many implicit structures of the living body. He has extended this work into exploring how image structures, especially metaphoric schemata, organize and guide our moral reasoning.

We human beings are imaginative creatures, from our most mundane, automatic acts of perception, all the way up to our most abstract conceptualization and reasoning. Consequently, our moral understanding depends in large measure on various structures of imagination, such as images, image schemas, metaphors, narratives, and so forth. Moral reasoning is thus basically an imaginative activity, because it uses imaginatively structured concepts and requires imagination to discern what is morally relevant in situations, to understand empathetically how others experience things, and to envision the full range of possibilities open to us in a particular case.22

Johnson explicitly recognizes that this is a "Deweyan conception of morality."23 By looking at how specific metaphoric structures organize our moral thinking and shape our moral vision of the world, Johnson has opened up a vast project which has direct implications for pragmatic ethical theory.

To conclude, the failure of the modernist approach to ethical theory has led to some important, new developments, mainly fo- cused around the reintroduction of themes found in the classical theories, such as character, without much successful confrontation of the dilemma posed to those theories by Darwinism. So far,




most of these have operated without any awareness of the contribution of Dewey's own ethical theory, which was developed in a consciously Darwinian manner. The centrality of imagination in recent theory, too, points toward Dewey as providing an adequate theoretical framework within which most of the topics in ethical theory must be reconsidered.

The implications of taking such an approach are extensive. Not only might ethics as a philosophic discipline escape the arid discussions of the deontological-utilitarian debate, but the issue of how moral reasoning is developed through cultural symbols, stories, myths, and religious systems remains to be explored. Con- nections with cognitive semantics on the one hand and sociological and anthropological studies on the other would make the field of ethics a study of the imaginative and practical ways human beings actually construct and live meaningful lives. Nor would this remain a descriptive approach. The focus on imagination reveals that we are constantly creating our worlds, for better or worse, and that this is an art which must be attended to with care. Dewey once described democracy as the art of being able to listen to others. At least, listening to other people's stories is the begin- ning of our ability to understand and communicate with them, and so is the first step of social intelligence.24

NOTES

Note: All citations from Dewey are from The Collected Works (SIU Press, ed. Jo Ann Boydston), indicated by series {Middle Works, MW, and Later Works, LW, volume and page number).

1. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue 2nd edition (University of Notre Dame, 1984). See especially Chapter 15, "The Virtues, the

Unity of a Human life and Tradition. " The crisis of contemporary moral

theory is the theme of Bernard Williams' Ethics and the Limits of Philoso-

phy (Harvard, 1985).




2. Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge, 1986). See especially Chapter 1, "Luck and Ethics."

3. See their subsequent studies, Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose

Justice, Which Rationality (Notre Dame, 1989) and Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge (Oxford, 1990). Nussbaum has explored the possibility of a moderate theory of human essence in "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XIII (1988). She lists eight common features of the human condition: mortality, the body, pleasure and pain, cognitive capability, practical reason, early infant devel-

opment, affiliation (or a sense of fellowship), and humor. But even so she has not addressed the metaphysical arguments a theory of essence must face with respect to Darwinism and evolutionism.

4. See Thomas Alexander, "Pragmatic Imagination," this

journal, Vol. XXVI, No. 3 (1990). See also thematically related articles, "Metaphysical Imagination," this journal, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2 (1992), "The Human Eros" in Philosophy and the Reconstruction of Culture, ed. John Stuhr (SUNY Press, forthcoming 1993), "The Democratic Imagina- tion" in Recovering Pragmatism's Voice, ed. Lenore Langsdorf (SUNY Press, forthcoming) and "The Moral Imagination and the Aesthetics of Human Existence" in Moral Education and the Liberal Arts, ed. Michael Mitias (Greenwood, 1992).

5. See Mark Johnson's fine discussion of this in his The Body in the Mind (University of Chicago Press, 1987), Ch. 6, "Toward a The- ory of Imagination. "

6. In Art as Experience, Dewey says, "Only imagination elic- its the possibilities that are interwoven within the texture of the actual" (LW 10: 348; hereafter cited in text as LW 10). Elsewhere, he describes it as the "spontaneous carrying power" ideas possess (LW 6:115-116). It is "testing in thought" (LW 8: 193). His most important discussion is in Human Nature and Conduct, where it is described as "dramatic rehear- sal" to possible environments (MW 14: 132-140). In The Quest for Cer- tainty and A Common Faith he stresses imagination as the origin of uni- fying ideals of conduct. (See LW: 4; 239-245 and LW 9: 29-36).

7. See Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago, 1977) and Steven Winter, "Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Rea-




soning and the Cognitive Stakes for Law," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 137, No. 4 (1989), pp. 1105-1237.

8. R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford, 1963). Hereaf- ter cited in text as FR.

9. Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism (Open Court, 1987), pp. 51-52.

10. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cam- bridge, 1989). Hereafter cited in text as CIS.

11. See my criticisms in "The Creative Community and the Aesthetics of Human Existence" in Frontiers in American Philosophy II, ed. Robert Burch (Texas A & M, forthcoming 1993). A more extensive critique can be found in Mark Johnson, "Good Rorty, Bad Rorty/ un- published manuscript.

12. See James J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986).

13. John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (MW 14: 15). Hereafter cited in text as HNC.

14. In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey says, "The more numerous our habits the wider the field of possible observation and foretelling. The more flexible they are, the more refined is perception in its discrimination and the more delicate the presentation evoked by imagination" (HNC: 123).

15. Again Human Nature and Conduct, "We do not act from reasoning; but reasoning puts before us objects which are not directly or sensibly present, so that we may react directly to these objects, with aversion, attraction, indifference or attachment, precisely as we would do to the same objects if they were physically present. In the end it results in a case of direct stimulus and response. In one case the stimulus is presented through sense; in the other case, it is indirectly reached through memory and constructive imagination" (HNC: 139).

16. This is most completely worked out in Mead's Mind, Self and Society, though a synopsis of the theory is outlined in the fifth chapter of Dewey's Experience and Nature.

17. As Dewey says, again in Human Nature and Conduct, "Principles are methods of inquiry and forecast which require verification




by the event; and the time honored effort to assimilate morals to mathe- matics is only a way of bolstering up an old dogmatic authority, or put- ting a new one upon the throne of the old. But the experimental nature of moral judgment does not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. Principles exist as hypotheses with which to experiment. . . . The problem is one of continuous and vital readaptation" (HNC: 164-165).

18. John Dewey and James Tufts, Ethics. 2nd edition, 1932

(LW 7: 286). Hereafter cited in text as LW 7. 19. See Robert Bellah, et al., Habits of the Heart (California,

1985) and The Good Society (Knopf, 1991). 20. For a more extended discussion of this theme in Dewey,

see Steven Rockefeller, John Dewey: Religious Faith and Democratic Hu- manism (Columbia, 1991), pp. 483 if.

21. See Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics (University of Chicago, 1993).

22. Johnson, Moral Imagination, Preface. 23. Johnson, Moral Imagination, "Acknowledgements." 24. See for example the series of studies by sociologist Rob-

ert Coles, Children of Crisis, 5 vols. (Atlantic, Little, Brown, 1964-1980) and especially his recent book, The Call of Stories: Teaching and the Moral

Imagination (Houghton Mifflin, 1989). I have explored the implications of this theory for education in my essay, "The Moral Imagination and the Aesthetics of Human Existence," cited in note 4. However for an art of the moral imagination may go toward overcoming misunderstanding and conflict, I wish to stress that the fundamental possibility for conflict and tragic failure of intelligence is ineradicable for the Deweyan view of

morality.

I would like to acknowledge the invaluable help of Mark L. John- son in working out the ideas in various incarnations of this paper. Steven

Fesmire, whose research has explored the mutual implications of John- son's theory of cognitive semantics and Dewey's theory of the moral art-

ist, has also given me much insight. A summer research grant from Southern Illinois University at Carbondale helped me put this essay into final form.



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John Dewey and the Moral Imagination: Beyond Putnam and Rorty toward a Postmodern Ethics