Joachim Monkelbaan Governance for the Sustainable

Governance for the Sustainable Development Goals

Joachim Monkelbaan

Exploring an Integrative Framework of Theories, Tools, and Competencies

Sustainable Development Goals SeriesPartnership for the Goals

Sustainable Development Goals Series

Series editors

R. B. Singh, University of Delhi, New Delhi, IndiaSuraj Mal, University of Delhi, New Delhi, IndiaMichael E. Meadows, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa

World leaders adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as part of the2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Providing in-depth knowledge,this series fosters comprehensive research on the global targets to endpoverty, fight inequality and injustice and tackle climate change.Sustainability of Future Earth is currently a major concern for the globalcommunity ans has been a central theme for a number of major globalinitiatives viz. Health and Well-being in Changing Urban Environment,Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, COP21, Habi-tat III and Future Earth Initiative. Perceiving the dire need for SustainableDevelopment, the United Nations and world leaders formulated the SDGtargets as a comprehensive framework based on the success of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs). The goals call for action by all countries, poor,rich and middle-income, to promote prosperity while protecting the planetearth and its life support system. For sustainability to be achieved, it isimportant to have inputs from all sectors, societies and stakeholders.Therefore, this series on the Sustainable Development Goals aims to providea comprehensive platform to the scientific, teaching and research communitiesworking on various global issues in the field of geography, earth sciences,environmental science, social sciences and human geosciences, in order tocontribute knowledge towards the current 17 Sustainable Development Goals.

Volumes in the Series are organized by the relevant goal, and guided by anexpert international panel of advisors. Contributions are welcome fromscientists, policy makers and researchers working in the field of any of thefollowing goals:

No povertyZero HungerGood Health and Well-BeingQuality EducationGender EqualityClean Water and SanitationAffordable and Clean EnergyDecent Work and Economic GrowthIndustry, Innovation and InfrastructureReduced InequalitiesSustainable Cities and CommunitiesResponsible Consumption and ProductionClimate ActionLife Below WaterLife on LandPeace, Justice and Strong InstitutionsPartnerships for the Goals

The theory, techniques and methods applied in the contributions will bebenchmarks and guide researchers on the knowledge and understandingneeded for future generations. The series welcomes case studies and goodpractices from diverse regions, and enhances the understanding at local andregional levels in order to contribute towards global sustainability.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/15486

Joachim Monkelbaan

Governancefor the SustainableDevelopment GoalsExploring an IntegrativeFramework of Theories, Tools,and Competencies

123

Joachim MonkelbaanUniversity of GenevaGenevaSwitzerland

ISSN 2523-3084 ISSN 2523-3092 (electronic)Sustainable Development Goals SeriesISBN 978-981-13-0474-3 ISBN 978-981-13-0475-0 (eBook)https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0475-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018940880

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole orpart of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse ofillustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way,and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software,or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in thispublication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names areexempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information inthis book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher northe authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the materialcontained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remainsneutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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Preface

Good, effective and equitable governance is critical for implementing theSustainable Development Goals (SDGs). To achieve the SDGs, it is essentialto address the fragmentation of governance along the vault lines of gover-nance levels, sectors, interests and approaches in order to take unified action.

Therefore, the main question that this book attempts to answer is: Whatare the essential elements and the organizing logic of an integrative frame-work that is suitable for analysing sustainability governance from a globalperspective and for achieving the SDGs? This book approaches this questionfrom four main avenues.

First, it applies a combination of innovative governance theories toimprove the analysis of sustainability governance. Secondly, the bookexplores several case studies. Thirdly, the research draws inferences on someareas in which the study and practice of sustainability governance need to beexpanded. Fourth, throughout the book several governance competencies arepointed out that will be critical for achieving the SDGs. These competencieslie mainly within the areas of power, knowledge and norms.

Other main findings are that the transformation of crisis into sustainabilitytransitions needs to find a place in risk management; that systems delibera-tion can complement democracy in addressing the wicked problems that theSDGs address; and that insights from behavioural science can play a crucialrole in achieving the SDGs. This book demonstrates the applicability of thefindings to ‘SDG Hubs’ or innovative platforms for collaboration andknowledge exchange on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Itwraps up by pointing out that we need paradigm and mind shifts that supporta sense of ‘unity in diversity’ in order to achieve the SDGs by 2030.

Geneva, Switzerland Joachim Monkelbaan

v

Contents

1 Introduction: Objectives, Substantive Issues and Structureof This Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1 Positioning Ourselves: The Objectives of This Book . . . . . . 11.2 Substantive Issues: The Sustainable Development Goals

and the Paris Climate Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.2.1 The Sustainable Development Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.2.2 Climate Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

1.3 The Context for the SDGs: Defining Global Change,Sustainable Development and Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.3.1 Global Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.3.2 Sustainable Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.3.3 Governance: Definition and Role

in the 2030 Agenda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121.3.4 Sustainability and Transition Governance:

Clarification of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161.4 Structure of This Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

2 Overview of Governance Theories That Are Relevantfor the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212.1 Combining Theories of Governing Societal Change

Towards Sustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222.2 Transition Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2.2.1 Transition Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222.2.2 Transition Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232.2.3 Analysing Transitions: Multilevel, Multiphase

and Driving Forces Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242.3 Metagovernance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

2.3.1 The Nature of Metagovernance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272.3.2 The Framework Conditions for Metagovernance . . . . 302.3.3 The Benefits of Metagovernance for the SDGs . . . . . 31

2.4 Polycentricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322.5 Network Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

2.5.1 Network Governance and the (Re)scaling ofSustainability Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

2.5.2 Transnational Governance Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

vii

2.6 Experimentalist Governance for the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372.6.1 Putting Experimentalist Governance in Practice . . . . 392.6.2 Benefits of Experimentalist Governance

for the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392.6.3 Conditions for Experimentalist SDG Governance . . . 41

2.7 Chapter Conclusions: Bridging Governance TheoriesThat Are Relevant for the SDGs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412.7.1 Comparing the Theories in This Chapter. . . . . . . . . . 42

References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

3 Laying Out Actors and Dynamics in the 2030 Agendafor Sustainable Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493.1 The Role of Traditionally Hierarchical, Single-Level

Actors in SDG Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493.1.1 Local Governments and Cities: SDG Action

on the Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493.1.2 National Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 553.1.3 International Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

3.2 Multilevel and Non-traditional Governance Actorsand Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643.2.1 Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643.2.2 Knowledge Institutions and Boundary

Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643.2.3 Private Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 673.2.4 Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) . . . . . . . . . 703.2.5 Empowered Citizens: The Role of Democracy

and Deliberative Governance in the SDGs . . . . . . . . 723.3 Conclusions: Bringing Actors Together in Order to

Achieve the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

4 Exploring Some Specific Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834.1 Case Study 1: Decarbonization of the Global Economy

(SDGs 7 and 13). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 834.1.1 Decarbonization Challenges. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 844.1.2 Decarbonization Opportunities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

4.2 Case Study 2: Energy Efficiency and the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . 894.2.1 What Is Energy Efficiency? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 894.2.2 Barriers to Improved Energy Efficiency. . . . . . . . . . . 904.2.3 Drivers for Improving Energy Efficiency. . . . . . . . . . 904.2.4 Energy Efficiency Across the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 904.2.5 A Systems Perspective on Energy Efficiency

and the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 944.3 Case Study 3: The ‘WEF-Climate Nexus’ Approach as a

Framework for Systems Thinking on the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . 954.3.1 Linkages Within the Nexus and Between

SDGs 2, 6, and 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 964.3.2 Governance Challenges and Needs

for the WEF Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

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4.3.3 Geopolitics and Transnational Coherence: Tradeand the WEF Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

4.4 Case Study 4: Trade and the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004.4.1 Introduction: General Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1004.4.2 Trade and the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1024.4.3 Trade in Environmental Goods and Services . . . . . . . 1044.4.4 The Origins of the Environmental Goods

Agreement (EGA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054.4.5 Economic Impacts of a Successful EGA . . . . . . . . . . 1054.4.6 Environmental Benefits of the EGA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1064.4.7 State-of-Play of the EGA Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . 108

4.5 Chapter Conclusions: Policy Implicationsand Ways Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

5 Governance Pillars and Competences: Power, Knowledgeand Norms as Cross-Cutting Issues in Governancefor the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135.1 Competencies in the ISG Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1135.2 Governance Pillar 1: Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

5.2.1 Defining Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1145.2.2 The Role of Power in the Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . 1155.2.3 Power Competence 1: Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1165.2.4 Power Competence 2: Networking and Stakeholder

Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1205.2.5 Power Competence 3: Empowerment . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

5.3 Governance Pillar 2: Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255.3.1 Defining Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255.3.2 The Role of Knowledge in Governance

for the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1255.3.3 Knowledge Competence 1: Knowledge

Cooperation (Knowledge Sharing and Learning) . . . . 1275.3.4 Knowledge Competence 2: Adaptiveness and

Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1285.3.5 Knowledge Competence 3: Reflexivity . . . . . . . . . . . 131

5.4 Governance Pillar 3: Norms and Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1325.4.1 Defining Norms and Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1325.4.2 The Importance of Norms and Values in

Governance for the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1335.4.3 Three Competences for Norms and Values . . . . . . . . 1345.4.4 Norm Competence 1: Equity—Justice

and Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1345.4.5 Norm Competence 2: Creating ‘Horizontal’ and

‘Vertical’ Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1365.4.6 Norm Competence 3: Inclusiveness

and Pluralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1415.5 Conclusions: Establishing Some Linkages Between Power,

Knowledge and Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Contents ix

6 Inferences on Improving Integrative SustainabilityGovernance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1536.1 Inference 1. Considering Behavioural Insights: The Human

Dimension of Governance for the SDGs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1536.1.1 Behavioural Barriers to Climate Governance. . . . . . . 1546.1.2 An Updated Multilevel Perspective that Includes

World View, Visions and Paradigms. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1566.1.3 Human Will and Motivation as Drivers for

Sustainability Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1566.1.4 Self-interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1586.1.5 Well-Being and Happiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1596.1.6 Enlightened Self-interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1606.1.7 (Political) Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

6.2 Inference 2. Addressing Complexity Through SystemsDesign and Systems Deliberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1656.2.1 Challenges that Complexity Poses for the SDGs . . . . 1676.2.2 The Multiplication of Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1676.2.3 The Benefits of Systems Thinking in Governance

for the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1686.2.4 A Systems Definition of Sustainable

Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1696.2.5 Structured Methods for (Collective) Systems

Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1706.2.6 Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development. . . . . 1746.2.7 Integral Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

6.3 Inference 3. Mobilizing the Momentum of ‘Crisis’ forChange and Collective Action on the SDGs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1766.3.1 Crisis in the Context of Climate Change

and Sustainable Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1766.3.2 Examples of Crisis Driving Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1806.3.3 Three Types of Crisis in Transition Theory. . . . . . . . 1826.3.4 Crisis Leadership. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1836.3.5 Crisis and Integrated Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . 184

6.4 Chapter Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

7 Conclusions: The Integrative Sustainability GovernanceFramework and Ways Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1937.1 Governance Factors and Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

7.1.1 Governance Factors: The Barriers and Driversto Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

7.1.2 Toolkit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1987.2 The Integrative Sustainability Governance Framework:

Showcasing Collective Action Through SDG Hubs . . . . . . . 2017.2.1 Background: Achieving the SDGs Requires Good,

Effective, Equitable and Integrated Governance. . . . . 2017.2.2 SDG Hubs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2027.2.3 The ISG Cycle and the Role that SDG Hubs Can

Play in It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

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7.2.4 Assessment of the Integrative SustainabilityGovernance Framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

7.2.5 Afterthought: The Need for Pragmatism andParadigm Shifts in Governance for the SDGs . . . . . . 211

References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

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Abbreviations

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic CooperationAPP Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and ClimateASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsBCAs Border Carbon AdjustmentsBRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South AfricaCCS Carbon Capture and StorageCDM Clean Development MechanismCFGS Climate-Friendly Goods and ServicesCITES Convention on International Trade in Endangered SpeciesCO2 Carbon dioxideCOP Conference of the PartiesEC European CommissionECJ European Court of JusticeEGA Environmental Goods AgreementEGS Environmental Goods and ServicesETS Emissions Trading SystemEU European UnionFAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United NationsFLEGT Forest Law Enforcement Governance and TradeFSC Forest Stewardship CouncilG2A2 Green Growth Action AllianceGANs Global Action NetworksGATS General Agreement on Trade in ServicesGATT General Agreement on Tariffs and TradeGDP Gross Domestic ProductGHG Greenhouse GasICLEI International Council for Local Environmental InitiativesICTSD International Centre for Trade and Sustainable DevelopmentIEA International Energy AgencyIMF International Monetary FundIPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate ChangeISG Integrative Sustainability GovernanceITA Information Technology AgreementIUCN International Union for Conservation of NaturekWh kilowatt-hoursLCR Local Content RequirementMBM Market-Based MechanismMDGs Millennium Development Goals

xiii

MFN Most favoured nationMNC Multinational corporationNGO Non-governmental organizationNTB Non-tariff BarrierOECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentPPP Public-Private PartnershipPV PhotovoltaicREEEP Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency ProgrammeRSPO Roundtable on Sustainable Palm OilSDGs Sustainable Development GoalsSET Sustainable Energy TechnologySETA Sustainable Energy Trade AgreementSETIs Sustainable Energy Trade InitiativesSIA Sustainability Impact AssessmentSME Small- and medium-sized enterpriseTCG The Climate GroupTM Transition ManagementUN United NationsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNEP United Nations Environment ProgrammeUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate ChangeUNWTO United Nations World Tourism OrganizationUS United StatesWBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable DevelopmentWEF World Economic ForumWSSD World Summit on Sustainable DevelopmentWTO World Trade OrganizationWWF World Wildlife Fund

xiv Abbreviations

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Most important SDGs for society to focus on to achievethe most progress (% of experts). Based on the question“Which of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)do you think are the most important for society tofocus on to achieve the most progress towardsustainable development?” (SourceGlobeScan/SustainAbility 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Fig. 1.2 The word sustainable is unsustainable.Source XKCD 2017 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Fig. 1.3 Sustainability as the overlap of social, economic andenvironmental dimensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Fig. 1.4 Mebratu’s model of the different dimensions ofsustainability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Fig. 1.5 Author’s arrangement of the Sustainable DevelopmentGoals (SDGs) based on Mebratu’s model of sustainabledevelopment. (Stockholm Resilience Centre 2016) . . . . . . 12

Fig. 1.6 Linkages between governance and the SDGs. (SourceThe author) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Fig. 2.1 Transition management cycle (Source DRIFT 2012). . . . . 24Fig. 2.2 Static multilevel framework (Source Geels

and Kemp 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Fig. 2.3 Dynamic multilevel framework (Source Geels 2002) . . . . 26Fig. 2.4 Multiphase framework (Source Vandevyvere and

Nevens 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Fig. 2.5 Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)

framework (Based on Ostrom et al. 1994: 37) . . . . . . . . . 33Fig. 2.6 SDGs as a network of targets (Source Le Blanc 2015) . . . 34Fig. 2.7 Experimentalist governance cycle (Based on Sabel and

Zeitlin 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Fig. 2.8 Key properties of the main theories that form the basis

for the integrative sustainability governanceframework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Fig. 3.1 Hierarchy of drivers of urban GHG emissions and policyleverages by urban-scale decision-making. Cities havelittle control over some of the most important driversof GHG emissions and have large control overcomparatively smaller drivers of emissions.Source IPCC (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

xv

Fig. 3.2 Targets under SDG 11. Source ICLEI (2015) . . . . . . . . . . 52Fig. 3.3 Key bodies and mechanisms for Agenda 2030 in

Finland (Prime Minister’s Office 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57Fig. 3.4 Public goods, common pool goods, club goods and

private goods at different governance scales. Based on:Açıkgöz Ersoy (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Fig. 3.5 Climate change Regime complex. Source Keohane andVictor (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Fig. 3.6 Climate clubs. Source Morgan and Weischer 2012.KEY: International Energy Agency’s ImplementingAgreements (IEA-IA), G8, G20, Renewable Energy &Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), CarbonSequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF), RenewableEnergy Policy Network for the twenty-first century(REN21), Asia-Pacific Partnership on CleanDevelopment and Climate (APP, ended in 20xx), GlobalBioenergy Partnership (GBEP), Major EconomiesForum on Energy and Climate (MEF), Clean EnergyMinisterial (CEM), REDD+ Partnership, GlobalMethane Initiative (GMI), Global Green GrowthInstitute (GGGI), International Partnership onMitigation and MRV (M&MRV), Low EmissionsDevelopment Strategies Global Partnership,International Energy and Climate Initiative Energy+,and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC). . . . . . . 63

Fig. 3.7 Institutions and processes involved in boundary work oninternational sustainable development decision-makingBased on: Jungcurt (2013). Note City networks wereadded by the author as they can span the range offunctions between assessment (science) and policy-making. Also, institutions at the local level were addedby the author as there are major opportunities for thescience–policy interface at the local level (e.g. throughcooperation between universities and the cities wherethey are based). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Fig. 3.8 Nine different types of innovation. Source LeanVentures (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Fig. 3.9 Five-step design thinking process. Source Dam andSiang (The Interaction Design Foundation) (2017) . . . . . . 77

Fig. 4.1 Renewable energy portfolio installation trajectory for2000 W net available energy per capita in 2100.Note a SET-compliant primary energy supply evolution(in PWh) for providing 2000 W average net power percapita by 2100 to a population of 10.8 billion. Fossil fuelemissions comply with a 990 Gt CO2 cap peaking in2020 and phased-out by 2075. b RE portfolioinstallation rate profile (in TWp/year). Inset shows theevolution of the weighted-average, composite REEROEI (black line) with an initial value of 20 and the

xvi List of Figures

EROEI values for each technology. c Installed RECapacity (in TWp). Inset magnifies the 1990–2014historical values (dotted lines) versus the modelledcurves. Source Sgouridis et al. (2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Fig. 4.2 Rate of emissions decreases required for reaching the 2°target. Note Peak year refers to the year in whichemissions have reached their highest level and start todecline. Delaying the peak year by just a few years, sayfrom 2010 to 2020, entails increasing the rate of annualemissions reduction from 3% to 4.5–5.5%. The figurealso reports the fastest historical decarbonization rateachieved over a five-year period (outside of periods ofeconomic collapse) and the decarbonization rate impliedby the European Union’s commitment between 2008and 2020. EU = European Union.Source Fay et al. (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Fig. 4.3 Carbon crunch. Source Figures et al. (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . 88Fig. 4.4 Primary CO2 emissions reduction potential by

technology in the Reference Case and IRENA’s Remapscenario, 2015–2050. Source IEA and IRENA (2017) . . . 90

Fig. 4.5 Energy efficiency as a conceptual ‘vector’ forconnecting different SDGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Fig. 4.6 Water–energy–food nexus and the main pressures on itAdapted by the author from CNA (2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Fig. 4.7 Virtual water balance per country and largest virtualwater flow related to international trade. SourceHoekstra (2014). Note In the countries, coloured green,water use for producing export commodities exceeds thewater use behind imported products (net virtual waterexport). In the countries coloured yellow to red, theopposite is true (net virtual water import). The thicknessof the arrows represents the comparative quantity ofwater being traded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Fig. 4.8 Trade and climate change linkages Adapted by theauthor from Cosbey (2008) Explanation examples oflegal linkages between climate change law (left top) andtrade law (right top) is climate change legislation thatcontains provisions on the limitation of imports ofcarbon-intensive products. On the other hand, WTOrules could affect the design of climate changelegislation that foresees in support for domesticrenewable energy industries. The blue arrow indicates theimpact that trade policies and disputes related to renewableenergy can have on climate change (mitigation). . . . . . . . . . 101

Fig. 5.1 The golden circle. Based on Sinek (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . 120Fig. 5.2 Layers of leverage in system innovations. Source Based

on Meadows (1998), illustration from UNEP(2012: 422) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Fig. 5.3 The Rose of Leary. Based on Leary 1957. . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

List of Figures xvii

Fig. 5.4 Knowledge democracy. Source In ‘t Veld (2013).Note The relations between politics, science and media,the corners in the inner triangle, are prone to profoundchange, indicated in second-order relationships: bottom-up (social) media do not only supplement but alsocompete with the classical media. Participatorydemocracy as a compliment or threat to representativedemocracy. Transdisciplinary design or research as abridge between classical science and the real world. As aconsequence, we are confronted with tensions, threatsand opportunities which are indicated in third-orderrelationships. The extensions of the corners of thetriangles can enrich society but can also create tensions.The first- and second-order tensions do not disappear ina knowledge democracy but do change character in thepresence of third-order tensions. The outer points of theextended triangle can strengthen and stimulateeach other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

Fig. 5.5 Vulnerability of different countries to climate change.Some of the countries with historically the highestemissions will be least impacted, while many with lowhistorical emissions will be affected severely.Source Standard and Poor’s (2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Fig. 5.6 Collaboration continuum. Based on http://www.collaborationforimpact.com/collaborative-approaches/ca-subpage-2/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Fig. 5.7 Health and social problems are worse in more unequalcountries. Source Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) . . . . . . . . 142

Fig. 6.1 Mindsets in the multilevel perspective ontransformations. Source Göpel (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Fig. 6.2 U process of cosensing and cocreating—Presencing.Source Presencing Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Fig. 6.3 Cynefin framework. Source Snowdenand Boone (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

Fig. 6.4 Decision-making process based on systems thinking.Source (Probst and Bassi 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Fig. 6.5 Visioning and backcasting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172Fig. 6.6 Sequence of the learning cycles in the concept of triple-

loop learning. Adapted from (Pahl-Wostl 2009) . . . . . . . . 174Fig. 6.7 Multiphase framework, including crisis as a driver

of transition. Source (Rotmans 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179Fig. 6.8 Risks of climate-related impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185Fig. 6.9 Model for integrated risk management. Source FOCP

KATAPLAN guideline (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186Fig. 6.10 Overview of problems, driver and barriers, and

strategies related to considering behavioural factorsin sustainability governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

Fig. 7.1 Integrative Sustainability Governance (ISG)framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204

xviii List of Figures

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Research characterised by the motivations thatinspire it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Table 1.2 Most important SDGs for society to focus on to achievethe most progress (% of experts), priorities by sector andby region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Table 2.1 Comparing the governance modes of hierarchy, marketand network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Table 2.2 Typology of problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Table 2.3 SDGs as an example of global experimentalist

governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Table 2.4 Key properties of the main theories that form the basis

for the Integrative Sustainability Governanceframework (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Table 6.1 AQAL model with the five framework conditionsfor successful metagovernance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Table 7.1 Tools for analysing power in transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

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List of Boxes

Box 2.1 Wicked Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Box 3.1 Example of Participatory Governance Approach in Wind

Power Development in Denmark and Germany . . . . . . . . . 53Box 3.2 The Partnership for Action on Green

Economy (PAGE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59Box 3.3 Governing Sustainable Energy as a Global

Public Good . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60Box 5.1 Indicators for Women’s Leadership Under the SDGs.

(Source: Hunt and Vlahakis 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116Box 5.2 Leadership in the Montreal Protocol

and in the UNFCCC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Box 5.3 The Rose of Leary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Box 5.4 The Role of Resilience in the SDGs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130Box 5.5 How can Blockchain help to Achieve the SDGs?. . . . . . . . 140Box 6.1 Visioning and backcasting (Fig. 6.5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

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1Introduction: Objectives, SubstantiveIssues and Structure of This Book

AbstractThis first chapter takes off by explaining theobjectives of this book on governance for theSustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Itexplains what the SDGs are and how theycame into being. Then, the chapter sets out theopportunities and challenges that are linkedwith the SDGs and in particular with SDG 6on sustainable energy and SDG 13 on climatechange. The chapter also gives a definition ofthe key term global change, sustainabledevelopment and governance. Finally, it laysout the structure of this book.

KeywordsSustainable Development Goals � Climatechange � Global change � Sustainabledevelopment � Governance

1.1 Positioning Ourselves: TheObjectives of This Book

We have arrived at a critical juncture when itcomes to governance for sustainable development.Policymakers have been crafting the 2030Development Agenda including a set of Sustain-able Development Goals (SDGs, also called the‘Global Goals’), The Paris Climate Agreementand numerous related initiatives around the world.

These initiatives will determine the direction ofgovernance efforts for many years to come. At thesame time, good governance1 has been called ‘thePandora’s box of the SDGs’.2 This book is anattempt to unpack this box and investigate waysfor governing sustainability initiatives moreeffectively,3 equitably,4 and coherently.

Within the area of governance for the SDG,there appears to be a need for perspectives onforms of governance that are fit for workingtowards improved sustainability in complex,dynamic and interdependent societies. This book

1Good governance focuses on processes ofdecision-making and their institutional foundations.Values such as enhanced participation and inclusion,transparency, accountability and access to information arecovered by this concept and will be discussed in this book.Good governance has also focused on combatting corrup-tion, securing basic human rights and the rule of law.2https://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2015/sep/25/good-governance-sustainable-development-goals-united-nations.3Effective governance concerns the problem-solvingcapacity of governments, or countries more broadly, topursue sustainable development. Effective governance islinked to institutional capacity, technology, expertise andfinancial resources and the ability to engage in long-termplanning to deal with interconnected problems, not justprocedural elements such as the rule of law.4Equitable governance focuses attention on distributionaloutcomes and equitable treatment, including of the very poorand marginalized. A notion of equitable governance appliesboth to decision-making, including ongoing demands forgreater equity in global decision-making, especially ineconomic governance, but also to the distribution of wealth,resources, and opportunities within societies.

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aspires to take some meaningful steps towardsidentifying and understanding such forms ofgovernance while simultaneously embedding thefindings in accepted theory and practice.

This book is based on the premise that aglobal, ‘world-embracing’ vision on sustainabil-ity challenges such as climate change is requiredat all levels of governance. There is a clear needfor dealing with climate change, poverty, envi-ronmental degradation and other global chal-lenges in an integrated manner. (Davis et al.2013; WEF 2015) At the same time, traditionalglobal governance5 is said to be in decline(Patrick and Bennett 2015) and the liberal worldorder that has been built up since the SecondWorld War is being questioned (Nye 2017;Niblett 2017). Governance that addresses globalchallenges and contributes to achieving theSDGs therefore requires innovative shifts inthinking and acting.

Objectives of This BookWithin this context, the overall objective of thisbook is to contribute to the field of sustainabilityscience6 by proposing an integrative framework for

the governance of transitions related to the SDGs.Sustainability science is based on transdisciplinary7

research on complex human–environment systems.Sustainability science and this research are inspiredboth by considerations of use and by the quest forfundamental understanding. Sustainability sciencetherefore can be placed in the quadrant of‘use-inspired research’ in Table 1.1.

This book aims to foster understanding of sus-tainability governance based on the systemicinteractions between different foundational gover-nance concepts and theories. The insights gainedfeed into the construction of the Integrative Sus-tainability Governance (ISG) framework. The ISG

Table 1.1 Research characterised by the motivations that inspire it

Research Inspired by… Considera ons of Use?

Quest for fundamental

understanding?

No Yes

No Applied Research

(Edison)

Yes Basic Research (Bohr) Use-inspired Basic

Research (Pasteur)

Source Clark (2007)

5The term ‘global governance’ is generally used todescribe specific forms of governance at the planetarylevel and processes of (intergovernmental) world politics,although there is no consensus on its definition (Com-mission on Global Governance 1995).6Sustainability science is “use-inspired research that spansand integrates a broad range of science, engineering, andpolicy disciplines and is directed towards the managementof human–environment systems in ways that meet needsfor human livelihoods while protecting ecosystem and

environmental integrity” (Clark and Dickson 2003;Turner et al. 2003). Sustainability science goes beyondearlier representations of science and policy as distinctand separate worlds and attempts to close the gap betweenthem.7Transdisciplinary studies integrate academic researchfrom disciplines with different research approaches aswell as non-academic participants (such as public orprivate sector decision-makers and other stakeholders) toresearch a common goal and create new knowledge, newtheories and new options to solve societal problems.Transdisciplinarity combines interdisciplinarity with aparticipatory approach. All involved parties, academicand non-academic, define and develop the research goalsand methods together to reach a common goal. Thisapproach integrates disciplines and subdisciplines andnon-academic knowledge, to share power equally (Evelyet al. 2010). For Lawrence (2010), transdisciplinarity hasthe following aims: (1) to tackle complexity in scienceand challenge knowledge fragmentation in a nonlinearand reflexive way which transcends academic disciplines;(2) to accept local contexts and uncertainty; (3) intercom-municative action; (4) action-oriented research.

2 1 Introduction: Objectives, Substantive Issues and Structure …

framework is original for several reasons. First, theframework comprises an unprecedented numberand diversity of governance theories. Second, it hasa unique transdisciplinary outlook that includespublic administration, international relations,political science and management. Third, theresearch is based on case studies that have not beenthe subject of academic analysis together previ-ously (in Chap. 4). In addition, this book aims tomake a significant contribution to the analysis andpractice of sustainability governance as it is basedon my work experience on cross-cutting globalsustainability challenges that are enshrined in theSDGs. In addition, the book offers intimate insightsfrom high-level decision-makers and other stake-holders that I captured through interviews. As theconcluding Chap. 7 demonstrates, the findings aremeant to form a starting point for sustainabilitygovernance into the future.

At the same time, the social sciences consis-tently conclude that there is no single governancemodel that works across all contexts (Ostrom et al.2007). As such, this book intends to offer a struc-tured framework in which different contexts anddimensions of sustainability governance can beunderstood and acted upon. By linking the envi-sioned framework and its constituent parts to bothextant academic literature and the governance ofsustainability transitions in practice, this book aimsto comment on wider transformations8 towardssustainability within the context of the SDGs.

The central contributions that this book aimsto make are:

(1) To clarify the phenomenon of sustainabilitygovernance and contribute to an improvedunderstanding of how governance can bemore effective to achieve the SDGs;

(2) To demonstrate how SDG 16 on the pro-motion of peaceful and inclusive societiesand inclusive institutions9 and SDG 17 on aglobal partnership for sustainable develop-ment10 can be implemented in practice;

(3) To explain and develop dynamics, principlesand mechanisms of the governance of sus-tainability transitions, for example throughidentifying cross-cutting themes in gover-nance and drawing inferences; and

(4) To discover new directions for improvingsustainability governance through a morecomprehensive understanding of the driversand barriers to realizing the SDGs.

As such, this book is meant to gather anddeepen understanding of the opportunities thatexist for making governance for the SDGs moreeffective, equitable and coherent. This book doesnot aim to come up with a conclusive,all-encompassing theory or definitive solutionsfor sustainability governance. Instead, this bookaims to come up with a framework that repre-sents significant and original contributions tounderstanding governance for the SDGs and thatis based on key governance theories and insightsfrom governance practice.

The first section of this introductory chapterprovides an overview of the substantive aspectsof the SDGs and climate change. Then, it definesthe concept of global change and two of the mostcontested terms in the entire social sciences(Jordan 2008): ‘sustainable development’ and‘governance’. Finally, this chapter explains themain approaches taken in this book and gives anoverview of the book’s structure.

8“Transformation or transformability in social–ecologicalsystems is defined as the capacity to create untriedbeginnings from which to evolve a fundamentally newway of living when existing ecological, economic andsocial conditions make the current system untenable”(Stockholm Resilience Centre 2012).

9Officially, SDG 16 is “Promote peaceful and inclusivesocieties for sustainable development, provide access tojustice for all and build effective, accountable andinclusive institutions at all levels”.10Officially, SDG 17 is “Strengthen the means ofimplementation and revitalize the global partnership forsustainable development.”.

1.1 Positioning Ourselves: The Objectives of This Book 3

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1.2 Substantive Issues: TheSustainable DevelopmentGoals and the Paris ClimateAgreement

1.2.1 The Sustainable DevelopmentGoals

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)were adopted in September 2015.11 The SDGsare set to determine the global developmentagenda for the coming decades and thus deservethe attention of all stakeholders involved in(sustainable) development.

The SDGs or ‘Global Goals’ are a follow-up ofthe Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).However, there are significant differences betweentheMDGs and the SDGs: the SDG agenda is morecomprehensive (especially in terms of its envi-ronmental dimension) and is universal (all coun-tries committed to achieving it). The SDGs arealso much more integrated; the linkages betweendifferent goals and targets are both implicit andexplicit. For example, some targets relating tothematic areas such as health are not only listedunder their namesake Goal (SDG 3 on healthylives and well-being), but across other goals aswell (e.g. Goals 2, 6, 11 and 12). The SDGs are infact so integrated that they could be seen as a‘network of targets’ (Le Blanc 2015: 3). Thisopens perspectives for cross-sectoral, integratedand more effective implementation in the longerterm. At the same time, the size and breadth of theSDGs present new challenges for governmentsand other development actors. One argument thatcritics bring up to demonstrate the weakness ofSDGs is that environmental issues are so closelyintegrated with social and economic issues in theSDGs that there are no ‘hard’ indicators for envi-ronmental targets.

The SDGs have an interesting and uniquehistory in terms of the negotiations in which theywere shaped. The idea for SDGs as a follow-up

to the MDGs was launched by the Colombiandelegation at an informal intergovernmentalmeeting in May 2011. Colombia gained thesupport of Guatemala, Peru, and the United ArabEmirates. Civil society quickly picked up theidea and proposed 17 specific SDGs in theDeclaration of the 64th Annual UN DPI/NGOConference in Solo (Indonesia).12 The Rio + 20outcome document, The Future We Want,13 in2012 gave the mandate for an Open WorkingGroup (OWG) to shape the SDGs through aninclusive and transparent process that is open toall stakeholders. The 30 seats in the OWG wereshared by 70 countries. This seat-sharingarrangement led to the breakdown of traditionalcoalitions that had made previous sustainabledevelopment negotiations intractable. Also, theOWG was a more technical group rather than atypical UN negotiating forum. There was a highlevel of leadership in the OWG in the sense ofcrafting proposals, imagining institutionaloptions and brokering the interests of numerousactors to line up in support for the proposedactions. This type of leadership, together with ahigh level of openness, transparency, ownershipand participation turned initial mistrust into trustand a high level of cohesion, common sense ofpurpose, shared understanding and receptivenessto new ideas along the negotiations.

The SDGs provide an opportunity for allstakeholders to establish commitments andexpress their preferences and interests on a broadset of issues under discussion. The formation ofSDGs could help to:

1. form and coordinate the interests of differentstakeholders across issues;

2. mobilize collective action based on a sharedvision and metanarrative on development andsustainability; and

3. help create shared global understanding aboutthe issues and problems at hand.

11The document that contains the SDGs is officially knownas Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-able Development, and is available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld.

12Available at http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/Bonn%20Declaration%202011.pdf.13Available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/futurewewant.html.


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1.2.2 Climate Change

Within the main focus on the SDGs, this bookmainly covers the strongly interlinked areas ofclimate change (SDG 13) and sustainable energy(SDG 7). The Paris Climate Agreement in 2015united almost all the world’s nations in a singleagreement on tackling climate change for the firsttime in history. A key objective of the ParisClimate Agreement is to keep global tempera-tures ‘well below’ 2.0C above pre-industrialtimes and ‘endeavour to limit’ them even more,to 1.5C. The Agreement is based on countries’voluntary actions (Nationally Determined Con-tributions or ‘NDCs’) which each countryreviews every 5 years so that they can scale uptheir efforts. The Paris Climate Agreement iswidely hailed as a success of multilateral diplo-macy. However, more critical voices say that theParis Climate Agreement has undermined envi-ronmental law as it contains no commitments orobligations but only voluntarily determined‘contributions’.

There is a linkage between the Paris ClimateAgreement and the SDGs, because SDG 13undertakes to ‘take urgent action to combat cli-mate change and its impacts’. Also, there aresignificant linkages and synergies betweennational climate plans and the SDGs14 (TERI2017). Climate change and sustainable energyare used in this book frequently as examples ofareas where sustainability governance is crucialfor the following reasons:

First, carbon dioxide emissions from powergeneration, transport, households, and industryplay a dominant role in humanity’s ecologicalfootprint (WWF 2012). Climate change is one ofthe ‘planetary boundaries’15 that have been

trespassed (Rockström et al. 2009; Steffen et al.2015). Thus, addressing greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions provides a crucial opportunityfor increasing the chances of sustaining the pla-net’s biocapacity.

Secondly, besides environmental effects, cli-mate change can have severe economic16 andsociopolitical17 impacts. Because of the numerouslinkages between climate change and (sustainable)energy, taking action on climate change inevitablywill impact the ways in which we use energy andorganize our industries. Beyond industry, energyuse is connected to many other issues that humansrely on, such as food production and water dis-tribution and use (the ‘water–energy–foodnexus’18; also, see case study 3 in Sect. 4.3). Infact, Project Drawdown, which ranks the 100mostpromising options for cutting emissions, demon-strates that agriculture and land use change offerat least as many opportunities for mitigating cli-mate change as the energy sector (Hawken2017). However, transitioning to more sustain-able forms of energy can deliver significant ben-efits in terms of economic growth, job creation,limitation of the damage from climate change andhealth improvement (OECD 2017).

14http://www.ndcfootprints.org/pdf/asiareport_july.pdf TERIalso developed a tool for further exploring the linkages andsynergies between climate plans and the SDGs: http://www.ndcfootprints.org/.15For ways in which the idea of planetary boundaries cansupport national implementation of the 2030 agenda, seehttps://www.sei-international.org/mediamanager/documents/Publications/SEI-2017-PB-Hoff-HowthePlanetary.pdf.

16According to the Stern report, the costs of climate changecan be up to 20% of global GDP, which is much higherthan the costs of mitigation which are around 0.06% ofglobal GDP per year (IPCC 2014). In contrast, the financialcrises and bailing out banks as a result of the 2008/2009financial crisis cost tens of trillions of dollars. As HugoChavez said in his speech at COP 15 in Copenhagen, `̀ Ifthe climate were a bank, we would have saved it by now''.17According to Hsiang et al. (2013), changes in temper-ature and rainfall across countries can be associated with arise in crime, conflict and war.18One example of an area where there are strong systemiclinkages is the area of combined energy and water supply.Water pumps require significant amounts of water, waterdesalination is a highly energy intensive process, hydro-power requires a steady flow of water and the production ofcoal (not to mention shale gas) requires enormous amountsof water, and thermal power plants use enormous amountsof water. Not thinking in a systemic way about water andenergy will have “potentially calamitous implications forbusiness, society and the environment” (KPMG 2013).

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Third, climate change is often ranked as themost ‘global’ and morally challenging19 of allsustainability problems, calling for clearerunderstandings of the role and shape of effectiveand equitable governance from a global perspec-tive. At the same time, climate change and sus-tainable energy are suitable subjects for globalgovernance and international cooperation becausethey continue to be seen as less strategic for manygovernments than, for example, national securityand defence. Therefore, they make an excellentobject for cooperation between countries and canbe stepping stones for cooperation in other areas.

The fourth reason to focus on these issues is thatI have worked for more than a decade at the UnitedNations Environment Programme (UNEP), theInternational Centre for Trade and SustainableDevelopment (ICTSD), the European Commis-sion, Climate-KIC and several other institutionson the linkages between climate change, sustain-able energy, innovation and trade. This booktherefore enables me to critically assess my ownobservations and ideas, to draw onmy network forinterviews, and to base my research approach onmy daily work with governance actors.

Fifth, despite a flurry of initiatives in the areaof climate change and sustainable energy, coor-dinated governance approaches have been eithernon-existent or ineffective. One reason for thisineffectiveness is that different pathways that areproposed for energy transitions20 by

heterogeneous actors are often mutually exclu-sive (Verbong and Loorbach 2012) and havemade fragmentation a common phenomenon inenergy and climate change governance.21

Another reason is that ‘energy is more than asector, policy or field; it is instead a cross-cuttingissue area that envelops a distinct set of gover-nance challenges’ and that ‘energy is, among allpolicy fields exhibiting externalities of a globalscale, by far the most complex, path dependent,and embedded one’ (Goldthau and Sovacool2012: 232).22

Sixth, surveys among thousands of expertsshow that climate action plays a primary role inthe SDG framework, as Fig. 1.1 and Table 1.2illustrate.

Seventh, it is important to focus on climatechange within the context of the SDGs becausethe period during which the SDGs are set to beachieved (until 2030) will be crucial for avoidingcatastrophic climate change. The window ofopportunity for avoiding such run-away climatechange is indeed closing rapidly. There is an

19Because GHGs mix globally in the atmosphere, theirimpacts are spread around the world independent from thelocation of emissions. This also means that any gover-nance level taking action—a region, a country, a state, ora city—will incur the direct costs of mitigation, but thedirect benefits from averted climate change will bedistributed globally. Therefore, “the direct climate bene-fits a jurisdiction reaps from its actions will inevitably beless than the costs it incurs, despite the fact that globalclimate benefits may be greater—possibly much greater—than global costs” (Stavins 2014). It is in the interest of nocountry to take action on the global commons problem ofclimate change, but each country can reap the benefits ofany countries that do take action (a classical free-riderproblem). This explains why global cooperation onclimate change is essential.20Sgouridis and Csala (2014: 2609) define sustainableenergy transitions as: “a controlled process that leads anadvanced, technical society to replace all major fossil fuel

primary energy inputs with sustainable renewableresources while maintaining a sufficient final energy ser-vice level per capita.” Besides the energy transition,Rogers and Daines (2014) identify three other majorglobal transitions: the “urban population transition”, the“nutrition transition” (in terms of greatly increased con-sumption of animal products and other high-value foods),and the “agricultural transition” from small-scale subsis-tence farming to large-scale commercial operations.21For the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research(PIK) and the International Institute for Applied SystemsAnalysis (IIASA), a fragmented world is the worst-casescenario for the future, as such a world would be failing toachieve global development goals, and make littleprogress in reducing resource intensity, fossil fuel depen-dency, or addressing local environmental concerns suchas air pollution. A regionalized world would lead toreduced trade flows, and institutional development wouldbe unfavourable, leaving large numbers of peoplevulnerable to climate change and many parts of the worldwith low adaptive capacity (O’Neill et al. 2012).22Goldthau and Sovacool (2012: 233) refer by energy to“the socio-technical system in place to convert energyfuels and carriers into services—thus not just technologyor hardware such as power plants and pipelines, but alsoother elements of the ‘‘fuel cycle’’ such as coal mines andoil wells in addition to the institutions and agencies suchas electric utilities or transnational corporations thatmanage the system.”.


39

26

24

24

23

19

18

17

15

14

13

12

11

10

8

7

5

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Climate Ac on

Quality Educa on

Responsible Consump on and Produc on

Peace, Jus ce, and Strong Ins tu ons

Reduced Inequali es

Clean Water and Sanita on

No Poverty

Sustainable Ci es and Communi es

Decent Work and Economic Growth

Affordable and Clean Energy

Zero Hunder

Good Health and Well-being

Gender Equality

Partnership for the Goals

Industry, Innova on and Infrastructure

Life on Land

Life Below Water

Fig. 1.1 Most important SDGs for society to focus on toachieve the most progress (% of experts). Based on thequestion “Which of the Sustainable Development Goals

(SDGs) do you think are the most important for society tofocus on to achieve the most progress toward sustainabledevelopment?” (Source GlobeScan/SustainAbility 2017)

Table 1.2 Most important SDGs for society to focus on to achieve the most progress (% of experts), priorities bysector and by region

38% Climate Action 34% Quality Education 28% Peace, Justice &Strong Institutions

34% Climate Action 26% Quality Education 26% Reduced Inequalities

44% Climate Action 31% Peace, Justice &Strong Institutions

26% Reduced Inequalities +Responsbile Consumption

38% Climate Action 31% Quality Education 24% Reduced Inequalities

41% Climate Action 26% Quality Education 25% ResponsibleConsumption

31% Climate Action 25% Quality Education 25% ResponsibleConsumption

44% Quality Education 31% Peace, Justice &Strong Institutions 28% Zero Hunger

39% Climate Action 29% Quality Education 25% ResponsibleConsumption & Production

46% Climate Action 28% Clean Water &Sanitation

23% Quality Education +Responsible Consumption

40% Reduced Inequalities 33% Climate Action 31% Peace, Justie & StrongInstitutions

Most Important Goal 2nd Most Important Goal 3rd Most Important Goal

Government*

NGO

Academic & Research

Corporate

Service & Media

Asia

Africa / Middle East*

Europe

North America

Latin America

Based on: GlobeScan/SustainAbility (2017)


acute need for lowering GHG emissions becausedelaying climate action by 2030 would increasecosts of decarbonization by 50% compared withimmediate action (World Bank 2015).Global GHG emissions should peak by 2020 andgo down rapidly after that in order to have anyreasonable chance of avoiding a rise in globaltemperatures of more than 2 degrees Celsius thatwas agreed in the Paris Climate Agreement. Thispoint is further explained in case study 1 inChap. 4.

These seven elements make sustainableenergy and climate change suitable arenas fordeveloping integrative23 modes of governance.Climate and sustainable energy governance havelocal, national, regional and global aspects, aredriven by both public and private sector actionand affect geographical, temporal and jurisdic-tional governance scales. Altogether, this canraise insights into multilevel, multisectoral andmultiactor governance.

This is not to derogate from other sustain-ability challenges that are covered by the SDGs,such as poverty24 and inequality,25 hunger, loss

of biodiversity, habitat destruction, waste,depletion of fish stocks, air and water pollution,top soil erosion,26 deforestation and desertifica-tion, rising food prices, resource and waterscarcity (Steffen et al. 2004; MEA 2005; WEF2015), socio-economic imbalances (Jackson2009), public health challenges, conflict,decreasing social trust and social capital (Putnam1995) and institutional failure (Scharmer2007).27

In 2017, indeed more than 15,000 scientistsendorsed an article by Ripple et al. (2017) whichsays that human well-being will be severelyjeopardized by negative trends in some types ofenvironmental harm, such as a changing climate,deforestation, loss of access to fresh water, spe-cies extinctions and human population growth.

23Whereas “integrative” in this research stands for theprocess of bringing different dimensions of governancetogether, “integrated” signifies an output which resultsfrom combining different parts. To be integrative meansgaining perspective and acknowledging the partiality ofany analysis of complex (sustainability) problems (Hirschand Brosius 2013).24According to the Brundtland report, ‘sustainable devel-opment’ contains the concept of ‘needs’, in particular theessential needs of the world’s poor, to which overridingpriority should be given. Despite the economic rise ofdeveloping countries, many people are unemployed, and 3billion in severe poverty.25The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks 2014 reportranked income disparity as the most likely risk to cause animpact on a global scale in the next decade. One sign ofthe growing economic inequality in the world, whichaccording to the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks2014 report is the most likely risk to cause an impact on aglobal scale in the next decade, is that the richest 85individuals in the world have the same amount of wealthas the poorest half of the world population (3, 6 billionpeople); another sign is that the richest 1% of the globalpopulation holds more wealth than the other 99%together. Oxfam Novib (2015), Turchin (2010) claimsthat the growth of a civilization or empire depends onsocial cohesion, and acknowledges inequality as afundamental barrier to social cohesion and predicts

political instability and impending crisis in Western Eur-ope and the US peaking in 2020.The interests in the topicof inequality are also reflected by the popularity ofPiketty’s (2014) book ‘Capital in the Twenty-First Cen-tury’. Piketty argues that wealth will concentrate if therate of return on capital is greater than the rate of eco-nomic growth. Over the long term, Piketty thinks thatinequality can lead to economic instability. JamesRobinson has criticized Piketty for focusing too much onstatistical data without proving causality and correlation.Instead, Robinson argues that it is ‘inclusive institutions’(access to education and the market, autonomous organ-isations of free citizens, property rights and political plu-ralism) which provide for economic incentives,opportunities for all and solid economic growth (Ace-moglu and Robinson 2012).26According to the FAO, the global amount of arable andproductive land per person in 2050 will be only onequarter of the level in 1960, and there will be no topsoilleft in 60 years due to chemical-intensive farming tech-niques, deforestation and global warming (Arsenault2014).27There are passionate debates ongoing on the questionwhether humanity can ‘break’ the planet. Brook et al.(2013) suggest that while human society modifies and,often enough, permanently and abruptly changes thedynamics of local and regional ecosystems, the collectiveimpact of all this on a planetary scale is too oftenoverstated. A growing body of research over the lastseveral years has suggested though that there are very realplanetary boundaries beyond which the entire terramachina starts to break down. Barnosky et al. (2012)have argued that population growth, destruction of naturalecosystems and climate change may be driving Earthtoward a planet-wide tipping point that would havedestructive consequences absent adequate preparation andmitigation.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0475-0_4

At the same time, positive changes can be madein other areas—such as a reduction inozone-depleting chemicals and an increase inenergy generated from renewable sources. Therehas been a rapid decline in fertility rates in someregions, which can be attributed to investments ineducation for women. The rate of deforestation insome regions has also slowed.

Among the negative 25-year global trendsnoted by Ripple et al. (2017) are:

• A 26% reduction in the amount of fresh wateravailable per capita;

• A drop in the harvest of wild-caught fish,despite an increase in fishing effort;

• A 75% increase in the number of ocean deadzones;

• A loss of nearly 300million acres of forestland,much of it converted for agricultural uses;

• Continuing significant increases in globalcarbon emissions and average temperatures;

• A 35% rise in human population;• A collective 29% reduction in the numbers of

mammals, reptiles, amphibians, birds and fish(Ripple et al. 2017).

These challenges are often closely connectedboth with each other and with climate change andenergy issues.28 Case study 1 in Chap. 4 expandsfurther on the substantive challenges andopportunities related to decarbonization.

1.3 The Context for the SDGs:Defining Global Change,Sustainable Developmentand Governance

1.3.1 Global Change

The term ‘global change’ refers to planetary-scalechanges in the Earth system. The Earth systemconsists of the land, oceans, atmosphere, polar

regions, life, the planet’s natural cycles and deepEarth processes (IGBP 2010). These constituentparts impact upon each other. The Earth systemincludes human society, so global change alsorefers to large-scale changes in society.29 (ibid.)Because this book looks both into the topic ofplanetary-scale change (mainly through climatechange) and its interactions with human societyand governance, the global change perspective isa suitable one for addressing the SDGs. The ideasof global change and planetary boundaries also fitwith the concept of the ‘Anthropocene’—a newgeological epoch in which humanity is drivingglobal (environmental) change.

1.3.2 Sustainable Development

Sustainable development is an intrinsicallycomplex, normative, subjective, ambiguous andcontested notion (Loorbach and Rotmans 2006).The distinction between ‘sustainable develop-ment’ and ‘sustainability’ is that sustainability iscommonly understood as a destination orend-state, and sustainable development is ameans of getting there.

The most-often quoted definition of ‘sustain-able development’30 was coined by the WorldCommission on Environment and Development(the ‘Brundtland Commission’) in its 1987 report‘Our Common Future’ as

development that meets the needs of the presentwithout compromising the ability of future gener-ations to meet their own needs. (p. 43)

28Climate change and energy are linked with a range ofother environmental issues: ocean acidification, biodiver-sity loss, deforestation, water, the ozone layer, land usechanges and short-lived chemicals.

29More in detail, the term “global change” can encom-pass: population, climate, the economy, resource use,energy development, transport, communication, land useand land cover, urbanization, globalization, atmosphericcirculation, ocean circulation, the carbon cycle, thenitrogen cycle, the water cycle and other cycles, sea iceloss, sea-level rise, food webs, biological diversity,pollution, health, overfishing, etc.30The term “sustainable” was used already in 1905 whenGifford Pinchot used it in describing “sustainable yield”as a criterion for harvesting timber on a long-termcontinual basis. (SOAS University of London 2015) Theterm ‘sustainable development’ was used in the WorldConservation Strategy (published by IUCN, UNEP andWWF) in 1980.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0475-0_4

This definition is

• normative (future generations should have thesame possibilities—even though future gen-erations do not have a voice and we do notknow their needs);

• subjective (it requires an assessment of futureneeds);

• ambiguous (it does not specify what humanneeds are nor what needs to be sustained andhow) (Martens and Rotmans 2005); and

• not describing what sustainable developmentis, but what it should result in, which makes itnot an actual definition.

These ambiguities of the concept of sustain-able development may be one of the reasons forits widespread acceptance because it can be usedto cover heterogeneous needs (Baker et al. 1997;Adams 2001).

The question ‘is the term “sustainable devel-opment” sustainable?’ is increasingly comingup. Some analysts argue that sustainable devel-opment is inherently contradictory and irrecon-cilable (Kates et al. 2005) and should bereconsidered or even abandoned (e.g. Richardson1997: 43) as it no longer adequately serves theimplementation aspects of environmental gover-nance (Vinuales 2013). McDonough and Braun-gart (2010) earlier argued that ‘sustainabledevelopment’ has helped to make things ‘less bad’but not to do the ‘right things’. For Loorbach(2014), the concepts of sustainable developmentand sustainability are ‘part of the problem’ andcontribute to the lock-in of inherently unsustain-able social arrangements as thinking in terms of‘sustainability’ and ‘problem-solving’ contributesto visions of optimizing and sustaining theseprevailing arrangements. Others have suggestedthat sustainability is not aspirational and thatinstead we need to focus on broader conceptual-izations of human well-being and prosperity as theultimate goal of sustainable development. A focuson human well-being eventually should also takethe social, economic and environmental factorsinto account that true prosperity depends on.31

This book posits the following working defi-nition of global sustainable development, which

is active and acknowledges that sustainability isnot an end point to be reached, but a process thatrequires constant maintenance (Fig. 1.2):

sustainable development is a continuous and col-lective effort for bringing the advancement ofhuman prosperity and well-being in lasting balancewith planetary support systems.

There is further criticism on the generallyaccepted understanding of sustainable develop-ment which is based on the supposedly separateexistence of environmental, economic and social‘pillars’ or dimensions which only partly overlap(Fig. 1.3).

According to Mebratu (1998), this modelsuggests that environmental, social and economicsystems are independent and can be treated assuch (reductionism) and within the zone wherethe three systems interact sustainability can beachieved, whereas outside of it, there is a zone ofcontradiction (bivalence). Instead, Mebratu pro-poses a model (Fig. 1.4) of sustainable devel-opment32 which is based on the understandingthat the economic and social cosmos are depen-dent on the (a) biotic cosmos33.

Figure 1.5 is one attempt to logically organizethe seventeen SDGs based on Mebratu’s con-centric model of the three dimensions (economic,social, and environmental or ‘biosphere’) ofsustainable development. It should be noted that

31See, e.g., https://www.bic.org/statements/prosperity-humankind.32The nested, hierarchical concept as put forward byMebratu (among others) is gaining traction also in theSustainable Development Goals (SDGs) deliberations.See, e.g., Griggs et al. (2013).33Nair (2014) outlines a hierarchy of needs in terms ofcapital which can be closely linked with Mebratu's modelof sustainable development as outlined above in Fig. 5:first, there is natural capital (water, air, flora and fauna,geology, soil, etc.); second, there is human capital(welfare and wellness, health, ideas, motivation andcreativity); third is social capital (institutions that allowpeople to reach their potential including education, lawand order, health care, religion, etc.); and fourth iseconomic capital. Based on this hierarchy, Nair arguesthat the preoccupation with economic capital-basedinequality (e.g. as a result of Piketty’s book—see footnote24 supra) is unjustified as economic capital has no value ifit destroys or does not contribute to the other forms ofcapital.


https://www.bic.org/statements/prosperity-humankind

https://www.bic.org/statements/prosperity-humankind

Fig. 1.2 The word sustainable is unsustainable. Source XKCD 2017

Social

Environ-mentalEconomic

“Sustainability”

Fig. 1.3 Sustainability as the overlap of social, economicand environmental dimensions

Abio cCosmos

Bio c Cosmos

Social Cosmos

EconomicCosmos

Fig. 1.4 Mebratu’s model of the different dimensions ofsustainability

1.3 The Context for the SDGs: Defining Global Change, … 11

in the case of the SDGs, assigning goals to sep-arate dimensions (however, much interlinkedthey are) can be rather arbitrary. For example,SDG 7 (sustainable energy) is listed underthe society and SDG 13 (climate change) underthe biosphere dimension of Fig. 1.5. But as thisbook demonstrates, SDGs 7 and 13 haveimportant links with all three dimensions.

The SDGs are an example of a process that isfocused exactly on wicked problems related tosustainability and poverty, with pre-definedobjectives and measures that indicate success.The process through which the SDGs wereconceptualized was partly the result of a delib-erative process (more than one million peoplegave their feedback on the SDGs through sur-veys) and constituted the largest consultativeeffort ever from the UN.

1.3.3 Governance: Definitionand Role in the 2030Agenda

Sustainable development is above all about gov-ernance—Meadowcroft (2012)

This quotation from Meadowcroft and alsoHulme’s (2009: 310) insight that ‘the climatecrisis is more like a crisis of governance than acrisis of the environment’ show the critical rolethat governance plays in addressing sustain-ability and climate change. In a ranking of 21emerging global environmental issues for thetwenty-first century, UNEP’s (2012) ForesightProcess indeed ranked ‘Aligning Governance tothe Challenges of Global Sustainability’ as thetop priority. ‘Governance’ is seen as critical forthe realization of sustainable development in

Fig. 1.5 Author’s arrangement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) based on Mebratu’s model ofsustainable development. (Stockholm Resilience Centre 2016)


general (e.g. Ayre and Callway 2005; EuropeanCommission 2009) and is sometimes referred toas ‘the fourth pillar or dimension of sustainabledevelopment’ (besides the economic, environ-mental and social dimensions; also, see Fig. 1.4).

Within political science, the growing interestin ‘governance’ can be linked with efforts tocomprehend changing patterns of interactionbetween state and society. Public administrationscholars have turned towards the term gover-nance because the phenomena that they are mostinterested in are increasingly heterogeneous anddefy established categories (Rosenau 1998).

The etymological roots of the word ‘gover-nance’ lie in the Greek verb jtbeqmάx [ku-bernáo], which is identified with navigation andhelmsmanship (steering) and was used for the firsttime in ametaphorical sense by Plato to refer to thesteering of human beings. Contemporary gover-nance can be identified with actions as broad asmanaging, regulating, influencing, informing,envisioning, coordinating, policy-making, facili-tating, ordering, decision-making, (setting theparameters for) cooperating and leading.

Scholars have defined governance in many dif-ferent ways without reaching a consensus on thecore elements of this broad concept (Adger andJordan 2009). According to Young (1994: 15),‘governance involves the establishment and opera-tion of social institutions (in the sense of rules thatserve to define social practices, assign roles, andguide interactions among the occupants of theseroles) capable of resolving conflicts, facilitatingcooperation, or, more generally, alleviating collec-tive action problems in a world of interdependentactors’. At times, it is challenging to distinguishpolitics from governance as governance is oftenclosely linked with politics and state relations.34

Governance institutions can determine therelations between actors and enable them tohandle rational choice problems (e.g. prisoner’sdilemma and the problem of the commons thatplay a central role in sustainable development).An institution can be broadly defined as anystructure or mechanism of social order andcooperation that shapes the behaviour of a set ofindividuals within a given community.35

Within the plethora of international organi-zations’ understandings of the term governance,UNDP (2014: 2) argues that ‘governance isbroader than institutions and includes relationsbetween state and people. It provides the mech-anisms through which collaboration can be gen-erated across sectors’. Paquet (2005: 3) also goesbeyond institutions as for him, governancemechanisms and dynamics are ‘the many ways inwhich (1) individuals and institutions (public,private and civic) manage their collective affairs,(2) diverse interests accommodate and resolvetheir differences, and (3) these many actors andorganizations are involved in a continuing pro-cess of formal and informal competition, coop-eration and learning’.

34Politics in general is understood to be more of anormative activity than governance as it is often associ-ated with power struggles (Sharp 1990), distribution ofresources (Laswell 1936) and the threat and application ofphysical force (Weber 1919). The dimension of “politics”denotes the actual process side of governance whereindividual and collective actors with diverging views andinterests interact. Controversy over problems, solutionsand rules of the game and the (power) struggle of actors toget their particular view established as the “commonview” are relevant in this dimension. Howlett et al. (2009)

propose to use power as a key factor for distinguishinggovernance arrangements in the politics dimension.35According to Scott (2008: 48), “institutions are com-prised of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitiveelements that, together with associated activities andresources, provide stability and meaning to social life”. Atthe same time, institutions are shaped by human interac-tion. Examples of institutions are marriage, religion,schools, government, civil society, (mass) media, industry(businesses) and the military. Institutions are one of theprincipal objects of study in the social sciences. Differentdisciplines (e.g. sociology, political science, internationalrelations) can have different understanding of what aninstitution entails. The definition of institutions in thisdissertation is broader than those limited to physicalorganizations because of the author’s legal backgroundand because a broader definition allows for takingdeliberation and discourses that shape institutions intoaccount. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012),‘good’ (inclusive and not extractive) institutions are themain factor in the success of nations. Ansell (2011: 39)has a more transactional understanding of institutions asmultilevel, grounded conceptual ecologies with audi-ences; institutions are based on higher-level guidingmetaconcepts whose meanings are experimentally deter-mined at lower levels.


Hirsch and Brosius (2013) define governanceas ‘processes by which different voices and per-spectives are engaged in making hard choicesabout complex trade-offs’, Similarly, Hufty seesgovernance as ‘decision-making processesinvolving collective stakes or both conflictiveand cooperative interests’ (2011: 178) and ‘acategory of social facts, namely the processes ofinteraction and decision-making among theactors involved in a collective problem that leadto the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction ofsocial norms and institutions’ (2011b: 405).

The Commission on Global Governance(1995: 3) defines governance as ‘a broad,dynamic, complex process of interactivedecision-making that is constantly evolving andresponding to changing circumstances’.

In the context of urban transitions, Frantzes-kaki et al. (2017) refer to governance as ‘themultifaceted processes whereby persistent soci-etal challenges are recognized, the potential fordesirable transitions identified, and the dynamicsthat might guide and accelerate such a transitionare stimulated’.

Although it is not the purpose of this book togive an all-encompassing definition of gover-nance, some main characteristics of governancemay be clear from existing definitions: gover-nance is a collective enterprise aimed at solvingproblems, making decisions and creating oppor-tunities; it can involve institutional, procedural,instrumental and organizational aspects; it iscontextual and dynamic as its meaning changesfrom one policy setting to the other; and it is oftenclosely linked with politics and government, butnon-public sectors are increasingly involved.

There are two main linkages between gover-nance and the SDGs, as expressed in Fig. 1.6. Onthe one hand, governance is crucial for theachievement of all SDGs (Biermann et al. 2017).In other words, governance is a critical ‘means ofimplementation’ (MoI) for the effective deploy-ment and mobilization of all other means forimplementing the SDGs (Arrow 1). On the otherhand, improved governance can be seen as a goalthat works on the SDGs in itself can reach(Arrow 2), even if some (e.g. Elder et al. 2016)

see it more as an essential means to achievehuman well-being.

Governance is most explicitly addressed inSDG 16 (on ‘Peace, Justice & Strong Institu-tions’) and SDG 17 (on ‘strengthening the meansof implementation and revitalizing the globalpartnership for sustainable development’).

Among SDGs 16 and 17, the most relevanttargets for governance are:

– Target 16.6 ‘develop effective, accountableand transparent institutions at all levels’;

– Target 16.7 ‘ensure responsive, inclusive,participatory and representativedecision-making at all levels’;

– Target 17.14 ‘enhance policy coherence forsustainable development’;

– Target 17.16 ‘enhance global partnerships(…) Complemented by multi-stakeholderpartnerships (…)’.

ICSU (2017) points squarely at SDG 16 andSDG 17 as the two goals that are truly thebeating heart of the SDG system: “[SDG 16 and17] are key to turning the potential for synergies

SDGs Governance

Arrow 1: Governance and ins tu onal arrangements need to support ac on, implementa on and review of the SDGs

Arrow 2: Improved governance as a goal that work on the SDGs can promote and pursue

Fig. 1.6 Linkages between governance and the SDGs.Source The author


into reality (…) For many if not all goals, havingin place effective governance systems, institu-tions, partnerships and intellectual and financialresources is key to an effective, efficient andcoherent approach to implementation”.

Among SDGs 1–15, the targets referring togovernance aspects, or financial or other meansof implementation (MoI), are indicated by lettersa., b. and c. Examples include:

• strengthen the participation of local commu-nities (6.b.);

• strengthening development planning (11.a.);• implementing integrated policies and plans

(11.b.); and• raising capacities for planning and manage-

ment (13.b.).

So What is the problem with governance?While achieving all 17 SDGs is both techno-logically36 and financially37 feasible, we need tomake drastic changes in the ways in which wegovern the global commons. The problem is thatextant forms of (global) governance are losingmomentum and are struggling to address chal-lenges related to unsustainability (Bruyninckxet al. 2012: 248). Long-term unsustainability isgrowing due to the absence of:

1. effective governance that goes beyondsustainable development as an optimizing

strategy. Sustainability as an optimizationstrategy fails38 to address the causes ofunsustainability at deeper levels and over thelong term (Loorbach 2014);

2. insights into the interplay (dynamics)between governance actors, scales, concepts(such as power, knowledge and norms),levels and styles (Meuleman 2008);

3. coherent efforts to weaken barriers andstrengthen drivers for transition governance,in other words, to provide incentives andmotivation for sustainability transitions.(Grubb 2014).

Because generally one or more of these ele-ments are absent in sustainability governance,there is a mismatch between observations inglobal change and effective, coordinatedresponses across governance levels and amongsectors and actors in society. Subsystems such aswater management (SDG 6) may be sustainablein themselves, but they may be sustainable at theexpense of other sectors such as the energysubsystem (SDG 7). For example, this can causeproblems when not enough water is available forthermal cooling or for hydropower plants orwhen sea water needs to be desalinated, which isan energy intensive process. Therefore, to makewhole societies sustainable, we need integrative‘system of systems’ approaches. Despite thisneed for effective, coherent and cooperativegovernance that mirrors the comprehensiveSDGs, regional (e.g. the EU) and global gover-nance processes (e.g. in the WTO and in theUNFCCC) seem to be in crisis. Coherence islacking horizontally between stakeholders at thesame governance level (e.g. states) because

36E.g. according to Ecofys (2014) and Greenpeace (2015),a 100% renewable electricity system is feasible by 2050.The Desertec Foundation argues that it is feasible to coverglobal energy demand with solar and wind powergenerated in the northern Sahara desert.37Cumulative investment in low-carbon energy andenergy efficiency would need to reach USD 53 trillionby 2035 to keep global warming to 2 degrees Celsius.This is only 10% more than the USD 48 trillioninvestment that is needed in any case in the energy sector(IEA 2014). More recently, Citigroup (2015) calculatedthat transitioning to sustainable energy is actually cheaperthan a business-as-usual investment in energy scenario,even when the benefits from mitigated climate change areexcluded. (also, see https://ir.citi.com/hsq32Jl1m4aIzicMqH8sBkPnbsqfnwy4Jgb1J2kIPYWIw5eM8yD3FY9VbGpK%2Baax).

38According to Walker and Salt (2006: 7), “Thoughefficiency per se is not the problem, when it is applied toonly a narrow range of values and a particular set ofinterests it sets the system on a trajectory that, due to itscomplex nature, leads inevitably to unwanted outcomes.”Thus, while it makes sense to make a specific technologymore optimal or efficient, broader systems implicationsmust be taken into account (e.g. rebound effects of energyand resource efficiency) to determine the true potential forimproved sustainability.


https://ir.citi.com/hsq32Jl1m4aIzicMqH8sBkPnbsqfnwy4Jgb1J2kIPYWIw5eM8yD3FY9VbGpK%252Baax



leadership roles are not well defined, and verti-cally, the chains of command between levels ofgovernance for sustainability are often weak. Inthis context, in extant literature and governancepractice, isolated elements of sustainability gov-ernance have been analysed, but there have beenno or few attempts at identifying integrated,comprehensive frameworks.

Based on the observations and findings above,both research on and the practice of sustainabilitygovernance can be seen as fragmented, rigid andineffective.

1.3.4 Sustainability and TransitionGovernance: Clarificationof Terms

While many movements in support of sustain-ability are encouraging, what is often lacking is asense of transformative and effective governancefor sustainable development. Governance iscrucial though for moving towards sustainabilityand for remaining sustainable once a state ofsustainability is reached.39

This book deploys the specific term ‘governancefor the SDGs’ and the more general ‘sustainabilitygovernance’ and ‘transition governance’. Thisbook is based on the assumption that the relativelyyoung term ‘Governance for the SDGs’ can benefitfrom the experience with sustainability governanceas they address similar objectives and areas. All thetopics in the SDGs already existed beforehand butwere never brought together in the comprehensiveframework that the SDGs represent.

Sustainability governance has been defined byMeadowcroft (2007: 299) as ‘processes ofsociopolitical governance oriented towards theattainment of sustainable development’. It is agoal-oriented activity that seeks to achieve certain

(desired) societal outcomes and to avoid other(less promising) social futures. Eventually, sus-tainable development cannot be expected to bespontaneous social outcomes, but requires‘goal-directed intervention by governments andother actors’ (Meadowcroft 2007: 302). Sustain-ability governance is perceived as normative andprescriptive and concerns the tools, methods andinstruments that are specifically regarded as usefulfor sustainable development (Meuleman 2012).The term sustainability governance is generallyaccepted to be more comprehensive than envi-ronmental governance in the sense that it alsocovers economic and social dimensions. Althoughsustainable development is the process towardsbecoming sustainable and sustainability is anenvisioned end-state, the term ‘sustainabilitygovernance’ here includes both the governance ofthe process of becoming sustainable and ofremaining sustainable, and it is used interchange-ably with the terms ‘governance for sustainability’and ‘governance for sustainable development’.

‘Transition governance’ in turn is supposed tobe a more profound form of sustainability gover-nance. Sustainability governance describesmostlyexisting governance practices, and transitiongovernance represents envisioned forms ofeffecting change. Whereas sustainability gover-nance often is aspiring towards sustainabilitythrough optimizing existing, inherently unsus-tainable societal structures, transition governancein this research includes the planning and imple-mentation of transformational change at a societallevel. Particularly, in the area of climate changeand sustainable energy, what is increasinglyrequired is guidance of radical change at the sys-tems level. Both sustainability and transitiongovernance will be required for achieving theSDGs. Bringing the different descriptions in thissection together, the definition of IntegrativeSustainability Governance in this book is a col-lective enterprise which aims to address sustain-ability problems adequately through fosteringfundamental change aimed at achieving the SDGsand other visions of sustainability. Chapter 3 fur-ther elaborates on the term transition governanceand on the theory behind it.

39RobecoSAM’s Country Sustainability Ranking (availableat http://www.robecosam.com/en/sustainability-insights/about-sustainability/country-sustainability-ranking.jsp), forexample, is based on three dimensions: environmental,social and governance. While the environmental and socialdimensions make up for 15 and 25%, respectively, of thefinal country sustainability score, the governance dimensionis dominant and makes up for 60% of the final score.


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1.4 Structure of This Book

This book is divided into seven chapters. Afterthis introductory chapter, Chap. 2 provides atheoretical background by describing a set ofsustainability governance theories. In order toprovide a lay of the land of climate and sus-tainable energy governance, Chap. 3 gives anoverview of different governance actors that areinvolved in governing sustainability transitionsand of the interactions between them. Then,Chap. 4 describes the main case studies ondecarbonization, energy efficiency, the water–energy–food nexus, trade and the SDGs andinnovation. Chapters 5 and 6 offer further theo-rization based on extant literature and theempirical findings and present suggestions formaking sustainability governance more coherentand effective. Finally, Chap. 7 concludes bydrawing the Integrative Sustainability Gover-nance framework together and presenting thecombined findings.

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2Overview of Governance TheoriesThat Are Relevant for the SDGs

AbstractThe purpose of this chapter is to offer anoverview of some key theories on governingchange that can be relevant for the SDGs. Thisoutline can serve as a basis for the explorationof the case studies in Chap. 4. Extant theoriesand their cross-cutting issues (called ‘theoret-ical pillars’ in this book) are meant to serve asthe basis for the novel concept of ‘integrativesustainability governance’ and can directlyfeed into the Integrative Sustainability Gover-nance (ISG) framework which is presented inChap. 7. As such, this chapter functions as thetheoretical ‘scaffolding’ fromwhich to work onthe construction of the ISG framework. How-ever, providing an exhaustive presentation ofall theories related to governance for the SDGsis beyond the scope of this book. (A goodoverview of transition studies can be found inGrin et al. 2010. Hale and Held (Handbookof transnational governance: institutions andinnovations. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2011)give a comprehensive account of transnationaland networked governance. Metagovernance isoutlined inMeuleman (Public management andthe metagovernance of hierarchies, networksand markets: the feasibility of designing andmanaging governance style combinations.Springer, New York, 2008), and the website

of the Workshop in Political Theory andPolicy Analysis (http://www.indiana.edu/*workshop/) provides numerous materialson polycentricity. Sabel and Zeitlin (TheOxford handbook of governance. OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, pp 169–185, 2012)describe experimental governance.) Thischapter starts by suggesting some reasonswhy a multiplicity of theories will continue tobe needed for governing complex sustainabil-ity issues. Next, it explores five promisingtheories that are relevant for governance forthe SDGs:

• Transition theory;• Metagovernance;• Polycentricity;• Network governance; and• Experimentalist governance.

Finally, the summary draws linkages betweenthe different theories and seeks to show syn-ergies and lacunae across the theories.

KeywordsTransitions �Metagovernance � PolycentricityNetwork governance � Experimentalistgovernance


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2.1 Combining Theoriesof Governing Societal ChangeTowards Sustainability

The consideration of a ‘bouquet’ of theoriesinstead of limiting the literature review to theconsideration of one particular theory can bejustified as follows.

First, research on sustainability governance ishistorically prone to theoretical multiplicity.Over the past few decades, research in this fieldhas gone through a number of rapid conceptualand empirical developments,1 which demonstratethat analysing and steering societal developmentsin areas as complex as sustainability are unlikelyto be successful when only one conceptual per-spective or theory is used, especially when therelevant time frame extends over one or moregenerations (Termeer and Dewulf 2012). Climatepolicy, for example, is much more complex thanany single theory or model can capture (Grubb2014). Likewise, governance of the combinedand interlinked SDGs is subject to high levels ofcomplexity.

Secondly, theoretical multiplicity can raisemore realistic and holistic insights into the mul-tiple challenges that present themselves whenimplementing the SDGs.

And thirdly, clarifying conceptual differencesbetween a variety of theories helps creating amore complete picture of societal relations andtransitions, provides a map of possible strategiesto intervene and offers practitioners involved in

the SDGs tools for reflection (De Caluwé andVermaak 2004).

The selection of theories in this chapter restson their foundational character and explicit focuson sustainability governance, on the potential ofthese theories to be useful for governance for theSDGs, and on the mutual compatibility of thesetheories.

2.2 Transition Governance

2.2.1 Transition Theory

In order to understand structural change, aninterdisciplinary2 field of studies has emergedthat focuses on ‘transitions’, most commonlydefined as long-term, nonlinear processes ofsocial change in which a societal system isstructurally transformed (Grin et al. 2010; deHaan and Rotmans 2011).

Frantzeskaki (2011) identifies three types oftransitions: institutional transitions, social–ecological transitions and socio-technologicaltransitions. Transitions can take place at severallevels: while households and individuals cantransition to sustainability, some speak of a ‘GreatTransition’, and envision ‘the advent of a newdevelopment paradigm redirecting the global tra-jectory towards a socially equitable, culturallyenriched, and ecologically resilient planetarycivilization’. (Tellus Institute 2015). I see SDGsindeed as smaller transitions within the ‘GreatTransition’ towards sustainability and true pros-perity, and the coming of age of humanity.1Early research by political scientists looked into the

conditions for the formulation and implementation ofsustainability governance in existing bureaucratic institu-tions. After that, more disciplinary approaches havebecome increasingly focused on international linkages,societal sectors beyond the state and have deployed theperspectives of pluralism (how can government institu-tions aggregate multiple competing interests?), agencycapture (how are agency agendas driven by industrialconstituents?), ecological Marxism (what is the role ofcapitalism in environmental degradation?), ecologicalmodernization (environment and economy are mutuallyreinforcing if properly managed), social constructionism(how do people assign meaning to the world?) and globalenvironmentalism (what are the external and suprana-tional pressures on nation states?) (Davidson and Frickel2004).

2Interdisciplinary studies involve two or more academicdisciplines with the same or different research paradigms,approaches and methods which cross subject boundariesand integrate their knowledge in ways that result in newinsights, knowledge, theories and methods, and solvecommon research questions. Interdisciplinary researchmight involve differing qualitative and quantitative meth-ods and different analytical and interpretative approaches.(Evely et al. 2010) According to Davidson and Frickel(2004: 485), ‘the future work of scholars interested inenvironmental governance (…) will benefit from respect-ing the interdisciplinary and cumulative nature of con-ceptual developments in environmental governance,rather than abiding by theoretical or disciplinaryboundaries’.

22 2 Overview of Governance Theories That Are Relevant for the SDGs

Whereas a system innovation refers to trans-formations within specific subsystems, any tran-sition transcends individual systems andcomprises various system innovations at differentscale levels and over a long period of time(Loorbach and Rotmans 2010). This means thatexisting systems of structures, institutions, cul-ture and practices are broken down and replacedby new ones.

A sustainability transition generally refers to a‘radical transformation towards a sustainablesociety as a response to a number of persistentproblems confronting contemporary modernsocieties’ (Grin et al. 2010: 1). Such a transfor-mation process is ‘long term, multidimensionaland fundamental’ (Markard et al. 2012), para-doxically comprises radical change in incre-mental steps (Loorbach and Rotmans 2010), andshifts established socio-technical systems tomore sustainable modes of consumption andproduction. The term ‘transition’ is alreadywidely accepted in the area that this book looksinto in more detail: sustainable energy and cli-mate change. The UNFCCC secretariat (2014),for example, speaks of the transition tolow-emission development paths. It is arguedhere that the SDGs, both individually and as anintegrated framework, represent transitionstowards improved sustainability.

The field of transition studies applies theoriesand methods from various disciplines to studythe history, dynamics and governance ofsocio-technical transitions and ‘system innova-tions’ (Rotmans et al. 2001; Loorbach 2007).‘Transition theory’ embraces concepts such ascoevolution, self-organization3 and emergenceand is intellectually rooted in three strands ofscience: complex systems theory4 (e.g. Kauffman

1995), governance literature (Rotmans et al.2001 and Smith et al. 2005) and innovationstudies (Geels 2005). While originally the focuswas on transitions in socio‐technical systems(e.g. mobility, energy, agriculture), recentdevelopments have broadened the focus towardssocietal systems more generally (e.g. cities,regions, sectors). Transition studies call for inter-and transdisciplinarity, acceptance of uncer-tainty, adaptive governance and attention to up‐and downscaling between different levels in timeand space, as well as aggregation in specificcases and issues. The understanding of transitiondynamics in social systems requires a holisticview on the interaction between human and non‐human aspects (not only social, cultural, institu-tional and political,5 but also economic, ecolog-ical, and technological).6 Guidance andgovernance are essential for sustainability tran-sitions (Smith et al. 2005).

2.2.2 Transition Management

Transition governance involves the deliberateadjustment of governance practices and societalinstitutions in order to maximize the opportuni-ties for continued human progress along a sus-tainable trajectory (Meadowcroft et al. 2005).Transition governance upgrades sustainabilitygovernance to a more proactive and targetedeffort for moving towards proven sustainability.

Transition management is a form of transitiongovernance that aims to ‘resolve persistent prob-lems in societal systems’, based on transitiondynamics insights. It is ‘a newmode of governance

3Technically, self-organization means that subsystemsmaintain themselves by capturing energy from the largersystem and by dissipating some of that energy back intotheir environment to sustain themselves through time(Prigogine and Stengers 1984).4Complex systems are systems in which the componentsexhibit dependencies such that the system as a whole hasproperties that ‘emerge’ and cannot be explained as thesum of the constituent parts. (Holland 1998) Complexsystems theory focuses on the interactions among com-ponents of a system (including socio-ecological and

socio-technical). It tends to highlight the potential forrelatively small-scale adjustments to a component or aninteraction of components to create a ripple effect that canultimately lead to large-scale changes of the system as awhole. (Long 2014).5A sustainable transition is a normative and inherentlypolitical project (Smith et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2010;Meadowcroft 2011).6This distinguishes the field from other forms of transitionresearch found in political science that focus predomi-nantly on processes of change in and around governmentsand nation‐states (e.g. power transition theory as found ininternational relations).

2.2 Transition Governance 23

for sustainable development’ (Loorbach 2007),which ‘tries to utilise the opportunities for trans-formation that are present in an existing system’ by‘joining in with ongoing dynamics rather thanforcing changes’ (Rotmans et al. 2001). Transitionmanagement is about understanding how actors(can) influence transition processes (Loorbach2007) in an iterative, reflective7 and explorativeway of governing (Frantzeskaki 2011).

The ‘transitionmanagement cycle’ (Fig. 2.1) isa particular operational governance design thatcombines transition ‘arenas’8 with varioussystemic transition instruments in a cyclical four-step transition management process (Loorbach2007: 115; Kemp et al. 2007). The transitionmanagement cycle serves to organize a participa-tory stakeholder process that is aimed at envi-sioning, learning and experimenting (Loorbach2007: 115) and that is focused upon long‐termsustainable solutions (Loorbach and Rotmans2010).

Transition management considers traditionalcommand and control governance unable toaddress persistent problems. Instead, one can‘manage’ these problems in terms of adjustingand influencing the choices of both individualactors and the societal system by organizing ajoint searching and learning process.

2.2.3 Analysing Transitions:Multilevel, Multiphaseand Driving ForcesFrameworks

In order to analyse transition dynamics, withintransition theory the ‘multilevel’, ‘multiphase’and ‘multipattern’ frameworks were developed(Grin et al. 2010).

2.2.3.1 The Multilevel FrameworksThe static multilevel framework (Fig. 2.2) is oneof the most central concepts in transition studies(Geels 2005). The multilevel framework servesto analyse a transition process as an interactionbetween different levels of functional aggregationthrough time: the ‘Landscape’ (macro),‘Regimes’ (meso) and ‘Niches’ (micro) levels.

Besides the static multilevel framework, Geels(2002: 1263) also developed a dynamic multi-level framework (Fig. 2.3), which shows in moredetail how the three levels interact dynamicallyin the unfolding of socio-technical transitions.

The transition theory concepts of ‘Landscape’,‘Regime’ and ‘Niche’ will be described in thefollowing and will be capitalized in the remain-der of this book to distinguish them from theconcept of ‘Landscape’ in a geographical senseand from the Regime concept in internationalrelations.

Problem structuring,Envisioning and Organizing

Transi on-Arenas

DevelopingSustainable

images, Coali ons and

joint Transi on-

agendas

Mobilizing Actors andTransi on-Experiments

Monitoring,Evalua ng

And Adap ng

Strategic

(Emphasis on

System, Culture)

Tac cal

(Emphasis on Sub-

System, Structures)

Opera onal

(Emphasis on niches,

prac ces)

Governance FrameworkFor dealing with transi ons

Fig. 2.1 Transition management cycle (Source DRIFT2012)

7For Meadowcroft, reflective governance is ‘a dynamicposture, oriented to exploiting the diffusion of power topromote adjustment of the development trajectory. It isabout judicious interventions to channel social energiesdown pathways conductive to sustainability’. (2007: 20)Meadowcroft (2007: 310) further sees reflective gover-nance as ‘extending an approach to governance thatconsciously employs interactions with other power cen-tres to define and realise goals, and that encouragesreflection (within government but also across society)about societal circumstances in order to reassess practicesand adjust initiatives’.8One of the most central elements in transition manage-ment concerns the set-up of a so‐called transition arena: ‘amulti‐actor governance instrument [that] intends to stim-ulate and coordinate innovation through creating shared(new) problem definitions and shared long‐term goals’,consisting of ‘a virtual arena, an open and dynamicnetwork in which different perspectives, different expec-tations, and different agendas are confronted, discussedand aligned where possible’ (Loorbach 2007: 132–133).


The Landscape refers to the surroundings of aparticular societal system under study, where onesees macro‐trends with a relatively slow progressand developments with a high autonomouscharacter.

In transition theory, the term Regime has adifferent meaning than in international relationsand international law and essentially is the most‘dominant’ societal constellation. The Regimedefends the status quo (e.g. fossil fuel industry)and is based on a set of rules that control thestable functioning of a societal system.

Niches refer to those arrangements inwhich non‐conformism and innovation candevelop. Niches are part of the societal system,but they can deviate from the dominant struc-tures, cultures and practices within that system.

Niches can cluster (or network) outside of theRegime and form an emergent Regime or‘Niche–Regime’.9 Such a Niche–Regime canbecome more powerful as the incumbent Regime

is weakening, and finally, the Niche–Regime cantake over the incumbent Regime. Niche–Regimes have the capacity to replace oldresources by new ones and to transform theextant distribution of resources.

Because Regimes dominate the societal sys-tem, an important condition for a transition is thatRegimes are either transformed or replaced bynew Regimes. The idea in transition managementis that the Regime resists radical change throughincremental adaptation and innovation, similar tothe process of autopoiesis. However, astop-down pressure from the Landscape andbottom-up influence from the Niche levelincrease, the Regime starts breaking down. Tothis end, in transition management practiceNiches are typically created and empowered asopen, multiactor networks. Such networks con-tain representatives of different sectors who arecommitted towards the transition goal andapproach.

Processes within the Regime can also lead toan integration of innovations from the Nichelevel into the Regime.10 (Rotmans and Loorbach2010) Developments at ‘the edges’ of the

Macro-Level: Landscape(e.g. global economic developments, climatechange, nuclear disaster)

Meso-Level: Regimes(e.g. legisla on, dominant industries,economic rules, social conven ons)

Micro-Level: Niches(e.g. innova ve companies, specific marketor applica on domain)

Fig. 2.2 Static multilevel framework (Source Geels and Kemp 2000)

9The ‘Niche–Regime’ (‘empowered Niche’) refers to ‘aNiche that has grown powerful enough to gain a numberof new characteristics, most important of which is theability to attack (sometimes effectively) an incumbentregime (and therefore to potentially take over from it)’(Rotmans and Loorbach 2010: 136). A Niche–Regime is agroup of actors that exercises transformative power, i.e.develops new structures and institutions.

10In the case of organizations undergoing environmentalchange, barriers external to an organization pose less of aproblem than barriers that are internal in nature. (Post andAltma 1994; Murillo-Luna et al. 2011).


Regime can accelerate Regime destabilization(Bosman et al. 2014). For example, in the contextof decarbonization, transition management pro-vides a framework for considering portfolios ofpolicy measures that nurture low-carbon Nichedevelopments and put pressure on dominantfossil fuel-based Regimes.

2.2.3.2 The Multiphase FrameworkAs changes during transitions accelerate andmultiply, old Regime structures are replaced bynew structures. Ultimately, a new Regime isformed that replaces the old Regime. In this

interaction between Regime, Niches and Land-scape various ‘phases’, ‘patterns’ and ‘pathways’can be distinguished (De Haan and Rotmans2011).

Whereas sustainability transitions (e.g. decar-bonization) are urgently needed for achieving theSDGs, the social science literature seems toprivilege stability over change. This can berelated to a lacking dimension of time in much ofthe social science literature and the accelerationof global change which was at a lower speedwhen most currently dominant theories werecrafted. Pollitt (2008: 7) claims that ‘political

Fig. 2.3 Dynamic multilevel framework (Source Geels 2002)


science in particular, but also social sciencesmore generally, have become increasinglydecontextualized’ and that ‘a prime form of thisdecontextualization was the loss of an explicittheoretical treatment of time’. If the dimension oftime is considered—as transition theory does—then the occurrence of change (and novelty) andurgency can be better reflected in research.

The multiphase framework in transition theory(see Fig. 2.4) is an attempt to reflect the timedimensions of transitions and distinguishes fourdifferent phases:

• During the pre‐development phase, changesoccur at the Landscape and Niche level, andthe Regime resists these changes.

• In the take‐off phase, structural changeaccelerates, and these changes put pressure onthe Regime up to the point that it starts tobreak down.

• During the acceleration phase, structuralchange becomes visible as new structuresreplace old Regime structures.

• The stabilization phase implies a new state ofequilibrium, in which a new Regime hasreplaced the old Regime (Avelino and Rot-mans 2009).

Altogether, these phases describe an ideal‐typetransition that can be visualized through the so‐called S‐curve. ‘Non‐ideal’ and ‘reverse’ transi-tion paths can also occur (a lock‐in, back-lash, or

system breakdown,11 showing that ‘unlearning’can be involved in sustainability governance(cf. Christensen 1997).

2.3 Metagovernance

2.3.1 The Nature of Metagovernance

Meuleman (2008: 11) defines metagovernance12

as: ‘the totality of interactions of governments,other public bodies, private sector and civilsociety, aimed at solving societal problems orcreating societal opportunities’. Metagovernanceis an approach that aims to design and manage

Predevelopment

Take-off

Accelera on

Stabiliza on

Lock-in

Backlash

System Breakdown

System State

Time

Fig. 2.4 Multiphaseframework (SourceVandevyvere and Nevens2015)

11Lock‐in: when ‘choices made in the past exclude differentopportunities now, e.g. by ingrained behaviour or ideas’,back‐lash: when the diversity of alternatives is too low and‘too much is betted on the wrong horse’ (e.g. a ‘hype’),system breakdown: a dynamic equilibrium is disturbedwithout being re‐established. (Rotmans 2005: 24).12This definition is mainly based on Jessop (2003) andSørensen (2006). For example, Jessop (2003) sees metagov-ernance as ‘the organization of the conditions for gover-nance’ which involves ‘managing the complexity, pluralityand tangled hierarchies found in prevailing modes ofco-ordination’. Sørensen (2006) describes metagovernanceas a way of enhancing coordination of governance in afragmented political system based on a high degree ofautonomy for networks and institutions, and also as ‘anindirect form of governing that is exercised by influencingvarious processes of self-governance’ aimed at ‘enhancingcoordinated governance in a fragmented [regulatory] systembased on a high degree of autonomy for a plurality ofself-governing networks and institutions’ (ibid., 2006: 100).


sets of situational preferences for a mix of insti-tutions, instruments and processes with elementsfrom the main modes of hierarchical, market andnetwork governance.13 Broadly speaking, gov-ernment depends on hierarchical governance, theprivate sector on market governance and civilsociety on network governance. Each of thegovernance modes exists on their own, butmetagovernance can help understand how theyrelate, interact and can be coordinated (ibid.).Table 2.1 compares the hierarchical, market andnetwork governance modes on a number of keyaspects.

Governance is different from governmentbecause the term governance can represent newforms of regulation that go beyond traditionalhierarchical state activity, and it can include newprocesses, dynamics and forms of interactionbetween actors (e.g. self-regulation, new formsof multilevel policy and private–publiccooperation).

In order to achieve the SDGs, only a hierar-chical approach of the 2030 Agenda is seeminglynot in line with the need for a pluralisticapproach, partnerships and ‘bottom-up’ action.Therefore, one of the biggest questions in gov-ernance for the SDGs is how to harmonize globalagreement and target setting with local imple-mentation and how to combine bottom-up withtop-down approaches. Governance for the SDGsrequires a variety and dynamic mixture ofapproaches, ranging from centralized to decen-tralized; from legally binding to voluntary; and

from hierarchical to network and market styles ofgovernance. This allows for variation in time, inplace and in the roles of different actors(Meuleman and Tromp 2010). Metagovernancerepresents dynamic mixtures of hierarchical,network and market governance styles and seemssuitable for addressing the numerous ‘wicked’problems (see Box 2.1) that the SDGs aim toaddress.

Box 2.1: Wicked ProblemsThe notion of ‘wicked problems’ (Ritteland Webber 1973) refers to a situationwhere there is neither consensus on valuesnor on knowledge (see Table 2.2) and iscrucial for understanding sustainability andclimate change.

The typical characteristics of wickedproblems are (Rittel and Webber 1973:162–166):

• Every wicked problem is essentiallyunique

• There is no definitive description of awicked problem

• Solutions to wicked problems are nottrue-or-false but good-or-bad

• Every implemented solution to awicked problem is a ‘one-shot opera-tion’ which leaves traces: it changes theproblem

• There are no criteria which enable oneto prove that all solutions to a wickedproblem have been identified andconsidered.The result of tackling wicked problems

is often path-dependent. Wicked problemsare characterized by lock-in effects withregard to physical (long lead) time, boun-ded by the use of a specific technique orinfrastructure) and social (mental, lifestyles) (Meuleman 2012: 42).

‘Solutions’ applied to wicked problemstypically only reinforce unsustainability.One example is the production of biofuelsin Indonesia, which are meant to mitigate

13Self-governance could be seen as a fourth mode ofgovernance. Kooiman (2000) distinguishes in a differentcategorization between first-, second- and metagover-nance orders. First-order governance concerns dealingwith problems directly, efficiently and legitimatelythrough implementation and action (e.g. setting targetsfor renewable energy). Second-order governance relatesto the context for first-order governance (e.g. institutionaldesign and the creation of policy instruments to steerfirst-order governance). Metagovernance for Kooimanmeans the governance of governance in terms of devisingguiding principles, influencing contextual factors forinstitution building and discussing norms for problemframing (e.g. by the media).


Table 2.1 Comparing the governance modes of hierarchy, market and network

Typicalexample

Market Command hierarchy (state) Network

Culture Individualism Hierarchism Egalitarianism

Underlyingtheory/theoreticalbackground

Rational choice theoryPublic choice theoryPrincipal–agent theory

RationalismPublic goodsPositivism

Social constructivism andsocial configuration theoryPublic valuesContingency theory

Rationality Formal and procedural Substantive and goal oriented Reflexive and procedural

Primaryvirtues

Cost-driven Reliable Great discretion, flexible

Style ofstrategy

Planning and designstyle; compliance torules and controlprocedures

Learning style;Chaos style:coping withunpredictability;deliberation

Power style;gettingcompetitive advantage

Criterion ofsuccess

Efficient allocation ofresources

Effective goal attainment Negotiated consent

Stylisedmode ofcalculation

Homo economicus Homo hierarchicus Homo politicus

Criteria offailure

Economic inefficiency, marketfailure, pseudo market

Ineffectiveness, bureaucracy ‘Noise’, ‘talking shop’,indecisiveness

Role ofgovernment

Social services supplier Govern society Partner in networks

Role ofcitizens

Clients, customers–calculativeconsumers

Subordinates, voters Partners, participative citizens

Roles ofknowledge

Knowledge for competitiveadvantage

Expertise for effectiveness ofruling

Knowledge as a shared good

Relations Independent, individualistic Dependent Mutually dependent,collective

Relationalvalues

Indifference Hegemony and separatism Pluralism and tolerance

Leadershipstyle

Self-steering, empowering Steering Coaching, supporting

Conflictresolution

Competition/creativedestruction

Judge: legitimate winner Mediator: win-win

Affinity withproblemtypes

Routine issues, non-sensitiveissues

Crises, disasters, problemsthat can be solved byexecuting force

Complex, unstructured,multiactor issues

Efficient implementationwithin limits, price signal forresources

Role of government: providestability, set broader vision

Implementation, consultation,legitimacy, complexity,engagement

Table 2.2 Typology of problems

Values:Knowledge:

Consensus Disagreement

Consensus Technical Political

Disagreement Scientific Wicked

2.3 Metagovernance 29

emissions from fuel production, but whichin turn lead to deforestation. And shale gasmay well be a cleaner burning fuel thancoal. But if producing shale gas leads toleakage of methane (which is a gas withmuch stronger warming effects than carbondioxide) and pollution of water resourcesfrom chemicals that are needed for crush-ing earth layers, this only moves theproblem around and may actually aggra-vate unsustainability, particularly in placeswith acute water shortages.

It is important to note that hierarchical andmarket governance mechanisms often fail whenthey are applied to wicked problems (Meuleman2008: 348). Hierarchies are based on theassumption that there are clearly defined prob-lems and that can be solved through a clear lineof command. The ‘invisible hand’ of markets isexpected to solve problems when suitableincentives and instruments are in place. In prac-tice, the invisible hand often turns out to be anillusion because most ‘markets’ related to envi-ronmental management, e.g. carbon markets, arecreated and regulated top down. While hierar-chies and markets can lose their grip on wickedproblems, networked governance more easilyaccepts the often chaotic and unpredictablereality of sustainability governance (Meuleman2012: 42).

Doubts about the suitability of metagover-nance and other governance theories for ‘wickedproblems’ should be mentioned. Metagovernanceis based on the assumption that governmentsrespond to sustainability challenges by makingtheir policy-making processes more inclusive,using participatory approaches. However,Mathijs (2008) argues that ‘wicked’ problemssuch as climate change cannot be dealt with inparticipatory ways as conflict avoidance andcompromise solutions between diverse actorsoften result in incremental change. What is nee-ded instead are more radical changes and thusalso different change models to deal with wickedsustainability challenges (ibid.).

2.3.2 The Framework Conditionsfor Metagovernance

Meuleman (2008) studied case studies in whichmetagovernance occurred and found five frame-work conditions for metagovernance.

The first framework condition is the culture,traditions and history of the administrative andsocietal system as the ideal-typical governancestyles hierarchy, market and network are based oncultural theory and can be seen as cultures or waysof life (Thompson et al. 1990: 1, 5).14 In allinvestigated administrative systems, the firstreflex was to try this underlying ‘default style’ thatfits with a particular culture style, which was, forexample, market governance in the USA and theUK, hierarchy in France and Germany and net-work governance in the Netherlands. Other styleswere only applied when the default style wasinappropriate.

The second framework condition Meule-man found was the personal conviction ofpoliticians or public managers. As successfulmetagovernors, they possessed a distinct logic of

14The three socially active ways of life of Thompson et al.(1990) show quite similar values and preferences as thethree ideal-typical governance styles. Hierarchism, egal-itarianism and individualism are three ‘ways of life’ incultural theory, and regarding social coordination, theyare analogous to hierarchical, network and market gov-ernance, respectively. Like the three governance styles,the three ways of life compete with each other, often in ahostile way. On the other hand, they complete oneanother, and they therefore continue to coexist. ‘That whatwe today define as free societies—those with the rule oflaw, alternation in office, and the right to criticise—are aproduct of the interpenetration of hierarchism, individu-alism, and egalitarism’ (Thompson et al. 1990: 50, 257).The two other, not socially active ‘ways of life’ (fatalismand autonomism), are not separate governance styles, andneither is anarchy. Some scholars use anarchical modelsof political structure in order to argue that states are themost important units of analysis, and to understand theirbehaviour one has to look at the anarchical structure of theinternational system due to the lack of a higher authority(‘world government’) above the state. States act in theirself-interest and will only cooperate if it is in their‘national interest’. The anarchical structure of interna-tional politics for them is the reason why it is so difficultto make progress in actual practice on issues like climatechange which most governments actually agree on inprinciple (ibid.).


action, which consists of three qualifications andtwo factors for how they dealt with the situation.

The three key qualifications for successfulmetagovernors that Meuleman identified were:

– Discretion (or ‘agency’—one has to be ableand be allowed to do what is necessary and beprepared to use this discretion up to itslimits);

– Willingness (the intention, drive or readinessof an actor to reflect on what is the bestgovernance mix according to the situation);and

– Capability (the responsible public managerswere capable of taking multiple perspectives,taking a helicopter view).

The first factor is dealing with the frameworkconditions offered by the governance environment.

The second factor comprises the applicationof three intervention strategies:

(1) Combining styles: Sometimes, one style wasused to solve conflicts and another todevelop better solutions. It may be possibleto deploy all three governance styles at thesame time. For example, hierarchies can beuseful for structuring networks and to safe-guard outcomes. Network governance canbring legitimacy, and marketing can be usedto ensure public awareness.

(2) Switching from one style to another.(3) Maintenance, for example, introducing hier-

archical elements like ‘house rules’ in anetwork to improve its functioning.

The third framework condition regardedsocietal expectations of the role(s) of govern-mental organizations: Civil society might lobbyfor network arrangements, whereas enterprisestypically strive for a combination of market andhierarchical governance.

The fourth framework condition concernedorganizational characteristics: For example,the organizational culture may be ‘open’ or‘closed’, ‘professional’ or ‘task-oriented’, and thedominant style of leadership may be ‘commandand control’, ‘coaching’ or ‘enabling’.

The fifth framework condition was the typeof problem (the ‘policy’ dimension): Thiscodetermines which style would serve best as thedominant style. If the policy problem is definedas an urgent matter (a crisis or emergency), therationale is to choose a hierarchical approach; ifit is a routine issue that should be dealt with asefficiently as possible, market governance seemsto work best, and for wicked problems, networkgovernance mostly is appropriate. A metagover-nance approach deliberately takes a situationalview, determining what would be the most suit-able governance approach on the basis or a rangeof factors (Meuleman 2008).15 Identifying, uti-lizing and counterbalancing modalities in the‘conventional’ modes of governance are crucialin this context.

2.3.3 The Benefits ofMetagovernancefor the SDGs

Ideally, metagovernance improves democraticdecision-making and participation, steering orthe coordination of collective action through(a combination of) different forms of governance.Metagovernance can improve coherence betweenincreasingly fragmented forms of governance, asnew governance bodies are created at differentscales and with different mixes of policy man-dates (Haughton and Allmendinger 2008).16

In contrast to other governance models,metagovernance has a better potential to coordi-nate in a context-specific manner, because it cantake a situational view, take local concerns intoaccount and determine what is ‘best’ on the basisof a range of different factors (institutional,

15Lund et al. (2012) show how Danish municipalitiesadapt to climate change and how added value can beachieved by a change of governance modes. According tothe authors, collaboration and metagovernance were forthe aid of the municipalities, stimulated intermunicipaland cross-sectoral collaboration and ultimately producedadaptation measures with added value.16Examples of new institutions are the creation of theDepartment of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) inthe UK and of the Ministry of Climate, Energy andBuildings in Denmark.

2.3 Metagovernance 31

environmental, social, etc.) (Meuleman 2008). Itis the coordination potential of metagovernancethat can make it valuable for addressing thecomplexity of sustainable development.

Pluralism and keeping different options openin order to be adaptable are key concerns forpolicy-makers when they design metagovernancearrangements. Meuleman sees that the question‘what is the most effective architecture for cli-mate politics?’ in the context of metagovernanceis too often framed under the assumption thatthere is only one solution to the challenge ofclimate change, which is often hierarchical andlegally binding.17 Such an approach underesti-mates the ways in which hierarchical, market andnetwork styles of governance can complementeach other. Metagovernance can provide moreclarity in this regard.

Finally, it is important to understand theimpacts of and trade-offs between different gov-ernance styles on sustainability transitions.Trutnevyte et al. (2015) analyse pathways fordecarbonization based on the market, hierarchicaland networked/civil society-led governance nar-ratives. They demonstrate that a market-ledenergy transition has the lowest investmentcosts, but this comes at the expense of certaintyover reaching specific emissions and renewableenergy targets. Steering by government wouldincrease the likelihood of achieving a low-carbonand secure energy system and would simultane-ously reduce total system costs in the long term(but at higher investment levels). A society-ledenergy transition would involve higher invest-ment and total system costs, but would ensurewider participation of society (ibid.).

2.4 Polycentricity

Polycentric governance means that there are‘many centres of decision-making that are for-mally independent of each other’ (Ostrom et al.1961: 831). Polycentric governance systems canbe defined as ‘complex, modular systems where

governance units with different purposes, orga-nizations and spatial locations interact to formtogether systems characterized by many degreesof freedom at different levels’ (Pahl-Wostl 2009:357). In a truly polycentric system, responsibili-ties at different governmental levels are tailoredto match the scale of the public services theyprovide (Ostrom 2009a). Ostrom observed that‘[global] solutions, negotiated at a global level—if not backed up by a variety of efforts atnational, regional and local levels—are notguaranteed to work effectively’ (ibid.: 4).Decentralized centres of authority can organizecollective action successfully to deal with publicgoods (Poteete et al. 2010) when they operatecoherently as a system. Global Regimes (e.g., fordeforestation) need support ranging fromnational implementing legislation to subnationalmonitoring and enforcement. Thus, effectiveglobal governance institutions are necessarilypolycentric in nature.

Polycentricity applies both to the ‘horizontal’proliferation of actors at the global level and tothe distribution of actors across different gover-nance ‘levels’ and ‘scales’. Because much of thechallenge of promoting the SDGs ends up beingabout the cross-level phenomena that character-ize interactive social and environmental phe-nomena, the complexity of global environmentalchange, and in particular climate change, neces-sitates analysis processes at lower levels of socialorganization and across different governancelevels (Karlsson 2000). Polycentric systems tendto provide more opportunities for experimenta-tion and learning to improve policies over time,and they improve communications and interac-tions to help build trust needed for increasedcooperation. Thus, polycentricity can enhanceinnovation, trustworthiness, levels of cooperationand the achievement of more effective andequitable outcomes for the SDGs at multiplescales. However, disaggregating environmentalpolitics and dividing responsibilities can carryrisks for political accountability and the effec-tiveness of governance.

Polycentricity reflects the fact that, although achallenge like climate change is a ‘global’ prob-lem, it is the cumulative result of diverse actions

17‘If you only have a hammer, you tend to see everyproblem as a nail’ (attributed to Abraham Maslow).


and decisions at multiple scales (Monkelbaan2015). Action on abating emissions similarlyneeds to be taken at multiple levels and scales(Kates and Wilbanks 2003). Moreover, polycen-tric approaches to climate and energy governanceare expected to offer an equitable, inclusive,informative, accountable, protective and adapt-able framework for promoting renewable energyand energy efficiency, fighting energy poverty,reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improvingenergy security (Sovacool 2010). In this context,polycentricity can be a useful concept for under-standing and improving efforts to implement theSDGs in specific situations. Along the idea ofpolycentricity, two frameworks were developedwhich can provide a starting point for governanceand policy-making analysis: The InstitutionalAnalysis and Development framework (IAD) andthe social–ecological systems (SES) framework.The Institutional Analysis and Development(IAD) framework is a systematic method foranalysing policy functions and for understandingthe ways institutions operate and change over aperiod of time (McGinnis 2011). The IADframework (see Fig. 2.5) assigns many relevantexplanatory factors and variables related to insti-tutional behaviour to categories and locates thesecategories within a foundational structure of log-ical relationships.

The social–ecological systems (SES) frame-work is an effort to revise the IAD framework inorder to give equal attention to the biophysical

and ecological foundations of institutional sys-tems. The SES framework also attempts to rem-edy the IAD framework’s failure to account forthe role of power, history and environmentaldiscourses in shaping local policies and subse-quent environmental outcomes.

2.5 Network Governance

Network governance deserves more attention asone of the governance modes in metagovernanceand as an upcoming mode of governance that isexpressed in transition theory and polycentricity.In the context of complex, interconnected andadaptive challenges related to implementing theSDGs (see Fig. 2.6), insights from networkgovernance could contribute to less formalisedforms of governance and multilevel analyses(e.g. by Ostrom 2009b; and Ekstrom and Young2009).

The rise of network governance is expected tocontinue, accelerate and spread geographicallyover the next few decades (European Union2012). The network society will become a globalreality in which international, transnational andtrans-local relations will coexist in a persistentprocess of globalization (ibid.). Therefore, it istimely to assess how networks can be bestdesigned or modified to contribute to achievingthe SDGs.

Policy Reform

Informa on

flow

Learning

Condi ons

Evalua on

Criteria Socioeconomic

Condi ons

Biophysical Environment

Ins tu onalArrangements

Actors

Ac onSitua ons

Outcomes

Context Ac on ArenaPa erns of Interac on

Fig. 2.5 Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework (Based on Ostrom et al. 1994: 37)

2.4 Polycentricity 33

The following network characteristics can bederived from the different definitions and insightsfrom governance, policy and complexity theory,which are of relevance for the creation of ananalytical framework:

• The network structure consists of relativelystable and mutually dependent relationships;

• A variety of actors is involved that are inter-dependent but autonomous;

• Actors share common purposes and frame-works and share the aim to govern;

• There can be flexible and creative adaptationto changing environments;

• Network policy processes are complexbecause of the variety of actors; and

• An exchange is taking place both within thenetwork (flows of energy, information,finance and ideas) and between the networkand its environment (Castells 2004: 36).

Network theory pays attention to multiple,partially overlapping or disconnected,decision-making arenas, and to the different rolesthat governmental actors can take up (Klijn and

Koppenjan 2000). As network theory has beendeveloped within the domain of public manage-ment, public policy and political sciences, itgives special attention to the political aspectssuch as the use of power and the position ofpoliticians in networks. Effective network gov-ernance requires interactive learning18 by andbetween all of these stakeholders because each ofthem has only a limited view of the whole andrestricted capacity to influence outcomes (Smithand Stirling 2007). Social network analysis19

(SNA) adds one aspect to the abovementioned

Fig. 2.6 SDGs as a network of targets (Source Le Blanc 2015)

18Including second-order or ‘double-loop’ learning(Argyris 1976) and generative learning (Senge 1990).19In social network analysis, the measurement ofbetweenness centrality is used to identify individualparticipants that occupy a bridging position (‘leaders’).Betweenness centrality is the number of times that anactor connects two nodes which would otherwise beunconnected. This actor brings diversity and new ideas toa network, but might feel torn between different elementsand might feel forced to take sides. Degree centrality isthe number of times a given actor is connected to othernodes. High degree centrality actors are important tomobilise the network, bring diverse stakeholders togetherand diffuse information.


definitions that is relevant, i.e. the relationbetween the network and individual actions ofthe actors in the network (Thompson, 2003).

2.5.1 Network Governanceand the (Re)scalingof SustainabilityGovernance

The dynamics that are involved in governancefor achieving (as opposed to designing) theSDGs often appear as global but in reality takeplace at scales that traditionally have beenunderstood as the national and the subnational(e.g. networks that enable cities to cooperateglobally) (Sassen 2002; Bulkeley et al. 2014).Analysis only based on a geographical scale (e.g.local–national–regional–global) seems opposedto understanding societies as dynamic andprocess-based (Swyngedouw 2004: 26). Instead,scalar configurations are also the outcome ofsocio-spatial processes that organize and regulatesocial power relations (Smith 1993; Swynge-douw 1996). Environmental movements, forexample, can mobilize local issues into politicalstrategies at higher scales. At the same time,environmental problems of scale arise due tomismatching spatial relations between and scalardimensions20 of biophysical processes, adminis-trative structures and procedures or individualpreferences (Moss and Newig 2010; Görg andRauschmayer 2009)

An important barrier to sustainability gover-nance is the scalar mismatch that can occurbetween the scales and levels where institutionsare established at and the levels at which driversand barriers to governance are identified (ibid.).For example, global institutions lack the mandateto restrict emissions of intensive industries at thenational level. Secondly, stakeholders at levelsthat do have capacity and legitimacy for sus-tainability governance refrain from taking action.

For example, the WTO has not provided clarityon the possibility to distinguish between ‘high’-and ‘low’-carbon production and processingmethods (PPMs) in policies such as border car-bon measures on imports of carbon intensivelyproduced goods (Holzer 2014).

The idea of polycentricity (also see Box 2.1above) fits well with the observation that thepractice and study of global environmental poli-tics and governance have been ‘dramatically’rescaled over the past decades (Andonova andMitchell 2010). The rescaling of global envi-ronmental politics and governance can bringalong power dynamics as these issues shifted.

(1) Horizontally across regional and sectoralorganizations and networks (cf. the idealtypes of hierarchical, market and networkgovernance styles in metagovernance);

(2) Horizontally towards new issues and policyareas (e.g. trade, climate change and avia-tion); and

(3) Vertically towards more local or moresupranational settings (rescaling).

Benefits of the rescaling of sustainabilitygovernance and of polycentricity in general are:

• More diversity of and innovation in environ-mental policy and management;

• Increased exchange of practices, ideas andstrategies across different problems, localitiesand sectors;

• Better fits between the scales of problemsbeing addressed and the solutions developedto address them (e.g. local learning andadaptation) (Andonova and Mitchell 2010);

• Local lessons are more likely to be showcasedand diffused through transnational networks;in general, polycentric approaches providegreater opportunity for experimentation,choice, and learning (Ostrom 2009b);

• Decentralized jurisdictions better reflect theheterogeneous preferences among citizens,(Hooghe and Marks 2001); and

• More ‘polycentric’ structures and balancebetween bottom-up and top-down approaches(also called ‘vertical integration’) have turned

20A scalar dimension is generally seen as an analyticaldimension of a problem under study, e.g. the biophysicaland the institutional scalar dimension. A scalar level is aparticular level on a scalar dimension, e.g. a municipalityin a political-administrative system.

2.5 Network Governance 35

out to lead to higher adaptive capacity andsustainability of a resource governanceRegime (Pahl-Wostl 2009).

Global governance architectures21 are frag-mented both vertically (between different levelsof political authority) and horizontally (amongdifferent countries, sectors and jurisdictions andtheir institutions and rule-making systems) (Zelliand van Asselt 2013; also see Sect. 3.1.3).

The invisibility, transience and process-basednature of network governance may contribute tothe problem-solving capacity (effectiveness) ofnetworks. However, these features can affect thelegitimacy and representativeness of governance(Hajer and Versteeg 2008).

2.5.2 Transnational GovernanceNetworks

Transnational networks may be understood asinformal institutions linking actors acrossnational boundaries and involving various aspectsof global governance in new and informal ways22

(Wessel 2011). Transnational networks that arefocused on topics related to the SDGs are growingrapidly. For instance, over 14,000 subnationaland non-state actors have joined internationalclimate change-related initiatives between 1990and 2012 (Andonova et al. 2014). In their trans-governmental23 form, networks exhibit ‘pattern[s] of regular and purposive relations among likegovernment units working across the borders that

divide countries from one another and thatdemarcate the ‘domestic’ from the ‘international’sphere’ (Slaughter 2004: 14).

Networks24 allow domestic officials to interactwith their foreign counterparts directly, withoutmuch supervision by foreign offices or seniorexecutive branch officials, and feature ‘looselystructured, peer-to-peer ties developed throughfrequent interaction rather than formal negotia-tion’ (Slaughter and Hale 2010: 48). This holdsin particular for networks between cities (also seeSect. 3.1.1).

Networks create a global situation, in thesense that people and institutions are ever more‘interconnected’. Types of sustainability gover-nance networks vary greatly. Advocacy networks(e.g. the Climate Action Network) are loosealliances which want to achieve a common set ofobjectives; business networks (e.g. the WorldBusiness Council for Sustainable Development—WBCSD) combine resources and capabilitiesand global public policy networks (e.g. WorldCommission on Dams and REEEP) are the col-laborations between actors from different sectors(both public and private). Government networks(e.g. the OECD or negotiating groups in theclimate negotiations) provide platforms on whichgovernments cooperate while transgovernmentalnetworks (e.g. local government). Public–privatepartnerships25 (PPPs) bring government(s),

21Governance architectures are norms, principles, regimesand other institutions in a given issue area (Biermannet al. 2009).22Hale and Held (2011: 15) see transnational governanceas ‘the processes and institutions, formal and informal,whereby rules are created, compliance is elicited, andgoods are provided in the pursuit of collective goals’when the actors involved are sub- and non-state actorsfrom different countries.23Keohane and Nye (1974: 39) defined transgovernmentalrelations as ‘direct bureaucratic contacts among govern-mental sub-units’. Such relations have the potential to‘create opportunities for international organizations toplay significant roles in world politics’ (ibid.: 42) and arean important component of international relations.

24The UN offers a platform for networks (https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships/actionnetworks) and other initiatives (https://sustainabledevelop-ment.un.org/partnership/search/?str) that are in support ofthe SDGs.25These partnerships were popular after the WSSD in2002. Recent evaluations of PPPs show that they couldbenefit from a clearer linkage to trade-offs and interna-tional agreements, measurable targets and timetables,effective leadership, improved accountability mecha-nisms, systemic review and reporting and monitoring.(Bäckstrand 2006) At the UN Secretary General's ClimateSummit in September 2014, several partnerships wereannounced. The first is a global alliance of the world’sleading consumer goods companies and producers, andmany important tropical forest countries, donor countriesand NGOs. This alliance commits to eliminate deforesta-tion from the production of agricultural commodities,such as palm oil, soy, paper and beef, no later than 2020.Unsustainable sourcing of these four commodities con-tributes to half of the world’s tropical deforestation, and


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https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnerships/actionnetworks



https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/search/?str


businesses and sometimes civil society and sci-entists together. Indeed, several targets underSDG 17 call for improved multistakeholderpartnerships (MSPs)26:

• ‘enhance the global partnership for sustain-able development complemented bymulti-stakeholder partnerships that mobilizeand share knowledge, expertise, technologiesand financial resources to support theachievement of sustainable developmentgoals (…)’ (Target 17.16)

• ‘encourage and promote effective public,public- private, and civil society partnerships,building on the experience and resourcingstrategies of partnerships’ (Target 17.17)

The Climate Knowledge and InnovationCommunity (‘Climate-KIC’) is one example of adiverse grouping that works internationally witha coalition of companies, universities, NGOs andpublic entities. The Green Growth Action

Alliance (G2A2) is a global PPP with theobjective of leveraging investment in greeninfrastructure projects and is hosted by the WorldEconomic Forum. And the UN SustainableDevelopment Solutions Network (SDSN) mobi-lizes global scientific and technological expertiseto promote practical solutions for sustainabledevelopment, including the implementation ofthe Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) andthe Paris Climate Agreement.

Waddell (2011, 2016) claims that a specifictype of inter-organizational networks—‘GlobalAction Networks’ or GANs27—represents acritical organizational innovation that is differentfrom governments, businesses and NGOs. GANsare based on (cultural) multistakeholder diver-sity, a high level of knowledge complexity andthe aim of transformational change.

2.6 Experimentalist Governancefor the SDGs

Experimentalist governance has been defined as‘a recursive process of provisional goal settingand revision based on learning from the com-parison of alternative approaches to advancingthem in different contexts’ (Sabel and Zeitlin2012: 169). It is an upcoming form of coordi-nation and governance which may be consideredpragmatic or experimentalist in the sense that itsystematically provokes doubt about its ownassumptions and practices. It accepts uncertaintyand treats all solutions as incomplete and corri-gible. It produces an ongoing reciprocal read-justment of ends and means through learningfrom committed comparison of local efforts toadvance general goals (ibid.).

Global or transnational experimentalist gov-ernance (GXG) is ‘a form of adaptive, open-ended, participatory and information-rich coop-eration in world politics’ (de Burca et al. 2013:

about 11 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions.Secondly, the Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agri-culture which is built among governments, food produc-ers, farmers, scientists, civil society, multilateralorganizations and the private sector was announced.Third, the Carbon Disclosure Standards Board alliance isa global public–private alliance that has developed acommon framework for reporting climate-related risksand performance in companies' annual reports to share-holders. Hsu et al. (2015) scrutinize the potential impactthat these partnerships can have on climate changemitigation.26Hemmati and Dodds (2017) have suggested to clearlydifferentiate between MSPs and PPPs using the followingdefinitions:

– Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) for sustainabledevelopment are specific commitments and contribu-tions, undertaken together by various partners inten-ded to support the implementation of transformationtowards sustainable development and help achieve theSustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and otherrelevant sustainable development agreements.

– Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are principallycontractual arrangements between single or severalpublic agencies (federal, state or local) and single orseveral private sector entities. Through such arrange-ments, the skills and assets of each sector (public andprivate) are shared, in delivering a service or facilityfor the use of the general public. Other stakeholdersmight be subcontractors in a PPP.

27Some of the oldest GANs are the Red Cross (withorigins in 1863), the International Labour Organization(ILO) and the International Union for the Conservation ofNature (IUCN).

2.5 Network Governance 37

4). In global experimentalist governance the localand the transnational interact through the local-ized elaboration of transnationally agreed generalnorms, subject to periodic revision in the light oflocal knowledge (ibid.). Global experimentalistgovernance affords autonomy to lower-level orlocally situated units to adjust the implementa-tion to local contexts, which leads to new formsof accountability and evaluation. Experimentalistgovernance gives structure to apparently fluidpractices of ‘network governance’.28 Some fea-tures of global experimentalist governance can befound in the SDGs (see Table 2.3).

The role of the HLPF deserves furtherexplanation at this point. The HLPF is centrally

positioned in the global governance frameworkfor the SDGs in order to ensure coherence andprovide direction. The HLPF has a broad man-date to:

• Provide political leadership and recommen-dations for sustainable development;

• Follow-up and review progress in implement-ing sustainable development commitments;

• Enhance the integration of economic, socialand environmental dimensions of sustainabledevelopment;

• Have a focused, dynamic and action-orientedagenda;

• Consider new and emerging sustainabledevelopment challenges; and

• From 2016 take on the functions of theECOSOC Annual Ministerial Reviews on theSDGs.

The HLPF must show its added value.It needs to help countries advance their own pathto sustainable development by serving as anintegrative platform for reviewing SDGs in thecontext of the 2030 Agenda, sharing experiencesand lessons learned and encouraging wide par-ticipation of both state and non-state actors. Thiswill require a very clear agenda as well as rig-orous methods of work, a robust preparatory

Table 2.3 SDGs as an example of global experimentalist governance

GXG feature Within the SDGs

Inclusive participation in anon-hierarchical process

Participants include states, local governments, companies, NGOs,development banks, international organizations.

Articulation of agreed commonproblem: open ended

There was agreement that the main problems in the world are related topoverty, peace and environmental degradation, but not on the magnitude ofthe risk or the feasibility of finding solutions in specific instances

Devolution to local actors Local actors are encouraged to implement the SDGs. Both local and nationalgovernments make plans for the SDGs

Continuous monitoring The focus of SDG monitoring will be at the national level. Complementarymonitoring will occur at regional and global levels. Moreover, each majorthematic community, such as health, education, agriculture, will mobilize,analyse and communicate data on progress towards achieving its objectives

Revision with peer review The High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) will bethe key forum for follow-up and review at the global level. The HLPFprocess can be grounded in the principle of mutual accountability and utilizethe mechanism of peer review.

Based on De Burca et al. (2014)

28Experimentalism is very similar to what Hajer (2011:43) calls ‘radical incrementalism’, which is radical interms of result and incremental in terms of processstructure. Such an approach which is based on ‘varietyand selection’ should work better than the conventionalhierarchical governance mode of ‘analysis and instruc-tion’. Just like in experimentalism, in the government inradical incrementalism does not rely on absolute controlbut puts an emphasis on learning ability, local concerns,horizontal and open governance, the innovative capacitylatent in society, dynamic regulation, and ‘releasingenergy’ at all levels of society. As such, many smallsteps may amount to a sizeable result. Fung (2004) showshow a radical incrementalist focuses on the mobilisationand empowerment of individuals and companies has ledto improvements in education and crime in Chicago.


process, a clear substantive focus and effectiveagenda setting and a long-term perspective.Strengthening the science–policy interface can behelpful and the Global Sustainable DevelopmentReport29 will play an important role in thisregard. The added value of the HLPF’s reviewmechanism would be that it could foster anintegrated nexus approach and integrateddecision-making on sustainable developmentrather than operating in traditional silos. Themain role of the HLPF should then be to reviewand promote overall progress on all SDGs as aninterlinked system. It should thus providehigh-level guidance for advancing integratedaction across the spectrum of SDGs.

The leadership challenge for the HLPF will beto work with a high level of complexity whilebuilding the necessary vision and legitimacy thatwill link SDGs more clearly and directly to theorganizational, financial and other levers. Les-sons learned on experimentalist governancecould provide useful ideas in this regard (Seth2015).

2.6.1 Putting ExperimentalistGovernance in Practice

Experimentalist governance in its most devel-oped form involves a multilevel architecture,which is open to participation of relevant stake-holders in a non-hierarchical process of decision-making (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012). The five con-stitutive elements of experimentalist governanceare linked in a deliberation-fostering, iterativecycle (see Fig. 2.7).

First, stakeholders reflect and discuss basedon a broadly shared perception of a problem.

Secondly, they articulate a framework under-standing with open-ended goals (such as makingforestry sustainable) and a combination of ‘cen-tral’ and ‘local’ units sets provisional metrics forevaluating their achievement—in consultation

with relevant stakeholders. Experimentalistactors broadly know what outcomes they desire.However, they are uncertain about how theseobjectives can be realized.

Third, local units are free to pursue thesegoals in their own way. These ‘local’ units can bepublic, private or hybrid partnerships.

Fourth, in exchange for autonomy, these unitsmust report regularly on their performance andparticipate in a peer review in which their resultsare compared with those of others. If the localunits fail to make progress against the agreedindicators, they need to demonstrate that they aretaking sufficient corrective measures, informedby the experience of their peers.

The result of reporting and peer review is thefifth step: the establishment of practices, involv-ing peer review, for revising goals, rules andpractices. This can again inform step 1, etc.,(Sabel and Zeitlin 2012).

2.6.2 Benefits of ExperimentalistGovernance for the SDGs

Experimentalist governance architectures canhave a number of significant virtues for theSDGs:

1. Iden fy Problem

2. Set Broad Goals

3. Locals Implement

4. Report & Peer

Review

5. Revision of Goals

Fig. 2.7 Experimentalist governance cycle (Based onSabel and Zeitlin 2012)

29https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/globalsdreport.

2.6 Experimentalist Governance for the SDGs 39

https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/globalsdreport

1. They accommodate diversity in adaptinggeneral goals to varied local contexts, ratherthan imposing uniform, one-size-fits-allsolutions.

2. In line with pragmatism (e.g. Dewey), theparticipation of stakeholders contributes toprocesses of social learning through thesharing of relevant information and theweighing of competing arguments. Stake-holders provide a mechanism for coordinatedlearning from implementation and localexperimentation, up to the point that Sabeland Zeitlin (2012) describe experimentalistgovernance as ‘a machine for learning fromdiversity’.

3. Both the goals themselves and the means forachieving them are explicitly conceived asprovisional and subject to revision in the lightof experience, so that problems identified inone phase of implementation can be correctedin the next.

4. The participation of civil society and otherstakeholders provides transparency. Coupledwith regular peer review, this can also pro-vide at least some protection against thedanger that experimentalist Regimes aredominated by powerful interests (Monkel-baan, 2015).

The pluralist and deliberative aspects ofexperimentalist decision-making structures, withmultiple units checking, monitoring and learningfrom each other’s’ performance, replace the out-dated ‘principal–agent’ model30 and ‘command-and-control’ regulation that are widely acknowl-edged to fail in a fast-moving world. Because oftheir reflexive, adaptive and self-revising capacity

and deliberately corrigible design, experimentalistgovernance architectures can be expected to copebetter with volatile and turbulent environments(ibid.). In such environments, strategic uncertaintymeans that effective solutions to problems canonly be determined in the course of pursuing them,while multipolar power distributions mean allactors need to take the views of others into account(Sabel and Zeitlin 2012). Overall, the pooling ofinformation between units facilitates a process ofsocial learning, such that governance is recon-ceptualized by experimentalists as a form ofproblem-solving. Experimentalist governance canbe attractive where detailed knowledge on how toimplement the SDGs is lacking as itspower-sharing and delegation of authority to localunits can generate alternatives and localinnovation.

In contrast to standard international relationstheory, where the formation of a comprehensiveinternational Regime requires hegemonic poweror the agreement among the key actors, experi-mentalist governance in fact depends on strategicuncertainty and diffused power relations (e.g.through power-sharing). In this situation, actorsdo not know their precise goals or how best toachieve them in advance, but must discover bothin the course of problem-solving (Monkelbaan2015).

Experimentalist governance processes aredeliberative in the sense that they encourage thequestioning of settled practices, the reconsidera-tion of related interests, and because ‘questionsare decided by argument about the best ways toaddress problems, not simply exertions of power,expressions of interest, or bargaining from powerpositions on the basis of interests’ (Cohen andSabel 2005: 779).

Central to experimentalism is the idea ofdemocratic destabilization. Democratic destabi-lization refers to the recognition that many actorsresist change, and that the destabilization ofentrenched forms of authority should be theresult of transparency and both penalty defaultsand deliberative processes. The assumption is

30The principal–agent problem, in political science andeconomics, (also known as agency dilemma or the agencyproblem) occurs when one person or entity (the ‘agent’) isable to make decisions on behalf of, or that impact,another person or entity: the ‘principal’. This dilemmaexists in circumstances where agents (e.g. politicians) aremotivated to act in their own best interests, which arecontrary to those of their principals (e.g. voters), and is anexample of moral hazard.


that given strategic uncertainty in a crisis situa-tion, the parties will prefer joint exploration tosubmission to external forces (e.g. judges in alawsuit) that no one truly controls (Sabel andZeitlin 2012). The process of peer review inexperimentalist governance in itself can havedestabilizing effects, as it establishes a contestbetween competing sources of authority. Thebenefit of experimentalist governance is that thiscompetition undercuts the threat that a unifiedcorpus of policy elite rules and defends the statusquo. Experimentalist governance is thus bestseen as a method that allows scientists andtechnocratic experts to play a part in regulatoryfunctions but only alongside stringent processesof peer review and oversight by other actors.

2.6.3 Conditions for ExperimentalistSDG Governance

Experimentalist governance of the SDGs can bebased on a number of premises.

Firstly, governments formulated a compre-hensive set of guidelines at negotiations on theSDGs and plan to effectively monitor compliancewith them.

A second condition is that a broad and ‘deep’civil society/business consortium for the SDGs isformed. Experimentalism works best when cen-tral actors have limited foresight and share a thinconsensus that leaves open important questionsof implementation (De Burca et al. 2014).Therefore, cooperation of civil society andbusiness actors either as agenda setters and/orproblem solvers will normally be essential for thesuccess of experimentalist SDG governance.

Third, the SDGs may have been defined ingeneral terms at a global level, but implementationwill be needed at other levels as well based on theresetting of complementary goals in the light ofrigorously evaluated experience, rather than onlyfrom targets set ex ante (de Burca et al. 2013).

Finally, the SDGs must not become a matter ofhigh politics. Matters of high politics will need tobe depoliticized in order to fit into experimentalistapproaches to implementing the SDGs (ibid.).

2.7 Chapter Conclusions: BridgingGovernance Theories That AreRelevant for the SDGs

In my experience one has to construct a kind ofconceptual architecture that encompasses (as doesa building!) many diverse elements. The criticalchallenge here is the organizing logic.—Sassen (2011)

In line with Sassen’s quote, this chapter hastried to demonstrate the value, originality andrichness of diverse elements, theories and con-cepts that are involved in the rich academicliterature on sustainability governance and thatare relevant for achieving the SDGs.

The theories prima facie share some basicfeatures. Most obviously, transition manage-ment, metagovernance, network governance,polycentricity and experimentalist governancecan be specifically applied to sustainabilitygovernance. They also have in common thatthey can tend towards critical realism, the mainepistemological approach in this book.

Each of the presented sustainability gover-nance bodies of theory is based on the ambition toembrace a number of ‘sub’-theories. They are allrelatively novel and dynamic fields of research,and all of them provide innovative insights intocomplex processes of systemic change charac-terized by multiple actors, diverse uncertaintiesand persistent problems of unsustainability.Transition management explicitly has transdisci-plinary ambitions, and the other theories alsoseem open to transdisciplinary insights. Throughtransdisciplinary research and in boundary orga-nizations (see Sect. 3.2.2), researchers andstakeholders from diverse sectors of society, forexample, can meet and exchange information,which opens up opportunities for analysis from ametagovernance perspective. Metagovernancemust take into account, that each of the sectorsorganizes knowledge and action according toindividual time scales, categories, priorities, etc.

In terms of global perspective, in particular intransition studies, there are major literature gaps.However, just like the other theories, there is noreason why transition management could not beopen to global developments and participation in

2.6 Experimentalist Governance for the SDGs 41

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order to make it relevant in the light of globalchange related to the SDGs. New modes ofgovernance need to reflect the increasingly mul-tiscalar, multilevel and multiactor realities ofgovernance for the SDGs, especially for thosesustainability challenges that result from aggre-gates of several local and regional actions.31

2.7.1 Comparing the Theories in ThisChapter

The theories analysed in this chapter divergefrom each other in some respects such as thecentrality of governmental actors, the manage-ability of change, the degree to which they focuson sustainability transitions and their disciplinaryroots. It could be argued though that insightsfrom the different theories could cross-fertilize tofill substantive intellectual lacunae, and cantogether strengthen an integrative conceptual-ization of governance for the SDGs.

Further, transition management lacks aproper view on cultural sensitivities, the role ofindividual agency as a potential driver of tran-sitions, and the differences between network,hierarchical and market-based governance sys-tems (as metagovernance does). Transitionmanagement together with network governance

has been criticized for its potentially elitistcharacter and its problems of democratic legiti-macy and accountability (Khan 2013). Whiletransition studies accept the concept of multi-level governance up to some point, metagover-nance and experimentalist governance couldgain in clarity from making multilevel gover-nance more explicit and polycentricity can offeruseful insight for that. Experimentalist gover-nance is focused on bottom-up action that is inline with the idea of Niches in transition man-agement, but it often overlooks the importanceof dominant Regime actors and the governancecontext.

Polycentricity and experimentalist governanceboth incorporate the reality of network gover-nance but still have to clearly point out hownetwork governance interacts with hierarchicaland market governance styles (metagovernance).

The difference between transition manage-ment as a mode of governance and experimen-talist governance is that transition managementtends to shield radical innovations from politicaldebate and established Regimes, depoliticizinggovernance and effectively reducing its com-plexity. Experimentalism could be used to rem-edy transition management’s technocratic viewof society. Here, experimentalism’s idea ofdemocratic destabilization can be used forestablishing relations of legitimate authority bykeeping decision-making open to new partici-pants (transition management’s ‘Niches’) andgenerating opportunities for problem-solving.

Whereas for Ostrom’s polycentricity localknowledge often remains tacit and actors engagein tit-for-tat bargaining strategies, the organiza-tion of global experimentalist governance obli-gates local actors to explain the reasons for theirchoices and typically to justify outcomes in termsof SDG standards, indicators, and metrics agreedon (and periodically revised) by all.32 (Monkel-baan 2015).

31Biodiversity and forestry (both in SDG 15) are exam-ples of local issues in a substantive sense, but globalgovernance approaches are used to address them. Illegaltimber trade, for example, is addressed through the EU’sForest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT)and trade in endangered species through the Conventionon International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).Target 15.7 is ‘Take urgent action to end poaching andtrafficking of protected species of flora and fauna andaddress both demand and supply of illegal wildlifeproducts’,. and Target 15.c is ‘Enhance global supportfor efforts to combat poaching and trafficking of protectedspecies, including by increasing the capacity of localcommunities to pursue sustainable livelihood opportuni-ties’. Although trade related to forestry and endangeredspecies is an international issue, the biodiversity loss andforest clearing that these instruments address are mostvisible locally. Deforestation can also have globalimpacts, e.g. on climate change (SDG 13). (Lawrenceand Vandecar 2015).

32Gold Standard, for example, introduced ‘Gold Standardfor the Global Goals’: https://www.goldstandard.org/articles/gold-standard-global-goals.


https://www.goldstandard.org/articles/gold-standard-global-goals


The five theories make different assumptionsabout the nature of change. They variously focuson changes in understandings, networks, struc-tures, technologies, policies, problem domains orentire societal domains. The change that thesetheories envisage can be directed towards dealingwith specific SDGs or towards the wider goal ofachieving the SDG framework as a whole. Tran-sition management is one of the more ambitiousand normative theories, focusing on sustainabilitythrough structural changes in entire societal

domains. Metagovernance, network governanceand polycentricity depend on a more static viewregarding social and policy changes. These theo-ries could benefit from the dynamism of transitionmanagement, which is focused on long-termchanges (one or more generations) based on itssystemic ideas about nonlinear changes.

Figure 2.8 and Table 2.4 compare the theoriesmentioned in this chapter on a number of coreaspects and indicate the main gaps in the litera-ture for each theory.

Transi on Management- Long-term, itera ve, structural change- Top-down management can enable Niches- Interac on between Niches, Regime and Landscape- Gaps: lacks global perspec ve and metagovernance

Metagovernance- Coordina on of markets-hierarchies-networks- Systemic interdependency and complexity- Innova ve , legi mate and equitable approaches- Gap: lacks policy dimension and mul level + dynamic aspects

Experimentalist Governance- Bo om-up, itera ve- Complex, diffused, diverse- Foster delibera on, coherence and par cipa on- Gap: lacks context, regime and mul level dimensions

Networked governance/Polycentricity

- Distributed, pluriform/diverse- Requires coherence and oversight- Process management enabling - par cipa on- Gap: lacks metagovernance and dynamic aspects

Integra ve Sustainability Governance

Fig. 2.8 Key properties of the main theories that form the basis for the integrative sustainability governanceframework

2.7 Chapter Conclusions: Bridging Governance Theories … 43

Table

2.4

Key

prop

ertiesof

themaintheories

that

form

thebasisfortheIntegrativeSu

stainabilityGov

ernancefram

ework(con

tinued)

Theory

Natureof

change

Chang

etrajectory

Relationship

betweenactors

Steering

/influence

Leading

actors

Roleforgo

vt.

Success

Transition

managem

ent

Lon

g-term

structural

change

S-shaped

curvewith

phases

(over

several

decades)

Con

flictsin

short-term

,long

-term

shared

goalsof

sustainability

Creating

transitio

narenas,

Niche

managem

ent

Transition

manager,vision

ary

inno

vators

Transition

manager,

facilitator

Moresustainable

societal

domain

Metagov

ernance

Balance

networks,

hierarchies,

markets

Lon

g-term

throug

hsuccessive

roun

ds

System

icinterdependencies,

complexity

Coo

rdinationand

facilitation,

oversigh

t

System

smanager

with

networkof

markets,

hierarchies,

networks

Facilitate

inno

vativ

esolutio

ns,keep

oversigh

tand

coherence

Legitimateand

equitablebalance

betweennetwork,

hierarchyandmarket

Polycentric

governance

ofpu

blic

good

s

Distributed

governance

Pluriform?

Sustainable

interdependencies,

coherence

Diffused

across

levelsandwith

inlevels

Diverse

Facilitate

inno

vativ

esolutio

ns,keep

oversigh

tand

coherence

Distributed

yet

coherent

governance

Exp

erim

entalist

governance

Bottom-up,

iterativ

eAccording

toexperimental

cycle

Com

plexity

Diffused

Diverse

Facilitate

Deliberative,

participative,

coherent,effective

Network

governance

Chang

ein

policy

networks

Successive

roun

dsSu

stainable

interdependencies,

overlapp

ing

networks

Network

constitution,

process

managem

ent

Network/process

manager

(central

node)

Partner,process

manager

Participation


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3Laying Out Actors and Dynamicsin the 2030 Agenda for SustainableDevelopment

AbstractThis chapter explores the question “who isinvolved in governance for the SDGs?” and isbased on the analytical elements from Chap. 2.In that sense, this chapter is a bridge betweenthe theories in the previous chapter and thespecific case studies in the next chapter. Thischapter lays out the wide range of actors (in thesense of stakeholders), interests and discoursesthat need to be involved in achieving the SDGs.The interviews and observations that thischapter is based on shed a critical light on thefunctioning of and interaction between differ-ent stakeholders involved in governance for theSDGs. Two main types of actors and institu-tions were identified early on this research. Thefirst type traditionally operates at one level on aspecific geographical or jurisdictional scale(local governments, national governments andinternational organizations) as discussed inSect. 3.1. The second type typically operatesin a non-traditional, ‘multilevel’ mode (e.g.networks and corporations) or is not limited toact at specific levels (e.g. academics andpowerful individuals) and is described inSect. 3.2.

KeywordsStakeholders � Cities � GovernmentsInternational organizations � Media

Academia � Corporations � Non-governmentalorganizations � Citizens

3.1 The Role of TraditionallyHierarchical, Single-LevelActors in SDG Governance

3.1.1 Local Governments and Cities:SDG Action on the Ground

The twenty-first century will not be dominated byAmerica or China, Brazil or India, but by the city.In an age that appears increasingly unmanageable,cities rather than states are becoming the islands ofgovernance on which the future world order willbe built. Khanna (2010)

The importance of cities for sustainabledevelopment

The number of inhabitants of cities will doublefrom about 3.5 billion in 2015 to 7 billion by2050 (UN-HABITAT 2014). By 2025, cities willneed to construct floor space equivalent to 85%of all of today’s residential and commercialbuilding stock (McKinsey 2014). This meansthat urban spaces could require an additional200 million hectares of land (the size of Mexico)within the next 40 years, creating a major impact


49

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in the environment and availability of resourceslike arable land (UNEP 2012). Today, citiesalready generate 80% of global GDP (WEF2014) and account for about 70% of global GHGemissions. Local authorities undertake more than70% of GHG mitigation and up to 90% of cli-mate adaptation measures (UNDP 2009).Therefore, former UN Secretary-General BanKi-Moon proclaimed that “our struggle for glo-bal sustainability will be won or lost in cities”.1

Projects and initiatives at the subnational levelhave filled some of the ‘governance gap’ that hasbeen caused by the failure of national govern-ments to show the required level of ambition,especially when it comes to climate change.Examples include ‘unilateral’ reductions at themunicipal2 level, and emissions trading schemesat the subnational level (e.g. the California ETS),3

British Columbia’s carbon tax, Melbourne’s goalto become carbon neutral by 2025 and Tokyo’sETS. A more recent example is that when USPresident Trump decided to withdraw the USAfrom the Paris Climate Agreement, an alliance ofcities, states, universities and corporations (the‘We Are Still In’ Alliance4) was quickly formedto declare that they will continue to support cli-mate action to meet the Paris Agreement. The

schism between federal and city governancebecame clear when President Trump mentionedthat he ‘was elected to represent the people ofPittsburgh, not Paris’ during his announcement topull out of the Paris Agreement, and the mayor ofPittsburgh signed up to the We Are Still In alli-ance.5 This shows that when national govern-ments do not take ambitious action on climatechange, subnational governments may still beable to manoeuvre within existing powerconfigurations.

Cities are actively involved in sustainabilitytransitions. They often have the professionalcapabilities, financial resources and the respon-sibility to deliver public services and a highquality of life (Costanza et al. 2014).6 to theircitizens. Power will increasingly be concentratedin cities, and city-level institutions have thecapacity to be flexible, innovative and dynamicand effectively involve multiple stakeholders ingovernance (WEF 2015).

Urban-scale policy options have differentleverage effects; i.e. cities have different amountof influence on the drivers of GHG emissions.For example, macro-level drivers such as eco-nomic geography are difficult to influencethrough policy options and decision-making, butit has an enormous influence on GHG emissions.At the same time, the emissions impact of moremicro-scale policies such as urban renewables ismore limited. The largest leverage on urbanGHG emissions from urban-scale decision-

1http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sgsm14249.doc.htmThe critical role of local governments in sustainabledevelopment has also been acknowledged in paragraph28 of Agenda 21: ‘the participation and cooperation oflocal authorities will be a determining factor infulfilling [Agenda 21’s] objectives. Local authoritiesconstruct, operate and maintain economic, social andenvironmental infrastructure, oversee planning pro-cesses, establish local environmental policies andregulations, and assist in implementing national andsub-national environmental policies. As the level ofgovernance closest to the people, they play a vital rolein educating, mobilizing and responding to the publicto promote sustainable development’.2The terms ‘municipal’ and ‘local’ government are oftenused interchangeably. A municipality is a form of localgovernment on an institutional scale, whereas ‘local’ perse is usually linked to a geographical scale. All munic-ipalities are a local government, but not all localgovernments are municipalities. A city can consist ofmultiple municipalities.3Also see http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm.4http://wearestillin.com/.

5Also see https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/eco-nomy/in-the-paris-of-the-appalachians-theyre-not-buying-trumps-climate-talk/2017/06/06/6f3ddd8a-49f9-11e7-bc1b-fddbd8359dee_story.html?utm_term=.be8868cb8a83.6Recently, there has been a shift within the field ofsustainable development indicators from traditionalapproaches of capturing isolated environmental, socialand economic phenomena towards measures that focus onthe goals of humanity’s efforts for sustainability, whichinclude ‘well-being’, ‘quality of life’ and ‘happiness’(European Commission 2007; Meadows 1998; Stiglitzet al. 2009). SDG 3 aims to ‘Ensure healthy lives andpromote well-being for all at all ages’. Improved humanwell-being and quality of life have also been suggested asthe overarching goal of the SDGs. See, e.g. https://www.thesolutionsjournal.com/article/an-overarching-goal-for-the-un-sustainable-development-goals/.

50 3 Laying Out Actors and Dynamics in the 2030 Agenda …

http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sgsm14249.doc.htm

http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm

http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm

http://wearestillin.com/

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/in-the-paris-of-the-appalachians-theyre-not-buying-trumps-climate-talk/2017/06/06/6f3ddd8a-49f9-11e7-bc1b-fddbd8359dee_story.html%3futm_term%3d.be8868cb8a83





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making thus is at the ‘meso’-scale level, forexample, improving the efficiency of equipmentused in a city, improving and integrating urbaninfrastructure and shaping urban form towardslow carbon pathways. Figure 3.1 offers a cate-gorization of urban policy intervention levels as afunction of potential impacts on emissions aswell as the degree to which policy interventionscan be implemented by urban-scale decision-making processes (IPCC 2014).

… and policy leverages by urban scale decisionmaking. Cities have little control over some of the

Cities in the 2030 Agenda: SDG 11 as the‘Urban SDG’

Against the background set out above, it is notsurprising that a full SDG is dedicated to cities.SDG 11 (also called the ‘Urban SDG’) aims to“Make cities and human settlements inclusive,safe, resilient and sustainable”. Cities can pro-vide the much-needed interlinkages and inte-grated approaches across sectors and goals, given

that cities represent a microcosm of all the otherSDGs. SDG 11 represents a pivotal step towardsthe integration of sustainable urban developmentinto the global framework for action. SDG 11 isimportant because a major obstacle to globalsustainable development in an urbanized world isthat urban policy is far too frequently pursued ina disintegrated manner. For local governmentsthat are leaders in sustainable development, theSDGs provide a platform that will allow them topush the pace of progress even further. It allowsthose cities to provide leadership for those citiesthat have started to engage in sustainable urbandevelopment more recently, and for whom theSDGs offer a blueprint for action. Figure 3.2shows the different targets under SDG 11.

SDG 11 and ‘governance’ SDGs 16 and 17

SDG 11 is linked with SDG 16 (on peaceful andinclusive societies and effective, accountableand inclusive institutions at all levels) as peaceand inclusion in urban areas are inextricably

Fig. 3.1 Hierarchy of drivers of urban GHG emissionsand policy leverages by urban-scale decision-making.Cities have little control over some of the most important

drivers of GHG emissions and have large control overcomparatively smaller drivers of emissions. Source IPCC(2014)

3.1 The Role of Traditionally Hierarchical, Single-Level … 51

linked to the transparency and accountability oflocal governments and institutions. Cities offer agreat range of opportunities for capacity buildingat all levels of government and provide platformsfor dialogue and democratic decision-making.SDG 16 calls on local governments to becomemore inclusive, participatory and transparent vis-à-vis their citizens (also see the next section onparticipatory approaches in cities). Inclusivespatial planning and urban design accompaniedby effective local institutions, for example, areimportant frameworks for a peaceful society.

SDG 11 is linked with SDG 17 (on means ofimplementation and the global partnership forsustainable development) as cities are centres ofeducation, culture, economic development andinfrastructure, and provide opportunities for

different networks and partners. Municipalcooperations with various public, private andcivil society partners can attract financial meansto implement different projects and can promotebetter inclusiveness during their implementation.Cities can take a leading role in SDG 17 bybuilding close networks with local, governmentaland international bodies, the private sector andcivil society. One upcoming example of suchnetworks is transnational city network on climatechange and sustainable development.

One way to make governance and leadershipwork for the SDGs is building in incentives forindividual leaders to step up sustainability action.Career development of local politicians, forexample, can be based on their sustainabilitytrack record. Many Indian city commissioners

Fig. 3.2 Targets under SDG 11. Source ICLEI (2015)


want to brand their city as a ‘solar city’ in orderto be recognized and receive career promotion.7

Participatory approaches in cities

Governance in cities and in neighbourhoods isunique because usually citizens and other stake-holders are relatively ‘close’ to city governors(compared with the distance they usually have tothe national government). This makes gover-nance in cities and neighbourhoods suitable forparticipatory governance approaches.

Box 3.1: Example of ParticipatoryGovernance Approach in Wind PowerDevelopment in Denmark andGermanyOne notable example of local participatorygovernance approaches to renewable energyis Denmark, where local resistance to grow-ingwind power plants often prevented furtherdevelopment in the past. Learning from theseexperiences, in 2008 the national governmentintroduced new requirements that broughtabout greater acceptance of new wind powerprojects. For example, residents are nowdirectly compensated for any loss in theirhouse value that results from the constructionof wind turbines nearby. In addition, at least20% of the shares in the project must beoffered to local residents, giving them a directstake in the investment. Finally, the commu-nity receives a direct allocation per megawattof power generated. All these measures havegreatly increased acceptance of wind farms inthe local community, as they bring directbenefits to the community and its citizens.

Also in the German Energiewende (‘en-ergy transition’) local ownership of windturbines by collectives of citizens plays animportant role. Local governments have theinstitutional capacity to identify sites forrenewable energy. This is a task that is

difficult to fulfil for the federal government ina top-downmode of governance.Knowledgeand scaling are closely linked in renewableenergy development as it is important toknow local concerns. Hundreds of localcooperatives and municipal and small-scaleproducers are now complementing the role oflarge utilities in Germany. As a result, Ger-many has also become a key producer andexporter of sustainable energy technologies(SETs), and is a key player in case study 4 ontrade in SETs in Sect. 4.4 of this book.

Transnational city networksTransnational8 cooperation is a rapidly emergingform of sustainability governance that deservesmore attention. Sassen (2011), for example, thinksthat diverse cross-border networks of global citiesare the future of global governance, and not the ‘big,slow-moving heavy dinosaurs of leading nationstates, such as the USA and China’ (Sassen 2011).9

Global initiatives like the C40 (CCLG 2017)10

indeed show that cities increasingly leave their fixedsingle-level governance mode and connect witheach other to project their interests to the nationaland the global levels. Subnational governmentshave realized that sustainable development hasinternational drivers (Bruyninckx et al. 2012).Therefore, they have to act internationally to shapethe decisions that national governments make ininternational fora but that subnational governmentshave to implement. The International Council forLocal Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), forexample, acts as the representative and focal pointfor local governments in theUNFCCCnegotiations.

7In India, the ‘Development of Solar Cities’ programme isdesigned to support cities in becoming ‘renewable energycities’ or ‘solar cities’. Also see http://mnre.gov.in/schemes/decentralised-systems/solar-cities/.

8Transnational phenomena bridge, operate or extendacross state boundaries and can involve both state andnon-state actors. Bulkeley et al. (2014), Hale and Held(2011: 15) see transnational governance as ‘the processesand institutions, formal and informal, whereby rules arecreated, compliance is elicited, and goods are provided inthe pursuit of collective goals’ when the actors involvedare sub- and non-state actors from different countries.9http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/09/theory-talk-43.html. Sassen also re-emphasized this point in a personalconversation with the author in Geneva on 3 June 2013.10http://www.c40.org/.


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http://mnre.gov.in/schemes/decentralised-systems/solar-cities/

http://mnre.gov.in/schemes/decentralised-systems/solar-cities/

http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/09/theory-talk-43.html

http://www.c40.org/

The climate negotiations in 2014 strengthenedthe momentum towards climate governance atthe city level and towards transnational networksbetween governments at the subnational level byproviding the Lima Call for Climate Action(UNFCCC 2015).11 The Lima Call declares thatsubnational and non-state actors are suitable forcatalysing and significantly enhancing nationalefforts to reduce GHG emissions and resilience toclimate change.

As such, ICLEI, its Cities for Climate Pro-tection (CCP) program, the Covenant of Mayors(European Commission 2017),12 the C40 andother initiatives focused on sustainable develop-ment and climate change and try to establish andimprove the linkages between local and interna-tional governance levels, sometimes bypassingthe national level. Cooperation between citiescan give local governments legitimization andthe opportunity to influence national and inter-national positions and policies. Other benefits ofcooperation between cities are that it can promotesustainability governance domestically in orderto let national governments take action, promotedialogue between the local and national level andempower the local governance level.

The EU seems to be furthest advanced when itcomes to experimentalist solutions in the contextof city networks due to rising strategic uncertaintyand inherent internal diversity (Sabel and Zeitlin2010). The empowerment of subnational govern-ments in the EU (e.g. through the Council of Citiesand Regions (CEMR 2014),13 the Covenant ofMayors [European Commission 2017)14 andSustainable Energy Systems in Advanced Cities(SESAC 2017)15] shows that experimentalistgovernance can go beyond an exclusive focus on

the interactions between nation states and supra-national entities. In the EU, experimentalismtransforms diversity from an obstacle to integra-tion into an asset for its advancement by enablinglocal units to learn from each other’s efforts tosolve similar problems (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012).

The relative weakening of the exclusive formalauthority of states over territory within nationalboundaries facilitates the ascendency of sub- andtransnational spaces and actors in political and civilprocesses (ibid.). In theEU, cities havebeenbuildingdirect institutional linkages with institutions inBrussels,while bypassing theMemberState nationalgovernments (Hooghe and Marks 2001). This canlead to political tensionswhen national governmentsfeel that they are losing control that they previouslyhad. However, because urban areas are fundamentalto the implementation of all 17 SDGs, the 2030Agenda for Sustainable Development in paragraph45 commits UNMember States to ‘work closely onimplementation with regional and local authorities’.

The reasons why cities get involved in interna-tional networks for climate governance lie in bothlegal requirements and mandates for subnationalgovernments and by attempts of local governmentsto gain legitimization, to strengthen their interna-tional presence and visibility and to acquire greaterrecognition of the crucial role that they play forsustainable development.16 In fact, internationalinfluence has been a trigger and a shaping force forsome subnational policies (ibid.: 259). The phe-nomenon of legitimization is particularly observedin cases where subnational governments have adistinct territorial identity and seek recognition inthe (inter)national policy space (e.g. Quebec, SuisseRomande, theBasqueCountry,Catalonia,Scotland,Wales, British Columbia17) (Beaty et al. 2014;Steele 2014).

11Available at: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/lima_dec_2014/application/pdf/auv_cop20_lima_call_for_climate_action.pdf.12http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html.13http://www.ccre.org/.14The Global Covenant of Mayors now has more than7400 cities on board with an estimated population ofnearly 700 million. Formerly the Compact of Mayors, theGlobal Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy is thelargest coalition of mayors committed to acceleratingclimate action. Also see http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html.

15http://www.2020-horizon.com/SESAC-Sustainable-Energy-Systems-in-Advanced-Cities%28SESAC%29-s13371.html.16The Chinese central government, for example, has takenon a carbon intensity target of 40–45% reduction in 2020compared with 2005 (in 2009 at the Copenhagen ClimateConference and in the 12th FYP) and has given mandatesto cities and provinces to implement this.17The British Columbia carbon tax shows that incentivescan effectively lead to lowering emissions while avoiding


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3.1.2 National Governments

It is impossible to generalize and speak ofnational governments as a uniform category.Because governments have different capabilitiesand priorities and face different challenges,18 weneed more nuanced and nationally specific the-ories of change. This requires the building ofnational strategies for transformations andunderstanding of national political dynamics.

Still, any state needs to meet importantimperatives. In liberal democracies, theseimperatives include, most of all, facilitation ofcapital investment, economic growth and taxrevenues to maintain state institutions and deliverpublic services (Dryzek 1996).

National governments are expected to providepublic goods,19 for example by steering towardstechnically robust low-carbon energy systemsthrough policy frameworks and incentives [e.g.taxing pollution (IMF 2017)20]. The state can actas a regulator, a monitor, a coordinator of collec-tive action or simply as an authority to create anenabling environment for SDG implementation.

Although the nation state can have thesecapabilities, it increasingly appears to be ineffec-tive in the face of global challenges. As Soto

(2015) puts it, ‘we have nineteenth century insti-tutions with twentieth century mindsets, attempt-ing to communicate with twenty-first centurycitizens’. There is widespread disappointmentabout the inability of governments to regulateGHG emissions. According to Klein (2014: 214),‘there are policies that can lower emissionsquickly (…) The biggest problem is that we havegovernments that don’t believe in governing’. ForLoorbach (2014: 26), the transfer of control fromgovernments to markets ‘has substantiallydiminished possibilities for governance’.

On the other hand, and despite upcomingdiscussions on the relative withdrawal of nationstates, there is surprisingly little empirical evi-dence supporting the claim that states are ‘losing’power or their dominant position (cf. Lange et al.2013; Driessen et al. 2012; Weber et al. 2011).Based on a review of global institutions andpolicy coordination on energy efficiency andrenewable energy, Karlsson and Jollands (2013)conclude that the national level indeed remainsthe key policy-making level for delivering publicgoods such as a global sustainable energy system.

Vested interests as a barrier to SDG gover-nance at the national level

Although national governments are generallyseen as dominant actors in sustainability gover-nance, vested interests can set up barriers tosustainability transitions and limit the agency ofnational governments. According to rationalchoice theory (cf. Olson 1965), groups thatdefend special (or narrow) interests have signif-icant organizational advantages compared withgroups that defend collective and diffuse values(e.g. environmental groups).

Governments can be influenced by vestedinterests and companies that act as sustainability“laggards” who lower the ambitions of govern-ments that would otherwise want to be progres-sive on sustainability. Vested interests, forexample, can convince governments to backtrackon climate commitments (‘unlearning’).Unlearning can be observed at a larger scale inthe withdrawal of national governments fromprevious climate policies (e.g. from the Kyoto

damage to the economy (mainly by lowering other taxes,including income taxes). In fact, since BC introduced thecarbon tax, its economy has grown faster than that ofother Canadian provinces. The effective carbon tax inBritish Columbia shows that while Canada is unlearningat the federal level, a province can move on climategovernance: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/the-insidious-truth-about-bcs-carbon-tax-it-works/article19512237/ and http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/jul/28/carbon-tax-australia-british-columbia-business-revenue-neutral.18For example, according to Lise Kingo (CEO andExecutive Director of the United Nations Global Com-pact), half of the delivery of the SDGs will come fromprogress made in just one country: India.19For arguments for governing sustainable energy as aglobal public good, see Annex 14.20The IMF, among others, has, for example, argued thatcarbon taxes and other fiscal instruments are the mosteffective policies for promoting cleaner development.Factsheet available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/enviro.htm. At the Business & Climate Summit inParis on 20 and 21 May 2015, there was broad privatesector support for a global price on carbon.


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Protocol) and the abolishment of carbon taxes. Inthese cases, vested interests promote the dis-course that climate action harms the economyand that it is more economical to postpone suchaction (Hurst 2014).21

Vested interests have usually gained mostfrom past and existing arrangements (e.g. subsi-dies) and partnerships with government and thusresist structural change. They are the main partsof the Regimes that transition management(Sect. 2.2.2 above) tries to address. In addition,governments can have vested interests in thefossil fuel industry as most fossil fuel reservesare held by state-owned enterprises (SOEs)22 andnot by privately owned companies. In manycountries, oil and gas rents make up for a sizableshare of government (tax) revenues. This cancreate a ‘credibility gap’s between governments’pronouncements about climate change and theirmaterial interests.

The interaction of national governments withlocal governments and with the private sectoron the SDGs

Although there is a leading role for the state inSDG implementation, one needs to be morespecific by looking at interactions of the nationalgovernment with subnational jurisdictions andwith the private sector to fully understand therole of the state and political authority.

Through SDG 17.14, all UN Member Statescommitted to ‘pursue policy coherence and anenabling environment for sustainable develop-ment at all levels and by all actors’. This meansthat, in achieving the SDGs, countries andstakeholders need to ensure that efforts in onegoal area are not undermined by policies oractions in other goal areas. For example, effortsto increase the share of renewable energy (SDGtarget 7.2) could potentially undermine progressto end hunger (SDG target 2.1) if food crops and

biofuel production compete for the same landand water resources. Policy Coherence for Sus-tainable Development (PCSD, also see Sect. 6.2.5 below) can inform decision-making to avoidunintended consequences, and help capitalize onsynergies between SDGs and targets, betweendifferent sectoral policies and between diverseactions at the local, regional, national and inter-national levels. For example, the costs ofimplementing the SDGs could be cut by up tohalf if synergies between the different goals areexploited (ICSU 2017).

The effective achievement of the SDGs entailstrade-offs among economic, social and environ-mental objectives and value judgments whichcannot be determined by governments alone.While essential, the strong leadership role ofgovernment is not sufficient to ensure a coherentimplementation of the SDGs. The engagement ofa wide range of stakeholders, and a sharedunderstanding of the nature and benefits of thenew agenda, is critical for building ownershipand mobilising action. This means working withnational and local government representatives,civil society, the business sector, faith-basedgroups and representatives from academia andscience. Collectively, they can identify commonchallenges, set priorities, align policies andactions and mobilize resources for sustainabledevelopment.

This multistakeholder engagement is essentialin the light of the long-term nature of the SDGAgenda. One interesting example of stakeholderengagement is ‘The Finland We Want by 2050—Society’s Commitment to Sustainable Develop-ment’. Finland’s approaches to governance forthe SDGs are generally seen as an example byother countries. Finland’s 2050 initiative bringstogether government leaders and representativesfrom local communities, the social partners andcivil society organizations to agree on a long-termvision and commit to action programmes.

In Finland, the Prime Minister’s Office is incharge of coordinating the national implementa-tion work and drawing up the national plan. Thiscoordination at the highest political level ensurescoherence in the planning and implementation ofsustainable development and SDG policy. The

21See, e.g. http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/10/climate-unity-dealt-blow-as-australia-and-canada-take-issue-with-us-stance.22The top 200 fossil fuel companies by size of reservescan be found at http://gofossilfree.org/top-200/.


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Office acts as the Coordination Secretariat, whichincludes representatives from the Prime Minis-ter’s Office, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs andthe Secretariat General of the National Com-mission on Sustainable Development. TheCoordination Secretariat functions as an opera-tional hub for Agenda 2030 coordination, and itworks closely together with the CoordinationNetwork, which comprises focal points from allgovernment ministries and the Finnish Devel-opment Policy Committee. The inter-ministerialCoordination Network guides and supports the

work of the Coordination Secretariat and ensuresthat all dimensions and aspects of sustainabledevelopment are taken into consideration in theimplementation. The ministries are also the keyexecutors of Agenda 2030 through their sectoralprogrammes, strategies, legislation and imple-mentation of international agreements and com-mitments (Fig. 3.3).

Specifically, there are three types of mecha-nisms that require national and subnationalgovernments to interact to advance the SDGs:

Prime Minister’s Office:

Agenda2030 Coordination

Secretariat

“PMO-hub”

National Follow-up and

Review Network

Chair: Prime Minister’s Office

Ministry for

Foreign Affairs

Sustainable Development

Coordination Network: All

Government Ministries

Finnish

Development Policy

Committee

Chair: Member of the

Parliament

National Commission

on Sustainable

Development

Chair: Prime Minister

Prime Minister’s Office

& Ministry of the

Environment

Sustainable Development Expert

Panel

Hosted by Finnish Innovation Fund

SITRA

Formatted: Font: Bold

Fig. 3.3 Key bodies and mechanisms for Agenda 2030 in Finland (Prime Minister’s Office 2016)


1. For successful implementation of nationalSDG plans, central governments must workclosely with regional and local governments.

2. Subnational governments have capacitieswhich national governments do not have butwhich are central to the promotion of theSDGs. For example, as local governments areoften simultaneously policy-makers, investorsand developers their decisions may lead toimmediate actions. However, the budgets oflocal governments usually are limited andtherefore they need additional funds from thenational government for the SDGs. Nationalgovernments may need access to the knowl-edge that local governments have aboutspecific opportunities for implementing theSDGs.

3. Subnational SDG actions can also promotenational actions when national governmentsare not as active as desired. In some countrieswhere sustainability is politicized at thedomestic level, e.g. because local fossil fuelextraction industries play a dominant role innational policies, subnational entities areahead of the national government in terms ofsustainability policies. Whereas some nationalgovernments were backtracking on climateaction, at the subnational level successfulinitiatives came up in these countries.23

As the state can rarely address sustainabilitychallenges on its own, Genschel and Zangl(2008) argue that the state will shift from amonopolist to a ‘manager of authority’ thatfacilitates partnerships between different stake-holders. According to Soto (2015), ‘rather thanseeing themselves as “pure” problem solvers,governments should position themselves as thebodies that articulate the issues faced by society,and then strive to create the right environment forprivate enterprise and academia to find thesolutions, providing the necessary data, policiesand funding to support these stakeholders’. Thiswould imply a (partial) shift from the reinforcive

power of states to more relational power and fallsunder the assumption that governments canovercome capture from vested interests. Nationalentities may otherwise miss the opportunity tofacilitate and influence connections between theglobal and the local governance levels.

Overall, it is important to go beyond thepopular preconception that market actors aremore innovative than government. For example,75% of the genuinely revolutionary drugs havebeen funded by the public US National Institutesof Health (NIH). The four biggest developmentbanks have invested eight times more than allventure capitalists in renewable energy. And theUS Department of Energy has been responsiblefor 90% of R&D investment into hydrologicalfracking. Thus, government institutions canindeed contribute to transformational technolo-gies (Mazzucato 2013).

3.1.3 International Organizations

‘International organization’ is an overarchingterm which includes both the intergovernmental(IGOs) organizations in themselves (the secre-tariats and their activities) and the IGOs as aforum for interactions between their memberstates, for example in intergovernmental negoti-ations. IGOs can share best practices, giveadvice, have convening power and can play animportant role in evaluating data, making it moreuniversally valid or comparable, and then makingit available to relevant stakeholders. IGOs mayassemble and distribute cutting-edge knowledgethat can enhance international cooperation(Simmons and Martin 2002) and empower pop-ulations to take on unsustainable practices locallyand nationally.

Challenges that international organizationsface in sustainability governance

UN institutions find it difficult to adapt to thedemands of global sustainability challengesbecause of their legacy mandates. Becauseinternational negotiations hosted by IGOs usu-ally follow a logic of acceptability and are based

23Examples given in the previous section include BritishColumbia’s carbon tax, Melbourne’s goal to becomecarbon neutral by 2020 and Tokyo’s ETS.


on the principle of national sovereignty andequality, they are unlikely to deliver agreementsthat challenge the status quo. Because of a shifttowards project-based funding, the role of manyinternational institutions in the fields of climatechange and sustainable development is evolvingfrom one focused on negotiating rules towardsmanaging networks and implementing projects.IGOs can, for example, coordinate networks ofNGOs and business and facilitate cooperationamong (subunits of) sympathetic governments(Goldstein and Keohane 1993). The MajorEconomies Forum (MEF) and the InternationalRenewable Energy Agency (IRENA) are notablecooperation mechanisms in the field of climatechange and sustainable energy.24

Incoherence can lead to the wastage of resour-ces and duplication of work in sustainabilitygovernance. Separate global institutions now arefocused on one of the dimensions of sustainabledevelopment (e.g. UNEP only deals with theenvironmental dimensions of sustainable devel-opment). A more recent initiative that tries toaddress the fragmentation between the work ofdifferent IGOs is the Partnership for Action onGreen Economy (PAGE, also see Box 3.2 below).

Box 3.2: The Partnership for Action onGreen Economy (PAGE)The Partnership for Action on GreenEconomy, or PAGE supports countries inbuilding national green economy strategiesfor implementing the SDG’s with anemphasis on generating new jobs and

skills, promoting clean technologies, andreducing environmental risks and poverty.

Five UN agencies—the United NationsEnvironment Programme (UNEP), theUnited Nations Development Programme(UNDP), the International Labour Organi-zation (ILO), the United Nations IndustrialDevelopment Organization (UNIDO) andtheUnitedNations Institute for Training andResearch (UNITAR)—will provide a com-prehensive suite of green economy servicesthat will enable countries to transform theirnational economic structures to meet thegrowing demands and challenges of thetwenty-first century. More specifically,PAGEwill focus on shifting investment andpolicies towards the creation of a new gen-eration of assets, such as clean technologies,resource efficient infrastructure, well-functioning ecosystems, green skilledlabour and good governance.

The five agencies have previouslyundertaken joint green initiatives. How-ever, this is the first time that all fivepartners have come together to coordinatetheir support, expertise and resources.

PAGE could be seen as experimentalistgovernance (also see Sect. 2.6 above) as itis open to participation of stakeholders in anon-hierarchical process of decision-making. There is an articulation of anagreed common problem (social, environ-mental and economic unsustainability) anda framework understanding of anopen-ended goal (the partners agree thatthey want to assist developing countries intheir transition to a Green Economy).Implementation is taken up by national andlocal actors with contextualized knowl-edge; there is a strong mechanism forcontinuous feedback, reporting and moni-toring; and there are established practices(involving peer review) for revising rulesand practices. Actors broadly know whatoutcomes they desire. The experiences andinsights derived from institutions andorganizations at other levels of government

24The term ‘cooperation mechanism’ is chosen herebecause an international ‘organization’ like the WTO isin fact not a singular actor that has agency, but rather asecretariat that is hosting exchanges between the memberstates who have the ultimate agency; the WTO-like mostIGOs is a ‘member-driven’ organization, and its secre-tariat has no power in and of itself beyond operational,intellectual and convening power (the WTO’s AppellateBody is a casu sui as it can take binding decisions).The WTO itself has been a successful IGO in terms ofinfluencing and reforming domestic policies and inremoving trade barriers and has a strong and bindingdispute settlement system, but now it is difficult to makeprogress in WTO negotiations in a multilateral mode.


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(which, in turn, learn from their ownexperiences as well as those of other gov-ernance units at various levels). The PAGESecretariat as a new kind of centre plays acontinuing role in PAGE, pooling infor-mation and organizing peer evaluation ofit. One challenge for PAGE is to find abalance between solid coordination andover-coordination (with high transactioncosts), creating value above the sum of itsparts. One another challenge is that PAGEuntil now has focused on developing evenmore sustainability plans and strategiesthan already existed, but that it remainsdifficult to implement those plans andstrategies.

Regime complexes for the SDGsThe concept ‘Regime complex’ is rapidly gain-ing ground in global governance circles.A Regime complex strikes a middle groundbetween “fully integrated institutions that imposeregulation through comprehensive, hierarchicalrules [and] highly fragmented collections ofinstitutions with no identifiable core and weak ornon-existent linkages between Regime elements”(Keohane and Victor 2011: 3–4).

Regime complexes are currently most devel-oped in the area of climate change (SDG 13).‘Climate clubs’ are smaller groups of countriesthat are determined to act together on climatechange, for example by linking their carbonmarkets (Petsonk and Keohane 2015). Deter-mining the relationships both within the climateRegime complex and between climate clubs andthe UNFCCC is expected to become an impor-tant issue in the ongoing climate negotiations.Climate clubs could complement the UNFCCCand report to it, but the UNFCCC is set to remainthe platform where global (in the sense of mul-tilateral) ambition and equity can be discussed.The actions of the club members could also bediscussed, recognized and monitored within theUNFCCC, adding to the idea of a more coherent‘Regime complex’.

Similarly, ‘improving coordination’ betweenRegimes25 can help to avoid inefficiencies andthe duplication of work on the SDGs and make itexplicit that actors are meant to complement—rather than undermine—each other.

Climate Regime complex and climate clubs

The increasingly systemic nature of global gov-ernance is reflected by the shift from asingle-institution, single-issue focus to muchmore dynamic, diverse and diffusedpolicy-making processes. Global ‘governance’ isbound to depend on a patchwork of differentkinds of institutions: formal and informal, hori-zontal and vertical, intergovernmental and trans-governmental, state-based and society-based,durable and flexible. However, there will con-tinue to be many areas of governance requiringinclusive multilateralism and coordination acrossdiverse institutions, notably to address challengesthat involve genuinely global public goods (seeBox 3.3 below)

Box 3.3: Governing Sustainable Energyas a Global Public GoodA public good in economic terminologyhas two specific aspects: in economic jar-gon it is ‘non-excludable’ (i.e. non-payingconsumers cannot be prevented fromaccessing it) and ‘non-rivalrous’ (for anylevel of production, the cost of providing agood to a marginal (additional) individualis zero). Because of these inherent char-acteristics which can lead to the free riderproblem, and because it is unlikely that the

25There are various causal mechanisms for interactionsbetween regimes (van Asselt 2014). Cognitive interactioncan be observed in the interactions between minilateralclean technology agreements (e.g. the APP as a ‘policymodel’) and the UN climate regime. Interaction throughcommitment can be identified in the interactions betweenthe UNFCCC and the WTO. The UNFCCC does notcontain nor condone climate-related trade measures butrather seems to defer to the WTO. This interactionthrough commitment emerges because the two regimescover different domains but have a largely overlappingmembership.


private sector will produce public goods onits own, State intervention can be justified.Some typical examples of public goods aresecurity, financial stability, a clean envi-ronment and free speech. In a rapidlyintegrating world, many of these publicgoods are increasingly transnational innature or have regional and global aspects.In this context, climate stability is oftengiven as the quintessential example of aglobal public good (and climate change asa global ‘bad’), because every country’semissions of greenhouse gases contributecumulatively to the increase of the overallconcentration in the atmosphere, and theatmosphere is not in private or nationalownership. Separate from each other, a fewcountries’ abatements entail higher coststhan benefits for those countries (assumingthat most other countries will free-ride),unless effective concerted action is taken.An example of a regional public good isless acid rain or having access to a cleansea that is shared with other nations.Besides at the global and regional levels,public goods can also be found at thenational and local levels (see Fig. 3.4).

Based on a systems perspective (whichincludes social, economic and environ-mental domains), Karlsson et al. (2012)argue for regarding the sustainability of theglobal energy system as a global publicgood for two reasons:

1. It would be difficult to exclude anyonefrom those benefits

2. One person’s enjoyment of those ben-efits does not reduce another’s ability totake advantage of those benefits.

Integrated Regimes as institutional monopo-lies will make it difficult to craft rival institutionsand can thus hamper institutional diversity andinnovation.26 A ‘Regime complex’ (see Fig. 3.5)is a patchwork of different kinds of institutionsand would be a middle ground between ‘fully

integrated institutions that impose regulationthrough comprehensive, hierarchical rules’ and‘highly fragmented collections of institutionswith no identifiable core and weak or non-existentlinkages between Regime elements’, (Keohaneand Victor 2011: 3–4).

In the current uncertainty about what mea-sures governments are willing and able toimplement, Regime complexes as a ‘plan B’ aremore likely outcomes than an integrated com-prehensive regulatory Regime for climatechange. Regime complexes have some advan-tages over comprehensive, integrated Regimes:

1. Flexibility across issues: Different statescould, for example, sign on to different sets ofagreements, making it more likely that theywould adhere to cuts in GHGs.

2. Adaptability over time as change in differentissue areas, or within the domestic politics ofdifferent countries, may take place at differentrates and depend on experimentalistgovernance.27

3. Lower transaction costs, which are high forchanging rules based on interstate consensusin an integrated Regime or IO.

4. Reaching outcomes that are more ambitiousand more specific than the lowest commondenominator that results from negotiating

26Keohane and Victor make the dysfunctions of theUNFCCC monopoly are evident in two areas:

1. Despite the fact that about two-thirds of the CDMcredits issued do not represent bona fide reductions inemissions, it is very difficult to improve the CDMwithin the complex and highly politicized nature ofdecision-making within the UNFCCC; the CDMmonopoly has excluded offsets in some areas (e.g.,carbon storage and nuclear power) while favouringoffsets in areas that may be less cost-effective, such assmall, rural renewable energy projects.

2. The UNFCCC/Kyoto arrangements for linkingnational trading systems face challenges as the rulesfor ‘docking’ have proven to be inflexible and do notencourage much additional effort by governments.

27Keohane and Victor give the example of the creation ofthe EU, which benefitted from flexibility to allow for‘multispeed’ coordination of policy—under a common (attimes leaky) umbrella of the common market andburgeoning EU law where the many members of theEU moved at quite different rates.


climate action among 192 or more countriesKeohane and Victor (2011).

Keohane and Victor suggest six criteria forevaluating Regime complexes from a normativepoint of view: coherence (components are com-patible and mutually reinforcing), accountability(to wide range of stakeholders), effectiveness(based on rules and net benefits), determinacy,sustainability and epistemic quality (consistencybetween rules and scientific knowledge).

Climate clubs

Similar to the idea of the climate Regimecomplex, Morgan and Weischer (2012) see arenewed interest in “2° climate clubs”—smallergroups of countries coming together to act onclimate change—and analyse 17 of such clubs.They find that all of them can be grouped intotwo categories (see Fig. 3.6): dialogue forums,where member countries exchange informationand improve understanding of each other’s

Fig. 3.4 Public goods, common pool goods, club goods and private goods at different governance scales. Based on:Açıkgöz Ersoy (2011)

Fig. 3.5 Climate change Regime complex. Source Keohane and Victor (2011)


positions, and implementation groups, whichcollectively implement strategies, programs orprojects.

Morgan and Weischer developed four, mainlyprocedural, criteria that would make climate clubstransformational, and these show some similari-ties with the criteria suggested by Keohane andVictor (2011) for the climate Regime complex:

1. An ambitious vision (‘determinacy’) that iscommensurate with what climate sciencesuggests is needed to avoid dangerous climatechange (‘epistemic quality’).

2. Clear conditions for membership that areconsistent with the ambitious vision.

3. Significant benefits provided to members,offering strong incentives for joining.

4. A pathway to start now and expand over time:starting with relatively easy-to-implementactivities, (e.g. information sharing), a twodegrees club should be set up in a way thatallows it to address more difficult questions,grow in scope (e.g. expanding from renew-able energy or efficiency to other areas) and inthe number of members over time.

For Sabel and Victor (2015), experimentalistgovernance differs from climate clubs in threeways:

1. Clubs form when private actors conclude thatprovision of some good has benefits to eachin excess of costs (Potoski and Prakash 2009).

Fig. 3.6 Climate clubs. Source Morgan and Weischer2012. KEY: International Energy Agency’s ImplementingAgreements (IEA-IA), G8, G20, Renewable Energy &Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP), Carbon Seques-tration Leadership Forum (CSLF), Renewable EnergyPolicy Network for the twenty-first century (REN21),Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development andClimate (APP, ended in 20xx), Global Bioenergy

Partnership (GBEP), Major Economies Forum on Energyand Climate (MEF), Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM),REDD+ Partnership, Global Methane Initiative (GMI),Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), InternationalPartnership on Mitigation and MRV (M&MRV), LowEmissions Development Strategies Global Partnership,International Energy and Climate Initiative Energy+, andthe Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)


Experimentalist governance stresses, in con-trast, that actors participate in joint activitiesonly when faced with the threat of draconianpenalty defaults, such as exclusion from avalued market.

2. Where the theory of clubs presumes that thenature and benefits of club goods areself-evident, actors in experimentalist gover-nance face uncertainty regarding both.

3. Experimentalist governance literature offersan explicit theory for how cooperation thatmight begin in small groups will spill over towider and deeper cooperation as new infor-mation makes regulatory action easier and thebenefits more apparent. Most of the clubsliterature has not offered a dynamic theory toexplain how ‘bottom-up’ cooperation doesnot get stuck at the bottom.

In terms of pragmatic ways forward for cli-mate governance specifically, the Paris ClimateAgreement could be seen as an umbrella agree-ment in the sense that it could cover multiple(future) agreements among smaller groups ofcountries following the climate club approach.An umbrella agreement could include commondisciplines and standards (e.g. for monitoring andreview) for climate clubs in order to managefragmentation. Climate clubs could focus onthose specific issues where there are strongcobenefits (e.g. the Climate and Clean AirCoalition or CCAC does for win-wins in terms ofair quality and GHG emissions mitigation). Cli-mate clubs would build more trust among alimited number of committed countries and couldinclude voluntary targets that are more accept-able to countries with unpredictable emissions inthe future. As proposed by Victor (2015), thelegitimacy and accountability of clubs couldresult from their complementarity with theUNFCCC in order to avoid the impression thatthe clubs erode the functioning of that existing,what Victor calls ‘maxilateral’ Regime. Simi-larly, the SDGs could be seen as an umbrellaframework of visions, transitions and goals.Similar criteria could apply to clubs and Regimescomplexes for the SDGs, but this deservesfurther investigation.

3.2 Multilevel and Non-traditionalGovernance Actorsand Institutions

The previous section described how sustainabil-ity governance can be observed at specific levels,including at the subnational, national andsupra-national levels. Some actors that typicallydo not act at a single level or that operate fluidlyat several levels are discussed in the following.

3.2.1 Media

The role of media has traditionally been to reportnews and convey information. In an era ofstruggling traditional media such as physicalnewspapers, increasing news consumptionthrough the Internet, a blurring line between newsand entertainment,28 the growing role of fakenews and shrinking budgets for investigativejournalism, the role of the media in sustainabilitygovernance is changing. It can be in the media’sown interest to distort or hide information, e.g. toprotect companies that pay for advertisements(Stelter 2012).29 Media can also play an importantrole though in revealing environmental damageand social injustices and in framing issues likeinequality and climate change.

3.2.2 Knowledge Institutionsand BoundaryOrganizations

The role of universities and other knowledgeinstitutions is changing as environmental scienceincreasingly is part of a larger environmental

28According to Brockington (2009), media are primarilyconcerned with entertainment and not informationdelivery.29One notorious example is that when the BBC series'Frozen Planet' was featured in the USA on DiscoveryChannel, the parts that featured the scientific consensus onclimate change were left out. This was reportedly due toconcerns over losing revenues from advertisements forcarbon-intensive industries (also see http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/21/business/media/discoverys-frozen-planet-is-silent-on-causes-of-climate-change.html?pagewanted=all).


http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/21/business/media/discoverys-frozen-planet-is-silent-on-causes-of-climate-change.html%3fpagewanted%3dall



politics (O’Riordan 2004: 234). For climatechange, for example, it is said that ‘its science isits politics’ (ibid.: 238).

Boundary work30 focuses on the various typesof interactions which take place in the spherebetween science and politics (the science–policyinterface)31 as a simple line across whichknowledge must be transferred. Really innova-tive and exciting idea in the end can only pro-mote sustainable development if they are used bydecision-makers. Here, the idea of ‘coproduc-tion’ which embodies the social and politicalprocesses through which science, policy andpractice coevolve becomes relevant.

Kaaronen (2016) outlines six types of science–policy interfaces:

1. The independent model—independent groupsor panels of experts conduct scientific advice,assessment and monitoring.

2. The integrated model—groups of expertsintegrated into the governmental sphere,consisting not only of scientific experts butalso of parliamentarians, political decision-makers and other stakeholders.

3. The assignment model—cases wheredemand-driven scientific support is providedfor policy-makers by task forces whenrequired.

4. The nested model—cases where scientificsupport is organized for policy-makers viathoroughly institutionalized arrangements ofnested expert hierarchies.

5. The adviser model—scientific advisersdirectly informing the highest political actors

6. The platform model—deliberative andcoproductive knowledge brokering arenas forscience–policy interaction often organized bythird parties.

7. The mixed model, which does not fit neatlyinto one slot and have features of two or moreof the six models above.

Boundary organizations are designed tofacilitate collaboration and information flowsbetween research and public policy communitiesand to reconcile scientific understanding withenvironmental policy and natural resourcemanagement (Guston 2001). Boundary organi-zations develop rules, procedures and normsthat shape perceptions of salience, credibilityand legitimacy of information and effectivelybalance trade-offs among them (Cash et al.2003).

Jungcurt (2013) conceives of the boundarybetween knowledge production and decision-making in an intergovernmental setting as atwo-dimensional space defined by the axes ofscience and policy as well as national and inter-national processes (Fig. 3.7). The further to theright a process or institution is located, the morepoliticized it can be expected to be.

The purpose of locating different institutionsand processes involved in boundary work is thatit enables the development of a more differenti-ated conceptualization of the types of processesand discourses taking place within these organi-zations. This can clarify the role of knowledgeinstitutions in SDG governance.

In climate governance specifically, countriescould open up their national pledges for reviewby scientists and economists, to increase trustand transparency. Other ways in which science

30The concept of boundary work has recently emerged inthe study of interactions between science and policy insustainable development decision-making. It is a promis-ing approach which focuses on the social processes at theboundary between the production of scientific and othertypes of knowledge as well as decision-making processes(Jungcurt 2013).31It is argued in the 2013 World Social Science Reportthat ‘the social sciences must help to fundamentallyreframe…global environmental change from a physicalinto a social problem’. The increased importance of the‘science–policy interface’ was indeed debated at the RIO+20 conference in June 2012. At the first UN Environ-ment Assembly (UNEA) in June 2014, one resolutioncalled for ‘strengthened assessment activities andimproved access to data and information’ and thedissemination and sharing of ‘evidence-based environ-mental information on critical and emerging economic,environmental and social issues’. Paragraph 88 of the Rio+20 outcome document ‘The Future We Want’ calls forpromoting ‘a strong science-policy interface, building onexisting international instruments, assessments, panelsand information networks, including the Global Environ-mental Outlook, as one of the processes aimed at bringingtogether information and assessment to support informeddecision-making’.

3.2 MultiLevel and Non-traditional Governance Actors and Institutions 65

can help are finding reliable methods ofreporting and verifying human-caused CO2

emissions.

The politicization of sustainability science

Research on governance for the SDGs inevitablyalso refers to research on the role that science andknowledge play in political processes. As such,sustainability science has become politicized asthe results of environmental research are oftensubject to uncertainties and differences within thescientific community. In addition, questionssurrounding what counts as sustainable, what isto be transformed, who is responsible for changeand how deep that change should be are alldeeply political.

Science has also been appropriated bypolicy-makers in the pursuit of political andeconomic interests (Jasanoff 1990). Mertonian32

norms and cognitive authority of science come

under pressure when scientists are called upon bypolicy-makers to provide advice in areas such asclimate science which are at the frontiers of sci-ence. In such areas, knowledge is uncertain andin turn, this often results in a fragile consensusamong scientists (Jasanoff 1987).

Climate scientists, for example, are oftendependent on government and/or private sectorfunding for their research. On the one hand, thishas led to claims that the threat of climate changehas been deliberately exaggerated (or, for thatmatter, downplayed) by individual scientists in

Fig. 3.7 Institutions and processes involved in boundary work on international sustainable developmentdecision-making Based on: Jungcurt (2013). Note City networks were added by the author as they can span therange of functions between assessment (science) and policy-making. Also, institutions at the local level were added bythe author as there are major opportunities for the science–policy interface at the local level (e.g. through cooperationbetween universities and the cities where they are based)

32Mertonian norms are a set of institutional principles thatdescribe the ethos of modern science: Communalism(results of scientific research are common property of thescientific community); universalism (all scientists cancontribute to science regardless of race, nationality andgender); disinterestedness (scientists should not mixpersonal beliefs or activism with the presentation of theirresearch results); originality (scientific claims must con-tribute new knowledge); and scepticism (validationthrough critical scrutiny) (Merton 1973).


order to attract research funding for further workin the area—work that over-respectively under-states the impacts of climate change (Bulkeleyand Newell 2010: 28). These researchers gener-ally feel that they have to be pragmatic in ordernot to be ignored. The result is that, paradoxi-cally, mitigation scenarios that explore policyoptions for transforming the global economyhave become more optimistic over the past fewyears because governments prefer to work withscientists who can model emission scenarios insuch a way that it seems like desired climatetargets are realistic (Hickel 2017).33

Along with the growing science–policyinterface, another important development in theinteraction between political and scientific com-munities will be workable transdisciplinaryapproaches. Such methods should integrate aca-demic research from different disciplines withinsights from non-academic participants toresearch a common goal and create new knowl-edge, new theories and new options for imple-menting the SDGs.

3.2.3 Private Corporations

The engagement of the private sector is crucial forachieving the SDGs. Sixty per cent of the 150biggest economies in the world are private com-panies. Corporations are aware of the importanceof sustainability; in a survey of 766 CEO’s by theUN Global Compact (2010), 93% of those CEOssaid that sustainability is important to the futureof their company. In addition, 96% of those CEOsagree that sustainability considerations should befully integrated into the strategy and operations ofa company (up from 72% in 2007).

SDG target 12.6 encourages ‘companies,especially large and transnational companies, toadopt sustainable practices and to integrate sus-tainability information into their reporting cycle’.However, contributions by small- andmedium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will be criticalfor the success of the SDGs. SMEs providelivelihoods to most people in developing coun-tries and are the largest contributors to job cre-ation. SMEs account for more than 90% of firmsand 90% of total employment in emergingeconomies (Bamber et al. 2014). The SDGsrecognize the role of SMEs to ‘promote strong,inclusive and sustainable economic growth anddecent work for all’ (SDG 8 and 9). Yet, SMEsin developing countries face multiple obstacles,including: the lack of skilled workers, legal andregulatory frameworks, inadequate access tofinancing and the ability to participate in globalvalue chains (GVCs).

For business, the SDGs represent a uniqueopportunity by providing:

• A global framework with a visible set ofoutcomes;

• A long-term horizon that offers direction forpolicy, investment and innovation, pointingto new, mostly untapped, markets; and

• A common language on social, environmentaland economic issues that can help to improvecommunication, coordination andcollaboration.

The most prominent guide for business actionon the SDGs is provided by the SDG Compass

33Geden (2015) notes that assumptions about the timing of aglobal emissions peak and about the feasible rate of globalemission reductions keep on changing. For example, thefourth assessment of the IPCC of 2007 stated that emissionsmust peak by 2015 to stay within 2 °C of warming.However, the fifth IPCC report, released in 2014, refers toemissions levels that rise until 2030 and that are stillcompatible with this limit, but with annual emissions—reduction rates of 6%. The annual Emissions Gap Report byUNEP had an original deadline of 2020 for its analysis ofhow to fill the gap between global emissions levelscompatible with a 2 °C target and national pledges; the2014 edition extended it to 2030. In both examples, climateeconomists assumed ‘negative emissions’ (the removal ofGHGs from the atmosphere—mainly through a combinationof using bioenergy coupled with CCS or ‘BECCS’) duringthe second-half of this century. It is highly unlikely thoughthat BECCS can be put into practice as it would involveturning one-third of the available arable land into treeplantations (monocultures that can threaten biodiversity).Therefore, Hickel (2017) calls for economic de-growth tolimit global warming (https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/jul/03/paris-climate-deal-wont-work-our-future-depends-degrowth).


https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2017/jul/03/paris-climate-deal-wont-work-our-future-depends-degrowth



(WBCSD 2017),34 which outlines steps to ‘assistcompanies in maximizing their contribution tothe SDGs’. The SDG Compass also provides alist of over 800 business indicators and a sum-mary of nearly 60 business tools to guide theapplication of the SDGs to business.

Companies are interested in sustainabilitybecause it allows them to:

• Develop new growth markets for greengoods;

• Cut costs and become more profitable andenergy- and resource efficient;

• Profile themselves as sustainability leaders(branding/marketing concerns);

• Have a global-level playing field because theyare concerned about losing competitivenesswhen sustainability measures are enforced onthem but not on foreign competitors; and

• Follow developments on sustainability thatcan be important for identifying strategicdirections based on dynamics in society andon expected policy changes.35

Companies that do lead on sustainabilityreceive high scores on the ability to articulate avision and define ambitious goals in the 2017Globescan/SustainAbility report ‘SustainabilityLeaders’. Integrated sustainability strategy,vision, innovation and transparency are thequalities that experts believe will define leadingorganizations a decade from now (ibid.).

It is impossible to speak of business as amonolithic group of actors, as companies holddifferent preferences, and some companies (forexample in renewable energy and environmentaltechnologies) may benefit from stricter environ-mental regulation and mitigation of climatechange where others may lose (for example fossil

fuel companies). Companies in the food industryare strongly in support of climate action as theirvalue chains are at risk because of changingweather. While the Regime of fossil fuel-basedindustries and existing socio-economic modelscan be expected to keep on resisting transitionstowards more efficiency and renewable energy, atthe Niche-level innovative energy technologiesand companies are entering the market. Evenbetween companies in the same sector, there maybe differential costs of environmental regulationacross firms (Keohane et al. 1998).

Traditional approaches of governments toinfluencing corporate behaviour, such as bindinglaw making, rule design and control of compli-ance, are being challenged by voluntary com-mitments and private rulemaking andenforcement. Leading companies increasinglyintroduce their own sustainability regulations andstandards.36 In that regard, the World Bench-marking Alliance (WBA) is a relevant initiativeas it will develop, fund, house and safeguardfree, publicly available corporate sustainabilitybenchmarks aligned with the SDGs.37

While voluntary commitments in the privatesector may be a welcome development, inter-viewees from the private sector emphasized thatbinding rules remain necessary for addressing anissue like climate change effectively in the longterm. The private sector beyond the leadingcompanies may otherwise remain largely obser-vant and defensive on sustainability governanceinitiatives that complicate business and increaseproduction costs. Furthermore, in our globalizedworld, multinational corporations often operatein a regulatory vacuum, necessitating globalgovernance for global actors. The aviation sectoris a prototypical example of a global industry thathas traditionally relied on global regulations.

34The SDG Compass was developed jointly by the GlobalReporting Initiative (GRI), the UN Global Compact andthe World Business Council for Sustainable Development(WBCSD) http://sdgcompass.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/019104_SDG_Compass_Guide_2015_v29.pdf.35This is based on remarks by a representative of WBCSDin an open policy dialogue on the SDGs that wasorganized by the University of Geneva and UNEP inGeneva on 2 September 2015.

36In the field of forestry, for example, the ForestryStewardship Council (FSC) has been introduced, andlikewise the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) infisheries. There have also been various attempts atintroducing carbon labelling schemes by companies, withmixed results due to the complexity of implementation.37https://www.worldbenchmarkingalliance.org/.


http://sdgcompass.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/019104_SDG_Compass_Guide_2015_v29.pdf

http://sdgcompass.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/019104_SDG_Compass_Guide_2015_v29.pdf

https://www.worldbenchmarkingalliance.org/

Corporate Social Responsibility

According to the ‘corporate social responsi-bility’ (CSR) movement, firms are supposed tobehave as good citizens through good corporategovernance practices, even when governmentpolicies do not request them to do so.38 Com-panies, for example, ‘green’ their market strate-gies and participate in ‘hybrid’ or public–privatepartnerships (PPPs) in which also national gov-ernments, IGOs, civil society and other actorscan be involved (Thorpe 2012).39 One exampleat the global level was the “Friends of Rio+20”, acoalition of business, scientific and civil society,which suggested practical actions to meet press-ing sustainable development challenges at theConference on Sustainable Development in Riode Janeiro in 2012. The strongest barriers togreater company board engagement are unclearfinancial impact, a lack of sustainability expertiseamong board members, other priorities,short-termism and the view that boards shouldfocus exclusively on shareholder value.

Managing change for sustainability (or ‘changemanagement’) means the process of managingorganizations for sustainability (or CSR) out-comes. In other words, it is about managingorganizational changes which are themselvesaimed at improving the sustainability of theorganization, rather than being concerned withmaking ‘change management in general’ moresustainable. There are potential difficulties con-cerning the scale of such changes. For example, itis difficult to qualify an initiative aimed at incre-mentally reducing what are already deeply and

fundamentally unsustainable practices as‘managing change for sustainability’.

Corporate influence on SDG implementation

It is important to consider corporate influence ongovernance for the SDGs because business canboth oppose governance initiatives and it cangive shape to solutions, and new understandings(e.g. of market-based governance and privategovernance).

Business actors can project power throughdirect lobbying at the local, national and inter-national levels, market influence (by movingcapital across borders40 and through technologi-cal R&D), participation in rule-setting schemes(e.g. for sustainability standards) and shapingunderstandings of sustainability issues (e.g.through marketing and funding research).

While competition between firms may limitthe influence of business on governance for theSDGs, cooperation and coalition buildingbetween firms may strengthen it (Clapp andMeckling 2013). Some main cooperation andnetworks between corporations on the SDGs canbe found at WBCSD, the Global Compact, theB20,41 the International Chamber of Commerce(ICC) and the Global Business Alliance(GBA) for 2030. GBA is a global businessinterface encompassing the views of global,regional, national and sectoral business organi-zations and associations. The GBA also coverscompanies from multinational corporations tosmall- and medium -sized enterprises from allgeographic regions having a shared vision thatmarket-based solutions are essential to movetowards a more sustainable and equitable world.The GBA offers a broad range of approaches,expertise and perspectives to strengthen andinform the intergovernmental deliberations at

38‘Corporate governance’ can be defined as ‘all theinfluences affecting the processes for appointing thosewho decide how operational control is exercised toproduce goods and services and all external influencesaffecting operations or the controllers’ (Turnbull 2000: 4).In corporate governance, the influence of shareholders hasgrown.39For example, Coca-Cola is very active in the field ofwater and sustainability: http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/best-practice-exchange/coca-cola-enterprises-water-sustainable. The most common issueareas for PPPs are energy efficiency, carbon finance,renewable energy and transport.

40The effect that the threat of companies leaving a countryhas on a government’s decision to withhold (the enforce-ment of) environmental policies is called the ‘regulatorychill’ effect (Neumayer 2001).41The ‘Business-20’ Summits (B-20), an internationalforum, aimed at fostering dialogue between governmentsand the global business community that meets alongsidethe G20.


http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/best-practice-exchange/coca-cola-enterprises-water-sustainable



every step of the way. Corporations mainlycooperate with each other on sustainability inalliances such as the GBA for the sake of infor-mation sharing, capacity building, direct action,monitoring and certification and target and rulesetting (Bulkeley et al. 2014).

The importance of the financial sector forsustainability

Achieving the SDGs will require more moneythan governments can make available, and thegap cannot be closed by official developmentassistance, which in 2017 stood at $132 billionper year. The private sector, as well as updatedfinancial markets, will be essential.

Financial institutions are extremely importantfor achieving the SDGs as renewable energy andsustainable infrastructure (e.g. public transporta-tion), for example, require high upfront invest-ments which surpass the capacities ofgovernment financing.42 The financial sector, forexample, can decarbonize its investment portfo-lios and boost the issuance of green bonds tofinance investment in renewable energy.43

The allocation of money to more or less sus-tainable activities is a key factor in transitions.A lot of power has been shifted to financialinstitutions and banks in the years during andafter the financial crisis of 2008/2009. Govern-ments need banks to sell their bonds. Sellingbonds is one of the last few sources of revenuefor states besides taxes as state-owned companieshave been sold in many cases. Thus, govern-ments are more dependent on banks than ever.44

At the same time, future financial crises seem

unavoidable as debt levels are rising and majorbanks have highly leveraged deposits (Lenzner2014).

3.2.4 Non-governmentalOrganizations (NGOs)

NGOs can play critical roles in stimulatingaction on the SDGs as they can channel diversepolitical values, interests, concerns and argu-ments into decision-making processes. NGOsare important in the implementation of interna-tional commitments and sometimes competewith government bodies to provide what thegovernment cannot provide in terms of publicgoods. NGOs can create a global public spherein which policy proposals and options are dis-cussed. However, after their activistic high pointat the end of the 1990s, culminating in the‘Battle of Seattle’ in which they disrupted theWTO Ministerial Conference, NGOs seeminglyplay an ever-tamer role in global governance.Most NGOs changed their political strategies inrecent years from a confrontational towards acooperative engagement on sustainability (Kolkand Pinkse 2007), indicating that they want totake part in the governance process in con-structive ways.

The influence of civil society on sustainabilitygovernance and its limitations

Much of the authority of civil society actors isvested in the discourses they represent and intheir abilities to promote these discourses withingovernmental frameworks (Holzscheiter 2005).The main types of power that NGOs possess areconvening power, knowledge power, communi-cations and support from society. It is challeng-ing for a single organization to perform all theseroles. Some NGOs are good at communications,will take on misconduct by industry and gov-ernments, are critical and get media headlines.This informs a public debate and provokes

42According to the IEA (2014), an additional USD 1trillion a year is needed between 2012 and 2050 to financea low-emissions transition.43See http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/us-climatechange-business-hollande-idUSKBN0O51ZQ20150520.44This can have far-reaching consequences for democracyas political parties have less leeway when their planningdepends on the demands of financial markets. In such asituation, there is not much difference between differentpolitical parties in terms of economic policies. Wheredifferences between parties may remain are social issuessuch as immigration. In Europe, this development hasgiven rise both to anti-immigration and to far-left and

anti-establishment parties such as Syriza in Greece,Podemos in Spain and Cinque Stelle in Italy.


http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/us-climatechange-business-hollande-idUSKBN0O51ZQ20150520

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/us-climatechange-business-hollande-idUSKBN0O51ZQ20150520

political thinking. But it is often difficult for theseorganizations to follow up with policy proposals.

NGOs and social entrepreneurs are seen ashaving contributed the most to advancing thesustainable development agenda in the 2017Globescan/SustainAbility report ‘SustainabilityLeaders’. Effective stakeholder engagement andcollaboration are the key reasons NGOs arerecognized as leaders. However, NGOs oftenlack knowledge and political capacities and needto hire specialized consultancies and academicinstitutions in order to collect data and under-stand the complexities of governance. NGOshave relatively little power in the field of climatechange compared with carbon-intensive sectorssuch as power supply, automobiles, mining andaviation which are in many countries the biggestindustries and are economically importantenough to geode government policies. SomeNGOs that used to be more radical in the pasthave been co-opted by industry in partnershipsand other cooperation arrangements which oftenmake environmental NGOs dependent on fund-ing from industry and draw them into moremainstream sustainability discourses that arelimited to making incremental progress on sus-tainability. According to one civil society acti-vist,45 NGOs that are policy-focused and thatregularly engage with governments and industrycan run into ‘part of a process’ limits as to whatthey can say in public without being undiplo-matic. NGOs like WWF have started to realizethe damage that corporate funding can do to theirimage and plan to take more distance from theprivate sector.

In the shaping of the SDGs, however, civilsociety played an active role throughout theentire process. Civil society stakeholders partic-ipated in sessions of the intergovernmentalnegotiations and the Open Working Group andprovided input to governments ahead of andduring sessions. Civil society fed into the dis-cussions through participating in consultationsorganized by UN, government and other stake-holders and engaged in persistent advocacy also

outside of formal settings to influence govern-ments’ positions. To coordinate their efforts andstrengthen the impact of their advocacy, civilsociety organizations worked in coalitions acrosssectors and across countries and regions.Through this engagement, civil society activelyhelped shape the 2030 Agenda. Civil societygroups strongly advocated for an ambitious andholistic agenda covering a wide set of objectivesacross social, economic and environmentaldimensions of sustainable development. Theyalso firmly called for an agenda grounded inhuman rights principles and aspiring to improveoutcomes for all people, including marginalizedpopulation groups, and thus an agenda address-ing many of the shortcomings of the MillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs).

Thus, one could say that the SDGs havetriggered a renaissance of civil society. Civilsociety can further contribute to achieving theSDGs in five new ways:

1. Protect civil society space: governmentsshould ensure that CSOs are able to effec-tively contribute to achieving the SDGs, andmeaningfully engage in their monitoring andreview.

2. Include civil society in emergency response:CSOs are often the first to respond duringcalamities. After Typhoon Haiyan in 2014,for example, CSOs in the Philippines realizedtheir enormous responsibility in helpingcommunities reduce their vulnerability tofuture natural disasters, and they have startedto mainstream disaster risk reduction andclimate change adaptation in theirinterventions.

3. ‘Go smart.’: CSOs have discovered thatinformation and communications technologycan help them deliver services in a moreefficient way. Mobile phones can be used tocollect data in rural communities to performmonitoring and evaluation in agricultureprojects.

4. Power to the people: technology and socialmedia have transferred power to the peopleand have given rise to online activism. It hasnever been easier to start a campaign and

45Interview with Bill Hemmings in Bonn on 12 March2013 and in Brussels on 26 September 2013.


express support for a cause such as imple-mentation of the SDGs.

5. Target the youth: SDG implementationshould be inclusive and responsive to theneeds of the youth—civil society can educatethem, help them develop sustainable liveli-hoods and empower them to contribute morefully to a better society (Nazal 2015).

3.2.5 Empowered Citizens: The Roleof Democracyand DeliberativeGovernance in the SDGs

The rise of the consuming or middle ‘class’46 isexpected to play an important role in making the2030 Agenda a success. The middle class hashistorically been an important driving forcebehind sustainability and social and politicalrevolutions. Once people rise above the subsis-tence level, they generally obtain the luxury toconsider longer term issues, feel politically moreempowered and can reflect upon developments inthe wider world (e.g. because they can affordhigher levels of education). Citizens see sus-tainability improvements in other cities andcountries and demand similar sustainabilityactions in their own locality. In fact, in the UNGlobal Compact’s CEO Study on Sustainability2013, consumers are identified as the mostimportant stakeholder group when it comes tocompanies’ approaches to sustainability (aheadof company employees and governments). AndRipple et al. (2017) argue that it may take agroundswell of public pressure to convincepolitical leaders to take the right correctiveactions in order to turn around negative globalenvironmental trends. Such activities couldinclude establishing more terrestrial and marinereserves, strengthening enforcement ofanti-poaching laws and restraints on wildlife

trade, expanding family planning and educationalprograms for women, promoting a dietary shifttowards plant-based foods and massively adopt-ing renewable energy and other ‘green’ tech-nologies (ibid.).

The role of democracy in governance for theSDGs

With the empowerment of citizens, discussion ofthe role of democracy in governance for theSDGs becomes inevitable. SDG Targets 16.6(Develop effective, accountable and transparentinstitutions at all levels) and 16.7 (Ensureresponsive, inclusive, participatory and repre-sentative decision-making at all levels) are themost relevant ones for democratic forms ofgovernance.

On the one hand, the countries that consis-tently rank high on the democracy index (TheEconomist 2013)47are virtually the same coun-tries that are the most sustainable (Robecosam2013).48 In the long term, democracies areexpected to produce public goods more effec-tively (Bättig and Bernauer 2008; WorldwatchInstitute 2013), as ‘the message from the data isthat the world can realistically expect morepolitical assertiveness on climate change to fol-low from more democracy’ (Petherick 2014: 83).

On the other hand, the effect of democracy onpolicy outcomes (actual GHG emission levels) ismore ambiguous (Bättig and Bernauer 2008)49

and causes widespread dissatisfaction aboutdemocracy among climate change experts. Thisdissatisfaction is based on the contrast betweenthe growing scientific certainty about (the causesof) climate change and the failure of current

46The term ‘middle class’ is used here without prejudiceto Marxist theory but more as a recognition of the fact thatincreasing numbers of citizens in developing and emerg-ing economies are rising above the subsistence incomelevel.

47See, e.g. http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/Democracy-Index-2012.pdf.48See, e.g. http://www.robecosam.com/en/sustainability-insights/about-sustainability/country-sustainability-ranking.jsp.49Canada is an example of a highly democratic,multi-level governance system, in which the federalgovernment negotiates with the provinces as partners, ina network, with extensive horizontal linkages, andwithout hierarchy. However, that does not make Canadianclimate governance effective (Weibust and Meadowcroft2014).


http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/Democracy-Index-2012.pdf

http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/Democracy-Index-2012.pdf




climate policies (Stehr 2013). According to crit-ics, democracy may be beneficial for producingpublic goods in the long term, but it is unlikely todrive strong climate action in the short term, evenif a majority of the population would be in sup-port of that.50 Current forms of liberal democracyare not seen any more as the exclusive ideologythat can make sustainable development pros-per,51 and some of its aspects such as electionand party systems and regulatory capture ofelected politicians by lobbyists are even regardedas a hindrance to sustainability due to severalstructural barriers.52

Kuwait, for example, is widely regarded asone of the most democratic countries in theMiddle East and in the Gulf Region. However, itsdemocratic governance system makes it difficultfor the government to remove fossil fuel

subsidies, which are the highest in the world on aper-capita basis.

Together with a loss of the credibility of‘traditional’ notions of democracy, there is “agrowing crisis of legitimacy and public trust inall political institutions, an outcome that mayultimately mean that all ‘formal’ political struc-tures fail to be believed and supported”(O’Riordan 2004).

Limitations to top-down governance for theSDGs

If democracy cannot address climate change,some experts think change can come eitherthrough an ‘enlightened benevolent dictator’ orthrough a “big crisis” (cf. Dangerman 2013) asthe ecological crisis is simply ‘too urgent’ to waitfor wide social support. In response to the con-cern that democracy can halt action on sustain-ability, numerous experts and scholars call formore powerful global institutions53 and authori-tarian forms of government (Mims 2011; Fried-man 2009)54 that can “implement the scientificconsensus on climate change” (Shearman andSmith 2007: 4; Pielke 2013).55 Although this

50A majority of people are concerned about climatechange (Leiserowitz 2006; Carson et al. 2010). There is asimilarity here between climate change and gun restrictionlaws in the USA. In the USA, more than 90% of votersare in favour of doing background checks on gun buyers,but due to strong lobbying from the weapon industry, thisis not democratically translated into regulation.51Rand (2011) shows in a comparison of Cuba and theUSA that sustainable development can indeed exist andgrow in countries that do not possess a democratic form ofgovernance, despite the fact that Chapter two of Agenda21 forges a conceptual link between democracy andsustainable development. Rand argues that (multiparty)democracy is not the exclusive ideology or form ofgovernment for sustainable development to thrive.Instead, the values of respecting human rights and ofstewarding resources in a responsible manner must bepromoted and divorced from one political ideology.52For example, nominating a limited number of candi-dates can limit the options for voters, hinders initiative insociety and discourages individual responsibility. Majori-tarian and party systems limit options (for example forminority factions to be heard) and control voting prefer-ences of party members. Party coherence depends onfixed ideological and public policy programs, whereas thecomplexity of sustainability challenges shows the limita-tions of ideologies. As many parliamentary systems arebased on adversarial and aggressive styles of debate, theydrown innovative dissenting voices rather than encouragethem. Election campaigns require increasing amounts offunding (mostly from ‘regime’ actors such as fossil fuelindustries) and are focused on conflict, strategic cateringto voter preferences and exclusion rather thanproblem-solving (Hassal 1991).

53Biermann et al. (2012) suggested: ‘most of us seesubstantial benefits in upgrading the United NationsEnvironment Programme to a specialised UN agency forenvironmental protection, along the lines of the WorldHealth Organization or the International Labour Organi-zation’. Efforts have been ongoing for decades toconceptualize an improved global environmental gover-nance regime, for example, by calling for a ‘WorldEnvironmental Organization’, but ‘if governments havenot deemed it advisable to amalgamate environmentalfunctions at the national level, why should one assume itwould be advantageous at the international plane?’(Charnovitz 2002).54At the 2014 WEF meeting in Davos, for example,UNFCCC chief Figueres suggested that China hassucceeded in its climate policies because its ‘politicalsystem avoids some of the legislative hurdles seen incountries including the USA’. For discussions along thesame lines, see http://grist.org/article/2011-01-21-is-chinas-quasi-dictatorship-better-prepared-for-the-21st-centur/ andhttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/opinion/09friedman.html?_r=0.55Other scholars that have voiced concerns about theincapability of democracy to address climate change andother planetary boundaries meaningfully and call for more


http://grist.org/article/2011-01-21-is-chinas-quasi-dictatorship-better-prepared-for-the-21st-centur/

http://grist.org/article/2011-01-21-is-chinas-quasi-dictatorship-better-prepared-for-the-21st-centur/

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/opinion/09friedman.html%3f_r%3d0

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/opinion/09friedman.html%3f_r%3d0

attention for taking strong climate action seemsapplaudable, it is important to avoid new prob-lems, including inequalities, ‘power inflation’,56

democratic deficits and disregard of values ofstakeholders. Furthermore, the bargaining costsof crafting global institutions are high, and cor-respondingly bigger players can more easily bearthese costs.

According to Heifetz (1994), technical prob-lems can be solved by expertise and traditional,top-down management (‘technocracy’). Butwicked, ‘adaptive’ problems, such as unsustain-ability, climate change and poverty, requireinnovation, learning and attention for local val-ues. Thus, even if some experts see it as desirableto create a ‘WTO-like’, global authority that canimpose an allocation of emissions rights, it willbe challenging to make such an entity legitimateand effective (Hajer 2000). As autocracies areineffective and unadaptive,57 Stehr (2015) arguesthat democracy needs to be enhanced. One wayto enhance democracy is reducing social andeconomic inequality in order not to let the ero-sion of democracy be an unnecessary suppres-sion of social complexity and human rights.58 In

this sense, achieving the SDGs (especially SDG1 on poverty eradication and SDG 10 on reduc-ing inequality) can enhance democracy.

Deliberative governance for the SDGs

There have been continued calls for integrat-ing democratic theory and practice into transitionmanagement and into sustainability governancemore generally (e.g. Hendriks and Grin 2007;Meadowcroft 2009; Stirling 2014). However, asargued above, the effectiveness of democracy canbe questioned when it comes to sustainability.The question then becomes: what options are leftif centralized, global, authoritarian and purelytechnocratic approaches to climate governanceare not desirable, and if conventional forms ofdemocracy are not effective?

One way forward would be to think in termsof dispersed, reflexive and deliberative democ-racy. A key task for sustainability governancewould then be to encourage (transnational) pub-lic spheres rather than large-scale institutionalreforms. (cf. Dryzek 2000) Deliberation plays akey role in the theories of transition management,polycentricity, network governance, metagover-nance and experimentalist governance asexplained in Chap. 2.59

In the complex, multiple objective, multiplestakeholder environment of transition gover-nance, ‘discourse and deliberation are at least assignificant skills as scientific analysis or investi-gation’60 (Gregory et al. 2006: 733). According

‘encompassing’ forms of governance based on needsidentified by science are Beeson (2010), Lovelock (2009—‘climate change may be as severe as a war’), andSchnellnhuber. However, they have been criticized byothers, such as Pielke: http://rogerpielkejr.blogspot.se/2013/04/planetary-boundries-as-power-grab.html?spref=tw. Similarly, free-market-oriented economists (e.g. Mil-ton Friedman) have criticized the efficiency of democracybased on the argument that voters are irrational.56Just like in the process of monetary inflation, Avelinohas suggested that power also loses value when it is‘overused’. Much of the debates over sustainabilityrevolve around ‘environmental limits’. In the same waythat we need to be careful in trespassing ‘ecologicalthresholds’, the use of power also has a ‘delicate balance’(‘social thresholds’ or ‘tipping points’), in which a greatdeal of time is necessary to create its basis of trust andlegitimacy.57Representative democracy as the dominant politicalconcept in Western countries may be in decay (In’t Veld2010), but as Zane notes in the International New YorkTimes of 14 September 2015 (p. 7): ‘Western democracyalways seems to be in crisis—which may be its greateststrength. When the dizzying velocity of change seems tobe the only constant in the world, democracy has provedsupple and stable enough to respond, adapt and evolveand, thereby, endure’.

58Hayek (1960) noted that science as it advances tend topromote ‘more deliberate and comprehensive control ofall human activities’ because ‘those intoxicated by theadvance of knowledge so often become the enemies offreedom’.59According to Ansell (2011), for example, experimen-talist governance is based on ‘a recursive cycle’: ‘[p]roblems generate reflection, which generates deliberation,which may produce a refined definition of the problem’.For Cohen and Sabel (1997: 332–333), ‘The legitimacy ofan experimentalist scheme is enhanced to the extent thateffective opportunities are available for stakeholders toparticipate in its deliberations’.60Whereas ‘deliberation’ refers to the quality with which adiscussion may be conducted, ‘discourse’ is purelydescriptive and analytical.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0475-0_2

http://rogerpielkejr.blogspot.se/2013/04/planetary-boundries-as-power-grab.html%3fspref%3dtw



to Sen (2003), while democracy as voting is aWestern construct, democracy as public reasonand discussion is more universal. If democracy ismore about deliberation, reasoned argument andpublic reflection than voting, then the legitimacyof governance could be generated through pro-cesses of deliberation among diverse societalactors.

Against the background of an increase in callsfor deliberative and participatory approaches61 tothe SDGs and sustainability governance morebroadly, proposals for activating society as awhole have come up in practice. The ‘participa-tion society’ and network governance are comingto the fore because of the relative decline andchanging role of the state. Concepts such as ‘BigSociety’ (as opposed to ‘Big Government’) andin the Netherlands the terms ‘ParticipatieSamenleving’ (‘Participative Society’, in whichthe elderly for example are more taken care of bytheir children and friends) and ‘energetic soci-ety’62 are popular with decision-makers (Hajer2011). The ‘open government’ and ‘open data’ideas function as enablers of participation as theyimply that citizens have the right to access thedocuments and proceedings of the government inorder to enable effective public oversight. Thecommitment to open data is a force for public

accountability and scrutiny (Yu and Robinson2012).63

The benefits and functions of deliberativegovernance for the SDGs

Some benefits of deliberation in the context ofgovernance for the SDGs are:

• The emergence and new consideration ofenvironmental values;

• Including a more diverse set of individualsand groups (in particular women) into theprocess as a counterweight to well-resourcedvested interests;

• Increasing interaction between citizen–par-ticipants and experts;

• Supporting more legitimate and efficientdecisions (Arias-Maldonado 2007); and

• Challenging dominant discourses and norms,addressing power disparities throughempowerment and opening opportunities forreflection (Elgert 2011).

Norton (2015) maintains that deliberativeprocesses should not be seen as alternatives for,but rather complements to existing, representa-tive government (e.g., by giving advice andmaking proposals for improved sustainabilitypolicies). Thus, deliberations in themselves maynot necessarily result in decisions, rules andnorms, but they can create a demand for regu-lation and make regulation more acceptable.

61Participation is sometimes equalled with deliberation;see e.g. Djalante et al. (2011: 5). Principle 10 of the RioDeclaration of 1992 states that environmental issues arebest handled with the participation of all concernedcitizens, that each individual shall have appropriate accessto information concerning the environment held by publicauthorities, and that countries should provide effectiveaccess to judicial and administrative proceedings, includ-ing redress and remedy. Principle 10 of the Rio Decla-ration paved the way for the Aarhus Convention (UNECE1998), the most prominent and elaborate internationalprocedural instrument on participation in environmentalgovernance.62An ‘energetic society’ perspective highlights the trans-formative potential of sustainability initiatives undertakenby various actors in societies around the world. Suchactors can be articulate, autonomous citizens, civil societyinitiatives, self-organized farmers, cities and innovativecompanies that take action in diverse contexts. Wheregovernments are retreating from the direct provision ofpublic goods, the energetic society steps in and providespublic services such as green areas, local energy provisionand provision of knowledge through citizen science.

63The Open Government Partnership (OGP) is a multi-lateral initiative that works to ‘secure concrete commit-ments from governments to promote transparency,empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness newtechnologies to strengthen governance’. The OGP collab-orates with individual countries to develop action plans oncitizen participation, ‘access-to-information’ laws, andanti-corruption disclosures, together with measures toimprove services, promote innovation and appropriatelymanage resources. The OGP publicly tracks progress andprovides independent reports and assessments in order topromote accountability between member governmentsand citizens.


Design thinking

Design thinking is a design methodology thatprovides a solution-based approach to solvingproblems and that can be a useful tool in pro-cesses of deliberative governance. Designthinking can be useful in tackling complex sus-tainability problems by engaging people thatwere previously unengaged in addressing envi-ronmental and sustainability issues. Designthinking methods lead to many solutions, stim-ulating creativity and idea generation that arriveat a variety of innovation types (see Fig. 3.8).Thus, design thinking can be used for identifyingnew products and services that confirm to con-sumers’ wishes and needs (thus giving thecompanies that offer those goods and services acompetitive advantage) and that are at the sametime more sustainable.

The five stages for design thinking proposedby the Hasso-Plattner Institute of Design atStanford University (also see Fig. 3.9) are asfollows:

1. Empathize: gain an empathic understandingof the problem; consult experts to find outmore about the area of concern throughobserving, engaging and empathizing withpeople to understand their experiences andmotivations; experience the physical envi-ronment to have a deeper personal under-standing of the issues involved.

2. Define (the problem): put together the infor-mation that was created and gathered duringthe empathize stage; analyse observations andsynthesize them in order to define the coreproblem(s) as a problem statement in ahuman-centred manner.

3. Ideate: start generating ideas, and identifynew solutions to the problem statement thatwas created in step 2; start to look for alter-native ways of viewing the problem. Ideationtechniques include Brainstorm, Brainwrite,Worst Possible Idea and SCAMPER.

4. Prototype: produce a number of inexpensive,scaled down versions of the product or ser-vice to investigate the problem solutions

Fig. 3.8 Nine different types of innovation. Source Lean Ventures (2016)


generated in the previous stage. This is anexperimental phase, and the aim is to identifythe best possible solution for each of theproblems identified during the first threestages. The solutions are implemented withinthe prototypes, and one-by-one, they areinvestigated and either accepted, improvedand re-examined, or rejected based on theusers’ experiences. By the end of this stage,the design team will have a better idea of theconstraints inherent within the product, theproblems that are present, and have abetter/more informed perspective of how realusers would behave, think and feel wheninteracting with the end product.

5. Test: test the complete product using the bestsolutions identified during the prototypingphase. This is the final stage of the five-stagemodel, but in an iterative process, the resultsgenerated during the testing phase are oftenused to refine solutions and redefine one ormore problems (based on Dam and Siang2017).

In this direct and linear design thinking pro-cess, one stage seemingly leads to the next with alogical conclusion at user testing. However, in

practice, the process is carried out in a moreflexible and nonlinear fashion. For example,more than one stage may be conducted concur-rently by different groups within the design team,or stages may be switched. Also, results from thetesting phase may reveal some insights aboutusers, which in turn may lead to another brain-storming session (ideation) or the developmentof new prototypes.

As Fig. 3.9 demonstrates, one of the mainbenefits of thefive-stagemodel is theway inwhichknowledge acquired at the later stages can feed-back to earlier stages. Information is continuallyused to both inform the understanding of theproblem and solution spaces and to redefine theproblem(s). This creates a perpetual loop, in whichthe designers continue to gain new insights,develop new ways of viewing the product and itspossible uses and develop a greater understandingof the users and the problems they face (ibid.).

To maximize the benefits of design thinking,one can apply ‘whole system thinking’ inresponse to sustainability challenges. Rather thansimply ʻbalancingʼ or ʻtrading off’ different sus-tainability objectives, an integrative designapproach ‘at every level, from technical devicesto production systems to companies to economic

Fig. 3.9 Five-step design thinking process. Source Dam and Siang (The Interaction Design Foundation) (2017)


sectors to entire cities and societies’, (Hawkenet al. 1999: xi). For example, a building thatemploys passive solar principles and eco-efficientmaterials in a systematic way can remove theneed for expensive cooling or heating equipmentthat would otherwise be required. Such anopportunity would be missed if only the sus-tainability (for example, energy efficiency) ofthat cooling or heating equipment was considered(Hawken et al. 1999: 87).

Citizens’ relience on the judiciary

If neither the legislative nor the executive bran-ches of government fulfil their duties in takingaction on climate change, another venue for cit-izens to voice their demand for mitigating cli-mate change is the judiciary. The European Courtof Justice has recognized climate change in 2001when it stated that ‘emissions of greenhousegases are amongst the main causes of climatechange’ (European Court of Justice 2001).64

The US Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that ‘therisk of catastrophic harm [from climate change],though remote, is nevertheless real’ (SupremeCourt of the United States 2007).65 In June 2015,in a landmark case a Dutch court ruled in favourof a group of almost 900 concerned citizens andUrgenda who claimed that the State of theNetherlands did not fulfil its obligations in termsof climate change mitigation. This was the firsttime a court determined that states have anindependent legal obligation regarding climatechange mitigation towards their citizens. Similarcases are coming before courts in other countries.

An example from the USA is the AtmosphericTrust Litigation Project, which initiates lawsuitson behalf of young people in all fifty US states torequire the state and federal governments to fulfiltheir obligation to protect the atmosphere as acommon property (Wood 2009). The lawsuits

argue that the atmosphere belongs as a commonto all people, of current and future generations.Governments serve them as trustees but do notown the atmosphere. The lawsuits seek declara-tive judgment applying the public trust doctrineto the earth’s atmosphere and ask the courts toissue injunctions ordering federal and state gov-ernments to reduce carbon emissions to fulfiltheir duty to protect it.

3.3 Conclusions: Bringing ActorsTogether in Order to Achievethe SDGs

The first part of this chapter on the various actorsinvolved in governance for the SDGs has shownthat the popularity of the term governance insteadof government in itself suggests that governancesystems now operate in a more fluid way. Thismeans that governance systems increasingly needto involve actors from different sectors and juris-dictions. However, fragmentation among institu-tions and processes as a barrier to effectivegovernance for the SDGs indicates the need forcoherence in sustainability governance. And theinterdependence of many different actors makessustainability transitions ‘inherently political,moved forward by processes of (dis)agreement,contestation, competition, negotiation, compro-mise and conflict’ (Frantzeskaki et al. 2017: 14).

The exploration in this chapter indicates thatgovernance modes can be placed along a con-tinuum which runs between the two opposingstyles or ‘poles’ of hierarchical state interventionon one end and self-organized or networkedsocietal autonomy on the other end. The rise ofnetwork and transnational governance does notmean the end of government authority, but itcalls for a redefinition of existing governance inorder to make it fit for achieving the SDGs.

As it can be challenging for governance actorsto implement the SDGs in isolation, innovativeforms of policy-making need to cross the bordersof policy areas, the public and private sectors, theborders of territorial jurisdictions and, most ofall, established ways of thinking. The state con-tinues to play a central role in governance

64Case C-379/98. The text of the judgment from theEuropean Court of Justice is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:61998CJ037965In: Massachusetts versus EPA. The opinion of the USSupreme Court in this case is available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf.


http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/%3furi%3dCELEX:61998CJ0379



http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/06pdf/05-1120.pdf

arrangements reflecting the broader argumentthat we have seen an evolution of the role of thestate, rather than a decline. The question is not(only) how the state can regain legitimacy andeffectiveness of sustainability governance bymaking the process more efficient, transparent orinclusive. Instead, governmental agency couldcoordinate networks and coalitions for the SDGswhile safeguarding basic values such as unity indiversity and equity.

One notable trend is the increasing recogni-tion of the importance of local government andcities in governance for the SDGs. Hence, it isimportant to organize SDG implementation ter-ritorially and functionally and to understand howthe (sub-)national, international and transnationaldomains of governance interact. It is in that sensethat the SDGs represent both challenges andopportunities for coordination, coherence andintegration between all levels of governance,and a challenge to effective and inclusivegovernance.

Individuals have been categorized in thischapter as ‘non-traditional governance actors’ asthe role of the individual in SDG governance hasbecome subject to research fairly recently. At thesame time, individuals play a decisive role inachieving the SDGs, both through their ownbehaviour and by being active within entities atdifferent levels of ‘traditional’ governance.

Now that governance for the SDGs has broadlybeen described in terms of the stakeholder land-scape, Chap. 4 next answers the question “how arethe SDGs governed in specific cases?”

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4Exploring Some Specific Case Studies

AbstractThis chapter contains the four specific casestudies for this book:

(1) The first case study concerns the decar-bonization of the global economy (SDG 13);

(2) The second case study is about ways inwhich energy efficiency can contribute toachieving the SDGs;

(3) The third case study is focused on the ‘wa-ter–energy–food–climate’ nexus or, in otherwords, the ways in which the domains ofwater, energy, food, and climate influenceeach other and how governance can betteraddress these linkages;

(4) The fourth case study is about the rapidlyevolving governance of trade in sustainableenergy technologies (SETs). The case showshow trade disputes, top-down ambitions andbottom-up initiatives provide the dynamicsfor a new global agreement that can unlockthe forces of globalization in the quest for alow-carbon economy and

A detailed investigation of these cases studies iswarranted for the following reasons:

• These combined fields (e.g. trade and sus-tainable energy) are examples of dynamicgovernance areas in search of a sustainabledirection;

• The sustainability challenges addressed in thecases require multilevel governance (thisincludes taking global perspectives intoaccount);

• The case studies show that sustainabilitydiscourses can be conflicting both with eachother and with other economic, political andsocial discourses;

• The selected case studies are sufficientlydiverse to provide valid but general and pre-liminary insights into the various dynamics ingovernance for the SDGs.

KeywordsCase studies � Decarbonization � Energyefficiency � Water–energy–food nexusTrade � Environmental goods and services

4.1 Case Study 1: Decarbonizationof the Global Economy (SDGs 7and 13)

SDGs 7 (Ensure access to affordable, reliable,sustainable and modern energy for all) and SDG13 (Take urgent action to combat climate changeand its impacts), together with the Paris ClimateAgreement provide mandates for deep decar-bonization of the global economy. SDG 7 can beconsidered as an enabling factor for the


83




implementation of the other SDGs, and in par-ticular of SDG 13 on climate change mitigationand adaptation.

4.1.1 Decarbonization Challenges

Global energy demand is expected to double by2050 (World Energy Council 2013). As a result,global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are pro-jected to increase at least until 2030 (IPCC 2014;IEA 2015)1 and might double by 2050 comparedwith 1990 (ibid.). Such an increase in emissionswould result in a 4–6 °C rise in global temper-ature as a result of self-reinforcing2 warming.While adaptation of ecological, economic andsocial systems to slightly rising temperaturesshould be feasible, the 6 °C average rise inglobal temperatures that the world is headed forby the end of this century can trigger the break-down of many of those systems (World Bank2012, 2013; IEA 2014a). The IPCC foresees, forinstance, that many parts of the world will sufferfrom flooding, drought, the loss of biodiversity,3

coastal erosion, wildfires, the spread of newdiseases and a reduction in crop productivity.UNDP foresees that the number of people thatwill be displaced because of climate changeranges from 200 million to 1 billion (UNDP2009: 45).

The challenge that the world faces is that inorder to limit global warming to the globallydetermined4 target of maximum 2 °C, by 2050GHG emissions will need to be cut by 50–85%while satisfying the doubling demand for energy.At the same time, billions of people are expectedto join the middle class (OECD 2010; EU 2012)and its carbon-intensive lifestyle.

It has been suggested that with existing tech-nologies, a global energy system that depends for100% on renewables would be feasible (WWF2011; Greenpeace 2015).5 However, as, e.g.Trainer (2007) argues, it is challenging to supporta growing consumer society of 9 billion peopleby using current forms of renewable energy.6

‘The’ energy transition involves moving toenergy sources with lower power density, whichcan reduce the average productivity of theeconomy as a whole. This makes the energytransition a tough political challenge and impliesthe importance of the social-political acceptability

1To the surprise of many experts, preliminary data fromthe IEA show that the growth in global CO2 emissionsfrom the energy sector stalled in 2014 despite globaleconomic growth of 3%. This is significant as it marks thefirst time in 40 years that CO2 emissions have stalled orfallen in the absence of an economic downturn. The IEAsuggests that global efforts to reduce greenhouse gasemissions through energy efficiency and renewableenergy (particularly in China) may be having a largerimpact than previously thought http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/news/2015/march/global-energy-related-emissions-of-carbon-dioxide-stalled-in-2014.html.2Examples of climate change feedback are the melting ofthe polar caps which leads to the heating up of sea water,which reflects less heat than ice; methane which evapo-rates as the tundra permafrost and arctic areas heat up; andincreased incidence of forest fires which cause GHGemissions.315–37% of all species may become extinct by 2050 dueto climate change (Thomas et al. 2004).

4Almost all parties to the UNFCCC have now agreed topursue the aim of limiting global warming to 2 °C abovethe pre-industrial level at the UNFCCC conferences ofparties (COP) in Copenhagen (COP 15) and Cancun(COP 16). It is important to note that the 2 °C target wasrather arbitrarily chosen and according to Victor andKennel (2014), it is both politically and scientificallywrong-headed.5See, e.g. WWF’s ‘The Energy Report: 100% RenewableEnergy by 2050’, available at https://www.ecofys.com/files/files/ecofys-wwf-2011-the-energy-report.pdf and theGreenpeace ‘Energy [R]evolution’ report, available athttp://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/climate/2015/Energy-Revolution-2015-Full.pdf.6This is mainly due to the intermittent nature andinefficiency of renewables such as solar and wind, andeven apart from the lower Energy Return on EnergyInvestment (EROEI). In terms of biofuel, the current viewamong the main researchers is that it should be possible toproduce about 7 GJ of ethanol from each tonne ofbiomass. Developed country per capita consumption ofliquid fuels represents 128 GJ per year, requiring16.3 tone of biomass each year. With an optimal biomassyield of 7 t/ha/y, we would need 2.6 ha of land growingbiomass to provide for one person’s net liquid and gasconsumption. 9 billion people would need 24 billionhectares of biomass plantations. However, the world’stotal land area is only 13 billion hectares (Trainer 2007).

84 4 Exploring Some Specific Case Studies

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of lower economic growth in the short run.7

Building up the required stock of renewable energyfurther calls for upfront inputs of fossil fuels andcan increase emissions from the manufacturing ofrenewable energy equipment in the short term.8

However, Sgouridis et al. (2015) find that aglobal transition from a fossil-based energyeconomy to one based on renewable energy isfeasible even though such a transition requires anupfront energy investment that subtracts from thenet energy available to society. The realization ofa global low-carbon transition requires a dou-bling of the ratio of investment9 in renewableenergy from less than 0.2–5.6% in 2055. Fig-ure 4.1 shows possible energy trajectories thatcan provide 2000 kWh net per capita (the lowerlimit energy need for maintaining an acceptablequality of life in a technical society) by 2100.Delaying the replacement of fossil-based energywith renewables may deteriorate the security ofenergy supply in the long term as it will be morechallenging to find the energy inputs for pro-ducing renewables once the exploitation of fossilfuels slows down or declines. Therefore, it isurgent to efficiently use fossil fuels for buildingup renewable energy equipment (ibid.).

Global investment (in monetary terms) inrenewable energy meanwhile should be four to

ten times higher than its current value to realize asustainable energy transition (Sgouridis andCsala 2014). An additional $1 trillion per year isneeded up to 2050 to finance a low-emissiontransition (IEA 2014b) that can limit globalwarming to 2 °C and avoid the worst effects ofclimate change.

The impacts of a global energy transition onemployment are uncertain. Whereas some studiesclaim that energy transitions will negativelyaffect employment,10 Greenpeace (2015) fore-sees that a transition to 100% renewable energyby 2050 could by 2030 result in the creation of20 million additional jobs in the global energysector compared to following existing policiesand would result in fuel savings of 1.1 trillionUSD annually. Still, the cost of fossil fuel sub-sidies is around 5.2 trillion USD per year if allnegative externalities of fossil fuel use arecounted as subsidies (IMF 2015).11 Subsidies forrenewable energy are only a fraction of thatamount.12 Diverting hundreds of billions ofdollars in subsidies from fossil fuels to renewableenergy and cutting energy waste would reduceexpected annual economic growth rates by just

7UNEP’s (2011) idea of the green economy includes theidea of investing in the natural capital base. According toUNEP’s modelling this may lead to lower economicgrowth in the short run, but higher growth in the longterm.8If an energy system, in addition to declining EROEI,faces a decline of fossil fuel supply, it may be faced withan ‘energy trap’ as replacing the lost fossil fuel input withrenewables will require up-front energy investment tobuild the renewable energy infrastructure, which multi-plies the decline of available fossil fuels. Also see http://physics.ucsd.edu/do-the-math/2011/10/the-energy-trap/.The idea of ‘solar breeders’ is intended to overcome thischallenge. A solar breeder is a solar power plant that usesits own energy to build more solar power plants. Such aplant could become not only energy self-sufficient but amajor supplier of new energy. In theory, it can reproduceexponentially, hence the name ‘breeder’.9Renewable energy investment ratio is the fraction of theenergy which society invests in building renewableenergy capital over total available energy.

10Based on input–output models, Frondel et al. (2010)suggest that energy transitions in Germany may diminishoverall employment because of crowding out effects ofgovernment subsidies for renewables instead of privateinvestment in cheaper forms of conventional energygeneration, lowered purchasing power of consumers andfirms, and the indirect impacts of higher electricity priceson upstream industries. Other studies (e.g. Mathiesenet al. 2011; Lehr et al. 2012) foresee positive impacts ofrenewable energy development on employment in Den-mark and Germany, respectively, especially in the exportindustry related to renewables.11Direct subsidies for fossil fuels are about USD 500billion per year. However, including all externalitiesincluding damage caused by climate change and airpollution raises the cost of fossil fuel subsidies to USD 5.2trillion per year. Total subsidies for fossil fuels are higherthan those for renewable energy, but per unit of electricitygenerated, subsidies for renewable energy are higher.12Global subsidies for renewables reached USD 121billion in 2013. (IEA 2014b) It should be noted that thefossil energy sources that are subsidized most (mainlyliquid fuels for transportation) in many cases do notdirectly compete with the renewable generation ofelectricity.

4.1 Case Study 1: Decarbonization of the Global Economy (SDGs 7 and 13) 85

http://physics.ucsd.edu/do-the-math/2011/10/the-energy-trap/

http://physics.ucsd.edu/do-the-math/2011/10/the-energy-trap/

0.06% (IPCC 2014).13 Moreover, removal of fossilfuel subsidies could result in a global reduction incarbon emissions of about 13% (IMF 2015).

Nevertheless, delaying climate action by 2030would increase costs of decarbonization by 50%compared with immediate action (Fig. 4.2),

(World Bank 2015). According to the WorldBank, not waiting for technological developmentand ‘magic bullets’ to curb emissions butearly-stage investment and commitments candrive the cost of climate action down. The cost ofsolar power, for example, fell dramaticallybecause a global market for solar PV panels wascreated (also see the case study on trade in sus-tainable energy technologies in Chap. 5).

Fig. 4.1 Renewable energy portfolio installation trajec-tory for 2000 W net available energy per capita in 2100.Note a SET-compliant primary energy supply evolution(in PWh) for providing 2000 W average net power percapita by 2100 to a population of 10.8 billion. Fossil fuelemissions comply with a 990 Gt CO2 cap peaking in 2020and phased-out by 2075. b RE portfolio installation rate

profile (in TWp/year). Inset shows the evolution of theweighted-average, composite RE EROEI (black line) withan initial value of 20 and the EROEI values for eachtechnology. c Installed RE Capacity (in TWp). Insetmagnifies the 1990–2014 historical values (dotted lines)versus the modelled curves. Source Sgouridis et al. (2016)

13This would add up to a 5% smaller global economy bythe end of the twenty-first century compared withbusiness-as-usual scenarios.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0475-0_5

If emissions continue to rise beyond 2020, oreven remain level, the temperature goals set inParis become almost unattainable and this wouldput the attainment of the SDGs at grave risk(Mission 2020, 2017). Humanity is left with a‘carbon budget’ of between 150 and 1050 giga-tonnes (Gt) of CO2 to meet the Paris target of1.5 °C or well below 2 °C (Peters 2017).

At the current emission rate of 41 Gt of CO2

per year, the midpoint of 600 Gt of CO2 would

be passed in 15 years. We need a gradual descentin emissions so that the global economy has thetime to adapt smoothly. It is still possible to meetthe Paris temperature goals if emissions begin tofall by 2020 (see Fig. 4.3).

The good news is that GHG emissions arealready decoupling from economic growth. From2014 to 2016, worldwide CO2 emissions fromfossil fuels have stayed flat, while the globaleconomy has grown by at least 3.1% per year

Fig. 4.2 Rate of emissions decreases required forreaching the 2° target. Note Peak year refers to the yearin which emissions have reached their highest level andstart to decline. Delaying the peak year by just a fewyears, say from 2010 to 2020, entails increasing the rateof annual emissions reduction from 3% to 4.5–5.5%. The

figure also reports the fastest historical decarbonizationrate achieved over a five-year period (outside of periodsof economic collapse) and the decarbonization rateimplied by the European Union’s commitment between2008 and 2020. EU = European Union. Source Fay et al.(2015)


(IEA 2017a).14 Interestingly, in previous instan-ces in which global emissions have fallen orstagnated, this was due to global economicpredicaments, but in the current one is not thecase.

4.1.2 Decarbonization Opportunities

Climate change has traditionally been framed interms of international negotiations, economicrestraint and historical responsibility. The ratio-nale behind developing renewable energy goesbeyond climate change mitigation and includesgrowth of the cleantech sector, green jobs,15

providing access to sustainable energy for all,16

and enhancing energy security and indepen-dence. Lower prices for sustainable energytechnologies (SETs) are claimed to contribute togreen growth, competitiveness and a reduction intaxpayer support for energy, freeing up govern-ment resources for other purposes.

As an indication, according to the IEA(2014c) replacing fossil fuels with renewables asthe world’s primary source of energy could savethe global economy USD 71 trillion until 2050.And according to the World Bank (2014),addressing climate change would help grow theworld economy, adding up to USD 2.6 trillion ayear to global GDP in the coming decades (CCC2013).17 These calculations do not include allother benefits of cutting fossil fuel use such as

Fig. 4.3 Carbon crunch.Source Figures et al. (2017)

14Emissions from the USA fell the most: by 3% last year,while its GDP grew by 1.6%. In China, CO2 emissionsfell by 1% in 2016, and its economy expanded by 6.7%(IEA 2017c).15Renewable energy tends to create more jobs—particu-larly in the services sector—per unit of generatedelectricity than traditional fossil fuel-based energy. (Weiet al. 2010; UNIDO and GGGI 2015).

16There are 1.6 billion people without access to modernforms of energy today.17Also the UK’s Committee on climate change shows thatdecarbonisation would result in substantial cost savings:http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/1720_EMR_report_web.pdf.


http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/1720_EMR_report_web.pdf

http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/1720_EMR_report_web.pdf

improved health18 and energy security.19 Windpower, for example, is in many cases alreadycheaper than both coal and gas when healthimpacts are factored in (Ecofys 2014).

According to the IEA and IRENA (2017),renewable energy can contribute to about 44% ofthe total mitigation of GHG emissions in 2020.Almost as much potential for decreasing GHGemissions in the short to medium term lies inimproving energy efficiency according to theIEA and IRENA (as highlighted in Fig. 4.4below). Case study 2 below looks deeper into therole of energy efficiency in achieving variousSDGs.

4.2 Case Study 2: Energy Efficiencyand the SDGs

SDG Target 7.3 is ‘doubling the global rate ofimprovement in energy efficiency by 2030’.Access to energy and renewable energy (SDGTargets 7.1 and 7.2, respectively) has typicallybeen prioritized compared to energy efficiency.However, the prominence of energy efficiencyhas risen on global, regional, national and sub-national agendas reflecting the low cost and arrayof multiple benefits on offer.

Doubling the rate of improvement in energyefficiency means that energy intensity (primaryenergy demand divided by GDP into real terms)needs to be raised from a baseline over the period

of 1990–2010 of 1.3% per year to an averageannual 2.6% improvement between 2010 and2030 (IEA and WB 2015).

It is widely recognized that improving energyefficiency is a vital condition for implementingglobal mandates that are both directly and indi-rectly related to the SDGs, such as those pro-vided by the Paris Climate Agreement, theSustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative(Sustainable Energy for All 2013),20 and theClean Energy Ministerial (2017),21 among oth-ers. The prominence of energy efficiency hasgrown in recent years and there is a need forclarifying the linkages with the other SDGs. Thiscase study addresses that need by identifying thelinkages between energy efficiency and theachievement of some specific SDGs. The mainresearch question that this section address is:What contributions can energy efficiency make toachieving the SDGs?

This question will be addressed throughanswering the following next subquestions:

• What are key terms and concepts related toenergy efficiency?

• What are the drivers and barriers for energyefficiency?

• How can energy efficiency be a conceptual‘vector’ for connecting different SDGs?

• Which governance approaches and tools areavailable for increasing the likelihood thatenergy efficiency will contribute to achievingthe SDGs in a coherent manner?

4.2.1 What Is Energy Efficiency?

The International Energy Agency (IEA) definesenergy efficiency as ‘a way of managing andrestraining the growth in energy consumption’(IEA 2017b).22 A common operational definitionof energy efficiency is ‘using less energy toprovide the same service’ (Lawrence Berkeley

18Massive savings to health care spending can be had ifgovernments implement a cap-and-trade carbon reductionprogram. (Thompson et al. 2014) And in developingcountries, according to the IEA (2010), ‘there are morepeople dying from smoke from biomass for cooking thanfrom malaria or tuberculosis today. By 2030 over 4000people will die prematurely every day from the effects ofindoor smoke’. Better access to modern cook-stoves suchas those based on solar or cleaner biomass fuels canreduce mortality from indoor air pollution caused byinefficient firewood or charcoal-based cooking and canalso halt deforestation caused by firewood collection.19E.g. the USA spends USD 50 billion per year onmilitary to keep access to the Persian Gulf. (Stern 2010)USA interests in the Gulf are expected to decline as theUSA becomes less dependent on oil from the MiddleEast. China’s dependence on oil from the Middle East oilon the other hand is expected to increase sharply.

20http://www.SEforall.org/.21http://www.cleanenergyministerial.org/.22Also see: https://www.iea.org/topics/energyefficiency/.


http://www.SEforall.org/

http://www.cleanenergyministerial.org/

https://www.iea.org/topics/energyefficiency/

National Laboratory). The term ‘sustainableenergy’ generally includes both energy efficiencyand renewable energy.

4.2.2 Barriers to Improved EnergyEfficiency

The barriers and drivers for improved energyefficiency are well known and so are the requiredeconomic and technological tools. The barriersare usually divided in six main categories: eco-nomic impediments (e.g. investment risks, fossilfuel subsidies, and low cost of energy); gaps inknowledge and awareness; cultural and beha-vioural barriers (e.g. public apathy and inertia);governance (e.g. lack of leadership and institu-tional barriers); aesthetic and environmentalchallenges and technical barriers.

4.2.3 Drivers for Improving EnergyEfficiency

Some main drivers for implementing energyefficiency measures can be pointed out. Aware-ness of benefits for both individuals and societyplays a crucial role (Reddy 2013). Althougheducational and promotional activities areimportant, a high level of awareness is usuallynot sufficient to attract private investment and

guarantee market success. Economically, theprice of a technology is an important factor todetermine its market penetration. Behaviouralfactors (e.g. appeal of a technology) play a roleas drivers as well.

There are many co-benefits of improvingenergy efficiency beyond traditional energy sav-ings and emissions reductions at the national andconsumer level. At the national level, theco-benefits include improved air quality, positiveimpacts on public budgets and job creationamong others (IEA 2014c; Puig and Farrell2015).

Finally, environmental regulations can driveinvestments in energy efficiency. Environmentalregulations (e.g. taxing carbon emissions) canforce producers and consumers to internalizeexternalities such as climate change into the priceof their energy goods and services, and driveenergy efficiency.

4.2.4 Energy Efficiency Acrossthe SDGs

Those concerned with SDG7 on sustainableenergy must take into account targets that refer toother goals, which may provide stronger incen-tives than in the past for cross-sector, integratedwork. Energy is a crucial input that is requiredfor achieving virtually all SDGs. While the

Fig. 4.4 Primary CO2

emissions reduction potentialby technology in theReference Case and IRENA’sRemap scenario, 2015–2050.Source IEA and IRENA(2017)


section below commences with examining SDG7on sustainable energy, what follows is an indi-cation of how energy efficiency is important inachieving several other SDGs.

SDG 7 Ensure access to affordable, reliable,sustainable and modern energy for all

Within its ‘own’ SDG, number 7, energy effi-ciency plays an important role in relation torenewable energy. Implementing energy effi-ciency measures and renewable energy optionstogether contributes significantly to bothincreasing the renewable energy share in totalfinal energy consumption (TFEC) and accelerat-ing the rate of annual energy intensity23

improvements. Examples are very high insula-tion levels as prerequisite for positive energybuildings and the use of renewable electricity inelectric cars and heat pumps (IRENA and C2E22015).

SDG 2 End hunger, achieve food security andimproved nutrition and promote sustainableagriculture

Globally, the agri-food chain consumes 30% ofthe world’s available energy—with more than70% consumed beyond the farm gate (FAO2012). Target 2.3 sets out to double globalagricultural productivity and incomes ofsmall-scale food producers by 2030. In devel-oping countries, implementation of these objec-tives will often require mechanization (replacingmanual labour, where relevant) and industrial

processing, which both call for increased energyefficiency and energy productivity.24

Target 2.4 aims at ensuring sustainable foodproduction systems by 2030. Primary food pro-duction and the food supply chain contributeapproximately 20% of total greenhouse gasemissions (GHG) each year (FAO 2012). Anadditional 15% of GHG emissions results fromland use changes, particularly changes linked todeforestation brought about by the expansion ofagricultural land (IPCC 2007). Target 2a. opensopportunities for improving energy efficiency inthe agricultural sector as it calls for increasedinvestment in rural infrastructures such as irri-gation systems, distributed electricity networksand food storage facilities.

SDG 3: Health and Well-being

Target 3.6 aims to halve the number of globaldeaths and injuries from road traffic accidents by2020. A number of energy efficiency initiativeshave transitioned street lighting to LEDs, whichin many cases has also increased safety (alsocompared with older streetlight technologies).

According to Target 3.9, we need to ‘sub-stantially reduce the number of deaths and ill-nesses from hazardous chemicals and air, waterand soil pollution and contamination’ by 2030.Energy efficiency can reduce pollution thataffects public health (Buonocore et al. 2016).According to the IEA (2014c), both supply- anddemand-side energy efficiencies can help reducethe need for additional generation therebyreducing local pollutants.

23Declines in energy intensity (EI) are a proxy of theefficiency with which an economy is able to use energy toproduce economic output. EI can indicate efficiencyimprovements, provided (a) energy intensity is repre-sented at an appropriate level of disaggregation to providemeaningful interpretation, and (b) other explanatory andbehavioural factors are isolated and accounted for.Energyefficiency refers to the activity or product that can beproduced with a given amount of energy. At the level of aspecific technology, the difference between efficiency andenergy intensity is insignificant one is simply the inverseof the other. At the level of the aggregate economy (oreven at the level of an end-use sector) energy efficiency isnot a meaningful concept because of the heterogeneousnature of the output.

24Energy productivity is the total value gained from usinga unit of energy. Energy productivity considers the totalvalue proposition to the user and the broader economy bybetter applying energy, not just the energy efficiency ofplant and equipment. While energy intensity considers theenergy required for generating one unit of GDP, energyproductivity focuses entirely on achieving greater eco-nomic output from each individual unit of energy. In thisway, energy productivity can serve economic growth andlessen global environmental impact at the same time.(UNEP DTU 2015) Energy productivity can be anintegrating concept as it captures total value and, thus,argues for the integration of energy end-use policy withindustry/urban/agriculture policy and planning.

4.2 Case Study 2: Energy Efficiency and the SDGs 91

SDG 8 Promote inclusive and sustainable eco-nomic growth, employment and decent work forall

SDG 8 contains targets aimed at sustaining eco-nomic growth (target 8.1),25 achieving higherlevels of economic productivity (target 8.2)26 andjob creation (target 8.3). At the same time, target8.427 foresees improving resource efficiency sothat economic growth can be decoupled fromenvironmental degradation.

There is a strong correlation between energyconsumption and GDP (economic output) (Tver-berg 2015). Although energy use seems to precedeeconomic growth, yet there is no consensus on thecausal link between energy consumption andGDP. However, Baranzini et al. (2013) argue thateven in a highly industrialized and service-basedeconomy like Switzerland, economic growth hashistorically induced greater demand for energy. Onthe other hand, energy consumption (except forheating oil) does not stimulate economic growth.Only more recently, energy consumption appearsto have started to decouple from economic growthin Switzerland (ibid.). This indicates that energyconservation policies do not necessarily impedeeconomic growth.

Economic benefits of energy efficiency

Most energy efficiency measures are cheaper,and pay for themselves faster, than most kinds ofrenewable energy generation (Lawrence Berke-ley National Laboratory 1996). Many invest-ments in energy efficiency could generate at least

a 10 per cent return on investment (McKinseyGlobal Institute 2010). When spread out over anannual USD 170 billion energy efficiency marketpotential, McKinsey suggests an average 17%return across those investments (McKinsey Glo-bal Institute 2008).

At the global level, the World Energy Outlook2012 (IEA 2012) highlighted the potential forenergy efficiency to save 18% of the 2010 globalenergy consumption by 2035—while increasingglobal GDP by 0.4%. Enhanced energy effi-ciency investments could boost global cumula-tive economic output by USD 18 trillion until2035, increasing growth by 0.25–1.1% per year(IEA 2014c).

Maximizing output per unit of energyincreases GDP and can provide other macroe-conomic benefits, including higher economicgrowth, job growth, a better trade balance, lowerenergy prices and greater security of supply(Ayres and Warr 2009; Stern 2011; Warr andAyres 2012; IEA 2014c; Yushchencko and Patel2016). Energy efficiency increases outputbecause it frees up resources for other, moreproductive investments, which is why the IEAestimates that efficiency measures yield benefitsup to 2.5 times the avoided energy costs. Fur-thermore, energy-efficient industries and countrieshave a competitive cost advantage, particularly inthe face of the increased application of emissionspricing (McKinsey Global Institute 2008).

Employment benefits of energy efficiency

The manufacture and installation ofenergy-efficient equipment and materials is arelatively labour-intensive activity. Because oftheir relatively high levels of labour intensity,energy efficiency measures are widely seen in theliterature as creating more jobs than new energygeneration, which tends to be much more capitalintensive. Per million euros of investment,energy efficiency could create up to three timesas many jobs as investment in new energy gen-eration (IEA 2012). A stimulus to employmentmay also arise as a result of the export potentialof energy efficiency activities and/or the substi-tution of imported energy.

25Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance withnational circumstances and, in particular, at least 7% grossdomestic product growth per annum in the least devel-oped countries.26Achieve higher levels of economic productivity throughdiversification, technological upgrading and innovation,including through a focus on high-value added andlabour-intensive sectors.27Improve progressively, through 2030, global resourceefficiency in consumption and production and endeavourto decouple economic growth from environmental degra-dation, in accordance with the 10-year framework ofprograms on sustainable consumption and production,with developed countries taking the lead.


Investment in energy efficiency

In previous sections, the importance of invest-ment in energy efficiency has been emphasized.According to the IEA (2014c), USD 130 billionwas invested in energy efficiency in 2013.However, total annual investment necessaryglobally is approximately USD 650 billion forenergy efficiency and USD 650 billion forrenewables. Compared to current levels, thisimplies a need to grow energy efficiency invest-ments by five times and renewables investmentsby about 2.5 times in the 2012–2030 period.

SDG 9 Build resilient infrastructure, promotesustainable industrialization and fosterinnovation

Some targets in SDG 9 focus on the developmentof sustainable and resilient infrastructure (target9.1),28 and on infrastructure and industry that ismore resource-efficient through clean and envi-ronmentally sound technologies (target 9.4).29

Development factors like urbanization andindustrialization are crucial to SDG 9 and cansubstantially affect energy intensity. However,little is known about how urbanization andindustrialization affect energy intensity in devel-oping countries. Sadorsky (2013) argues thathigher industrialization increases energy inten-sity in both the short run and the long run.

In terms of innovation, R&D investments inenergy efficiency should be increased substan-tially. This need for innovation, particularly indeveloping countries, is reflected in targets 9.530

and 9.7.31 Governments should support energyefficiency-related research and promote innova-tion activities.

SDG 11 Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient andsustainable

Currently, more than half of all people live in anurban area. By 2050, the share of the world’surban population is expected to increase to 66%,with 94% of that increase occurring in develop-ing countries (UN 2014). Cities now consumeabout two-thirds of the world’s energy and areresponsible for about 70% of the world’s GHGemissions (ESMAP 2016). The net impact thaturbanization has on energy intensity is difficult topredict in theory. On the one hand, urbanizationincreases economic activity through a higherconcentration of consumption and productionand expansion of basic infrastructure andmunicipal services. At the same time, urbaniza-tion also leads to economies of scale and pro-vides the opportunity for increased energyefficiency (Sadorsky 2013). Buildings are theworld’s largest consumers of electricity, but theIEA (2012) estimates that 80% of the energyefficiency potential of buildings is untapped. Inthis context, targets 11.3,32 11.6,33 and 11.934

28Target 9.1: Develop quality, reliable, sustainable andresilient infrastructure, including regional andtrans-border infrastructure, to support economic develop-ment and human well-being, with a focus on affordableand equitable access for all.29Target 9.4: By 2030, upgrade infrastructure and retrofitindustries to make them sustainable, with increasedresource use efficiency and greater adoption of cleanand environmentally sound technologies and industrialprocesses, with all countries acting in accordance withtheir respective capabilities.30Target 9.5: Enhance scientific research, upgrade thetechnological capabilities of industrial sectors in allcountries, developing countries, including, by 2030,

encouraging innovation and substantially increasing thenumber of research and development workers per 1 mil-lion people and public and private research and devel-opment spending.31Target 9.b: Support domestic technology development,research and innovation in developing countries, includ-ing by ensuring a conducive policy environment forinter-alia, industrial diversification and value addition tocommodities.32Target 11.3: By 2030, enhance inclusive and sustainableurbanization and capacity for participatory, integrated andsustainable human settlement planning and managementin all countries.33By 2030, reduce the adverse per capita environmentalimpact of cities, including by paying special attention toair quality and municipal and other waste management.34By 2020, substantially increase the number of cities andhuman settlements adopting and implementing integratedpolicies and plans towards inclusion, resource efficiency,mitigation and adaptation to climate change, resilience todisasters, and develop and implement, in line with theSendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, holistic disaster risk management at all levels. The


call for improved sustainability, resilience andresource efficiency in cities.

SDG 12 Ensure sustainable consumption andproduction patterns

Industrial energy efficiency is included in SDG 9,but it is also closely related with SDG 12 onsustainable consumption and production (SCP),and in particular its target 12.2,35 12.6,36 12.8,37

and 12.a. SDG 12 is more of a cross-cutting SDG(Le Blanc 2015). Energy efficiency policy inOECD countries has focussed primarily onincreasing the energy efficiency of buildings,appliances, vehicles, and industrial operations.Less attention has been devoted to changingconsumer behaviour, e.g. encouraging people todrive less or buy fewer/smaller vehicles, appli-ances or homes. Consumer behaviour can beinfluenced by offering convenient alternatives,using financial incentives, increasing awareness,providing feedback on energy consumption andchanging attitudes (ibid.).

SDG 13 Take urgent action to combat climatechange and its impacts

Target 13.2 calls for integrating climate changemeasures into national policies, strategies andplanning. From a climate perspective, improvingenergy efficiency is a crucial element of nationalpolicies, strategies and planning as energy effi-ciency is a proven way to reduce GHG emissionscost-effectively. The IPCC calls energy efficiencymeasures ‘a key mitigation strategy’ in scenariosthat keep atmospheric CO2 levels at 450–500 ppm by 2100, emphasizing their ability todeliver near-term energy demand reductionscost-effectively (IPCC 2014). To stay on a 2 °Cpath, the IEA shows the energy intensity of GDPwould need to decline by around 60% by 2050compared to 2015, i.e. by 1.5% p.a (IEA 2015).This would allow economic output to triple withonly a 20% increase in primary energy use. Ofthe total energy sector GHG reductions neededby 2050 for a 2 °C instead of a 6 °C pathway, theIEA envisions 38% coming from improved effi-ciency in end uses (IEA 2016a, b). Besidesmitigation, energy efficiency also can contributeto adaptation to climate change. Energy effi-ciency can address some of the energy sector’svulnerabilities to climate change impact (e.g.reduce peak loads through efficient airconditioning).

4.2.5 A Systems Perspectiveon Energy Efficiencyand the SDGs

Although the interest in systems’ thinking in thedomain of governance is rising, we continue toadminister, organize, analyse, manage and gov-ern complex energy systems as if they were acollection of isolated parts. In response to thequestion ‘How can energy efficiency be a con-ceptual ‘vector’ for connecting different SDGs?’Figure 4.5 below demonstrates some of the mainlinkages between energy efficiency explored inthis case study.

Chai and Yeo (2012) recognized and consid-ered a multifaceted energy efficiency adoption

Sendai Framework is voluntary, non-binding agreementthat recognizes that the State has the primary role toreduce disaster risk, but that responsibility should beshared with other stakeholders including local govern-ment, the private sector and other stakeholders. It aims forthe substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses inlives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physi-cal, social, cultural and environmental assets of people,businesses, communities and countries. The SendaiFramework sets out specific targets and priorities foraction with a strong emphasis on disaster risk manage-ment, the reduction of disaster risk, the prevention of newrisk and on reducing existing risk and strengtheningresilience.35By 2030, achieve the sustainable management andefficient use of natural resources.36Encourage companies, especially large and transna-tional companies, to adopt sustainable practices and tointegrate sustainability information into their reportingcycle.37By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have therelevant information and awareness for sustainable devel-opment and lifestyles in harmony with nature.


system that takes into consideration the interplayof barriers to energy efficiency internal andexternal to the company, as well as the influenceof the actions of different stakeholders in theprocess of energy efficiency adoption. Chai andYeo argue that there is a lack of consideration forinteractions among barriers to energy efficiency,which is why barriers persist despite the efforts oftrying to remove them. Barriers to energy effi-ciency cannot be properly studied by looking atthem in isolation. Systems thinking could helpidentify possible relationships among the (groupsof) barriers and among the different SDGs whereenergy efficiency is most relevant.

One aspect of energy efficiency, and a potentialbarrier, that requires a more sophisticated systemsview is the rebound effect. The rebound effectneeds to be examined in more detail both at themacro- and micro-level. At the macro-level,indirect rebound effects are far from fully under-stood. At the same time, understanding at the

micro-level is required as rebound effects varywidely between different technologies, sectors andincome groups. Where rebound effects areexpected to be large, there may be a greater needfor policies that increase energy prices.

4.3 Case Study 3: The ‘WEF-ClimateNexus’ Approachas a Framework for SystemsThinking on the SDGs

By 2050, the FAO predicts 70% increaseddemand for food (100% in developing countries),and the World Energy Council expects a 100%increase in energy demand by that time. Almostall this increase will come from non-OECDcountries. Biofuel demands could already doubleby 2030 (IEA 2012). As farming remains thelargest user of water, food must be producedsustainably to ensure future supplies of food and

Target 7.3/7.bEnergy Efficiency

SDG 2: Hunger &

Food Security

SDG 3: Health &

Well-being

SDG 6: Access to

Water & Sanita on

SDG 7: Sustainable

Energy for All

SDG 8: Economic &

Employment

SDG 9: Infrastructure,

Industry, Innova on

SDG 11:

Ci es

SDG 12: Sustainable

consump on &

Production

SDG 13:

Climate Change

Reduced EfficientFood

Clean Air,

Water

Water

S mulates growth

Efficient Infrastructure &

Technology

Smart, Efficient, Resilient Ci es

Consumer behaviour & Efficiency Produc on

Fig. 4.5 Energy efficiency as a conceptual ‘vector’ for connecting different SDGS


water. Water scarcity already affects more than40% of the world’s population, largely becausetoo much water is used to produce food.

This case study describes the three issues or‘sectors’ of water, energy and food, and thestrong linkages between them. Activities in anyof these three sectors may drive or limit eco-nomic growth in the two others.

Water–energy–food (WEF) ‘nexus’ approa-ches hold the promise of greater policy coher-ence by integrating governance across energy,water and food sectors and scales. Extantpolicy-making in ‘silos’ therefore needs to becomplemented by nexus approaches that reducetrade-offs and build synergies across sectors.A nexus approach can also help to avoid ‘sunkcosts’, i.e. investments that lock developmentinto non-sustainable pathways. The guidingprinciples of the nexus are like those thatunderpin the SDGs, namely ensuring access toresources for the most vulnerable, promotingefficiency in resource use and ensuring sustain-ability (Weitz et al. 2014).

The SDGs show the need for a systemic nexusapproach to sustainability challenges. Whereasthe MDGs fell short in terms of identifying sec-toral goals with little consideration of how effortsto attain a goal in one sector would affect effortsin another sector (Weitz et al. 2014), the SDGsopen up the opportunity for integrating goalsacross sectors in order to make implementationmore efficient and cost-effective and to considertrade-offs between goals.

The WEF nexus can serve as a framework forsystems thinking among different stakeholders,rather than being directly implementable as such.SDG 7 (on sustainable energy) can be closelyconnected with SDG 2 (food and agriculture) andSDG 6 (water and sanitation). Climate change(SDG 13) can put additional pressure on theconnections within the WEF nexus (see Fig. 4.6below). For example, climatic changes may affectrainfall and thus water and energy use for foodproduction. The nexus approach highlights theseinterdependencies and the need to address inter-connected policy sectors and resource systems notin isolation but through integrated managementapproaches that cut across multiple domains.

Guillaume et al. (2015) suggest five ways inwhich systems theory can help us to help us tounderstand nexus issues better:

(1) Mapping nexus issues and their interlinkages;(2) Finding the most important linkages;(3) Using models for systems models;(4) appreciating the rebound effect from a sys-

tems perspective and(5) Crafting system-level solutions.

4.3.1 Linkages Within the Nexusand Between SDGs 2, 6,and 7

There are numerous examples of linkagesbetween two of the three nexus sectors, forexample, the water-energy nexus (e.g. hydro-power, power plant cooling and groundwaterpumping). Water and food are linked throughirrigation and rainwater harvesting. Thinking ofthe energy–food nexus, usually biofuels versuscrops trade-offs come to mind.38 Moreover, thefull food production and supply chain areresponsible for around 30% of total globalenergy demand. Energy accounts for almost 55%of the operating costs of water utilities (IRENA2015), and 70–90% of water used by humans isfor food production (FAO 2011).

However, it is more challenging to findexamples of how all three issues jointly areaffected. For a true nexus approach, the threeinterrelating sectors must be brought together,including those that are currently consideredseparately and in isolation. This is easier saidthan done. Examples include groundwater irri-gation, water desalination for food production39

and biogas production from wastewater, whereresidues are used as fertilizer.

38Moreover, fossil phosphorus reserves could be depletedwithin 50 years if the world were to replace 10 per cent ofits energy requirements with biofuels.(Davis 2011).39Global desalination capacity currently stands at 45million cubic meters per day, half of which is in theMENA region, where a growth by 500% is projected upto 2030.


Fig.4.6

Water–energy

–food

nexu

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(201

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4.3 Case Study 3: The ‘WEF-Climate Nexus’ … 97

In general, the WEF nexus demonstrates theimportance of monitoring the linkages betweendifferent SDGs, which may in the end be soundindividually but incompatible with each other.40

Beyond the WEF nexus, there are trade-offsbetween eradicating poverty (SDG 1) and pro-viding access to energy for all (SDG 7) on theone hand, and reducing resource consumption(SDG 12) and emissions (SDG 13) on the other(Wu et al. 2012).41

Beyond screening simply for interactionsbetween SDGs and targets, one can explore thenature of these interactions. ICSU (2017) assignspositive interactions between SDGs scores of +1(‘enabling’), +2 (‘reinforcing’) or +3 (‘indivisi-ble’), while it scores interactions characterized bytrade-offs with −1 (‘constraining’), −2 (‘coun-teracting’), or −3 (‘cancelling’).

For example, reduction of air pollution (target12.4) is indivisible (score of +3) from improvedhealth (SDG 3). And promoting sustainableenergy (SDG 7) that is carbon-free is largely alsoair pollution-free. Therefore, interaction betweenthe SDG 7 targets and target 3.9 (reducing airpollution) is considered reinforcing and is allo-cated a score of +2. Nevertheless, achieving SDG7 is not enough to meet the air quality targets ofSDG 3: additional measures will be required.

Interestingly, the experts involved in ICSU(2017) found that the process of deciding on thescore for interactions between different SDGsand their targets was possibly more valuable thanthe final result. To reach the results, a consider-ation of the issues and potential context depen-dencies, a review of limitations and gaps incurrent knowledge and discussion with otherswas required. As such, assessing the interactionsin specific situations can become a vehicle fortriggering the conversation, interpretation andlearning process.

4.3.2 Governance Challengesand Needs for the WEFNexus

There is growing awareness of the need forpolicy measures to address the institutionaldimensions of the water–energy–food nexus.Regulation and collective action can help toguide investments and innovation to minimizenegative externalities and share benefitsequitably.

Fragmented approaches to planning and pol-icy implementation are common in environmen-tal governance, particularly in developingcountries. Fragmented approaches arise fromcompetition among urban and rural local gov-ernments for funds, overlapping jurisdictionalboundaries and inadequate management coordi-nation among line departments and ministries.Institutional fragmentation is also supported byweak feedback loops from environmentalresource users, making it difficult to designinterventions that respond effectively to feedbackfrom citizens.

40Whereas the Mebratu’s sustainable development modelof concentric circles with the environmental dimension asthe overall concern was suggested as the basis for theSDGs, in the adopted SDGs, the social-economic dimen-sions are connected well with each other but not with theenvironmental dimension. In other words, the SDGs donot fully appreciate that progress on the socio-economicfront eventually depends on the environment.41Climate change and sustainable energy are issues thatare closely linked with the environmental, social andeconomic pillars of sustainable development, and in factshow that these pillars may conflict with each other.Trying to keep atmospheric carbon-dioxide levels to 450parts per million seems to be at odds with giving access toelectricity to the billions of people that are left withoutaccess to reliable sources of energy. Research shows thestrong correlation between per capita energy consumptionand human development (e.g. Wu et al. 2012, http://cdn.intechopen.com/pdfs/31594.pdf). The ‘access to sustain-able energy for all’ discourse argues for a world withaccessible, secure low cost energy for all. If fossil fuelscannot deliver such a world, ensuring ‘access to sustain-able energy for all’ will bring about decarbonization on amassive scale in the long term as it would have to bebased on bringing the price of clean energy down. Thus,framing clean energy as a development opportunity canprovide a more acceptable journey to the same objectiveof lowering emissions. Reframing low-carbon transitionsaround energy and equity may sound appealing, but itneeds to be worked out how it can be driven by effectivegovernance. It will require leadership and able manage-ment to use development as leverage for an acceleratedenergy transition while not allowing carbon-dioxide levelsto get much higher.


http://cdn.intechopen.com/pdfs/31594.pdf

http://cdn.intechopen.com/pdfs/31594.pdf

Considering (‘internalizing’) resources thatpreviously had been externalized is the essentialnexus challenge. The nexus concept posesopportunities for innovation, participation andexperimentation to explore what these external-ized resources are and how to take them intoconsideration. Equitable integrated water andland resources planning and management there-fore should include: secure property rights;transparency and accountability; participationthrough informed consent and effectiveanti-corruption measures.

Governance could focus further on providingincentives for innovation focused on improvingresource use efficiency. Economic instrumentsfor stimulating investment include, e.g. pricing ofresources and ecosystem services, water marketsand tradeable rights, and payments for ecosystemservices. Inversely, this means abolishing subsi-dies which incentivize the unsustainable use ofresources, for example, fertilizer, irrigation andfossil fuel subsidies.

Overall, the complexity that is inherent ingovernance of the WEF nexus requires in-depthknowledge. There is a need for a coordinated andharmonized nexus knowledge-base and databaseindicators and metrics that cover all relevantspatial and temporal scales and planning hori-zons. Full life cycle analyses across the nexus arealso needed. Such an improved nexus under-standing could underpin new decision- andpolicy-making. New nexus indicators/metricswhich address sustainable resource use, humanwell-being and equity as well as integratedassessments of water, energy and food sectors,are required for future quantitative trade-offanalyses. System thinking, robust analyticaltools, including life cycle analysis and consistentdata sets across the water, energy and food sec-tors are essential for building synergies, avoidingtensions and to monitor and inform policies andregulations across the nexus and across theSDGs.

Adaptive management for the WEF nexus

Adaptive management (AM) is an approach toresource and ecosystem management that refers

to functionally defined social–ecological systemswith a regional scope, such as natural parks, riverbasins, mountain ranges (Walters 1986; Voss2011). With foundations in ecological systemstheory and evolutionary theory (UNEP 1978),AM has been postulated as a critical alternativeto conventional rationalistic concepts of ecosys-tem management (Berkes et al. 2003; Holling2003) as it accounts for the inherent complexityand unpredictability of ecosystem dynamics(Folke et al. 2005; Olsson et al. 2004; Pahl-Wostl2007).

According to Heifetz (1994), leaders areconfronted with two types of problems. Techni-cal problems can be solved by expertise andtraditional, top-down management (‘technoc-racy’). But wicked, ‘adaptive’ problems, such astrade-offs between water, energy and food sup-ply, require innovation and learning, becausewhen beliefs and values come into play techno-cratic ‘fixes’ tend to exacerbate the problem.

A more adaptive and transformative approachto implementing the SDGs would be to acceptuncertainty and pay attention to procedure, sys-tem behaviour and social learning at all gover-nance levels and across nexus sectors. Therefore,it would be useful if the SDG process wouldallow for ongoing examinations of goals andtargets at local, national and global levels as theworld keeps on changing in the years after theadoption of the SDGs. Although it may not befeasible to adapt the SDGs at the global level,individual countries can make their goals andplans more ambitious (‘ratchet’ them up), in thesame way that the Paris Climate Agreement is a‘living’ agreement in the sense that it encouragescountries to review their progress and adapt theirgoals (with the idea of making them moreambitious) every five years.

4.3.3 Geopolitics and TransnationalCoherence: Trade and theWEF Nexus

Water, energy and food security have becomeglobal issues that are no longer contained withinterritorial national or river basin boundaries. As

4.3 Case Study 3: The ‘WEF-Climate Nexus’ … 99

trends, such as human population growth, eco-nomic development and globalization accelerate,the interdependence of countries and regionsbecomes more and more evident. This can lead toeither more resource competition and potentialconflict, or increased collaboration andco-management. Many river basins are trans-boundary, with upstream water and land usesaffecting downstream water, energy and foodavailability.

Trade and investment are rapidly becominggeopolitical issues. There is intensive trade inenergy and in food, and moreover, in products with‘embodied’ water or energy (Fig. 4.7). Interna-tional trade in water-intensive commodities cangenerate water savings in the countries that importthose commodities. One example would be tradedin wheat from water-abundant Canada or Russia toSaudi Arabia. In the period from 1997 to 2001,Japan (the largest net importer of water-intensivegoods in the world) annually saved 94 billion m3by not using its domestic water resources. Thisvolume of water would have been required, inaddition to its current water use, if Japan domes-tically produced products instead of importingthem (Chapagain et al. 2006).42 Yet by external-izing their water footprints, importers of embodiedwater are in a weak spot of water dependency,

which could be costly from the political and socialperspective. Pushing for self-sufficiency may harmsustainability though in the longer run.

Trade in agricultural and other commoditiesthus may help to address local scarcities. By2050 about half of the world population, mostlyliving in poor water-scarce countries, is expectedto rely to some extent on food imports, unlessproductivity increases and/or cropland expansioncan keep up with increasing demand (Rockströmet al. 2012). Trade can also increase overallresource use efficiency if trade flows followproductivity gradients, i.e. from high-productiveto low-productive regions. The next case studydelves deeper into the contributions that tradecan make to achieve the SDGs.

4.4 Case Study 4: Tradeand the SDGs

4.4.1 Introduction: General Overview

Therefore, as part of the Sustainable Develop-ment Goals, we must promote policy coherencebetween the economic, financial and trade sys-tems and environmental sustainability, includingthe climate change agreement—former UNSecretary-General Ban Ki-moon (WTO 2014).43

Fig. 4.7 Virtual water balance per country and largestvirtual water flow related to international trade. SourceHoekstra (2014). Note In the countries, coloured green,water use for producing export commodities exceeds thewater use behind imported products (net virtual water

export). In the countries coloured yellow to red, theopposite is true (net virtual water import). The thicknessof the arrows represents the comparative quantity of waterbeing traded

42Similarly, Mexico annually saved 65 billion m3, Italy59 billion m3, China 56 billion m3, and Algeria 45 billionm3.

43http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/igo_01oct14_e.htm.


http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/igo_01oct14_e.htm

http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/igo_01oct14_e.htm

According to Ban Ki-Moon, trade is importantfor sustainable development. For several dec-ades, policy statements and international agree-ments indeed have reflected the need for tradegovernance to be part of a coherent governanceregime for sustainable development.

The purpose of this case study is to explorehow trade policies can contribute to sustainabledevelopment in general, and to the SDGs inparticular. Thereby it gives the example of tradein environmental goods and services (EGS) andof the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA).The linkages between trade and sustainabledevelopment are varied and nuanced. In the caseof climate change, the UNEP–WTO report ontrade and climate change (WTO/UNEP 2009).44

Demonstrates some of the key linkages. Besidesthe physical impacts that climate change canhave on trade (e.g. through changed patterns in

agricultural production), trade and economicactivity affect the climate (e.g. through thescale,45 composition,46 technique47 and direct48

Fig. 4.8 Trade and climate change linkages Adapted bythe author from Cosbey (2008) Explanation examples oflegal linkages between climate change law (left top) andtrade law (right top) is climate change legislation thatcontains provisions on the limitation of imports ofcarbon-intensive products. On the other hand, WTO

rules could affect the design of climate change legislationthat foresees in support for domestic renewable energyindustries. The blue arrow indicates the impact that tradepolicies and disputes related to renewable energy canhave on climate change (mitigation)

44WTO-UNEP (2009), Trade and Climate Change,Accessed on 29/09/2015, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf.

45The scale effect means that more efficient allocation ofresources within countries shifts out the global productionpossibilities frontier, raising the size of the industrialpollution base, resulting in greater global emissions otherthings being equal.46The composition effect measures changes in emissionsarising from the change in a country’s industrial compo-sition following trade liberalization. If, for example,liberalization induces an economy’s service sector toexpand and its heavy industry to contract, the country’stotal emissions will likely fall since the expanding sectoris less emission intensive.47The technique effect refers to the numerous channelsthrough which trade liberalization impacts pollutionthrough changes in the stringency of environmentalregulation in response to income growth or the politicalclimate surrounding regulation. The technique effect alsoincludes technology transfer facilitated by trade.48Direct effects include emissions and environmentaldamage associated with the physical movement of goodsbetween exporters and importers, resulting for examplefrom international transport.

4.4 Case Study 4: Trade and the SDGs 101

http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf


effects). There are also the legal and policylinkages between climate change and trade gov-ernance, and the competitiveness impacts thatthese can have (also see Fig. 4.8 below). Thecross-boundary effects of emissions throughtrade are also increasingly discussed and framedin terms of fairness (e.g. if a fridge is made incountry A and one buys and uses it in country B,should the emissions that result from the pro-duction of that fridge be counted as emissions ofcountry A or B?).

Trade is frequently blamed for social erosionssuch as the loss of jobs and the decline of themiddle class. However, if one looks into moredetail, one can see that some countries that aremost globalized and open to trade and investmentare also countries with a thriving middle class.Such countries (in particular in Northern Europe)actively seek to make their labour market moreflexible and provide their population with themeans to adjust to the dynamism that resultsfrom globalization (e.g. with tailored redistribu-tion, health care, social protection and continuededucation policies). On the other hand, govern-ments that choose to blame globalization to hidetheir own shortcomings are much less capable ofadapting to the realities of a more closely con-nected global economy.

Meanwhile, the number of WTO disputes andother trade-related tensions in renewable energyhas been increasing rapidly. These disputes aremainly focused on the question whether thesupport that governments give to their renewableenergy industry in the form of subsidies ormarket protection is admissible under WTOrules. Such tensions can have an impact on cli-mate change if they hamper the development ofsustainable energy technologies (SETs)—in-cluding renewable energy and energy efficiencytechnologies. Trade and investment play anincreasingly important role in the developmentand diffusion of SETs. Trade policies and dis-putes related to renewable energy (SDG 7) thatcan affect climate change (SDG 13) by hamper-ing trade in SETs are reflected as the blue arrowin Fig. 4.8. These specific interlinkages reinforcethe need to address the overall relation betweentrade and climate action in a systematic way.

4.4.2 Trade and the SDGs

Trade is not considered to be an end in itselfunder the SDG framework but rather a means ofimplementation (‘MoI’). Examples oftrade-related targets in the SDGs are:

• SDG 2 on hunger and food securityincludes a call to correct and prevent traderestrictions and distortions in world agricul-tural markets, including through the parallelelimination of all forms of agricultural exportsubsidies and all export measures withequivalent effect.49

• SDG 3 on ensuring healthy lives and pro-moting well-being includes the target ofproviding ‘access to affordable essentialmedicines and vaccines’. It recalls the 2001Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement andPublic Health, which affirms the right to use tothe full the provisions in the TRIPS Agreementregarding flexibilities to protect public healthand provide access to medicines for all.50

• SDG 7 on sustainable energy calls for sub-stantially increasing the share of renewableenergy in the global energy mix. This is likelyto require ongoing support from govern-ments. However, clean energy subsidies have

49Target 2.b: correct and prevent trade restrictions anddistortions in world agricultural markets including by theparallel elimination of all forms of agricultural exportsubsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect,in accordance with the mandate of the Doha DevelopmentRound.50Target 3.b: support the research and development ofvaccines and medicines for the communicable andnon-communicable diseases that primarily affect devel-oping countries, provide access to affordable essentialmedicines and vaccines, in accordance with the DohaDeclaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,which affirms the right of developing countries to use tothe full the provisions in the Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property Rights regarding flexibil-ities to protect public health and, in particular, provideaccess to medicines for all.


repeatedly been challenged under the WTOdispute settlement system.51

• SDG 8 on economic growth and employ-ment calls on improving aid for trade supportfor developing countries, especially forLDCs, including through the enhanced inte-grated framework for trade-related technicalassistance (EIF).52

• Goal 9 on industry, innovation andinfrastructure notes the need for quality,reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastruc-ture, including regional and trans-borderinfrastructure and increasing the integrationof small-scale industrial and other enterprises,in developing countries, into value chains andmarkets.

• Goal 10 on reducing inequality stresses theimportance of special and differential treat-ment for developing countries, in accordancewith WTO agreements.53

• Goal 14 on conserving maritime resources:the ocean absorbs more than a quarter of CO2

emissions and therefore plays a key role inclimate regulation. It is also a key source offood, medicine, minerals and renewableenergy. SDG 14 further calls for disciplining(rich countries’) fishery subsidies, which is akey negotiating topic at the WTO. Also,maritime transport is essential to trade as over90% of the world’s trade is carried by sea.

Shipping is, by far, the most cost-effectiveway to move goods and raw materials aroundthe world. However, it also causes pollutionof air and water and is a growing source ofGHG emissions.

• Goal 15 (sustain life on land; target 15.c):enhance global support for efforts to combatpoaching and trafficking (illegal trade) ofprotected species, including by increasing thecapacity of local communities to pursue sus-tainable livelihood opportunities.

• Goal 17 (strengthening the means ofimplementation and the global partnershipfor sustainable development) includes lan-guage on the importance of:

• A universal, rules-based, open,non-discriminatory and equitable multilateraltrading system under the WTO54

• Significantly increasing developing countries’exports, including doubling the share ofLDCs by 202055

• Timely implementation of duty-free andquota-free market access on a lasting basis forall LDCs and ensuring that preferential rulesof origin are transparent, simple and con-tribute to facilitating market access56

A cost-benefit analysis of the SDGs con-ducted by the Copenhagen Consensus Centerreveals that trade-related goals are ‘phenomenal’in terms of return on investment compared toother means of implementation such as official

51Some of the legal uncertainty around these subsidiescould be removed by clarifying key concepts in the SCMAgreement in the context of clean energy subsidies aswell as clarifying the applicability of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXGeneral Exceptions provisions to the SCM Agreement;agreeing on a time-limited and conditional ‘peace clause’preventing WTO disputes being taken against certaincarefully selected categories of climate-related subsidies;and re-introduction of the category of ‘non-actionablesubsidies’ under Article 8 of the SCM Agreement toprovide leeway to certain types of clean energy subsidies(Das and Bandyopadhyay 2016).52Target 8.a: increase Aid for Trade support for develop-ing countries, particularly LDCs, including through theEnhanced Integrated Framework for LDCs.53Target 10.a: implement the principle of special anddifferential treatment for developing countries, leastdeveloped countries, in accordance with World TradeOrganization agreements.

54Target 17.10: promote a universal, rules-based, open,non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral tradingsystem under the WTO including through the conclusionof negotiations within its Doha Development Agenda.55Target 17.11: significantly increase the exports ofdeveloping countries, with a view to doubling the leastdeveloped countries’ share of global exports by 2020.56Target 17.12: Realize timely implementation ofduty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basisfor all least developed countries, consistent with WorldTrade Organization decisions, including by ensuring thatpreferential rules of origin applicable to imports from leastdeveloped countries are transparent and simple, andcontribute to facilitating market access.


development aid (ODA)(Copenhagen ConsensusCenter 2016).57

4.4.3 Trade in Environmental Goodsand Services

As the previous section demonstrates, both tradeand technology are acknowledged as importantdrivers for achieving the SDGs. An importantway of improving access to technology that isrequired for reaching the SDGs is throughincreasing the diffusion of environmental goodsand services (EGS). Removing trade barriers toaccess such goods could be one aspect of theinternational cooperation referenced in the targetsdescribed above.

The environmental-social-economic win-win-win situation of trade in environmental goodsand services (EGS) is typically given as theprime example of how trade can contribute tosustainable development (WTO/UNEP 2009).58

The WTO’s Doha Ministerial Declaration of2001 includes the mandate59 to negotiate theliberalization of trade in environmental goodsand services. Due to several reasons,60 it wasdifficult to finalize these negotiations.

Sustainable energy technologies (SETs), forexample, as any technologically advanced prod-ucts, are produced through complex global valuechains (GVCs).61 Value chains for solar panels,for example, run across developed and develop-ing countries.

The development of SETs will require bothglobal and local markets that are based on asupportive enabling environment and on clear andcoherent governance regimes for related goodsand services. Even though environmental tech-nologies are trade intensive, there is currently nospecific framework or policy process for facili-tating trade in SETs. This is highly unfortunate asthe creation of global markets for SETs can spur aglobal energy transition (World Bank 2015).

Several targets in the different UN outcomedocuments on the SDGs refer to increasedinternational cooperation to improve diffusion of,and access to, environmental goods and services.One of the specific means of implementation(MoI) identified under proposed goal 6 on waterand sanitation is the expansion of ‘internationalcooperation and capacity-building support todeveloping countries’ around water and sanita-tion activities and technology.

Similarly, SDG 7 on sustainable energy isrelevant. First, SDG Target 7.a commits coun-tries to ‘enhance international cooperation tofacilitate access to clean energy research andtechnologies’. Several of the cross-cutting meansof implementation under SDG 17 (especiallyTarget 17.7)62 also relate to technology, includ-ing promoting the transfer, dissemination anddiffusion of environmentally sound technologies

57www.copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/preliminary-benefit-cost-assessment-final-owg-targets. This assess-ment claimed to identify the goals in which the moneyspent would save most lives. Although this sounds like agreat idea, the analytical tool and mainstream economicmind-set used is unsuitable for transformational strategies.Overturning deeply embedded path dependencies willalways produce higher transaction costs, at least in theshort term. And what comes across as objectivenumber-crunching entails massive ethical decisions andweighting (Goepel 2016).58E.g. in the WTO-UNEP report on trade and climatechange, available at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf. Another, upcom-ing example of how trade can contribute to sustainabledevelopment is through resource efficiencies, especially inwater, flowers and meat.59Doha Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 31.60The main reasons for deadlock in the EGS negotiationswas overall lack of progress in the Doha Round (which isnegotiated as a ‘single undertaking, meaning that no issueis agreed upon until there is agreement on all topics in theRound), and disagreement over the identification ofenvironmental goods and coverage of the agreement.

61Imagine for example only harbour systems as goodrepresentations of complex systems; harbour governance‘‘systems encompass local community planning, as globallogistical planning. Thus, a considerable number of actorswith different stakes, strategies and operating proceduresattempt to influence port governance processes’’ (Teismanet al. 2009: 77). Also, the popularity of global value chainperspectives and ‘added value’ in trade shows the need foranalysis at the local level (Hoekman 2014).62Target 17.7: Promote the development, transfer, dis-semination and diffusion of environmentally sound tech-nologies to developing countries on favourable terms,including on concessional and preferential terms, asmutually agreed.


http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/publication/preliminary-benefit-cost-assessment-final-owg-targets




to developing countries on favourable terms, asmutually agreed.

4.4.4 The Origins of theEnvironmental GoodsAgreement (EGA)

As the number of trade disputes related torenewable energy started growing after 2011, theSwiss think tank ICTSD (disclaimer: the authorworked at ICTSD from 2009 until 2014) realizedthat there was a need for so-called SustainableEnergy Trade Initiatives (SETIs). ICTSD startedto develop a conceptual framework for differentoptions for SETIs including a holistic Sustain-able Energy Trade Agreement (SETA).63

Because China (also a member of APEC) hassuch strong interests in avoiding trade conflictsand smoothening trade in SETs (e.g. because ofenergy security, access to technology, environ-mental sustainability, exports and employment—also see Monkelbaan et al. 2012; Monkelbaan2014), it had become supportive of the idea ofnegotiated agreements in this area.

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)economies liberalized trade in a list of environ-mental goods by reducing applied tariffs on 54tariff lines with environmental goods to 5% orless by the end of 2015. The constructivedevelopments in APEC had resulted in 14countries64 getting together to discuss options forbuilding upon the APEC-agreement. In July

2014, these WTO Members (calling themselves‘Friends of EGS’) indeed launched negotiationson a global EGA.

The EGA is expected to have a status like thesuccessful Information Technology Agreement(ITA) in the WTO. This means that the agree-ment would be based on the ‘most favourednation’ (MFN) principle. This means that thebenefits of the agreement (in terms of marketaccess to the countries negotiating) would beshared with all WTO Members, even those whodo not sign up to the agreement.

Trade negotiations on SETs should not belimited to trade per se as climate, innovation, andinvestment governance are some other important(and often inter-related) factors that can have realimpacts on the development of SETs.

4.4.5 Economic Impactsof a Successful EGA

The size of the global market for environmentaltechnologies is expected to amount to about USD2 trillion by 2020 (UNEP 2014), and a major partof that market can be linked with sustainableenergy. Trade and investment allow for com-parative advantages to be exploited and for glo-bal competition which drives prices ofsustainable energy down (Jha 2013).

Most trade in environmental goods takesplace between developed countries, but manydeveloping countries are catching up. Forexample, in the period 2001–2012, Malaysiaincreased its exports of EGS from less than EUR1.8 billion to more than EUR 6.2 billion, whileThailand saw an increase from just over EUR 0.9billion to more than EUR 5.3 billion, and Indiaan increase from less than EUR 0.9 billion toabove EUR 4.4 billion.65 Due to high growthrates, and large baseline market potential, coun-tries such as Brazil, Russia, Malaysia, Thailand

63The concept of a SETA originates from the GlobalAgenda Council of the World Economic Forum. Itsanalytical case has been developed since 2011, primarilyby ICTSD and its partners, the Global Green GrowthInstitute and the Peterson Institute of InternationalEconomics. In 2012, a public-private partnership, theSETI Alliance, was launched. The SETI Alliance worksconstructively to support policy action in trade in SETs torealize benefits for both the public and the private sector.In 2013, the SETI Alliance merged with the Alliance forAffordable Solar Energy (AFASE), creating a network ofmore than 1800 companies, think tanks and severalgovernments.64The fourteen original members are the EU, USA, China,Costa Rica, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway,Switzerland, South Korea, Japan, Hong Kong (China) andSingapore. Israel joined the negotiations formally in

January 2015 and Turkey and Iceland joined in March2015.65WTO. ‘Trade to remain subdued in 2013 after sluggishgrowth in 2012 as European economies continue tostruggle’.


and India are increasingly significant actors in thetrade in EGs (WTO 2013).66

In summary, a successful conclusion of anEGA between the 17 negotiating parties, whichincluded a broad range of identified environ-mental goods could lead to up to a 1.1% or aEUR 21 billion increase in the value of tradeworldwide.

The shift towards a greener economy hasalready had impacts on employment (SDG 8).Many different definitions of green jobs exist,however, there is general agreement that the risein environmental regulation and concern forenvironmental conservation is leading to the riseof new industries and opportunities for innova-tion (SDG 9).

The International Labour Office estimates thattens of millions of green jobs have already beencreated around the world. Between 15 and 60million additional jobs could be created annuallyif a shift towards a greener economy was to bemade. Similar trends can be observed in the EU.An additional 5 million jobs could be retainedand/or created by 2020 in the EU through theimplementation of energy efficiency measuresand the development of renewable energy sour-ces (European Commission 2017).67

A recent joint UNIDO–Global Green GrowthInstitute (GGGI) study looking at renewableenergy and energy efficiency industries showedthat in five geographically diverse countries68

new investments in energy efficiency andrenewable energy will consistently generate morejobs for a given amount of spending than main-taining or expanding each country’s existingfossil fuel sectors.69 In June 2017, when

President Trump announced that he wouldwithdraw the USA from the Paris ClimateAgreement for the reason that this Agreementdestroys American jobs and growth, there werealready twice as many jobs in the US solarindustry than in all fossil industries combined.

4.4.6 Environmental Benefitsof the EGA

‘There is now the real prospect that the firstbinding global agreement to fight climate changewill come from what may seem an unlikelysource—the WTO’—Bacchus (2014), formerchair of the WTO’s Appellate Body

As this quotation illustrates, the decision of 14WTO Members in early 2014 to start negotiationson an EGA was hailed as (the start of) a majorachievement for both the global trading systemand for the environment (also see Annex 18).

Despite this enthusiasm of politicians andtrade negotiators, some experts (e.g. Cosbey2014) argue that an EGA carries little environ-mental effectiveness and represents many chal-lenges. If an EGA follows the APEC model andonly covers tariffs70—which is the current scopeof the EGA negotiations—then it is indeedunlikely to address the real obstacles to trade inthese goods. These obstacles include ‘non-tariffbarriers’ such as anti-dumping measures, coun-tervailing duties, standards, export subsidies and,probably most importantly, the overall enablingenvironment in terms of political stability, tech-nological and financial capacity and regulatoryframeworks. Thus, only taking away tariff bar-riers may be a first step towards better dissemi-nation of SETs, but it is not a guarantee forsustainable energy development. The domesticregulatory climate is at least as important as tradebarriers. In this context, the OECD has shown theimportance of drivers for environmental goodstrade such as the stringency of environmental

66WTO. ‘Trade to remain subdued in 2013 after sluggishgrowth in 2012 as European economies continue tostruggle’ accessed on 09/09/2015: https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres13_e/pr688_e.htm.67European Commission (2015), European SemesterThematic Fiche: Green Jobs Employment Potential andChallenges, accessed on 18/02/2016: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/2015/green_jobs.pdf.68Included in the study was: Brazil, Germany, Indonesia,South Africa and South Korea.69UNIDO, GGGI (2015) Global Green Growth: CleanEnergy Industrial Investments and Expanding Job Oppor-tunities, p 24.

70Of the current list of 54 environmental goods, theaverage current tariff is only 1.8%.


https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres13_e/pr688_e.htm

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http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/2015/green_jobs.pdf

regulations, the overall business environment andaccess to financing (OECD 2014).71

Therefore, the EGA must extend beyond tar-iffs. Most major countries already apply low orzero tariffs on green goods. The maximum con-ceivable GHG emission reduction expected fromliberalization (using the much larger list of 153goods proposed in the World Trade Organization[WTO] under the Doha Round negotiations onEGS), under optimistic assumptions, would bebetween 0.1 and 0.9% of 2030 total GHGemissions (Wooders 2009). Thus, trade liberal-ization should be seen as only part of a gover-nance package that should lead to climate action.Jha’s (2013) calculations show that among thecountries surveyed, removal of import tariffs onEGs would have the greatest impacts in China interms of emission reduction (minus 0,8%) andlowering of electricity prices (minus 0,3%).However, numbers from the IMF (2013) putthese gains in perspective by pointing out thedramatic effects of the removal of fossil fuelsubsidies: it estimates that eliminating fossil fuelsubsidies would reduce global carbon dioxideemissions by 4.5 billion tonnes, or 13%.Although there are no legal constraints for theWTO to question fossil fuel subsidies as unfairdistortions of competitiveness and trade, thesesubsidies have not been as closely scrutinized inthe WTO as subsidies for renewable energy.Therefore, it could be questioned why the WTOhas not yet addressed the removal of fossil fuelsubsidies and at which point it will start to do so.

Jha further expects that removing local con-tent requirements (LCRs) in the renewablessector will actually increase output, employmentand trade in China and other developing coun-tries such as India and Brazil. The welfare gainsthat would result from reduced emissions inChina alone through removal of LCRs, importtariffs and feed-in tariffs would amount to morethan USD 4.5 billion.

Thus, despite all enthusiasm about the pro-spects for an EGA, it has to be noted that in termsof impacts on GHG emissions and sustainableenergy development an EGA is not a panacea. Asformer WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamyargued in 2007 in reaction to questions on whatthe WTO can do for the environment: ‘traderegulations are not, and cannot be, a substitutefor environmental regulations’ (WTO 2007).72

Limiting the most severe impacts from climatechange would require an unprecedented effort interms of emission cuts, and a complete overhaulof our economic, social and governance systems.

However, in a wider and more long-term per-spective the EGA might facilitate the diffusion anddevelopment of SETs. As such, an EGA may havea strong systemic impact by enabling the creationof global markets for sustainable energy whichdrives competition and innovation.73 In addition,the EGA has a symbolical meaning as it showsthat the cleantech industry has evolved to a leveland scale at which governments consider it wor-thy of a dedicated global trade agreement. Finally,the EGA should be a ‘living’ agreement in thesense that trade barriers beyond tariffs (e.g. stan-dards, local content, subsidies, barriers to trade inservices and investment) can be discussed in fol-lowing iterations of the negotiations.

71It is important that governments and development banksfocus on leveraging their financial inputs by reducing riskfor institutional investors in renewable energy projects indeveloping countries instead of spending directly onrenewable energy equipment for example. There may bebarriers here in terms of public visibility, as donors preferto support projects where their inputs are directly visible(e.g. in a solar energy project), whereas they could haveleveraged much bigger investments by guaranteeingbanking loans indirectly. One recent example is the LakeTurkana wind project in Kenya, which was delayed for6 years because of unclarity over investment guarantees.In the end, the World Bank took on the risk guarantee forthis wind power project, which was a good addition to itsrenewable energy portfolio after the World Bank wascriticized for supporting coal fired power plants indeveloping countries.

72http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl83_e.htm.73The narrative that through trade, more developedcountries can focus on R&D in clean energy while themanufacturing takes place in developing countries missesthe point that much innovation (particularly in matureproducts such as solar PV) is a result of manufacturingand other processes and that the two are difficult toseparate.


http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl83_e.htm

4.4.7 State-of-Play of the EGANegotiations

In December 2016, a ministerial-level meeting ofthe G-17 aimed at concluding talks for the EGAfinished without agreement. Before the ministe-rial meeting, EGA negotiating rounds hadworked on the basis of a so-called ‘landing zone’product list, also referred to as an L-list bynegotiators, which covered over 300 tariff linesand related ex-outs. The 300-plus list was sub-sequently split into two, with one ‘A list’ of over250 items that were deemed to have reasonablelevels of consensus, along with another ‘B’ list ofmore sensitive items that would require politicaldecisions. The most political issues included theinclusion of bicycles (a key demand by Chinathat was difficult to accept for the EU. The EUand the USA as co-chairs of the EGA ministerialsubsequently issued their own list by addingsome tariff lines to the original A list. However,China put forward its own list of products on thesecond day of the ministerial—leaving little timefor building convergence or consensus around it.

This all leaves the next steps towards the EGAunclear for the time being. There is a sharedwillingness to continue with the EGA negotia-tions though and to expand them into areas suchas services and investment.

4.5 Chapter Conclusions: PolicyImplications and Ways Forward

This chapter has presented four specific casestudies on decarbonization of the global economy,energy efficiency and the SDGs, the water–en-ergy–food–climate nexus, and trade in sustainableenergy technologies. These case studies haveintriguing historical backgrounds and need to beunderstood within their specific political, eco-nomic and environmental contexts. If there is onecommon thread in these cases, it is that pursuingsustainability is not easy or straightforward. Inparticular, the governance barriers at a moreunderlying, systemic level require more attention.Fragmentation of governance along the vault linesof governance scales, academic disciplines, levels,

sectors, interests and approaches is an importantbarrier to implementing global frameworks forsustainable development, including the areas thatare relevant for the case studies in this chapter.

For example, increasing the efficiency withwhich energy is extracted or captured, convertedand utilized not only requires improved andtransformative technologies. Energy efficiencyalso requires a sound enabling framework; clearstrategies and plans; institutional operationalcapability; integration across all levels andobjective evaluation of progress.

Although fragmentation can be a barrier in thequest for sustainability and ‘breaking down thesilos’ has become again a vivid mantra in debateson governance for the SDGs, the common call tobreak down institutional silos (such as ministries)poses risks. Institutional silos have a function asthey provide the necessary structure, expertise,accountability, reliability, transparency andcommunication points. Instead of breaking themdown, Niestroy and Meuleman (2016) argue thatwe need to teach silos to ‘dance’. This means thatwe should strive to make institutional silos moreflexible, permeable, interactive and transparent,while keeping their typical strengths and theirspecific functions in different administrativecultures. It remains a key approach for betterpolicy integration to reinvigorate and improvehorizontal coordination. Examples of such hori-zontal coordination arrangements are wide-spread, e.g. ‘inter-service steering groups’(European Commission), state secretaries’ com-missions or similar bodies for national sustain-able development strategies (Germany, Finland),interdepartmental ‘dossier teams’ (Netherlands)or cross-sectoral project teams. The SDGs rein-vigorate the need to better bridge domestic andexternal policies—a coordination task that has sofar hardly been tackled (ibid.).

Besides institutional silos, mental silos can bea barrier to integrative governance. A focus onfacilitating dialogue, interaction and learning areat the core of opening mental silos. Openingmental silos will also require different leadershipstyles, e.g. switching from commanding tocoaching and capacity building for such adaptiveleadership. Leaders will also need to allow, and


even stimulate mistakes, as making mistakes is anormal feature of innovation. There is no single‘best’ way to make silos more collaborative: eachculture has unwritten rules about how people canwork together (ibid.). In sum, a systems perspec-tive to governance in the case studies discussedhere may increase coherence as it allows bettermanagement of the complex cause and effectrelationships between social and technologicalphenomena. The application of systems analysis isno panacea in the face of vested interests, concernabout impacts on competitiveness and wealth andpolitical ideologies, but it does offer a tool toclarify the consequences of our actions, identifyour options, and extend our foresight.

The next chapter will further analyse thecommon main themes in the case studies and ingovernance for sustainability in general.

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5Governance Pillarsand Competences: Power,Knowledge and Normsas Cross-Cutting Issuesin Governance for the SDGs

AbstractBased on the findings and analyses in theprevious chapters, this chapter suggests somekey areas around which the Integrative SDGGovernance (ISG) framework could be devel-oped. This is in line with the question ‘Whichtheoretical pillars (cross-cutting themes) andcompetences can be drawn from existingliterature and the case studies together on theareas in which Integrative SDG Governanceshould be more encompassing than extantsustainability governance?’ The indicatorareas or ‘frames’ are grouped around the threepillars of power, knowledge and normsbecause the literature review, interviews andcase studies together show the importance of(the interplay between) these themes as ulti-mate drivers for sustainability governance(Conventional strategies for sustainable devel-opment operate on the ‘proximate drivers’ ofgovernance, namely technology, demograph-ics and institutions. These proximate driversare mainly responsive to short-term interven-tion. The ultimate drivers for sustainabledevelopment are power, knowledge, normsand culture (Raskin et al. 2002). These driversare subject to long-term systemic processes.).However, there is not much research availableon sustainability governance that looks intothe role of all three of these theoretical pillars.

Still, much of the existing literature on power,knowledge and norms is problematic in thecontext of interdisciplinary and transdisci-plinary research fields (such as sustainabilityscience) and tends to reach high levels ofabstraction and terminological subtleties.

KeywordsCompetencies � Power � LeadershipNetworking � Empowerment � KnowledgeAdaptiveness � Resilience � ReflexivityNorms � Values � Justice � Trust �Inclusiveness

5.1 Competencies in the ISGFramework

There are indicators to measure the three classi-cal sustainable development dimensions, such asthe state of the economy, the environment andpeople’s social well-being. While economic andsocial statistics, survey methods and indicatorsare often used to measure the effectiveness ofnational SDG strategies, research focused ondefining and using indicators for the drivers andbarriers to sustainability governance has beenlimited. Policy-makers start to be interested inindicators for governance, as the draft text for the


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Paris Climate Agreement at one point showed(UN/UNFCCC 2014).1

This research identifies areas (‘frames’) inwhich ‘parameters’, ‘variables’ or ‘indicators’could be developed for substantive aspects thatunderlie sustainability governance. Governanceindicators are understood as proxy measures thatcan be used to monitor the progress of projects(Reed et al. 2005; OECD 2010).

Indicators can be useful for conceptualizingthe challenge of promoting sustainability gover-nance across governance settings and styles, andfor thinking through the required processes.Indicators can also help to identify the causes ofgovernance failures and to do more substantiatedcomparative research. Identifying competencieseventually can result in transformational learningfor sustainability governance actors (e.g. enhancedawareness of people’s motivations, commitmentand behaviour), insights into general strategicplanning, the transformation of relationships andshared understandings of capabilities. Governancecapabilities2 and capacities3 that were previouslyabstract in nature, and understood in differentways by different individuals, can be opera-tionalized and measured by specific indicators.Thus, previously invisible dimensions of anactivity like governing can be made visiblethrough defining and using indicators.

Skills and competencies are necessary formediating between the ‘real’ world and the worldof ‘constructs’ (including the SDGs and Paris

Climate Agreement). On the one hand, skills toobserve, monitor, analyse and diagnosereal-world problems are necessary to inductivelydevelop new constructs and theories, or to selectconstructs and solutions that could be applicable.On the other hand, deductive reasoning skills arerequired for working from the more generalconstructs to more specific hypotheses andobservations that can be used to confirm (orreject) the constructs in a ‘top-down’ manner.Most social research and actions involve bothinductive and deductive reasoning processes.Naturally, there is a constant interaction betweenconstructs and the real world.

5.2 Governance Pillar 1: Power

5.2.1 Defining Power

Climate change is not a fight over science andreason, but over money and power.- McKibben (2011), climate activist and founder of350.org

One main theoretical pillar which can be identifiedin previous chapters is power. Power is one of themost disputed concepts in social and politicaltheory. The definitions of power4 are manifoldand highly diverse.5 Max Weber understands by‘power’ the chance to realize one’s own will in acommunal action even against the resistance ofothers who are participating in the action (Coser1977). Parsons (1967: 193) takes a broader viewby seeing power as ‘the capacity of a social

1The draft negotiating text for the Paris Climate Agree-ment which came out of UNFCCC COP 20 in Lima(available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2014/cop20/eng/10a01.pdf), in Paragraph 29, Option 1 states: ‘Mon-itoring and evaluation of, reporting on, and learning fromplans, policies and programmes shall (…) considerindicators for governance and planning’.2Following Termeer et al. (2013: 4–5), I define gover-nance capability as ‘the ability of policy-makers toobserve wicked problems (also see Annex 7) and to actaccordingly, and the ability of the governance system toenable such observing and acting’. Every capabilityshould include the three dimensions of acting, observingand enabling.3Capacities are defined as the ability of individuals,institutions and societies to perform functions, solveproblems and set and achieve objectives in a sustainablemanner (UNDP 2007).

4Power, knowledge and norms are examples of familyresemblance concepts. The term family resemblanceconcept originates in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of lan-guage (Haugaard 2002: 3). A typical example of a ‘familyresemblance concept’ is the word ‘game’: its meaninginherently depends on the context in which it is used. The‘playfulness’ of a card game played at home starklycontradicts with the ‘seriousness’ of a political game. Allpossible meanings of the word ‘game’ partly overlap andpartly contradict each other, hence making it impossibleto agree on one all-encompassing definition.5This is also due to the fact that whereas ‘power’ in theEnglish language mostly covers a number of meanings, inother languages such as Dutch, German and French, thereare separate words for these separate meanings. Dutchlanguage for example in general distinguishes between‘macht’ (might) and ‘kracht’ (force).

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system to mobilize resources to realize collectivegoals’. Sadhuji adds structural sources of power,which encompass knowledge, resources (includ-ing money, materials and human resources),decision-making ability and networks (based oncooperation and relations).

Avelino and Rotmans (2009) agree with Par-sons that power is the ability to mobilize resourcesto achieve a specific goal but differ from Parsons’definition by saying that resources are mobilized byactors rather than by the system and that the goalcould be either collective or in one’s self-interest.Foucault analysed power as an inherently non‐subjective phenomenon that is exercised by struc-tures and through actors: ‘individuals are thevehicles of power’ (Foucault 1980: 101).

Overall, it is important to distinguish betweenpower and ‘influence’ or ‘impact’. One of themost convincing distinctions between power and‘influence’ is given by Morriss, who concludesthat power ‘always refers to a capacity to dothings (…) whilst ‘influence’ sometimes (andtypically) does not’ (1987: 282).6

A general distinction in Western debates onpower can be drawn between four ‘faces ofpower’ (Lukes 2005): coercive, agenda-setting,normative and discursive power. According toLukes, coercive (‘instrumental’) perspectivesview power as actor-specific resources used inthe pursuit of self-interest, even against resis-tance. Agenda-setting power is related to theability to influence the agenda and link issues,which can be based on knowledge, informationand expertise. Normative power means shapingwhat others see as legitimate and acceptablethrough the spread of norms and ideas. Norma-tive power then is for Lukes the power to set,implement and adopt new norms and standards,and to institutionalize those norms and standardsto anchor them in the permanency of social andpolitical structures. Normative power is reflectedin the cases in the ability to set technical

standards, for example, smart-grid standards orenergy efficiency standards.

In addition, discursive perspectives on poweremphasize the dominance of doxa—widely heldideas, frames, norms, discourses, perspectives andbeliefs (Fuchs 2007). The source of discursivepower is persuasion and communication. Byexercising discursive power, actors can strengtheninstrumental power. From a metagovernance per-spective, governments generally have coercivepower, markets display remunerative power andnetworks generally depend on normative power.7

These different types of power can contain hardand soft resources that can be combined intostrategies such as ‘smart’ power (Nye 2011).

5.2.2 The Role of Power in the CaseStudies

In the case studies, in terms of power dynamics,existing institutions (e.g. WTO and IOC) andparadigms were reinforced and reproduced.

The market and technological power of busi-ness actors is part of structural power. Structuralpower implies that actors can both influence theformation and functioning of environmental pol-icy and can shape political ideologies which affectpolicy decisions of governments. One examplefrom case study 4 is that solar cell manufacturersin the USA and in the EU were able to convincegovernments to put trade restrictive measures inplace on imports of Chinese solar cells eventhough it was not in the public interest to do so.

Overall, it became clearer from the case studiesthat the most powerful ministries or departments(e.g. economic affairs, finance and transport) areusually closer to industry than weaker environ-mental ministries and have a mandate to stimulateshort-term economic growth. However, framingclimate change as an environmental issue rather

6Further, influence and impact can be arbitrary andunintentional. This is related to the distinction betweenaffecting and effecting. While ‘affecting’ refers to alteringor impinging on something in any kind of way, ‘effecting’is about accomplishing something.

7Similarly, power relations can be categorized based onthe nature of the interactions between actors into threetypes based on classic institutional economics (Commons1934) and social anthropology (Mauss 1923): ‘negotiationtransactions’ (as usually observed in market transactions),‘directive transactions’ (often in hierarchical relations)and ‘reciprocity transactions’ (as in networks).

5.2 Governance Pillar 1: Power 115

than an economic and industrial challenge has madeenvironmental ministries the main departmentresponsible for climate (negotiations) in manycountries.

Power in the case studies is either so widelydistributed (e.g. among small renewable energycompanies) that policy-makers lack the ability totake action or aggregated at such a high level(e.g. vested interests such as oil majors) that it ishard to conceive and implement transition gov-ernance. The SDGs make challenges related topower distribution more profound than otherproblems because of their cross-cutting nature.

5.2.3 Power Competence 1:Leadership

Whatever the dimensions of global governance,however, renewed and enlarged its machinery,whatever values give it content, the quality of globalgovernance depends ultimately on leadership. Reportof the Commission on Global Governance (1995)

As the empirical findings show, leadership is acritical success factor in the context of sustain-ability governance. In particular at the global level,leadership is required for advancing the 2030Development Agenda (including the SDGs). ForNajam et al. (2006: 73), ‘there is probably no betterinvestment in global environmental governancereform than an investment in leadership’. Mean-while, Pascal Lamy pondered on the question‘what then are the specific challenges of globalgovernance?’ and argues that ‘the first challengestems from the difficulty to identify leadership’.8

Closely related to the topics of this book, Aleklett(2012: 135) claims that ‘(…) we lack leadership onthe future’s most serious issues: energy and cli-mate’. For Senge (2001), leadership is the ability ofenabling people to create a new reality. Transitionleadership is about transformation in the motiva-tions, values and beliefs of followers, as well as atransformation in the structures of organizations(Bass 1990).

Box 5.1: Indicators for Women’sLeadership Under the SDGs. (Source:Hunt and Vlahakis 2015)Measuring progress on women’s lead-ership under the SDGsVarious studies show that women play acrucial role in achieving the SDGs as theyare generally more open to change andmore in favour of environmental protectionthan men (The Economist 2018). There-fore, it is important to facilitate andencourage the participation of women andgirls in governance for the SDGs.

The UK Gender and Development Net-work made recommendations on globalindicators to measure progress on women’sparticipation and influence in decision-making under Target 5.5, as follows:

• The proportion of seats held by womenin local governments and national par-liaments, and the proportion of thoseseats held at a leadership, ministerial orcabinet level should be disaggregatedby socio-economic status, and

• female politicians’ perceptions of theimpact they have on decision-making, bylevel of government, should be recorded.To give us real insight into whether

women around the world are meaningfullyinvolved in decision-making, these indi-cators should:

• Capture transformative change ratherthan just numbers;

• Be both qualitative and quantitative,including a self-reported indicator tocapture the experiences of womenleaders;

• Be applied at all levels of leadership;• Be more ambitious than previously

agreed indicators, particularly MDGindicators and

• Be comparable across countries.Finally, it is crucial that the indicators

adopted are ambitious and do not resort towhat is easy, or easier, to measure. Reflecting

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need rather than the current availability ofdata must be a priority if the SDGs are tooffer a real chance to build on the progressmade on women’s participation and leader-ship under the MDGs.

According to Heifetz (1994), the task of theleader is to adaptively close the gap betweenvalues and circumstances. Leadership for himconsists ‘not of answers or assured visions, but oftaking action to clarify values’. Leadership, sodefined, allows any member of an organization toexhibit leadership and enables assessing theconcept of leadership within the context of col-lective action by a wide variety of stakeholders.

Most research on sustainability leadership isabout the type of individual leadership, compe-tencies and abilities that are required to handlechallenges. The idea of sustainability governanceembodies a specific social steering logic as sus-tainable development requires goal-directedinterventions (Meadowcroft 2007: 6) combinedwith a process of self-steering (ibid. 7). Becauseboth sustainable development and climate changeare frequently described as ‘wicked’, ‘systemic’and ‘meta’ problems, they require systemicapproaches. This means that in order to addressthese types problems, depending on the traditionalimage of an individual ‘superhero’ leader withspecific skills, traits, and competencies (such assystems thinking) may be insufficient. The reasonis that a focus on emergent, episodic and dis-tributed forms of leadership that are suitable forsystemic approaches requires attention andcapacity building for effective group processes.

Leadership is inherent to transitions if onedefines leadership as ‘creating change’. Transitionleadership means empowering and inducing oth-ers to take action involving a restructuring of asituation, using innovative and transformativepower to produce change towards sustainabilityand applying knowledge in a precautionary man-ner to reduce risks and build in resilience. In thatsense, the precautionary principle9 is a normwhich can act as a mandate for leadership intransition governance. However, the precautionary

principle is more accepted as a guiding principlein some regions of the world than in others.10

Amidst the global leadership crisis11 whichLamy and Aleklett signal, there is a certainnostalgia for the great political leaders of thepast. However, past leaders ruled in a much lesscomplex and interconnected world, and underless pressure from the (social) media. In theprivate sector, sustainability governance comesmore down to the individual leadership of highermanagement (with famous examples likeUnilever CEO Paul Polman making headlines).

Box 5.2: Leadership in the MontrealProtocol and in the UNFCCCIn terms of geopolitics, a key factor fortransnational collective action on sustain-ability is the presence of a leading nationthat can make leeway on delivering apublic good. For example, the active sup-port of the USA (the biggest producer ofCFCs) and its domestic industry which wasleading in innovation on CFC replacementswas decisive for the crafting of the Mon-treal Protocol (Galluccio 2014). For theUSA, it was easier to assume a leadershiprole on CFCs than on GHGs because itsperceived benefits from acting aloneexceeded the associated costs and the

9The precautionary principle or precautionary approach torisk management holds that if an action or policy has asuspected risk of causing harm to the public or to theenvironment, in the absence of scientific consensus thatthe action or policy is not harmful, the burden of proofthat it is not harmful falls on those taking an action.10National energy policies are difficult to compare forexample in terms of nuclear power and risk acceptance.For example, in the USA, nuclear power is seen as a wayto address climate change. Several European countries onthe other hand decided to phase out nuclear power afterthe Fukushima disaster. EU environmental policy is basedon the precautionary principle (paragraph 2 of Article 191of the Lisbon Treaty). Restriction in the EU on usinghormones for growing meat faster and on the use ofgenetically modified organisms are also based on theprecautionary principle and have led to trade disputes withthe USA.1186% of respondents to the WEF's Survey on the GlobalAgenda 2014 agreed that there is a leadership crisis in theworld today.


scientific consensus on the causal linkbetween CFCs and the ozone layerdestruction was established rapidly. USPresident Reagan was supported by twoother conservative leaders in his pursuit ofthe Montreal Protocol: UK Prime MinisterThatcher and Canadian Prime MinisterMulroney.

Whereas the replacement of CFCs didnot require major shifts in power structures,the solutions to climate change (e.g. phasingout fossil fuels) require major power shiftsat both the geopolitical level (from countriesrich in hydrocarbon reserves to countriesrich in renewable energy and technologicalcapability) and at the industry and firm level(from carbon-intensive industries tolow-carbon businesses).

Addressing climate change is sur-rounded by different dynamics than thecase of the hole in the ozone layer.The USA may remain the biggest cumu-lative GHG emitter, but China is sinceabout 2007 the biggest annual emitter ofGHG emissions. Although China says thatit is not ready to lead in the UNFCCC, it isalready perceived as the de facto leader inthe climate negotiations by many devel-oping countries. The impression of China’sleadership has only grown since the USAdministration decided to pull out of theParis Climate Agreement in 2017.

Types of leadership for the SDGs

Based on Papa and Gleason’s (2012: 917) threetypes of global leadership, leadership on theSDGs could be categorized as follows:

1. Policy-based leadership refers to the abilityto (intellectually) frame problems, provide avision and promote specific policy solutionsand set an example by implementing solu-tions. The consistent push by the EU to framethe climate change problem in the context of

sustainable development is an example ofpolicy-based leadership. Through policy-based leadership, there can be ‘races to thetop’, as the interesting dynamic betweenJapan, China and South Korea on emissionstrading shows. Initially, each of these threecountries was hesitant to introduce a nationalETS because of concerns of loss of compet-itiveness compared with the other two coun-tries. South Korea showed regional leadershipby implementing its ETS first and then Chinafollowed. Japan introduced a VoluntaryEmissions Trading Scheme (JVETS) inSeptember 2005 and Tokyo has had an ETSin place since 2010 but recent plans for adomestic ETS have made less progress.12

2. Structural leadership means exercisingpower that is based on political strength in theglobal order and the importance of an actorwith respect to a particular problem (‘hard’power, cf. Nye 2004). BRICS (increasinglyregrouped as ICASA—India, China, Africaand South-East Asia) countries deploy struc-tural leadership in the climate regime becausetheir (future) emissions are so significant thata global climate treaty is unthinkable withouttheir participation. They can use threats andpromises to incentivize others.

3. Instrumental leadership refers to the abilityto use negotiation skills and to craft politicalconsensus. Such skills are crucial because inmultilateral diplomacy, policy agendas areset through highly complex multiparty bar-gaining. The instrumental leadership ofBRICS countries stems from their ability toforge their own coalitions and consensuswith other major developing country nego-tiating groups.

12In September 2015 Environment Minister Mochizukiannounced that he was considering the introduction of anational ETS. In October 2015, he was dismissedfollowing opposition from the private sector and PremierAbe’s renewed drive for regaining economic growth.


Behavioural aspects of sustainability leader-ship: the need for inspirational leadership

Brown (2011b) looked into the behaviouralaspects of sustainability leadership and foundthat leaders and change agents with a highlydeveloped meaning-making system13

• Design sustainability initiatives from a deepinner foundation (they see their work as spir-itual practice and ground design in transper-sonal meaning);

• Access non-rational ways of knowing (ac-cording to cognitive neuroscientists, we areconscious of only about 5% of our cognitiveactivity, so most of our decisions, actions,emotions and behaviour depends on the 95%of brain activity that goes beyond our con-scious awareness) and

• Adaptively manage through ‘dialogue’ withthe system.

From Brown’s work, it can be concluded thatthe widespread development of meaning-makingcapacity amongst leaders is crucial for achievingthe challenging objectives of sustainability gov-ernance. Moreover, the most effective leaders areable to develop meaning-making capacity notjust in themselves but also in others. In otherwords, they can inspire others in order to reach acommon goal. Tangible things that inspirationalleaders do is set stretch goals with their team,spend time developing their subordinates, engagein highly collaborative behaviour and encourageothers to be more innovative. At a less tangiblelevel, inspirational leaders are more adept atcommunicating and making emotional connec-tions with their subordinates and are better atestablishing a clear vision. Furthermore, they areardent champions of change and are perceived aseffective role models within the organization.

Besides being enthusiastic and extraverted,leaders can take any number of other approachesto be inspirational by:

• Creating a compelling vision (the ‘visionary’approach);

• Meeting with team members and have them,collectively, set the goal (an ‘enhancing’approach.);

• Tossing out a challenge to the group and set aspecific deadline by which to make it (takinga ‘driver’ approach);

• Encouraging the team to find an ethical goalthat focuses on the organization’s mission(the ‘principled’ route);

• Convening a meeting and delivered a classichalf-time locker room speech to set the goal(the classical ‘enthusiast’ style); or

• Taking the ‘expert’ route and interview teammembers to determine what skills each mightbest contribute to the effort.

Leaders who are able to master multiple of theabove approaches significantly increase theireffectiveness. It is good to know that with aware-ness, good feedback and a plan of development,leaders are able to develop their own competencyto inspire others (Zenger and Folkman 2013).

Sinek’s (2009) idea of the Golden Circle(Fig. 5.1) offers an interesting insight into why someleaders and organizations are inspirational and haveachieved such an exceptional degree of influence.

The Golden Circle has the following mainthree components:

• WHAT: every single organization on the planetknows WHAT they do. WHATs are easy toidentify;

• HOW: some companies and people knowHOW they do WHAT they do. HOWs areoften given to explain how something isdifferent or better. But there is one missingdetail.

• WHY: very few people or organizations canclearly articulate WHY they do WHAT theydo. WHY is all about your purpose, cause orbelief. WHY does your company exist?And WHY should anyone care?

13Meaning-making can be defined as the ability tointegrate challenging or ambiguous situations into aframework of personal meaning using conscious,value-based reflection (van den Heuvel et al. 2009).


When most organizations or people think, actor communicate they do so from the outside in,from WHAT to WHY. And for good reason—they go from the tangible to the intangible. Wesay WHAT we do, we sometimes say HOW wedo it, but rarely say WHY we do WHAT we do.But every single inspired leader and companythinks, acts and communicates from the insideout.

When an organization articulates their WHYand we believe it, then we go above and beyondto include their offerings in our lives. Weembrace their beliefs, not because they’re nec-essarily better, but because they represent valuesthat are important to us and that make us feel likewe belong.

Meadows earlier proposed a hierarchical listof leverage points for system change. UNEP(2012) reworked those points for its GEO-5report,14 which informed the Rio+20 negotia-tions (Fig. 5.2).

The outer layer (or low-ranking adjustmentsin Meadows’ list) will change little in the overalldynamic of development: putting different lead-ers in charge of making political or managerialadjustments is not going to bring about a systeminnovation as long as the levers they pull are thesame as before. They can only use them with thesame information and the same rules as beforeand thus keep on pursuing the same old goal.

Thus, change of CEOs or political leaders maynot turn out to be radical in effect unless the newleaders start repurposing the system by tacklingthe high leverage points. The parallels with theGolden Circle may be obvious: the surface layerin Fig. 5.1 describes the ‘what’, the mid layer the‘how’, and the deep layer the ‘why’. Translatingthis to the setting of governance for the SDGs:

• The surface layer in Fig. 5.2 describes thefacts and developments (including projectsand programmes) that SDG indicators cancapture;

• The mid layer captures the governance ormanagement for implementation of the SDGs(including policies and strategies) and

• The deep layer represents the required shiftin mindsets (and related shift in paradigms,discourses and narratives) that is needed tomake the transformative 2030 Agenda areality.

5.2.4 Power Competence 2:Networking andStakeholder Management

Governance is a relational concept. Hierarchyneeds dependent subjects, network governancerequires interdependency between partners, andmarket governance necessitates independent rela-tionships. - In ‘t Veld 2013: 285

Fig. 5.1 The golden circle.Based on Sinek (2009)

14http://web.unep.org/geo/assessments/global-assessments/global-environment-outlook-5.


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Relations and ‘having a network’ are key powerresources. Power must be understood in rela-tional terms (Nye 2011) and connectedness hasbecome the measure of power (Slaughter 2009:94).15 Actors that are ‘hubs’16 in networks, forexample, have an advantage over other players(Thompson 2004: 413). Manuel-Navarette(2010: 2) observes that ‘climate changeresearch needs to dedicate more analyticalattention to social power (…) because powerrelations will determine how societies choose torespond’ and that ‘climate research would benefitfrom diving into the vast literature discussingpower relations in the context of radical socialtransformations’.

One way to categorize power in relationsbetween people is to distinguish betweenconflictual and consensual power.

Another way is to differentiate between powerover, with, to and within. First, power can consist

of the capacity to mobilize people, thereby pos-sibly exercising power ‘over’ them. This cancreate relations of dependence, for example,between the aviation, fossil fuel and financialindustry on one side and governments on theother. Power with refers to collaborative power.Power to is productive power to affect some-thing. And power within is a person’sself-knowledge and self-actualization (Pantazi-dou 2012).

Furthermore, actor A can have ‘more’ powerthan actor B, in the sense that A can mobilize‘more’ resources than B can. This can lead tocooperation if actors have collective goals orcompetition if they have mutually exclusivegoals.

Finally, there are different types of power:person A can mobilize different resources, ormobilize resources in a different way, than Bdoes. For example, the fossil fuel industry is seenas exercising reinforcive power, while manyrenewable energy companies are supposed toexercise innovative power, or one country exer-cises economic power (Walsh 2004),17 whileanother country exercises geopolitical or military

Fig. 5.2 Layers of leverage in system innovations. Source Based on Meadows (1998), illustration from UNEP (2012:422)

15For Castells (2009), power is exercised through net-works. He sees four different forms of power:

1. Networking Power: the power of the core actors andorganizations included in the networks

2. Network Power: the power resulting from the stan-dards required to coordinate social interaction in thenetworks.

3. Networked Power: the power of social actors overother social actors in the network.

4. Network-making Power: the power to program net-works according to the interests and values of theprogrammers.

16Actors with a higher than average number of ‘links’with other actors.

17In the case of the trade remedy measures that the EUwanted to take on imports of solar panels from China,China also threatened with taking retaliatory measures onproducts (wine and luxury cars) that would mainly impacttwo of the EU’s core member states: France andGermany. A more explicit link between the climate andtrade regimes is that the EU used its economic powerwhen it made its approval of Russia's accession to theWTO contingent upon Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto


power, etc. If the different power exercises byactors enable and support one another, there issynergy, whereas there are antagonistic powerrelations if different power exercises restrict,resist or disrupt one another.

Stakeholder management

Effective stakeholder management is moreimportant than ever for achieving the compre-hensive and systemic SDGs. The influence ofstakeholders on activities for the SDGs can beimmense. Effective identification, understandingand management of stakeholders, their triggersand their expectations will improve the ability toreduce risk, tailor mitigation measures andachieve the SDGs. Five strategies that can help tomanage stakeholders are:

1. Stakeholder mapping: early in the project,conduct a thorough stakeholder analysis toidentify stakeholders. Identify and examinekey factors including proximity to your pro-ject, demographics, interest in the project,needs and concerns, expectations of yourproject and any previous public statements.

2. Influence is key: understanding levels ofinfluence will allow to predict how a partic-ular stakeholder may interact directly withyour project team or with others. The range ofpossible influence is broad, from positivesentiment and support through to activismand engagement of other community mem-bers against your project. To measure thepossible influence of stakeholders, one canidentify their level on a scale ranking fromhigh, medium to low.

3. Identify the triggers: stakeholders will reactin different ways to different project actions,however, by identifying triggers and mitiga-tion measures, one can avoid preventablecomplaints.

4. Look for opportunities: from a risk man-agement perspective, it is tempting to focuson those stakeholders most likely to cause

disruption to the project. Equally importantare those stakeholders who view the projectfavourably or may benefit from it. Identifythese stakeholders and investigate opportuni-ties to leverage their positive perception asproject advocates.

5. Proactive mitigation: with a solid under-standing of stakeholders, their influence andtriggers, the next step is to develop a miti-gation plan. This step details the risks one isprepared to accept, share or avoid and outli-nes how you can reduce their impact. Work-ing with stakeholders through this processwill also improve project buy-in, credibilityand ownership of the mitigation measure (TheWorldcom Group 2017).

5.2.5 Power Competence 3:Empowerment

Like power, empowerment has no agreed‐upondefinition and is often used to capture ‘a familyof somewhat related meanings’ (Thomas andVelthouse 1990: 666). Generally speaking,empowerment refers to a person’s belief that ‘heor she can direct organizational events towardsdesired ends’ (Elmes and Smith 2001: 34).Rappaport (1987: 122) defines empowermentbroadly as a ‘process’ or ‘mechanism’ by whichpeople and organizations ‘gain mastery over theiraffairs’, and Alsop (2006) sees it as increasingthe capacity of individuals and groups to makechoices and to transform these choices intodesired actions and outcomes.

Empowerment has also been defined in morepsychological terms such as ‘perceptions ofcontrol’ (Spreitzer et al. 1999: 511) and intrinsicmotivation18 (Thomas and Velthouse 1990)instead of extrinsic motivation. In fact, the workof Lertzman (2012) demonstrates that inaction onclimate change is not so much due to apathy or

Protocol. Also see http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/22/environment.russia.

18Intrinsic task motivation ‘involves positively valuedexperiences that individuals derive directly from a task’resulting from the cognitions about a task that producemotivation and satisfaction (Thomas and Velthouse 1990:668).


http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/22/environment.russia

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/22/environment.russia

indifference, but to a sense of powerlessness anda sense of not being empowered to take action.Apathy and indifference then rather are psycho-logical defence mechanisms to deal with loss andhelplessness and symptoms of thatdisempowerment.

Empowerment is important because it is notonly power, but indeed (a sense of) powerless-ness, that forms the main obstacle to transforma-tive change (cf. Avelino 2011). Beyond actualinfluence, empowerment means that actors need tobe aware of the extent to which they themselvesknow (Leary 1957) and believe that they haveinfluence and power—also see Box 5.3 below.

Box 5.3: The Rose of LearyIn order to clarify human behaviour and theinteraction between people, Leary (1957)developed a communication model, namedthe Rose of Leary (Fig. 5.3) based on ahorizontal and a vertical axis. The hori-zontal axis focuses on relationships withothers and the vertical axis focuses onattitude to others. Leary referred to thenorth axis as the above behaviour, thesouth axis as the below behaviour, the westaxis as the ‘opposed’ behaviour and theeast as the together behaviour. TimothyLeary distinguishes additional nuances inthese four basic behaviours such asabove-together, above-opposed, below-together and below-opposed.

Above behaviour is about active, initi-ating and leading behaviour. The degree ofdominance is determined by the other party.

Below behaviour is about submissivebehaviour, the individual does not getinvolved, effaces himself or displays verymodest behaviour.

Opposed behaviour is about peoplewho are aggressive and do not agree withother people unquestioningly. They wantthorough explanations and motivationsbefore they take action. This could developinto defiant behaviour.

Together behaviour is about an idealsituation in which people can work as ateam and in which people are receptive toother people’s opinions.

People tend to respond with comple-mentary behaviour to behavioural variants,in which one type of behaviour triggersanother type of behaviour. On the onehand, this has to do with the humaninstinct; on the other hand, this has to dowith influences from the environment. Inhis complementarity theory of the rose ofLeary, he indicates how this works:

• Above behaviour triggers below beha-viour—unconsciously, we are inclinedto respond submissively to abovebehaviour and we let ourselves be gui-ded and controlled by this;

• Below behaviour triggers above beha-viour—unconsciously, we are inclinedto display leadership behaviour when weinteract with people who display belowbehaviour, we are inclined to take themby the hand and control them;

• Opposed behaviour triggers opposedbehaviour—unconsciously, we areinclined to react more critically whensomeone else is critical and we are eveninclined to agree with so-called defiantbehaviour;

• Together behaviour triggers togetherbehaviour—unconsciously, we areenergized by working together in

Leading

Helping

Co-opera ve

DependentWithdrawn

Defiant

Aggressive

Compe ve

Above

Below

TOGOPP

Fig. 5.3 The Rose of Leary. Based on Leary 1957


harmony. It stimulates us to continuedoing our work and to listen to otherpeople’s opinions.It is only after becoming aware of the

complementarity theory, that it is possibleto resist this unconscious control. TimothyLeary provides points of reference but healso emphasized that each person respondsdifferently.

The best application for each beha-vioural variant is to use the opposed variantabove-together. Without putting theemphasis on dominance, this behaviouradopts leadership soft skills so that coop-eration can be achieved. By giving theright feedback, people, who are inclined todisplay above behaviour, opposed beha-viour or below behaviour, can be correctedand encouraged and empowered to coop-erate with each other.

From: https://www.toolshero.com/communication-skills/rose-of-leary/

Empowerment is related to scaling and globalposturing (e.g. global actors can gain power byclaiming that climate change is a global problemthat requires global solutions). By focusing toomuch on a framing of the SDGs as a globalagenda, local politicians and citizens sometimesmay not feel empowered to take the importantmeasures which can be taken at a local level. Asargued in Chap. 3, cooperation between cities onthe other hand can empower the local governancelevel. Framing the SDGs as ‘Global Goals’ coulddisempower local climate action if achievementsat the local level are not reported in the mediaand the expectation is created that internationalnegotiators will deal with the problem. Thus,local governments and cities need to beempowered: they need a voice, tools, budgetsand need to connect with each other. ‘Byempowering local governance systems, nationalpolicies could leverage existing local experi-ments, accelerate policy responses, fosterresource mobilization and engage local stake-holders’ (UNSDSN and IDDRI 2014: 95, 96).

If one’s goal is to achieve a societal goal (e.g.ecological sustainability), decentralized powerstructures in combination with intrinsic motiva-tion and understanding of co-benefits may bemore effective and efficient for achieving theSDGs.

From the perspective of transition man-agement, the empowerment of innovativeNiches and new Regimes alone may be insuffi-cient in the transition battlefield; what is alsoneeded is the active ‘depowerment’ and deinsti-tutionalization of Regimes that are antagonisticto the Regime, while assisting the ‘losers’ fromsustainability transition. The question then comesup how institutions and mechanisms equitablydistribute the benefits and burdens of the changesthat result from transition governance. This isimportant because international (climate) agree-ments require domestic ratification, and if suchagreements are not perceived as ‘fair’ bydomestic publics and legislatures, they areprobably not going to be politically acceptableand not implementable (Klinsky 2014). In thatsense, the concept of ‘Just Transition’ is criticalfor achieving the SDGs and the Paris ClimateAgreement. The Just Transition concept has beendeveloped by the trade union movement toencompass a range of social interventions neededto secure workers’ jobs and livelihoods wheneconomies are shifting to sustainable production,including avoiding climate change, protectingbiodiversity and ending war, among other chal-lenges. For example, transitioning to renewableenergy requires that those who lose out fromsuch a transition (e.g. coal miners) receive sup-port to become solar panel installers. A justtransition brings together workers, communities,employers and government in social dialogue todrive the concrete plans, policies and investmentsneeded for a fast and fair transformation. Itfocuses on jobs, livelihoods and ensuring that noone is left behind as we reduce emissions, protectthe climate and advance social and economicjustice.19

19To deliver and build the social dialogue for a justtransition, the International Trade Union Confederation


https://www.toolshero.com/communication-skills/rose-of-leary/

https://www.toolshero.com/communication-skills/rose-of-leary/

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0475-0_3

5.3 Governance Pillar 2: Knowledge

5.3.1 Defining Knowledge

As Bertrand Russell’s ‘Theory of Knowledge’illustrates, it is difficult to define knowledge.According to the Oxford Dictionary, knowl-edge is ‘a familiarity with someone or some-thing, which can include facts, information,descriptions or skills acquired through experi-ence or education. Knowledge refers to thepractical or theoretical understanding of a sub-ject. It can be implicit (as with practical skills orexpertise) or explicit (as with the theoreticalunderstanding of a subject)’.

Some transdisciplinary scholars (e.g. Pohl andHirsch Hadorn 2007; Jahn et al. 2012) distin-guish between three types of knowledge that arerelevant for sustainability transitions. For them,systems knowledge is the knowledge necessaryto understand an issue, i.e. in the case of transi-tions, their dynamics, drivers and barriers. Targetknowledge is about the vision of, and motivationfor the system aimed for. Transformativeknowledge is about the ‘how’, or the practicalways and means of realizing the desired state of aspecific system. Rauschmayer et al. (2015)hypothesize that any informational and scientificbasis for transition governance should compriseall three of these types of knowledge. Systems,target and transformational knowledge thenshould be grounded both at the societal and at theindividual levels and furthermore conceptualizedas a bridge between individual and societallevels.

5.3.2 The Role of Knowledgein Governancefor the SDGs

Knowledge and facts are more important insustainable development than in many otherareas (Najam et al. 2006). Knowledge is relevant,first, in the form of scientific information that

plays a major role in the monitoring and evalu-ation of SDG implementation. Increasingly, cit-izens have access to scientific knowledge onsustainability through online platforms.20

Science and innovation play three main roles inthe SDGs.

Firstly, science and innovation are goals inand of themselves as key drivers for economicgrowth and job creation. Goal 9 is the SDG thatmost directly addresses science and innovation. Itlooks at the key ingredients needed to increasescientific capabilities and innovation

Secondly, science is central to the imple-mentation of other goals. For example, endinghunger (Goal 2) asks for investment into ‘agri-cultural research’; ensuring healthy lives (Goal 3)requires more ‘research and development ofvaccines and medicine’ and establishing sus-tainable consumption and production patterns(Goal 12) means supporting ‘developing coun-tries to strengthen their scientific and techno-logical capacity’.

Thirdly, scientific knowledge can supporttranslation of targets to national policies and helpmeasure and evaluate impact. Science has a roleto play to ensure that the appropriate expertise isfed into policy development. The high-levelpolitical forum (HLPF) will oversee follow-upand review the SDGs and part of its remit will beto ‘strengthen the science–policy interface’.Target 17.8 is to ‘increase significantly theavailability of high-quality, timely and reliabledata’. When 57 million infants born in 2012—that is four out of every ten babies—were notregistered with civil authorities this may be easiersaid than done. Lack of data, poor quality dataand regional differences will be a massive chal-lenge for the SDGs. Scientists need to support allaspects of implementation, including ensuringthat appropriate metrics, monitoring, evaluation,infrastructure and data are in place.

and its partners have established a Just Transition Centre.Also see https://www.ituc-csi.org/just-transition-centre.

20E.g. though the ESRI platform for the SDGs, anyonecan follow how specific areas of the world perform interms of the SDGs based on a Geographic InformationsSystem (GIS): http://sdg.esri.com/.

5.3 Governance Pillar 2: Knowledge 125

https://www.ituc-csi.org/just-transition-centre

http://sdg.esri.com/

Challenges to transferring knowledge intopolicy.

Knowledge can play an important practicalrole in sustainability efforts. For example, in thecase study on energy efficiency, it may be usefulfor people to be aware of their exact energy usethrough technologies such as smart energymeters. However, the assumption that knowledgecan be transferred directly to the policy domainand the broader expectation that knowledge candirect governance can be questioned for severalreasons.

First, ‘evidence-based policy-making’ in thecontext of sustainable development is often notbased on factual, undisputable knowledge and onrational models of problem-solving (Hertin et al.2009). ‘Evidence’ regarding complex naturalsystems (such as climatic systems) is often rareand assessments of planetary boundaries cannotbe based exclusively on scientific knowledgeclaims but require science–society and transdis-ciplinary deliberations (Schmidt 2013). TheIPCC process21, for example, is based on anetwork-type consensual process within the sci-ence community. However, the results fromIPCC deliberations seem to be weighed bypoliticians22 and the media on the parameter ofclassical scientific authority (Meuleman 2012a).

Secondly, it is challenging to get decision-makers to consider sustainability science and itscomplexities, and the presentation of data haslittle direct impact on governance practice (e.g.the Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity(TEEB) reports did not have much impact onpolicy-making, even according to intervieweeswho work in the TEEB Secretariat). And eventhough the IPCC has expressed a clear consensuson the urgency of addressing climate change (e.g.

in its Assessment Reports), it is unclear if andhow this has influenced the climate negotiations.

Thirdly, there are several neuropsychologicalphenomena at play in humans that may stillprevent action even when the level of conscienceand knowledge of the complexities around neg-ative effects of climate change is increased (alsosee section 6.1 below on the behavioural aspectsof governance for the SDGs). The lack of con-sistency between scientific knowledge and ourdirect experiences and tacit knowledge can be abarrier to effective climate action (the‘knowledge-action paradox’) (Naustdalslid2011). Science may increasingly uncover thedynamics and threats of climate change, but it isdifficult for laymen to perceive these threats intheir daily lives. Recent research shows that atthe individual level perceptions of climatechange risk in fact decline as scientific literacyand numeracy increase (e.g. Kahan et al. 2011,2012). Higher educated people are more inclinedto be individualistic and oppose egalitarianism,and use their scientific knowledge to defend theirstatus quo. The implication is that providingmore information on climate change will notnecessarily succeed in strengthening climateaction (World Development Report 2015).

Fourth, we may be able to measure the eco-logical details of pollution (SDGs 3, 6 and 14)and overfishing (SDG 14?) or changes in climaticpatterns, but scientific facts are ignored forpolitical reasons. The broad scientific consensuson climate change and its causes and effects areoften put in doubt (mainly by vested interests incarbon-intensive industries), which has severeconsequences for both mitigation and adaptationaction. Also, facts can easily be twisted and theseed of doubt (e.g. on the anthropogenic causesof climate change) can easily be sown if peopleexperience an information overload and havetrouble selecting the facts that are in line with thescientific consensus (Oreskes 2004).23

21IPCC assessment reports are compiled and reviewed byleading scientists, but the politically more relevant‘Summaries for Policy makers’ (SPMs) have to be agreedupon by all delegates from participating countries.22Meuleman (2012a) sees in this context the statement ofa former Dutch Environment minister as illustrative whenshe says that ‘I will not accept any more mistakes fromthe IPCC. As a politician, I must be able to have blindtrust in what science says’.

23For one of many investigations on whether a scientificconsensus exists on climate change, see Oreskes (2004),available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/306/5702/1686.full.


http://www.sciencemag.org/content/306/5702/1686.full

http://www.sciencemag.org/content/306/5702/1686.full

Knowledge democracy.

In ‘t Veld (2013) acknowledges the emer-gence of turbulent democracies and describes itas ‘knowledge democracy’ (also see Fig. 5.4). Ina knowledge democracy, there is

1. Lack of consensus;2. Mutual dependence of media, science and

politics;3. Tension between bottom-up participation and

monopolized information by ruling elites and4. A decay of representative democracy.

In a knowledge democracy, social changeis brought about in a bottom-up fashion and outof deliberations between individuals and canlead to the destabilization that experimentalist

governance and transition management suggestis needed for transitions.

5.3.3 Knowledge Competence 1:Knowledge Cooperation(Knowledge Sharingand Learning)

Governance relates to social systems and thesesystems learn continuously, with the support ofexperience, knowledge, revelation and so on.Because complex sustainability problems oftenare unpredictable, it is important to have a cultureof learning, rather than a fixed strategy (Bein-hocker 2006). Where each governance actor hasa limited view of a large sustainability issue,learning between different actors can foster the

Fig. 5.4 Knowledge democracy. Source In ‘t Veld(2013). Note The relations between politics, science andmedia, the corners in the inner triangle, are prone toprofound change, indicated in second-order relationships:bottom-up (social) media do not only supplement but alsocompete with the classical media. Participatory democ-racy as a compliment or threat to representative democ-racy. Transdisciplinary design or research as a bridgebetween classical science and the real world. As a

consequence, we are confronted with tensions, threatsand opportunities which are indicated in third-orderrelationships. The extensions of the corners of thetriangles can enrich society but can also create tensions.The first- and second-order tensions do not disappear in aknowledge democracy but do change character in thepresence of third-order tensions. The outer points of theextended triangle can strengthen and stimulate each other


collective cognition that is necessary to take onpolicy-making functions of greater complexity.(Huppé and Creech 2012) As such, cooperationbetween different actors and knowledge shar-ing24 can contribute to more qualitatively diverseknowledge of sustainability.

The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Develop-ment calls for ‘enhance[ing] knowledge sharingon mutually agreed terms’ (para 17.6) while theAddis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing forDevelopment ‘encourage[s] knowledge sharing[…] in sectors contributing to the achievement ofthe SDGs’ (para 117).

The first knowledge competence therefore is‘knowledge cooperation’, which covers bothlearning and knowledge sharing. This compe-tence shows the need for recognizing ‘knowledgerelations’ in addition to power relations.

Powell (1994) argues that networks have anadvantage over markets and hierarchies when itcomes to sharing knowledge. Networks andmultilevel governance can encourage experi-mental efforts and learn at multiple levels(Ostrom 2010). The distribution of knowledge isthought to be subject to what Cash and Moser(2000) have termed ‘scale-specific comparativeadvantages’. Linking the local, national andglobal levels of knowledge systems requiresindividuals or organizations (e.g. NGOs) takingactive roles as coordinators and facilitators of

collaborative processes (e.g. Halls et al. 2005).By enabling and hosting deliberative processes,NGOs, for example, can promote both local andglobal knowledge sharing. In such knowledgesharing efforts, it is important to create the spaceand trust for not only sharing success stories (ashappens usually when governments report ontheir progress on the SDGs), but also failures inorder to achieve deeper learning and avoidmaking the same failures in the future.

5.3.4 Knowledge Competence 2:Adaptivenessand Resilience

Adaptiveness and adaptive capacity in gover-nance cover a set of related concepts such asvulnerability, resilience, risk management,robustness, responsiveness,25 adaptive capacityand social learning (Adger 2006). Adaptivecapacity in the context of vulnerability to climatechange is associated predominantly with gover-nance (Brooks et al. 2005). As I heard one experton sustainable corporate governance say, ‘onecannot lead or manage change, one can onlyadapt’.

Adaptiveness can apply to processes ofchange and adaptation within governance sys-tems (Biermann et al. 2010). More ‘polycentric’structures and balance between bottom-up andcentralized top-down approaches (also called‘vertical integration’) have in general turned outto indeed lead to sustainability of resourceregimes and higher levels adaptability and resi-lience (Pahl-Wostl 2009; Huppé and Creech2012). Vice versa, adaptability and resilience arecrucial for enabling transition management andnetwork governance. Moreover, in networksocieties it is also easier to instil collective action(ibid.). Adaptiveness is one competence underthe theoretical pillar of knowledge becauseknowledge represents both a powerful

24Gramsci contended that the modern prince ‘cannot be areal person or concrete individual’ but ‘can only be anorganism, a complex element of society in which acollective will, which has already been recognized andhas to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to takeconcrete form’ (Hoare and Nowell-Smith 1971: 129).Similarly, Olsson et al. (2014) suggest that a theory on therole of agents in sustainability transformations mayinvolve moving the focus from the role of individualleaders to interacting key individuals. Mental and sociallearning processes could further trigger public participa-tion in collective cultural change and a mass transforma-tion of human understanding through public participationand improved decision making. Cognitive science andphilosophy of science is exploring in this context theconcept of ‘distributed cognition’ (Giere and Moffat 2003;Hutchins and Klausen 1996; Nersessian 2006), whichmeans that collective learning can take place throughobjects occurring outside individual minds, (e.g. throughthe use of a computer) in order to address complexproblems more distributively.

25Legitimacy, broadly understood, can rest on a range ofqualities and characteristics including law, but alsoauthenticity, responsiveness, and problem-solving capac-ities (Ansell 2011: 149–50).


determinant and indicator of adaptive capacity(Williams et al. 2015).

Because the wicked problems that many ofthe SDGs address cannot be ‘solved’ (Hulme2009), they call for an adaptive ‘dealing with’approach (also see Box 1 on page xxx). Imple-menting the SDGs will require adaptive gover-nance in order to be flexible to adjust to ourever-changing world, including new actors,contexts and challenges (Boons et al. 2009). In acomplex, interconnected and rapidly changingworld, there is a need for adaptation to reducevulnerability.

Governance can have an impact on adaptationto climate change, for example, through manag-ing infrastructure development. Vice versa, thechallenges of climate change affect politicalprocesses and necessitate the adaptation of gov-ernance practice to changing circumstances anddemands from citizens. A system which is toostable can become rigid and unadaptable; mean-while, a system which is too changeable maybecome fragile. Herein lies the paradox of theneed for both adaptability and resilience of someexisting practices and for the radical transfor-mation of other habits in order to achieve theSDGs. Only a robust governance type thatcombines the dual needs for stability and changecan perform well in the face of uncertainty andrapid change. This makes the challenge of copingwith the tension between institutional flexibilityand stability a crucial one for policy-makers thatwork on the SDGs. Knowledge then becomeseven more important in order to distinguishbetween what needs to be preserved and whatneeds to change. In reality, a balance betweenrobustness and change is difficult to achieve,especially if existing legal frameworks stand inthe way of change that is based on progressinginsights.26

Resilience

Resilience is ‘the capability to flexibly adaptone’s course in response to frequent and uncer-tain changes without losing identity’ (Termeeret al. 2013: 6).

Resilience allows a system to adapt flexibly touncertainties and the constantly changing con-ditions surrounding wicked problems. Resiliencecan be seen as a property of a system that definesits robustness and reliability but it does not implyresistance to change. For ecological systems,resilience is desirable and can be associated withsustainability.

Resilience also is the ability to self-organize,and learn, and can be seen as the bridge betweenadaptive governance and disaster risk reduction(DRR) (Djalante et al. 2011). Resilience is theultimate goal of disaster risk reduction(DRR) and of SDG Target 1.5 (also see Box 5.4below). Resilience can relate to multilevel gov-ernance, as, for example, energy systems areorganized in a centralized or hierarchical waythat ‘can account for only a limited number ofconnections and linkages between energy sub-systems and scales, thus being unable to respondto simultaneous challenges effectively’. (Gold-thau and Sovacool 2012: 237) Centralizedarrangements can be expected to be rigid andstatic (Cherp et al. 2011) and thus less prone toresilience. In interviews, utility experts27

explained that existing power utilities prefercentralized forms of renewable energy such asmajor off-shore wind and solar installations (e.g.Desertec) as they fit into their existing businessmodels.

26The rule of law is in general considered as important forsustainable development, but legal frameworks canconflict with adaptive approaches. For example, KemalDerviş (former head of UNDP and member of the IMFmission to Greece) in a meeting in Geneva in May 2015said that even though the Troika approach to the financialcrisis in Greece was understood not to work much earlier,

there were agreements that had to be respected so that itwas difficult to perform adaptive governance.27For example, Jan Ossenbrink, interview in person withRoland-Jan Meijer (Global Solar Council) in Brussels on16 October 2013.


Box 5.4: The Role of Resilience in theSDGsTarget 1.5 represents the core resiliencetarget, as follows: ‘By 2030 build theresilience of the poor and those in vulner-able situations and reduce their exposureand vulnerability to climate-relatedextreme events and other economic,social and environmental shocks anddisasters’.

In addition, resilience is a core featureof target 13.1 in its aim to ‘strengthenresilience and adaptive capacity toclimate-related hazards and natural disas-ters in all countries’.

Resilience also underpins the achieve-ment of several other targets, including:

– 9.1: ‘develop quality, reliable, sustain-able and resilient infrastructure…’;

– 2.4: ‘ensure sustainable food produc-tion systems and implement resilientagricultural practices…’;

– 11.5: ‘significantly reduce the numberof deaths and the number of peopleaffected and decrease by [x] per cent theeconomic losses relative to grossdomestic product caused by disasters,including water-related disasters, with afocus on protecting the poor and peoplein vulnerable situations…’;

– 11.b: ‘substantially increase the numberof cities and human settlements adopt-ing and implementing integrated poli-cies and plans towards inclusion,resource efficiency, mitigation andadaptation to climate change, resilienceto disasters, develop and implement, inline with the Sendai Framework forDisaster Risk Reduction, holistic dis-aster risk management at all levels’.

Resilience and adaptation are related conceptsas they both relate to the dynamics of a particularsystem or a closely related set of systems. Net-works, for example, can enhance learning and

innovation, which can improve resilience (Dja-lante et al. 2011). Adaptability can be seen as thecapacity of actors in a system to influence resi-lience (Walker et al. 2004). Vice versa, increas-ing the resilience increases the possibility toadapt to new circumstances.

The resilience approach to governanceexplains how social–ecological systems behavewhen confronted with external pressures orinternal stresses. When resilience has beeneroded, threshold effects,28 crises, surprises(black swan events), tipping points29 and cas-cading effects30 can push the system over athreshold into an alternative state (Kofinas2009).

Brown (2011a) identifies three types ofsocio-political tipping points:

1. Rapid response to an emergency. Oneexample is the reaction of the City of NewYork to storm Sandy, where a climate miti-gation and adaptation plan was adoptedwithin weeks after the devastating storm hit(Greenhalgh 2013).31

2. A slow but sure societal reaction: A tippingpoint on a particular issue is reached afteran extended period of gradual change inthinking and attitudes. An example ofreaching a tipping point slowly is the low-ering rate of smoking in most Westerncountries in response to scientific evidenceon the health risks, despite the propaganda

28Small events that trigger changes that are impossible toreverse.29Gladwell (2000) defines a tipping point as ‘the momentof critical mass, the threshold, the boiling point’ anddescribes three types of people that are crucial in thecreation and spread of social tipping points: Connectors,Mavens and Salesmen. Connectors are the social equiv-alent of computer network hubs; they know people acrosssocial, cultural, professional, and economic communitiesand introduce people who function in different circles.Mavens are information specialists and knowledge bro-kers. Salesmen are charismatic people with strong nego-tiation skills who can persuade others.30Events that produce immense consequences acrossscales, systems and time.31http://www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-case-studies/how-sandy-affected-new-york-city%E2%80%99s-long-term-planning.


http://www.climate.gov/news-features/climate-case-studies/how-sandy-affected-new-york-city%25E2%2580%2599s-long-term-planning



of the tobacco industry (cf. propaganda anddenial of the fossil fuel industry on climatechange).

3. The third is the sandwich model of socialchange, where there is a dedicated grassrootsmovement (‘Niches’) pushing for change thatis strongly supported by (part of) the elitesand by ‘Landscape’ developments. Forexample, both bottom-up and elitist move-ments in support of climate action can beexpected to gain support as the impacts ofclimatic change become more visible.

Eventually, global decarbonization and therelated transitions can be expected to result fromreaching combinations of these three types oftipping points. Climatic disasters are set toawaken the need for stronger action while at thesame time we can expect social and economictipping points in support of transitions to bereached.

From a more critical perspective, resiliencecan normalize crises and change and can privi-lege elites with sufficient economic and finan-cial capital who are best prepared to experimentand learn. As resilience discourses candepoliticize transitions, resilience planningshould include consideration of the direction inwhich society wishes to go (Evans 2012). Therehave been wide-ranging discussions on thequestion in how far resilience of current systemsis complementary with transitioning away fromthose systems. In the context of climate change,an example would be the continuation of pro-ducing crops in a specific place, but withclimate-resilient crop varieties instead of aban-doning the production of that crop in thatlocation. However, in the face of long-termsecular stress, as with many sustainabilitythreats, such measures can constrain adaptabil-ity and transformative capacity (Leach et al.2010a) as they lead to system lock-in. There-fore, resilience approaches need to distinguishbetween responses to shock and to stress (Leachet al. 2010b). Resilience can improve responsesto shocks, but transitions may be necessary foravoiding or alleviating longer-term stress.

5.3.5 Knowledge Competence 3:Reflexivity

Reflexivity (or in Giddens’ terminology ‘reflexivemonitoring’32) is concerned with the humancompetences to reflect, critically think, learn andadapt. Reflexivity also enables people to learnfrom any source, experience, practice, informa-tion, knowledge, theory and so on, and tore-orientate behaviour subsequently (In ’t Veldet al. 2011: 72). For Jessop (2003: 7) morespecifically, reflexivity is ‘the ability and com-mitment to uncover and make explicit to oneselfthe nature of one’s intentions, projects andactions and their conditions of possibility, and inthis context, to learn about them, critique themand act upon any lessons that have been learnt’.Self-reflexivity has two main dimensions: cul-tural33 (collective) and psychological(individual).

At a more structural level, reflexivity is linkedto the transformation of the governance systemitself and the search for innovative solutions tosocial problems by moving beyond surfacemanifestations to uncover systemic underpin-nings. The term reflexive governance is not onlyan acknowledgement of the importance oflearning and adaptiveness, but also of complexityin the governing and the governed systems(Frantzeskaki and Loorbach 2009).

Reflexive governance is an overarching con-cept and covers both adaptive management andtransition management. (Voss and Bornemann2011) Adaptive governance is based on adaptivemanagement and is suggested as an approach forgoverning complex problems such as disasters(Djalante 2012). Adaptive management is anapproach to resource and ecosystem management

32The term ‘reflexivity’ is used by Giddens to refer to theability of an agent to consciously alter his or her place inthe social structure; thus globalization and the emergenceof the ‘post-traditional’ society might be said to allow for‘greater social reflexivity’. Social and political sciencesare therefore important because social knowledge, asself-knowledge, is potentially emancipatory.33Cultural self-reflexivity is the critical examination of thecollective, cultural, or intersubjective elements of theworldview that one is embedded in.


that refers to functionally defined social–eco-logical systems with a regional scope, such asnatural parks, river basins, mountain ranges andso forth. Adaptive management accounts for theinherent complexity and unpredictability ofecosystem dynamics (Pahl-Wostl 2007). Adap-tive management is based on an idea of learningby doing and is a type of management thatintegrates science and local knowledge withdeliberative and experimental practices (Vossand Bornemann 2011; Norton 2015). Processesof learning by doing and ‘doing by learning’have been the results of cooperation and dialoguebetween different disciplines and between sci-entific, policy and civil society actors onmanaging complex systems (Verbong andLoorbach 2012).

There are various differences between adap-tive management and transition management:

• Adaptive management is more focused onsocio-ecological systems (e.g. natural parks);

• Transition management applies tosocio-technical systems (e.g. renewablesinnovation).

In terms of similarities, both adaptive man-agement and transition management assumecomplex and coevolving systems, the involve-ment of a broad range of stakeholders indecision-making and the need for ‘experimenta-tion and learning’. Reflexivity is essential fordealing with the variety of possible perspectivesand discourses on wicked problems.

Reflexivity can help to appreciate a variety ofperspectives on a sustainability challenge, tocontinuously reconsider dominant problemframes, to bring about a redefinition of actionperspectives and to avoid tunnel vision (Schönand Rein 1994). People in governing positionsare often adequately informed on climate change,but also that they see the issue from differentperspectives and in different contexts. Accordingto Hulme (2009), this diversity of viewpoints isthe main reason for disagreement on climatechange. Indeed the lack of common understand-ing of both the meaning and substantial value ofsustainable development and of the extent of

authority and power that should be imbued ingovernance can be a barrier to implementingsustainability (Huh 2014).

The governance capability for reflexivity thusrelies on understanding and handling the varietyof frames in a policy domain. Therewith, reflex-ivity and diversity are mutually dependent. Toobserve reflexively means to observe how fram-ing affects wicked problem dynamics (Dewulfet al. 2009; Drake and Donohue 1996).

5.4 Governance Pillar 3: Normsand Values

The global transformation that is needed now mustbe based not on technological advancement, but onour collective values and convictions. - Rockström(2015)

5.4.1 Defining Norms and Values

The purpose of this section is to identify funda-mental norms, values and ethical perspectivesrelated to governance for the SDGs and to embedthese perspectives in both ethical philosophy andpolitical theory.

Whereas norms are standards of behaviourthat are typical or accepted within a particulargroup or society (usually as a result of societaldiscourses—cf. Dryzek and Stevenson 2012),values are:

• Abstract ideas and prescriptive convictionsabout what is right and wrong and what isimportant (what is valued?);

• Social and psychological concepts, rooted incognition and emotion and

• Dynamic and forged by deliberation (Krasner1983: 2).

Values define or direct us to goals, frame ourattitudes and views, and provide standardsagainst which human behaviour can be judged(Leiserowitz et al. 2006). Values are conceptu-alizations that originate from Western philosophyand can be separated from experience. At the


same time, values can have strong practicalimplications when socialized values lead tonorms that regulate human behaviour. Morals arevalues with a greater social element and distin-guish ‘good’ from ‘bad’. Ethics is a theory or asystem of moral values.34 Ethics determines ourpurpose as individuals and as a society, and ourvision of the future.

At the individual level, normative competenceis the ability to map, apply and reconcile sus-tainability values, principles and targets withinternal and external stakeholders, withoutembracing any given norm but based on the goodcharacter of the one who is involved in sustain-ability issues (Wiek et al. 2011).

At the collective level, values that are livedconstitute culture. (In ‘t Veld 2013: 284)Although values may differ from culture to cul-ture and can evolve over time, there are alsoclaims on ‘global’ or ‘universal’ sustainabilityvalues. The SDGs in that sense could be regardedas a set of norms and values as the Goals expresswhat we value, are the result of considerate dis-courses, are widely accepted, and guide stake-holders together in specific directions.

5.4.2 The Importance of Normsand Values in Governancefor the SDGs

According to Accountability’s SustainabilityLeadership survey, commitment to sustainabilityvalues is more than ever the biggest factor indetermining sustainability leadership.

Values are important first because all charac-teristics of wicked problems are symptoms ofunderlying value conflicts (Norton 2015).

Secondly, ‘the only way to develop a moresustainable society is through a process of fun-damental reflection on our current values andsocietal Regimes’ (Verbong and Loorbach 2012:15–16).

Third, consideration of norms, values andshared conceptions allows for an understandingof how social structures shape policy processes(Clemens and Cook 1999).

Fourth, policy coherence for implementingthe SDGs in itself will not avoid the reality ofpower politics. Promoting coherence amongactors and regimes which differ in terms of theirpower then is unlikely to challenge the domi-nance of powerful interests without correspond-ing normative realignment around ambitions forsustainability.

And fifth, in successful governance for theSDGs, science will play a crucial role. However,the illusion of value-free science can enable the(mis-)use of expertise in policy-making andpolicy prescription, which can start at themoment problems are framed based on ethicaljudgments (Hulme 2009). Therefore, it is difficultto separate science from values in many cases aschanging scientific models often involveschanging values and assumptions (Norton2015).35 The relation between the knowledgesystems of science and ethics must be betterrecognized and balanced to help us understandnot only what goals to reach in terms of sus-tainability and how to reach these goals, but alsowhy we aim for sustainability in specific ways(Dahl 2010). The emphasis of sustainability sci-ence on the scientific side of sustainability is notnecessarily meant to disregard the importance ofvalues, but it can place science in such a domi-nant role that it weakens its contribution to valueproblems (Clark and Dickson 2003). Putnam(2004) argues that all scientific statements at leastimply cognitive values (e.g. consistency, coher-ence or objectivity) that share fundamental

34The three major strands in the Western philosophy ofethics are

• consequentialism/utilitarianism (ends can justify acertain action);

• virtue ethics (the action is justified because a specificperson is acting); and

• Deontology (an action is justified through the way it isimplanted) (García‐Rosell and Moisander 2008).

35Ethics are important in scientific research (researchethics). Whereas the origins of research ethics lie inmedical science and are based on protecting a weakerresearch object (patient) from a powerful doctor, in socialscience the roles can be reversed often when a researcherhas powerful objects as research subject.

5.4 Governance Pillar 3: Norms and Values 133

characteristics with ethical value judgments. ForDouglas (2009), some predominant cognitivevalues in scientific research in fact are built onethical values.

5.4.3 Three Competences for Normsand Values

Here, it is hypothesized that the main norms andvalues in the context of governance for the SDGscan be differentiated into three competences,each of which involves a different level ofanalysis:

1. Universal or ‘meta’ norms and values refer toprinciples that guide overall behaviour insocieties (e.g. justice and equity in SDG 16,sustainable development, gender equality asexpressed in SDG 5.);

2. Norms and values that smoothen overallhuman cooperation processes and build socialcapital (e.g. general trust, mutuality andreciprocity);

3. ‘Regulatory norms’ or rules, delimitate theconduct of individuals and groups and indicateobligations and prohibitions. This includesvalues that can be considered to be importantspecifically for traditional forms of top-downgovernance (e.g. trust as expressed in legiti-macy and accountability) (Hufty 2011).

In the following, these three competences arediscussed, starting with justice and equity, followedby the second category of trust which covers bothcooperation values (‘horizontal trust’) and thespecific governance values of legitimacy andaccountability (‘vertical trust’). Finally, inclusiveness(pluralism and respect for diversity) is presented asthe third competence for norms and values.

5.4.4 Norm Competence 1: Equity—Justice and Fairness

No study on governing sustainability transitionswould be complete without a consideration of the

relevant justice and equity aspects. One examplethat was mentioned above is the concept of a‘just transition’, in which employees in industriesthat will see a decline (e.g. coal mining) areactively supported in terms of, e.g. re-education.Moreover, SDG 16 is focused on peace, justice,and strong institutions.

Whereas justice is an end point to beachieved, equity in climate governance can beseen as a means to reach that objective. TheOxford Dictionary equates equity with ‘being fairand impartial’. In governance practice, equity isclosely linked with information sharing, mean-ingful participation and accountability indecision-making.

In fact, for Rauschmayer et al. (2013), sus-tainability transitions are societal phenomena thattarget to improve justice. Sachs and Santarius(2007) argue that considerations of justice awardlegitimacy and that justice consideration can be aunifying principle that may be useful for makingclimate policies socially acceptable, imple-mentable and effective. Perceived justice andfairness are affected both by policy features andindividual perceptions and can strongly affectresponses to policies (Dreyer and Walker 2013).

Justice can be seen as ‘the practical expressionof awareness that, in the achievement of humanprogress, the interests of the individual and thoseof society are inextricably linked’ (Bahá’í Inter-national Community 1995). Further, ‘justice isnot merely about trying to achieve, or dreamingabout achieving, some perfectly just society orsocial arrangements, but about preventing mani-festly severe injustices’ (Sen 1999: 21).

Justice is a good example of a topic wheremore convergence among disciplinary discoursescan engender collective action. Sociologistsspeak of social justice, social psychologists ofperceptions of justice, lawyers call it equity,resource analysts talk of access, economists ofdistribution, geographers of environmental jus-tice and political scientists of fairness.

The SDGs are grounded in human rightsnorms and are intended to be universally appli-cable. Human rights law recognizes that humansare entitled to individual ‘access to justice’. In


this context, formal justice (e.g. equal treatment),procedural justice,36 distributive justice,37 cor-rective justice and equity (e.g. consideringspecific circumstances that justify deviationsfrom formal principles of justice) are relevant(Petersmann 2012).

Example: The relevance of justice and equityfor climate and sustainable energy governance

The question of justice in climate governance isoften framed in the context of accountability and ofburden sharing. Typical topics for discussions onclimate justice are power, process and participation;mobilization of capabilities; prioritization of needsand responsibilities and distributive justice argu-ments. Distributive justice arguments usually evolvearound questions of causality (based on current and

historical emissions), ability to pay, protection ofthe vulnerable, entitlements to climate security andeconomic development and burden sharing (Klin-sky and Dowlatabadi 2009). Geographical equity isimportant in climate justice as some of the countrieswith the highest historical emissions will be leastimpacted, while many countries with negligiblehistorical emissions are very vulnerable to climatechange (for a map of the potential vulnerability ofdifferent countries to climate change see Fig. 5.5).Intergenerational equity will be important becausethe choices of past and current generations will havean impact on generations to come.

The global energy system in itself has beendescribed as unjust on the demand side, as bil-lions of people today live without access toelectricity and depend on highly polluting tradi-tional fuels for cooking and heating (Goldthauand Sovacool 2012).38 Energy disparity andpoverty (SDG 7) often intersect with other SDGs,

Fig. 5.5 Vulnerability of different countries to climatechange. Some of the countries with historically thehighest emissions will be least impacted, while many

with low historical emissions will be affected severely.Source Standard and Poor’s (2014)

36Procedural justice is concerned with fairly includingpeople and communities in decision-making about energysystems.37Distributive justice entails equitably sharing the benefitsand burdens of, e.g. energy production and consumptionacross individuals and societies.

38UNESCAP (2008) found that poorer households paid171% more (relative to their income) for cooking fuelsand 120% more for transportation, 67% more forelectricity, and 33% more for fertilisers when compared


such as gender equity (SDG 5; e.g. mostlywomen have to search for firewood) and justice(SDG 16) in sharing the burdens of environ-mental degradation as poorer populations usuallylive in more polluted areas and often lack sani-tation (ibid.).

At first sight, renewable energy can lead tosocial empowerment, independence (Kormann2015)39 and democratization of the energy sys-tem as a decentralized power system in theoryhas less (concentrated) political power.40 How-ever, the main criticism on the German Ener-giewende is one of fairness; consumers pay forrenewable energy subsidies through a levy onelectricity, while energy-intensive industries geta discount and actually pay historically lowelectricity rates. There is sufficient supportthough in Germany for the Energiewendebecause many citizens can benefit from generat-ing renewable energy. Farmers, for example, canearn additional income by placing a wind turbineor solar panels on their land.41 However, peoplewho install solar panels already are wealthier,

own assets such as a house or land, and can getthe loans to buy solar equipment. Meanwhile,those without those assets pay higher prices fortheir electricity if there is a surcharge which isdestined for solar feed-in tariffs. Thus, solarpower can indeed reinforce existing (uneven)wealth distribution. Recently, there have beendevelopments in this area (e.g. community solarinstallations on residential buildings) which aremeant to empower renters and poorer home-owners to benefit from local solar powergeneration.

5.4.5 Norm Competence 2: Creating‘Horizontal’ and ‘Vertical’Trust

Trust refers to the positive expectation that otheractors will refrain from opportunistic behaviour,even when they have the opportunity to do so(Edelenbos and Klijn 2007). Thus, trust is ‘theexpectation that arises within a community ofregular, honest and cooperative behaviour basedon commonly shared norms, on the part of othermembers of that community’ (Fukuyama 1995:26).

The economy benefits in many ways fromsocial trust. A society with a high level of socialtrust has fewer formalities, conflicts and legalprocesses. In economic terms, social trust redu-ces transaction costs in the economy, i.e. costsassociated with ensuring that an agreement isfulfilled. But the effects of trust extend beyondpurely economic aspects—research has alsoshown social benefits. People with greater levelsof trust are more inclined to perceive that theyhave better control over their lives and better lifechances. Trust is also regarded as an importantcomponent in promoting engagement in society,reducing criminality and increasing individualhappiness (Nordic Council of Ministers 2017).

Trust is thought to be especially importantwhen dealing with the complexity involved inimplementing the SDGs because vertical meansof control are difficult given the interdependen-cies between actors. In this section, two types oftrust that are relevant to governance for the SDGs

to the expenditures on energy from middle- andupper-class households.39Renewable energy can make people more independentif they do not need access to the grid any more, forexample, and are less dependent on centralised utilities.Gaining liberty through renewables is one reason why inthe US state of Georgia, the Tea Party cooperated with theSierra Club to lobby for distributed solar power. Also seehttp://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/green-tea-party-solar.40Sovacool (2009) suggests that energy technologies canbe read as congealed culture: ‘The social interests of thosedesigning the electric utility system get built into thesystem, rather than becoming a latent or unintended result.The system thus redistributes social power and entrenchesestablished practices and methods of reasoning that havegrave consequences for society, including the emission ofgreenhouse gases and toxic pollutants’.41This is why politically, the Energiewende was originallya Socialist-Green Party initiative but also gained supportfrom the conservative Christian Democrat Party CDU (theparty favoured in general by German farmers).An unin-tended side-effect of the Energiewende is that subsidizedrenewables undercut relatively climate-friendly naturalgas on price. Therefore, traditional utilities have turned tocoal-powered electricity generation. Thus, prices ofelectricity have gone up in Germany and the use ofrenewable sources has expanded, but Germany ended upemitting more carbon until the year 2014.


http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/green-tea-party-solar

http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/green-tea-party-solar

are identified. The first is ‘horizontal’ trust orsocial capital. This is the trust between equalpartners which enables cooperation. The secondtype of trust is ‘vertical’ trust (accountability andlegitimacy).

Horizontal trust and social capital.

The performance of governance structures suchas networks can be explained largely with theconcepts of social capital and institutionalcapacity (Huppé and Creech 2012).42

Social capital is based on trust, reciprocity43

and mutuality44 and has been described as ‘theglue for collaborative governance processes’(Adger 2003: 395). Social capital is extremelyimportant in the sphere of ecological sustain-ability (Alfredsson and Wijkman 2014). Socialcapital is understood to exist at micro- (be-havioural), meso- (structural) and macro- (con-textual) levels (Ahn and Ostrom 2002). Socialcapital in governance networks contributes toproblem-solving functions, positive governanceoutcomes and tasks of greater complexity. Theprocess of creating social capital is closely

related to the ability of the network to experiencesignificant psychological shifts (Putnam 2004).45

Such a shift is sometimes called ‘mutual recog-nition’ (Saarikoski 2000) or ‘joint appreciation’(Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004), and occurswhen participants update their mental frames46

and models of reference (e.g. Nersessian 2002).The World Social Capital Monitor (2012)47 is

the first worldwide survey in which people canassess their hometowns by social climate, trust,solidarity, helpfulness, friendliness and hospital-ity. The Monitor has been selected by the UnitedNations Sustainable Development Goals Part-nership for the SDG no. 8, 10, 11 and 16 (peace).The objective of this initiative is to assess theSocial Capital of 500.000 places worldwide up to2018.

Throughout this book, the terms ‘coopera-tion’, ‘coordination’, ‘collaboration’ and ‘inte-grative’ have been used. These terms deservefurther clarification in relation to one another.Ansell and Gash (2007) identify collaborativegovernance48 as a specific way of governance,and Kim (2010) extracted six main elements ofcollaborative governance from the governanceliterature: inclusive stakeholder involvement; thepromotion of institutional capacity; collaborativeleadership of stakeholders; the role of govern-ment as a facilitator; the role of education andtraining and institutional design. Figure 5.6 gives

42Social capital is the aggregate trust that individuals in agroup of community have in one another. Social capital iscrucial for the workings of a society and for sustainabilitygovernance as it allows diverse participants to worktogether towards sustainability transitions in heteroge-neous networks. Institutional capacities fall under fourcategories: intellectual, social, material and political(Huppé and Creech 2012).43Reciprocity refers to a relationship whereby thebehaviour of one actor occurs in the justified belief ofanother actor behaving in a certain way (e.g. positiveactions by one actor are reciprocated by positive action byanother).44Mutuality is the recognition of mutual interdependenceand common interest between actors. Interdependencecreates a strong motive for collaboration, and is seen asthe starting point for any networked governance process(Imperial 2005). Trust, mutuality and reciprocity are builtupon interactions and a certain history of collaboration, inwhat is often understood as an iterative, virtuous cycle ofcommunication, trust, commitment, understanding andoutcomes (ibid.). Trust between interdependent actors islikely to lead to reciprocating positive behaviour and tomutually beneficial outcomes—outcomes that subse-quently generate a higher level of trust among relevantactors (Ostrom 2000).

45A major advance in understanding the role of values innetworks is provided by Hajer (1995) as he examines therole of values in networks and describes norm creationwithin networks.46A mental frame of perception contains the actor’sknowledge, assumptions, interests, values and beliefs anddetermines what they see as being of interest, and whatinterests they perceive as conflicting with others (Schönand Rein 1994; Fischer 2000), and thus has an importantimpact on the actor’s construction of meaning of infor-mation, shaping his or her policy positions and attitudestowards the policy-making process (Kolkman et al. 2005).47https://trustyourplace.com/.48For Ansell and Gash (2007: 544) collaborative gover-nance is ‘A governing arrangement where one or morepublic agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders ina collective decision-making process that is formal,consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims tomake or implement public policy or manage publicprograms or assets’.


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a continuum of these terms based on the level oftrust involved.

Organization management literature hasshown that social capital improves participants’capacity to create innovative solutions (Moran2005) and to engage in constructive processes ofcommunication, social integration and coordina-tion among functionally diverse groups (Evansand Carson 2005).

Trust plays an important role in knowledgesharing (Sect. 5.3.3) and is a more effectivemeans of dealing with knowledge-intensiveorganizations than price and authority (Adler2001). When horizontal relations in governancesystems (e.g. through cooperation between gov-ernments, private sector and civil society)increase in importance, the demand for trustbecomes an important coordination mechanismas uncertainties can no longer be managedthrough hierarchical power alone (Edelenbos andEshuis 2009: 195).

‘Vertical’ trust—accountability andlegitimacy.

‘Effectiveness and legitimacy are the basicrequirements for viable global governance frame-works, and the basic drivers of reform and inno-vation’ - EU ‘2030 report’ (2012: 147)

Accountability and legitimacy can be seen as twosides of the ‘trust coin’. Accountability refers tothe willingness to accept responsibility or toaccount for one’s actions. (Biermann and Gupta2011: 1857) Legitimacy describes the state orquality of being legitimate and in accord withestablished legal norms, requirements and rec-ognized principles or rules and standards ofbehaviour. The acceptance and justification ofauthority are key elements of the concept oflegitimacy in political science. Legitimacy isconferred through social consent, given formallyor informally.

It is important to elucidate the role account-ability must play if the SDGs are to translate intoreal policy change on the ground. For anyaccountability framework, it is important to

document and guide how stakeholders takeresponsibility, learn from their efforts and adjusttheir behaviour towards achieving the SDGs in atransparent manner. A coherent accountabilityframework for the SDGs would feature improvedmonitoring, review and reporting as compared tothe Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Itshould consist of three key components: keyactors (governments, the UN system and otherstakeholders), interlinkages (within UN struc-tures and outside of them) and ambition (indesign and commitments).

The rising power of civil groups and of theglobal middle class that was described in Chap. 3shows that there is a growing link betweendemocratic, participative societies and the trustthat citizens in those societies have in politicaland judicial institutions (Dahlberg and Holmberg2014). At the same time, in many (formal)democracies, trust in politicians is in decline(Pew Research Center 2014).49 The financialcrisis has affected citizens’ trust in existingpolitical systems, and the same reaction is fore-seeable as climate change becomes more visibleand impacts people’s lives more severely in thedecades ahead.

While governors are expected to be transpar-ent and show their accountability, the governedin turn allocate legitimacy to the governing andthe governance. If citizens approve the policy,think that they should comply and see the policyas fairly and effectively enforced, then the costsof enforcement and levels of evasion are gener-ally lower than when rules are imposed uponthem. Trust that government officials are fair,effective and objective is more important forenabling a successful government policy thanreliance on force (Rothstein 2005). Much of theliterature on accountability is still focused onconsidering ‘sticks’ or sanctions for (neglecting)accountability. However, according to Drake(2012), we need to go beyond this approachbecause of the increasingly complex, horizontal

49Trust in politicians has always been volatile, but inrecent decades trust in politicians in both Europe and theUSA has declined (Pew Research Center 2014) availableat http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0475-0_3

http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/


and informal way that accountability relationswork in reality.

Transparency as a form of accountability forthe SDGs: the role that blockchain can play inachieving the SDGs.

Drake (2012) concludes that analysis needs to gobeyond democratic accountability and shouldfocus on whether organizations are effective anddo what they promise (substantive accountabil-ity), and whether they use the available mecha-nisms in a correct manner (proceduralaccountability). Distinguishing between sub-stantive and procedural accountability is relevantfor IGOs, where ‘there is a risk of conflatingaccountability for doing the right thing (e.g. openinclusive negotiations) with achieving the rightthing (e.g. a trading system that would supportsustainable development)’ (Halle et al. 2012: 6).Such an analysis needs to take transparency intoaccount as the basis for accountability—it needsto be knowable what an organization promisesand how it is trying to keep that promise. Thus,transparency is necessary for both the mecha-nisms that actors have available and of theirfunctioning.50 UNDP (2014: 4) lists account-ability and transparency (together with democ-racy, participation, normative frameworks andresilience) as key themes underpinning gover-nance. Technology such as blockchain (seeBox 5.5 below) (Epsom 2017) can play apromising role in increasing trust, accountabilityand transparency.

Box 5.5: How can Blockchain help toAchieve the SDGs?Picture a spreadsheet that is duplicatedthousands of times across a network ofcomputers. Then imagine that this networkis designed to regularly update thisspreadsheet and you have a basic

understanding of the blockchain. Informa-tion held on a blockchain exists as a shared—and continually reconciled—database.The blockchain database isn’t stored in anysingle location, meaning the records itkeeps are truly public and easily verifiable.No centralized version of this informationexists for a hacker to corrupt. Hosted bymillions of computers simultaneously, itsdata is accessible to anyone on the Internet.With the blockchain providing bettertransparency and more trust, many of thepositive actions already trying to tacklethese major issues can start to gain traction:

Examples of how blockchain can helpachieve the SDGs abound:

• BanQu allows those in developingcountries (e.g. farmers) to create aneconomic identity based on the block-chain regardless of how little land orincome they might have and regardlessof gender (SDG 5). This not onlyallows them access to credit but alsoopens them up to the global economy.

• ‘Asset tagging’ of raw materials (anddiamonds) would allow for full trans-parency and traceability throughout thesupply chain which will ensure prod-ucts are actually sourced in line withtheir sustainability claims (e.g. conflictmineral legislation such as 3TG and theKimberly Process for conflictdiamonds).

• UK-based company Provenance haspiloted tracking fish through supplychain to guarantee that sustainableclaims aren’t falsified as the productmoves from the point of being caught tothe supermarket shelf. This means thatcustomers looking to buy ‘sustainablycaught’ fish can be sure that the ‘claim’associated with that fish hasn’t beenduplicated and that their purchase isactually supporting the sustainablefishing industry.

50The benefit of a global MBM in terms of transparencycould be showing the emissions of individual airlines andairports. This raises awareness, and makes airlines morecomparable and competitive in terms of loweringemissions.


• For the circular economy, (relevant toSDG 12) German company Slock. it isdeveloping a ‘Universal Share Net-work’ powered by blockchain technol-ogy which will allow underused assetssuch as temporarily vacant apartments,office space, shipping containers ormachinery to be utilized. Essentially,they are developing an automated andfully verifiable infrastructure for the‘Sharing Economy’.

• Walmart partnered with IBM to useblockchain to track a ‘packaged pro-duce’ item in the USA and a porkproduct in China. This allowed Wal-mart to obtain vital data, for each pro-duct, on how and where the food wasgrown or reared and who inspected it.When a contaminated product is iden-tified they can identify exactly whichfarm it originated from and only recallthose affected rather than the entireproduct range.

• Dubai has a city-wide pilot to integrateblockchain with city services. Thiswould greatly reduce wasted time,effort and resources and could play acrucial role under SDG 11—Sustain-able Cities and Communities.

• Blockchain is being utilized at a rurallevel where the programme for theEndorsement of Forestry Certification,who is responsible for more than 300million hectares of certified forests, hasbeen investigating blockchain as analternative solution for tracing prove-nance; an example of SDG 15—Life onLand in action.

5.4.6 Norm Competence 3:Inclusivenessand Pluralism

Differences are not intended to separate, to alien-ate. We are different precisely in order to realizeour need of one another. - Tutu (2004: 76)

Inclusion is at the core of the 2030 Agenda forSustainable Development. Inclusiveness speaksto the notion of empowerment and the principleof non-discrimination. It is reflected in the 2030Agenda’s pledge to ‘leave no one behind’ and inthe vision of a ‘just, equitable, tolerant, open andsocially inclusive world in which the needs of themost vulnerable are met’ and ‘a world in whichevery country enjoys sustained, inclusive andsustainable economic growth and decent workfor all’ (UN 2015). It is also reflected both ingoals and targets, including Goal 4, which refersto inclusive and equitable quality education;Goal 8, which refers to sustained, inclusive andsustainable economic growth; Goal 9, whichrefers to inclusive and sustainable industrializa-tion; Goal 11, which refers to inclusive, safe,resilient and sustainable cities and human set-tlements and Goal 16, which refers to peacefuland inclusive societies for sustainable develop-ment and to accountable and inclusive institu-tions at all levels. It refers to the need to includeeveryone in societal processes and conveys thenotion that people should not only be allowed tothrive, but should have a voice and effectiveopportunities to shape the course of develop-ment. Thus, the Agenda is relevant to all coun-tries and all people, belongs to everyone, and itssuccess will depend on the active implication andengagement of all actors and on reaching thefurthest behind first.

Identifying and addressing the barriers facedby disadvantaged and vulnerable groups in theaccess to resources, services and opportunitieswill require effectively drawing into governancethe groups that are typically excluded from theseprocesses and left behind in the outcomes.

Inclusiveness and diversity in themselveshave a great number of benefits for the SDGs.

First, inclusiveness and diversity can providefor the multitude of different observations andreflexive approaches in various function systemswhich allow society to adapt (Van Assche et al.2010). Diminishing this diversity would lead tode-differentiation and would not be able toaddress the SDGs at the same level ofcomplexity.


Second, diversity and differentiation need tobe safeguarded as they enable the adaptation andinnovation that the SDGs require.51 Thus,inclusiveness and diversity further help conferresilience and robustness (Stirling 2011).

Third, diverse, polycentric governance sys-tems of multiple decision centres and overlap-ping jurisdictions may offer possible solutions tothe governance challenges created by hetero-geneity of beliefs, values, identities, preferencesand endowments in a world transformed byglobalization and an ongoing technological rev-olution. Although such diversity may increasecomplexity, progress on the SDGs will requirecritical analysis of assumptions and beliefs, a

goal best reached through engaging with acomplex diversity of voices and ideas (Nisbet2014).

Fourth, Hahn et al. (2014) find that organi-zations that include managers from differentcognitive types are more successful in managingsustainability issues.

Fifth, diversity has benefits as it facilitates thediffusion of ideas, norms, strategies and practices(Andonova and Mitchell 2010) and offers benefitsfor sustainable development (Kemp et al. 2005:15). It is a source of learning and ‘the fuel forevolution’ (ibid.) and a resource base for adapta-tion and reorganization (Rammel and van denBergh 2003). For Landemore (2013: 103), ‘it isoften better to have a group of cognitively diversepeople than a group of very smart people whothink alike’. Therefore cultural diversity can beimportant for enhancing the capacity for adapta-tion and transformation (also see O’Brien 2009;Jessop 2003: 8). Also in system theory (e.g.Luhmann 1995) it is held that diversity promotesresilience and uniformity breeds’ fragility.52

Fig. 5.7 Health and social problems are worse in more unequal countries. Source Wilkinson and Pickett (2009)

51Studies on product development (e.g. Lester and Piore2004) show that radical innovation involves combinationsacross different fields (e.g. smart grids draw on ICT andtraditional network technologies, medical devices drawfrom basic life sciences and clinical practice, aviationtechnologies draw from defence and aerospace technolo-gies). Friction between different systemic frames anddiscourses can thus challenge the status quo (Stark 2009).Engagement between different fields can also supportinnovation by redistributing risk and enabling innovationby communal absorption of risks taken by innovativeactors. But this tool also has limits, as the example ofinnovative banking in the financial crisis shows.

52Luhmann (1995) distinguished three types of socialsystems: interactions (conversations), organizations andfunction systems (the systems of communication that


Sixth, Target 16.7 calls for responsive,inclusive, participatory and representativedecision-making at all levels. The competence toembrace diversity and interdisciplinarity is rele-vant here. This competence includes the ability tostructure relationships, spot issues and recognizethe legitimacy of other viewpoints in businessdecision-making processes; be it about environ-mental, social and/or economic issues (Ellis andWeekes 2008).

Seventh, the governance theories that werediscussed in Chap. 2 (transition management,metagovernance and experimentalism) in them-selves are inherently engaged with the ways inwhich the diversity of scales, institutions, sectors,norms and understandings of sustainability con-tribute to the need for studying pluralism insustainability governance (Davidson and Frickel2004).

Eighth, promoting inclusiveness by dimin-ishing social and economic inequalities in itselfcan promote sustainable economic growth.Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) demonstrate that interms of physical health, mental health, drugabuse, education, imprisonment, obesity, socialmobility, trust and community life, violence,teenage pregnancies and child well-being, out-comes are significantly worse in more unequalcountries, whether rich or poor (Fig. 5.7).

While global agreement on ways to addressthe SDGs may sound attractive, there are alsobenefits of diversity and fragmentation, such asthe extension of governance to new areas and theglobal diffusion of best governance practices insupport of the SDGs.

The relevance of cultural diversity in SDGgovernance

Appreciating cultural diversity in governance hasits own set of benefits. Institutions, instruments,processes and actor involvement should be based

on compatibility of values and traditions. Themeaning of ‘sustainable development’ (also seeChap. 1) which originates in individualist, Wes-tern countries may have very different meaningsin other, more collectivist societies.53 Similarly,it is important to note that ‘short-term versuslong-term’ thinking and more generally theconcept of time can be understood differentlyfrom culture to culture and can be difficult tointegrate into human behaviour.54

The importance of diversity for sustainabilitywas confirmed in a letter that a group of almost240 scientists and conservation leaders (Tallisand Lubchenco 2014)55 published in the journalNature, requesting increased diversity in envi-ronmental governance. This diversity couldresult from embracing all plausible conservationactors, from corporations to governmental

fulfil a function in (global) society at large, e.g. law,economy, politics, religion, science and education). Thisconceptualization of social systems rejects the idea thatsystems should be based on hierarchical relations andcontrol from higher levels. Luhmann argues that society isa polycentric collection of interacting social systems.

53Many well-known models of value patterns, likeMaslow’s hierarchy of human needs, have a strongWestern bias. In Maslow’s model, individualistself-actualisation constitutes the top of the pyramid,whereas in collectivist countries (e.g. China) the basicneed is belonging and self-actualisation concerns societalneeds (Gambrel and Cian-ci 2003). Theindividualist/collectivist divide is one of the five indexeswith which intercultural differences have been explainedby Hofstede (2001).54For policy development, it is a still a widely neglectedphenomenon that an understanding of the concept of timedepends on one’s cultural background. Cote and Tansuhaj(1989) formulated the challenge as follows: ‘If we asksomeone about their future behaviour, the respondentmust have some conception of ‘future’ for their answer tobe meaningful. Westerners have relatively little difficultyconceiving the ‘future’. This is not true of all cultures.Different cultures often have different perceptions abouttime (McGrath and Rotchford 1983). Graham (1981)identifies three general orientations toward time, linear-separable, circular-traditional, and procedural-tradi-tional. Linear time is most similar to western perceptionsof a past, present and future stretching to infinity. Time isalso seen as being separable into discrete units along thisline. People with a circular time orientation perceive timerelative to repeated patterns such as cycles of the sun,moon and seasons. They have no perception of timestretching into the future and therefore, expect the futureto be like the past. Instead they focus on the present.People with a procedural time orientation view time asbeing irrelevant. Behaviour is activity driven rather thantime driven.55Available at http://www.nature.com/news/working-together-a-call-for-inclusive-conservation-1.16260.


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agencies, faith-based organizations and interestedindividuals (the writers of the letter emphasizegender equality).

At the same time, the diversity of argumentsthat exist in environmental debates is given asexactly the reason why these debates are unre-solvable (Myerson and Rydin 1996: 30; Hulme2009). A plurality of interests can causeconflicting goals, also between different parts ofthe same government and lead to policy inco-herence and legislative or bureaucratic stalemates(Hoberg 1992).

From a metagovernance point of view, oneproblem of an exclusive use of hierarchicalgovernance is that it does not necessarily matchwith cultural preferences. If culture is ‘the values,attitudes, beliefs, orientations and underlyingassumptions prevalent among people in a soci-ety’ (Huntington 2000: xv) and cultures are adynamic pattern of assumptions in a given group(Schein 1987: 9), then hierarchical, network andmarket forms of governance are also reflectionsof cultures. SDG governance may be more suc-cessful if it is based on the consideration ofculture and cultural diversity as an indicator foroptimal combinations of hierarchical, networkand market governance (Meuleman 2012b: 45).Cultural diversity is further relevant because

• Different cultures are effective when it comesto living in different environments;

• Different cultures carry different types ofwisdom;

• Multiple cultures mean multiple options forhumanity;

• Culture links the larger goals of survival tospecific moral visions, and thus makes sus-tainability attractive (and essential) forpeople;

• If cultural diversity is eliminated, it can bereplaced by other worldviews (e.g. con-sumerism) which are promoted by the stron-gest, wealthiest or least ethical party (ibid.).

5.5 Conclusions: Establishing SomeLinkages Between Power,Knowledge and Norms

This chapter identified three theoretical pillars ingovernance for the SDGs: power, knowledge andnorms. Within these themes, it developed somemain competence areas. For power, the compe-tences are related to leadership, nurturing rela-tions and empowerment. For knowledge, thecompetences are adaptiveness, ‘knowledgecooperation’ (learning and knowledge sharing)and reflexivity. Under norms and values, the keycompetences are fostering justice, trust andembracing inclusiveness (pluralism). Thesecompetences are applicable at the individual,organizational and institutional levels.

The main findings of this chapter can beexpressed in terms of the linkages between thethree theoretical pillars of power, knowledge andnorms and their competences. It may be useful togive some (non-exhaustive) examples of theselinkages as this may lead to a more coherentunderstanding of governance for the SDGs.

1. Linkages between knowledge and norms.– Diversity, learning and reflexivity.

Social involvement (e.g. through leveragingdiversity, enhancing social capital, trust, mutualawareness and relational skills) is as important asknowledge and content management (Pahl-Wostl2006). As the SDGs attain a certain level ofcomplexity, it is thought that the capacities forachieving them are widely distributed acrossdiverse but interdependent actors from differentscales and sectors of society.

The development of reflexive capacitydepends on the ability to establish connectionsbetween different discourses. Homogeneity caneasily replace diversity in governance, therebyresulting in diminished reflexive capacity. Rep-etition and persuasiveness of a single discourse


with few arguments and articulated in competi-tive terms (e.g. climate scepticism versus climatealarmism)56 can make individuals associate aproblem disproportionately with that single dis-course (Sunstein 2007: 275–276). Individualsthen change their perspective in the direction ofthe majority and the desire to be perceivedfavourably by that majority can lead to the ‘spiralof silence’ (Noelle-Neumann 1984).57 In addi-tion, ideological amplification58 (Sunstein 2007)and group polarization59 (Sunstein 2002) rein-force commitments to existing biases/convictionsthat are supported by the majority.

– Accountability/legitimacy and uncertainty.

Trust in general can enable knowledge diffusion(Cheng 2014). Knowledge on sustainability ismore likely to be influential (effective) to theextent that it, and the process that produced thatknowledge (output respectively input legiti-macy)60 is perceived to be more legitimate as

well as credible by relevant stakeholders (Spit-zeck and Hansen 2010.)

Experimentalist ‘dynamic accountability’anticipates the transformation of rules in use. Inthat way, experimentalist dynamic accountabilityoffers a potentially effective response to bothchallenges of strategic uncertainty, and to long-standing legitimacy deficits of principal-agentgovernance (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012). Legiti-macy, accountability, cost-efficiency, coordina-tion and resilience as a response to uncertaintyhave been shown to be mutually reinforcing insustainability management (Dano 2013).

2. Linkages between power and norms.– Ethics and power in the governance of

transitions.

Different ethical perspectives (e.g. consequen-tialist, virtue and deontological ethics) relate toone another in the context of governance andpower as follows:

1. Power can be justified through its ends(consequentialist ethics);

2. Power can be justified through the personexercising it (virtue ethics);

3. Power can be justified through the way inwhich it is exercised (deontological ethics).

Avelino (2011) argues that it is possible topostulate some ethical principles on transitionsand power, which all include and combine thethree different ethical perspectives:

1. The exercise of power to enable transitionsshould serve sustainability (based on all threeethics);

2. Both transitions and power should not begoals in themselves (based on virtue andconsequentialist ethics; there is no separable‘end’ to justify the ‘means’);

3. We should strive for sustainable power rela-tions, both now and in the future (based on allthree ethics; people should be treated as endsand never only as means).

56One might claim that the climate change discourse splitthe climate change community in two ‘discourse coali-tions’ (Hajer 1995) in the 1990 and 2000s: one isalarmistic, proclaiming a climate crisis, dramatic ecolog-ical consequences, the collapse of civilization (e.g. Brown2009, 2011) and the need for immediate, hierarchical andstrong mitigation action (e.g. by limiting consumption andbuilding wind turbines). Originally, this discourse waspromoted by climatologists, NGOs, but increasingly mainstream institutions like the OECD, IMF, the UNFCCCand the World Bank are promoting this discourse. Theother discourse coalition is focused on energy, economicrationality, and development space (e.g. industry andself-proclaimed ‘experts’ like Lomborg).57Noell-Neuman’s theory of the ‘spiral of silence’ (1984)suggests that those who perceive themselves to be in aminority will refrain from voicing their perspective.58Ideological amplification is psychological behaviourthat occurs when people with similar views engage andsubsequently develop their views to a further extreme. Itcan unify and solidify the group, and move the group toexcessive positions that none of the members individuallywould likely have reached on their own.59In social psychology, group polarization refers to thetendency for groups to make decisions that are moreextreme than the initial inclination of its members.60Annex 26 discusses the trade-offs between differentgovernance arrangements in terms of input and outputlegitimacy further.

5.5 Conclusions: Establishing Some Linkages Between Power, Knowledge and Norms 145

Moral power is a widely present and importantfactor in governance. Moral power largely is afunction of whether one is perceived to be morallywell-intentioned (acting in accordance with moralprinciples), morally capable (able to persuasivelymake moral judgments) and had moral standing(is part of the moral interpretative community). Interms of Lukes’ three dimensions of power asdiscussed in Sect. 5.2.1, moral power is closest todiscursive power (the power to influence andchange what others see as desirable). In morecollaborative and less hierarchical organizations(e.g. in networks), moral power can help toovercome collective action dilemmas and moti-vate charges to action (ibid.).

An extension of moral power is the concept of‘moral leadership’. Moral leadership can beexpected to avoid the compromise betweenrespecting ethical values and reaching fast andefficient results, and between serving one’s per-sonal privileges and the public good.

3. Linkages between knowledge and power.

One key issue that came up in almost all inter-views is the dynamic relation between knowl-edge and power, with some intervieweesclaiming that knowledge is power. The relationbetween power and knowledge is one of the mostcontested relations in social theory (Garcia2001). Foucault was a prime proponent ofestablishing the relation between power andknowledge. Barnes even defines power as ‘thedistribution of knowledge’ within society andclaims that ‘to possess power an agent must beknown to possess it’ (2002: 126).

Knowledge and knowledge systems are oftencreated and stimulated by those with resources.This may move science and scientific results inspecific directions. One can capture this innotions of the politics of science (Gupta and vander Zaag 2009) or of governmentality, as scienceis used to discipline both humans and environ-ments (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006).

The mobilization, construction and commu-nication of mental resources (information, con-cepts, ideas and beliefs) can be seen as a specifictype of power exercise. One can also exercise

power by constructing and communicatingknowledge and thus influencing how other actorsmobilize all other types of resources. For exam-ple, creating doubt about the causes and effects ofclimate change can result in more investment infossil fuels and less in renewable energy. In fact,‘it is no longer possible to deal with such stapleconcepts of democratic theory as citizenship ordeliberation or accountability without delvinginto their interaction with the dynamics ofknowledge creation and use’ (Jasanoff 2005: 6).A truly reflexive approach to governance for theSDGs therefore would include the recognition ofthe capacity to do independent research as ahuman right, as such a capacity can empowerstakeholders to participate in deliberative pro-cesses (cf. Appadurai 2013).

The next chapter will critically reflect on thevarious outcomes of the case studies and presentthree inferences that were established throughabductive reasoning that follow from both thecase studies and the literature review. Theseinferences are meant to indicate some of therespects in which Integrative Governance for theSDGs goes beyond existing understanding ofsustainability governance.

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6Inferences on Improving IntegrativeSustainability Governance

AbstractThis book demonstrates the role of gover-nance at different levels in implementing theSDGs, and within that context in previouschapters the main discourses are analysed andkey competences for effective and coherenttransition governance are identified. Thischapter takes these findings one step furtherby suggesting three actions that can be takento increase the effectiveness and coherence ofgovernance for the SDGs at both the individ-ual and the collective (community, organiza-tion, institution, societal, etc.) levels. Theseinferenced actions are:

– Inference 1: Considering behavioural insights– Inference 2: Addressing complexity through

systems deliberations– Inference 3: Mobilizing ‘crisis’ for change

and collective action.

These inferences are highly complementarywith the theoretical pillars and competences inthe previous chapter and in fact build on them.All three inferences are meant to function asbuilding blocks for coherent approaches inthe Integrative Sustainability Governance(ISG) framework which is presented in thenext and final chapter.

KeywordsBehavioural � Motivation � Self-interestComplexity � Systems thinking � Policycoherence � Crisis � Risk management

6.1 Inference 1. ConsideringBehavioural Insights: TheHuman Dimensionof Governance for the SDGs

You almost couldn’t design a problem that is aworse fit with our underlying psychology. BethGardiner (2012)1

So far, research on sustainability governancehas focused largely on institutional actors and onthe proximate drivers of governance (e.g. tech-nology and demographics). Decision-making andbehaviour at the individual level which ultimatelydrive societal change have received much lessattention (Clayton et al. 2015). Based on Chap. 3(and in particular Sect. 3.2.5 on empowered citi-zens as stakeholders), it can be argued that it iscrucial to examine the role of psychologicalresearch2 in order to understand human behaviour

1http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/22/opinion/sunday/were-all-climate-change-idiots.html.2Psychological research applies empirical methods toinvestigate individual perceptions and cognitions, individualand collective behaviours, and psychological well-being.This research incorporates physiological, cognitive, affectiveand interpersonal processes, as well as factors in the social,


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and motivations that can lead to effective sus-tainability governance.

Whereas behaviour change involves carefullytargeted interventions directed towards the indi-vidual and behavioural psychology informs manybehaviour change programmes, social changefocuses on the community. Social change aims totransform the way political, economic and socialpower is distributed within and between commu-nities. This approach assumes that significanttransformation requires more than targeting cul-tural practices or ingrained norms. It also necessi-tates identifying and challenging structuralinequalities and the institutions and systems (in-cluding economic systems) that lock communitiesinto unsustainable trajectories or prevent capacity-building for longer-term change (UNICEF 2017).

Governance emanates both from organizationsand institutions and through individuals.Well-functioning institutions require the inputsfrom capable individuals. Also, achieving theSDGs is highly dependent on both collectiveaction and the individual leadership and choicesthat constitute collective action. Therefore, anyintegrative consideration of governance for theSDGs at some point needs to take human natureinto account if it wants to reflect the functioning ofhuman agency realistically in the light of struc-tural, deterministic limitations to achieving theSDGs. Many governance theories meanwhile dis-regard the role of the individual and assume thathumans have sufficient agency to govern society asa whole towards sustainability. This section ques-tions that omission and argues that an under-standing of behavioural barriers, human will,self-interest and other insights in human func-tioning are critical for strengthening the effective-ness and coherence of governance for the SDGs.

6.1.1 Behavioural Barriers to ClimateGovernance

Climate change policy is ultimately about humandecision-making at both the collective and at the

individual level. Research on the sources ofindividual decision-makers’ preferences can helpidentify why cooperation processes are, at times,far from perfectly optimal or functional to thestrategic problem at hand. One reason could bethat traditional approaches to education havebeen based on competition rather than collabo-ration and innovation. Hafner-Burton et al.(2014) hypothesize that certain behavioural traits(especially patience and strategic reasoning) ofdecision-makers in the field of internationalcooperation can explain their preferences fornegotiating and joining international agreements.One condition for metagovernance that was lis-ted in Chap. 2 is the personal conviction of theresponsible politician or public manager; suc-cessful metagovernors possess willingness3 andcapability.

Therefore, sustainability governance andinternational relations can no longer avoid thefindings of neuroscience and psychology thathuman thinking is ‘predictably irrational’.Brosch et al. (2014) indeed argue for integratingconcepts from several branches of the beha-vioural sciences such as economics, social psy-chology and affective science into the study ofhow decision-making and behaviour related toenergy use as affective and cognitive processesare closely entwined. Emotions may play animportant role in individual decisions and beha-viours related to sustainable energy, over andabove considerations of utility, beliefs andbehavioural norms.

Humans, for example, are inclined to denial-ism, and this can be a barrier to climate action(cf. Norgaard 2011). The phenomenon of disat-tention to the impacts from climate change isprevalent in communities struck and threatened

cultural, biophysical and environments of individuals(Clayton et al. 2015).

3Willingness generally can be described as the intention,drive or readiness of an actor to reflect on what is the bestgovernance mix according to the situation. The generalinfluences of a person’s willingness can be internal andexternal. Internal influences can be born from someone’scharacter, goals, mission in life, past experiences, knowl-edge and perception of things (these are all unique to aperson). External influences include relations with others.

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by climate-related disasters (Cannon 2015).4

Marshall (2014) finds that communities recov-ering from disasters tend to have a high spirit ofcooperation and communal endeavour, and theydo not want to be confronted with the possibilityof future calamities from climate change. Theybecome intolerant of divisive issues like climatechange, which they see as a threat to thereestablishment of normality.

Climate change evokes fear, guilt5 and help-lessness. The 2015 Human Development Reportacknowledges this and dedicates a full chapter tothe behavioural6 and cognitive aspects of climatechange governance. The chapter states thatinertia in behaviour related to climate changearises both from economic incentives and psy-chological and ideological sources. Such inertia(also called status quo bias or aversion to change)is the result of avoiding the costs associated withchange.

As argued in Sect. 5.3.2, knowledge alonemay not be as strong a driver for sustainabilitytransitions as it is often believed to be. Percep-tions of climate change risk, for example, declineas scientific literacy and numeracy increase(Kahan et al. 2012). Still, research suggests thatdifferent types of knowledge can impact onenvironmental behaviour differently. Frick et al.(2004) found that only action-related knowledge(i.e. knowing what can be done about environ-mental problems) and effectiveness knowledge(i.e. knowing about the benefits or effectivenessof pro-environmental actions) can predict envi-ronmental behaviour.

Gifford (2011) and Leggett (2013) discusssome other key categories of psychological bar-riers that can be linked to climate governance.Among these are a limited cognition about theproblem of climate change ignorance, endowmenteffect,7 environmental numbness, uncertainty,loss aversion, judgmental discounting,8 optimismand status quo biases, ideological world views(e.g. capitalism, system justification9 and tech-nosalvation) that tend to preclude climate action,discredence towards experts and authorities(mistrust), perceived risks and positive but inad-equate behaviour change (e.g. rebound effects).

More specifically, Stavins (2015) sees beha-vioural barriers to adoption of energy efficiencymeasures in inattentiveness and salience, myopiaand short-sightedness, bounded rationality andheuristic decision-making, prospect theory,10 andsystematically biased beliefs.

Markowitz and Shariff (2012) further identi-fied six reasons why, ‘unlike financial fraud orterrorist attacks, climate change does not register,emotionally, as a wrong that demands to berighted’. Among those reasons are

1. The abstractness and cognitive complexity ofclimate change;

2. The blamelessness of unintentional action(we all contribute to climate change);

3. Guilty bias which provokes self-defensivebias;

4. Uncertainty of climate science breeds wishfulthinking;

4In Florida (the US state most susceptible to rising sealevels), state environmental officials are ordered not to usethe terms ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’ in anygovernment communications, emails or reports. (http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article12983720.html#storylink=cpy).5One interviewee (Pier Vellinga) suggested that the reasonwhy the Netherlands is the biggest donor for UNEP andwhy Norway is the biggest donor for forestry/REDD+projects is that they feel ‘guilty’ about their fossil fuelproduction and energy-intensive industries/trade activities.6Behavioural sciences deal with the activities and inter-actions of all organisms in the natural world. Psychologyis a subheading under behavioural sciences that is focusedon mental processes and behaviours.

7In psychology and behavioural economics, the endow-ment effect is the hypothesis that people ascribe morevalue to things merely because they own them (Roeck-elein 2006).8Discounting here refers to the undervaluing of distant orfuture risks.9System justification refers to the tendency to defend andjustify the societal status quo. In other words, systemjustification is about the way in which people countersuch unease and “are motivated to justify and rationalizethe way things are, so that existing social, economic andpolitical arrangements tend to be perceived as fair andlegitimate” (Jost and Hunyady 2005).10Prospect theory (Kahneman andTversky 1979) states thathumans have an irrational tendency to be less willing togamble with profits than with losses. This implies thatlosses are perceived as being bigger than gains of equal size.

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5. Moral tribalism (the politicization of climatechange fosters ideological polarization); and

6. Long-time horizons and faraway impacts ofclimate change.

Markowitz and Shariff argue that tapping intoexisting, emotionally positive moral values andsocial norms is a psychological strategy that can beused to bolster the recognition of climate change.

Finally, psychology as a ‘hub’ discipline withorigins in physics, physiology and philosophyallows it to span disciplinary boundaries betweensocial and natural science, and humanities(Clayton et al. 2015). As such, psychology initself may offer opportunities for interdisciplinarycollaborations and provide insight about organi-zational dynamics that can enhance the effectivefunctioning of multidisciplinary teams. (ibid.)11

6.1.2 An Updated MultilevelPerspective that IncludesWorld View, Visionsand Paradigms

Inference 1. (the need for considering beha-vioural aspects at the individual level) togetherwith the importance of world views, visions andparadigms that cut across and mediate betweenthe structurations on the Niche and Regimelevels and the individuals lead to an updatedmultilevel framework (Fig. 6.1).

The purple and blue arrows illustrate howideas, narratives and discourses function as theglue that holds societies together. The purplearrows stand for the hegemonic paradigm andcommon-sense framework that serves as a ref-erence for individual strategies and narratives. Itis embedded in Regime structures as well as inNiche projects. At the same time, individualmindsets (the light blue arrows) might carryalternative paradigms that influence theirpioneering strategies. In addition to trying toshowcase new solutions in line with the newparadigm, all individuals can also engage ingeneral paradigm-busting work that influencesthe perpetuation or challenging of the dominantparadigm. This is the big arrow on the right-handside of the graph: it shows that each individual isconstantly involved in shaping the future para-digm. By providing reason, opinions, argumentsand experiences as well as non-verbal reactionsand behaviour, we can all participate in paradigmshifts and thus in changing reality (Göpel 2016).

6.1.3 Human Will and Motivation asDrivers for SustainabilityGovernance

Psychological research demonstrates that effec-tive communication must be based on sourcesthat are trusted and attractive and that the mes-sage must be relevant, clear and coherent; butalso, that the audience must be motivated andable to act (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). In par-ticular (political) willingness is regarded as a keyfactor in social, and thus governance change (e.g.

11One example of a psychological approach that may beuseful for both individually and collectively dealing withthe complexity and dynamics of sustainability governanceis Gestalt psychology. Gestalt theory is based on under-standing our ability to acquire and maintain meaningfulperceptions in a seemingly chaotic world. The centralprinciple of Gestalt psychology is that the mind (just likesociety) forms a global whole with self-organizingtendencies instead of just collections of simpler andunrelated elements. This principle maintains that when thehuman mind (perceptual system) forms a percept orGestalt, the whole has a reality of its own, independent ofthe parts. Gestalt therapy aims to let a person deal withchange by letting him become what he is already, insteadof forcing change within the classical hierarchical thera-pist–patient relationship.It is claimed that Gestalt theorycan also be applied to social systems that orderly changewithin dynamic and fragmented social systems is in thedirection of integration and holism. This requires that thesystem becomes conscious of alienated fragments withinand without so it can bring them into the main functionalactivities by processes similar to empowerment of theindividual. This should lead to communication with othersubsystems and facilitate an integrated, harmoniousdevelopment of the whole system.Confronted with apluralistic, multifaceted, changing society, the individualis left to his own devices to find stability. He must do thisthrough an approach that allows him to move dynamicallyand flexibly with the times while still maintaining somecentral gyroscope to guide him. He can no longer do thiswith ideologies, which become obsolete, but must do itwith a change theory, whether explicit or implicit. Thegoal of Gestalt therapy becomes not so much to develop agood, fixed character but to be able to move with thetimes while retaining some individual stability.


in metagovernance, see Meuleman 2008). At thesame time, few efforts have been undertaken todefine what political will means, rendering it anempty term. In democracies, the will is supposedto be with the electorate. In reality though, thereare many ways in which the will of the electoratecan be either kept at bay, debilitated or preventedfrom taking shape at all.

The willingness to exercise power is a crucialcondition for the exercise of power. Dealing withwicked problems requires a willingness for col-lective engagement and cooperative behaviour(Van Bueren et al. 2003:195). When the moti-vation for more sustainable behaviour is exclu-sively extrinsic (instead of resulting fromintrinsic will), people will focus on maximizingrewards, gaining competitive advantage andavoiding sanctions instead of sharing knowledgeand collaborating for addressing a commoninterest or public good. Intrinsic motivation onthe other hand can improve transition governanceby building up values such as trust, collaboration,

shared motivation and commitment to publicgoods (Bao et al. 2013). Research indeed hasshown that intrinsic factors are often moreimportant than extrinsic ones for climate changemitigation (Abrahamse and Steg 2013).

Extrinsic motivation has some seriousdrawbacks:

1. It is not sustainable—As soon as one with-draws the punishment or reward, the moti-vation disappears;

2. One gets diminishing returns—If the punish-ment or reward stays at the same levels,motivation slowly drops off. Being equallymotivated the next time requires a biggerreward;

3. It hurts intrinsic motivation—Punishing orrewarding people for doing somethingremoves their own innate desire to do it ontheir own. From now on one mustpunish/reward every time to get them to do it(ibid.); and

Fig. 6.1 Mindsets in the multilevel perspective on transformations. Source Göpel (2016)


4. Extrinsic incentives can crowd out (under-mine) intrinsic motivation. (Deci et al. 1999)Because extrinsic benefits (e.g. cost savingsbecause of energy efficiency measures) mayspeak for themselves, it may make sense toemphasize intrinsic benefits such as emissionsmitigation (Schwartz et al. 2015—also seeSect. 6.1.3 below).

Willingness does not merely refer to a ‘wish’,but also involves the belief that one can haveinfluence. This relates to the other conditions ofpower:

1. access to resources;2. strategies to mobilize them;3. skills to apply those methods; and4. the willingness to do so (Avelino 2011).

These conditions of power are interlinked; bygaining access to resources, by learning newstrategies12 and skills, an actor’s willingness toexercise power can increase. However, it alsoworks the other way around; an actor that is‘willing’ has more intrinsic motivation to gainaccess to resources, and to learn new strategiesand skills (ibid.). In practice, even though manypublic and private actors have the beliefs,resources, strategies and skills for sustainabilitygovernance, they lack the willingness to applythese resources and capabilities.

One particular form of extrinsic motivationthat can be used to overcome the inertia describedabove is a nudge. A nudge is a concept in beha-vioural science, political theory and economicsillustrating the notion that it is possible to shapethe behaviour of individuals without normativelyforcing, economically stimulating or morallypushing them. Nudges are unconscious modula-tions of their choice architectures. In other words,nudging means positive reinforcement and indi-rect suggestions to try to achieve non-forced

compliance (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). Nudgescan be at least as effective as direct instruction,legislation or enforcement. One example of anudge is an electricity company offering its cli-ents green energy as the default option, and giv-ing the clients the choice to change to ‘brown’electricity if they prefer to do so.

6.1.4 Self-interest

Self-interest was consistently mentioned in theinterviews as a primary motivation and driver ofsustainability governance. Such self-interest canbe based on the understanding of the need forsustainable development, and the need for inte-grated solutions for both the government andsociety at large. Self-interest as a driver for tak-ing action on climate change can vary greatly andcan for example be based on:

• Reputation: around 80% of the market value ofcompanies comes from hard-to-assess intangi-ble assets such as brand equity, intellectualcapital and goodwill (Eccles et al. 2007).Companies but also countries and cities areincreasingly sensitive to their image when itcomes to climate change (Gardener et al. 2011).

• Creating economic opportunities,13 exports,jobs, efficiency and competitiveness14 in boththe ‘old’ and the ‘new’ growth sectors such asclean tech. South Korea, for example, was theworld leader in 2009 in terms of the (relative)size of its ‘green’ stimulus package, and alsoin terms of putting green growth on theinternational agenda.15 It has been suggested

12Strategies refer to the methods that are applied in orderto exercise power, including the ways in which actorscombine different types of power exercise in reaction tothe (combined) power exercise of others, i.e. what kind ofpower relations they engage with, and how they play intoa synergetic or antagonistic power dynamics.

13For example, addressing climate change would helpgrow the world economy by up to USD 2.6 trillion a yearin comparison with a business-as-usual scenario (WorldBank 2014).14Royal Dutch Shell for example is in favour of emissionstrading because that will make its growing gas explo-ration, production and trading activities more competitiverelative to coal.15Korea, as Chair of the OECD Meeting of the Council atthe Ministerial Level (MCM) in June 2009, initiated theadoption of the OECD Declaration on Green Growth. In2010, Korea ensured in the G20 Seoul Summit that GreenGrowth was included in the G20 agenda.


that Korea’s decision to pursue a ‘GreenGrowth strategy’ was mainly based onself-interest (Kim 2013) and that this decisionwas a reaction to the financial crisis.

Other self-interest-based drivers for climateaction can be energy security (e.g. reducingdependence on imports of fossil fuels fromvolatile regions) and existential reasons forlow-lying lands that are threatened by sea levelrise (e.g. Maldives and the Netherlands).

The main drivers of municipalities to go for100% renewable energy generation are tangiblebenefits, the demand for quality of life of citi-zens, and the ‘good of the municipality’ in termsof economic factors (e.g. jobs, income or taxrevenues) and non-economic aspects (e.g. thestrengthening of social life, the absence of healthhazards or an experience of progress) instead ofmore abstract aspects such as ‘climate change’ or‘the transformation of the power supply system’(Hajer 2011; Busch and McCormick 2014).Governments often take action on the environ-ment when standards of living rise and people arenot willing to accept local pollution any more.Europe and the USA managed to clean up waterand air in densely populated industrial areas fromthe 1960s and 1970s as people started to demanda healthier environment and as industries movedto countries with more lax (implementation of)environmental regulations.

The Hartwell paper (Prins et al. 2010) ques-tions whether ‘global’ CO2 reduction in itself(without direct benefits) can ever be politicallycompelling. It is obvious that narrowly focusingon climate change does not inspire action; suchaction is too much (assumed to be) linked withgiving up benefits, quality of life and economicgrowth.16 Instead, the Hartwell paper calls for

accepting that taming climate change will only beachieved successfully as a benefit contingentupon other goals that are politically attractive andrelentlessly pragmatic, including ‘cobenefits’.The SDGs offer the opportunity to identify andpursue those cobenefits (and also the trade-offs) ina coherent framework. Case study 3 in Chap. 4 onthe water–energy–food nexus showed the benefitsof this approach. The necessity to focus more onthe side benefits of action on climate change hasbeen consistently shown in research, for examplein terms of the cobenefits of commitments for theParis Climate Agreement (e.g. Höhne et al. 2015).In our current capitalist system, it is thereforenecessary to make the business case for climateaction in the wider context of sustainable devel-opment and its (economic) cobenefits clearer andattractive to a wider range of stakeholders (TheGlobal Commission 2015).17

The likelihood of national action on environ-mental issues can be expected to increase as theproportion of nation-specific benefits to totalbenefits increases. (Sandler 1998) The fact thatsulphur emissions which cause acid rain typicallydo not travel long distances, and that 50% ofEuropean sulphur depositions fall on the emitternation’s own soil explains why European coun-tries have taken early and rigorous action oncutting these emissions. Self-interest can alsoexplain why countries with relatively low (percapita) forest cover, such as the Netherlands, aredeeply involved in and push for progress in theglobal negotiations on forests (Hoogeveen andVerkooijen 2010).

6.1.5 Well-Being and Happiness

The behavioural sciences have become increas-ingly interested in subjective well-being, qualityof life and happiness. Psychologists, sociologists,economists and philosophers investigate a broad

16Growth is inherent to life and to living organisms, and asystems view regards human societies and economies asliving organisms. However, growth is neither linear norunlimited; while certain parts of systems decline, othersflourish. Systems views focus on the qualities of thesystem as a whole and of the relations between itsconstitutive parts. Instead of only using a crude numberfor economic growth (GDP) as a policy objective andmeasure of success, it could be helpful to distinguishbetween ‘sustainable’ and ‘unsustainable’ growth, for

example by adding measurements of environmentalquality, ‘quality of life’ and well-being.17The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate’sreport ‘Better Growth, Better Climate’, for example,shows that economic growth and climate change mitiga-tion can go hand-in-hand: http://newclimateeconomy.net/.


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range of topics related to human welfare, such aswhat makes people happy, how people definehappiness, why some societies are happier thanothers and how happiness produces socio-economic benefits like increased productivityand reduced health spending.

According to the World Happiness Report2012, happiness studies have the potential tocontribute to and deepen the debate on the rela-tionship between economic growth and envi-ronmental protection.

Rather than framing sustainability as implyinga way of life that could compromise freedom ofchoice and constrain individual lifestyles,research provides evidence of the ambiguouseffects of (ever increasing) material affluence onhappiness and subjective well-being (Frey 2008).Already in 1974, Mazur and Rosa (1974)demonstrated that across nations energy con-sumption had decoupled from lifestyle, putting theassumption that increasing human well-being issynonymous with increased resource consump-tion into question. More recent studies (e.g. Lambet al. 2014) confirm the finding that increases inhuman well-being are not necessarily associatedwith GDP per capita or other measures of eco-nomic activity, nor with resource consumption.

Moreover, subjective well-being and ecolog-ically responsible behaviours are not only com-patible, but living more sustainably actuallypromotes more fulfilling and happier lives(Brown and Kasser 2005; Corral-Verdugo et al.2010). Such findings could have importantimplications for devising strategies focused onreplacing material satisfaction with social andpersonal satisfaction in a more sustainableeconomy (Jackson 2009).

Producing less waste, for example, has beendemonstrated to has positive effects on both lifeand domain satisfaction (Gandelman et al. 2012).One explanation could come from evolutionarypsychology, which tells that human brains arehardwired to produce a sense of pleasure andwell-being when we engage in activities thatensure the survival of the individual and thespecies—for instance, eating and having sex(Grinde 2002). Another example is that individ-uals feel more capable if they see that they can

control their waste and reap eudaimonic rewards(i.e. an experience of flourishing) in the form ofan increased sense of independence and controlover one’s life (De Young 1996).

Sustainability might be redefined as increas-ing the efficiency with which we producewell-being relative to the harm we do to theenvironment (Dietz and Jorgenson 2014). TheHappy Planet Index (HPI) reflects this idea as itproposes an alternative to GDP by combining lifeexpectancy with experienced well-being anddividing it by the country’s ecological footprint,or resource consumption.

6.1.6 Enlightened Self-interest

Enlightened self-interest extends beyond narrowself-interest and short time horizons and is basedon a deeper understanding of the underlyingdrivers of (un)sustainability and their impact onothers. Taufik et al. (2015) argue that people aremotivated by intrinsic rewards and that doing theright thing (e.g. acting in an environmentallyfriendly manner) elicits psychological rewards inthe form of positive feelings. Asensio and Del-mas (2015) confirm that environment andhealth-based information strategies can outper-form monetary savings information to driveenergy conservation.

Inevitably, business has taken an approach ofenlightened self-interest towards the SDGs.Unilever CEO Paul Polman dubbed the SDGs as‘the greatest economic opportunity of a life-time’.18 Companies have zeroed in on SDGs thatdemonstrate the greatest potential impact andopportunity in areas that will help drive their ownbusiness growth.

Beyond (enlightened) self-interest, motivationto be engaged in effective sustainability gover-nance can be based on altruistic motives andexpanded loyalty. Rifkin (2009), for example,argues that an expansion of loyalty and empathytowards the interests of citizens of other states

18http://businesscommission.org/index.php?p=our-work/sustainable-development-isnt-just-doing-the-right-thing-its-good-business-sense.


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would facilitate governance and the constructionof international Regimes, since shared interestswill be greater.

Building awareness of different interests, dis-courses and world views in that sense can lead toempathy for other actors and to more constructivecommunication and cooperation. (Hedlund-deWitt 2013; also see the section below on TheoryU).19 Often environmental communications seemto reflect a lack of self-reflexivity, succumbing toan unconsciousness vis-à-vis the positionality ofthe communicator(s) own world view and Nichewithin the larger system of world views.20

Because climate change can be framed in manydifferent ways,21 it is important to take intoaccount what prior commitments, world views,stories, beliefs and values the different stake-holders hold onto.22

Empathy has been shown to foster environ-mentalism as compassionate feelings for the suf-fering environment promote conservation ofnature (Pfattheicher et al. 2016). Pfattheicher et al.

(2016) extend this notion and relate compassionfor suffering humans to pro-environmental ten-dencies and indeed reveal that compassion ispositively related to pro-environmental values andintentions.

Followers of the realist tradition in interna-tional relations may see the loyalty-, empathy-and value-based strategies discussed here asutopian. Still, in the global governance of envi-ronmental sustainability there ‘seems to beoccurring an evolution from the notion of com-mon heritage of mankind (as emerged in thecontexts of law of the sea and space law) to that ofcommon concern of mankind’ (Trindade 1992:253). Beyond the ‘fast thinking’ and ‘basicinstincts’ of rational self-interest, cognitive psy-chology shows the need for more reasonable,deliberative ‘slow thinking’ which is based ondeductive reasoning and reflecting on the cogni-tive biases of human instincts and intuition(Kahneman 2011). It is suggested here thatempathy in the context of sustainability gover-nance can be regarded as a rational capability forenvisaging and conceptualizing the framings andperspectives of other stakeholders without preju-dices in order to constructively engage with them.

In that perspective, expanded loyalty and theambition to safeguard human progress in thelong-term offer improved chances for facingbarriers to sustainability that are posed by vestedinterests.

It would be difficult to imagine how the dif-ferent interests involved in transition governancecan be reconciled based on self-interests in azero-sum game and how the necessary giganticemission cuts can be achieved based on coben-efits only. Zadek (2014) argues that a selfishapproach to climate change (e.g. through onlyfocusing on the cobenefits of climate action) hasits limits as the climate is changing too rapidly.Moreover, carbon-intensive industries willremain profitable for the foreseeable future, andthey will continue to attract the investment whichshould go into developing and deployingrenewable energy. Therefore, Zadek pleads forpursuing long-term objectives despite short-termcosts to carbon-intensive industries: ‘the stateexists to advance its citizens’ collective interests.

19Lakoff (2008) argues that empathy and cooperation arefundamental human capacities by drawing on neurolog-ical evidence for ‘mirror neurons’ which fire both when anindividual acts, and when an individual observes anotheracting in the same way a person to literally feel whatanother person is feeling.20One example is that environmental groups concernedwith climate change highlight the threat of climate changeto polar bears. By appealing to the fate of the (bothphysically and emotionally far away) polar bear, ratherthan to speaking to the impacts of climate change onpeople’s everyday world (e.g. food production, jobs,children’s health), a more expansive and world centricvalue-set is assumed by environmental groups.21The variety of interests and stakeholders in climatechange is unparalleled. Climate change can mean differentthings to different people; it is used as a battlegroundbetween different practices and philosophies of scienceand between different ways of knowing; it is used as anexcuse for the commodification of the atmosphere and ofthe gas carbon dioxide; it is the inspiration for globalnetworks of social movements; and it is used to revealthreats to human and environmental security. Overall, theidea of climate change is changing our social worlds andaffects our world views (Hulme 2010).22Sarewitz (2004) further states that “those holdingdifferent value perspectives may see in the huge anddiverse body of scientific information related to climatechange, different facts, theories and hypotheses relevant toand consistent with their own normative frameworks”.


When one group of citizens, acting in their ownself-interest, threatens everyone, the state mustdefend the greater good’. Although self-interestmay be a useful tool, eventually ‘there is nosubstitute for social conscience and concertedaction’ (Zadek 2015).

6.1.7 (Political) Identity

Markowitz and Shariff argue that tapping intoexisting, emotionally positive moral values andsocial norms is a psychological strategy that can beused to bolster the recognition of climate change.Feinberg and Willer (2013) come to a similarconclusion after examining the role that moralperceptions play in driving the differencesbetween liberal and conservative Americans’views of environmental issues. The difference inviews partly explains the effect of political ideol-ogy on environmental attitudes. Presenting con-servatives with pro-environmental messagescouched within a particularly conservative moraldomain (e.g. order and cleanliness) led them toadopt more pro-environmental attitudes, compa-rable to those of liberals. Based on this, Feinbergand Willer suggest that political polarizationaround environmental issues can be reduced bycrafting pro-environmental arguments that res-onate with existing values. Thus, reframing envi-ronmental issues in different moral terms offersone way to improve communication between theopposing sides of liberals and conservatives.

Hahnel and Brosch (2016) extend this argu-ment from individual convictions to political andsocial group identity. Such a group identity caninfluence how people perceive and interpretcertain objects and situations. These perceptions,in turn, may influence intergroup judgments anddecisions on climate change judgments andactions. In other words, perception acts as amediator between political identity and climatechange judgments and actions. Political identityaffects selection of information sources, percep-tion23 of relevant information, and judgments

regarding climate change (ibid.). This mecha-nism may underlie the increasing polarization ofpolitical opinions, as observed, e.g. in the USA.Hornsey et al. (2016) take this argument furtherby predicting that political group identity has anincremental and unique impact on perception thatmay even be larger than the influence of indi-vidual traits or ideology.

Theory U: The creation of social systems as afunction of the quality of awareness, attentionor consciousness

Theory U (Scharmer 2007) proposes that thequality of the results that we create in any kind ofsocial system is a function of the quality ofawareness, attention or consciousness that theparticipants in the system operate from. The-ory U has come to be understood in three pri-mary ways: first as a framework; second, as amethod for leading profound change; and third,as a way of being—connecting to the moreauthentic of higher aspects of our self.

Scharmer inquired and integrated recentfindings in leadership, management, economics,neuroscience, contemplative practice and com-plexity research. He found that we cannottransform the behaviour of systems unless wetransform the quality of awareness and attentionthat people apply to their actions within thesesystems, both individually and collectively.

In exploring this territory more deeply,Scharmer realized that most of the existinglearning methodologies relied on learning fromthe past, while most of the real leadership chal-lenges in organizations seemed to require some-thing quite different: letting go of the past inorder to connect with and learn from emergingfuture possibilities. This ‘learning from theemerging future’ not only had no methodology,but also had no real name. And yet innovators,entrepreneurs and highly creative people allexpress an intimate relationship with this deepersource of knowing. Scharmer started referring toit as Theory U and ‘presencing’. Presencing is a

23Hahnel and Brosch employ a definition of perceptionthat goes beyond rudimentary perceptual processes and

encompasses attentional processes, expectations andinferences.


blended word combining ‘sensing’ (feeling thefuture possibility) and ‘presence’ (the state ofbeing in the present moment): presencing means‘sensing and actualizing one’s highest futurepossibility—acting from the presence of what iswanting to emerge’.

The proposition of Theory U, that the qualityof results in any kind of socio-economic systemis a function of the awareness that people in thesystem are operating from, leads to a differenti-ation between four levels of awareness. Thesefour levels of awareness affect where actionsoriginate relative to the boundaries of the system.

For example, when we are listening, the basiclevel of listening is downloading. Downloadingdescribes habitual behaviour and thought andresults in ‘same old, same old’ behaviours andoutcomes: this type of listening originates fromthe centre of our habits, from what we alreadyknow from past experience. In contrast, pres-encing represents a state of the social field inwhich the circle of attention widens and a newreality enters the horizon and comes into being. Inthis state, listening originates outside the world ofour preconceived notions. We feel as if we areconnected to and operating from a wideningsurrounding sphere. As the presence of thisheightened state of attention deepens, time seemsto slow down, space seems to open up, and theexperience of the self-morphs from a single point(ego) to a heightened presence and strongerconnection to the surrounding sphere (eco).

The key principles of presencing are asfollows:

(1) Energy follows attention. Wherever youplace your attention, that is where the energyof the system will go. ‘Energy followsattention’ means that we need to shift ourattention from what we are trying to avoid towhat we want to bring into reality.

(2) Follow the three movements of the U. Werefer to this as the U process because of the‘shape’ of the journey. In order to get to thedeep point of transformation (at the bottom ofthe U in Fig. 6.3), it is necessary first to ‘godown the U’ (the left-hand side of Fig. 6.2) byopening our minds, hearts and will, and then,

after ‘passing through the eye of the needle’ atthe bottom, ‘go up the U’ (the right-hand side)to bring the new into reality. The three mainmovements of the U process are:• Going down the U: ‘Observe, observe,

observe’. Stop downloading and totallyimmerse yourself in the places of mostpotential, in the places that matter most toyour situation;

• At the bottom of the U: ‘Retreat andreflect, allow the inner knowing toemerge’. Go to the places of stillnesswhere knowing comes to the surface.Here you share and reflect on everythingthat you have learned from a deep placeof listening, asking, ‘What wants toemerge here?’ and ‘How does that relateto the journey forward?’;

• Going up the U: ‘Act in an instant’.Explore the future by doing. Develop aprototype. A prototype explores thefuture by doing something small, speedyand spontaneous; it quickly generatesfeedback from all the key stakeholdersand allows you to evolve and iterate youridea.

(3) Go to the edges of the self. To apply thisprocess in the context of institutions, wehave to power it with a new leadershiptechnology. The core of this new leadershiptechnology focuses on tuning three instru-ments: the open mind (suspend old habits),the open heart (empathize) and the open will(let go and let [the new] come).

(4) Pass through the eye of the needle. At thedeepest point of each U journey is a thresh-old. Crossing that threshold, passing throughthe eye of the needle, can feel like dying andbeing reborn. If we want to go through theeye of the needle at the bottom of the U, wehave to let go of everything and offload allthe baggage that isn’t essential. Goingthrough that gate means encountering thetwo root questions of our journey: Who ismy Self? and What is my Work? The capital‘S’ Self is my highest future possibility. Thecapital ‘W’ Work is my sense of purpose orcalling.


(5) Transform the three enemies. Why is the Ujourney the road less travelled? Most peopleare aware of this deeper process of knowingand yet it rarely happens because themoment we commit ourselves to going onthis journey we start to encounter our threeprincipal enemies: the voice of judgment(shutting down the open mind), the voice ofcynicism (shutting down the open heart) andthe voice of fear (shutting down the openwill).

(6) Always start by ‘attending to the crack’.The future shows up first in our feelings andthrough our hands, not in our abstract anal-ysis. ‘Attend to the crack’ means attend tothe openings, the challenges and the disrup-tions where you feel the past ending, and thefuture wanting to begin.

(7) Transform the fields of conversation fromdownloading and debate to dialogue andcollective creativity. Each social field needsa container. Higher-level conversation likedialogue and collective creativity requirehigher-quality containers and holding spaces.‘Transforming the quality of conversation’ ina system means to transform the quality ofrelationship and thought. Collective creativ-ity requires a sense of unity, and in thatsense, ‘the bedrock of a strategy that canengage the world’s population in assumingresponsibility for its collective destiny mustbe the consciousness of the oneness ofhumankind’ (BIC 1995).

(8) Strengthen the sources of presencing inorder to avoid the destructive dynamics ofabsencing. Modern society emerges from theinterplay of two powerful social fields: pres-encing and absencing. The field of presencingworks through the opening of the mind, the

Fig. 6.2 U process of cosensing and cocreating—Presencing. Source Presencing Institute

Fig. 6.3 Cynefin framework. Source Snowden andBoone (2007)


heart and the will. We know that there aremany empirical examples of this process. Buteveryone who works in institutions and sys-tems also knows that there is another field outthere. That field is characterized by gettingstuck with the idea that there is only OneTruth rather than operating with an openmind, by getting stuck in One Us vs. Themrather than operating from an open heart, andby being frozen inside one rigid identityrather than operating from an open will.We live in the tension of these two fields ofpresencing and absencing. Social reality emer-ges continuously from the interplay of thesetwo forces (which in my view could be com-pared with the philosophy of yin and yang): thefield of presencing that gives birth to somethingnew, and the field of absencing that candestroy it (From: Presencing Institute 2015).

6.2 Inference 2. AddressingComplexity Through SystemsDesign and SystemsDeliberation

The transitions which are required forde-carbonizing the global economy go beyondthe narrative of a ‘Third Industrial Revolution’(cf. Rifkin 2011) in terms of complexity, thediversity of stakeholders that need to be involvedand the adaptation of established developmentexpectations. If ‘civilization’ was the major ideaunderpinning social and political thought in thenineteenth century and was developed into themetanarratives of ‘development’ and ‘modern-ization’ in the twentieth century, then a promi-nent narrative underpinning the reconsiderationof governance in the twenty-first century is theconcept of ‘complexity’ (Walters 2004).

The complexity paradigm originates in math-ematical studies of organic systems and hasentered the field of social studies, includingtheories on governance and leadership. Whereascomplicated systems are composed of differentinteracting parts whose behaviour follows aprecise logic, repeats itself and is predictable,

complex systems are subject to dynamics that areoften beyond control, do not follow regular pat-terns, and are not reducible to the interactions atthe level of the system’s composing parts (theyare ‘emergent’) (Probst and Bassi 2014). Bothmetagovernance and transition studies arebased on the complexity paradigm (De Haan andRotmans 2011; Meuleman 2008).24

Vasileiadou and Safarzynska (2010) argue thatit is necessary to empirically investigate whethera governed system is complex instead of takingcomplexity theory as a starting point for transitionstudies. While a complex (societal)25 system isdefined as operating far from equilibrium (Cilliers1998), the current energy system, for example, isoften described in terms of a lock-into fossil fuels,indicating exactly an unwanted and inefficientequilibrium. Also, while complexity often impliesa lack of centralized control, the governmentintervenes at several levels in the current energysystem. Vasileiadou and Safarzynska insteadplead for increasing the complexity to preventlock-in and increase diversity of energy systemsin order to make them more sustainable. (cf.Regime destabilization)

The Cynefin Framework

Cynefin (pronunciation: “kunevin”) is a Welshword for habitat. The Cynefin framework is aconceptual framework used to help managers,policy-makers and others reach decisions. Theframework draws on research into systems the-ory, complexity theory, network theory andlearning theories.

The Cynefin framework (Fig. 6.3) offers fivedecision-making contexts or ‘domains’: simple,complicated, complex, chaotic and disorder—that enable managers to identify how they

24There are three levels of dynamics in complex systems:the agent level; the system level; and the context level.These levels bear strong similarities with the three levelsof Landscape, Regimes and Niches in transition manage-ment’s multilevel framework.25Here it is important to distinguish between social andtechnical systems as complex technical systems can allowoperation of, e.g. a building close to equilibrium temper-ature through measures such as automatic blinds.


perceive situations, and to make sense of theirown and other people’s behaviour:

Simple Domain

The simple domain represents the ‘knownknowns’. There are rules (or best practice), thesituation is stable, and the relationship betweencause and effect is clear. The advice is to ‘sense–categorize–respond’: establish the facts (‘sense’),categorize, then respond by following the rule orapplying best practice.

This is the domain of legal structures, stan-dard operating procedures, practices that areproven to work. When success breeds compla-cency, there can be a catastrophic clockwise shiftinto the chaotic domain. Leaders therefore needto provide a communication channel, if necessaryan anonymous one, so that dissenters (e.g. withina workforce) can warn about complacency.

Complicated Domain

The complicated domain consists of the ‘knownunknowns’. The relationship between cause andeffect requires analysis or expertise; there is arange of right answers. The framework recom-mends ‘sense–analyse–respond’: assess the facts,analyse and apply the appropriate good operatingpractice. Work rationally here towards a decisionrequires refined judgment and expertise.

Complex Domain

The complex domain represents the ‘unknownunknowns’. Cause and effect can only be deducedin retrospect. There are no right answers. Cynefincalls this process ‘probe–sense–respond’.

In a complicated context, at least one rightanswer exists. In a complex context, however,right answers can’t be ferreted out as the complexwhole (e.g. an ecosystem or a climatic system) isfar more than the sum of its parts.

Chaotic Domain

In the chaotic domain, cause and effect areunclear. Action—any action—is the first and

only way to respond appropriately. In this con-text, managers ‘act–sense–respond’: act toestablish order; sense where stability lies;respond to turn the chaotic into the complex.

In the chaotic domain, a leader’s immediatejob is not to discover patterns but to staunch thebleeding. A leader must first act to establishorder, then sense where stability is present andfrom where it is absent, and then respond byworking to transform the situation from chaos tocomplexity, where the identification of emergingpatterns can both help prevent future crises anddiscern new opportunities. Communication of themost direct top-down or broadcast kind isimperative; there’s simply no time to ask forinput.

Disorder Domain

The disorder domain in the centre of Figure xrepresents situations where there is no clarityabout which of the other domains apply. Bydefinition it is hard to see when this domainapplies. Here, multiple perspectives jostle forprominence, factional leaders argue with oneanother and cacophony rules. The way out of thisrealm is to break down the situation intoconstituent parts and assign each to one of theother four realms. Leaders can then make deci-sions and intervene in contextually appropriateways.

Moving Through Domains

As knowledge increases, there is a clockwisedrift from chaotic through complex and compli-cated to simple. Similarly, a build-up of biases,complacency or lack of maintenance can cause acatastrophic failure: a clockwise movement fromsimple to chaotic, represented by the foldbetween those domains. There can be counter-clockwise movement as people die and knowl-edge is forgotten, or as new generations questionthe rules; and a counterclockwise push fromchaotic to simple can occur when a lack of ordercauses rules to be imposed suddenly (Snowdenand Boone 2007).


6.2.1 Challenges that ComplexityPoses for the SDGs

Complexity in governance for the SDGs involvesa unique set of challenges

First of all, the more complex the policyproblem, the more widely distributed will be theinstitutional capacities (Huppé and Creech 2012).Governance networks that seek to integrate thesecapacities should involve a number of interde-pendent actors with various capacities distributedacross multiple scales, sectors, domains andlevels of society. However, such networks alsoinvolve participants with more diverse worldviews, interests, motivations, power and otherresources. (ibid.)

The second challenge is not to let additionalcomplexity hinder problem-solving and collabo-ration. The complexity of solutions thereforeshould match the complexity of the SDGs.

Third, tendencies to break complex challengesdown in manageable ‘pieces’ can lead to frag-mentation of sustainability governance. This canlead astray from coherent and effective gover-nance for the SDGs.

Fourth, the linkages between complex sys-tems (or ‘systems of systems’) such as energyand global finance, which can interact in energytransitions are not well understood. Economists,for example, may base a carbon price on exter-nalities and on the discount rate which they deemappropriate. However, they do not considerdynamic factors such as the rising costs ofdelayed emissions reduction (World Bank 2015;also see Fig. 4.2 in Sect. 4.1.1) or the feasibilityof energy transitions in terms of the availabilityof fossils fuels which are required to buildrenewable energy infrastructures (cf. Sgouridiset al. 2015). Another example of a complexlinkage between energy and financial systemswhich has come up fairly recently is the questionof accounting for stranded assets and a possible‘carbon bubble’.26

6.2.2 The Multiplicationof Complexity

Based on the amount of resources available,complexity can breed complexity. In an elabo-rate consideration of historical instances ofcomplexity in governance, Tainter (2011) hasinvestigated the level of complexity in societiesand their need for energy. Tainter observes thatwhen human societies have surplus energy (asindustrial societies have had over the past twohundred years because of the high EROEI offossil fuels), the complexity of those societiesincreases. The excess energy increases com-plexity, but at the same time opens up new kindsof problems such as climate change and pollu-tion. To address these and other wicked sus-tainability problems creates the need forcomplexity in society and in the economy toincrease, which requires more energy and otherresources (Tainter 1988; Allen et al. 2003). Oneclear example of this is the push for energyefficiency and biofuels, which can be limited by

26If governments limit emissions to a level consistent withscience (e.g. 2 °C above pre-industrial levels), then fossilfuel companies can sell and burn only a minor part of theirreserves (McGlade and Ekins 2015). Also, energy utilitiesand oil majors would have stranded assets (e.g. coal fired

power plants and oil reserves that are not desired anymore). As a result, those companies would face collapse,and so would global stock markets (fossil fuel companiescontrol one-third of global stock market assets), the taxesthat fossil fuel companies pay to governments, the banksthat made loans to fossil fuel companies, and the revenuesthat governments will lose from state-owned enterprises(70% of fossil fuel reserves are owned by SOEs). Cur-rently, fossil fuels account for 20–30% of the worth ofmajor stock exchanges around the world (Carbon Tracker2011; available at http://go.nature.com/2ppxcyh). Thisphenomenon of fossil fuel-related assets that may becomeworthless is called the ‘carbon bubble’. Several oil com-panies, including Shell, Statoil and BP have decided toreport on how they address (measures on) climate changeunder pressure from shareholders. In addition, campaignshave been launched to ‘divest’ from the fossil fuelindustry. In October 2015 Mark Carney, Governor of theBank of England and chairman of the G20 countries’Financial Stability Board, warned that climate changemight make the world’s stock markets and banks unstableand lead to a financial crash because of stranded assets.Carney called for the setting up of a Climate DisclosureTask Force to which companies have to declare howmuch carbon they emit, and how they are going to pro-ceed to zero emissions in the future. Also see http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34396961.

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rebound and other secondary effects (cf. Stern2011). But once the supply of energy decreasesor cannot keep up with the increasing level ofcomplexity, societies become unsustainable.Thus contrary to usual belief, ‘it is not possiblefor a society to reduce its consumption ofresources voluntarily over the long term’. (ibid.:93) According to Tainter, innovation (e.g. inclean tech) cannot be as transformational as it isoften claimed to be for sustainability, becauseinnovation can also lead to higher complexity,and delivers diminishing returns as it becomesmore and more expensive to make progress.

In sum, for Tainter, sustainability is aproblem-solving strategy, which increases com-plexity, which in turn requires more and not lessenergy and resources. Thus, sustainability cannotbe achieved, and increasing energy and resourcedemands in the search for sustainability eventu-ally become unsupportable. This can lead to thecollapse of a society when that society does nottake action to adapt to changing contexts.(Tainter 1988) However, this pathway of col-lapse has proven true only for hierarchicallygoverned societies. Tainter, for example, baseshis findings on his examination of the collapse ofthe Roman Empire due to increasing governancecomplexity which could not be supported atsome point by resource inputs when agriculturalyields declined.

Alexander (2012) disagrees with Tainter’sview as he thinks that societies do have theability to reduce complexity voluntarily in orderto reduce energy use and avoid collapse. First ofall, Alexander notes that we can rethink, priori-tize and decide what problems deserve to besolved. While for Tainter ‘simplification’ meanssolving fewer problems, Alexander argues thatsimplification can mean that one decides to solvedifferent problems, or solve the same problem indifferent, less energy-intensive ways. Alexanderfurther argues that voluntary simplification is nota passive activity, but self-reflective anddynamic. Governments are not likely to supportsimplification in society as they depend onincreasing taxes and are driven by the objectiveof economic growth (Purdey 2010).

6.2.3 The Benefits of SystemsThinking in Governancefor the SDGs

Sustainability challenges are often the result offailures of holistic thinking.27 (Dahl 2012; Capra2002). The foundations of traditional economictheory which are based on concepts of equilib-rium in nineteenth-century physics and on per-fectly rational actors do not hold in practice(Beinhocker 2006).

Instead we need systems thinking to clarifythe functioning of complex adaptive systems28

that will determine the success of the SDGs.Many aspects of our unsustainability are due tothe failure to consider the environmental conse-quences of our consumption and productionpatterns which are dismissed as ‘externalities’.Systems thinking can assist in viewing complexsystems from a broad perspective that includesseeing overall structures, patterns and cycles in asystem, rather than only individual events.

Systems thinking is suggested here as animportant way to address complexity in gover-nance for the SDGs. The systems thinkingapproach is a perspective which views an eventor a system in a holistic manner by placingexplicit emphasis on the relationships and inter-actions between its various elements and con-stituents (Senge 1990; Finger et al. 2005).System-level problems, such as the ones thatmany SDGs aim to address, require “a differentpolicy approach: a long-term, integrated

27One example that Dahl gives of the lack of holisticthinking is the global financial crisis of 2008. Thefinancial crisis is widely acknowledged to have beencaused by an overconfidence in scientific tools of riskassessment for each financial product without consideringthe overall behaviour of the system. Risk assessmentindeed should be separated from risk management.Whereas the former addresses the question “what arethe likely consequences?” and can be based on science,the latter asks “what should we do about it?” and isnormative. Technical information is not enough formaking choices about the social consequences of sustain-ability governance (Gregory et al. 2006).28Typical examples of complex adaptive systems include:the climate; cities; firms; markets; governments; indus-tries; ecosystems; social networks; power grids; andtransport systems.


approach addressing problems of uncertainty,29

complexity and interdependence’ (Kemp andLoorbach 2003: 3). This makes strong policycoordination necessary that can integrate inno-vation, economic, environmental and other pol-icy areas (Scrase and Smith 2009: 718).

Thinking systemically is performed through adynamic cycle of action, observation/reflectionand consultation among stakeholders. It meansthinking about the different aspects of a systemor process, integrating all the dimensions andtheir interactions and examining issues frommultiple perspectives.

Systems thinking enables breaking downcomplexity into subsystems and exploring inter-linked information loops of feedback andfeed-forward. Systems thinking both allows forand necessitates crafting the procedural andsubstantive conceptual framework which isenvisioned in this book. Systems thinking furtheroffers a framework for distinguishing exogenousand systemic forces for achieving the SDGs.30

Traditionally, governance covers the policy,polity and politics dimensions.31 In writing thisbook, it has indeed turned out to be useful to takea systems perspective on policy, polity and pol-itics under the theme of governance as thedividing lines between these dimensions other-wise can get murky in governance practice.

According to Markard et al. (2012: 962), ‘there isa pressing need to improve the understanding ofthe politics and policies of sustainability transi-tions’. It can be difficult to precisely distinguishrules and institutions (polity) from the policieswhich they produce and the politics which thepolicies are produced through. In order to get aclear insight into the governance for the SDGs, itis important to take all three dimensions of pol-icy, polity and politics into account in concor-dance. However, it is important to also look atthe fourth ‘p’ of governance which is not inclu-ded in traditional definitions of governance, andthis is the process dimension. The reason is thatpolicy and polity (and to a lesser extent politics)are rather static concepts. Therefore, the Inte-grative Sustainability Governance (ISG) frame-work in Chap. 7 of this book should include aelement of process (the ISG cycle).

6.2.4 A Systems Definitionof SustainableDevelopment

If we need more of a systems view on sustainabledevelopment, then this can also influence ourdefinition of sustainable development and ourunderstanding of the SDGs. Bosschaert (2018)defines sustainable development as a systemsconcept follows:

Sustainability is a state of a complex, dynamicsystem. In this state the system continues toflourish resiliently, equitably, and autonomously,without requiring critical inputs from outside itssystem boundaries.

Applied to our civilization, this state is con-sistent with societies powered by renewableenergy and closed loop material systems, livingin harmony with thriving ecosystems and a bio-diverse planet, with healthy and happy individ-uals living in tolerant and diverse cultures,supported by open, just and transparenteconomies’.

The first part of the definition defines whatsustainability is, actionable and testable. Thesecond part exemplifies what the first part meanswhen applied to our civilization.

29As Frantzeskaki (2011: 3) explains, there is a differencebetween complexity and uncertainty when referring tosystems and their processes: ‘Complexity refers to thecharacteristic of the subsystems of a system and it is aproperty of the system. When we know the subsystemsand functions of a system but its interdependencies andprocesses are too nested and too intertwined to disentan-gle, the system is characterized as complex. Uncertaintyrefers to the inability to foresee how processes orphenomena will develop over the long-term and/or theunknowability of these processes. The distinction betweencomplexity and uncertainty relies on the dimension oftime: uncertainty relates to the time dimension whereascomplexity as a property is indifferent or, better, unrelatedto time’.30Systemic forces are exercised and/or act within thesystem, while exogenous forces are present and exercisedupon the system (from outside the system).31Politics includes questions of power and interactionbetween actors; polity is about ontology, rules, norms andinstitutions; and policy describes specific problems,solutions and knowledge (Howlett 2009).


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A unique part of Bosschaert’s definition isthat it defines sustainability not as a physicalconstant, but as a state and part of a dynamicsystem, with a system boundary. This means thatsustainability is an edge condition of somethingthat always moves, changes, grows, shrinks andacts in accordance to changes in its environmentand internal composition. Defining it as suchallows one to evaluate and work towards sus-tainability without locking oneself into static andrigid structures that may cause future issues. Itputs sustainability in the realm of systems anal-ysis and science, including network and com-plexity theory. This enables a myriad of newperspectives on how to achieve and work withsustainability and the SDGs, allowing many newinnovative pathways to be explored.

This systems definition tells us that an object,say a house, car or phone, in itself cannot be saidto be sustainable (or not). This is because anobject is not a system, and sustainability is thestate of a system, of a set of relations.

The definition also ensures, in the second part,with words like ‘equitable’, that a foundation forour actions often needs to be sought in the fieldof ethics, where physical measures are ambiva-lent and we are dealing with the complexities ofhuman relations.

6.2.5 Structured Methodsfor (Collective) SystemsThinking

Probst and Bassi (2014) discuss systemsapproaches to complexity governance and pro-pose a decision-making cycle which is verysimilar to the experimentalist governance and thetransition management cycle in terms of theproblem identification, decision-making andmonitoring steps. However, Probst and Bassi(2014) add two steps in the process: systemcharacterization and strategy/policy assessment32

(see Fig. 6.4).

The first additional step, system characteriza-tion, is needed for going beyond simple causalmodels to solve complex problems. (Damer2009) Decision-makers across different sectorsand expertises need to engage continuously andeffectively in order to avoid overlooking thedynamic complexity of the SDGs. Instead ofonly taking a snapshot of the actual state of acomplex system, an appreciation of its dynamismshould include assessing the relation between thestock (history) and flows (constant modifications)of that system. This can be done by identifyingand isolating the different components of a sys-tem, finding the causal relations between them(e.g. by building a causal loop diagram) andunderstanding the ways in which these relations(in terms of feedback loops) govern the totalsystem’s behaviour in the face of a problem.Systems thinking encourages identifying causesand effects across a sustainability problem’ssocial, economic and environmental dimensions.The shared understanding thus gained shouldlead to more effective and targeted governanceinterventions which take relevant governancedrivers and barriers into account.

The second additional step, strategy or policyassessment, should be based on the premise that‘the system always kicks back’ (Gall 1986: 27),that governance of complex systems should beadaptive and that solutions should take intoaccount a system’s learning capabilities. Carry-ing out an integrated assessment of strategies andpolicies can be done in three steps (Probst andBassi 2014):

1. Designing potential interventions (based onthe system characterization and in the form ofinvestments, (dis)incentives (e.g. taxes andsubsidies) and regulations/standards);

2. Assessing interventions (e.g. through scenariobuilding, foresight,33 and envisioning—alsosee the section below); and

32The strategic management competence is the ability tocollectively design projects, implement interventions,

transitions and strategies for sustainable developmentpractices (de Haan 2006; Wiek et al. 2011).33The foresighted thinking competence is the ability tocollectively analyse, evaluate, and craft ‘pictures’ of thefuture in which the impact of local and/or short-termdecisions on environmental, social and economic issues is


3. Selecting effective and efficient interventionoptions (e.g. through a cost-benefit or multi-criteria34 analysis) and indicators.

Box 6.1: Visioning and backcasting(Fig. 6.5)A = Awareness and Visioning: This firststep aligns the participant around a com-mon understanding of sustainability gov-ernance and identifies a ‘whole-systems’context; building a common languagearound sustainability as well as creating avision of what that organization wouldlook like in a sustainable future. During thevisioning process, people are encouragedto set ambitious goals which may requireradical changes.

B = Baseline Mapping: This step con-ducts a sustainability ‘gap analysis’ of the

organization to see how its activities arerunning counter to sustainability gover-nance principles. The assessment alsolooks at the social context and organiza-tional culture in order to understand how topositively introduce change. This allowsthe organization to identify critical sus-tainability issues, governance implications,resources and opportunities.

C = Creative Solutions: In this step,people are asked to brainstorm potentialsolutions to the issues highlighted in thebaseline analysis without any constraints.Armed with their vision of success andpotential actions, organizations look back-wards from the vision to develop strategiestowards sustainability. This is calledbackcasting and it prevents people fromdeveloping strategies that just solve theproblems of today. Instead, they begin withthe end in mind, moving towards a sharedvision of sustainability.

D = Decide on Priorities: After iden-tifying the opportunities and potentialsolutions in the ‘C’ step, the group priori-tizes the measures that move the organiza-tion towards sustainability fastest. This step

Fig. 6.4 Decision-making process based on systems thinking. Source (Probst and Bassi 2014)

viewed on a global/cosmopolitan scale and in the longterm (Wiek et al. 2011). Strategic foresight can be definedas ‘the capacity to anticipate alternative futures and anability to visualize multiple possible outcomes and theirconsequences’ (Fuerth 2009).34For example, the costs of inaction in terms of economic,biophysical, social and cultural damage across the differ-ent systems elements.


supports effective, step-by-step implemen-tation and action planning. Backcasting isused to continually assess decisions andactions to see whether they are moving theorganization towards the desired outcomeidentified in ‘A’ step (awareness andvisioning). The sustainability principleshelp people stay on course as they processthe myriad of information and decisionsinvolved in long-term planning. Thisapproach is based on systems thinking,setting ambitious goals and developingrealistic strategies to achieve them.

Envisioning is a process in which participantsidentify values, describe the future they seek anddevelop a plan to achieve goals. Envisioningcomplements traditional forms of planning,serving as a tool for determining common needsand desires and initiating the process of orga-nizational change. By focusing on shared valuesand long-term goals, envisioning exercisesamong different actors can result in a surprisingamount of consensus while avoiding thedivisiveness and polarization that often chal-lenge open-ended discussions on governance(Pollock et al. 2009). Mebratu (1998) seesvisioning as ‘the most powerful tool for escap-ing from the confines of ideas and paradigmsthat lock us into many undesirable patterns of

behaviour and practice’.35 While its roots lie inlocal government and business planning, it isequally effective at the institutional level (Cost-anza 2000). In this project, interviews will beemployed to expand the visioning process to theparticipants (Sharp 2002; Solop 2001).

Envisioning can fail if the focus remainsmainly on processes rather than on identifyingspecific outcomes (Helling 1998). Envisioning isoften done concurrently with more traditionaland hierarchical planning processes (such asresults-based management), and is generally seenonly as a guiding tool. This can limit its ability toeffect change in the highly political arena ofglobal governance and decision-making.

Visioning is important for breaking throughthe common ‘is‐versus‐ought’ thinking in socialscience. By studying sustainability governance inthe context of how things can be, it will approachthe key parameters in terms of pragmatism andtransformative capacity. Visioning will be usedas a tool to assess the potential for governance tocontribute to sustainability solutions. Accordingto Meadows (In: Van den Belt 2004: 43), ‘avision should be judged by the clarity of itsvalues, not by the clarity of its implementationpath’. For Meadows, planning based on modelsand information precedes implementation, andvision precedes planning.

Fig. 6.5 Visioning andbackcasting

35This does not mean that vision always leads to desirableoutcomes; in history there have been numerous destruc-tive events based on individual and collective ‘vision’.


Envisioning in networked governance andtransition management

Collaborative visioning is crucial for both net-worked governance processes and is crucial forthe first stage of transition management (Loor-bach 2007: 115).36However, according to Ave-lino (2011), visioning in transition managementgoes beyond the Regime level. And shouldinclude explicit discussion and positioningtowards Landscape developments. In the contextof sustainable development, collaborativevisioning is undertaken to identify desirablefutures and pathways through positive visioning(Costanza 2000; Rotmans et al. 2001).

Through collaborative visioning, sustainabilitygovernance actors engage in a process of ‘con-structing and shaping political reality’ by goingfrom abstract notions of the problem frame, topositive projections of desirable futures and pos-sible pathways and intermediate actions, andbackward again between problem definitions andassessments of desirable futures (Voss et al. 2009).

Visioning is a process of continuously testingconcepts that could accommodate the views ofthe diverse participants whose support is neededto make the policy work (Bardach 1980; Kingdon1995). In this process, participants build theirsystems intelligence through first-, second- andeven third-order learning (Pahl-Wostl 2009).Argyris and Schön (1997) describe single-loop(first-order) learning as being that which does not

challenge the underlying assumptions of indi-vidual and organizational behaviour. Here thequestion is ‘are we doing things right?’. In thiscontext, Morin (2008) asserts that ‘pseudocom-plexity’ thinking abounds in approaches andpeople who define themselves in opposition to thetenets of reductionism and espouse complexity,but do not consistently live complexity as theircommunications and actions are still influencedby reductionism. Double-loop (second-order)learning achieves a new level of insight throughactors’ revisions of their assumptions within theirvalue-normative framework. Double-loop learn-ing questions ‘are we doing things right?’.

The third level of learning, often calledtriple-loop or epistemic learning, occurs whenlearners start to reconsider underlying values,beliefs and world views (e.g. Pahl-Wostl 2009),and ask ‘how do we know what is best?’. Fig-ure 6.6 presents the sequence of learning cyclesin the concept of triple-loop learning.

Deliberative systems thinking

Both systems thinking and deliberative gover-nance have been discussed in previous sections.Here it is argued that combining both approachescan deliver important benefits in terms of thecoherence, effectiveness and legitimacy of gov-erning sustainability transitions.

A form of ‘systems deliberation’ is proposedhere in the sense that deliberative capacity can bedistributed among many different stakeholders inthe SDGs. A deliberative system can result thenin an integrated, interconnected and essentiallypolycentric system that can be local, national,regional or global in scale, and sectoral oroverarching in scope. An important capacity thatcan enable such deliberative systems is‘co-intelligence’. Co-intelligence is the capacityto think in terms of interconnected aspects ofgovernance and incorporates diversity, creativityand power-sharing (Atlee 2002). Systems think-ing and co-intelligence can contribute to justiceand equity if they encourage evaluating SDGgovernance across actors and finding inclusivestrategies. Both fostering justice & equity andinclusiveness (pluralism) are identified as

36Transition management literature traditionally describesa process, based on sustainability visions, in whichtransition paths are developed and a common transitionagenda is formulated collaboratively by network actors(Loorbach 2007). This transition agenda contains anumber of joint objectives, action points, projects andinstruments to realize collective outcomes, and makes itvery clear what party is responsible for which type ofactivity, project or instrument that is being developed. Thenext step, which they call the technical stage is to translatethe visions into transition paths and establish a series ofintermediate objectives, which, as they come closer, canbe formulated more quantitatively. Most of the focus isaimed at the structures of the Regime, and at affecting theregulatory, institutional, economic, technological, beha-vioural and other barriers that may influence the system tomove in one direction or the other. The implementationstage relies on experimentations and continuous learning.


competences in Chap. 5 (Sects. 5.4.4 and 5.4.6respectively).

Systems thinking can further help to concep-tualize the motives, expectations and assump-tions of relevant actors and of drivers forinclusive37 governance and causal awareness indeliberative governance (cf. Hillon 2014).A systems perspective generally requires anapolitical approach, which means disregardingthe interests and behaviours of specific actors andhow they influence the decisions taken. Thus,systems thinking is suitable for facilitatingdeliberative processes in an unbiased manner.

Deliberative systems thinking can be usefulfor problem structuring and envisioning and itcan support the development of images, coali-tions and agendas collectively before imple-mentation and enhance monitoring, evaluatingand adapting afterwards (the tactical level in theTM cycle).

IGOs can use deliberative forms of commu-nication for making up their shortcomings in theareas of efficiency, accountability and legitimacy(Milewicz and Goodin 2012). Petersmann (2012)calls the EU a leader in terms of deliberativedemocracy and multilevel governance.38

Tàbara (2011) argues that complex societiesare better capable of dealing with complexproblems, on the condition that such complexitycontributes to progressively reducing negativesystemic change by making the best use ofknowledge and information. In that sense, sys-tems thinking may be useful for leveragingcapabilities for dealing with complex situationssuch as crises. Therefore, Sect. 6.3 looks deeperinto the opportunities that crises may offer forchange and collective action for sustainabilitytransitions.

6.2.6 Policy Coherence forSustainable Development

The EU and the OECD have started to respond tocalls for dealing with complexity and creatingmore coherence in sustainable development pol-icy by promoting the concept of ‘Policy Coher-ence for Development’ (PCD).39 PCD can beseen as an effort to deal with complexity ingovernance practice, and entails:

Fig. 6.6 Sequence of thelearning cycles in the conceptof triple-loop learning.Adapted from (Pahl-Wostl2009)

37Inclusive strategies should ‘allocate costs consistentlyand distribute the benefits equitably across the key actorsof the system’ (Probst and Bassi 2014).38In fact, the 2007 Lisbon Treaty on EU remains the onlymultilateral treaty so far prescribing principles of consti-tutional, parliamentary, participatory and ‘deliberativedemocracy’ (cf. Articles 9–12 TEU) and a detailed‘Charter of Fundamental Rights’ for multilevel

governance of public goods by an international organi-zation as well as principles of ‘cosmopolitan constitu-tionalism’ for the external actions of the EU (cf. Articles3–6, 21 TEU) (Petersmann 2012: 238).39According to the PCD approach, governments need todesign more effective policies that not only avoid impactsthat adversely affect the development prospects of othercountries but that also enhance capacities to exploitsynergies across different policy areas (e.g. trade, invest-ment, agriculture, environment and developmentco-operation).


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• ensuring that the interactions among variouspolicies in the economic, social, environ-mental, legal and political domains supportcountries on their pathway towards inclusivesustainable growth;

• putting in place institutional mechanisms,processes and tools to produce effective,efficient, sustainable and coherent policies inall sectors;

• developing evidence-based analysis, sounddata and reliable indicators to informdecision-making and help translate politicalcommitments into practice; and

• fostering multistakeholder policy dialogue toidentify the barriers to, and the catalysts for,change (OECD 2015).

More recently, the OECD has used the termPolicy Coherence for Sustainable Development(PCSD). The analytical framework below pro-vides the basis for the OECD’s (2015)40 defini-tion of PCSD. PCSD is in line with SDG target17.1341 and 17.1442 and can help facilitate thedesign and implementation of policies to con-sider the:

(i) Diversity, roles and responsibilities ofdifferent actors as well as sources offinance—public and private, domestic andinternational;

(ii) Policy interlinkages across economic,social and environmental areas, includingthe identification of synergies andtrade-offs;

(iii) Non-policy drivers, i.e. the enablers anddisablers at global, national, local andregional levels for sustainable develop-ment outcomes; and

(iv) Policy effects, i.e. transboundary andtemporal impacts (OECD 2015).

PCSD and the SDGs

With the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sus-tainable Development and the Addis AbabaAction Agenda, all UN Member States commit-ted to ‘pursue policy coherence and an enablingenvironment for sustainable development at alllevels and by all actors’ (SDG 17.14).

In achieving the SDGs, countries and stake-holders need to ensure that efforts in one goalarea are not undermined by policies or actions inother goal areas. For example, efforts to increasethe share of renewable energy (SDG target 7.2)could potentially undermine progress to endhunger (SDG target 2.1) if food crops and biofuelproduction compete for the same land and waterresources. Policy Coherence for SustainableDevelopment (PCSD) can informdecision-making to avoid unintended conse-quences, and help capitalize on synergies amongSDGs and targets, between different sectoralpolicies, and between diverse actions at the local,regional, national and international levels.

The effective achievement of the SDGs entailstrade-offs among economic, social and environ-mental objectives and value judgments whichcannot be determined by governments alone.While essential, the strong leadership role ofgovernment is not sufficient to ensure a coherentimplementation of the SDGs. The engagement ofa wide range of stakeholders and a sharedunderstanding of the nature and benefits of thenew agenda are critical for building ownershipand mobilizing action. Collectively, stakeholderscan identify common challenges, set priorities,align policies and actions, and mobilize resourcesfor sustainable development.

This multistakeholder engagement is essentialin the light of the long-term nature of the SDGAgenda, which needs to transcend partisan poli-tics and electoral cycles. One interesting example

40www.oecd.org/development/pcd/Note%20on%20Shaping%20Targets.pdf.41‘Enhance global macro-economic stability, includingthrough policy coordination and policy coherence’.42‘Enhance policy coherence for sustainable development’.


http://www.oecd.org/development/pcd/Note%20on%20Shaping%20Targets.pdf

http://www.oecd.org/development/pcd/Note%20on%20Shaping%20Targets.pdf

of stakeholder engagement is ‘The Finland WeWant by 2050—Society’s Commitment to Sus-tainable Development’ (The Finnish NationalCommission on Sustainable Development2017).43 This initiative brings together govern-ment leaders and representatives from localcommunities, the social partners and civil societyorganizations to agree on a long-term vision andcommit to action programmes.

6.2.7 Integral Theory

Integral theory represents an ongoing attempt toacknowledge complexity by placing a widevariety of theories (e.g. on psychology, eco-nomics and sociology) into one single frame-work. Integral theory can be useful for mappingthe integration of the interior dimensions and theexterior dimensions of governance at both theindividual and collective levels (Wilber 2000).

The ‘All Quadrants All Levels’ (AQAL)model (Table 5) forms the basis for integraltheory. The governance theories previouslycovered in this book illustrate mainly the exteriorquadrants in Table 6.1 (the behaviour in quad-rant 1 and the structural in quadrant 2.). With theexception of metagovernance, few governancetheories explicitly acknowledge the importanceof the cultural dimension (quadrant 3).The AQAL model can be used for identifyingthese dimensions of governance which otherwiseremain neglected. The five framework conditionsfor metagovernance (also see Sect. 2.2.1) fit inthe four different AQAL quadrants. Collectiveaction is placed here by the author at the heart ofthe four quadrants, as collective action requiresthe beliefs and norms and understanding of(many) different individuals, and collective val-ues and governance structures. Integral leadersimplement the SDGs as a ‘dynamic process ofdeveloping sustainability involving personal,collective and systemic transformation’ ensuring‘that people’s interiority (feelings, beliefs, worldviews) influence and inform development inter-ventions’ (Hochachka 2009).

6.3 Inference 3. Mobilizingthe Momentum of ‘Crisis’for Change and CollectiveAction on the SDGs

People only accept change in necessity, and onlysee necessity in crisis.—Jean Monnet44

6.3.1 Crisis in the Context of ClimateChange and SustainableEnergy

Emergency response action has been one of theprime ‘sources’ of environmentalism. However,there has been a taboo on arguing that large-scaledisasters are needed for moving towards effectiveclimate governance. The tide is changing though,and practitioners have started to realize that dis-asters can bring about paradigm shifts.

Confino (2015) claims that it will take a dis-aster of unprecedented proportions to wakebusiness leaders up to the need to take radicalaction on sustainability (Confino 2015).45

Although awareness of sustainability has grownwith CEOs, many business executives andinvestors are still ignoring the reality of climatechange, resource scarcity, social injustice andbiodiversity collapse. Indeed, Polanyi (1944)suggests that enterprises in a capitalist economycannot change their environmental practices faror fast enough to avert environmental crisis (noteven forced by more active government regula-tion). The environmental crisis has gone so farand is progressing so quickly that regulatorymeasures—at least those that are politically andeconomically feasible today—are unlikely tomaterialize anytime soon. The Stern Report, forexample, estimated that reducing CO2 emissionsany faster than 1% a year would precipitateeconomic recession (Stern 2007: 231–232).

43Also see https://commitment2050.fi/.

44Jean Monnet wrote in his memoirs: ‘I have alwaysbelieved that Europe will be established through crisis,and that the outcome will be the sum of the outcomes ofthose crises’.45http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/jan/13/business-leaders-not-taking-sustainability-seriously.


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Table 6.1 AQAL model with the five framework conditions for successful metagovernance

Interior Exterior

Individual 1. Individual/psychological Reflection and reflexivityPersonal beliefs, values, awareness, and willingness Metagovernance framework condition 2: The personal conviction of the responsible politician or public managers

2. (Inter-personal) behaviour of individualTrust, knowledge and understanding Metagovernance framework condition 2: - Discretion and capability - Adaptiveness - dealing with the

framework conditions offered by the governance environment

- Using 3 metagovernance intervention strategies315

Collective

3. Social and Cultural Fairness and justice, collective worldviews, collective willingness, language, discourse, values and beliefs

Metagovernance framework condition 1: The culture, traditions and history of the administrative and societal system.

Framework condition 4: Organisational culture

4. Structural and systemicGovernance, strategy, decision-making, procedures, rules, policies, institutions

Metagovernance framework condition 3: Societal expectations of the role(s) of governmental organisations Metagovernance framework condition 4: Organisational characteristics (structural part)Metagovernance framework condition 5: the type of problem

Individual and

collective

action

aThe three strategies are: 1. combining styles; 2. switching from one to another style; and 3. maintenance

6.3 Inference 3. Mobilizing the Momentum of ‘Crisis’ for Change … 177

Based on these assumptions, in amarket-based economy, regulatory efforts for theenvironment of the intensity and breadth that areneeded now are unlikely to create any virtuouscycle of economic growth (as propounded by theidea of a ‘green economy’) but instead couldengender economic crisis. There is therefore littlereason to believe that regulatory and normativepressures for environmental purposes can prevailover counterpressures and entrenched interests.

The widely perceived assumption that crisis isneeded for creating the momentum that is nec-essary for realizing transitions is largely based onthe fact that governance systems are virtuallyimpossible to change because such changerequires substantial changes in power and dom-inant resource structures. The scale of the chal-lenges such as climate change requires radicalrethinking of existing governance systems. Thechange in power, knowledge and norms that isrequired for decarbonization is so profound thatit is very unlikely that in a business-as-usualscenario either climate change or financialinstability will be addressed up to the level thatsevere future disruption is averted.46 Efforts toreform oversight of financial markets show howbanks can hold governments at ransom bythreatening to sell (or stop buying) governmentbonds. Likewise, fossil fuel companies can arguethat radical action on climate change may causethe carbon bubble47 to burst, taking the globaleconomy down in their slipstream.

Crisis is inherent to transitions, as transitionsoften are pursued in response to problems orcrisis.48 Galaz et al. (2008: 174) argue that crisescan trigger change given that they ‘can open upspace for new interactions’. Crises may not be

desirable and they may not be a necessary pre-condition for positive change as incrementalimprovements in sustainability need to be pur-sued even if at times crisis seems necessary forcreating the momentum for systemic transitions.

One main improvement that can be drawnfrom the case studies is that TM could take crisisbetter into account as a source of momentum fortransitions.

If crisis can be a driver for transition gover-nance, then crisis—equalled here with backlashor system breakdown—does not have to be theend of governance (Fig. 6.7). Previous sustain-ability transitions and societal transformationshave often been the result of systemic break-downs and backlashes. But breakdown can alsobe the prime source of the transformation, as itremoves barriers, institutions and customs thatpreviously stood in the way of sustainabilitytransitions. Niches in stable circumstances arerarely strong enough to change the Regime.

Thus, crises can be one source49 of change andthe ‘constructive destruction’ of the societal sys-tem (Scott 1998: 97). Crises can function con-structively for political actors that initiate orpropose the implementation of institutional changeas a response to these crises50 (Razin 2004).

At the micro-level, behavioural psychologyconfirms that behavioural change often will not

46Vice versa, it is suggested that environmental shockscan expose and topple governments that are corrupt,unresponsive, elitist or inefficient (Pelling 2011). This isimportant as Flagg (2015) hypothesizes that corrupt statesthat are led by small elites tend to ignore the public goodand are less likely to make climate pledges.47See footnote 26 supra.48Grin et al. (2010: 1) define a sustainability transition asa ‘radical transformation towards a sustainable society asa response to a number of persistent problems confrontingcontemporary modern societies’.

49Osborne and Brown (2005) in fact accept that the causeof emergent change in public organizations is limited totwo critical factors: politics and crises.50Despite this enthusiasm over the potential for crisis toevoke change, it is important to realize that institutionaltheorists and political theory scientists have the tendencyto use the term ‘crisis’ as an umbrella concept to describeany type of inefficiency or pathology of the system, or anytype of unanticipated events (Frantzeskaki 2011). There-fore, it is important to distinguish between different typesof triggers for collapse, namely system failures orinstitutional failures to describe discrepancies (ineffi-ciency, ineffectiveness), exogenous events to captureevents exogenous to the system that influence its oper-ation and crisis that are uncertain events of high impactthat shock the system. (ibid.) From a transition perspec-tive, collapse differs from adaptation or Regime shifting inthe sense that there is no institutional response and a lackof initiative from actors (as manifested by the presence ofNiches or new practices).


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result from preference or attitudinal51 change andthat changing behaviours usually occur as aresult of situational factors (e.g. crisis) andstructural features that affect incentives (Heber-lein 2012). Sabel and Zeitlin (2012) argue that‘democratic destabilization’ is necessary forexperimentalist governance (see Sect. 2.6).

6.3.2 Examples of Crisis DrivingChange

Brockner and James (2008) explored the condi-tions under which private company executivessee crises as opportunities and found that con-ditions are good for positive outcomes to emergefollowing a crisis when the organization supportsa culture where divergent thinking and learningare the norm and when managers lean towardsreflection, learning and analysis after a crisis.There are numerous historical cases that supportthe hypothesis that crisis is a precondition forradical change.

Risks and crises around energy security wereimportant drivers of climate and sustainableenergy governance in Denmark. Denmark hasbecome a frontrunner in renewable energy andenergy efficiency as a response to the 1970s oilcrisis. Denmark was the country that was rela-tively most dependent on oil imports (after Italy)during that oil crisis. Because of the oil crisis,Denmark invested heavily in renewables andenergy over the past few decades. The result hasthat the Danish economy grew by 78% since1980, even though energy consumption hasremained nearly the same. By 2025, Copenhagenaims to be a carbon-neutral city and by 2050,

Denmark plans to meet 100% of its energy needswith renewables.52

A second example of energy crisis that canprovide an incentive for accelerating sustainableenergy development is the EU’s dependence onRussian gas, and the uncertainties that the con-flict in the Ukraine in 2014 and the EU’s eco-nomic sanctions on Russia have caused (Higgins2014).53 Oxfam, for example, has been callingfor an increase in renewable energy and energyefficiency, and a reduction in emissions, as areaction to the conflict with Russia (Press Asso-ciation 2014a, b).54 According to Denmark’sforeign minister, an EU deal to cut fuel use andincrease renewable energy would be a betterpunishment on Russia than more sanctions as itwould clearly show that the EU can cut its reli-ance on Russian gas (Lewis 2014).55

Also according to Dangerman (2013), energytransitions are likely to result either from wide-spread crises or strong, top-down policy coordi-nation and the early implementation of long-termtransition scenarios.

The G7 is an example of a global forum whichhas been forced to evolve into the G20 on a morepermanent basis because of the global financialcrisis (the G20 was already set up in 1999 todiscuss policy pertaining to the promotion ofinternational financial stability). Some argue thatthe last time that global governance was suc-cessful was indeed during the G20 summit ofleaders in 2008 at the height of the financial crisis.World leaders gathered and took decisive actionto reign in the collapse of the global financialsystem by rescuing banks. They also reachedagreement rapidly on ‘Basel III’, another rareachievement in terms of global governance.

51Heberlein (2012) describes ‘attitudes’ as beliefs ‘tied toa value’, so that the belief ‘says or implies that somethingis better than something else’. Unlike economists’ whobelieve that preferences and attitudes are fixed, psychol-ogists believe attitudes can change. Heberlein furtherseparates attitudes from values by saying that whereasattitudes always have an object, values do not (p. 15). It isvery difficult to change values in the shorter term whileattitudes can be changed.

52Also in economic terms, Denmark’s policies havestarted to pay off; in 2010, the Danish energy technologysector accounted for about 10% of the country’s exports.53On the other hand, Russia allegedly supports protests inEurope against shale gas: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/01/world/russian-money-suspected-behind-fracking-protests.html?_r=1.54http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/ukraine-eu-fuel-energy-crisis-oxfam-europe.55http://news.yahoo.com/denmark-says-eu-green-energy-deal-best-way-161654562–finance.html;_ylt=AwrBJR.ygS1UuV4Ag4LQtDMD.


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http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/ukraine-eu-fuel-energy-crisis-oxfam-europe

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/03/ukraine-eu-fuel-energy-crisis-oxfam-europe

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Almost ten years earlier, auditing practices in theUSA were made more robust through the Sar-banes–Oxley law as a reaction to major account-ing crises involving Enron and Worldcom.

Amore recent example isDieselgate, a scandalin which car manufacturer Volkswagen (VW) wasinvolved. In September 2015, the US Environ-mental Protection Agency (EPA) found thatmany VW cars being sold in America had a “de-feat device”—or software—in diesel engines thatcould detect when they were being tested,changing the performance accordingly to improveresults. The result was that the engines emittednitrogen oxide pollutants up to 40 times abovewhat is allowed in the USA. Soon after, authori-ties in other countries started investigations andfound similar results. VW admitted that 11 mdiesel vehicles worldwide had been fitted withdefeat devices. The stock price of VW tumbled,and it had to pay billions in repairs (totalling 25billion euros by the end of 2017). However,dieselgate triggered VW’s appetite for trans-forming into an electric mobility company. Beforedieselgate, VW had been reluctant to make elec-tric vehicles. However, by the end of 2017, VWannounced that it would invest 34 billion euros inorder to become the global leader in electricmobility by 2025 and electrify its whole fleet by2030. It would be difficult to imagine that VWwould have pursued the development of electriccars so aggressively if it had not gone through thedieselgate crisis.

Finally, there are examples of cases where adiscourse of crisis was used to bring aboutchange. Therefore, one needs to be cautious ofwho decides what situation can be classified as acrisis, and for whom that situation is a crisis.Williamson’s (1994) crisis hypothesis states thata discourse of crisis can condition the public toaccept a radical institutional reform. Thosereforms can both be in support of or detrimentalto sustainability. Klein (2007), for example,argues that libertarian free market policies havebeen promoted through deliberate strategies (the‘shock doctrine’) such as the exploitation ofcrises to push through controversial anti-socialpolicies while citizens are too distracted byupheavals to resist. Similarly, economic crisis

can be mobilized as an argument for puttingenvironmental policies aside as being too bur-densome for already weakened companies.

On the other hand, discourses of crisis havealready been crafted in order to galvanize supportfor sustainability transitions, for example byChinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang when heclaims that ‘China will wage a war on pollution’.Further, in the case of the Ebola outbreak in WestAfrica, the US Centres for Disease Control andPrevention (CDC) and the World Health Orga-nization (WHO) claimed as late as in September2014 that ‘the number of Ebola cases could swellup to 1.4 million’. However, a few months later(by the end of 2014) the Ebola crisis had beencontained. The crisis discourse of the CDC andthe WHO seems to have created the momentumfor the rapid mobilization of international supportthrough which the Ebola outbreak could becontained rapidly. Climate change has also beenframed as a medical emergency which requirescooperation across sectors (Watts et al. 2015).

US President Obama mobilized the discourseof climate change as a crisis situation in order togain support for climate action. Obama frequentlyframed climate change as a risk to national andglobal security (Rampton 2015).56In 2004, U.K.Chief Scientific Advisor Sir David King arguedthat climate change is ‘the most severe problemthat we are facing today—more serious even thanthe threat of terrorism’. Obama, for example,pointed to severe drought in Nigeria as creatinginstability that was exploited by terror groupBoko Haram, and said crop failures and high foodprices in Syria fuelled unrest that led to civil warand the rise of the Islamic State (IS). The NobelPeace Prize committee made the linkage betweenclimate change and safeguarding peace in 2007,when it awarded its Prize to Al Gore and theIPCC, stating that ‘[because of climate change]there may be increased danger of violent conflictsand wars, within and between states’.

The Montreal Protocol (also see Sect. 5.2.3) isa prime example of an effective governanceinstrument which is based on strong cooperation

56http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/20/obama-climate-change_n_7341638.html


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between market and government actors, aimingtogether at solving an environmental-turned-health crisis (skin cancer started to reach epi-demic proportions in Australia among othersahead of the conclusion of the MontrealProtocol).

Compulsive policy-making

It remains unclear how complex system interde-pendencies limit policy-makers’ ability to pur-posefully intervene in socio-technical systemsinstead of reacting incrementally to ongoingdynamics. Hoppmann et al. (2014) based on astudy of solar PV policy in Germany argue thatpolicy interventions can change thesocio-technical system in a way that brings upnew challenges. The newly emerged issuesbecome the target of subsequent policy efforts,leading to a continuous cycle of policy-makersinducing and reacting to technological change. Inanalogy with Rosenberg’s (1969) concept of‘compulsive sequences’, Hoppmann et al. labelthe cycles in which German energy policies weredriven by innovations in solar PV technologyand the subsequent lowering of solar PV panelprices (rather than that the policy-making processwas in control of these development) as ‘com-pulsive policy-making’. Their framework pointsto the important role of complex, crisis-likedynamics of socio-technical systems—predomi-nantly technological change and the unexpectedlowering of solar PV prices—as a driver of pol-icy change. Compulsive policy-making may alsohave been the basis of the German and EUreaction to the unexpected lowering of solarpanel prices due to a rise in exports from China.

6.3.3 Three Types of Crisisin Transition Theory

Based on institutional theory, radical institutionalchange can be seen as the result of crises, acci-dents and revolutions that shock the system, haveacute impacts and are irreversible events (North1990). From a transition theory point of view,crises can happen in different ways:

• A ‘top‐down’ disruption is caused byexogenous Landscape events (e.g. an inter-national crisis, large accidents (e.g. Cher-nobyl), energy crisis, epidemic outbreak,natural disaster or the emergence of a newforeign market) and can be a tipping point forsocietal transformation (Pelling 2011),Regime change (Loorbach 2014) and orien-tation towards identifying future risks.57

• An ‘internal’ power disruption is caused bya clash between Regime actors (e.g. a cabinetcrisis, an election period or a competitivebattle between established companies—e.g.between European and Chinese solar PVmanufacturers, and between solar installersand manufacturers within Europe).

• A ‘bottom‐up’ power disruption is causedbyNiches andNiche–Regimes challenging theRegime (e.g. a technological innovationdestroying the market for existing technology,or environmental activists publicly denounc-ing a certain company or industrial sector). Thetake‐off stage is one of struggle and antago-nistic power relations; the Regime tries tosurvive by increasing the dependence of otherson the Regime, there is an internal competitionover resources among Regime actors, and/orthere are highly antagonistic dynamicsbetween Niches, Niche–Regimes andRegimes, in which innovative and transfor-mative power are exercised to disrupt reinfor-cive power, and vice versa. If during this powerstruggle the Regime succeeds in reclaiming itsinitial dominant position and controlling thecontingency, a so‐called back‐lash occurs. Oneexample of this was the development of pas-sive and energy-positive houses in northernEurope the 1980s following the oil crisis. Oncethe oil price went down again and house priceswent down however, the technology wasforegone and energy-positive homes are still

57One result of this can be the ‘risk society’. According toGiddens, a risk society is ‘a society increasingly preoc-cupied with the future (and also with safety), whichgenerates the notion of risk’, (1999: 3) while Beck definesit as ‘a systematic way of dealing with hazards andinsecurities induced and introduced by modernization it-self’ (1992: 21). Also see Annex 28.


rare. If, however, the Regime fails in reclaim-ing its initial dominant position, the transitioncan continue (Avelino and Rotmans 2009).

6.3.4 Crisis Leadership

Crisis leadership has two distinct phases. First isan emergency phase, when the task for leaders isto stabilize the situation. Second is the adaptivephase, when the underlying causes of the crisisneed to be tackled and the capacity to thrive in anew reality needs to be built. Too often leadersonly fulfil the first phase of crisis response bystabilizing a situation and do not execute thesecond, adaptive phase.58 In fact, by reducing thesense of urgency, a successful initial crisisresponse can create the illusion of a return tonormalcy (Heifetz et al. 2009).

Adaptive leadership means seizing theopportunity for transformation and using theturbulence of the present to build on and bringclosure to the past. In the process, adaptiveleadership means changing key rules of thegame, and reshaping organizations and institu-tions. The adaptive phase of a crisis requiressome new leadership practices. Without urgency,difficult change becomes far less likely. Crisisleadership involves orchestrating the inevitableconflict, chaos and confusion of change so thatthe disturbance is productive rather thandestructive. The way in which leadership isleveraged in crisis (e.g. by identifying vulnera-bilities, making sound decisions and takingcourageous action) reflects the competency of anorganization (James and Wooten 2005).

Crisis leadership involves five critical tasks(James and Wooten 2005):

1. Sense-making: the classical situation assess-ment step in decision-making;

2. Decision-making: the act of coming to a deci-sion and the implementation of that decision;

3. Meaning making: crisis management aspolitical communication and reform of theorganization’s mindset;

4. Terminating a crisis: handling accountabilityand building an environment of trust; and

5. Learning: a crisis often opens a window ofopportunity for reform.

For crisis leaders, it is crucial to invent a newlanguage of hope and optimism for turning acrisis into positive change. In a foreseeable butunavoidable crisis and out of frustration with thefailure of implementing transitions purposefullyit may be tempting for leaders to say that crisis isthe only driver they can imagine for creating themomentum for change. Crisis-based narrativesare unattractive as they imply policy-makers’incapability to purposefully implement transi-tions which may lead to citizens to lose trust inpolicy-makers. Instead, it is the task of crisisleaders to ensure that capabilities are developedand applied which can turn crisis into opportu-nity. Watts et al. (2015), for example, argue thatclimate change can make gains in healthimprovement over the past 50 years undone, butit can also be the greatest global health oppor-tunity of the twenty-first century. The SendaiFramework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR 2015)59 states in paragraph 32that ‘disasters have demonstrated that therecovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction phase,which needs to be prepared ahead of a disaster, isa critical opportunity to “Build Back Better”,including through integrating disaster riskreduction into development measures, makingnations and communities resilient to disasters’.

Resilience to crisis is strongly linked to socialcapital. The World Happiness Report 2015argues that crisis provides a test of the quality ofsocial fabric. If the social fabric is sufficientlystrong, then a crisis may lead to higher subjectivewell-being as people get the chance to worktogether towards a good purpose and notice thepower of mutual social support and cooperation.If social institutions are inadequate in the face of58What holds at the collective level is often also expressed

at the individual level. Many people survive heart attacks,but most cardiac surgery patients soon resume their oldways: only about 20% give up smoking, change their dietor get more exercise.

59Available at http://www.preventionweb.net/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf.


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a crisis, they may succumb under the resultingpressures. Therefore, there is a role for leaders instrengthening social capital by addressinginequalities, create equal opportunities, ensurethat no one is left behind, avoid unproductivedivision and promote unity in diversity.

On the one hand, in Greece the perceivedquality of the climate of social and political trusthas eroded significantly after the financial crisisof 2008–2009. On the other hand, levels of trustand social capital increased in both Iceland andIreland60 after the financial crisis of 2008 and inthe Fukushima region of Japan after the Earth-quake of 2011.

6.3.5 Crisis and Integrated RiskManagement

‘It is also important to recognize, however, that a[sustainability] transition will occur in any case,and that it will almost certainly be driven bycrises’. (Beddoe et al. 2009: 2488)

At the end of numerous interviews, afterhaving discussed the multitude of structuralbarriers to sustainability governance and the lackof drivers and (feasible) ways forward, the finalquestion often turned out to be: What are theenabling conditions for using crisis in a con-structive way for sustainability?

One hypothesis that came up is that similarskills and approaches may be needed for bothgovernance that is aimed at voluntarily or pur-posively preventing the deterioration of earthsystems beyond repair (through a ‘Great Transi-tion’ or ‘the next industrial revolution’) and forgovernance that is externally pressured to dealwith rapid transformation as it occurs (‘GreatDisruption’ or ‘Perfect Storm’).61

Climate change has been identified as ‘theultimate threat multiplier’ as it will exacerbate

fragile situations and may contribute to socialupheaval and even violent conflict. (G7, 2015)Crises can be a major driver of change (for sus-tainability). If it takes a disaster to generatechange, we need to understand risk managementbetter and make it more prone to fostering sus-tainability transitions. The concept of ‘risk’ isusually a function of probability and conse-quence (Jones and Boer 2004). In the context ofclimate change, risk can be conceptualized byidentifying the three overlapping elements ofexposure, vulnerability and hazards (see Fig. 6.8)(IPCC 2014).

Risks of climate-related impacts result fromthe interaction of climate-related hazards (in-cluding hazardous events and trends) with thevulnerability and exposure of human and naturalsystems. Changes in both the climate system (left)and socioeconomic processes including adapta-tion and mitigation (right) are drivers of hazards,exposure, and vulnerability (Source IPCC 2014).

Hazards are generally understood to be acomponent of risk in the sense that it representsanything that can cause harm. Vulnerability is aweakness or lack of capacity that favoursadverse effects on exposed elements in a society.Exposure to a risk finally means that an elementcan be exposed to a risk but is not necessarilyvulnerable (e.g. a wealthy country’s coastlinemay be exposed to a rising sea level, but as it hasthe capacity to adapt, it is not necessarilyvulnerable).

Chapter 5 and this chapter demonstrated theneed for adaptiveness, managing risk and lever-aging the opportunities that crisis offers fortransitions. In this context, integrated risk man-agement and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)62

can be systemic tools for managing disaster riskand leveraging the momentum that crisis createsfor fostering sustainability transitions. Integratedrisk management (IRM) refers to a particulartype of risk management which was mainly

60In both Iceland and Ireland, there is a high degree ofsocial support, as indicated by the Gallup World Poll.61There are small differences discernible between theseapproaches though. While resilience, for example, can beproductive when there is a need to adapt to climatechange, it can be an obstacle to climate change mitigationwhen the fossil fuel industry turns out to be resilient.

62The UN General Assembly adopted the InternationalStrategy for Disaster Reduction in 1999 and establishedUNISDR (http://www.unisdr.org/) the secretariat toensure its implementation. UNISDR is also the focalpoint in the UN system for the coordination of disasterrisk reduction.


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developed in Switzerland over the past few years.IRM includes an overall risk assessment processand its components (risk identification, riskanalysis and risk evaluation), as well as risktreatment (preparedness, response, recovery) (seeFig. 6.9).

According to the Swiss Federal Office forCivil Protection (2014), IRM essentially coversthe following themes or steps:

1. Establishing the context: define and delimitthe system. All of the hazards that are relevantto a system or society, and their related risks,are considered;

2. Conducting a risk assessment (including riskidentification, -analysis and -evaluation) basedon damage indicators as well as ecological,economic and social sustainability criteria;

3. Risk treatment: consider the full spectrum ofpreparedness, response and recoverymeasures;

4. Communication and consultation with theaffected stakeholders;

5. Monitoring and review as an ongoingprocess.

IRM addresses risks across a variety of gov-ernance levels. It aims at bridging strategy andtactics and is focused on maximizing opportu-nities (Hillson 2006).

In crisis situations, often an interagency taskforce is formed. Such a task force is usuallyheaded by a head of state (President or PrimeMinister) who provides leadership. In addition,crisis task forces usually gain immediate legiti-macy after inception. The lesson learned frommultidepartmental and multidisciplinary taskforces may be useful for governance for theSDGs as they can provide for a detailed lay-outof the proximate and ultimate factors for sus-tainability transitions (such as the factors out-lined in Sect. 7.1.1 below). Based on the insightthat crisis can be an important driver for sus-tainability transitions, the IRM approach couldbe extended by including such transitionstowards SG achievement explicitly as anobjective.

6.4 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter identified three inferences orrequired inputs for effectively and coherentlygoverning towards achievement of the SDGs:

– Inference 1: Applying behavioural insights;– Inference 2: Addressing complexity through

systems thinking; and– Inference 3: Mobilizing ‘crisis’ for change

and collective action

Fig. 6.8 Risks of climate-related impacts


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These inferences are highly complementaryand build on each other and on the nine com-petence areas from Chap. 5. The inferencesapply from the individual to the collective andfrom the inherent to the contextual levels.

In terms of the behavioural aspects of sus-tainability transitions, a thorough understandingof the mechanisms underlying decision-makingand behaviours requires the simultaneous con-sideration of the decision situation with itsincentive structures, the individual and his or herbeliefs, values, appraisals and emotions, and thetype of decision.

This chapter has explored different ways inwhich behavioural and in particular psychologi-cal factors can be considered and integrated inthe research and practice of sustainability gov-ernance. As such, the chapter provides the basisfor an integrative conceptual framework that

brings an overview of the behavioural aspects ofsustainability governance together with somepractical and theoretical strategies (Fig. 6.10).

Fig. 6.9 Model for integrated risk management. Source FOCP KATAPLAN guideline (2013)

Fig. 6.10 Overview of problems, driver and barriers,and strategies related to considering behavioural factors insustainability governance


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In terms of strategies to address behaviouralfactors of sustainability governance, in particularmore research is needed on how systems thinkingcan be fostered in governance and decision-making processes. Furthermore, the concept of‘sustainable happiness’ offers a fresh approach tohappiness, one that invites reflection on sustain-ability issues, coupled with opportunities toenhance quality of life and contribute to indi-vidual, community and global well-being.

Secondly, complexity is a common feature ofsustainability governance and usually carries anegative connotation. However, systems thinkingcan be used to address this complexity andmoreover, bring about the positive features thatcomplexity can have for governance. Systemsthinking is strongly linked with mental framesand the use of knowledge and can be a guidingprinciple for bringing inputs from differentstakeholders coherently together through delib-erative systems thinking. Renn and Schweizer(2008), for example, argue that there may begood reasons for combining functionalist (ana-lytical) and deliberative perspectives. Delibera-tive governance can foster inclusiveness63 and incombination with systems approaches it can bean avenue for changing power dynamics.

Traditionally, different types of governancewere regarded as ways to ‘pull change along’ in apurposive manner. The reality of governance forthe SDGs turns out to be more unruly as itrequires the creation of an enabling environmentfor eventual implementation, which can bereached through the creation of arenas fordeliberation, participation and reflexivity.Governance aspects such as behavioural barriersand the need for inclusive deliberation and

capabilities for dealing with complexity demon-strate that governance for the SDGs is also aboutcreating and mobilizing momentum for ‘pushingchange forward’. Altogether, this chapter showsthe need for ‘push and pull governance’ in termsof purposively pursuing visions of a sustainablefuture and for accelerating the thrust that is cre-ated by unforeseen events.

Crisis can be necessary for shifting powerstructures that are inert and fail to provide publicgoods. The main challenge related to a crisis liesin channelling the momentum that it createstowards more sustainable pathways. To be ableto leverage a crisis, close attention needs to bepaid to building capacity within all of the com-petence areas as identified in Chap. 5. In relationto power, overcoming crises requires able lead-ership, trustworthy relations throughout society,and empowerment of the previously disadvan-taged. With regards to knowledge, learning andadaptiveness are clearly needed for leveragingcrises for transitions and also reflexivity is nec-essary to analyse what went wrong and what canbe improved to avoid future crises. Norms andvalues are critical to crises which may result frominequities and neglected minority interests.A crisis can provide an impetus for legitimacybut also it can put pressure on governors to beaccountable as major interests are at stake.

Overall, the definition of crisis (according tothe Oxford Dictionary, a crisis is a time ofintense difficulty or danger, or a time when adifficult or important decision must be made)needs to be expanded in order to capture thelong-term nature of the global climate crisis. Theclimate crisis is set to express itself both at theglobal level and over the centuries to come, andat the local level in weather emergencies.

Now that the different elements for the ISGframework have been identified in the previoussections, it is the task for the final and con-cluding chapter to assemble the collectivefindings and to present the Integrative Sustain-ability Governance (ISG) framework and itsorganizing logic.

63According to UNDP (2007), ‘To be inclusive is a corevalue of democratic governance, in terms of equalparticipation, equal treatment and equal rights before thelaw. This implies that all people […] have the right toparticipate meaningfully in governance processes andinfluence decisions that affect them. It also means thatgovernance institutions and policies are accessible,accountable and responsive to disadvantaged groups […].

6.4 Chapter Conclusions 187

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7Conclusions: The IntegrativeSustainability GovernanceFramework and Ways Forward

AbstractChapter 1 started off by explaining that Inte-grative Sustainability Governance is a specificform of sustainability governance and definesit as ‘a collective enterprise which aims toaddress sustainability problems adequatelythrough fostering fundamental change’. Thisfinal chapter aims to draw together the Inte-grative Sustainability Governance frameworkin an effort to answer the main question thatthis book addresses (‘What are the essentialelements and the organizing logic of anintegrative framework that is suitable foranalysing governance for the SDGs from aglobal perspective and for implementing therelated transitions?’). As such, this chaptersummarizes the main findings of this book. Inaddition, this chapter suggests promisingavenues for future practice and research onthe SDGs.

KeywordsGovernance factors � Tools � IntegrativeSustainability Governance frameworkSDG Hubs

7.1 Governance Factors and Tools

7.1.1 Governance Factors: TheBarriers and Driversto Transitions

Both drivers and barriers to governance for theSDGs are often cast as purely of a technical andfinancial nature. In practice, the factors that arefavourable (‘drivers’) or unfavourable (‘barriers’)towards effectively governing sustainabilitytransitions encompass social, political, economicand cultural aspects. This section offers anon-exhaustive compilation of categories of dri-vers and barriers (‘governance factors’). Thecompetences and inferences identified inChaps. 5 and 6 and certain governance factorslisted below can function both as drivers andbarriers for effectively and coherently governingsustainability transitions. Numerous paradoxeslie hidden within these drivers and barriersdepending on their context, intention and


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numerous other factors.1 For example, trade andinvestment can be both drivers and barriers forsustainability (e.g. trade and investment inrenewable energy versus trade in coal). Andleadership can be projected both by the fossil fuelindustry and by low-carbon innovators. Thissection addresses the opportunities and tools formaking the practice and analysis of governancefor the SDGs more effective and coherent.

The ‘proximate drivers’ of governance whichdetermine short-term, conventional strategies(e.g. technology, economic interests and institu-tions) are distinguished from the ultimate driversfor sustainable development (e.g. power,knowledge, norms and culture).

Proximate factorsThe proximate factors as detailed below areself-interest, institutional factors, technologicalfactors, crisis and governance actors.

Self-interest can be a primary factor in sus-tainability governance. Therefore, it is importantto leverage co-benefits of climate action in termsof economic growth, health and quality of life.Calls to (enlightened) self-interest may be useful,but they may in themselves not be sufficient fordecarbonizing at the required speed and need tobe flanked with other drivers.

Economic motivations for decarbonization arecurrently not sufficiently triggered as the exter-nalities of fossil fuel use and of emissions are notpriced in (e.g. through a global carbon tax).Furthermore, global markets for sustainableenergy technologies (SETs) can promote decar-bonization through technology transfer and dis-semination, investment, innovation andcompetition that lower the cost of clean energy.

In terms of investment, more incentives areneeded for allocating resources to new energy

infrastructures. However, even if those incentiveswere there, utilities, for example, often would nothave the financial means to invest in renewables.At the same time, governments promote invest-ment in renewable energy when they see that thiscan deliver local green jobs, economic growth,access to sustainable energy for all and enhancedenergy security.

In terms of institutional factors, stakeholderscan ‘game’ governance systems, for example, byscale jumping. Some stakeholders prefer to takediscussions on environmental standards from thenational to the global level because they expectthat there the chance is higher that no measureswill materialize at all. Global solutions in generalmay limit the need for domestic mitigation anddistract from local and national responsibilities.Therefore, a key reflexive capability fordecision-makers is identifying the relevant scale(s) at which a sustainability problem needs to beaddressed (‘scale sensitivity’).2

Fragmentation among institutions can leadto power imbalances that affect the influence ofweaker institutions. Institutional coherence gen-erally is seen as a precondition for effectivelyaddressing wicked sustainability problems.However, efforts to create coherence need to betreated with caution as the merging of weakerwith stronger departments can lead to the ‘si-lencing’ of the weaker departments.

While technological factors and innovationare crucial for decarbonization, such innovationshould be seen within the wider global energyand resource metabolism. For example, upfrontinputs of fossil fuels are required for building uprenewable energy infrastructures. However, thetransition to sustainable energy should be feasi-ble in terms of the required resource inputsdepending on whether investment in renewableenergy infrastructure (e.g. smart grids and stor-age capacity) accelerates rapidly enough over thenext few decades.

Chapters 4 and 5 showcased the role that(governance) crisis, ‘exogenous’ events,

1Second modernity (Beck 1992; Giddens 2009) is theinsight that change is taking place increasingly alongcontradictions (e.g. glocalisation) that need to be harmo-nized instead of oversimplified and polarized. Oneexample here is the claim that the state is retreating.However, when looking into the details, the role of thestate is changing (e.g. from implementation towardsfacilitating cooperation between multiple actors such ascity governments) rather than disappearing.

2Scale sensitivity is ‘the capability to observe and addresscross-scale and cross-level issues’ (Termeer and Dewulf2014: 2).

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‘destabilization’’ and compulsive policy-making’can play in sustainability transitions. Disasterssuch as storm sandy cause external or exogenouspressure and prompt action. Based on the insightthat crisis can provide an impetus for transitions,Integrative Risk Management (see Sect. 6.3.5)could be expanded by building in mechanismsthat prepare for turning crises into transitionstowards sustainability in the longer term inaddition to preparing for shocks in the short term.Crisis can in some cases be a driver for instillingcollective action from an integral theory per-spective, involving the psychological, beha-vioural, social and cultural, and systemic andcultural dimensions of governance (Sect. 6.2.6).

Ultimate factors

The ultimate factors of sustainability governanceidentified in this research are behavioural aspectsof governance, power, knowledge, and existinggovernance practices and culture.

Behavioural aspects

The behavioural aspects of governing transi-tions and psychological barriers that can belinked sustainability governance are:

• A limited cognition about the problem ofclimate change (ignorance, endowment effect,environmental numbness, uncertainty, boun-ded rationality, loss aversion, judgmentaldiscounting, bounded rationality, optimismand status quo biases);

• Ideological world views (e.g. system justifi-cation and technosalvation);

• Mistrust towards experts and authorities;• Myopia and short-sightedness;• Perceived risks; and• Positive but inadequate behaviour change

(e.g. rebound effects).

It would make sense to foster psychologicaldevelopment into leader development programsin order to deal with these barriers. The ‘deepinner foundation’ that Brown (2011) identifiesmay also point to the importance of spiritual

teachings (including religion) as an intrinsicmotivation in sustainability governance. All theworld’s major religions contain exhortations forenvironmental guardianship.3 Teachings fromthe major religions reflect the explicit emphasiswhich spiritual teachings can put on environ-mental stewardship (Pope Francis 2015; ARC2015).4

Power

The ISG framework reflects the acknowledgmentthat not all actors have the same influence in agovernance process. The power factors deter-mining governance have been identified inChap. 5 in four main categories:

• Empowerment of previously disenfranchizedgroups may be a necessary driver for sus-tainability transitions, equity and pluralism.Knowledge provision and education are nec-essary ingredients for creating opportunitiesfor previously excluded stakeholders. How-ever, empowerment efforts can be barriers ifthey re‐enforce current relations of power andperpetuate existing patterns of injustice.

3Hanley (2014) sees science and religion as complemen-tary approaches to understanding reality which can jointlyfoster human progress in ways neither could alone.Science is linear, minimalist, precise, applicable, sys-temic, ‘objective', verifiable and exact. However, it oftenlacks a global vision and is less suitable for answeringnormative ‘why?’ questions. Religion on the other handtakes general, universal principles as a starting point andmoves towards specific applications that can fostercollective action for the common good. Religion accord-ing to Hanley is nonlinear, maximalist, provides visionand offers moral direction, but is complex and lacksclarity and exactness.4Religions have (collectively) become active in the fieldof climate governance by signing statements and bringingout declarations, as they take note of the scientificevidence around climate change and also realize that thereare many moral and ethical issues related to climatechange. In June 2015, Pope Francis issued an encyclicalon climate change which is available at:http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html Also seehttp://www.arcworld.org/ for cooperation between reli-gions on environmental conservation.

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• Vested interests can hamper the sustainabil-ity ambitions of governments. Internationalorganizations operating in diplomatic envi-ronments usually follow logic of acceptabilityand are inclined to support the status quo.Entrenched interests and politicization at thenational and global level can cause ineffectiveand incoherent governance.

• Leadership cities can be good examples ofcollective sustainability leadership that issupported from the bottom-up by citizens andlocal NGOs who cooperate to project sharedleadership. As such, leadership needs to bemore inspirational. One way to make leader-ship work for sustainability is building inincentives for individual city leaders to stepup sustainability action (e.g. in terms ofcareer development of local politicians).

• Democracy may be beneficial for producingpublic goods in the long term, but it is unli-kely to drive strong climate action in the shortterm. Top-down, autocratic forms of gover-nance are usually ineffective and unadaptivein the face of wicked problems with along-time horizon such as climate change.Therefore, democracy needs to be upgradedby reducing social inequality, leveraging thediversity of views that social complexityentails, and promoting human rights.5

Networking and stakeholder management:Relations and ‘having a network’ are key powerresources. In networks (and relations in general),we can differentiate between power over, with, toand within. Also, actor A can have ‘more’ powerthan actor B, and they may hold different types ofpower. Five strategies that can help to managestakeholders are stakeholder mapping, influenc-ing, identifying triggers, looking for

opportunities (e.g. identify optimistic stakehold-ers and investigate opportunities to leverage theirpositive perception as project advocates), anddeveloping a risk mitigation plan.

Knowledge

A lack of knowledge and learning may be abarrier to effective participation in sustainabilitygovernance. Simultaneously, citizens can getmore connected and informed through technol-ogy. However, the assumption that knowledge initself can foster sustainability transitions can bequestioned for several reasons:

(1) ‘Evidence-based policy-making’ in the con-text of sustainable development is often notbased on factual, undisputable knowledgeand on rational models of problem-solving(Hertin et al. 2009). Knowledge regardingcomplex natural systems (including climaticsystems) is often incomplete and assessmentsof planetary boundaries require science–so-ciety and transdisciplinary deliberations (cf.Schmidt 2013).

(2) It is often challenging to get decision-makersto consider sustainability science and itscomplexities, and the presentation of scien-tific data has indirect rather than directimpacts on governance practice.

(3) In conjunction with the behavioural driversand barriers listed above, neuropsychologicalphenomena may prevent action despite highlevels of knowledge of the negative effects ofclimate change (the ‘knowledge–actionparadox’). In fact, at the individual levelperceptions of climate change, risk candecline as scientific literacy and numeracyincrease. Thus providing more informationon climate change in itself will not neces-sarily succeed in strengthening climateaction (World Development Report 2015).Behavioural change also depends on one’sunderlying culture, attitudes, thought pat-terns and outlook.

(4) Better understanding of sustainability chal-lenges may not necessarily enhance thecapacity to manage these problems. Focusing

5Representative democracy as the dominant politicalconcept in Western countries may be in decay (In ‘t Veld2013: 276; Gore 2013), but as Zane notes in theInternational New York Times of 14 September 2015(p. 7): ‘Western democracy always seems to be in crisis—which may be its greatest strength. When the dizzyingvelocity of change seems to be the only constant in theworld, democracy has proved supple and stable enough torespond, adapt and evolve and, thereby, endure’.


on the effects or goals of political actionrather than its conditions may reduce sus-tainability challenges from sociopolitical totechn(olog)ical issues.

(5) Scientific facts may be ignored for politicalreasons. Doubt (e.g. on the consensus onanthropogenic causes of climate change) canbe sown as people suffer from an informationoverload and have trouble selecting the factsthat are in line with the scientific consensus.

For these and other reasons, knowledge initself is rarely sufficient as a driver of transitiongovernance. In addition, factors such as values(e.g. justice) and (self)-interest need to be calledupon.

Uncertainty

Governments often aim for evidence-basedpolicy-making.6 However, evidence-basedpolicy-making can lead to decisions which donot take uncertainty and unpredictability intoaccount (cognitive dissonance).7 Uncertaintyrelated to sustainability questions, and planetaryboundaries cannot be completely eliminated(Steffen et al. 2015), in particular in relation toclimate change which is difficult to predict due tonumerous feedback mechanisms in climatic sys-tems. Uncertainty is an important barrier to sus-tainability transitions as it can

(1) weaken incentives for change and lead to thequestioning of the authority of knowledge;

(2) make governments question whether othercountries and jurisdictions will join in takingclimate action. Therefore, there is a need forclear emissions information and metrics;

(3) cause governance to lose its coherence andbecome inconstant and fragmented becauseof the spillover effects that it can cause, forexample, across national boundaries8; and

(4) make it difficult to calculate the exact eco-nomic efficiency, investment needs andenvironmental effectiveness (e.g. energyefficiency can be compromised by reboundeffects).

Making choices in the face of uncertainty is animportant theme in debates on ethics. The pre-cautionary principle as discussed in Sect. 5.2.3 is anorm which can apply to the high levels ofuncertainty that one can face in sustainabilitygovernance.

Reflexivity implies that one can understandand handle different frames in a given gover-nance setting while abstaining oneself fromprejudice. A truly reflexive approach to gover-nance includes the appreciation of independentresearch as a human right, as such investigationcan empower stakeholders to participate indeliberative processes. Independent research isimportant for the scoping of global sustainabilitychallenges, as globalized knowledge can bede-contextualized top-down and detached frommeaning-making in a world with a multiplicity ofclimates, cultures and values.

Another factor with growing importanceunder the knowledge category is adaptiveness asbuilding resilience to climate disasters isincreasingly integrated with decarbonization(IPCC 2014). ‘Agile’ leadership is importanthere as it is the ability of a leader to be able tolead well in a wide range of circumstancesespecially new, changing and ambiguous situa-tions. Learning from disasters coupled withreflexivity is crucial for avoiding system lock-inby distinguishing between responses to shockand to stress. Resilience may improve responsesto shocks, but more radical transitions are usually

6In some cases, governments seek for policy-basedevidence making. This means that policy-makers demandor select specific scientific evidence so that they can createlegitimacy for their policies by making use of scientificauthority (e.g. Pielke 2007). Also see footnote 540 below.7In psychology, cognitive dissonance is the mental stressor discomfort experienced by an individual who holds twoor more contradictory beliefs, ideas or values at the sametime, or is confronted by new information that conflictswith existing beliefs, ideas or values (Festinger 1957).

8For example, the German Government's decision tophase out nuclear power can have impacts on the stabilityof electricity grids and markets of its neighbouringcountries.


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needed for avoiding or alleviating longer-termstress such as climate change.

Norms and values

Inclusiveness, diversity and differentiation canenable adaptation and innovation for the SDGs.Thus, diversity further helps confer resilienceand robustness. At the same time, a diversity ofarguments can make environmental debatesunresolvable. The plurality of actors and per-spectives involved in the SDGs needs to beharmonized with a sense of united vision andaction to avoid fragmentation. More sophisti-cated communicative and decision-makingmethods are therefore needed for harnessingdiversity and overcoming differing perspectives(also see the suggestion for consultation in thenext section).

Questions of justice (e.g. related to prioriti-zation of needs, responsibilities, and protectionof the vulnerable) can drive governance for theSDGs. Calls to justice and equity are frequentlyused as arguments for making progress on theSDGs.

The emerging twenty-first-century paradigmsof reflexivity and transformative literacy wouldallow for precaution, respect for diversity, andremaining open to what emerges. DonellaMeadows called this ‘transcend[ing] paradigms’and positioned it as her highest leverage point forsystem change. Engaging in sustainability gov-ernance therefore needs to be married withfutures ethics: what are the novel frames andimaginaries that we are proposing and withwhich intention? (Göpel 2016).

Existing governance practices, cultures andframeworks

One of the most important obstacles that standsin the way of more effective climate policies isthat existing governance practices, culturesand frameworks are in support of unsustainableRegimes such as the fossil fuels andcarbon-intensive industries (OECD 2015). Thisis understandable as these industries have beendriving economic development for decades and

even centuries. Transforming the global econ-omy and industrial base for a growing and moreprosperous population will be a daunting task initself even when some of the barriers listed hereare addressed.

7.1.2 Toolkit

Mapping tools

The literature review in Chap. 2 results in anoverview of tools that can be useful for mappingand analysing governance situations andprocesses:

• Multilevel and multiphase frameworks (tran-sition management, see Sect. 2.2.3);

• Institutional Analysis and Development(IAD) framework (see Sect. 2.4)

• Social Network Analysis (see Sect. 2.5) andstakeholder mapping (Sect. 5.2.4).

Chapter 3 demonstrated that in order to assessand categorize the power and influence of therelevant stakeholders, an ISG assessment shouldcontain not only a situational analysis of actorsbut also of their power resources. Table 7.1proposes ways to assess power in terms of thetype of resources, the type of power exercised,the type of power relations, the conditions ofpower and empowerment.

Engagement between discourses canimprove coherence and cooperation. The casestudies and the literature review demonstrate thatin a polycentric world without centralizedauthority, discourses can play a coordinatingrole; ‘discourses are consequential because theycan coordinate the actions of large numbers ofindividuals who never need to communicate witheach other directly’ (Dryzek and Stevenson2012: 191).9 ‘Superdiscourses’ such as ‘sustain-able development’ are often composed ofnumerous smaller discourses which are often

9Dryzek and Stevenson (2012) give the example ofmarket liberalism, which coordinates global economicgovernance.


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connected to and integrated into each other. Theconfrontation of and engagement between dis-courses or world views may form the startingpoint of a creative process for the seeking ofsyntheses and new pathways for governance andpolicy-making.

Creating ‘spaces for systems deliberation’

This book demonstrated how the complexity andinterconnectedness of sustainability governancehave increased with respect to scale, variety ofactors, and linkages with non-environmentalissues. Both governance and sustainable devel-opment are processes that are predominantly

based on social processes, and therefore, arenasfor deliberation can provide the ability to dealwith different levels of complexity. More effec-tive governance for the SDGs would requiremore coherent but flexible institutional arenas or‘spaces for systems deliberation’ (‘deliberativespaces’) where different stakeholders can engageand cooperate with each other. In the context ofthe ISG framework, deliberative spaces aredefined as physical or virtual spaces where var-ious problems, actors, and processes converge,and where decisions are taken, agreements con-cluded, knowledge shared, perspectives dis-cussed, and social norms created (e.g. anegotiating table or a local community

Table 7.1 Tools for analysing power in transitions

Which resources are mobilized?

Type of resources —Mental, human, artifactual, natural and monetary—‘Symbolic capital’, ‘economic capital’, ‘social capital’ and ‘cultural capital’

Which types of power are exercised?

Innovative power Capacity to invent and create new resources (e.g. Niches)

Reinforcive power Capacity to reinforce and reproduce existing structures and institutions (e.g. Regimes)

Destructive power Capacity to destroy and annihilate existing resources

Transformative power Capacity to invent and develop new structures & institutions (e.g. Niche–Regime)

Systemic/structuralpower

Capacity to enable and safeguard the survival of a societal system (e.g. Landscape)

Which power relations can be distinguished?

Power ‘over’ Mutual dependence, one‐sided dependence or independence?

‘More’ power to Cooperation, competition or coexistence?

‘Different’ power to Synergy, antagonism or neutrality?

How and to what extent are the conditions of power met?

Access to resources Possibility of attaining resources, information about resources

Strategies Methods applied to exercise power (e.g. lobbying, protest, debate)

Skills Competencies necessary to apply strategies to exercise power

Willingness Willingness to exercise power for a specific goal

To what extent is there a culture of empowerment?

Organizational Setting Empowerment setting vs. hierarchical setting (management studies)

Type of leadership?

Policy-based Ability to frame problems, provide vision and promote policy solutions

Structural Based on political strength in the global order and the importance of an actor

Instrumental Ability to use negotiation skills and to craft political consensus

(Based on: Avelino 2011)


assembly). Instead of seeking consensus as asingle-point outcome, the purpose of deliberativespaces would be to increase the harmonization ofand engagement between discourses.10 This canlead to polycentric action on the SDGs.

New and existing deliberative spaces shouldminimize the tendency of government depart-ments and international organizations to engagein ‘turf wars’ and unhealthy competition for newresponsibilities and financial support. Engage-ment between different discourses in deliberativespaces through cooperation can lead toknowledge-sharing and innovation.11

A deeply interconnected world requires com-mon platforms for dialogue, a stronger collectivevision and a shared set of goals for humanity

(Oxford Martin Commission 2013). The SDGsrepresent such a set of goals that is widely sharedamong UN member states and thereby gainslegitimacy and provide for a shared vision.

Consultation as a tool for deliberation

There is a need to create tools for governanceprocesses that appreciate different knowledgeclaims and go beyond resolving conflicts andreaching consensus (as in alternative disputeresolution) by focusing on fostering informeddecision-making processes and policies. Valueconflicts and trade-offs are inherent to wickedsustainability problems (see Annex 7). Thisshows the need for workable forms of conflictresolution. If discourses are ideas,12 then con-sultation is an opportunity for a ‘battle of thediscourses’, in which discourses, ideas andinterests are seen as separated from specificactors.

The form of consultation propounded here13 isa method for working towards convergence ofinterests and discourses through a process ofcollective inquiry and is based on (1) broadparticipation; (2) committing to the final decisionas a collective; and (3) knowledge-sharing.

Such a form of consultation can serve as thebasis for forms of deliberation anddecision-making that are unifying rather thandivisive and that can iteratively lead to an over-arching, strategic narrative which is based onengagement between different discourses andstorylines (cf. Bushell et al. 2015). As such,cooperative action can go beyond prejudice andideology (including on what sustainability shouldlook like and how it should be reached) by

10For Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006), there are three kindsof consensus:

1. Normative consensus refers to agreement regardingvalues driving the decision process;

2. Epistemic consensus refers to the judgmental aspect ofpreference formation and credibility of disputedbeliefs; and

3. Preference consensus pertains to the degree ofagreement on the nature of disputed choices acrossalternatives.Dryzek and Niemeyer further argue thatdeliberative democracy preserves pluralism at thenormative level of consensus while achieving con-sensus on one or more of the metalevels.

11Notable is the competition between Regional Develop-ment Banks and the World Bank, especially in the field ofsustainability financing. Another notable example is theILO which tends to frame climate change and greeneconomy in the context of jobs, and lobbies hard in otherfora to get issues related to labour integrated in otherpolicies (including in climate change and environmentalagreements). This is linked also to an attitude of mutualityand reciprocity: ILO hesitates to integrate sustainabledevelopment concerns in labour regulations, but it wantsto see labour aspects reflected in sustainability outcomes.Within UNEP, for example, it was documented that one issupposed not to mention the term ‘climate change’ (whichis considered to be within the exclusive remit of theUNFCCC and too much associated with the storyline ofmaking mandatory emissions cuts) in the context of thegreen economy (which is the discourse that UNEPdeveloped by itself and which is seen as taking voluntaryaction). The only way to avoid such separation is tojustify one’s work at UNEP on climate change by placingit within the context of the green economy and calling it‘low-carbon development’.

12Ideas are the substantive content of discourses. Politicalscientists see ideas at three levels: policies, programs andat the more basic level of (public) philosophies whichunderlie policies and programs. Philosophical ideasgenerally are at the background and only contested interms of crisis (cf. Campbell 2004: 93–94).13Often the term ‘consultation’ is used for processes ofinformation-sharing, consultation (as in an enquiry) andconcertation. Here, it is meant to be more encompassingas in equal participation, collaboration and empowerment.


stating related disagreements as hypotheses thatcan be tested in the consultation and in practice,and by eliminating value concepts that focusdisagreement on pre-experimental commitmentsand prejudices (Norton 2015).

This type of consultation was successfullyapplied to sustainability governance in the UNCommission on Sustainable Development’s‘Indicators of Sustainable Development’ project.This was a high-level networking initiative andexchange of ideas, which operated at a timewhen the UNCSD was mistrusted by developingcountries as they thought that indicators wouldbe used by the World Bank to pressure for itsloan conditionality. The results from this con-sultative process formed the basis for the Bella-gio principles (Hardi and Zdan 1997; UNSystem-wide Earthwatch Coordination 2011).14

Consultation can be an important tool in thesearch for coherence between distinct perspec-tives and the translation into collective action.While participants in a consultation may havedifferent views or understandings of the issues athand, they can exchange and explore these dif-ferences in a unifying manner within the frame-work of consultation and out of a commitment tothe process and principles that guide it. In con-sultation, the values of inclusiveness and diver-sity are inextricably linked to the goal ofcollective action, one that acknowledges differ-ences and strives to transcend them through aprocess of principled deliberation.

7.2 The Integrative SustainabilityGovernance Framework:Showcasing Collective ActionThrough SDG Hubs

7.2.1 Background: Achievingthe SDGs Requires Good,Effective, Equitableand IntegratedGovernance

This book started off by stating the need for goodgovernance. Effective and equitable governancehave been treated separately in this book. Goodgovernance focuses on processes ofdecision-making and their institutional founda-tions and encompasses values such as enhancedparticipation and inclusion, transparency,accountability and access to information, andrespect for human rights and the rule of law.Effective governance is linked to institutionalproblem-solving capacity, technology, expertiseand financial resources and the ability to engagein long-term planning in the face of intercon-nected problems. Equitable governance focusesattention on distributional outcomes and equi-table treatment, especially of the very poor andmarginalized. Integrated or coherent governance,which can be seen as a fourth and overarchinggovernance need for the SDGs, requires takinginto account all three aspects of good, effectiveand equitable governance.

The SDGs show the need for integrated gov-ernance and coherence in the work of differentIGOs because SDG issue areas and stakeholdersare linked in numerous ways. According to theUN Secretary General’s Synthesis Report on thePost-2015 Agenda (paragraph 82), ‘Sustainabledevelopment must be an integrated agenda foreconomic, environmental, and social solutions(…). Responding to all goals as a cohesive andintegrated whole will be critical to ensuring thetransformations needed at scale’. It must be saidhere that the topic of cohesion, coherence andintegration comes up in nearly all discussions onthe SDGs. One crucial issue that requires atten-tion and coherence among IGOs and their localpartners (e.g. local and national governments)

14The Bellagio principles serve as guidelines for wholeenvironmental assessment processes including the choiceand design of indicators, their interpretation and commu-nication of the result. The principles are interrelated andshould be applied as a complete set. Also see https://www.iisd.org/pdf/bellagio.pdf. This consultative processincluded a meeting of government representatives andscientists that Arthur Dahl organized in Ghent and ascientific workshop in Wuppertal, and his work in UNSystem-wide Earthwatch Coordination (also see http://yabaha.net/dahl/earthw/indicat.htm), as well as a Scien-tific Committee on Problems of the Environment(SCOPE) project and a Consultative Group on Sustain-able Development Indicators under IISD.


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would be the monitoring of the linkages betweenthe different SDGs, which may in the end besound individually but incompatible with eachother (ICSU 2015, 2017).

The SDGs can provide a vision for bettercooperation between different stakeholders asthey represent an integrated agenda for sustain-able development across sectors and levels ofgovernance. At the same time, the SDGs embodya ‘permissive’ agenda that provides for policyspace—or ‘Common but Differentiated Gover-nance’ (Niestroy 2015)—as planning andimplementation of the SDGs take place at thenational and local level. Thus by design, theSDGs demand skills and competencies related tolateral thinking, creativity and sensitivity tonational-level realities. The SDGs are not rigidprescriptions but ideas out of which countries canorganize their own sustainable developmentagendas. Key questions are how the internationalcommunity can contribute to this organizingprocess and what kinds of alliances and coali-tions need to be built to connect governancelevels from the global to the local.

Effectiveness and coherence are not only themain guidelines for this book but will also becrucial requirements for implementation of theSDGs. Effectiveness is enclosed both in the term‘Goals’ and in the fact that the success of sus-tainability policies and actions will eventually bejudged for their contributions to achieving thepre-determined SDGs. Because of the indepen-dent and interconnected nature of the goalsthemselves (e.g. through the water–energy–foodnexus—see case study 3 in Sect. 4.3) and of thestakeholders involved in their implementation,coherence is as much a crucial attribute of soundgovernance related to the SDGs as it is to the ISGframework.

7.2.2 SDG Hubs

Based on the findings in this book, the need forinstitutions that can enable coherent and effectivecollective action for the SDGs across governancesectors, levels and actors becomes evident. Thisfinal section aims to highlight the ISG framework

and its main elements in a context of applica-bility. As such, it serves not only as a finalsummary but also as a starting point for design-ing institutions that facilitate coherent gover-nance in order to bring the findings of thisresearch to life.

Analysing the range of existing actors that canbe involved in SDG implementation, it becomesapparent that there is a gap in terms of inde-pendent institutions that can act as fora for dif-ferent stakeholders to engage on SDGimplementation. In terms of substance, numer-ous institutions exist that provide useful oppor-tunities for knowledge-sharing and networkingon single-issue areas (e.g. Geneva Water Hub,Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, and the Sus-tainable Energy 4 All initiative).The SDGs createthe opportunity for these and other initiatives togo beyond their traditional approach by makinglinkages between virtually allsustainability-related topics, including the sub-stantive issues that are the main focus of thisbook: sustainable energy (SDG 7) and climatechange (SDG 13). Therefore, in order to placethe different elements in a workable and appliedsetting, imaginary think-and-do-tanks called‘SDG Hubs’ are suggested here as a promisinginstitutional blueprint. SDG Hubs would beneutral, non-partisan institutions that createopportunities for collective action across allseventeen SDGs by facilitating cooperation andtaking governance coherence at heart. This alsomeans that SDG Hubs pay close attention to thelessons learned from other efforts at creatinggovernance coherence (e.g. the UN DevelopmentAssistance Framework, the Enhanced IntegratedFramework, and the UN’s ‘Delivering as One’initiative).

SDG Hubs could be active at the local,national and global level and would form anintegrated network with each other. SDG Hubscould be hosted by existing institutions or theycould be set up as completely independentstructures. Each SDG Hub (including the ones atthe global, national and local levels) would havea governing council that consists of electedmembers that reflect different stakeholder groups.Global SDG Hubs provide strategic instructions


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for the national SDG Hubs, and the national SDGHubs translate these into actionable guidelinesfor local SDG Hubs. Vice versa, local SDG Hubscan provide feedback based on which nationaland global Hubs can adapt their outlooks. Alongthe lines of transnational governance, local SDGHubs could collaborate through, e.g. peer learn-ing (ESDN 2017)15 (following the example ofcity sustainability networks). The interactionbetween SDG Hubs should contribute to a senseof organic unity among themselves and amongthe stakeholders that they represent. As such,SDG Hubs aim to create social capital (cf. FutureEarth 2017).

One interesting initiative in this regard is theSDG Lab that is based in Geneva. The SDG Labis a multistakeholder initiative that is situated inthe Office of the Director General at UnitedNations Office at Geneva (UNOG). The Labcontributes to the implementation of the SDGsby supporting Geneva-based actors in furtherleveraging expertise and knowledge into policy,practice and action.

The Lab partners with the International Insti-tute for Sustainable Development (IISD) toco-convene a group of over 80 organizations,referred to as the Geneva 2030 Ecosystem. Thisgroup is comprised of representatives from UNorganizations, NGOs, academic institutions, pri-vate sector entities and social entrepreneurs. TheGeneva 2030 Ecosystem meets approximatelyonce every three months to create a commonvision for how Geneva can support implemen-tation of the SDGs at the national and interna-tional level. The group also exchangesinformation about their individual initiatives tofind potential areas of synergy for collaborationand runs joint innovation exercises to encouragenew approaches to policy and practice.

This dynamic Lab model strengthens theindividual efforts of governments and organiza-tions by amplifying their unique voices, creatingspace for new partnerships to form, and

providing a platform to innovate and experiment.It supports the collective knowledge and exper-tise within Geneva, making it increasingly rele-vant and actionable for national- and local-levelSDG implementation.

Another example that SDG Hubs could followis that of the Impact Hub network (2017).16

Impact Hubs are part innovation Lab, part busi-ness incubator and co-working space, and partcommunity centre.

7.2.3 The ISG Cycle and the Rolethat SDG Hubs Can Playin It

The purpose of this section is to construct theISG framework based on the findings in theprevious chapters. The ISG framework inFig. 7.1 contains different theories, actors, dis-courses, theoretical pillars, competences, infer-ences, tools and main factors that are discussed inthis book and that can make the analysis andimplementation of sustainability governancemore effective and coherent.

Based on the work that is required forimplementing the SDGs and the Paris ClimateAgreement, the following sections illustrate themeaning and application of the ISG frameworkand its different elements with the idea of creat-ing the SDG Hubs that were described in theprevious section.

The ISG framework is based on the ‘ISGcycle’ which is represented as the cycle with fourstages at the centre of Fig. 7.1. The ISG cyclecontains elements from the action research,transition management, experimentalist gover-nance, integrated risk management and systemsthinking cycles. The ISG cycle represents theprocess dimension which is lacking in descrip-tions of governance that only cover the politics,polity and policy dimensions. The followingillustrates the functioning of SDG Hubs based onthe four stages, the ISG cycle and other elementsof the ISG framework.

15The European Sustainable Development Network(ESDN) has been hosting platforms for peer learning onthe SDGs between policy-makers: http://www.sd-network.eu/?k=ESDN%20peer%20learning. 16http://www.impacthub.net/.

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IntegrativeSu

stainabilityGov

ernance(ISG

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ework


Stage 1 of the ISG cycle: Seeing—mapping thesystem and its context

Interventions from SDG Hubs can start bymapping a governance context, and in particularthe stakeholders in a specific setting. This isbased on the idea that SDG Hubs need to beadapted to their context and that ‘not one size fitsall’. SDG Hub would allow local governments,national governments, IGOs, NGOs, companiesand individuals to interact in innovative waysthat defy divisions of scales and sectors. Suchinteraction and coalition building may be helpfulin countering vested interests in, e.g.carbon-intensive industries. Connecting consortiaof IGOs to stakeholders such as national andlocal governments can further leverage comple-mentarities between IGOs and allow them todemonstrate their capability to create efficienciesand add value in a time of funding pressures. Onemodel for such a consortium could be the Part-nership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE).

In terms of non-traditional actors, the mediashould be able to get access to reports onimplementation of the SDGs through SDG Hubs.In fact, one way for SDG Hubs to raise aware-ness of the SDGs and share new ideas would beto partner with media. Through active collabo-ration with universities and other knowledgeinstitutions, SDG Hubs could promote the sci-ence–policy interface by acting as boundaryorganizations. This means that SDG Hubs canfacilitate collaboration and information flowsbetween research, public policy, and grassrootscommunities and reconcile scientific under-standing with SDG implementation. In fact, SDGHubs could constitute track II diplomacy17 byserving as a ‘science diplomacy network’(Swiss Confederation 2017).18 Citizens couldplay an important role in mapping by collecting

data19 relevant to the SDGs through civic scienceand technologies such as social media (also seestage 4).

SDG Hubs can assess the resources and powerof these stakeholders, for example, by usingTable 7.1 with Tools for analysing power intransitions (above in Sect. 7.1.2). Next, an SDGHub could analyse the relations between stake-holders through Social Network Analysis (Fig-ure A in the ISG framework). Transitionmanagement’s multilevel framework can provideclarity on the role of actors in transitions (e.g.Niches, Regimes and Niche–Regimes) (Figure Cin the ISG framework). The multiphase frame-work (Figures D in the ISG framework) canprovide clarity on the staging of transitions andon what are the drivers, the barriers and thetriggers for transitions. Once the stakeholders arewell mapped out, the Institutional Analysis andDevelopment (IAD) framework (Figure B in theISG framework) can be used by the SDG Hub foranalysing policy functions and for understandingthe ways institutions operate and change over aperiod of time.

Beyond mapping of actors, SDG Hubs couldactively identify opportunities for new multi-stakeholder coalitions, along the idea of the‘C20-C30-C40 Coalition’ (Oxford Martin Com-mission 2013). This coalition would bring themain constituencies together, which at the globallevel would be countries (utilizing the G20),companies (through the B20 or through selecting30 ‘climate ambitious’ companies affiliated to theWorld Business Council for Sustainable Devel-opment, for example) and cities (workingthrough the existing C40 Cities initiative orICLEI). The coalition would embrace ‘inclusiveminilateralism’ (Eckersley 2012) and report tothe UNFCCC and the High-Level Political

17Track II diplomacy refers to ‘non-governmental, infor-mal and unofficial contacts and activities between privatecitizens or groups of individuals, sometimes called'non-state actors’. (Diamond and McDonald 1991: 1).18One example of a science diplomacy network isSwissnex, a network of science and technology outpostsaimed at connecting Switzerland with the world's mostinnovative cities. Also see http://www.swissnex.org/.

19Categories of relevant data could be: global reportingsystems and surveys; country reporting systems andsurveys; open data from governments, the private sector,and institutions on ‘commitments to action’; dynamicsocial data; citizen-generated data; environmental andgeospatial data; global indices, such as the HumanDevelopment Index, the Open Budget Index, etc.; andprivate corporate datasets connected to MNCs’ socialresponsibility and global compact programme (CSEND2014).


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Forum (HLPF).20 Such coalitions could inspireand show leadership to countries, companies andcities to undertake meaningful and practicalaction on climate change. Practically, the coali-tions could develop targets in areas such asenergy efficiency, waste management, urbanplanning, transport and emissions monitoring.

The SDG Hubs could be cast as a GlobalAction Network (GAN) (cf. Waddell 2011).SDG Hubs could make publicity for issues suchas aviation and climate change and trade in sus-tainable energy technologies by hosting publicdiscussions and by assessing and demonstratingthe impacts of the related global policies at thelocal level.

Stage 2 of the ISG cycle: Connecting—problemstructuring and strategy

In step 2, SDG Hubs can start to serve as adeliberative space for drawing up implementa-tion strategies. Beyond systems thinking, SDGHubs would constitute spaces for systemsdeliberation in order to leverage inputs fromstakeholders throughout the governance process.As such, SDG Hubs can host processes ofengagement between discourses which are basedon the principles of consultation that are listed inSect. 7.1.2.

In this stage, Policy Coherence for Sustain-able Development (also see Sect. 6.2.5) is onepragmatic approach towards creating more con-sistency in SDG-related policy design andimplementation. SDG Hubs can in stage 2 alsohost deliberative envisioning exercises (seeSect. 6.2.4) to establish long-term objectives thatcan help to operationalize sustainability transi-tions in a specific societal and political context.As societal objectives and visions of

sustainability need to be embedded in suchspecific contexts, one important way for SDGHubs to demonstrate leadership is to activelyenable the clarification and harmonization ofvalues that are important for various stakeholdersthrough deliberation (cf. Heifetz 1994).

The focus of practice and research can beexpected to shift gradually from the politicallycorrect question ‘how do we prevent climate andother sustainability calamities through incre-mental and partial change, for example throughdeploying renewable energy?’ to ‘how do weboth handle crises and turn them into opportu-nities and incentives for structural transitionssuch as the SDGs?’. Mechanisms that prepare forturning crises into transitions towards sustain-ability (e.g. under integrated risk management) inthe longer term could be a complement toinstruments for dealing with shocks in the shortterm. In stage 2 of the ISG cycle, SDG Hubstherefore could mainstream Integrated RiskManagement in planning for SDG implemen-tation. In addition, SDG Hubs could consider theidea that crisis can be a critical driver forchange (see Sect. 6.3). Thus, in envisioningexercises (Figure K in the ISG framework), SDGHubs could include the question: how could acrisis that happens at a particular stage of SDGimplementation be turned into a driver for tran-sitions? Based on this question, different stake-holders could identify their role, and moreover,the ways in which they can create synergies byaddressing a crisis together.

Stage 3 of the ISG cycle: Changing andCreating—Implementation

SDG Hubs can use action research to improve theISG framework in terms of exploring and facili-tating the practical application of the frameworkfor and by practitioners. Action research movesbeyond knowledge created by external expertsselecting variables, to a proactive generative the-orizing, data collection and inquiry amidst anemergent structure. A transdisciplinary approachwill allow the SDG Hub to collaborate withpractitioners and to leverage contributions fromvarious disciplinary perspectives.

20The High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) providespolitical leadership, guidance and recommendations,follow-ups and reviews the implementation of sustainabledevelopment commitments and, as of 2016, the post-2015Development Agenda and the Sustainable DevelopmentGoals (SDGs). It addresses new and emerging challenges,promotes the science–policy interface and enhances theintegration of economic, social and environmental dimen-sions of sustainable development.


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Implementation at the local and nationallevels can be based on strategies that are theresult of stage 2 of the ISG cycle, or it can be theimplementation of existing national plans, suchas the Nationally Determined Contributions(NDCs) (UNFCCC 2017a, b)21—the main com-mitments under the Paris Climate Agreement atthe national level.

SDG Hubs need to take a systems approachand focus on policy coherence in order toacknowledge the interlinked nature of the SDGs.A systems approach can enhance learning frommonitoring and evaluation by looking at theways in which systems across actors and sectorsrespond to governance and to improvedecision-making based on gradually targeting thedrivers and barriers to change. A systemsapproach includes the ‘governance value chain’approach by being involved not only in one partof a policy-making cycle, but by taking alonger-term view that runs from policy design tomonitoring, evaluation and, very importantly,adaptation and revision of policies related to theSDGs (see stage 4). Further, thinking systemi-cally about governance processes in addition tothe policy, polity and politics dimensions ofgovernance can assist SDG Hubs in taking moreintegrative approaches.

In addition to these orientations, SDG Hubswould make use of insights from the behaviouralsciences, for example, on how people can beintrinsically motivated to work on implementingthe SDGs. It will be important to make theseinsights and the ways in which they are usedtransparent in order to avoid the impression thatSDG Hubs are manipulative entities.

Stage 4 of the ISG cycle: Learning—Evalua-tion, reflection and adaptation

Monitoring and evaluation based on carefullycrafted indicators will be a discerning aspect ofSDG implementation. Whereas evaluation typi-cally takes place in stage 4, monitoring shouldcontinue throughout the ISG cycle. SDG Hubs

could assist in the design of indicators for gov-ernance coherence. The Hubs could assist in thedevelopment of context-specific indicators andmonitoring and evaluation mechanisms thatsafeguard coherent SDG governance.

An SDG Hub could facilitate both expert-typeand more stakeholder-based (e.g. through socialmedia) reviews of SDG implementation. Basedon the expected interest of the rising globalmiddle class in sustainability (see Sect. 3.2.5), amore ‘participatory society’ and a vibrant ‘publicsphere’, it is important to encourage the growthof pragmatic ‘ecological citizenship’.

In terms of governance actors, the role ofgovernments in sustainability transitions isshifting from a steering role towards a facilitatingfunction. The rapidly growingmiddle class is themost important stakeholder group when it comesto companies’ approaches to sustainability. Therole of civil society actors seems to be changing(and some think diminishing) in sustainabilitygovernance as NGOs have switched from con-frontational to more cooperative engagement.NGOs however can demonstrate their ‘en-trepreneurial authority’ better through provisionof information (transparency), empowerment andcritical feedback. Another upcoming venue forcitizens to voice their demand for mitigatingclimate change is the judiciary (see Sect. 3.2.5).

SDG Hubs can encourage ecological citizen-ship and popular participation by using socialmedia and other technologies to leverage mobileand Web-based applications, participatory maps,aerial and satellite imagery, geospatial platformsand statistical models to empower effectivemonitoring of SDG-related activities. As such,the Hubs can support the development of a‘geography of sustainability transitions’ andattract popular interest in the work of SDG Hubs.This could help to popularize governance pro-cesses at the global level which nonetheless willhave impacts on people’s daily lives. The casestudies in this research show that some gover-nance processes (e.g. related to trade) are locatedat a global level with relatively little engagementfrom civil society.

SDG Hubs can give advice on designingindicators that can inform integrated

21Submitted NDCs are available from an interim registryat http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx.


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decision-making processes not only in stage 4 ofthe ISG cycle but also at the other stages. In stage1 (mapping), indicators can help evaluate thestate of the system by looking at its current andhistorical functioning. However, governmentsneed advice on a range of challenges in SDGimplementation, including on how to measureprogress against indicators where data is lackingand where there is a lack of disaggregated data.In stage 2, indicators can help with identifyingand designing solutions and policies by pin-pointing out the governance factors (e.g. driversand barriers) that should be influenced in order toreach the envisioned goals. In other words,indicators can support the assessment of expec-ted performance of various visions and inter-vention strategies (cf. Probst and Bassi 2014).

The overall purpose of identifying indicatorswould be to improve and evaluate the quality ofsustainability governance. In addition, indicatorscan create new forms of peer pressure forimproving sustainability governance (WorldDevelopment Report 2015). Indicators will playa crucial role in the 2030 Development Frame-work as they ‘will be the backbone of monitoringprogress towards the Sustainable DevelopmentGoals’ (UNSDSN 2015: 2). Overall, monitoringand reporting offer an opportunity for SDG Hubsto gain authority and create impact by increasingtransparency and presenting data in more acces-sible ways.

Throughout all steps of the ISG cycle

First of all, it should be noted that that eventhough the four steps or stages are describedbelow separately, there can be significant over-laps and synergies between them. For example,step 1 (‘See’) and step 2 (‘Connect’) are bothrequired for collaborative mapping of a gover-nance system. And step 2 (‘Connect’) and step 3(‘Create and change’) are needed for sensing andchanging as described in Theory U.

Second, there are factors that are importantthroughout the whole ISG cycle. Throughout thesteps 1 to 4, SDG Hubs, for example, could takeboth proximate drivers and ultimate drivers of

power, knowledge and norms (the governancefactors of Sect. 7.1.1) into account. In terms ofpower, in particular, leadership (Golden circle inFigure F of the ISG) and influencing (Rose ofLeary in Figure G of the ISG) are crucialcompetences.

Behavioural aspects (Sect. 6.1) call forincreased awareness (Theory U from Sect. 6.1.7—Figure H in the ISG).

An SDG Hub could identify the types ofpower that are involved in specific strategies andprojects and work on the three competences asidentified in Chap. 5: leadership and networkdevelopment, and empowerment of underrepre-sented stakeholders (in particular, women).

By acting as knowledge-sharing platforms,SDG Hubs would acknowledge transitions to‘knowledge democracy’, or in other words thatshifts are taking place from top-down media tobottom-up (social) media, from representativedemocracy to participatory democracy, andfrom disciplinary science to transdisciplinaryscience. Referring to the competences forknowledge in Chap. 5, SDG Hubs activelycontribute to knowledge-sharing (e.g. throughnews updates and acting as a repository forresearch and events). They take the need foradaptiveness and resilience into account, but atthe same time they are aware that resiliencemay hold up transitions that are required forlong-term sustainability. SDG Hubs put anemphasis on reflexivity (the competence toreflect, learn and to adapt) in order to enablepeople to learn from any source, experience,practice, information, knowledge, theory and soon, and to re-orientate behaviour subsequently.Systems knowledge (e.g. dynamics, drivers andbarriers to transitions) is most relevant in stage1 of the ISG cycle, target knowledge (the visionof and motivation for the system aimed for) isimportant in stage 2, and transformativeknowledge (the ‘how’ of transitions) can belinked to stage 3.

One way for SDG Hubs to build capacitywould be to host Massive Open Online Courses(MOOCs) together with universities and to hostexecutive courses for policy-makers.


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The guiding norms and values for SDG Hubswould be justice (equity and fairness), trust (ac-countability and legitimacy) and pluralism (in-clusiveness and respect for diversity). As such,SDG Hubs aim at moving engagement betweenstakeholders from cooperation and collaborationtowards truly integrative approaches (also see theCollaboration Continuum in Fig. 37). One wayto do so is by building social capital (also seeSect. 5.4.5).

Applying governance theories in SDG Hubs

The relevant governance theories are reflected inFigure I in the ISG framework.

If each of the SDGs represents sustainabilitytransitions, then insights from transition theorymay well be applicable. Based on the principles oftransition management, SDG Hubs can hostparticipatory stakeholder‐processes that are aimedat envisioning, learning and experimenting, andthat empower Niches. SDG Hubs could comple-ment transition management with insights fromthe capability approach and practice theory (interms of remedying the transition management’slack of systems knowledge at the Regime leveland target knowledge at the individual level).

The metagovernance perspective could fur-ther strengthen the advice that SDG Hubs givethrough promoting ‘Common but DifferentiatedGovernance’, i.e. finding smart ways in whichthe market, hierarchical and networked styles ofgovernance can be combined in specific contexts.

SDG Hubs would further recognize that theglobal SDG framework needs support rangingfrom national implementing plans to sub-nationalmonitoring and enforcement (in other words, thatglobal governance institutions are polycentric innature). Organizationally, the SDG Hubs reflectpolycentricity by being present at the local,national and global levels. The polycentricapproach of SDG Hubs can create opportunitiesfor experimentation and learning to improvepolicies over time, and they can help build trustneeded for increased cooperation at multiple

scales. Some benefits of polycentric and net-worked approaches for SDG Hubs are:

• More diversity of and innovation in environ-mental policy and management;

• Increased exchange of practices, ideas andstrategies;

• Better fits between the scales of problemsbeing addressed and solutions;

• Local lessons are more likely to be showcasedand diffused through SDG Hubs;

• Higher adaptive capacity.

Inspired by the idea of polycentricity, SDGHubs have the potential to demonstrate that theincreasingly systemic nature of global gover-nance entails a shift from a single-institution,single-issue focus to much more dynamic,diverse and diffused policy-making processes(e.g. the climate Regime complex) and transna-tional governance.

SDG Hubs could apply experimentalistapproaches to set provisional goals and revisingthese goals based on learning from the compar-ison of alternative approaches in stage 4 of theISG cycle. As such, SDG Hubs could work onthe ongoing reciprocal readjustment of ends andmeans through learning from committed com-parison of local efforts to advance the SDGs.SDG Hubs could take on the role of proactive‘revitalizer’ by recognizing and unblockingcounterproductive patterns in policy processes.As such, they could reanimate actors and intro-duce experimentalist processes needed to copewith wicked problems.

Integral theory (see Sect. 6.2.6) can be use-ful for mapping the integration of the interiordimensions and the exterior dimensions of gov-ernance at both the individual and collectivelevels in SDG Hubs.

However encompassing the role of institutionslike SDG Hubs may be, their capacity may belimited. Therefore, it would be important tocreate institutions similar to central banks thatsafeguard sustainability in the long term (for


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example, through a Climate Disclosure TaskForce) (BBC 2015)22 and an Ombudsman thatcan address short-term sustainability concerns.One example of a measure that requires oversightfrom an independent institution is an equitablyimplemented global carbon price that could beeffective alongside mandated targets and pro-cesses of target- and policy-setting. Independentinstitutions should have the authority to act onbehalf of humanity and manage the numeroustrade-offs and synergies between SDGs that needto be managed in an equitable manner.23

7.2.4 Assessment of the IntegrativeSustainabilityGovernance Framework

It is important to assess the ISG frameworkagainst the main objective of this book, which isto propose an integrative framework for thegovernance of transitions related to the SDGs.

Compared with other approaches to (sustain-ability) governance, the creation of the ISGframework is a prominent attempt to incorporatea wide range of theories, methods, analyticaltools and concepts into a single heuristic. Amongthe various frameworks that have been developedfor the study of sustainability governance, theISG framework is unique in terms of its com-prehensiveness. It fulfils several criteria thatseem fundamental for the operationalization ofthe concept of governance and the developmentof a relevant methodology: it is realistic

(non-normative), reflexive, comparative, gener-alizable and operational (suitable for analysingconcrete empirical situations). The ISG frame-work addresses multiple actors, multiple sectors,multiple levels, multiple timescales, multipleobjectives and multiple options. The ISGframework and its toolkit are interdisciplinaryand transdisciplinary, intergenerational, multi‐level and multisectoral and should enableresearchers and practitioners with different dis-ciplinary backgrounds and dissimilar epistemo-logical beliefs to engage in fruitful dialogue andcooperation.

Putting governance dimensions together intoone framework gives a comprehensive schematicimage of the politics that need to be consideredwhen new governance initiatives are designed.The ISG framework is truly integrative in thesense that it is comprehensive without necessar-ily claiming to be complete, and it can integratethe different dimensions of a specific sustain-ability governance field in a logical manner.Furthermore, the framework is flexible in thesense that other theories and tools can be addedto it in the future. The ISG framework can serveusers with differing perspectives by allowingthem to get an overview of specific governancefields.

This middle range framework24 can be used to‘map’ and critically assess different sustainabilitygovernance features, such as governance pro-cesses, actors and resources, norms and institu-tions, and policy objectives and instruments.Rather than aiming to fully describe, explain orpredict social, political and environmental com-plexity (‘the map is not the territory’), the ISGframework aspires to highlight its most relevantpatterns—helping one to navigate them in aflexible yet comprehensive manner. The ISGframework is pragmatic, pluralistic and poly-centric (the requirements for effective climategovernance suggested by Hulme 2009) to capturethe interactions between actors, institutions and

22The idea of a Climate Disclosure Task Force to whichcompanies have to declare how much carbon they emitand how they are going to proceed to zero emissions inthe future is proposed by Mark Carney, Governor of theBank of England and chairman of the G20 countries’Financial Stability Board, who warned that climatechange might make the world’s stock markets and banksunstable and lead to a financial crash because of strandedassets. Also see http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34396961.23The Earth Atmospheric Trust, which would treat theatmosphere as a global common property asset managedas a trust for the benefit of current and future generations,would be one example of such an innovative initiative(also see Weston and Bollier 2013).

24‘Middle range theory’, developed by Merton (1968), isan approach to sociological theorizing aimed at integrat-ing theory and empirical research. It is currently the defacto dominant approach to sociological theoryconstruction.




discourses from a global perspective. Theframework facilitates a meaningful differentia-tion of real-world governance modes anddimensions and the complexity of their interplay(e.g. between the politics, polity and policydimensions). The ISG framework is especiallysuitable for addressing complex situations, as itfacilitates the delimitation of a case study in timeand space by systematically subdividing com-plexity into manageable parts, while at the sametime ensuring coherence and a holistic overview.However, as Elinor Ostrom was always quick topoint out: ‘Self-organized, polycentric systemsare not a panacea!’. Neither is presenting anintegrated framework for sustainability gover-nance by any means a panacea. Sustainabilitygovernance ultimately entails a learning processand the development of a new consciousness anda shift in paradigm, and new competencies,especially when it comes to learning fromexperience and adapting to changingenvironments.

7.2.5 Afterthought: The Needfor Pragmatismand Paradigm Shiftsin Governancefor the SDGs

This book has given an overview of the manifoldways in which the SDGs, as the blueprint forsustainable development for many years to come,can be operationalized. Thereby, it has argued forincreasing the understanding of the complexlinkages between the goals and their targets inorder to think systematically about the interac-tions between the SDGs. But more is needed inorder to turn the SDGs into reality. The growingneed for pragmatism in sustainability governancehas therefore reverberated throughout this book.

The tenets of pragmatism and this book con-firm the necessity for governance theories to benot only academically debatable, but also prac-tically implementable to contribute to transfor-mative sustainability transitions. The pragmatictradition urges flexibility and democracy; itendorses pluralism and eclecticism and aspires

practical theory which can inform effectivepractice. Sustainability science after all haspragmatic roots and is ‘a field defined by theproblems it addresses rather than by the disci-plines it employs’ Clark (2007: 1737).25

What we need is better coordination and col-laboration between sectors, disciplines and levelsof governance. This could involve transforma-tions in decision-making structures that enablethe design of policies that better balance syn-ergies and trade-offs between SDGs. The idea ofestablishing SDG Hubs is suggested here as onepragmatic way forward for leveraging coherentand effective sustainability governance. At thesame time, SDG Hubs would act from theunderstanding that governance coherence is ameans and not an end in itself.

It will require more energy, time, courage,creativity, co-production and understanding toupgrade existing governance institutions for theSDGs and to create new ones such as SDG Hubs.This book has attempted to advance thinking andacting regarding long-term societal change andsustainable development by identifying the keyelements that can make governance for the SDGsmore effective and coherent. It reflects my aca-demic and professional development as well asthat of my colleagues involved in sustainabilitygovernance. This book greatly benefited fromthis growing network of professionals andhopefully can inspire others. Sustainability gov-ernance is set to become a collective enterprise, anew trajectory, fuelled by theoretical insights andpractical experience. Governance can bringtogether a great variety of stakeholders inenthusiastic quests for collective action on sus-tainable development, and this book aims to beone contribution to those endeavours.

Together, the three inferences described inChap. 6 point towards another prerequisitebesides the need for pragmatism: the need forparadigm shifts in order to achieve the SDGs.Meadows (1998) defines paradigms as ‘the

25In this regard, it is interesting to note that incomingIPCC Chairman Lee stated that ‘I would like to beremembered as the chairman that shifted the IPCC’s focusto solutions’.


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shared idea in the minds of society, the great bigunstated assumptions—unstated because unnec-essary to state; everyone already knows them—constitute that society’s paradigm, or deepest setof beliefs about how the world works’ (Meadows1999: 17). Other researchers use the term ‘worldviews’ and define them as ‘inescapable, overar-ching systems of meaning and meaning-makingthat to a substantial extent inform how humansinterpret, enact, and co-create reality’(Hedlund-de Witt 2013: 18). ‘Paradigms’ arethus points of view; they are the source of systemdesigns. Discourses and narratives in turn are thelanguage we use to talk about things and expressthe meanings of things. As meanings depend onour differing points of view (‘paradigms’), para-digms pervade all discourses and narratives.Thus, paradigms are more fundamental thandiscourses and narratives as they make any par-ticular discourse or narrative possible.

Paradigms translate into unconscious pro-gramming and routine habits that psychologistsand neurologists explain are necessary for copingwith the complexity of life.

The term ‘mind shift’ usually applies to theindividual level and expresses the way that see-ing and believing differently goes beyond anupdate of information. A mind shift also meanschanges in attention, consciousness, instinct,imagination, judgment, power, sense, spirit andpsyche. ‘Mind’ emphasizes not so much the factsor ideas in themselves but the processes ofknowing, believing and arguing in which theyare embedded. Paradigm shifts or mind shifts arethe bridge between the radical and incrementalaspects of transformation strategies. Paradigmshifts involve radically different imaginaries andvisions of potential pathways to influence theformulation of new goals for the system that canthen be implemented step by step, changing therules, procedures, roles and norms accordingly.The SDGs offer us an integrated framework thatrepresents such imaginaries, visions, andpathways.

This book demonstrates that besides above alltechnicalities that are involved in governance, itis our world views and mindsets that are essentialfor (re-)shaping the collective visions and

strategies for systemic change towards achievingthe SDGs. This reshaping includes a reassess-ment of the main paradigms that inform devel-opment decisions, including economic growth.

Thus to really innovate our systems thatdetermine sustainable development and humanwell-being, we need transformation strategiesthat include the acknowledgement of mental pathdependencies. As I have argued in this book, thismeans engaging with core human aspirations,beliefs and values in an inspiring manner.

Geneva, May 2018

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Joachim Monkelbaan Governance for the Sustainable