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The services accept and joint doctrinecodifies the fact that a Joint Force AirComponent Commander (JFACC)

represents the best way to command andcontrol airpower in support of a joint forcecommander’s (JFC’s) campaign plan. Whilethere may be differences among the serviceson the degree of command or control, all ac-knowledge the importance of, and support,centralized planning and decentralized ap-plication of air assets to implement a JFC’sconcept of operations. The inherent flexibil-ity of airpower makes it a powerful but notinfinite theater asset. It would be a graveerror to squander this valuable tool by usingit in the wrong place or at the wrong time.

Desert Storm was a true test of the JFACCconcept. In contrast to the fragmented appli-cation of airpower in Vietnam, Desert Stormshowed the benefits of centrally controlledairpower. Since the Gulf War we have seencontinual improvements in the concept. Butwe can do better. This article examines theseimprovements and discusses where weshould go with JFACC.

The JFACC RoleOnce a theater CINC or JFC develops a

concept of operations and designates aJFACC, the air component staff translates itinto a cohesive joint air operations plan. Incoordination with planners from other as-signed functional components (land, sea,space, and special operations), air componentplanners design a comprehensive master at-tack plan to meet the overall objectives of thecampaign plan. Air operations (which mightinclude deep-strike helicopter missions, Tom-ahawk cruise missiles, and Army tactical mis-sile strikes beyond the fire support coordina-tion line) are then phased and sequenced inan overall campaign plan to affect enemy op-erational and strategic centers of gravity. Aswith all operational-level planning and exe-cution mechanisms, a JFACC provides thelinkage between strategic objectives and thetactical application of combat power.

General William Momyer, commanderof 7th Air Force during the Vietnam War,noted that airpower can decide battles orwin campaigns. The commander’s dilemma,he said, is determining the proper balanceamong competing demands, strategic attack,interdiction, and close air support. All arenecessary elements and it is a JFC, with ad-vice from a JFACC and functional comman-ders, who decides the level of effort he wants

JFACCTaking theNEXT STEP

By M A R C U S H U R L E Y

Designating a Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) has rapidly become the customary procedurefor exercising command and control of airpower in support of joint force commanders. This approachenables JFACCs and air component staffs to develop joint operations plans together with staffs from otherassigned components. Though limited resources preclude maintaining large standing air component staff forevery contingency, it makes sense to have a small, trained cadre augmented by liaison officers from eachcomponent as well as trained personnel seconded in times of crisis. Such a mix can foster mutual trust, ensurethe correct blend of capabilities, and furnish air assets to implement myriad requirements of the joint forcecommander’s concept of operations. A review of the improvements made in the JFACC concept since thePersian Gulf War points the way to a new age of centrally controlled airpower.

Summary

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to dedicate to each element byphase of the campaign plan.This apportionment of air as-sets tells a JFACC what to planand tells other functional com-manders what sort of air sup-port they can expect.

After a JFC’s apportion-ment decision is made, a JFACC and his staffplan and execute the air operations necessaryto achieve campaign objectives. The air com-ponent staff is made up of trained and readymen and women who develop and execute aJFACC’s strategic and operational-level plans.Being an effective JFACC or air componentstaff member, however, requires theater-widevision and rigorous study and practice. TheAir Force has taken the lead in developingthe training, education, and exercise pro-grams that airmen from all services need tobecome JFACCs and effective air componentstaff members.

JFACC TrainingTraining people is as important as giving

them the proper tools. General Colin L.Powell, USA, indicated in Joint Pub 1, JointWarfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, that trainingthe team as they will fight helps build thebonds of trust which are absolutely criticalin joint operations. Each functional compo-nent (land, sea, air, space, and special opera-tions) must understand and believe that air-power will be used where and when it isneeded to achieve a CINC’s or JFC’s objec-tives. That is the promise which we airmen,regardless of our service, must keep. Webegin by training to a common standard andthen maximizing airpower during contin-gencies and exercises.

The Joint Doctrine Air Campaign Course(JDACC) taught by Air University is a special-ized course in air operations planning forcompany and field grade officers from all ser-vices who serve on theater and service aircomponent staffs. JDACC addresses the sup-porting and supported roles of a JFACC andintegrating airpower into a CINC’s or JFC’scampaign plan. It teaches officers to develop

and sequence the different operations whichmake up theater campaign plans, maximiz-ing the potential of airpower to achieve cam-paign objectives. Students learn and practicefundamental concepts, principles, and proce-dures needed to plan and execute joint andmultinational theater air operations. Thecourse stresses center-of-gravity analysis, airobjectives, and force apportionment.

Officers attending the Air Commandand Staff College receive a more in-depth ed-ucation in campaign planning and execu-tion. They use the air campaign planningtool to build comprehensive theater air oper-ations plans and, by wargaming tactical andoperational-level scenarios, they design andphase independent and supporting air oper-ations to achieve a JFC’s objectives. The stu-dents must try to resolve the dilemma Gen-eral Momyer posed. In an academic settingthese officers deal with the tough apportion-ment issues that bedevil JFACCs who theywill serve after graduation.

After spending a year at Air Commandand Staff College, a small group of officers isthen selected to spend another year at theSchool of Advanced Airpower Studies(SAAS). The students (including 25 Air Forceofficers and one Army officer in academicyear 1994–95) take an intensive course onthe operational-strategic levels of war. SAAScombines theory, history, and wargaming totrain and exercise a cadre of air strategistswho can develop effective theater air opera-tions plans. These officers will become airplanners for theater CINCs and air compo-nent commanders.

The Air Warfare Center conducts bat-tlestaff exercises for numbered Air Forcecommanders and their assembled joint staffsin the command, control, and intelligenceprocedures of JFACCs. The computer-basedexercises, known as Blue Flag, replicate the-ater conditions by using friendly and enemyorders of battle, war plans, and theater oper-ating procedures. Participants regularly in-clude members of other services and alliednations to provide a realistic employmentexperience. State-of-the-art computer tech-nology allows ground, enemy air defense,and maritime simulations to run simultane-ously with offensive and defensive air opera-tions. Distributed wargaming makes it possi-ble to direct exercises from other sites andinclude geographically separated units as

H u r l e y

a JFACC and his staff plan and execute the air operations necessary to achieve campaign objectives

Major General Marcus Hurley, USAF, is Director of Plans and Policy at Air Combat Command. A fighter pilot who has commanded an F–4 squad-ron and an F–16 wing, he also has served as thecommander of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia.

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players. Blue Flag is a world class opportu-nity for joint and combined air forces totrain as they will fight.

The crown jewel in JFACC training willbe the JFACC Theater Air Strategy Sympo-sium, a week-long event that will introducegeneral and flag officers who serve or mayserve as JFACCs to the available air opera-tions planning tools. It will prepare partici-pants to seek and exploit synergism throughcentralized planning and decentralized exe-cution of joint air operations. They willstudy service-unique capabilities and themeans of integrating them to maximizeavailable combat power. This course will beJFACCing from a warfighter’s perspective.

Air Tasking OrderThe central tenet of airpower is that

planning (control) must be centralized andexecution decentralized. Centralized plan-ning is key to coordinating efforts among allavailable air forces. Decentralized executionmakes it possible to generate the tempo ofoperations required and to cope with the un-certainty and disorder of air combat in bat-tle. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery,who commanded Allied ground forces atNormandy, noted: “Airpower is indivisible.If you split it up into compartments, youmerely pull it to pieces and destroy its great-est asset—its flexibility.” Airpower’s speed,range, and flexibility give it the ability tomass combat power throughout a theater ofoperations. Massing combat power is thegoal of all commanders. Compartmentaliz-ing or dividing command and control re-sponsibilities for airpower degrades the abil-ity to mass.

One difficulty in achieving centralizedcontrol of theater-wide air operations arisesfrom the fact that command and controlstructure has not been responsive enoughfor centralized planning and rapid execu-tion. In Desert Storm advanced technologyoffered this ability. Linking computers withtheater planning, communications, intelli-gence, reconnaissance, and targeting systemsgave the air component commander theability to use the intent of the Commanderin Chief, U.S. Central Command (CINC-CENT) to produce a comprehensive air oper-ations plan, adjust the air tasking order(ATO) if retargeting was necessary, and exe-cute the plan via the ATO.

In the Gulf War, U.S. Central CommandAir Forces (CENTAF) used the 72-hour plan-ning and 48-hour tasking cycles outlined inJoint Pub 3–56.1, Command and Control forJoint Air Operations. While air operationswere driven by the JFC’s intent, missionguidance, and combat assessment, the criticsof the ATO process viewed the air operationsplan as too inflexible. They claimed the ATOcould not adjust to changes based on re-ported battle damage assessments (BDA), in-flight reports, or the ground commander’srequirements. But every night during DesertStorm CINCCENT personally reviewed andrevised the next day’s air operations plan toaddress changes in the enemy order of bat-tle. Moreover, he adjusted the next two days’targeting priorities as well as apportionmenttotals to meet new threat assessments andrevised target lists.

It is understandable how one might per-ceive an ATO as being too rigid. The docu-ment is a theater-wide tasker to strike asmany targets as possible in a 24-hour periodand achieve a CINC’s or JFC’s campaign ob-jectives. Air component staffs usually workthree ATOs simultaneously: one being exe-cuted (today’s), one in production (tomor-row’s), and one in planning (for the dayafter tomorrow). Differences in intelligenceand post-mission reporting which are avail-able to functional components and subuni-fied commands mean that many targetsnominated by one component may not beserviced when requested since they havebeen hit previously or are no longer viabletargets (though the component’s intelligenceorganization does not know it). With hun-dreds of targets and thousands of sorties toschedule, deconflict, recover, regenerate, andrelaunch, the ATO is large, comprehensive,and imposing. Today, with the command,control, and communications systemsfielded since the Gulf War, the current ATOprocess allows greater flexibility. We haveworked on the training, now we need to giveour people better tools.

Contingency PlanningAs in Desert Storm ATOs can and will be

changed during daily targeting reviews con-ducted prior to their execution. A new com-mand and control tool, the Contingency

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Theater Automated Plan-ning System (CTAPS), re-places the automatedsystem used in the GulfWar. CTAPS makes it eas-ier for a JFACC to redi-rect sorties and missionseven after the ATO is

published and distributed since it allowsreal-time communications among opera-tions staffs, including naval aviation aboardcarriers. Additionally, by assigning primaryand secondary taskings in the ATO, sortiescan be redirected to hit assigned secondarytargets or diverted to address unexpectedbattlefield situations. Procedural and sys-temic changes allow a JFC to add or shift

combat airpower to main orsupporting efforts and af-ford unprecedented flexibil-ity to meet sudden changeson the modern, dynamicbattlefield.

Air Force computer sys-tems used to plan and exe-cute air operations in the

Gulf War were incompatible with those ofother services and coalition air forces. Thesystems were not intended to address uniquerequirements of joint and multinational airoperations in a contingency theater. To over-come the systemic obstacles to a single inte-grated air operation, paper copies of the ATObeing executed were hand delivered to shipsand certain coalition forces. This was a greatsource of frustration for planners, operationscontrollers on the CENTAF staff, andsquadrons tasked with flying missions.

The Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Forcehave expended tremendous efforts to ensurethat CTAPS meets the needs of theater aircomponent commanders—regardless of aJFACC’s service. The system has been desig-nated the joint standard for ATO generationand dissemination by the Joint Staff. In addi-tion, the software used to develop, transmit,and execute the ATO meets DOD commonuser standards. While the hardware may bedifferent, both ATO inputs and the productsavailable will be the same among all forcesparticipating in theater air operations.

Initial versions of CTAPS hardware andsoftware have been fielded. The services usethe system for exercises and actual deploy-ments. Interoperability and system connec-tivity simplifies the job of air componentstaffs and intensifies the effectiveness of air-power. CTAPS represents a great leap forwardin technology, ease of operation, communi-cations flow, and customer support. Moderntechnology has enhanced the ability of aJFACC to support a theater campaign strat-egy. These tools will undergo refinement astechnology and combat change.

Standing OrganizationCENTAF planning and execution staffs

during the Gulf War were augmented byhundreds of Air Force planners and liaisonofficers from other services. Since then,CINCs and JFCs have used ad hoc joint staffsto plan and execute air operations in contin-gency and exercise scenarios. This puts atremendous training burden on air compo-nent commanders who are assigned JFACCresponsibilities. In a crisis training time maybe unavailable or inappropriate because ofoperational security concerns. An eventougher problem occurs if a CINC requires aJFACC to execute initial air operations andplan others while the staff is deploying. Thisis extremely difficult for a trained and readyair component staff and nearly impossiblefor an ad hoc group.

We can overcome such problems by as-signing members of all services to a theaterCINC’s air component staff full time. Thisjoint staff would live together and work as ateam every day, most likely at the air compo-nent commander’s headquarters. The staffwould then be a trained and ready core

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around which a full JFACC staff could beformed in crises. This requires training morepeople from all services to act as members ofair component staffs. Even if they are not ac-tively serving on a joint air component staff,they will be available to augment the as-signed staff.

Numbered Air Forces (NAFs) have severalhundred people assigned to form an Air Forcecore around which a theater air componentstaff can be built. NAF commanders train andexercise assigned Air Force people to build anair operations plan, coordinate plans and op-erations between service components, and ex-ecute initial and subsequent ATOs in theevent of crisis. This capability has been testedsuccessfully in real-world contingencies, the-ater exercises, and at Blue Flag with liaisonpersonnel from other services and some allies.What is missing is full-time representativesfrom other service components who will pro-vide airpower in response to a regional con-tingency. JFACCs need this full-time serviceexpertise to wage the joint warfare whichGeneral Powell said is essential to victory. It isup to the services to recognize the need andassign the right people.

In the ongoing commitment to South-west Asia, Operation Southern Watch, 150 AirForce and Navy officers augment CENTCOM

and CENTAF staffs.Personnel on tem-porary duty withthe joint task forcestaff plan and exe-cute air operationsin support of U.N.Resolutions 687and 688. In return,they are practicingtheir skills in anoperational setting.

The JFACC forSouthern Watch isalso the Joint Task

Force-Southwest Asia (JTF–SWA) commander,the Area Air Defense commander, and theAirspace Control Authority. Operational con-trol over Navy and Air Force flying units aswell as Army Patriot missile batteries in thetheater is retained by the respective servicecomponent commanders. The JTF–SWA com-mander exercises tactical control over Navyand Air Force sorties made available for plan-ning through Commander, U.S. Naval Forces

Central Command, and Commander, U.S.Central Command Air Forces. This arrange-ment gives the JTF–SWA commander local di-rection and control of sorties. In addition, heensures airspace is laid out in a coordinated,disciplined manner. By articulating the levelof effort required and focusing all players onthe mission requirements, the JTF–SWA com-mander is able to execute the air operationsrequired to achieve CINCCENT objectives.

While it may be desirable, fiscal realityprevents us from forming large, new air com-ponent staffs in each theater. The JTF–SWAexperience has shown that a small, trained,and ready cadre, augmented by quality liai-son officers from each component andtrained augmentees, can transform the com-mander’s objectives into a comprehensive airoperations plan and an executable ATO.

Effective airpower, capable of meetingthe strategic needs of a JFC and addressingdirect air support requirements of land andmaritime component commanders, dependson a solid foundation of communicationsand trust. When a JFACC clearly articulateshis goals and focuses components and hisjoint staff to achieve them, we can be suc-cessful. As seen in Southern Watch andother contingencies, properly trained,equipped, and motivated personnel (as-signed or augmenting) can become aformidable JFACC team when trust is estab-lished and communications are maintained.

The FutureWhile the nature of future conflict is

uncertain, U.S. participation in it and theneed for responsive and flexible airpower isnot. Operations other than war (OOTW)constitute a growth industry in which theNation will be involved. Thus airpower willalso be involved in some form. Ongoing op-erations in Bosnia, Southwest Asia, the Hornof Africa, Haiti, and other regions are be-coming the norm rather than the exception.Experiences in these and other crises arehelping us transform the lessons of DesertStorm into experience for present and futureair commanders.

We are witnessing the first steps towardscontrolling all theater air operations via theATO. The Chairman recently changed JointPub 3–56.1, Command and Control for Joint AirOperations, to require positive control of all

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air operations in a the-ater, including Army heli-copters, on the ATO or aflight plan. Special Opera-tions Forces have demon-strated that they canmake significant contri-butions to the deep bat-tle. We have the ability toregularly include specialoperations missions onthe ATO. During OOTW,the consequences of notexercising positive con-trol over all air operationscould be disastrous. Posi-tive control helps avoidfratricide by giving allteam members a copy ofthe game plan. The con-tention that doing so

makes a cumbersome document even moreunwieldy fails to take into account CTAPSand future command and control systems.

We should also expect to encounter andexercise more frequently with JFACCs whoare not Air Force officers or who have a mo-bility rather than a combat background. Aprimary reason for such joint training pro-grams is to prepare for scenarios when a non-Air Force service will have the preponderanceof air assets and the command and controlmechanisms to plan and execute theater airoperations. It is not difficult to imagine a sce-nario when a Navy admiral is the initial

JFACC in a contingency andthen passes his responsibilityto an Air Force or a Marinegeneral as operations moveashore. As the commitment toa particular contingency ma-tures, the JFACC may again be

an admiral or general responsible for plan-ning and executing mobility and sustain-ment activities. This would be difficult to ac-complish in a large operation today, butstandardized planning and execution toolsand joint training programs will make thehand-off easier in the future. Now we needpractice.

It is possible and advisable to test thisconcept. Under different funding and spon-sorship Blue Flag could be run with a non-AirForce JFACC and his principle staff. Air Force

personnel could serve as deputy JFACC andin liaison functions, providing expertise inareas such as space warfare, airlift, and strate-gic attack. Another possibility is to structuretheater exercises to provide for an Air ForceJFACC afloat with a predominantly Navystaff. Linking and sequencing service trainingsimulations such as the Navy’s Fleetex andthe Army’s Battle Training Program with BlueFlag to accomplish a CINC’s joint trainingobjectives is yet another area with tremen-dous potential. Phased simulations, keepingkey players in their respective roles, moreclosely approximates the real execution of acampaign plan. With other innovations likethe distributed wargaming system, we canand will do more to simulate and exercisejoint procedures that will be in use shouldwe go to war.

The future of airpower is optimistic forboth airmen and other functional compo-nents. The new tools and training we aregiving to JFACCs and their staffs will makeairpower more capable and flexible. Short-comings identified during and after the GulfWar are being addressed and initial resultsare very promising. As new systems andtraining programs mature we will see betterand more responsive air operations to sup-port a JFC’s concept of operations.

With newly acquired capabilities, how-ever, come responsibilities to act as an equalpartner beside both land and maritime com-ponents as a supporting as well as supportedcomponent. This means seeking innovativeways to sequence and phase air operationsto achieve theater objectives. It also meansmassing airpower to delay, disrupt, and de-stroy enemy combat forces before they closewith ground and naval forces. And finally, itmeans being available to put steel on targetwhen a JFC needs to add or shift weight to amain or supporting effort.

Future JFACCs will wield more controland provide better airpower capability toJFCs and other components of a joint force.In the past centrally planning the executionof limited air assets has been a difficulty, butenhanced training and enhanced command,control, and planning systems will help usrealize the theater-wide benefits of flexible,responsive, and lethal airpower. JFQ

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new tools we are givingJFACCs will make air-power more capable andflexible

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