JESHION 2001 Donnellan on Neptune

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXIII, No. 1, July 2001

Donnellan on Neptune*

ROBIN JESHION

University of Southern California

Donnellan famously argued that while one can fix the reference of a name with a definite description, one cannot thereby have a de re belief about the named object. All that is generated is meta-linguistic knowledge that the sentence If there is a unique F. then N is F is true. Donnellans argument and the sceptical position are extremely influential. This article aims to show that Donnellans argument is unsound, and that the Millian who embraces Donnellans scepticism that the reference-fixer cannot secure the relevant de re belief faces a serious problem: Millianism about names plus scepticism about the reference-fixers de re belief conflicts with what seems to be an analytical thesis about the relationship between semantic content and understanding. The upshot is that the Millian has good reason to seek an alternative to scepticism.

Heres the story: Leverrier and no one else of his time perceived the planet we now call Neptune. Upon attaining scientific evidence that a certain planet was causing perturbations p in Uranuss orbit, Leverrier introduced the name Neptune into the language by stipulating that its reference is to be the planet causing perturbations p in Uranuss orbit. The stipulation was an act of reference-fixing, not meaning-giving, of the proper name. Neptune is then, we will suppose, a rigid designator. So in all counterfactual situations, the term denotes the same object that it actually denotes.

Heres the question: Has Leverrier thereby secured a priori knowledge of the contingent truth expressed by the sentence If there is a planet causing perturbations p in the orbit of Uranus, then Neptune is the planet causing those perturbations?

Kripke [ 19801 and Kaplan [ 19891 think so. But the view has not exactly caught on, especially among Millians. Detractors include Soames [ 19981, [ 19951, Salmon [ 19881, Fitch [ 19871, Blackburn [1984], Plantinga [ 19741,

I presented material from this paper in colloquia at the University of California, Riverside in May 1998 and at the University of California, lrvine in December 1998, and in a colloquium session at the 1999 Pacific APA Meeting in Berkeley.) presented the full paper in a symposium at the Pacific APA in Albuquerque in 2000. A short version of this paper was presented at the CSPA meeting in October 1999. I am grateful to the audi- ences who have heard the paper and to the students in my University of Southern Cali- fornia autumn 1998 graduate seminar on de re belief for their stimulating questions and criticisms. Special thanks to Kent Bach, Heimer Geirson, Nathan Salmon, Janet Levin, Michael Nelson, and Marga Reimer for discussion of these issues.

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Levin [ 19751, Kaplan [ 19691, and no doubt many others. The popularity of the sceptical view about attaining such a priori knowledge is due in no small measure to Keith Donnellans [1979] publication of The Contingent A priori and Rigid Designators.* Donnellan argues that the introduction of a rigid designator by means of a definite description does not enable one to have any a priori knowledge of contingent truths about the object satisfying the description. He develops this view in two stages. First he offers an argument that aims to establish that via the descriptive reference-fixing the stipulator cannot know the contingent truth expressed by the sentence If the F exists, N is the F. Following that, he attempts to explain away the appearance of such knowledge by suggesting that the reference-fixer does secure a priori knowledge that the sentence If the F exists, N is the F expresses a truth. The upshot is that while descriptive reference-fixing does enable one to have a priori knowledge of a meta-linguistic contingent truth-namely that the sentence If the F exists, N is the F expresses a truth, this is a wholly uninteresting and unthreatening epistemological accomplishment.

Donnellans paper, replete with examples and analogies about our uses of names and demonstrativedindexicals, is undoubtedly seductive. But his argument for the sceptical position is unsound. Or so I will argue. That is one of the burdens of this paper.

The project is an important one. Donnellans arguments have convinced many to adopt the sceptical position. Yet the sceptical position is itself exceedingly problematic. Establishing this point is the other burden of this Paper.

So my aim is twofold: to argue that Donnellans argument that the stipulator could not have a priori knowledge of the truth expressed by If the F exists, N is F is unsuccessful; and to argue that because the sceptical position entails that we abandon a natural thesis about the relationship between language and thought, there is good reason to seek an alternative to the sceptical view. If I am right, Donnellan, Salmon, Soames, and (as we shall see) any committed Millian will need to come to grips with an unsavory consequence of their views. In this paper I will not attempt to establish that the sceptical position is wrong or that some alternative stance is right. But I do hope to demonstrate that advocates of the sceptical position have fewer resources than they may think.

The structure of this paper is as follows. In 91, I explicate how to properly characterize the general problem presented by Kripkes case. In 92, I articulate Donnellans argument. 93 is devoted to demonstrating why Donnel- lans argument fails. In 84, I attempt to dismantle the persuasive force of

And possibly Kripke, during some points in time since Kripke [1980]. Salmon [I9881 reports that Kripke has had some changes of mind about the cases. Plantinga [1974] and Levin [I9751 both advocated the sceptical stance before Donnellan, but Donnellan [1979] offers the fullest development of and argument for this position.

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various analogies Donnellan advances to show that the stipulators a priori knowledge is merely meta-linguistic. I conclude in $5 by arguing that the scepticism embraced by Donnellan, Salmon, Soames, and others is incompatible with a highly plausible thesis about the relationship between language and understanding; one that, I will submit, anyone should be reluctant to relinquish.

01 Characterizing the Problem Commentators standardly assume that the problem before us is essentially about the possibility of knowing contingent truths a priori via stipulative, descriptive reference-fixing. The assumption is made by Donnellan, Kripke, Salmon, among many other^.^ But this is a mistake. In a certain sense that I will spell out, the general problem is independent of the modal status of the proposition allegedly known a priori by the ~tipulator.~

There are cases involving knowledge of a necessary truth that raise the same philosophical issue as that raised by the Neptune case. For the sake of the argument, lets assume a thesis of essentialism and suppose that having a certain atomic number is an essence-determining property of elements. Suppose that, at a time prior to the discovery of an element having atomic number 121, a chemist stipulates: Let Angelesium refer to the element having atomic number 121. Then it appears that that chemist has a priori knowledge that if there is an element having atomic number 121, Angele- sium is the element having atomic number 121. We should be just as bothered by this case of alleged a priori knowledge of a necessary truth as we are by the cases involving such knowledge of a contingent truth, and for precisely the same reason.

One might think that because the Angelesium case involves a proposition typically known a posteriori by non-stipulators, the general problem is captured by the idea that there are some truths known a priori by stipulators that can only be known a posteriori by non-stipulators. This, however, is not so. Like the modal distinction, the a priorila posteriori distinction does not suffice to capture the essentials of our problem, for there are cases involving truths that are typically known a priori by non-stipulators. Suppose that a mathematician stipulates: Thelma is to refer to the 36th prime number. Then it appears that just via her stipulative act, she can know a priori the

Most all commentators on these cases make this assumption. See Kripke [1980], Donnel- Ian [1979]. Blackburn [1984], Carter [1976], Casullo [1977]. Cowles [1994], Evans [1979], Fitch [1987], Forbes [1989], Kaplan [1989]. Kitcher [1980], Oppy [1994], Richard [1993], and Salmon [1986], [1988]. Sutton [2000] comes close to dispensing with this assumption, but doesnt make the final break. lnan [I9971 recognizes that there are cases involving necessary truths, but holds (mistakenly, I think) that a priority is irrelevant to the issue. I offer only an abbreviated version of the arguments for this point since I have argued for it in greater detail in Jeshion [2000].

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proposition expressed by Thelma is the 36th prime number, a proposition about, or involving, the number 151. Although most of us could know this proposition a priori as well, the case nevertheless raises the same puzzlement as the Neptune and Angelesium cases. For our stipulator seems to be able to know a proposition a prion and directly that everyone else can know only by engaging in some a priori mathematical reasoning. What these cases show is that the root of our problem is neither the modal properties of the propositions known nor the justificatory source itself, but rather the alleged capacity of stipulative descriptive reference-fixing to generate direct a priori knowledge.

How then should we characterize the problem before us? We can start by noting two uncontroversial facts:

Stipulative Descriptive Reference-fixing [SDR]: There appears to be a particular possible, and possibly actual, linguistic phenomenon-stipulative descriptive reference-fixing-in which an agent introduces a name into the language by stipulating: N is to refer to the F.

Epistemic Privilege of Reference-fixing [EPR]: The act of descriptive reference-fixing appears to put the stipulator in position to be non-inferentially a priori justified in believing the proposition expressed by the sentence N is the F (on the assumption that there is a unique F).

[SDR] and [EPR] are theory-neutral data. Now, at the most general level our problem concerns how to account for [SDR] and [EPR]. This can be stated somewhat more precisely as conditions on any full theory about the relationship between language and thought:

Any full theory should include an account of the semantics of names introduced by descriptive reference-fixing, or should explain why such a linguistic phenomenon, which appears possible, is impossible. It must either explain or explain away [SDR].

Any full theory that deems descriptive reference-fixing possible must either provide an analysis accounting for how the stipulator can be in such a special epistemic position or explain its appearance away. It must explain or explain away [EPR].

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02 Donnellans Main Argument Although Donnellan stated his sceptical position as a position about the impossibility of attaining contingent a priori knowledge via descriptive reference-fixing, his thesis is easily generalized to accommodate the point in $1. In fact, his argument for the sceptical thesis in no way depends upon the modal status of the proposition. So it seems very likely that Donnellan would agree to the following (initially rough) characterization of the sceptical thesis: Via descriptive reference-fixing, the stipulator cannot attain Q priori knowledge, indeed, cannot attain any knowledge whatsoever, of the proposition expressed by the sentence If the F exists, N is the F.5

To argue for this claim, Donnellan begins by making four important assumptions.

First, Donnellan grants, and maintains himself, that it is at least in principle possible for an individual to introduce a name into the language by fixing its reference with a definite description6 and for the name to thereby be a rigid designators7

Second, although Donnellan tells us very little about the conditions on successfully introducing a name into the language via descriptive reference- fixing,8 he does claim that if an agent stipulates that N is to refer to the F

Donnellans discussion is independent of the existential complaint that one could not have the relevant non-meta-linguistic a priori knowledge unless one has a priori knowledge of the existence of the object denoted by the F. Our discussion will likewise ignore this issue. For development of the debate, cf., Carter [1976], Cowles [1994], and Ray [1994]. I will sometimes ignore the qualifier If N exists in what is supposed to be known n priori. But it is always intended. Some have denied Kripke this point as a way of blocking the supposedly absurd consequence of someone having a priori knowledge of a contingent truth. Dummett [ 19731, for example, argues that because the introduction of names into the language via descriptive reference-fixing entails the possibility of having a priori ,knowledge of contingent truths-an obvious absurdity, in Dummetts viewdescriptive reference-fixing is impossible. Cf., also Kim [1977] and Russell [1956]. For our purposes here, that the introduced name is a rigid designator just means, in the language of possible-world semantics, that the term designates the same object in all possible worlds, at least for all possible worlds in which it designates anything at all. One thing he does tell us is misguided. In Kripkes cases, the individual who introduces the name always makes a stipulation (either explicitly or implicitly) of the following form:

Though Donnellan acknowledges that this is the standard form for the relevant set of stipulations. he claims that the following sort of stipulation may be substituted for the standard one:

Donnellan Stipulation [DS]: Let N is the F express a contingent truth. Donnellan claims that, though there may be problems with substituting [DS] for [KS], [DS] serves as a useful heuristic device for recognizing his thesis that stipulative descriptive reference-fixing engenders only a priori knowledge of the meta-linguistic truth: N is the F expresses a contingent truth. The close tie between the meta-linguistic knowledge and the stipulation itself is unmistakable.

This will not do. By stipulation, one cannot make it true that N is the F expresses a contingent truth. The modal status of a proposition is simply not something that avails itself

Kripke Stipulation [KS]: Let N refer to the F.

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and there is no individual that is the unique F, then the act does not count as a successful introduction of N into the language. The stipulation has been an unhappy one and [is] not to be taken as being in effect. So all cases in which there is no object satisfying the description are to be regarded as outside the scope of the argument?

Third, Donnellan assumes that the name that is introduced by the stipulator gets a Millian semantical analysis. The name lacks semantic descriptive content.( It is important to see that the assumption does not follow automatically from Millianism about ordinary proper names. As Donnellan recognizes, a Millian can consistently maintain that proper names introduced by descriptive reference-fixing are non-Millian. that they are semantically special, and so perhaps have descriptive content. Nevertheless, Donnellan takes the purist route. The result is that, for Donnellan. and any purist Millian, if the stipulator has a pion knowledge of the proposition expressed by If the F exists, N is the F, the stipulators knowledge must be de re, not merely de dicta.

Fourth, Donnellan assumes that introspective knowledge of ones thoughts counts as a pr io i knowledge. In making this assumption, Donnel- lan is allowing that if the stipulator needs knowledge of the stipulative act to have the propositional knowledge expressed by If the F exists, N is thC F,

to stipulation. The property denoted by the F may well be an essence-determining property of the object denoted by N, unbeknownst to the stipulator. Despite the stipulators decree. the proposition expressed by N is the F would be a necessary, not a contingent, truth. Furthermore, this introduces an U M ~ C ~ S S ~ ~ Y constraint on a successful stipulation. A stipulator could make the relevant stipulation without being a modal sophisticate. A stipulator might entirely lack the modal concepts needed to make [DS], yet still succeed in introducing a name into the language via descriptive reference-fixing. The upshot is that the so-called mere heuristic device [DS] must be abandoned. Since (I believe) Donnellan could and should give up [DS], in the text I have assumed that all stipulations are of the [KS] variety. Donnellan [ 19761, p. 52. Donnellan did not strictly adhere to this restriction. In addition to the Neptune case, Donnellan tends to focus on Kaplans [1%9] Newman 1 case in which an agent stipulates that Newman 1 is to refer to the first person born in the 22nd century. Then it seems that the stipulator can know something about that individual who will be the first person born in the twenty-second century. Whether this case satisfies Donnellans constraint on existence is a matter of much controversy. Contrast with Gareth Evans [1979], who complains that Donnellan denies the existence of descriptive names, names that do acquire semantic descriptive content upon being introduced via descriptive reference-fixing. This is simply a mistake. Donnellan actually explicitly acknowledges the possibility. But he also allows for the possibility of names, so introduced, lacking in semantic descriptive content. Cf.. Salmon [1988]. For many Millians, the contents of de re beliefs (knowledge and other attitudes) are just singular propositions, propositions whose constituents are individuals and properties. Since Donnellan seems reluctant to embrace this view, I have followed him in talking rather blankly in t e r n of the objects of de re belief as opposed to singular propositions. Nevertheless, all of my discussion, and Donnellans argument itself, may be easily tailored to construct associated points for friends of singular propositions.

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the intellectual experience of that act does not itself prevent the possibility of having the propositional a priori knowledge.I2

In evaluating Donnellans argument, I will simply grant these four assumptions.

* So much for the basic set up. Donnellans strategy is to establish that descriptive reference-fixing cannot

put one in position to have de re knowledge. He starts by offering a rough, intuitive characterization of de re knowledge: de re knowledge is knowledge that is directly about an individual. The characterization is limited in detail- in the extreme-but that is Donnellans intention. He thinks he can establish his thesis while wading past the deep and murky waters involved in giving necessary and sufficient conditions on having de re knowledge. The strategy is a prima facie good one.

Instead, Donnellan advances what he calls a loose principle concerning names and de re knowledge that essentially serves as an intuitive test for the absence of de re kn0w1edge.I~ The principle runs as follows:

If one has a name N for an individual and there is a bit of knowledge that one would express by saying N is the F, then if one subsequently meets the individual it will be true to say to that individual I knew that you are the F (or, if the individual is not a person, pointing, I knew that that is the F).

The underlying motivation for the principle is that since de re knowledge is directly about a particular individual, one can substitute the name with the pronoun you (or with a demonstrative that plus demonstration) to pick out the individual in the attitude attribution.

According to Donnellan, instances of ordinary de re knowledge normally pass this test. (I discuss the all important class of possible exceptions in $3 below. Theyre what make the principles loose.) Suppose I have de re

l 2 l 3

Donnellan does not comment on whether such knowledge is indeed needed. Donnellan actually offers two principles, the one in the text involving substitution with a demonstrative or pronoun, and the following principle involving translation:

If an object is called by one name, say N, by one group of people and by another name by a second group, say M, and if in the language of the first group N is F expresses a bit of knowledge of theirs and if is G is a translation of is F into the language of the second group, then if the relevant facts are known to the second group, they can say truly that the first group knew that M is G.

I have omitted the translation principle from the main discussion because it contributes nothing that is not already contained in the other principle and has considerably less chance of success, introducing complications concerning the appropriateness of translation.

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knowledge of Robert Hass that he wrote Field Guide. Then, if I encountered the poet and uttered the sentence I knew that you wrote Field Guide, I will have spoken truly. Or suppose I have de re knowledge of the Empire State Building that it was once the tallest building in the world. Then, if I arrived in New York City, and stood in front of the Empire State Building, and pointed to it, I will have spoken truly if I asserted I knew that that was once the tallest building in the world.

Donnellan claims that the Neptune case intuitively fails the test. If, years after his stipulative act, Leverrier telescopically identifies Neptune in the heavens, he would have spoken falsely if he uttered the sentence I knew that that is the cause of the perturbations in Uranuss orbit.I4 Of such failure Donnellan says:

in the absence of any other explanation of why [the principle] should fail in these cases, I suggest that the reason is that the stipulations have not given rise to any knowledge (other than of linguistic matters). And so not to any knowledge a priori.

It is important to recognize that, although Donnellan frames the principle as a test for the absence of de re knowledge, it is actually a weaker principle- one that tests for the absence of de re belief-that does all the work. For notice that his argument attacks neither the truth nor the justification condition on knowledge, but rather aims to establish that the stipulative act never engenders de re belief at all.I5 So the operative principle, which Ill call the De Re Principle is

If one has a name N for an individual, and there is a belief that one would express by saying N is the F, then if one subsequently meets the individual it will be true to say to that individual I believed that you are the F (or, if the individual is not a person, pointing, I believed that that is the F).

l4 Though Donnellan does not explicitly say so, it appears he thinks that all cases of stipulative descriptive reference-fixing will similarly fail. (And he must say this if he is to prove Kripke wrong.) It is, however, puzzling that he says nothing about Kripkes meter stick case. Perhaps he avoids such discussion because, at least for the scenario in which the stipulator perceives the stick, the stipulator certainly has a de re belief about the sticks length. Perhaps Donnellan would agree with Nathan Salmon [I9881 that in such a scenario, the stipulators belief must be justified a posteriori. Contrast with Mark Richard [I9931 who claims that Donnellan is arguing that you cant have knowledge de re about an object a priori unless (maybe) the object is yourself. Richard [1993], p. 258. This cannot be Donneh s argument. First, as noted in the text, the argument Donnellan gives operates solely off of the belief, not the justification condition, on having a priori knowledge. Second, the view Richard attributes to Donnellan is rather implausible, as it would automatically rule out the possibility of having a priori knowledge de re about numbers.

I5

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Donnellans point, then, is that in the absence of an alternative explanation of why the De Re Principle intuitively fails to hold in descriptive reference- fixing cases, the failure indicates that the relevant de re belief was never generated from the stipulative act in the first place.

Donnellans position vis-h-vis [SDR] and [EPR] is now very easy to state. He assumes a purist Millian semantics. He maintains that the data given by [SDR] indicates the presence of a real, or at least a possible linguistic phenomenon. There are (or at least may be) instances in which a stipulator fixes the reference of N with the definite description the F. Yet he attempts to explain away [EPR]. The stipulator does not have a priori knowledge of what is expressed by If the F exists, N is the F. There are two possible ways of denying that the stipulator has no such privileged knowledge:

[ I ] Explain why stipulative descriptive reference-fixing cannot give rise to de re belief about the object a that is the unique F.

[2] Explain why stipulators who, via the stipulation, have the relevant de re belief cannot be directly a priori justified in that belief, given that everyone else needs empirical evidence or a proof to be justified in that belief.

Donnellans strategy is the former, to show that the stipulator never secures a de re belief via the stipulation. His argument is intended to be entirely independent of [2]. Ill now show why this simple point is crucial to a critical evaluation of Donnellans argument.

53 Why Donnellans Argument Fails What is wrong with Donnellans argument that descriptive reference-fixing does not give rise to de re belief? My claim is that Donnellan has not ruled out an alternative explanation as to why descriptive reference-fixing cases strain the De Re Principle (i.e., appear to fail the test). The alternative explanation resides in the Freges Puzzle structure that will be inherent in all cases (if there are any) in which agents have a de re belief about the referent of N via the descriptive reference-fixing.16 I will explain.

Consider the following two cases:

The Smith Case: Suppose that while flipping channels on the TV, Petunia comes across a show on 20120 hyping the coming

I6 After completing this paper, I was informed that Inans [I9971 dissertation offers a criti- cism of Donnellan along these lines.

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millennium. Petunia sees Mr. Smith being honored as the first person born in the twentieth century.

Petunia is inclined to deny that the person she calls Grandpa Joe is the first person born in the twentieth century. But, of course, Grandpa Joe is Smith. Petunia just didnt identify the man on TV that was all dolled up for the festivities as her Grandpa Joe.

Question: Will Petunia speak truly if she says, looking her Grandpa square in the face, I believed that you are the first person born in the twentieth century?

The Oldman 1 Case: Suppose that 20120 has announced that it will give away a large grant to a child with the best proposal about how to celebrate the millennium. Young Petunia fastens on the idea that it would be interesting to honor the first person born in the twentieth century. In writing her grant proposal, Petunia coins a name for this individual in the following fashion. She stipulates: Oldman 1 shall name the first person born in the twentieth century. Her project is to discover and then honor Oldman 1.

She is, as before, inclined to deny that the person she calls Grandpa Joe is the first person born in the twentieth century. But, as before, Oldman 1 is Grandpa Joe.

Question: On encountering her Grandpa, will Petunia speak truly if she says I believed that you are the first person born in the twentieth century?

The first of our two cases involves no descriptive reference-fixing, yet (nearly) uncontroversially involves a de re belief of a person a that he is the first person born in the twentieth century. The second involves reference- fixing with definite description, and is up for evaluation with regard to the presence of a de re belief of a that he is the first person born in the twentieth century. I think it is fair to say that both of our cases strain the De Re Principle.

The question is this. Has Donnellan established that the reason for the strain on the De Re Principle in the Oldman I Case is not exactly the same as the reason for the strain in the Smith Case? I will argue that he has not, and that, consequently, his argument gives us no reason to suppose that stipulators cannot secure the relevant non-meta-linguistic de re belief.

Well, what would Donnellan say about the Smith Case? Earlier I remarked that, according to Donnellan, the De Re Principle offers only a loose test for the absence of de re belief. In a rather curious footnote (number 22), he claims that the test is loose because all cases that exhibit a structure that gives rise to Freges Puzzle present trouble. Our Smith Case, of course,

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plainly exhibits this structure. For the Millian, these cases uncontroversially involve de re belief. Yet, intuitively, they seems to fail the De Re Principle. Many contemporary Millians would claim that Petunia in the Smith Case does speak the truth.17 Donnellan does not take a firm stand on the matter. But we can still evaluate his argument.

Whether Donnellan regards the Smith Case, and others of its ilk, as pass- ing the test or as exceptions to it, he will always offer the same analysis as to why the De Re Principle is strained: Petunia has two ways of taking the object of her belief, the one, Wtv, arising from watching a on the TV program, the other, Wg, arising from interactions she had with a at family gatherings, holidays, and weekend visits to his house. When she addresses a, saying I believed that you are the first person born in the twentieth century, she thinks of a under the Grandpa guise Wg, and fails to identify the object of Wtv and the object of Wg.

But now it is far from clear that a reason for the strain in the Oldman 1 Case is not exactly the same as in the Smith Case, where the presence of de re belief is not disputed. Since Donnellan grants that Petunia does indeed succeed in fixing the reference of Oldman 1 , that name picks out a. So if she has de re belief via her stipulative act, she will have a descriptive way of taking a, Wd, associated with her reference-fixing act.I8 If so, the De Re Principle will be strained by the case because our subject has two ways of taking the object of her belief, the descriptive way of taking, Wd, the other, as in the Smith Case, Wg, and she fails to identify the object of Wd and the object of Wg. There is, therefore, an alternative explanation for the intuitive failure of the De Re Principle, one that is consistent with (indeed, presup- poses) the presence of the relevant de re belief.

Whats more, Donnellan offers us no supplementary argument for ruling out this alternative explanation. He says that the structure exhibited by Hesperus-Phosphorus cases does not seem to be present in the Neptune-type case,IY but why should we believe that? Or rather, there is no reason why it should fail to seem to be present unless one is antecedently committed to the idea that via the stipulative act, the stipulator attains no non-meta-linguistic de re belief at all. It will seem to be present to one who maintains that the

I have in mind here proponents of a naive semantics of attitude reports, like Salmon and Soames. But the main point in the text, that Donnellans argument does not go through, stands entirely independent of whether the Millian adopts a naive semantics of attitude reports or, say, a hidden indexical account. In suggesting that the subject will have a descriptive way of taking a (if she has a de re belief associated with her stipulation), I do not mean that, for our subject, Oldman 1 is a descriptive name, in Evanss sense. As I noted earlier, 1 am assuming with Donnellan that the introduced name gets a Millian analysis. A descriptive way of taking a is a way of taking a-a cognitive fix on a- that is, at least in part, in some fashion generated from a description that a satisfies.

I

I y Donnellan [1979]. p. 60.

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stipulation generates a de re belief. For, as I indicated above, if the stipulation gives rise to a de re belief, it will do so because the stipulator has a descriptive way of taking the object, one that would not necessarily enable the agent to make an identification while taking the object in, say, a perceptual way.

Note well: First, I am not arguing that our subject in the Oldman 1 Case does have a de re belief generated from the descriptive reference-fixing. I only maintain that it is incumbent upon Donnellan to establish otherwise, and he offers no rationale for thinking that the Freges Puzzle structure is what is responsible for the intuitive failure of the De Re Principle. Second, my criti- cism of Donnellans argument does not in any way essentially depend upon the fact that in the Oldman 1 Case, our subject does have de re beliefs about a that are not generated from the stipulation. The fact that Petunia has other de re beliefs about a has nothing to do with the issue. The presence of other ways of taking a serves only to highlight the Freges Puzzle structure that will be inherent whenever Donnellans test is applied to a case of descriptive reference-fixing.

I said earlier that if one countenances the possibility of descriptive reference-fixing, there are two ways of denying that the stipulator has no privileged a priori knowledge. One can [ 11 show that descriptive reference-fixing cannot give rise to de re belief about the object a that is the unique F. Or one can [2] show that stipulators who, in virtue of the stipulation, have the relevant de re belief about a cannot be directly a priori justified in that belief, especially given that everyone else would need empirical evidence or a proof to be justified in that belief. Donnellan intends for his argument to accom- plish [l], and, moreover, to be entirely independent of [2]. The line I have been pushing questions whether his argument is in fact independent of [2]. For notice that [2] is essentially a special case of Freges Puzzle. Freges Puzzle is a challenge to the Millian to explain how a single proposition can differ in its informational value or its cognitive significance. The Puzzle can be formulated (as Frege originally formulated it) in explicitly epistemological terms: If the semantic content of a term is just its referent, then, assuming a and b are co-referential, a=a and a=b express the same proposition. Yet one is uninformative and known a priori while the other can be informative, indeed it may be known empirically or by proof.2o Now, if we assume that the stipulation gives rise to the non-meta-linguistic de re belief about a that a is F, we have a special case of Freges Puzzle-a single belief content is uninformative (and directly a priori justified) to the stipulator but informative (and justified empirically or by proof) to the rest of us.z In other words, and this is just the point I have been pressing, if the stipulator can have the

*I Frege [1893]. 21 In Jeshion [2000]. I develop this point in greater detail and offer a solution to [2] along

the lines of standard Millian solutions to Freges Puzzle.

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relevant non-meta-linguistic de re belief, there will always be a Freges Puzzle structure in place due to the alternative guises under which stipulators and non-stipulators grasp the relevant proposition.

My point against Donnellan is now easily summarized as follows: he has not ruled out the possibility that the strain on the De Re Principle is due solely to the elements in its structure that generate Freges Puzzle, and so concerns [2], as opposed to [ 11, the stipulators failure to have the relevant de re belief.

04 On merely knowing a priori that the sentence expresses a truth

If my argument in $3 is correct, then Donnellan has not succeeded in show- ing that stipulation never gives rise to non-meta-linguistic de re a priori knowledge. It would be nice if this would suffice to turn back Donnellans challenge. But, although Donnellans test for de re knowledge constitutes all of what could appropriately be regarded as his argument against Kripkes claims, I think that Donnellans papers seductiveness rests at least in part (and perhaps even more so) on another source. In attempting to explain away the appearance of non-meta-linguistic a pnori knowledge, Donnellan offered three classes of memorable examples in which, he claims, a subject comes to know a sentence S expresses a truth but fails to know what S expresses. While Donnellan claims that he mentions the examples only to make the distinction between meta- and non-meta-linguistic knowledge clear, it is apparent that he intends for them to pump intuitions to convince us that descriptive reference-fixing cases behave analogously. A thorough critical treatment requires stripping away their persuasive force.

I shall suggest that Donnellan is right that the agents in the first two classes of cases merely have meta-linguistic knowledge, but that these cases cannot help convince us of the sceptical view for descriptive reference-fixing cases. The features of the cases responsible for the agents failures to grasp the non-meta-linguistic propositions are simply not present in our cases. Concerning the third class of cases, I shall argue that although they have the right structure to serve as appropriate analogies with descriptive reference- fixing cases, it is a matter of considerable controversy whether the agents attain only meta-linguistic knowledge.

In the type-1 cases, an agent knows a certain sentence is true because she has been so-informed by a source known by the agent to be epistemically unimpeachable and sincere. For example, suppose a German-speaking friend informs me that a German sentence S is true. If I do not understand German, I do not know the truth that S expresses (at least not in virtue of understanding that assertion). But I can know that S is true. Or imagine that I read in Scien- tific American the sentence S * , The oblateness of Mars is .003, but am ignorant of the meaning of oblateness. Then, while I can thereby have

DONNELLAN ON N E ~ E 123

knowledge that S* is true, I cannot thereby have knowledge of what S* expresses. In both these cases, I could pass on the infomation by uttering the sentence to another party. Like our cases involving descriptive reference- fixing, I may then appear to know the proposition expressed. Yet, in such a circumstance, I only act as a mouthpiece, transmitting information about which I am ignorant.

In the type-I examples, the subject attains meta-linguistic knowledge that S is true by means of whatever epistemic credentials reside in the informants say-so. Since the subject fails to understand the whole or part of the semantic content of the sentence, the subject cannot thereby come to know the proposition expressed.

A crucial disanalogy with descriptive reference-fixing blocks their persuasive force. As Donnellan himself notes, in our cases, the stipulator has full semantic understanding. It is not surprising that one would fail to have knowledge of what is expressed by a sentence S via an assertion of S if one lacks some semantic understanding of S. What is surprising is that one cannot have such knowledge if one has complete semantic understanding.

Donnellan advances type-2 and type-3 cases to skirt this difficulty. Type-2 cases involve demonstratives or pronouns. Suppose you say to me That is mine, and I fail to grasp what it is that you are referring to with that, yet I know you are a reliable source of information and keep scrupulous track of your possessions. Then, according to Donnellan, I can know that the sentence you asserted is true, but fail to gain the non-meta-linguistic knowledge of what you expressed in asserting that sentence.

Here again, it is clear that I have the relevant meta-linguistic knowledge because I hear the assertion and know the source is ultra-reliable and sincere. And because of my blindness to the relevant contextual facts, I do not grasp, and so cannot know, the proposition p expressed. Unlike type-1 cases, I do have some semantic understanding of each term in the sentence. Nevertheless, type-2 cases cannot help Donnellan. The reason is obvious. Although one may be said to understand the character of the demonstrative (in the sense of Kaplan), it is part of the semantics of demonstratives, pronouns, and indexicals that one needs to know the relevant features of the context to have any attitudes toward the proposition expressed by the sentence in that context. In type-2 cases, ignorance of contextual knowledge accounts for the subjects inability to grasp the proposition. This cannot be the explanation in stipulation cases. For if the definite description contains no indexicals, no term in the sentence If F exists, N is the F requires knowledge of specific features of the context. If the definite description does contain an indexical, we can suppose that our descriptive reference-fixers know everything there is to know about the context. So stipulators have all the understanding of the sentences terms normally required for grasping the proposition that the sentence

124 ROBIN JESHION

expresses. Because of this crucial disanalogy, type-2 cases shed no light on why the stipulator cannot grasp p.

Type-3 cases involve neither meaning-ignorance nor context-ignorance. Suppose that my friend Alex knows Vladimir but I have never met him and have no information about him. As Donnellan says, I do not have the least idea who Vladimir is. Now, if Alex says to me,

[VV] Vladimir is called by me Vladimir

then, because I know that any assertion of a sentence having the form

[*I N is called by me N

expresses a truth, I know that if Alex has asserted anything, he has asserted a truth. But, claims Donnellan, from Alexs assertion alone, I do not know the proposition Alex expresses in asserting sentence [VV]. I do not know that Vladimir is called by Alex Vladimir.

The example here is a far more plausible candidate to encourage the sceptical view about stipulative descriptive reference-fixing. The way in which the subject attains meta-linguistic knowledge (sans testimony) invites very close comparisons. In type-3 cases and descriptive reference-fixing cases, the meta- linguistic knowledge derives from knowledge of a general and particular fact. In the type-3 case, I can know the general truth that any sentence having the form [*I expresses a truth, and the particular truth that my friend Alex has expressed a sentence of that form. Likewise, in our cases, if I am the stipulator, I can know the general truth that if one stipulates that N is to refer to the F, taking N as a rigid designator, then the sentence If F exists, N is the F expresses a truth, and the particular truth that I have just engaged in the relevant stipulative act. So the example does thereby illuminate how, via descriptive reference-fixing, the stipulator can have the meta-linguistic knowledge.

Despite this intriguing parallel, it is a mistake to view the case as support for the sceptical view. For all that we have is a good analogy about how an agent can know that a sentence expresses a truth from knowledge of general linguistic and particular associated facts. Yet the capacity to know that a sentence expresses a truth in this fashion in no way (in and of itself) shows or entails that the agent does not or could not also know the proposition expressed by the sentence from understanding an assertion of it. For the Vladimir case to stand as a persuasive analogy, it must be that I cannot also attain non-meta-linguistic knowledge of what is expressed by the asserted sentence [VV]. This I challenge.

Recall that in our Vladimir case, we are not considering a mere possible assertion of a sentence having the form [*I, construed in the abstract. In our scenario, I am actually communicating with Alex, who knows Vladimir, and

DONNELLAN ON NEPTUNE 125

he is telling me something about Vladimir. Notice that this must obtain if Donnellan is to have a case in which I fail to grasp the proposition that a certain sentence expresses on a particular occasion of use. In asserting [VV], my interlocutor must be expressing genuine content about Vladimir, something that, if grasped and believed, would be de re. So, in asserting [VV], Alex has an intention to express information about how (or what) he calls Vladimir. In this way, his assertion is no different in kind from an assertion of

[VWTl Vladimir is called by Olga Wild Thing

The sole difference between the two is that [VV] is self-verifying in the sense that an assertion of the sentence makes it true, while [VWT] is not.22 But that fact pertains only to securing meta-linguistic knowledge, and in no way prevents Alex from communicating content to me about Vladimir. (Compare: an assertion of I assert that the tomatoes have ripened is self-verifying because any assertion having form I assert that p is self-verifying-assertion of it makes it true. But, on hearing it, one could also grasp the proposition expressed if one knows who has made the assertion.) The upshot is this: if Alexs assertion of [VWT] enables me to have the de re belief about Vladimir, then his assertion of [W] does as well.

This raises a delicate question. Can one acquire de re beliefs and knowledge about individuals one antecedently knows nothing about by acquiring information about them through communication with others, especially others who stand in a causal-informational chain to the individual? This problem about transmission of de re beliefs and knowledge via communication is controversial. Yet it is far from obvious that it is impossible to acquire de re beliefs in this fashion. Indeed, many of the most refined theories countenance such communication-based de re Fortunately, we need not settle

22 The self-verifying nature of an assertion of N is called by me N derives only from the fact that the act of assertion is one instance in which the assertor calls N by the name IN. So there is no necessary difference between the relative informativeness of (or interest of the information conveyed in) an assertion like [VV] and [VWT]. In certain contexts, the latter may be completely boring (most everyone calls Vladimir Wild Thing), while the former may be striking, even a boast (only Alex is plucky enough to call Vladimir Vladimir). Cf., especially Kent Bach (19821 and [1986] and Recanati [I9931 for interesting and detailed discussion of how de re thoughts are transferred through communication chains. (Though both adopt a neo-Fregean semantics, much of the general account of de re thought transmission would be congenial to Millians for whom the thought content is just a singular proposition.) Other theorists, including, it seems Donnellan, also allow for the possibility of such thoughts even if there is a failure of knowledge who/which or an inability to individuate the object of the thought. Cf., also Boer and Lycan [I9861 and, perhaps, Burge [1977]. Contrast Salmon [1988] who seems to require knowledge which in maintaining that a stipulator could not have a de re belief about a meter unless she knew exactly, or very nearly, how long that length is.

23

126 ROBIN JESHION

this here. Donnellan thought his Vladimir case suggested straight-away that there could be no de re knowledge. The discussion above shows that whether or not it can help the proponent of the sceptical view depends upon the conditions for having a de re belief via communication, a fact that eluded Donnel- Ian. Without an additional argument that de re belief (and knowledge) is incompatible with knowledge-who ignorance, type-3 cases cannot serve as examples of situations in which an agent cannot know what S expresses despite full knowledge of the meaning of all the terms in S and the relevant context.24

S Consequences of Scepticism Donnellan, or any proponent of the sceptical view, could of course respond to these criticisms by plunging into the messy task of giving necessary and sufficient conditions on having de re beliefs so as to explain why descriptive reference-fixing gives rise to no such beliefs. I happen to think that this is the sceptics best strategy.

But all sceptics should first appreciate an unsavory consequence of this position. The variety of scepticism under discussion entails that one can introduce a name into ones language by fixing its reference with a definite description yet one cannot use the name in the sense that one cannot think any thoughts or have any attitudes about the names referent by mentally tokening the name. Suppose that someone introduces N into her idiolect via descriptive reference-fixing. Then that individuals language will contain an infinite number of sentences {s, s, s ...) containing N which have a determinate truth value and which express propositions { p, p, p. . . 1. Yet our linguistically competent subject cannot have attitudes with the propositions { p, p, p. . . ) as content by means of accepting sentences { s, s, s. . . 1. Neither meaning- nor contextual-ignorance can account for the incapacity. This, I submit, is a highly undesirable cdnsequence of the sceptical position.

Donnellan anticipated this consequence, but, curiously, was not particu- larly bothered by it. He seems to think that there are analogous situations involving reference-fixings with demonstratives which generate this consequence as well. Suppose I close my eyes and say, pointing, Let murple be the color of that.25 I have no idea what I am pointing to, but suppose that I am pointing to a definite color.

24 It is worth mentioning that the case may prove to assist the proponent of the non-sceptical view. An account of de re attitudes that admits as genuine those that are communication- based may help explain how stipulative descriptive reference-fixers have the relevant non-meta-linguistic de re belief. I attempt to develop such a non-sceptical analysis in Jeshion [2001a] and [2001c]. Donnellan [ 19791, p. 57. Donnellan describes the stipulation somewhat differently. In his example, I close my eyes and say, I will call the color of that murple. But this formulation is deceptive, suggesting that he is not now, with eyes closed, fixing the reference of

25


Have I not set up an indefinite number of sentences, for example, Murple is the color of my true loves hair, each of which expresses something true or false? But while my eyes remain shut I do not believe I know what they express. The apparatus, however, has been constructed and I have only to open my eyes to see, for example, how ludicrous i t would be to think that murple is the color of my true loves hair and that grass is murple.

The case is clever, to be sure, but it is lame as an analogy. Heres why. First of all, if the case is to be persuasive, Donnellan must be offering us a case that is different in kind from the cases of descriptive reference-fixing. I think he means to be advancing a case in which demonstrative reference-fixing generates the same consequences. Yet, for such cases, while I am blind, no reference-fixing occurs. There are at least two (related) reasons. First, the reference-fixing of the introduced term requires that I demonstratively refer to the object that will serve to fix the names reference. But to demonstratively refer to something, one must have a particular object in mind and intend to refer to it. One must intend to pick it out with the use of the demonstrative plus demonstration. But in the case above, I have no particular object in mind. Second, reference-fixings with demonstratives or definite descriptions do not occur just from sayings. Merely uttering the words Let N be that or Let N be the F does not suffice to count as a successful reference-fixing. An intention to actually use the introduced term in the stipulated way must accompany the saying for the act to count as a successful reference-fixing. Yet while blind, I cannot have such an intention. With closed eyes, I cannot have an intention to use the term murple to refer to that color, for I do not see it. Of course, I may have an intention to use murple to apply to the unique color, if any, that I am pointing to, whatever it is. But, if so, then the scenario isnt an analogy at all, but rather just another instance of descriptive reference-fixing. After all, that as it occurs in this stipulative act is but a term of laziness for the definite description the unique color I am pointing to. So Donnellan hasnt found an analogous case to assuage concern about the unattractive consequence of his scepticism.

In fact, I wouldnt hold out much hope for finding one. The consequence runs counter to a natural thesis about the relationship between language and thought. The content of a sentence in our language is always accessible to one who understands it. There are no propositions expressed by sentences in our language that are, so to speak, hidden. More formally,

murple, but is only making a prediction about how he will use murple once he opens his eyes. For the case to work, the reference of the term must be fixed while the stipulators eyes are closed.

128 ROBIN JESHION

Accessibility of Content: For all non-indexical expressions E in the language L, and all sentences S in L expressing some proposition P, if agent A understands all the non-indexical expressions E contained in S, then A could have an attitude having P as its content by understanding S.

A more general principle, applicable to sentences containing indexical expressions, is this:

Accessibility of Content [ I ] : For all expressions E in the language L, and all sentences S in L expressing some proposition P, if agent A understands all the expressions E contained in S, then if A were apprised of all the relevant contextual information, A could have an attitude having P as its content by understanding S.2h

Any theorist should be reluctant to give these theses up. Indeed, they can be seen as giving expression to a partial analysis of sentence-understanding and to the fact that the semantical content of a sentence is a function solely of the semantic content of its contained terms.

Millian sceptics have staked out two lines on this issue. (Note that Donnellan himself never advances a line on the issue.) Soames [I9951 (footnote 5 ) claims that the stipulator understands all the words in the sentence, as well as how they are combined in the sentence. That is, i t seems he holds:

Understanding Millian Names: In cases of descriptive reference- fixing, the stipulator understands the sentence N is the F, if anything is and is aware of any features of the context relevant to the determination of the content of that sentence.

So, in embracing scepticism, it seems that he is committed to rejecting Accessibility of Content [ I ] . He seems to think that the cases of interest are to be treated specially, so that AccessibiliQ of Content [I] is to be regarded as satisfied only in normal situations. The problem with this line is straight- forward. The formulation of Accessibility of Content [I] is completely neutral with respect to situations; it simply states a relationship between sentence- understanding (supplemented with context) and grasp of sentence-content. The thesis is, arguably, an analytic statement about that relationship. It is far from clear that it should ever break-down.

Salmon [I9881 (footnote 10) advances an alternative line. In a certain sense, he intends to reject Understanding Millian Names. He does so by

I include knowledge of referential intention within knowledge o f the relevant context information, so as to include the stipulators knowledge of her own referential intentions.


invoking a distinction between strong and weak ways of understanding a proper name. Strong understanding of N requires that one stand in some relevant relation to the referent of N. Since the stipulator does not satisfy this condition, she has only weak understanding of N. His key idea then becomes that Accessibility of Content / I ] is a thesis that is only about strong understanding, and the stipulator has no such strong understanding of the sentence N is the F, if anything is. Here we are in temtory that needs more development that I can presently offer, but I would like to suggest two related concerns about the tenability of this move. Lets start off by noting that we have a term of the language that, for the purist Millian, has no semantical content apart from its referent. So Salmons appeal to strong and weak understanding of the term should not be assimilated to the partial/full understanding distinction commonly invoked to account for degrees of understanding (and misunderstanding) of the meaning of concept-words and natural kind terms. With names as construed by the Millian, there is no analytical defini- tion of the term that an agent could master to progress from partial to full understanding. What Salmon is saying is rather that an agent can gain strong understanding only by coming to stand in, say, a perceptual relation to the object. Now, the first problem is that the purist Millian will not ordinarily regard such a change in relation between agent and object as grounds for maintaining a change in the agents understanding of the term that refers to the object. If you finally met me, would you thereby better understand the term Robin Jeshion? Surely this is something that the Millian denies. If he wishes to embrace it for these special cases, he needs a good reason why he does not always maintain that such a change occurs. The second, related (yet more direct) point is this: because the entire content of a Millian name is its referent, it seems that what the stipulator lacks is not anything that could properly be deemed understanding of the name. After all, wouldnt one intuitively say that all that the stipulator is missing is knowledge who or knowledge which? Upon having, say, visual contact with Neptune, what the stipulator gains is knowledge which planet it is-and not a strong understanding (or any change in understanding)-of the name.

If these two lines are untenable, the upshot is rather unsettling news for the Millian sceptic. The following theses are jointly incompatible.

Possibility of Stipulative Descriptive Reference-Fixing: It is possible for a stipulator to introduce a name N into the public language by stipulating that its reference is to be fixed by the definite description the F.

Purist Millianism about Proper Names: For all proper names, the sole semantic content of a name N is its referent 01.

130 ROBIN JFSHION

Scepticism about Descriptive Reference- Fixing Generated De Re Befief: Just by stipulating that N is to refer to the F, it is not possible for the stipulator to thereby have a de re belief about the object a that is the unique F.

Accessibility of Content [ I ] : For all expressions E in the language L, and all sentences S in L expressing some proposition P, if agent A understands of all the expressions E contained in S, then if A were apprised of all the relevant contextual information, then A could have an attitude having P as its content by understanding S.

Understanding Miflian Names: In cases of descriptive reference- fixing, the stipulator understands the sentence N is the F, if anything is and is aware of any features of the context relevant to the determination of the content of that sentence.

One of the above must be rejected. What is a Millian to do? I end this paper with some brief and unrefined, but I hope thought-provok-

ing, commentary on the obstacles to the various options and the associated burdens they place on a theory of thought and language.

Abandon the possibility of stipufative descriptive reference-fixing? This proposal is inconsistent with what appears to be simple linguistic fact. In addition to Neptune, we have Jack the Ripper and Deep Throat as real examples of names which at least seem to have been introduced into the language by descriptive reference-fixing. And certainly the procedure seems possible in principle. You cant deny it without explaining away the linguistic data and explaining why such reference-fixing is impossible.

Abandon the purist Miflian thesis, maintaining that names introduced by stipulative descriptive reference-fixing have semantic content? This is an interesting proposal, but it is extremely t ro~blesome.~~ The Millian who plumbs for this way out needs a principled reason as to why names introduced into the public language by descriptive reference-fixing have something other than just their referent as semantic content while names introduced by baptism do not. Perhaps the natural answer here would be that the descrip- tional means of securing a referent suffices as a reason. But this option spawns other problems. For it seems that once the name is introduced into the language by the stipulator, others may use the name to refer to the object a. And it is far from apparent that such ordinary uses of the name are in any way defective. But then the semantic arguments against descriptivism seem to get a foothold. Once N is introduced, some users of N will fail to asso- ciate the content of any definite description with it, much less with the

27 Reimer (2001al. [2001b] takes this route. I offer more extensive concerns about rejecting Purist Millianism in Jeshion [2001b].

DONNELLAN ON N E I E 13 1

content of the F with which the stipulator used to fix Ns reference. For example, the best description one might have of Jack the Ripper is some multiple-murderer, a description satisfied by far too many persons. Yet there appears to be little reason to regard the semantic argument against descriptivism as inapplicable in these cases.

Abandon accessibility of content [ I ] ? The obvious problem here is that pitching the accessibility thesis requires that one explains why rational agents understanding each term in a sentence and all the relevant contextual information cannot grasp the proposition the sentence expresses. This, it seems to me, is no small task. Indeed, as I indicated above, accessibility of content [ I ] borders on being an analytic statement about linguistic understanding.

Abandon understanding Millian names? The difficulty here is that it is hard to see how the purist Millian can consistently maintain that one can understand a sentence containing a name, say Richard Feynmen, even if one has only descriptive information to individuate Feynmen from others, yet one does not understand a sentence containing a descriptively introduced name. Moreover, as 1 discussed above, there seems to be no principled way for a Millian to isolate two types (weak and strong) of understanding of names.

Abandon scepticism about descriptive reference-fixing generated &i E belief? No doubt, most Millians will shy away. And perhaps rightly so. If you reject the sceptical thesis, you need to explain how it is possible for de re belief (and other attitudes) to be generated by acts of descriptive reference- fixing. In canonical cases of de re belief, we have either direct perceptual or introspective relation to/acquaintance with the object of belief; or we have indirect relation to/acquaintance with the object via a communication chain sustained by the use of the name and ending with someone who uses the name for the object while being directly acquainted with it. Such direct and indirect acquaintance is missing in our cases. Abandoning scepticism about attaining de re belief via descriptive reference-fixing entails that some de re belief will not be rooted in acquaintance. Whether or not the line is viable will depend upon whether a cogent de rdde dicto distinction can be preserved while allowing for some non-acquaintance-based de re belief. A second problem for the non-sceptic is to explain what it is about descriptive reference-fixing that enables the stipulator to have a de re belief. This route may appear hopeless. Nevertheless, Im inclined to think it an option worthy of serious consideration. To be sure, its a matter to reserve for another occasion.28

I advance an argument in support of the possibility of acquaintanceless de re belief about concrete objects in Jeshion [2001a], [2001c].

132 ROBlh JESHION

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Documents

JESHION 2001 Donnellan on Neptune