James Harrington as Aristotelian

James Harrington as AristotelianAuthor(s): James CottonSource: Political Theory, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Aug., 1979), pp. 371-389Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/190946 .

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JAMES HARRINGTON AS ARISTOTELIAN

JAMES COTTON RUniversity of Newcastle upon Tyne

N RECENT YEARS-James Harrington has ceased to be recog- nized as an innovator or anticipator in social and political theory,' and has become regarded (with a small allowance for originality) as a figure embedded in a tradition, or traditions, of political thinking. This has been partly the result of renewed interest in historical and textual criticism, but whatever its cause, Harrington's indebtedness to Machiavelli2 and to Aristotle3 is now generally acknowledged. The emphasis, however, has been on the borrowing, by Harrington, of the arguments and devices of other thinkers indirectly, by virtue of his situation in the tradition identified. Thus, for J.G.A. Pocock, Harring- ton is an Aristotelian (and a Machiavellian) because of his place in the joint enterprise of theorizing the notions of civic humanism and mixed government. Here a somewhat different approach will be employed in that Harrington's indebtedness to Aristotle will be assessed directly, it being argued that much of Harrington's political thought consists in unmediated derivations from Aristotle. This will be seen to extend from matters of constitutional detail ("rotation," "the Agrari- an Law") to Harrington's principle of "the balance" and even to his preoccupation with property, long regarded as his original contribution to seventeenth-century political theory.4 Further, it will be claimed that Oceana is a "polity" in keeping with Aristotle's views on the nature of the good life for the state. Finally, some attention will be given to the grounds upon which Leo Strauss and his school reject the importance of Harrington's debt to Aristotle in the interpretation and understanding of Harrington's political thought.

A UTHOR'S NOTE: I am indebted to Dr. Robert Orr and Dr. E. D. Wattfor their com- ments on an earlier draft of this article.

POLITICAL THEORY, Vol. 7 No. 3, August 1979 371-389 i 1979 Sage Publications, Inc.

371



372 / POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1979

I

Harrington's principal discovery, as he was never tired of informing his readers, was the principle of the balance. And here Aristotle is credited with furnishing him with at least intimations of this notion, though, as Harrington admits, he may in this have "strain'd courtesy with Aristotle (who indeed is not always of one mind)."5

The two sources in the Politics to which Harrington most frequently refers his readers are "1.5 C.3." and "1.3 C.9."6 In both these places Aristotle is discussing the relation between inequality in attributes on the part of the citizens, and the stability of government. In Oceana the passage from Book V is paraphrased, but in the Prerogative of Popular Government we are given what appears to be Harrington's own translation:

Inequality is the source of all sedition, as when the riches of one or the few com to cause such an overbalance as draws the commonwealth into monarchy or ogilarchy; for prevention whereof the ostracism has been of use in divers places, as at Argos and Athens. But it were better to provide in the beginning, that there be no such disease in the commonwealth, than to com afterwards to her cure.7

Where Aristotle has "excessive predominance," or the development of "some form of superiority," Harrington has "riches [which] overbalance."8 And Aristotle is concerned with the existence of felt or perceived injustices in the distribution of offices, honors, or benefits,9 whereas Harrington's concern is almost entirely with "riches," though he associates the possession of definite forms of riches with political (and moral) qualities and claims based upon these qualities. Never- theless, Harrington feels justified in conflating this account of the origin of subversive forces with Aristotle's subsequent discussion of the "disproportionate increase of a part of the state"-one of the cases cited in the Politics being the transformation, at Tarentum, of a "polity" into a "democracy" with the defeat and death of many of the notables in war. This Harrington is able to interpret as an alteration in the balance, and thus in the form of government, from "aristocratical" to "popular."'0

Harrington seeks further support for his view of the fundamental importance of the "balance" in Aristotle's discussion of citizenship. Aristotle is endeavoring to discover which claims to rule should be accepted if the state is to be constituted in the best possible way. And he discerns a problem if there exists in the state some man or men of



Cotton / HARRINGTON AS ARISTOTELIAN / 373

outstanding virtue or merit, since laws which regard all as equal will only result in injustice being done to such a man or men. Democratic states, that is, states that aim at equality, will, in these circumstances, banish those who could not fairly be required to submit to laws which are equal for all. Again Harrington offers what appears to be his own translation and interpretation of the Politics:

If one man, or such a number of men, as to the capacity of government com within the compass of the few, excel all the rest (kat areten) in balance, or in such manner, that the (dunamis politike) political faculties or estates of all the rest be not able to hold weight with him or them, they will never condescend to share equally with the rest in power, whom they excel in balance.... For this cause ... citys that live under popular power, have instituted the ostracism for the preservation of equality; by which, if a man increase in riches, retinue, or popularity, above what is safe, they can remove him (without loss of honor or estate) for a time."I

Harrington's most singular usage of Aristotle goes further, since he identifies the device of ostracism as a species of "Agrarian Law" insofar as it admits the principle that the state should intervene when there appear potentially subversive inequalities of the relevant sort in the body politic: "the ostracism being of like nature, was that which supply'd the defect, in the Grecian citys, of an agrarian."'2 On the subject of the Agrarian Law, Harrington is somewhat closer to Aristotle than on the issue of "balance," for he is able to cite the precedent of Phaleas of Chalcedon, whose constitutional proposals Aristotle examines, though critically, in Book II of the Politics. As Harrington puts the matter:

It has seem'd to som (says Aristotle) the main point of institution in government, to order riches right; whence otherwise derives all civil discord. Upon this ground Phaleas the Chalcedonian legislator made it his first work to introduce equality of goods. '3

Yet Aristotle, although he has a not insignificant place for the question of the distribution of property in the well-ordered state, passes harsh judgment on Phaleas for failing to observe the importance of other considerations; indeed, the critique Aristotle offers comprises a powerful condemnation of those who would look simply to the leveling or equalizing of property as the most important device in attaining constitutional harmony.'4 Equality of property is to no avail, says Aristotle, if the amount be too small or too large. And even if a moderate amount of property could be settled for all,




It is more necessary to equalize men's desires than their properties; and that is a result which cannot be achieved unless men are adequately trained by the influence of laws."'5

Civil discord, moreover, arises not merely from inequality of property but also from inequality of offices, but with the difference that whereas the mass of men become restive when property is distributed unequally, men of education are restive when the distribution of offices is equal. "Want" is not the only cause of crime, and the greatest crimes are committed for "superfluities" rather than "necessities." Mere equality of property neglects the importance of external affairs and evades the issue of whether it is only property that shall be equalized, or all riches. Aristotle concludes that dissension over property and possessions is to be remedied

not [by] the equalization of property, but rather [by] a method of training which makes the better sort of natures unwilling, and the poorer sort unable, to indulge in covetousness.'6

Can Harrington survive the condemnation Aristotle aims at Phaleas even allowing for the fact that Phaleas is after the leveling of property, while Harrington is arguing merely for its limitation? There is a sugges- tion that he does elude criticism on these grounds in the rather striking parallel between the lines of Aristotle quoted above, and one of Harring- ton's often repeated formulas which guarantees stability in the arrangements of Oceana. An ideal commonwealth, we are instructed,

must be such in which no number of men, having the interest, can have the power or strength; and no number of men, having the power or strength, can have the interest to invade or disturb the government.'7

But Harrington's more substantial defense lies in his acceptance of the importance of laws in the right ordering of the state, indeed he borrows some constitutional devices from Aristotle's own text.

The distinction which Harrington observes between the "government of laws" and the "government of men" is of fundamental importance for his political theory and prescriptions for government. It is a distinction which Harrington is concerned to maintain against the objections of Hobbes, and which derives directly from the Politics.




Government (to define it de jure, or according to antient prudence) is an art where- by a civil society of men is instituted and preserv'd upon the foundation of common right or interest; or (to follow Aristotle and Livy) it is the empire of laws, and not of men.'8

Harrington, then, is no mere "property determinist." Accordingly, he wishes to secure his agrarian or property limitation and the practices it entails with appropriate laws, laws which require the frequent "rotation" of offices among duly elected office holders: "As the agrarian answers to the equality of the foundation or root, so dos rotation to the equality of the superstructures or branches of a commonwealth."19 It is to be observed that Aristotle's consideration of these topics proceeds in much the same order. If the members of a state are equals in all significant respects, for justice to be done, they all must play a part in the ruling of the state, which implies "their being ruled as well as their ruling, and therefore involves rotation of office."20 And if this "rotation" is to be fair and orderly, some law must regulate its operation, which implies that the conduct of government is subordinate to law. Aristotle's objections to Phaleas are here transformed into positive prescriptions for the right ordering of an equal commonwealth, just as Harrington transforms the brute fact of shifts in property ownership into a political and social ordering of the British state which aspires to stability, longevity, and justice.

Regarding the wisdom of "rotation" in the Senate,21 Harrington cites Aristotle as an authority. And he finds a precedent for the rotation of the "Prerogative Tribe" in Oceana in the constitution of "Thales" (i.e., Telecles) of Miletus "where the people . . . assembl'd (to kata meros, alla me pantas athroous) by turns or rotation."22 In addition, Aristotle provides support for the (democratic) device of election by lot.23

In the role that "the people" play in a rightly ordered commonwealth there are further parallels between Harrington's writings and the Politics. Harrington detects in Aristotle the original of the view, given eloquent voice by Machiavelli, that "the people are wiser and more constant in their resolutions than a prince."24 Immediately preceding his definitive word on the need for the rule of law, rather than men, Aristotle considers the problem of those difficulties in the state so particular in character that abstract regulations may be of no real use in their resolution. His preference for judgment in these cases is for it to be assigned to a body of men rather than to an individual-they will




bring their various talents to bear and will be more resistant to corrup- tion.25 And Aristotle's whole consideration of citizenship implies that in the well-ordered state all those who are to be accounted citizens shall, by turns, rule and be ruled, which further implies a participatory role for "the people," though tempered by the steadying hand of those whose contribution to the state exceeds that of the ordinary citizen. The limited role of the popular legislative house, or "Prerogative Tribe," in Oceana is an important. aspect of Harrington's constitutional arrangements: "The people" were to "resolve" on issues put to them by the Senate but not to debate those issues, such debate being the business of the delegates of the "horse" who sat in the upper chamber. Harrington finds the original of this division of powers of government in Sparta and to a lesser extent in Venice, and he is critical of states (Athens, Rome) where the functions of debate and decision are both left to the machinations of a popular assembly. While Aristotle cannot be said to be the inspiration for this view, his disapproval of Carthage, where the popular assembly did perform both of these functions, is noted by Harrington in a passage considering the merits and demerits of ancient and modern republics.26

In comparing constitutions, and in discussing the character of the best possible constitution, Aristotle is always concerned to look behind the abstract labels of "middle class" or "people" to the sort of individuals that make up those classes, and to the kind of aspirations and desires such individuals would be likely to have, given what is known of their circumstances. In discussing "democracy," therefore, Aristotle ad- dresses the question of what contribution to the state can be expected from "the people" if their position in life and calling can be prescribed or known in advance. Aristotle approves most of the form of democracy dominated by the agricultural class on the grounds that their attending to activities dictated by necessity renders their frequent attendance at the popular assembly unlikely, and because their wants and preferences are limited to their business and do not extend to the desire to hold important office.27

Aristotle proceeds, in this section of the Politics, to outline some features of agricultural democracy markedly similar to those of Oceana. It may be necessary, in such a constitution, to introduce some form of Agrarian Law. Moreover, while

on the one hand all the citizens will enjoy the three rights of electing the magistrates, calling them to account, and sitting in the law courts; on the other hand the most




important offices will be filled by election, and confined to those who can satisfy a property qualification.28

Harrington makes no mention of these points, but does note Aristotle's enthusiasm for those of "the country way of life . . . as the best stuff of a commonwealth" on the grounds that such men are obstinate asserters of their liberties, and opposed to great or sudden innova- tions.29 The attributes of the "horse" and the "foot" in Oceana are not far short of the characteristics of the "notables"" and the "farmers" in Aristotle's agricultural democracy: The latter have limited demands and circumscribed preferences, and without having their lives complete- ly determined for them, are content to leave great matters of state and policy to the more leisured owners of property.

II

We now pass to the theory and practice of Harrington's political prescriptions. The discussion of "authority" and "power" (or "empire") found in the "Preliminaries" or theoretical prolegomena of Oceana is highly significant for an understanding of Harrington's Aristo- telianism.

To go my own way, and yet to follow the antients, the principles of government are twofold; internal, or the goods of the mind; and external, or the goods of fortune. The goods of the mind are natural or acquir'd virtues, as wisdom, prudence and courage, &c. The goods of fortune are riches. There be goods also of the body, as health, beauty, strength; but these are not to be brought into account upon this score [as irrelevant to politics].... The principles of government then are in the goods of the mind, or in the goods of fortune. To the goods of the mind answer authority; to the goods of fortune, power or empire.30

Considering first the goods of fortune, of these, lands held in a particular country are of the greatest significance. The natural history of the balance of property is the natural history of empire or power, and thus, for example, if neither one nor the few overbalance the people by their propriety of the bulk of the lands, "the empire (without the inter- position of force) is a commonwealth."3' Authority, by contrast, has no natural history, but rather is the work of the legislator, and it is the measure of a wise and beneficent legislator that he combine his art with that material given to him by fortune to fashion.32 And it may be




suggested, parenthetically, that what distinguishes ancient prudence (the theory and practice of government up until the decline of the Roman Empire) from modern prudence (preeminently the theory and practice of the "Gothic" polity) is the absence, in the latter period, of any figure alike in stature and function to the ancient lawgivers.

The distinction between the three goods (which Harrington reduces to two) derives from Aristotle.33 And the aphorism that Aristotle sets down on the relation between these goods is as follows:

The best way of life, for individuals severally as well as for states collectively, is the life of goodness duly equipped with such a store of requisites [i.e., of external goods and of the goods of the body] as makes it possible to share in the activities of goodness.34

Harrington's premises, then, are those of Aristotle. But, more im- portantly, the conclusion he comes to, indeed the whole purpose and character of the Oceana and its kindred works, is in keeping with Aristotle's view of the good life for the state, and the appropriate means to the attainment of that good life.

To reiterate, property ("riches") does have what may be called a "natural history," but this should not be considered as akin to the history of the means of production in Marxian theory. To this extent, Mr. Christopher Hill, in characterizing Harrington's thought as "eco- nomic determinist" (but "muddled") is manifestly incorrect.35 First, Harrington does have some observations, no doubt somewhat inco- herent,on the role of force in relation to the existing "balance" of property. Stated succinctly, it may be possible to alter the state of the balance by the application of "force," notwithstanding that force must here be equivalent to military forces, and the character of military forces is dependent, in the larger context, upon the nature of the balance of property in the given instance.36

The natural history of property, then, has free reign as the arbiter of forms of government only providing human agency does not intervene. "Force" constitutes one such intervention, though of less importance than the other type of intervention, the activity of lawgiving. Indeed, Harrington goes so far as to suggest that without laws of a particular kind, the "balance" is never stable: "Without an Agrarian, government, whether monarchical, aristocratical, or popular, has no long lease."37 The conclusion of the "Preliminaries" of Oceana outlines, accordingly, neither a program to be achieved by mass action, nor a result to be accepted as inevitable by the Englishmen of 1656, but the




steps to be taken by Olphaus Megaletor, the lawgiver and general of the state.

Harrington's lawgiver is to be understood in Aristotelian terms: It is his task to hit upon an appropriate combination of the goods of the mind and the goods of fortune, and have this combination accepted by the citizenry. It remains to be considered whether the specific prescription offered by Harrington is in accordance with Aristotle's view of the best (practicable) regime.

Here it may be asserted that while Harrington goes his own way and yet follows the ancients,38 his ideal (or best practicable) constitution, though it is not greatly similar to the rather sketchy remarks of Aristotle on the composition of the "best" state (Politics, Book VII), does cleave to his account of the polity or mixed regime. And it should be added that while Aristotle classes the polity as a "perverted" political regime, it is perverted only by comparison with the "best form of right constitution": Indeed, in his treatment of aristocracies, Aristotle tends to merge less than perfect aristocracies with the type of "polity."39

Aristotle's polity, if it is to be stable and if it is to function effica- ciously, must rest upon a numerous middle class, a class sufficiently large to outweigh the influence of the notables and the masses, and sufficiently wealthy, individually, to make a definite military contribution to the state.40

The society appropriate to government of the constitutional type [i.e., the "polity"] is one in which there naturally exists a body of persons possessing military capacity, who can rule and be ruled under a system of law which distributes offices among the wealthy in proportion to merit.4'

Only those in possession of arms may enjoy constitutional rights, and while this implies a property qualification for the state to remain a polity, Aristotle is clear that this should not render a majority of the population ineligible for participation in political life.42

In Harrington's Oceana, great accumulations of wealth have become dispersed. This is what Harrington understood by the assertion that "the balance" lay "in the people."43 Now it is necessary to establish the extent to which Harrington's "people" conform with Aristotle's prescriptions for the "middle class" of a polity. At one point in The Art of Lawgiving, Harrington seems to be insisting that "any small parcel of land" is- sufficient to make a citizen,44 but in general what




distinguishes a possessor of political rights and duties is his ability to live "of himself," that is, his emancipation from the status of servant. Harrington's rationale for this division is that those who are servants are not independent, neither do they have distinct interests; they are bound to the wills of others, and cannot properly participate in government as free agents.45 Aristotle's view of the attributes of a citizen, both in his discussion of citizenship as such and in his discussion of citizenship in the best state, is much the same as Harrington's: The citizen must be liberated from the continual production and reproduction of necessities, and he must be independent.46

The connection between property ownership and military capacity is manifest in Harrington, as the third "Order" of Oceana demonstrates, though here bearers of arms are further divided into those with estates large enough to maintain their owner as a member of "the horse" and those with smaller estates (less than.Ll00 p.a.), who must be content to be of "the foot."47

How large did Harrington intend his citizen-military class to be? For this we have no direct evidence, though some inferences can be drawn from Harrington's treatment of related matters. In his consideration of The Agreement of the People, Harrington's objections to the proposed Leveller constitution are not directed against the populism inherent in that scheme; on the contrary, this element seems to have Harrington's approval. Harrington's objections to the Agreement are objections to the constitution proposed therein, to its tendency to ogilarchy, and even to "anarchy." While there can be little doubt that Harrington would have objected to a citizen body which contained servants, he refers to the Leveller franchise of "Five hundred thousand men, or more", as "popular," a franchise of "the many" as opposed to "the few," terms which occur repeatedly in Harrington's works as synonyms for, respectively, the people and the nobility.48 In a speech of the Lord Archon in Oceana the estimate is offered of the total number of all elders and youths of the tribes as one million, though this figure is then used in calculations more obviously connected with the total number of adult males.49 On the strength of these two texts, C. B. Macpherson argues that Harrington "thought of there being-about 500,000 male citizens and an equal number of male servants," figures which correspond rather closely with Macpherson's own estimates of the Leveller "non-servant" franchise of about 416,700, of a total adult male population of a little more than one million.50 Although it needs to be pointed out that Harrington's calculations of these figures are




not unequivocal, and that he brought to them no twentieth-century assumptions about the equality of all men, nevertheless it can be seen that, in general, Harrington's "people" is not far removed in numbers and characteristics from Aristotle's "middle class."

There is, however, one problem yet to be considered, a problem Harrington himself raises and one which his critics considered a great weakness of his system. The device of the Agrarian Law was originally envisaged as an absolute check upon the enlargement of the possessions of those few with considerable estates, as a means to ensure that they would not cease to be of "the people," though greater in wealth. Harrington, by estimating that the dry rent of England would amount to some ten million pounds a year, notes that with an Agrarian of two thousand pounds a year, all the lands of the realm could come into the hands of five thousand individuals. His argument is to the effect that these five thousand would be a number greater than a "few," that is, they would have neither the power nor the interest to reestablish rule by king and nobility. But it is perhaps a mistake to dwell upon these passages, as some modern commentators have done, in an attempt to show that Harrington's regard for a "popular" polity was feigned or contradictory. First, Harrington makes it clear that he is discussing an unlikely, perhaps impossible, limiting case:

If you set [the Agrarian Law] at five thousand pounds a year, it can com into no fewer than two thousand hands; and if you set it at two thousand pounds a year, it can com into no fewer than five thousand hands. It will be said, in which way you please, it will never com into so few hands as are capable of having it; which is certain: yet because the effects in their approaches would be such as may be measur'd by their extremes, I shall pitch upon these as the readiest way to guide my computation.5'

Second, though Harrington states that if five thousand individuals did own all the land, this would be "excluding the people," he does not extend this exclusion to political life. In this hypothetical case "the people [would be] equally possest of the government, of the arms, and far superior in number [by comparison with the five thousand]," that is to say, they would still be "intrusted with a vote."52 However difficult this may be to square with Harrington's distinction between freeman and servants, it serves to show that Oceana, even in its limiting case, would always be constituted by a numerous citizen body. The conclusion to drawn, then, is that the social characteristics of Oceana are not remote from those of the Aristotelian polity.




In Oceana the citizen body is divided into the orders of "the horse" and "the foot," the former order comprising the gentlemen of the state in whose hands lie much of the political authority. Aristotle's polity is a similar political order to the extent that it attempts to recog- nize the (distinct) claims of the wealthy as well as of the free-born, and in so doing sometimes takes on the characteristics of "aristocracy":

The form of constitution called "polity" is embellished, in most states, by a higher title. The mixture attempted in it seeks only to blend the rich and the poor, or wealth and free birth; but the rich are regarded by common opinion as holding the position of gentlemen [and a "polity" in which they are included thus comes to be embellished by the higher title of aristocracy].53

Although the division between "the horse" and "the foot" is a division stated in terms of wealth, it is Harrington's expectation that the men of property will also be men of "excellent parts," since it is their role in the state to be advisers and counsellors to the people. Indeed, our author goes so far as to eulogize the conduct of gentlemen in a popular state, which allows the conclusion that Oceana is a polity with some entitlement to be "embellished" by a "higher title."54

The formal constitution of a polity is a judicious combination of oligarchic and democratic features, and it can readily be observed that the "orders" of Oceana conform to such a combination. Only those possessed of ?100 p.a. in lands, goods, and money may be elected to the Senate (though they are elected by all the elders of the tribe, horse as well as foot) and the powers of the Senate are extensive, being the only body empowered to frame laws. Yet no measure of the Senate may become law without the affirmation of the Assembly, a popular body, though one empowered only to vote on proposals from the Senate, being forbidden from debate. And in his discussion of constitutional arrangements that tend toward polity, Aristotle proposes much the same combination:

A . . .system of arrangement [of the "deliberative" power of the state], which may . . . be carried into effect in a number of different ways, is that some of the citizens should deliberate on all matters. This is characteristic of oligarchy. One way of carrying this . . . system into effect is that the members of the deliberative body should be eligible on the basis of a moderate property qualification, and should therefore be fairly numerous: that they should not make changes in matters where the law prohibits change, but should obey its rules; and that all who acquire property to the amount of the qualification required should be allowed to share in




the right of deliberation. Here we have something which is oligarchy, but an oligarchy tending to "polity" by virtue of its moderation.55

Further parallels between Harrington and Aristotle may be found in the latter's understanding of the three powers of government, and in his various suggestions for the appointment of magistrates and members of the judiciary.56

A polity, then, is a political order in which legality and the rule of law are important features, and where there are not great differences in wealth among the citizenry. Moreover, the polity is not an appropriate constitution for all circumstances, but where it can be erected, it is relatively stable. Harrington's Oceana is characterized by the rule of laws and not of men, and it comes as close to immortality as is possible for a political order: on all these issues save perhaps the last, Harrington and Aristotle appear in agreement.

III

Harrington's indebtedness to Aristotle is thus manifest and important, and though its extensiveness is not always discerned by critics, its importance is systematically denied only by Leo Strauss and his school, who assert that Harrington's utopia is of a "modern" rather than an "ancient" character, as is his republicanism. It will be necessary, therefore, to consider the evidence for this line of argument.

If Harrington is a "modern utopian," how is this doctrine to be distinguished from that of the writers of ancient utopias? Modern utopias, on the Straussian view, rest upon principles and argument intended to be understood by all; moreover they delineate realizable future states. Ancient utopias, by comparison, can only be grasped by the wise, and the most important of the genre, Plato's Republic, is seen as a disquisition on the limits of the city as a vehicle by which to fully realize the demands of justice.57 The former holds out the promise of a perfect or immortal political order, the latter cautions against expectations of immortality, let alone perfection, in any political constitution.

Presuming the Oceana to be a utopia, how well did Harrington expect its proposed constitution, and the principles of government serving as its foundation, to be understood? It cannot be disputed that the reasoning, language and illustrations employed in the Oceana




are recondite and abstruse. But if we move to Harrington's later pamphlets, it is possible to observe a clarification and simplifying of the argument. The present troubles of England, Harrington writes in 1659, are caused partly by the fact that

They are too few who understand what is the form or model naturally necessary to a popular government, or what is requii'd in that form or prudence for the fitting of it to the use of this nation.58

Harrington's Seven Models of a Commonwealth was written specifical- ly to remedy this defect in the popular understanding. It presents seven models of commonwealths ancient, modern, and imaginary, followed by a much simplified version of the "orders" of Oceana. Harrington's claims for the former, in particular, underline the popular cast of his work:

If these models (in which I claim to be the first that has laid the whole, and the highest mysterys of the antient commonwealths, to the lowest capacity of vulgar debate) be not all in the mouths of great men, and in pamphlets, for chimaeras or utopias, it is great chance: yet contain they no less than the whole revolution of popular prudence. Nor is it more certain, that no one of them would fit the present state of this nation.59

However, Harrington's proposed constitution, though it had come to be simplified, even popularized, by the desperate year of 1659, remained the same in all its essential features. That is to say, the doctrine of the natural aristocracy of wit, and the preeminent position of the gentlemen in the state remain, features which, it has been argued, cause Oceana to resemble more an Aristotelian polity than a democracy of the classical type. It is now possible to consider the argument of the Straussian school to the effect that Harrington's republicanism is. a modern rather than an ancient republicanism, for the nature of the difference between the two lies in the essentially "popular" nature of the former.

Comparing the "classical republicans" of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain with their ancient counterparts, Leo Strauss discerns a "fundamental" dissimilarity between them:

The "classical republicans" were basically more democratic than their classical teachers, if only in their adoption of the principle of popular sovereignty.... they had studied Machiavelli, and Machiavelli (as distinguished from Polybius, who had suspended judgment on the subject) had explicitly preferred the expan-




sionist and hence relatively democratic Roman republic to nonexpansionist and aristocratic Sparta, to say nothing of other democratic elements of his teaching.60

It is not without irony that a writer so long identified with the seventeenth century gentry (rising or falling) is here referred to as a partisan of democracy. But it has been argued that, while "popular" consent is a feature of Harrington's republicanism, this consent is tempered by some restriction on who may claim to be of the people, and who may rule in its name, restrictions defined initially in terms of property. Moreover, Harrington's expectation clearly was that the preeminent position of the gentlemen was a preeminence of merit or talent, as well as of property. Oceana, then, may not be an Aristotelian aristocracy, but it is a political order close to that "practically best regime" of the ancients which Leo Strauss describes as "the mixed regime" or "the rule, under law, of gentlemen."6'

Having discussed the "popular" nature of Oceana, it is now possible to return to a further consideration of Harrington's utopianism, this time in connection with our author's understanding of the practice of ruling. Notice has already been taken of the view that if Harrington's intention had been to present a utopia at once realizable and immortal, his political teaching must differ in its fundamentals from classical political philosophy. If it is presumed that classical political philosophy speaks with one voice on the subject of utopia, what can be made of this argument? Harrington's utopia was intended as a practical guide to a realizable end. Neither the political regime of Book VII of Aristotle's Politics nor the political order of Plato's Laws evade this characterization, though both require the help of fortune and nature, if they are to be realized. The Laws in particular lays down prescriptions for a political order, which has yet to be brought to birth, with the aid of (unique) reflections on the history of past political orders, a strategy akin to that of Harrington.62 Numerous parallels exist between this work of Plato's, and the Oceana; what is most striking is the claim that this "second best state" (second best because practicable) "6would come very near immortality."63 If there remains a difference between Harrington's assertions concerning the "immortality" of Oceana, and classical expectations of the longevity of a modified (or perfected) polis, even allowing for the rhetorical character of many of the former, it lies in the substitution of certainty for probability, in the knowledge of political things. In particular it is to be found in the




replacement of the contingent procedure of ruling and being ruled in the state, with an inevitable and anticipated process of political life.64

Now there is little in Harrington's argument which justifies this certainty, but it is Harrington's claim that he has been able to advance such a conception of political life precisely because he has rendered systematic what is ambiguous or disconnected in his originals. And these originals are Aristotle (and Machiavelli) though in their rendering we may discern, in addition, the influence of Harvey and Hobbes. This is the sense in which James Harrington may be understood as "Aristo- telian."

NOTES

1. The older view of Harrington is to be found, with variations, in R. H. Tawney, Harrington's Interpretation of His Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942); Christo- pher Hill, "James Harrington and the People," in Puritanism and Revolution (London: Panther, 1968); C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 160-193.

2. F. Raab, The English Face of Machiavelli (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 185-217; J.G.A. Pocock, "Machiavelli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century," in Politics, Language and Time (London: Methuen, 1972); J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 2nd ed., pp. 124-147.

3. Z. S. Fink, The Classical Republicans, 2nd ed. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1962), pp. 52-89; J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (Prince- ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

4. R. H. Tawney, pp. 4, 9, 11, 25; H. J. Laski, The Rise of European Liberalism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1936), p. 141; R. Polin, "Economique et Politique au XVII Siecle: L'Oceana de James Harrington," Revue Francaise de Science Politique 2 (1952); H. F. Russell Smith, Harrington and His Oceana (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1914), pp. 23-36.

5. Harrington, "The Prerogative of Popular Government," in Works, 3rd ed. London: T. Becket, 1771), p. 272.

6. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, pp. 39,96,98; S. B. Liljegren (ed.), James Harring- ton's Oceana (Heidelberg: Carl Winters, 1924), pp. 17, 87, 90-91. Harrington, "The Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, pp. 270, 271, 275, 281. The passages of the Politics Harrington refers to are Book V, 1302b and Book III, 1284a.

7. Harrington, "Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, p. 275. 8. Rackman's translation has at 1302b "excessive predominance," whereas Barker

has "some from of superiority": H. Rackman (trans.) Aristotle: The Politics (London: Heinemann, 1932), p. 381; E. Barker (trans.), The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948), p. 208.




9. Cf., E. Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York: Dover, 1959), pp. 486-492; W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887), Vol. 1: "Introduction," pp. 522-552.

10. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1302b-1303a, p. 209; Harrington, "Prerogative of PopularGovernment," Works, p. 270.

11. Harrington, "Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, pp. 272-272; cf. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1284a, pp. 134-135; W. L. Newman, Vol. I, pp. 262-263.

12. Harrington, "Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, p. 272; cf. p. 281. 13. Harrington, "Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, p. 271; Barker,

(Liljegren ed., pp. 87, 91). 14. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1266a-1267b, pp. 63-67; cf. Newman, Vol. I,

pp. 204ff., Vol. II, pp. 283ff. 15. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1266b, p. 64. 16. Ibid., 1267b, p. 67. 17. Harrington, "Art of Lawgiving," Works, p. 433; cf., "Oceana," Works, p. 49

(Liljegren ed., p. 30). 18. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 35 (Liljegren ed., p. 12). Moreover: "the com-

monwealth where the law is king, is said by Aristotle to be the kingdom of God," "Oceana," Works, p. 49 (Liljegren ed., p. 29). Cf., Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1287a, p. 146; also 128 la, pp. 121-123; 1282b, p. 127.

19. Harrington, "Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, p. 282; cf., "Oceana," Works, p. 94 (Liljegren ed., p. 85), "Art of Lawgiving," Works, p. 370.

20. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1287a, p. 145. 21. "The senat of Lacedemon reprov'd in that it was for life, by Aristotle," Harrington,

"Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, p. 282; cf., Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1270b, p. 77.

22. Harrington, "Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, p. 284; cf. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1298a, pp. 189-190. Barker has "all the citizens may meet to deliberate in relays, and not in a single body."

23. Harrington, "Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, p. 324. Here Harring- ton cites Aristotle's book VI chapter 2, i.e., Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1317b- 1318a, pp. 258-262.

24. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 144 (Liljegren ed., p. 142) referring to Machia- velli's Discourses, I, 58.

25. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1286a, pp. 142-143; cf., 1281a, pp. 123-124. 26. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 48 (Liljegren ed., p. 29). 27. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1318b-1319a, pp. 263-265; cf. Newman, op. cit.,

Vol. IV, pp. 507-509. 28. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1318b, p. 264. 29. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 33 (Liljegren ed., p. 10). 30. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 36-37 (Liljegren ed., p. 14). 31. Ibid., p. 37 (p. 15); cf., "Art of Lawgiving," Works, p. 364, for examples of govern-

ment against the balance. 32. "The principles of authority, which are internal [are] ... founded upon the goods

of the mind. These the legislator that can unite in his government with those of fortune, coms nearest to the work of God, whose government consists of heaven and earth." Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 41 (Liljegren ed., p. 20).

33. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1323a ff., pp. 279 ff; W. D. Ross, The Works



388 I POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1979

of Aristotle, vol. IX: Ethica Nicomachea, I, 8, 1098b ff. Compare Plato, Laws, trans. T. J. Saunders (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970) 743E, p. 213.

34. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1323b-1324a, p. 282; cf. Newman, op. cit., vol I, pp. 298-301.

35. Christopher Hill, op. cit., p. 301; cf., J.G.A. Pocock, 7he Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), pp. 144-147.

36. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 38 (Liljegren ed., p. 15); cf., "Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, p. 226-227, 270.

37. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 38 (Liljegren ed., p. 16). 38. Ibid., p. 36 (p. 14). 39. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1293a-1293b, pp. 172-174. 40. Ibid., 1295b-1296a, pp. 180-183; 1296b, p. 185. 41. Ibid., 1288a, p. 150. This is not far removed from Aristotle's prescription for the

best possible state, in Book vii of the Politics (1329b, p. 305); "land should be owned, in our ideal state, by the class which bears arms and the class which shares in the conduct of government."

42. Ibid., 1279b, p. 114; 1297b, p. 187. 43. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 67 (Liljegren ed., p. 53). 44. Harrington, "Art of Lawgiving," Works, p. 429; cf. "Prerogative of Popular

Government," Works, p. 247. 45. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 77 (Liljegren ed., p. 64); cf., J.G.A. Pocock,

"The Classical Theory of Deference," American Historical Review 81 (1976), pp. 516- 523.

46. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1274b-1278a, pp. 92-110; 1328b-1329a, pp. 301-302.

47. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 78 (Liljegren ed., p. 65). 48. Harrington, "Art of Lawgiving," Works, p. 403-404. 49. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, p. 154 (Liljegren ed., pp. 155-156). 50. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, note M,

p. 298. Macpherson's franchise calculations are to be found on pp. 279-292. Macpherson's conclusions regarding the Levellers have, of course, been subject to much criticism: cf., laian Hampsher-Monk, "The Political Theory of the Levellers: Putney, Property and Professor Macpherson," Political Studies XXIV (1976), pp. 397-422.

51. Harrington, "The Art of Lawgiving," Works, p. 428. 52. Harrington, "Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, pp. 243-244, 247; cf.,

"Oceana," pp. 154-155 (Liljegren ed., pp. 155-156). Macpherson, in his discussion of this passage (op. cit., pp. 184-188) misses this most important point.

53. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1294a, p. 176 (Barker's expansion). 54. Harrington, "Oceana," Works, pp. 44-45, 52-53 (Liljegren ed. pp. 23-24, 34-35). 55. Barker, The Politics of Aristotle, 1298a- 1928b, p. 191. Cf., 1294a- 1294b, pp. 176-

178, where a property qualification is described as "oligarchic," and the principle of the lot as "democratic": both features are to be found in "Oceana."

56. Ibid., 1297b ff., pp. 189ff. (on the three powers of government); 1300a, p. 199 (on the appointment of magistrates); 1301a, p. 202 (on the judiciary).

57. Plato, The Republic, trans., and with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 410; Leo Strauss "Plato," in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), History of Political Philosophy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), p. 41. For a discussion of Harrington's utopianism from the point of view under examination, see




J. A. Wettergreen "Note on the Intention of James Harrington's Political Art," Interpreta- tion 2 (1971), pp. 64-69; J. A. Wettergreen, Chiron and Leviathan: James Harrington's Political Teaching (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont College, 1971), pp. 17-27.

58. Harrington, "Seven Models of a Commonwealth," Works, p. 491. 59. Ibid., p. 498. 60. Leo Strauss, review of Zera S. Fink, The Classical Republicans, in Social Research

13 (1946), p. 394; cf., J. A. Wettergreen, Chiron and Leviathan, pp. 35-64. 61. Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1953), pp. 142-143. Note, however, that Harrington also expressed the view that the stability and immortality of Oceana depended only upon the right ordering of laws: e.g., speech of Olphaus Megaletor, "Oceana," Works, pp. 178-179 (Liljegren ed., pp. 185-186); cf., Leo Strauss, Social Research 13 (1946), p. 394.

62. Plato, Laws, trans. T. J. Saunders, 676-702, pp. 118-156; cf., Charles Blitzer's discussion of the influence of the Laws on Harrington: An Immortal Commonwealth: The Political Thought of James Harrington, pp. 290-293.

63. Plato, Laws, trans. T. J. Saunders, 739, p. 208. 64. On the immortality of the commonwealth of Oceana, see the speech of Olphaus

Megaletor in "Oceana," Works, pp. 178-189 (Liljegren ed., pp. 185-198); cf. "Prerogative of Popular Government," Works, pp. 242-248.

James Cotton studied at Flinders University of South Australia, London School of Economics, and Princeton University. He now teaches at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne.



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James Harrington as Aristotelian