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Crisis: Can It

National Intetfigence Estimate4 A

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Tis National lnteffgence Estimate represents .

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C05918534, u Director of S ret

CentralIntelligence

NIE 29/15-92

A Broadening BalkanCrisis: Can It BeManaged?

Information available as of 23 April 1992 was usedin the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.

The following intelligence organizations participatedin the preparation of this Estimate:The Central Intelligence AgencyThe Defense Intelligence AgencyThe National Security AgencyThe Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research,Department of StateThe Office of Intelligence Support,Department of the Treasury

also participating:The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,Department of the ArmyThe Director of Naval Intelligence,Department of the NavyThe Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,Department of the Air ForceThe Director of Intelligence,Headquarters, Marine Corps

This Estimate was approved for publication by theNational Foreign Intelligence Board.

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Figure 1Balkan Ethnic Groups

- Maldova

Hungarian Serbs

edam ~ ~ "u -~odsibati tZ .>"

SRomanians []Croats a rSBulgarians |E Macedonians ~

s Albanians E SlovenesG] Turks 89 Mountenegrins ;

tilNo majority Q Muslirns y: E " y Aegean

presenc sea k e

amo s coups or othe sJignmnt ,tups that may no -ycmmi..m jo uysmal eoues int.anotam, ~ ~ ~.i soi. Rtnitan, Gypsues, viacas, Jews, and

Mediterranean ~ ,o 1oo 200onometeo S ,Se

o 100 200 Mil

724731( 0468) 4-92

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Key JudgmentsA Broadening BalkanCrisis: Can It BeManaged?

In the near term, nothing short of large-scale, outside military interven-tion-which no European country is now prepared to undertake-can endthe fighting in Yugoslavia. =

Current UN peacekeeping operations in Croatia and European-sponsoredpeace talks cannot resolve the nearly irreconcilable territorial claims andgrowing animosities among Serbs, Croats, Muslims, and Albanians. Themost serious present obstacle to peace is the Serbian-inspired fighting inBosnia, which confirms Belgrade's intent to include Serbs in neighboringrepublics into a Greater Serbia. Fighting is likely to resume in Croatia.

Over the longer term, it may be possible to lower the current level ofviolence and reduce the potential for spillover beyond Yugoslavia. Thatwould only be possible if the international community used all availablesanctions and rewards to exploit economic problems in Serbia and warweariness to bring combatants to the negotiating table:

- Isolation of Serbia and selective denial of Western aid until a settlementis reached would help push Serbs and Croats toward a cessation ofviolence. Specific measures might include withholding membership in theUN and international financial institutions, freezing assets, and enforc-ing arms and economic embargoes.

- An expanded, combat-ready UN peacekeeping force will be needed tokeep the peace for the long term and provide any chance of a negotiatedsettlement. The UN is likely to require US logistic support and militarypersonnel for any enhanced mission.=

As to the nature of a settlement, some Intelligence Community agenciesmaintain that negotiated and internationally supervised border changesand population transfers within Yugoslavia will be required.' Otheragencies hold that negotiated border and population shifts are generallyunworkable and will result in additional violence, economic dislocation,

i The Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency hold this view.

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and violations of minority and individual human rights? The Communityagrees, however, that either approach would leave in place powerful,potentially violent irredentist forces and require long-term internationalmanagement.

There is a serious danger of military conflict spilling over Yugoslavia'sborders. This expansion could erupt with little or no additional warning:- There is a high likelihood of military clashes between the ethnic

Albanian majority in Kosovo and Serbian forces; this would promptAlbanian involvement.

" There is some chance that Macedonia's drive for independence will causeSerbia, Bulgaria, and Albania to reassert historical territorial claims andlead to clashes with Greece.

" There is only a slight chance of war between Hungary and Serbia overthe ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina, but renewed Croat-Serb fightingcould prompt border incidents.

The way in which Yugoslavia disintegrates will have important demonstra-tion effects. If the combination of violence and authoritarian rule succeedsin establishing a Greater Serbia, it will encourage authoritarian forces inother parts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. On the otherhand, an imposed settlement by the international community wouldprovide a positive model for resolving ethnic conflicts in the Balkan regionand elsewhere

The inability of international institutions-notably the UN, the EC, andthe CSCE-to resolve this crisis raises questions about their capacity tomanage similar ethnic conflicts that are likely to challenge Europeansecurity in the future. While NATO's credibility has not been directlydamaged by the crisis, the Alliance's willingness and ability to supportCSCE missions, like peacekeeping, will be severely tested.

Escalating violence and its potential spillover into other Balkan stateswould undercut US interests in promoting democracy, economic reform,and regional cooperation. The emergence of competing regional alignmentswill also complicate US bilateral ties to Balkan countries and entangleWashington in competition among allies backing competing ethnic groups.

' The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research; the Assistant Chief ofStad, Department of the Air Force; the Director of Intelligence, Marine Corps; and theDeputy Chief of Stafffor Intelligence, Department of the Army hold this view=

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The UN and the Europeans will become less willing to increase theirinvolvement in the crisis without comparable US action. Europeans believethe United States can strengthen the EC. peace process by tougheninginternational responses to Serbian and Croatian intransigence and bybolstering the UN's peacekeeping capabilities, perhaps with NATO's help.EC partners also would welcome pressure on neighborin states-whereUS leverage is strong-to stay out of the fighting.

In sum, there is virtually no chance of a real negotiated settlement thatleads to interethnic peace. There are, however, two attainable goals: toreduce the likelihood of spillover and the level of ethnic violence. The firstis achievable through concerted international application of sanctions; thesecond would require introduction of outside combat-ready forces with along-term commitment. Greater US engagement increases the risk that USforces could become involved in the fighting. However, failure to act or toachieve a positive outcome would have a negative impact on the USsecurity role in Europe.

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Figure 2Serb Territorial Claims in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina

SIovenia' *H*ZAGREB

VoJvodina(autonomous

C povince)

Yugoslavia

AdriaticSea Mate e

SELECTED ETHNIC MAJORMTES

[ Croats Mtteriegro[ Muslims-

[]Serbs[]No majority present

Based on opstina data from ele 1991 census.

0 20 40 60 Filometers

0 20 40 60 Miles Abania

724812 (00389) 492

The recent breakup of Yugoslavi is unique in its Serbia; and i separate Macedonia, threatened bycomplexity and. is producing a checkerboard of economic weakness and Serbian Greek, Bulgaribewly independent, economically *eak, and politi an, and Albanian neighbors. The newly recognizedcaly unstable states.At least four independeni Bosnia-Herigbvan without substantial WesternStates are embegingfom'the rd if Yugoslavia: interventio4 wiil'spli :a Serbsind Croatsjnrelatively stable Slovenia; a war torn, embittered ethnic kins nen in,neighborlngrepublics.Croatia; an enliged but weakened and isolated

C05918534

Discussion

The Balkan' Powder Keg

The prospects for a settlement of the crisis over thenext year are slight under present circumstances.Neither Belgrade's nor Zagreb's commitment topeacefully resolving nearly irreconcilable territorialclaims is deep. Moreover, age-old animosities areincreasing and prevent any meaningful discussion ofprotecting minority and individual rights.j

The latest fighting makes clear Belgrade's intent toinclude Serbs in neighboring republics into a rumpYugoslavia. Belgrade's strongman Slobodon Milo-sevic has used Serb leaders in Bosnia to create a"Greater Serbia," while denying official involvement.This objective enjoys wide support, and even if Milo-sevic were persuaded to abandon it or were removedfrom power, other Serbians would continue to pursueit. Newly seized Bosnian territory has been added toSerbian conquests in Croatia; these include substan-tial parts of Slavonia, Dalmatia, and the Serb-major-ity Krajina.

Figure 3. Serbian Soldier. "It's 'back to the Financial Times CCroatian attitudes have also hardened. Since gaining future' in the Serb-Croat civil war. GrizzledEC diplomatic recognition, Franjo Tudjman has been Serbian volunteer militiaman resembles his fore-losing interest in the EC peace conference, and fathers from Balkan Wars, World War I.

Croatia is likely to resume fighting Serbs in thedisputed Krajina region, despite deployment of a UNpeacekeeping force. Tudjman may eventually try to European and UN Efforts Failingdrive the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) out of all of EC-led efforts to pump new life into the negotiationsCroatia, as defined by the internal Yugoslav bound- in Brussels are flagging. The EC peace process proba-ary of 1974. bly helped to slow the fighting, but the Europeans

have not agreed upon an approach to resolving rivalThe fighting in Bosnia is likely to intensify. Serb, ethnic claims. Moreover, most EC members are un-Croat, and Muslim communities are fiercely loyal to prepared to take the lead and at the same time haveterritory there and will not agree on a new state that resisted unilateral efforts-such as Germany's earlyincludes all of them. The prospects for an agreement recognition of Croatia and Slovenia-to do so.are further diminished by the presence in the republic Greece's special sensitivity to Macedonian inde-of large numbers of JNA soldiers and poorly con- pendence also will remain an obstacle to a unifiedtrolled Serbian and Croatian irregulars. [j EC policy toward the region.

' The Balkans comprise the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria,Romania, Greece, and Turkey

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The Ygosiav Peoples Army: low Independent? UN Peacekeeping Forces in Yugoslavia

The :Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) will contin- The U* is deploying a lightly armed force ofue to influence decisionmaking in the former 14,000 men in spec-iccommunitieg in Slavonia,Yugoslavia; and negotiations will have to ac- - the Krafina, and parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina.commodate at least some ofi tsinterests. Weak- Twelve countries,-including Russia for theered by the secession ofSlaeriia Croatia, and. 'frst time-will ea4 provide'an infantry battalMacedonia, the'JNA is dedeftined to preserve. ion of about S00 d. 00 men to play the ta} pits .bes and industry in Basia-Hercegovina role in separating-the combatants. Others willand protect Serbian minorities: Although nomi- provide five-man teams of military observers,nally subordinate to the Serb/Montenegrin fed- eight-man teams of military policemen, and 30-eral -presidency, the JNA is responsive to civil- man contingents of civilian police to establishian controlftom Belgrade otly to the extent .. order in the new demilitarized zone. Severalthat its institutional interes arenot-seriously- states have refused to participate for fnancialthreatened; The.JNA ispo responsive to Bos- reasons, and afew-ineluding Jordan a444,r-na; l.howe idependence Zrddeprive it of t4h . gen'tina) lrave askebd e United Statesfare s-lair shret of its Pan Yugosla identity portation tp the region.[ii

There is a small chance that the Community would Consequences of Continuing Conflictconsider stronger UN sanctions to exert pressure onall the combatants, but it is more likely to support Growing Danger of Spilloversanctions solely against Serbia. Germany, Austria, In the absence of more effective international con-and Italy are likely to resist reimposition of sanctions straints on Yugoslav parties, there is a strong chanceagainst Croatia, but only Greece would oppose appli- that the conflict will involve one or more neighboringcation of sanctions against the Serbian bloc. L 1 states. This could occur with little or no additiondl

warningfjUN forces in Croatia presently cannot fulfill theirmission and are likely to be at considerable risk unless Kosovo. An uprising by the almost 2 million Albani-their terms of engagement are strengthened. EC ans of Kosovo is the most serious and likely threat.states will remain unwilling to send their own forces The long-suppressed Albanians will almost certainlyto restore order if renewed fighting frustrates the rebel if the Serbs refuse to negotiate their autonomyUN's peacekeeping mission: and they are surrounded by others struggling against

Serbian domination. Moreover, the recent election of- Europeans, however, are increasingly inclined to a democratic government in Tirane has raised the

support an expanded military mandate for the UN, Kosovars' hopes for unification with Albania, analthough for now they remain reluctant to use force aspiration Tirane has been encouraging and that thethemselves. Serbians will try to suppress by force. Albania cannot

control its borders, and Kosovo rebels inevitably will- Should the UN accept this mandate, it is likely to seek sanctuary in Albania. If that happens, Serbia

turn for support to CSCE and, through it, to probably will respond with airstrikes and hot pursuit.NATO. If it does not accept it, the Europeans will In such circumstances, Greece may intervene to pro-turn to these institutions themselves and try to enlist tect Greeks in southern Albania=iUS support.=

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The Macedonian Problem. Macedonia's drive forindependence is exacerbating its internal political andeconomic weaknesses and straining relations amongneighboring Greece, Serbia, Albania, and Bulgaria:

- Greece is increasingly agitated about Skopje's pre-sumed threat to Greek Macedonia. Greek rhetoric,demonstrations, troop movements to the border, andharassment of cross-border trade have heightenedtensions and invite overreactions by Macedonians.

- The ultranationalist Internal Macedonian Revo-lutionary Organization, the largest party in theMacedonian parliament, espouses territorial claims ed CFroatian town "kon the D strategically locat- Der se

edCtia ono haube, was virtuallyagainst Greece and could provoke a Greek-Macedo- destroyed during its capture by Serbs in 1991."nian clash.

- If Macedonians ignore the demands of the Albanianminority (30 percent), intercommunal fighting be- violence in Bosnia has added another 200,000. If thetween the majority Macedonians and Albanians is fighting intensifies in Bosnia and spreads, the totalalso possible. A likely Serb-Albanian conflict in number could run as high as 2 million. If Bosnia isKosovo also would stimulate such fighting. partitioned, more than 1.4 million people could be

forced to relocate or be ruled by another dominantConflict between Serbia and Bulgaria, which have ethnic group. Some of these refugees would go tohistorical claim on parts of Macedonia and are openly Italy, Austria, and Hungary, all of which have al-competing for influence over Skopje, is also possible ready taken large numbers of Yugoslav nationalsbut less likely. High-level Bulgarian visits to Belgrade displaced by the fighting. A Serb-Kosova ,conflictand Skopje and official denials of territorial ambitions could produce massive population flows towardare aimed at cooling Serbian and Greek mistrust. Albania, where economic problems have alreadyBulgaria's resolve to stay out of a conflict would caused a large exodus to Italy. In the end, theweaken quickly, if Serbia reasserts its territorial European Community and other Western govern-claims or forcibly incorporates parts of Macedonia. It ments would be forced to care for these refugees.also would be eroded by nationalist challenges to thegovernment, including rumors of coups, and by dimin-ished Western economic interest in Bulgaria Economic Cost. The conflict in Yugoslavia has

already taken some 10,000 lives and caused aboutVojvodina and Hungary. Budapest will bend over $35 billion in damages. It also has contributed tobackwards to avoid a war with Serbia that would hyperinflation (over 50,000 percent annually inderail its progress toward integration with Western Serbia), a steep fall in industrial output, and massiveEurope. However, if the current truce between Serbia unemployment throughout the republics. The costs ofand Croatia breaks down, there is a strong chance of reconstruction will be considerable and probably willmajor border violations or other military incidents. have to be paid with European Community help.Repression of the Hungarians in Vojvodina could Interruptions of trade have also touched Hungary,draw Budapest into the conflict. Bulgaria, and Albania. As long as the Adria oil

pipeline-which provides Hungary and Czechoslova-Wider Consequences kia with 20 to 25 percent of their oil needs-remainsRefugees. The fighting between Serbia and Croatia sofar has produced an estimated 600,000 refugees, thebulk of whom are living within Yugoslavia. The

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closed, the Hungarian and Czechoslovak economies Croatian Liberation Diversion Front, which to datewill remain vulnerable to disruptions in oil supplies has attacked only Serbian and Federal Yugoslav

from Russia, their only other source targets, would also have reason to attack other tar-gets, if Western governments allow the creation of a

Demonstration Ffect of Violent Dissolution. The Greater Serbia.disintegration of Yugoslavia is setting a dangerous

precedent for ethnic self-determination in the rest of Competing Regional Alignments. Conflicting ethnic

Europe. The Serbian model has warned most East interests in the Balkans will encourage the develop-European governments about the human and eco- ment of small and shifting regional ententes:

nomic costs of violence, but the West's inabilityto prevent Yugoslavia's violent fragmentation will e Serbia and Greece are likely to pursue their

probably encourage militant nationalists throughout common interests against Macedonia and Albania;

Eastern Europe lif Hungarians in Vojvodina are badly mistreated,Hungary could make common cause with Croatia

Threats to Democracy and Reform. Regional instabil- and Albania against Serbia.ity and ethnic conflict will further burden democrati-zation, economic growth, and regional economic coop- e Turkey's ties to Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, and

eration in former Yugoslav republics, Albania, Bosnia's Muslim community will continue to in-

Bulgaria, Romania, and to a lesser extent Hungary. crease, driven by Ankara's desire to safeguardThey also will ease the way for more authoritarian, Muslim minority rights and expand its influence

nationalist regimes. An authoritarian Greater Serbia to the rest of Europe. This policy is likely to add

would be a continuing source of tension and instabil- to mutual mistrust and tension with Greece and

ity. Milosevic's success in exploiting nationalist Serbia=themes will encourage other likeminded politicalforces to use his tactics. Romania and Bul aria are e The violent partition of Bosnia also would radicalize

especially susceptible to this danger what had been now a peaceful, largely secularSlavic Muslim community, leading it to expand and

Renewed Nationalist Claims. Even if the dissolution intensify its links to the radical Islamic states of

of Yugoslavia were not accomplished through force, it Libya and Iran-and indeed, we have evidence thatwould nonetheless encourage new claims for statehood this is occurring.

by ethnic minorities and reincorporation of ethnicgroups separated from their motherlands. For exam- Undermining International Institutions. The Yugo-

ple, Hungarian officials already have hinted that slav crisis raises questions about the ability of West-

events in Yugoslavia could reopen the issue of Vojvo- ern governments to adapt international institutions to

dina-territory Hungary gave up in the 1920 Treaty prevent or contain ethnic conflicts. Western govern-of Trianon. Similar demands could challenge the ments have been unable to assign peacekeeping re-.borders of every multiethnic East European and west- sponsibilities in Europe to the UN, the EC, NATO, or

ern CIS nation= the CSCE. Without mandates and resources to fulfillpeacekeeping missions, no institution will be able to

Terrorism. Major international terrorist acts linked to manage similar crises in Europe in the future. While

the Yugoslav crisis have not yet occurred, and Yugo- NATO's credibility has not been directly damaged by

slav-related terrorism abroad has been far below the the crisis, the Alliance's willingness and ability to

peak levels of a dozen years ago. But we cannot rule support CSCE missions, like peacekeeping, will be

out the possibility that outrage among ethnic groups severely tested.

living in Western countries could lead to terrorist acts.We have seen reports of terrorist threats by theSerbian Black Hand against governments and institu-tions recognizing other Yugoslav republics. The

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Can Negotiations Succeed? rLeft to themselves, the Yugoslav parties are incapableof reaching a negotiated settlement. At best, it may bepossible to lower the level of violence and reduce thepotential for spillover beyond Yugoslvia. Only greaterinternational intervention-including diplomatic, eco-nomic, and military sanctions, binding arbitration,and stronger and expanded peacekeeping forces-provide a chance for these outcomes over the nextyear or two:

- Fear of international isolation, encirclement by hos-tile neighbors, exclusion from EC reconstructionaid, and sanctions could compel Serbia to negotiate tionalists in the Krarina will be a constant threat

seriously. Fear of losing control within Serbia might to UNpeacekeepers.'=make Milosevic more willing to compromise, butonly if other nationalists also reached the conclusionthat peace would safeguard Serbian interests best. Bringing the parties to the table probably will requireMore EC economic carrots probably would be need- concerted application of all available sanctions anded to persuade Serbia to drop its maximum territori- rewards against all the warring parties, includingal demands. withholding membership in the UN and international

financial institutions, enforcing arms and economic- Outside pressure, especially German pressure on embargoes, and raising the military costs of continued

Tudjman, would increase the chances that Croatia fighting in Yugoslaviawill drop its demands for recovering all its lostterritory. What Might A Settlement Look Like?

Intelligence Community agencies differ opWhether a- The complete deployment of UN peacekeepers in satisfactory outcome must include internationally

Croatia and an expanded mission in Bosnia might sanctioned border and population shifts in order to bebuy time for the EC-sponsored talks in Brussels to effective. Some agencies maintain no settlement issucceed. The UN would have to be prepared to take possible without redrawing borders, shifting popula-and inflict casualties as it tries to maintain the tions, and guaranteeing minority rights Even then, acease-fire, disarm combatants, and protect return- settlement may remain elusive.=ing refugees. The UN is likely to require US logisticsupport and military personnel for any enhanced The agencies holding this view do not underestimatemission. the extraordinary difficulty of implementing such

measures and of limiting the dangerous precedent of- Growing war weariness, economic dislocation, and seeming to validate the use of force in achieving

the greater activism of the small, democratic opposi- border changes. They argue that these borders are,tion in Serbia eventually could help undermine the in fact, being changed by force, and that activeapproach of Milosevic and other hardliners toward management of these changes by international institu-Croatia. tions is most likely to reduce human suffering and

bring the process within international norms 7- A weakened JNA might accept negotiated territori-

al adjustments, because it believes a multifront ' The Central Intelligen A cy and the National Security

conflict or international military sanctions threaten Agency hold this view

its institutional surviva

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violence and economic hardship, violate collective andCompeting Demands " the United States individual human rights, and undermine European

institutions such as CSCE.- Allies are likely t request logisticahd tintelli-

ence assets ilueg heavy'airlI A WACS All agencies agree that either approach would leave inand satellite reconnaissance) to support a , place powerful, potentially violent irredentist forces

peacekeeping mission. In addition, they might and require long-term international management.request that the US Navy maintain an embar-go or provide air support for UN-peacekeepers. Implications for the United States

A broadening crisis in the Balkans would undercutisIf peacekeeping exceeds the capabilities of the US interests in promoting democracy, economic re-

UN, some allies will press NA TO assist form, and regional cooperation. It also would compli-CSCE efforts to restore order and avoid cate relations with all Balkan countries as they pressatrocities. Washington to support their conflicting positions.

Longstanding US allies, including Greece, Turkey,9. Some Balkan and neighboring'st.ates will in- . and Germany, could become entangled in this compe-

creasingly ask for itelligence on the military. tition. Such allied disputes would almost certainlycapabilities of their neighbors. Some combat- hamper US efforts to gain agreement on NATO'sants will request direct US militdry future security roleassistance.

- . There is a danger that the UN and the EC will" *$orne parties,for exqcmple the 4svars, may become less willing to increase their involvement in

present new petitians for diplomati-Iecognt- the crisis without comparable US action. Beyond USlion, and newly independent states will want support for the EC peace process, they will expect theWashington to support their bid foriMF United States to bolster-perhaps with NATO's

membership and reconstruction funds... help-the UN's peacekeeping capabilities, toughen-responses to Serbian and Croatian intransigence, and

The United States could be asked g ri- press neighboring states-where US leverage isonce redeploy or acutate UNpeackeepers strong-to stay out of the fighting.

In sum, there is virtually no chance of a negotiatedsettlement that leads to interethnic peace. There are,howeyer, two other attainable goals: to reduce the

Other agencies believe that the central flaw in peace likelihood of spillover and the level of ethnic violence.negotiations up to now has been their failure to follow The first is achievable through concerted interna-

through on the EC's earlier strategy.' This strategy tional sanctions; the second would require introduc-

conditioned aid, recognition, and economic association tion of outside combat ready forces with a long-termof independent Yugoslav republics on acceptance of commitment. Greater US engagement increases the

the principle that borders cannot be altered by force risk that US forces could become involved in the

and a return to the interrepublic border regime of fighting. However, failure to act or to achieve a

1974. In their judgment, redrawing borders would be positive outcome would have a negative impact on the

unworkable under current conditions, and the dis- US security role in Europe.=

placement of large populations would produce more

The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research;the Assistant Chief of Sta, Department of the Air Force; theDirector of Intelligence. Marine Corps; and the Deputy Chief ofSt or Intelligence, Department of the Army hold this view.

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Annex

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C05918534.o aret

Figure 6The Balkan Region

The Macedonian Question: 1908 Through the Second Balkan War of 1913

Croatia-Slavonia an Empireti r-- ^

-Romania- -Bosnia and1 Hercegovina

administered by Austro- S e r bHungaran &npire since 1878; autonomous within Ottoman

annexed 1908 &npire since 1830;independent since 1878

San Stefano Bulgaria. !4 (March-Juy 1878)

' f ' jfjBulgaria- Montenegro autonomous wRtn Ottoman

tncependent :mp&rpfe 1878-1908;Adriatic1878 / --,ained independence 1908Adriatic/

Sea

Treaty of Bucharest, 1913(disposition of Macedoniaand neighboring territory) lbania

QZ~ Ceded to Serbia ?declared

® Ceded to Greece 1912® Ceded to Bulgaria

International boundary1908-13

0 ~75 Mile + e

7247325(20121 4-92

A Balkian Tradition: Instability, Entangling Alliances, and War

The current crisis is not 1914 revisited, because no dissolution of European Turkey. Competing territorialEuropean Great Power has been promoting instability in ambitions resurfaced in the Second Balkan War ofthe Balkans. But the competing territorial, ethnic, and 1913, when Serbia and Greece-with the help of Turkeyreligious claims that spawned World War I endured and and Romania-won back large parts af Macedoniafromhave been rekindled by the collapse of Communism. Bulgaria. Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in 1915,

The demise of Ottoman hegemony at the end of the 19th hoping to recoup its territorial lossescentury contributed to the creation of shifting alliances As Turkish influence collapsed. Bosnia-Hercegovinaamong newly emerging states and challenges to the became the target of an independent Serbia and Cro-Great Powers. After 1908, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece atian nationalists in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.set aside their cordlicting claims to Macedonia and Austria's annexation of the former Turkish province injoined Montenegro to take advantage.of Turkish weak- 1908 sparked Serbian terrorism and led to World Warness. The First Balkan War of 1912 led to the virtual 1,

C05918534S Cret

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