J. Blackmon. When a machine causes harm, why don’t we think it deserves punishment? When a human kills someone, it’s common for people to think the

DETERMINISM AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

J. Blackmon

Deserving Punishment

When a machine causes harm, why don’t we think it deserves punishment? When a human kills someone, it’s

common for people to think the human deserves some kind of punishment.

But when a machine does the very same thing, our attitude is completely different.

Why?


When a machine causes harm, why don’t we think it deserves punishment? One answer is that humans, not

machines, are conscious. Thus, a human can experience the suffering of punishment while a machine cannot.

And surely it makes no sense to punish an entity that is not conscious!


When a machine causes harm, why don’t we think it deserves punishment? One answer is that humans, not

machines, are conscious. Thus, a human can experience the suffering of punishment while a machine cannot.

And surely it makes no sense to punish an entity that is not conscious!

Yes, consciousness seems to be necessary.


Yes, consciousness seems to be necessary. But is it sufficient?

After all, this answer fails to explain a common response to cases in which humans are forced to do something which results in killing a human.


Wikus, from District 9, is conscious, and it’s his finger that pulls the trigger, resulting in killing someone.

But no one thinks Wikus deserves punishment for this!

After all, Wikus couldn’t help it! He could not have done otherwise.


Two Common Principles X can’t be morally responsible for an

action unless X could have done otherwise.

X doesn’t deserve punishment for an action unless X is morally responsible for it.


Two Common Principles X can’t be morally responsible for an

action unless X could have done otherwise.

X doesn’t deserve punishment for an action unless X is morally responsible for it.

Thus, X doesn’t deserve punishment for an action unless X could have done otherwise.


X doesn’t deserve punishment for an action unless X could have done otherwise.



This is why Wikus doesn’t deserve punishment.

He could not have done anything but shoot the victim.



This is why Wikus doesn’t deserve punishment.

He could not have done anything but shoot the victim.

Conscious or not, he’s in the same situation as the machine.



But are we any different? When we consciously, intentionally

commit an act, could we really have done otherwise?





What does science seem to tell us?





What does science seem to tell us? One answer is represented by Judea

Pearl.


What does science seem to tell us? Our behavior is

determined by the activity of our neurons.

The activity of our neurons is governed by the laws of physics.


What does science seem to tell us? The laws of

physics are deterministic, at least at the level of neurons.

Thus, whenever we take action, we could not have done otherwise!

Where in the causal chain do you become free?

The neurons in “integration” are just as governed by the laws of physics as are the sensory and motor neurons.


Rene Descartes believed the causal chain was mediated by an immaterial self which interacted with the body via the brain’s pineal gland.


There appears to be no good scientific evidence for Descartes’ hypothesis that our behavior is governed by an immaterial self.


Whenever we take action, we could not have done otherwise! So, if desert

requires free will, then we deserve nothing.


Whenever we take action, we could not have done otherwise! So, if desert

requires free will, then we deserve nothing.

Free will may, however, remain a useful notion.


Free will may be a useful illusion.

We know the table is mostly empty space, but it’s a useful illusion to think of it as solid.

We know we spin on a round Earth at about 1000 mph around its center and hurdle around the sun at another 67,000 mph, but it’s a useful illusion to think of ourselves at rest on a flat plane.



In the natural world in which we evolved, reward/punishment and praise/blame are effective means to making changes in a person’s future behavior.



In the natural world in which we evolved, reward/punishment and praise/blame are effective means to making changes in a person’s future behavior.

Thus, in the absence of better means, we are rational in continuing to use these means if we want to make changes in the behavior of others.



However, effective means such as criticism, chastisement, and punishment don’t seem to require the anger and hatred that so often seem to motivate them.

Perhaps then we can carry out the appropriate actions in criticizing, chastising, punishing without having these actions driven by anger and hatred.


Free will may be a useful illusion. Having analyzed free will in this context, it

appears we are justified in “acting as if we have free will” (just as Pearle’s robots might be).

But we might benefit if we can avoid the hatred and anger that often accompanies the thought that someone who has causes great harm could have done otherwise.

End

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J. Blackmon. When a machine causes harm, why don’t we think it deserves punishment? When a human kills someone, it’s common for people to think the