REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.Section 1.It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.Section 2.Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.Section 3.Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national security:Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed:Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded.The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.Section 4.Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.Section 5.All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.Section 6.This Act shall take effect upon its approval.Approved: June 19, 1965

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986EDGARDO A. GAANAN,petitioner,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by the petitioner.In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High School;(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.We rule for the petitioner.We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's.Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results.The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device.Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the other party or end.The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or thedeliberateinstallation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).In the case ofEmpire Insurance Com any v. Rufino(90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.xxx xxx xxxConsequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments ofthe same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a partyline or a telephone unitwhich shares its line with another. As was held in the case ofRathbun v. United States(355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred.In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case ofPeople v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).In the same case ofPurisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.xxx xxx xxxSenator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would only consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials and the person in fact would have the right to tape record their conversation.Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace offices.(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).xxx xxx xxxSenator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow him to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in court.(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.SO ORDERED.Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA,respondents.KAPUNAN,J.:A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."1In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.2The transcript reads as follows:Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.CHUCHI Kasi, naka duty ako noon.ESG Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)CHUCHI Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon ESG Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.CHUCHI Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.ESG Bastos ka,nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).CHUCHI Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.ESG Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.ESG Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.CHUCHI Kumuha kami ng exam noon.ESG Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.CHUCHI Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. TamayoESG Kukunin ka kasi ako.CHUCHI Eh, di sana ESG Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasiwala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.CHUCHI Mag-eexplain ako.ESG Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.ESG Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.CHUCHI Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.ESG Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.CHUCHI Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.ESG Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.CHUCHI Paano kita nilapastanganan?ESG Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:INFORMATIONThe Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.Contrary to law.Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.MARIANO M. CUNETAAsst. City FiscalUpon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a personotherthan a participant to the communication.4From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review onCertiorariwith this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible bycertiorari.5Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.8In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act.10We disagree.First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible11or absurb or would lead to an injustice.12Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator"13under this provision of R.A. 4200.A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:xxx xxx xxxSenator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?Senator Taada: That is right. This is acomplete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable becauseit is not sporting to record the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him.It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being recorded.Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded.Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more.But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.xxx xxx xxx(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded,if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill.It is the communication between one person and another person not between a speaker and a public.xxx xxx xxx(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)xxx xxx xxxThe unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretlyoverhearing, intercepting or recordingprivate communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed."14Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin wordcommunicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in aconversation,15or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)"16These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from theirconversationsbeing overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature ofconversationsas well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Freeconversationsare often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to theprivacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature ofconversationsbetween individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange ofcommunicationbetween individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17InGaanan vs.Intermediate Appellate Court,18a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein,19following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."20The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 121087 August 26, 1999FELIPE NAVARRO,petitioner,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.MENDOZA,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariof the decision1of the Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years ofprision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as maximum, but increased the death indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.The information against petitioner alleged That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused his death.The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing the nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.2At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture.3Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job."4Sioco pushed Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him.5When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions.6Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policeman on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco arrived on a motorcycle.7Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes.8Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?"9Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na kita?"10At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan pumarito kami para magpa-blotter, I am here to mediate."11Petitoner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo."12He then turned to Sgt. Aonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.13This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan"14Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko."15The two then had a heated exchange.16Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo."17Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?"18As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him.19Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan and naghamon."20He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang naghamon."21He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter.22Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.23Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy, Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.24Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.25The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.Navarro: Who is that abusing?Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I'm out of the problem.x x x x x x x x xNavarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare, Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm the number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. . . .Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!Lingan: I'm brave also.Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda. Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!(Sounds of a scuffle)Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete.26In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this court finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible.The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance overturn the strength of the prosecution's evidence.This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or injury.Going over the evidence on record, thepostmortemreport issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries.Saidpost-mortemreport together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's falling down on the concrete pavement head first.The Court of Appeals affirmed:We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the conflicting versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and we find the trial court's factual conclusions to have better and stronger evidentiary support.In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of appellant's aggression does not impair the probative worth of his positive and logical account of the incident in question. In fact, far from proving his innocence, appellant's unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually admitted, clearly betrays his violent character or disposition and his capacity to harm others. Apparently, the same motivation that led him into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked him into also attacking Lingan who had interceded for Jalbuena and humiliated him and further challenged to a fist fight.1wphi1.ntx x x x x x x x xOn the other hand, appellant's explanation as how Lingan was injured is too tenuous and illogical to be accepted. It is in fact contradicted by the number, nature and location of Lingan's injuries as shown in thepost-mortemreport (Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was outbalanced in the course of boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left and right eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E.). Certainly, these injuries could not have been resulted from Lingan's accidental fall.Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON SPECULATION, SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN, ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.The appeal is without merit.First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness, having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable.27Trial courts, which have the opportunity observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence.28In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording had made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.x x x x x x x x xSec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.29Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.30In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording;31that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded;32and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.33A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued the medical certificate,34dated February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:Post MortemFindings:= Dried blood, forehead & face= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral eyebrow, Left= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right eyebrow= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toesCAUSE OF DEATH:= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK= BLOW ON THE HEADDr. Yamamato testified:Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number one, which is oozing of blood from the forehead?A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1.?A It is possible, sir.Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete floor?A Possible, sir.FISCAL:What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?WITNESS:It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.Q How about this findings No. 4?A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?A Same cause, sir.Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?A Same thing sir.Q How about the last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what could have caused it doctor?WITNESS:It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.FISCAL:In this samepost mortemreport and under the heading cause of death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion and Shock, will you explain it?A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or jarring of the brain, sir.Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.Q Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?A Yes, sir.Q Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?A May be, sir.FISCAL:Which of these two more likely, to cause death?WITNESS:Shock, sir.Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier sir.x x x x x x x x xFISCAL:Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete floor have caused shock?WITNESS:Possible, sir.How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?A Possible, sir.35The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting or irritating anyone.36The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.37To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity.38And it must immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the accused.39In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient provocation. InPeople v.Macaso,40we appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.41InPeople v.Castro,42the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was committed right in the police station where policemen were discharging their public functions.43The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code isreclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period.44Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower degree,i.e.,prision mayor, and the maximum of which isreclusion temporalin its minimum period.45The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with the current jurisprudence.46WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of 18 years ofprision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months ofreclusion temporal, as maximum.

Thirteenth CongressThird Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the nineteenth day of February, two thousand seven.Republic Act No. 9372 March 6, 2007AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISMBe it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:SECTION 1.Short Title.- This Act shall henceforth be known as the "Human Security Act of 2007."SEC. 2.Declaration of Policy.- It is declared a policy of the State to protect life, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations.In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic rights and fundamental liberties of the people as enshrined in the Constitution.The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach, comprising political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly taking into account the root causes of terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such measures shall include conflict management and post-conflict peace-building, addressing the roots of conflict by building state capacity and promoting equitable economic development.Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally recognized powers of the executive branch of the government. It is to be understood, however that the exercise of the constitutionally recognized powers of the executive department of the government shall not prejudice respect for human rights which shall be absolute and protected at all times.SEC. 3.Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;d. Article 248 (Murder);e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.SEC. 4.Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism.- Persons who conspire to commit the crime of terrorism shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to commit the same.SEC. 5.Accomplice.- Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the execution of either the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of from seventeen (17) years, four months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.SEC. 6.Accessory.- Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of subparagraph (a).SEC. 7.Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications.-The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.SEC. 8.Formal Application for Judicial Authorization.- The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to establish: (a) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (b) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained; and, (c) that there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence.SEC. 9.Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court.- The written order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same, the original application of the applicant, including his application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: Provided, That the person being surveilled or whose communications, letters, papers, messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and effects have been monitored, listened to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued the written order. The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following: (a) the identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is a reasonable ground to do so; (b) the identity (name, address, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement official, including the individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the members of his team, judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words; (c) the offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and, (d) the length of time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out.SEC. 10.Effective Period of Judicial Authorization.- Any authorization granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act, shall only be effective for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official.The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said authorization for another non-extendible period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period: Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest: andProvided, further, That the ex parte application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council.In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the application for extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant among the members of the team named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law enforcement personnel under Section 20 hereof, the applicant police or law enforcement official shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office for any violation of this Act.If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance, interception and recording of the termination of the said surveillance, interception and recording. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official who fails to notify the person subject of the surveillance, monitoring, interception and recording as specified above.SEC. 11.Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications.- All tapes, discs, and recordings made pursuant to the authorization of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, including all excerpts and summaries thereof as well as all written notes or memoranda made in connection therewith, shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of any extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing Division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the members of his team.In case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled to execute the required affidavit, the one next in rank to the applicant among the members of the team named in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall execute with the members of the team that required affidavit.It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs and recording, and their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever.Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the items enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.SEC. 12.Contents of Joint Affidavit.- The joint affidavit of the police or of the law enforcement official and the individual members of his team shall state: (a) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings that have been made, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda, if any, made in connection therewith; (b) the dates and times covered by each of such tapes, discs, and recordings; (c) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda made in connection therewith that have been included in the deposit; and (d) the date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the tracking down, tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authority granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part of any of such tapes, discs, and recordings, and that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part of any of such excerpts, summaries, written notes, and memoranda, have been made, or, if made, that all such duplicates and copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law enforcement official to omit or exclude from the joint affidavit any item or portion thereof mentioned in this Section.Any person, police or law enforcement officer who violates any of the acts prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of not less than ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.SEC. 13.Disposition of Deposited Material.-The sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and are hereby declared classified information, and the sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents (including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the excerpts and summaries thereof and the notes and memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged, revealed, read, replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed before the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application with proper written notice the person whose conversation, communication, message discussion or spoken or written words have been the subject of surveillance, monitoring, recording and interception to open, reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing the persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.SEC. 14.Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed Package.- The written application with notice to the party concerned to open the deposited sealed envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the purpose or reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for revealing or disclosing its classified contents; (c) for replaying, divulging, and or reading any of the listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); [ and, (d) for using any of said listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith) as evidence.Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.SEC. 15.Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials.- Any listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, or any part or parts thereof, or any information or fact contained therein, including their existence, content, substance, purport, effect, or meaning, which have been secured in violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act, shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.SEC. 16.Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings.- Any police or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written word of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment and the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act, the party aggrieved by such authorization shall be allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution of any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said authorization.SEC. 17.Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group of Persons.- Any organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court.SEC. 18.Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest.- The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and judge as Provided in the preceding paragraph.SEC. 19.Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack.- In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned:Provided, however, That within three days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.SEC. 20.Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority within Three Days.- The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three days.SEC. 21.Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention.- The moment a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed, by the arresting police or law enforcement officers or by the police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her right: (a) to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal assistance unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO thus contacted to immediately visit the person(s) detained and provide him or her with legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice; (b) informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time without restriction; (d) allowed to commu