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ince NASA's Constellation Program (CxP), intended to return humansto the Moon by 2020, was cancelled in 2010, there has been noshortage of professional views as to what should happen next.Nevertheless, development work on systems to fly beyond low Earth

orbit (LEO) has continued without interruption, with the main targetremaining the same: to resurrect technologies that were allegedly availableback in the late 1960s.

So, the key aspects of the current strategy defined in the NASAAuthorization Act of 2010 are unsurprising: to develop a heavy-launch vehicleand a module for the crew, capable of the safe return from space trips beyondLEO. Doesn't this simply mean a rocket analogous to the Saturn V launchvehicle and a capsule similar to the Apollo Command Module (CM)?

However, the CxP plan to return to the Moon was not the first of its kind.An historical review (Arch. Study, 2005) pointed to a number of NationalAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) task forces which, since atleast 1989, had been assembled periodically in order to formulate the nextviable Moon mission.

A permanent base on the Moon had seemed to be the most logical andattractive goal, bearing in mind the apparent success of the Apollo program.Had the planned road maps of the early 1990s been realised within a span ofsome 15 years, in all probability a functioning inhabited outpost would havebeen developed on the Moon by now.

The most recent of the human spaceflight projects, the CxP again plannedat last to get to the Moon. Until its cancellation in 2010, the project hadachieved remarkable progress in planning, design and early development at acost of around US$10 billion. Yet, on 15 April 2010, President Obamaspeaking to scientists, astronauts and policymakersfinally denounced theCxP. Instead of a program to return to the Moon, he outlined the plan forNASA: "By the mid-2030s, I believe we can send humans to orbit Mars andreturn them safely to Earth," the President said. "And a landing on Mars willfollow. And I expect to be around to see it." (Pres. Speech, 2010)

Obviously, this totally new strategy means no landings, either on the Moonor on Mars, for at least some 20 years from 2010. So then, what is the majorproblem with landing on the Moon? What does it really mean in terms oftechnology and logistical challenges to repeat a feat which, according to therecord, was confidently completed many times, more than 40 years ago?

The answer can be found in recent US government and NASA documents.Any such mission is a complex chain of essential operations, all of which haveto be accomplished safely. It is sufficient for one or two links in the chain tobe unreliable to make a Moon return deadly dangerous, and the missionbecomes absolutely impossible when just one link is incomplete. Such linkswere actually acknowledged by NASA.

IISS TTHEREHERE AANYNY HHOPEOPE FORFORAA MMOONOON BBASEASE??

NASA documents on the now-defunct

ConstellationProgram for a returnto the Moon by 2020

reveal startlingevidence that the

agency is still actuallyunable to send amanned mission

to the Moon. Its as if nothing hasbeen learned from the Apollo missions,and, until recently,criticism was taboo.

by Phil Kouts June 2014

Email: philkuts@gmail.com

S

Heat Shield of the Command Module One crucial link in any mission to the Moon requires that

the return capsule be equipped with an effective andreliable heat shield. In particular, it was literally the vitalelement in the construction of each Apollo CM. Thisessential protection was necessary for re-entry into theEarth's atmosphere on lunar return. The CM hits andenters the Earth's atmosphere at the re-entry speed of 11.2kilometres per second (escape velocity value).Development of such a high-specification shield musthave been a significant scientific and technologicalchallengeespecially in the mid-1960sdue to thecomplex technical requirements.

According to the chronology, the first successful use ofthe Apollo heat shield with a crew on board the CM was inDecember 1968 during the return of Apollo 8 from thejourney around the Moon. After that, all Apollo missionsreportedly completed perfect landings and no problem hasever been highlighted or discussed.

However, the Architecture Study for the CxP reveals thatNASA now does have a problem with the thermalprotection material: "A Thermal Protection System (TPS)requires materials specifically designed to manageaerothermal heating (heat flux, dynamic pressure)experienced during hypersonic entry, for both nominal andabort scenarios Only ablators can meet maximumrequirements; they are designed to sacrifice mass underextreme heating efficiently and reliably The Apolloablative TPS (AVCOAT5061) no longer exists.Qualification of new or replacement materials will requireextensive analysis and testing." (Arch. Study, 2005, p. 629)

The essential requirement of a CM returning to Earthwith its crew is to protect the module against enormousheat at deceleration from the high re-entry speed to adescent speed appropriate for parachutes to be deployed.

At entry into the atmosphere, the protective material hasto withstand around 2,700 C compared to the lowertemperature of approximately 1,600 C at which the SpaceShuttle's shield operates. (NASA News, 2006)

This subject has remained in the background for over 40years but is now revealed as an outstanding problem.Worse still, it is perhaps a problem that has never beenresolved satisfactorily. In a 2008 report by the USGovernment Accountability Office (GAO), the admission iseven more startling than the one made three years earlier:"[A]ccording to the Orion program executive the OrionProject originally intended to use the heat shield from theApollo program as a fallback technology for the Orionthermal protection system, but was unable to recreate theApollo material." (GAO, 2008, p. 6) The report clarifies:"Furthermore, heat shield design features required by theOrion, namely the size, have never been proven and mustbe developed." (GAO, 2008, p. 11)

The importance of a reliable and effective heat shieldcannot be overstated. The availability of a proper heatshield was absolutely critical for the safe return of all theApollo crews. NASA's admission that the agency cannotnow recreate the thermal shield of a return module isabsolutely astounding. Such an admission could only becompared to an inconceivable statement that, for example,American military officials admit that after using armouredsteel in their tanks during World War II, some 40 years laterthey don't have the technology at hand to developarmoured steel and have great difficulty in reproducingsuch steel despite the previous experience during the war.The GAO report concludes: "With respect to Orion'sthermal protection system, facilities available from theApollo era for testing large-scale heat shields no longerexist." (GAO, 2008, p. 14)

Eighteen months later, possibly to soften the shockingrevelation regarding the absence of aneffective heat shield made in its firstreport, the GAO provides clarification:"NASA is using an ablative materialderived from the substance used in theApollo program. After somedifficulties, NASA was successful inrecreating the material. Because ituses a framework with manyhoneycomb-shaped cells, each ofwhich must be individually filledwithout voids or imperfections, it maybe difficult to repeatedly manufactureto consistent standards.

According to program officials,during the Apollo program the cellswere filled by hand. The contractorplans to automate the process for theOrion Thermal Protection System, butthis capability is still beingdeveloped." (GAO, 2009, p. 11) Doesthis help to convince the public that

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Apollo 14 Command Module, allegedly returned from the Moon and now housed at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida. (Source: Phil Kouts)

the problem is only one of small operations versus largeoperations and thus has been resolved?

As recently as the end of 2012, it was announced that theOrion capsule is to be tested for a medium (around 8.9kilometres per second) re-entry speed at expectedtemperatures of up to 2,200 C. (Orion Factsheet, 2012)This approach is entirely reasonable if NASA intends toinvestigate re-entry thermal conditions step by step,having had no preliminary experience. Again, it is evidentthat there is no reliance whatsoever on the claimedaccomplishments of the Apollo program.

Re-entry into the Earths Atmosphere Another crucial link in the successful chain of operations

is the choice of landing trajectory. The re-entry profile inparticular determines critical requirements for the thermalshield. According to NASA, the Apollo systems performeda "direct entry", i.e., that which is along the simplest,shortest trajectory. But this choice carries with it thepenalty of maximum atmosphereresistanceresulting in maxi-mum heat for the landingcapsule and maximum gravi-tational deceleration overload forthe crew in the module. Anothertechnique known as "skip entry"seems now to be preferred forreturning crew modules from theMoon. A skip entry meansentering the Earth's atmospherewith a longer gliding path and asoft bouncing on the Earth'satmosphere, which allows thelanding capsule to experience less heat and, at the sametime, far less gravitational overload.

NASA has reviewed trajectories for returning to Earthfrom the Moon and concludes that compared to thoseused during Apollo, the new concept should beimplemented: "it is recommended that NASA utilizeskip-entry guidance on the lunar return trajectories. Theskip-entry lunar return technique provides an approach forreturning crew to a singlelanding site anytime during alunar month. The Apollo-style direct-entry techniquerequires water or land recovery over a wide range oflatitudes." (Arch. Study, 2005, p. 39)

A wide range of latitudes would normally mean a fewdegrees on the globe, which in turn would mean a largeterritory a few hundred kilometres across, which is in linewith theoretical estimates for direct entry. Strangelyenough, to say that Apollo-style direct entry requires alarge territory entirely contradicts the historical recordsregarding the Apollo CM splashdowns that were regularlyaccomplished within a short distance from the recoveryaircraft carriers. Typical splashdown miss distances of justa few kilometres were recorded for each Apollo missionrecoverywhich should make the current recovery teamsvery envious, as they presently pick up astronauts

returning from the International Space Station (ISS) interritories dozens of kilometres across. As a matter of fact,by mentioning "a wide range of latitudes", the modernNASA research teams denounced the declaredachievement of the Apollo program in using the direct-entry technique. Today, NASA teams actually have todevelop a precise landing technique which was apparentlyavailable in the late 1960s.

It is worthwhile noting that in the period ofapproximately three years since late 2009the time of theAugustine Studyto the end of 2012, the developmentswith the Orion capsule were focused on its completion fortrips to and safe return from the ISS, which, of course, isonly stationed in LEO where the capsule would notexperience the same extreme conditions as would be thecase with flights returning from the Moon.

Radiation beyond Low Earth Orbit Regarding the radiation limits for travelling beyond LEO:

"NASA relies on externalguidance from the NationalAcademy of Sciences (NAS) andthe National Council onRadiation Protection andMeasurements (NCRP) for estab-lishing dose limits. Due to thelack of data and knowledge, theNAS and NCRP recom-mendedthat radiation limits forexploration missions could notbe determined until new sciencedata and knowledge [were]obtained." (Arch. Study, 2005, p.

109) The next year, in swift response to NASA's request, the

NCRP produced a report with a title to puzzle anunprepared reader: "Information Needed to MakeRadiation Protection Recommendations for SpaceMissions Beyond Low-Earth Orbit". (NCRP, 2006) By this,the NCRP admits that there is no substantial informationavailable on cosmic radiation beyond LEO, including dataon lunar surface radiation, despite the allegedachievements of Apollo.

The Augustine Committee quotes another report, thistime from the National Research Council (NRC, 2008),which largely confirms the problem: "Lack of knowledgeabout the biological effects of and responses to spaceradiation is the single most important factor limiting theprediction of radiation risk associated with human spaceexploration." (Augustine, 2009, p. 100)

The National Academy of Sciences needed some rawinformation just to be able to start working on thoserecommendations. Of course, some data should havebeen readily available to the American scientificcommunity over the 40 years since the Apollo program.

Common sense tells us that information regardingradiation effects on the Moon, if such information exists at

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by mentioning a wide range of latitudes,the modern NASA research

teams denounced thedeclared achievement of theApollo program in using the

direct-entry technique.

all, should be available within NASA, but from thecommittee's report it is clear that NASA does not have it,either. This is an incredible omission because if the Apollocrews were indeed on the lunar surface, the agencydefinitely should have the relevant extra-vehicularradiation data. Where is this data? Especially significantwould surely be data from the Apollo 15, 16 and 17missions.

According to the mission reports, the six astronauts onthese three missions each spent from 18 to 20 hours on thesurface during three exits (extra-vehicular activities, EVAs),under the direct radiation from the Sun and other cosmicsources, in their spacesuitswithout any additionalshielding. Moreover, some EVAs occurred at the time ofelevated solar activity, potentially bringing excessive solarflares or particle events and resulting radiation to the crew.It is notable that more than 40 yearslater, there is no overt indication thatthe Apollo astronauts ever experiencedany residual effects from radiationexposure.

In their late 70s and early 80s, theastronauts seemingly continue to leadnormal lives. Neil Armstrong passedaway in 2012 at the respectable age of82, due to causes apparently unrelatedto radiation effects. This is a fantasticoutcome of the Apollo programprovided that it really was accomplishedin 196972. Yet, strangely enough, thereis little indication that NASA hasever paid any attention to thisremarkable biomedical fact whichis a direct scientific outcome of theApollo program. This is importantself-evident information, and NASAshould have started talking aboutthis exciting finding: that no specialmedical and protective precautions againstwalking and working on the Moon arerequired.

On the contrary, NASA is silenton the matter and, as shown above,has asked for help on a subject when it should be in fullpossession of the prime information and be the proudleader in this research. It is also noteworthy that in itsmass media releases, NASA regularly reminds itsaudiences about Apollo 11, where astronauts were on thelunar surface for only two hours, while it does not usuallytalk about circumstances of the Apollo 12 and 14 EVAs tosuch a degree and is remarkably silent on Apollo missions15 to 17 which would be crucial evidence in favour ofharmless trips to the Moon.

Regarding radiation effects on humans, the AugustineCommittee concludes: "These radiation effects areinsufficiently understood and remain a majorphysiological and engineering uncertainty in any human

exploration program beyond low-Earth orbit." (Augustine,2009, p. 100) The committee doesn't speak specificallyabout potential radiation problems on the lunar surfaceitself. Nor is the radiation danger during landing of crewson the Moon in the Apollo missions considered to anyextent. Could it be that the decision not to mention Apollowas based not on the fact that the committee limited itselfto studies carried out in LEO but precisely because thereis no medical data on effects on human health beyondLEO? In fact, there is no connection or reference at all tothe legendary Moon missions regarding the radiationproblem in the quoted NASA reports (i.e., Arch. Study,2005, and Augustine, 2009).

Landing On and Taking Off from the Lunar Surface While considering optimal strategies for travelling to the

Moon and Mars, NASA admits thatthere could be technical problemswhen actually landing on and thereaftertaking off from the lunar surface. TheAugustine Committee considers anoption to delay the Moon landing asmore viable, and contemplates that"[a]t least initially, astronauts wouldnot travel into the deep gravity wells ofthe lunar and Martian surface, deferringthe cost of developing human landingand surface systems" (Augustine, 2009,p. 15)thus also avoiding issuesconcerning radiation exposure during

EVA. Nevertheless, when giving

preference to a combined strategywhere landing on the Moon isindefinitely delayed, thecommittee admits the difficultiesof developing the landingtechnologies.

Again, why not rely on theexperience apparently gained fromthe Apollo program? And why is atechnical aspect which was sosuccessfully handled some 40

years ago now labelled as a "deep gravity well", implyingthat it is a struggle to get out of the lunar or Martianenvironments?

Although the Augustine Committee talks about gravityon the Moon and on Mars at the same time, one may notethat the gravity forces on the surfaces of these two spacebodies are different. Let's state them relative to our ownon the Earth, in percentages: then the gravity on Mars is37 per cent of Earth's, and the Moon's gravity is 16.6 percent or just one-sixth of Earth's. Obviously, it must be fareasier to take off from the Moon.

So, one would expect NASA to discuss the comparativelygreater challenge of takeoff from Mars, yet the agencyplaces both at the same level of difficulty, which seems

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NASA regularlyreminds its

audiences aboutApollo 11

and is remarkablysilent on Apollomissions 15 to 17which would becrucial evidence in favour ofharmless trips to the Moon.

illogical. In 1969, gravity wasn't a problem for takeoffs fromthe Moonbut for some reason by 2010 it had become avery serious problem.

The Augustine Committee expands on objectives set outin 2005 as broadly as one can imagine today: "Themissions would go to places humans have never been to,escaping from the Earth/Moon system, visiting near-Earthobjects, flying by Mars, thereby continuously engagingpublic interest. Explorers would initially avoid traveling tothe bottom of the relatively deep gravity wells of thesurface of the Moon and Mars, but would learn to workwith robotic probes on the planetary surface." (Augustine,2009, p. 43)

The initial intention of the CxP was to complete asatisfactory return to the Moon that could be seen as thefirst step in this new, broadly brushed range of programs.However, now the time frame and scope have becomeentirely uncertain.

The findings of the Augustine Committee regarding lunarexploration demonstrate that the connection to the datafrom Apollo systems available inthe 1960s, i.e., human landingand surface systems as well asthe ascent capabilities of Apollo,has been deliberatelysidelinedwhich implies that allthe data from Apollo is of littlevalue to the actual requirementsof space exploration, which takesus to that ascent vehicle: theSaturn V rocket.

The Heavy-Launch Rocket At the outset of the CxP in

2005, NASA put forward thisrecommendation: "Adopt and pursue a Shuttle-derivedarchitecture as the next-generation launch system forcrewed flights into LEO and for 125-mT-class cargo flightsfor exploration beyond Earth's orbit. After thoroughanalysis of multiple options for crew and cargotransportation, Shuttle-derived options were found to havesignificant advantages with respect to cost, schedule,safety, and reliability." (Arch. Study, 2005, p. 47)

Despite these advantages, the Space Shuttle system as akey candidate had a fundamental flaw: limited payloadcapacity. It could hardly serve as a heavy-lift vehicle for aMoon mission. Indeed, the Saturn V allegedly used to takeup to LEO a payload of approximately 120 tons, whileSpace Shuttle systems are limited to payloads of around100 tons or so, including the orbiter. The redesign of thesesystems presents a completely new task (see below).

It is not surprising that NASA has continued to examineoptions for the suitability of various powerful rockets fortravelling to the Moon and beyond. It would seem logicalthat the development of this next generation of launchrockets would take into account the achievements of theSaturn V system deployed during Apollo.

First-Stage Engines (F-1)The success of the Apollo program was largely based on

the performance of the Saturn V rocket with its five massiveF-1 engines in the first stage, which were claimed to be themost powerful rocket engines ever built. However, inNASA's comprehensive, 750-page Architecture Study, theF-1 engine is neither considered as a fall-back option noranalysed as a prototype for further development. It is onlyonce vaguely mentioned in this detailed review of NASA'scapabilities in rocket science and technology. (Arch. Study,2005, p. 467)

Instead, four years into the CxP, NASA had made no cleardecision regarding what the next heavy-lift launch vehicleshould be based upon. By mid-2009, the AugustineCommittee was still trying to choose between the newlysuggested "Ares I + Ares V architecture; a Shuttle-derived vehicle; and a 'super-heavy' launcher derived fromEvolved Expendable Launch Vehicleheritage".(Augustine, 2009, p. 64) The latter were vehicles ofmedium capacity, routinely used by NASA in recent

unmanned missions. The Aresrockets were part of the CxP. Hereagain, the Augustine Committeementions neither the Saturn Vnor the F-1 engines.

Furthermore, the GAO pointsto an issue identified during theearly study and modelling of anew Ares I crew launch vehicle:"Current modeling indicates thatthrust oscillation within the firststage causes unacceptablestructural vibrations. There is apossibility that the thrustoscillation frequency and

magnitude may be outside the design limits of the Ares designrequirements [emphasis added]." Then, the GAO continues:"A NASA focus team studied this issue and has proposedoptions for mitigation including incorporating vibrationabsorbers into the design of the first stage and redesigningportions of the Orion Vehicle to isolate the crew from thevibration Failure to completely understand the flightcharacteristics of the modified booster could create a riskof hardware failure and loss of vehicle control." (GAO,2008, p. 10)

This statement has an historical aspect. The sameproblemi.e., structural vibration in the body of therocket, caused by the vibration of the thrust chambers ofthe first-stage engineswas found at the second-ever trialof the Saturn V after its unmanned launch on 4 April 1968,known as Apollo 6. The so-called "pogo" vibrations werefound to be so large that they were recognised as a threatto the health and survival of the crew and to the integrityof the payload, including the Lunar Module (LM). Even atthe time it was admitted: "Had there been men on boardApollo 6, the crew probably would have aborted themission during the pogo, when they would have been so

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Instead, four years into the CxP, NASA had madeno clear decision regardingwhat the next heavy-liftlaunch vehicle should

be based upon.

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violently banged around that they couldn't have operatedthe spacecraft." (Apollo, 1989, p. 314)

However, without any further test launches since theproblematic trial in April, in December 1968 the Saturn V,according to NASA reports, successfully took Apollo 8 to flyaround the Moon with a human crew. Much later, duringthe third unmanned launch of the Saturn V with Skylab onboard, the vibrational problem returned. During thelaunch on 14 May 1973, the Skylab station was heavilydamaged due to the severe vibrations of the first stage ofthe rocket. One solar panel was torn away from the stationbody and severely dented it as a result. For some period oftime, because of the damage, Skylab was treated as lost.

Yet it begs the question: how did the Saturn V manageto run perfectly from 1968 through to 1972 and then, somesix months after the end of the Apollomissions, succumb to the sameproblem that it had at its birth? For itwas between the second and the thirdunmanned launches of the Saturn Vthat all the apparently successfulmissions to the Moon occurred.

These historical events could help usto understand the recent decision-making processes in NASA during thedevelopment of a heavy-launch vehicle.While not relying on Apollo's besttechnology, NASA has struggled tochoose the design of a large launchrocket. It faces immense engine-vibration problems similar to thosethat occurred during at least twounmanned Saturn V launches.

In mid-2009, some 18 monthsafter its first comment onvibrations identified in the firststage, the GAO admitted at thetime of the Augustine Committeereport that NASA still hadvibrational problems with Ares I:"Another issue related to vibrationis vibroacousticsthe pressure ofthe acoustic wavesproduced bythe firing of the Ares I first stage and the rocket'sacceleration through the atmospherewhich may causeunacceptable structural vibrations throughout Ares I andOrion. According to agency officials, NASA is stilldetermining how these vibrations and acousticenvironments may affect the vehicles." (GAO, 2009, p. 13)

The Augustine Committee expresses similar concernsabout the Ares I rocket, without suggesting any viablesolution: "NASA determined that the original plan touse the Space Shuttle main engines on the Ares I upperstage would be too costly But the replacement enginehad less thrust and inferior fuel economy, so the first-stagesolid rockets had to be modified to provide more totalimpulse. This in turn contributed to a vibration

phenomenon, the correction of which has yet to be fullydemonstrated." (Augustine, 2009, p. 111)

To sum up, a four-year period of research and design hasresulted in identification of the key problems analogous tothose experienced with the Saturn V unmanned missions.Soon, the Ares rocket development was cancelled. Thevibration problem of Apollo 6 allegedly had been solved byDecember 1968, since, for the Apollo 8 launch vehicle, thissupposition was made: "The new helium prevalve cavitypressurization system will be flying on the S-IC for the firsttime. In this system, cavities in the liquid oxygen prevalvesare filled with helium to create accumulators or 'shockabsorbers' to damp out oscillations. This system wasinstalled to prevent excessive longitudinal oscillationsexperienced in the Apollo 6 flight." (Ap-8 PK, 1968, p. 47)

If this oscillation issue truly had beensettled, then one must forciblyconclude that this fix was withheld atthe time of the Skylab accident and tothis day is not considered a viablesolution for future space travel. So, theobservation remains that, once again,since there is no reliance on the Apolloexperiences in this regard, all allegedlysuccessful Saturn V launches for thenine manned Apollo missions arequestionable.

Second-Stage Engines (J-2X)Whatever the first stage of the

heavy-lift vehicle would be, for thesecond stage a hydrogen engine, J-2X, had confidently been selected.A recommended rocket stage fordeparture from Earth's orbit willalso require J-2X. This means thedevelopment of a modified engineas a derivative from the J-2 upper-stage engine used in theApolloSaturn system.

Along with the F-1 engine, the J-2engine was the basis of the Apollosuccess. The engine had a thrust

that could not be delivered by any other means ofcomparable size and weight, and it was essential, first, tobring the payload into LEO and then to launch theCommand/Service Module with Lunar Module to theMoon. After the Apollo missions, the last time that the J-2engine was used was for the launch of a Saturn 1B rocketin 1975 for a space rendezvous with the Soyuz craft in LEO(the ApolloSoyuz Test Project).

At the beginning of the CxP, NASA was determined tomodify the J-2, although the agency admitted that therewere problems: "The use of a J-2S engine for an EarthDeparture Stage (EDS) is an area of high risk because a J-2S

Continued on page 82

Yet it begs thequestion: how did the Saturn Vmanage to run

perfectly from 1968through to 1972

and then, some sixmonths after the end of theApollo missions,succumb to the

same problem thatit had at its birth?

engine has never been flown. The J-2S(J-2 simplified) was designed toreplace the Saturn vehicle upper stageJ-2 engines Thus, the estimatedtime of 4 years for qualification,fabrication, and testing of the engineposes a significant risk to theprogram." (Arch. Study, 2005, p. 8)

After the analysis and design workhad been underway for some three tofour years, the GAO then made aprovisional suggestion of a requiredtime frame and intensity for thisredevelopment: "The developmentschedule for the J-2X is aggressive,allowing less than 7 years fromdevelopment start to first flight, andhighly concurrent." (GAO, 2008, p. 12)

If the engine had indeed beenreliably used some 40 years ago, whywould it now takeat the current rateof progress in technologya massiveseven years for its redevelopment?And why was the redevelopment,which is going to be concurrent, raisedas a troubling aspect? Naturally, NASAshould have relied on its experiencewith the Apollo systems on similar,concurrent development works.

The GAO reaches an astoundingconclusion on the J-2X upper-stageengine: "Although the J-2X is based onthe J-2 and J-2S engines used on theSaturn-Vthe number of plannedchanges is such that, according toNASA review boards, the effortessentially represents a new enginedevelopment." (GAO, 2008, p. 10)

How does this conclusion comparewith the whole Apollo spacecraftdevelopment, which was completed inthe mid-1960s within seven years andwas indeed new and concurrent withseveral other critical developmentsall completed for the first time?

The construction of a heavy-launchrocket as the key part of the CxP waseventually stopped by 2010. The crewvehicle, Ares I, was tried in anunmanned flight only once, in October2009, and it was already clear at thetime that it had no future. There wasno reliance on the Saturn V's key

elements such as the powerful F-1engine of the first stage, and there wasvery little reliance on the J-2 engine ofthe second stage.

In the CxP, the new Moon rocketappeared to be based on newdevelopments unrelated to the SaturnV. Moreover, the legendary F-1 engineis not even mentioned in modernNASA documents. It is as if it hadnever existed. While NASA doesn'thave a suitable heavy launcher, itimplies by this omission that it doesn'thave confidence in the Apollotechnological capability, either.

Conclusion In April 2008, the GAO saw the key

technical elements of the Apollo SpaceProgram as a fall-back option to thesystem under development. However,quite possibly it was also becomingclear over time that supportivesolutions were not always availablefrom NASA's experience and expertise.Whatever might be the real reasonsbehind this lack of will to rely uponApollo data for matters lunar, by mid-2009 the US government had come torealise the impossibility of completingthe Constellation Program within theinitially allocated time frame of 15years.

The GAO notes that it has reportedon "areas of technical challenge in thepast, including thrust oscillation,thermal protection systemand J-2Xnozzle extension". The GAO continues:"In addition to these challenges, ourrecent work has highlighted othertechnical challenges, including Orionmass control, vibroacoustics, lift-offdrift, launch abort system, andmeeting safety requirements." (GAO,2009, p. 10)

The GAO has identified multipletechnical risks for both the launchingrocket and the Orion developmentand, as a result, for the current missionto the Moon. Many problemsidentified in 200509 are surprisinglysimilar to those which would havebeen encountered and, of course,solved in order for the legendaryApollo program to be successful.

The viability of the old program wasinevitably questioned inside NASAwhen the new one was started. If therewasn't much expertise to inherit fromthe Apollo program, then the questionas to whether such a program couldhave been completed 40 years ago isnow highlighted in a major way.

NASA still faces technical challengeswhich were seemingly resolved some40 years ago. The overall message ofthe latest NASA reports is that thetechnology for journeying to the Moonis not available. Neither is a launchingrocket, nor even a module for the safetransportation of a crew and return toEarth.

Departure from the Moon's surface,which wasn't a problem during theApollo era, is now a problem due tothe perceived difficulties in getting outof the so-called deep gravity well.Furthermore, NASA admits that theagency doesn't have sufficientunderstanding of radiation beyondLEO. If just one crucial link in a Moonvisitation project is missing, the wholeprogram becomes impossible. Onesuch link is, certainly, the heat shield ofthe returning module which is still tobe developed. Without an effectiveand reliable shield, any manned lunarmissions would be one way onlyincapable of returning.

It was recently admitted by TomYoung, a retired Lockheed Martinexecutive, that NASA is on "a decliningtrajectory". Asteroids and Lagrangepoints "can be steps" but do not"inspire", while there are only a few"practical" destinations: the Earth'smoon, the moons of Mars, and theplanet Mars itself. (Young, 2013) So,an idea to develop an inhabitablelunar outpost, cherished initially (Arch.Study, 2005, p. 56), still stands.

In light of the above and many recentfindings, to identify honestly the keyproblems and to clear the way forwardto their pragmatic solution, wouldn't itbe more productive to recognise finallythat the Apollo manned missions tothe Moon, allegedly completed fourdecades ago, did not happen?

Is There Any Hope for a Moon Base?

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