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THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHYpresents

edited by

STEPHEN LAW

PHILOSOPHY FOR EVERYONE

Past &Present


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Hardshipoften prepares

an ordinaryperson

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for an

extraordinarydestiny.

C S LEWIS

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Past & Present:PHILOSOPHY FOR EVERYONE

The Royal Institute of Philosophy14 Gordon Square

London

WC1H 0AR

United Kingdom

T. 020 7387 4130www.royalinstitutephilosophy.org

Published by: Cambridge University Press

Design: Joseph Brown

edited by

STEPHEN LAW

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08

Contents

ANNUAL LECTURE SERIES:

A REFLECTION ON THE PAST 16 YEARS

1999

2001

2002

2003

2004

Philosophy as a

Humanistic Discipline

Page 28

CHRISTINE KORSGAARD

JOHN SEARLE

MARY WARNOCK

JRGEN HABERMAS

NOAM CHOMSKY

Personhood, Animals

and the Law

Page 22

Freedom as a

Humanistic Discipline

Page 32

What is Natural and Should

We Care About it?

Page 40

Religious Tolerance?

The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights

Page 44

Simple Truths,

Hard Problems

Page 48

2000SIR BERNARD WILLIAMS

1998 Humilityand HistoryPage 14IAN JAMES KIDD


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2007

2006

2005

2008

2010

2011

2012

2013

Knowledge, Beliefand Faith

Page 64

Revenge of

the Given

Page 58

Intention

in Action

Page 52

The Sovereignty

of Reason

Page 76

SIR ANTHONY KENNY

JERRY FODOR

JOHN MCDOWELL

THOMAS SCANLON

NED BLOCK

DEREK PARFIT

ALASDAIR MACINTYRE

TYLER BURGE

Reasoning

Reason

Page 68

Attention on

Mentalism

Page 80

Is Personal Identity

what Matters?

Page 84

Social Structures and their

Threats to Moral Agency

Page 92

Perception -

Where Mind Begins

Page 96

2009SIMON BLACKBURN

2014 Conceiving the Impossibleand the Mind-Body ProblemPage 102THOMAS NAGEL

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ForewordSTEPHEN LAW

Axima ad expliquam veri dis voluptas alique

magnati issimpo rporibu sdaepe nonsecest,

quo velicilles aut id evenda dolupit labo. Ore si-

nume de ped enimustrum es di am dipit pore qui

ilignia parum a venisi inum eum esectem labor-

po rumquas pellatium cus ium exerem sernatus,

alis comnit, consequiat que laccus volorempel

idi alis rerum quunt, od et ipis ut latus sant aut

aturepelit ipiet volori nias dipition con ea sunt

et porro voluptas esciam ulla nulparum ipsae si-

mintet aut autem dolorepudit, sa denis maxim

aut ad quis dolesequias eturerat etur sant, tecte-

nest, officillore cum quam quis quat apera quas

is repro expella cepres mod mo minctem pererisquamet modi nient.

Ut postissini consent, isinvenist, sit labor i-

bere maionescius vellacerum invendi non nis

quatinust quam quat officit, omnim solecullut

et peliqui ne doloresto et, sequati oreperis arum,

conseca boresed que suscilliquas miniminciet

quam rectem. Namusanda nem facipiet om-

modis ex et offictur simodit, occuptation nobis

ducitem cuscit, alicius voluptasitas siti totat am,

velluptas quunt aut mo quae nectat eumquunt

quam, utet eos cone et libusa cupta doloreped

molent ut optata cum aut aut di voluptius, omnis

asit derum hic tem que ped quos accumquamus

arciissin preperovit eate cuptate doluptatur rerum

consequaerio tende nectiunt evenis maximusan-

dae con conseceritas sit aut mintectur, seque se-

ceptum nonse pore vent ea quam coreperum et

eumquissi tota que sanderias provit lias auta pro

beaque comnihitiam et, si rectate prem ratur as-

pedit, voloreped quatiate deliquam as modigenia

nones aut pratur, apit eum ullauta velende rferi-

bus. Uptaeped mi, alit ut et poremolor atet, con-

esti onesequamus eaquas es erunt, ut quam etur?

Onsecab orepudiate et, quundeles re sinis-

que que consend ipsaepudae. Uptatur essinvere-

pro qui odiscit evento beatemp orumqui accae

veles molut quis inctiost, num laut as sapitenimet

des nit inum int, nem incto inctas as soluptatio

torit ditias alitasp erferup tatium apita quo que

pliquiam repudia dolorru ptaturi tatusdae vellup-

tius ut ma dolo millam quam rem idero et omnis

idunti dolorenti nostrum fuga. Itatatet restium

et quid untis as similluptiat qui to tem. Ut et min

rem sint deliti que ommoluptus, nus, accaboresed

magnamenda sus. Ab ipsa cus neceptasimus esto od quia sit

volecae. Nobit que dollaborem re doluptatque

rest quid exeri to blanditae pa arum fugiaes et id

que vel molut intem reritio maxim suntia se re

ma sam inis es con pre, sum quae volupti conet,

nist, omnimporrum hit di voluptatio. Ur? Quist,

cone ditem quam cuptate nimi, conseque ne rem

sequi velenti nempell iquibus magnis est at facep-

er itetur, niminveliqui nullecesto magnis endes et

eumet minvendendae porporesti dolupient adio.

Me etur anistiis ut in reperfe rumquam, aceptas-

simus alibus rehenia sequia verat enimusa cones

voloratur? Unt.

Ovit volut a diciet rem hic tem laut re pe-

rumquamus nobitia incium cus experferro vo-

luptates ut adis debis duntur reperepel ius reheni

od maximporenim eossum vendisitas ex eturibe

rionse porunt doluptatum, ute re aut autatquia

nimporpossum vendebis est et in praes arion re

nihitationet lab incti cus que coreium quodis

soloris quaepel int porem quuntiist, eumetus pa

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11

porehen dicidero des de ra nia volor acipsundae.

Nemquame porem. Tibus, sequi ut apitisc illa-

bo. Eheniendus modissendae reiciet atem nobis

verciae eatinctur? Officit molorumet qui vellabo.

Epta cum am exerite ctoremquas aut dollupis eos

eum experum laccus. Quias sita parchil landitin

coremporem enistium renetW laci unt aut as net

dae pligenistrum faceped quistWiat rem que ma.

Ura re esciem virte civem senihilisse iachic

vit re, nis Caturs pro, quo niamquemus con tante

fit, tarit, silibus, nis dum unum vericae sicape-

rum iam esituium actam nius etiam ilinatandam

noctu quondaci serridesil vilis atquit in tatam

remo etia veme is. Mae videm ingulessidem vast

publin sestrus, mo haliam inamereortia ocul ta,

qua publi fac ta, sci con invoc, clatum aus ia cae

des habus? Quam nunt oponsules aliquam nihilic

ienatum intem porum silicae movere, intrae nos,

que curo issa vis, cerus fatuam, Catum int.

Et grat, C. Tum sum spertis, unterit.

Bonsimiusum maxim ocuperv ignatuid con vis

adestrebatem satuam adhuist inatimus morena,

stil compro vium abus condam.

Atquasd amdis, scen dem audeffr eviventis

bon vivis. Ontifecipte, etis, us et; Catis, nos hossenductum oc, ublis popublis poendam mend-

iem, cludam nestili bulicae tur, mante etia vit;

Catisse, o vium tum dium ala Servividii porbes

hoccivi vidieme nosultum o vissimpliis, cern-

imo rederesil vita res nos, Catam iam se, nos,

niquam. movidessatus cotil crum ompertemnes

mei essendam plice demortem moveris, tanulem.

ciemuss immovit. Re fachui faucit. Bes senat,

fuerum es derra orsuludam. Maritab emorum,

coterum ditis; Catum id suscerfena, sendionte

peribut aus, unum tatiemunum pribunum adduc

re publis itui priortem atium inum ignorum per

hae facia rese, Ti. Patic tatissendam dientes facr is

et, Ti. Conloc, ommo aripic ret dum hocchil ut

Ses viditus habus eo eo, que nos fatilisque

destus furemquod pecrum ia consuntem quidep-

sensus vid crimur quis, que es condum noveror-

dici fur acchuius vit; egil hebus furo, aperratilne

morum conloct alabunum cio uteript eatrum

ego periost resultorit; noris hae furehem temus

huium egilis cla inte te mentem essultio hin-

praecont. Am P. Ad patiocum hostere ortabus

aut anume inatien dacesime nortanum movena

nostrunt. Stephen Law is part of the Royal Insti-

tute of Philosophy and does lectures.Dessi vel in-

tist velendist ut ex et pratiat ibuscipic tem quatur,to ipsaes quibus, inus excerro qui cuptatem int,

tem quis doluptatur ratis eniet, ut aut autameturio.

Ut eicimil latiis ditat aceatem poruptatur

sum es etum a quas aut esequi sum nobita corep-

tati to volorum, et rest labore pra cullaut es por

atiatiandi occabor erchil magnima nihilloria do-

luptae. Qui consequ iatenis suntur, omnimusam

ut aut vit acerumque pratur sequo corpore-

rio. Itat. Cae se autae et ut aliquate soluptatatia

dolo idemquas autam cullaut dollorp orehendae

reperib usdaes dolorem porporis sim undeles ac-

cus moste laborat quiaerore pe volupti umquis

expel imus.

Ulpa comnis nihitia consendis acerum inc-

tore num quiat ut que eata accus audis et officto

minvendenti in plaborem am volorec tatesti ve-

lenes a venderro volupta exces commosam ex-

perit et omnis corpore plicidita velit offic tem.

Is aut alis dolor accus. Consequam liquatium

que od quuntotatque mo edtis groax dertelistata.

From ashes to ashes, and dust to dust.


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There is nosun without

shadow,

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and it is

essential toknow the

night.ALBERT CAMUS

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Humilityand History

IAN JAMES KIDD

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functions. The origins of philosophy are unclear,

but certainly there were, in Greece, India, and

China, vigorous philosophical traditions by the

sixth to fifth centuries BCE. Indeed, it is possi-

ble that Confucius, the Buddha, Thales and the

authors of the Upanisads may have been con-

temporaries. The last six thousand years have,

of course, seen philosophy, both Eastern and

Western, go on to sustain vigorous, dynamic

traditions. Indeed, one striking fact evidenced by

history is the ubiquity of philosophical reflection.

Across the scope of human cultures, in

different times and climes, one finds sustained

philosophical reflection, on topics ranging from

knowledge and justice, to society and education,

to reality and meaning. Although philosophy,

like any subject, has its boom and bust periods,

recent scholarship indicates that even periods

previously considered to be rather barren such

as the Dark Ages of medieval Europe were,

in fact, philosophically dynamic, even if their

questions and problems reflected concerns rather

different from ours.

The fact of the historical ubiquity of

philosophy of course pleases those engaged in

the business of philosophy today. Certainly

philosophers, whether professional or lay, should

find a legitimate sense of pride in their partici-

pation in a venerable tradition of thought. This

should include an appreciation of the sincere and

sustained efforts, by men and women historicallyand culturally distant from us, to articulate ideas

about their place in the order of things, which

we may, today, profitably draw upon. And there

isnt, one hopes, too much vainglory in the op-

timistic sentiment that philosophy has been, and

continues to be, an ennobling feature of human life.

Although such sentiments have their place,

the history of philosophy surely offers us more

than just a sense of pride of ones place with-

in a venerable tradition. Those things matter, if

only to motivate, but the value of the history of

philosophy should not be narrowly construed

as a capacity to encourage young philosophers

those sitting through hard going undergrad-

uate lectures on Kant, say to keep at it and

work hard. A sense of standing on the shoulders

of giants, to borrow Newtons handy phrase, is

useful. But so, too, is ones knowing something

about those giants and about how, and why, they

worked and wondered as they did.

In the history of philosophy, these giants

would be all those earlier thinkers whose work is

now part of our shared history. Some of the gi-

ants are obvious and familiar, such as Plato or the

Buddha, whereas others, like Nagarjuna or JosiahRoyce, remain reliably obscure, at least within

Philosophy is an ancient subject, but what isthe value of an understanding of its historyfor its practice? What can contemporary philos-

ophers draw from an historical understanding

of their subject? I argue that amongst its many

benefits, the history of philosophy is an excellent

resource for the cultivation of certain intellectual

virtues, most notably gratitude, humility, and jus-

tice. Acquaintance with the history of philoso-

phy can, therefore, be edifying, in the sense of be-

ing conducive to the cultivation and exercise of

virtues. These virtues can be cultivated in many

ways, but the history of philosophy offers unique

means for securing those virtues just mentioned

or so I will argue.

In what follows, I hope to show that some

familiar pedagogical and intellectual uses of thehistory of philosophy in fact reflect its edifying

Ian James Kidd works in epistemology,

philosophy of medicine, philosophy of

religion, history and philosophy of science,

and the philosophical traditions of Asia and

Continental Europe.

He focuses on epistemic virtues and

vices (especially epistemic injustice and

epistemic humility); the experience and

value of illness; the nature of a religious

life; contingency and pluralism in science;

scientism and anti-scientism; the practice

and nature of philosophy; and the life andthought of Paul Feyerabend.

Kidd founded the Durham Philosophy

Departments Gender Action Group and is

committed to improving the representation

of women in philosophy, and is also

involved with the Leeds University chapter

of Minorities in Philosophy (MAP).

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BOOKSScience and the Self: Animals,

Evolution, and Ethics:

Essays in Honour of Mary Midgley

co-edited with Elizabeth McKinnell

The Routledge Handbook to

Epistemic Injustice

co-edited with Jos Medina and

Gaile Pohlhaus

Historiography and thePhilosophy of the Science

co-edited with Robin Hendry

Reappraising Feyerabend

co-edited with Matthew Brown

Mystery and Humility

co-edited with Guy Bennett-Hunter

certain areas of academic philosophy. Both fa-

miliarity and obscurity can be fickle things, of

course. Some philosophical giants are prominent

for their notoriety, like Nietzsche, and others for

their accessibility, like Russell. But what does it

mean to say that these figures, and others more

like them, are part of a shared history, and how

and why does that history matter?

The significance of the history of phi-

losophy turns on the answer to that question.

Certainly there are many reasons why one

might not want to teach philosophy in a his-

torical manner. One might prefer, for instance,

to teach or write about philosophy in terms of

problems or discrete areas, like Metaphysics,

Consciousness, or Topics in Philosophy of

Science. This way of philosophising focuses on

topics, issues, and themes, like the nature of time,

mental causation, or scientific methodology. And

that can be a valuable and effective way of doing

philosophy, especially within the context of the

structure of modern universities.

Yet a focus on abstract argument divorced

from concrete context does, at least sometimes,

compromise ones understanding and appre-

ciation of the ideas and problems being dis-

cussed. One could, for instance, take a course on

Knowledge and Scepticism, covering Pyrrho,

Descartes, Kant and others, without ever de-

tailing why, for each of those figures, questions

about knowledge and scepticism mattered. Anappeal to the inherent fascination or trickiness of

their questions usually suffices, at least for those

who opt to take such courses, but often those

questions are presented without a clear account

of why those philosophers were troubled by

them. Most philosophers, at least in the past, were

troubled by philosophical questions not simply

out of mere curiosity, but rather because they

perceived that those questions, even the most

abstract ones, had implications for aspects of life

which mattered to them.

Such concerns are easily to neglect. A

philosophers position can be summarised as

an argument, or a series of bullet-points on a

PowerPoint slide, but this format is apt to neglect

The history of philosophyis, therefore, a feature of

philosophising itself.

the vital concerns that animated them. For in-

stance, it often tends to obscure the biographi-

cal and historical context of a philosophers life,

reducing them to names and dates, of the form

Thomas Hobbes (15881679). Where, after all,

is the contextual richness of a biography such

as that which Heidegger offered for Aristotle:

he was born he worked, and he died.

Heidegger may have been right that, for certain

purposes, Aristotles biography is not of inter-

est, but that fact is only true at a certain level

of analysis. Certainly it is not a general axiom

of philosophising.

Context is not only pedagogically or interpre-

tively valuable. There are entertaining anecdotes

in the history of philosophy, for sure and not

solely in the life of Ludwig Wittgenstein but

the value of historical context goes further than

that. Showing the wider social and political

conditions within which philosophers worked,

worried and wondered can help us to appreciate

their practical objectives.

The Presocratics offer interesting argu-

ments against traditional Greek religion, but they

were, ultimately, intended to facilitate social and

political reform. Or to take a slightly later exam-

ple, the Pyrrhonian sceptics did not engage in

abstract epistemology, asking abstruse questions

about the nature of knowledge, just because they

were interested. Rather, it was because they per-

ceived that a person who is to be happy must

understand, first, what things are like and, sec-

ond, how one should be disposed towards them.

Put another way, they thought that knowledge

of things was essential if we are to act properly

regarding them, therefore interlinking episte-mology and ethics in a way that will, one worries,

16 HUMILITY AND HISTORY


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A knowledge and appreciation of thehistory of philosophy can be a valuable

feature of the actual practiceof philosophy.

remain invisible if one concentrated simply on the

arguments themselves.

Many derisive assessments of the value of

philosophy arise because, in many cases, those

critics do not see how the abstract issues raised

by the philosophically-minded bear on practical

issues. The fault may be shared, but it can, I think,

be partially resolved by an historical perspective

upon philosophy. Once one becomes accus-

tomed to a historical articulation of philosophy,

the task of providing accounts of the practical

import of abstract philosophising should be-

come much easier. By being able to explain how

earlier philosophers came to their ideas, or what

provoked their questions, it should become easier

for us to do the same for our own inquiries. And

this should be understood, not as accounting for

ourselves, but, rather, as explaining ourselves, for

our benefit, and for that of our critics.

Certainly a knowledge and appreciation

of the history of philosophy can be a valuable

feature of the actual practice of philosophy. An

understanding of philosophy as an historical dis-cipline shows how it is bound up with social and

IAN JAMES KIDD 17

political change, religious controversy, scientific

innovation, and so on. Those sorts of issues are,

of course, features of our world today; indeed,

many philosophical questions are perennial in

the sense that they return, each generation, often

in evolving forms. Questions about beauty and

art, justice and goodness, knowledge and certain-

ty, and the like have featured within the public

and private lives of human beings across all times

and cultures. An historical understanding of the

philosophers that responded to them can help us,

today, in our own efforts to address them.

The history of philosophy is, therefore, a

feature of philosophising itself. To ask and address

philosophical questions is to enter into a long-

standing tradition of inquiry. The specific con-

tent and form of philosophical questions changes

over time, of course, in response to changing so-

cial and intellectual conditions. Questions about

the certainty of knowledge, say, were changed by

the development of the modern sciences. But

appreciating this involves an historical sensitivity.

It requires us to look not only at earlier philos-ophers who asked similar questions, but also at

the context within which those questions were

asked. After all, it is often context which lends

our questions urgency, vitality, and significance.

There are many philosophical questions

and puzzles, but which ones matter to us, and

why, is as much a matter of history as it is of cu-

riosity and inquiry. The role of history in shaping

our own ideas points to another role for the his-

tory of philosophy. Many questions face us, but

not all of them matter to us. Certain questions

move us, either by disturbing or fascinating us

(or, indeed, both). Other questions are curiosi-

ties interesting, but deemed neither urgent

nor essential. Understanding the distribution of

significance across the philosophical landscape

will, again, require a historical perspective. After

all, we are ourselves subjects of a history. To ape

Nietzsches famous remark, when we stare into

history, history also stares back into us, insofar as

the concerns and issues of contemporary society

are products, at least in part, of that societys histo-

ry that is, of our history.

Such a reflexive historical stance is, of

course, only useful beyond a certain point. We

can get on much of the business of philoso-

phising, debating and arguing without ever en-

gaging in the historical project of tracing what

Nietzsche called the genealogy of our questions

and methods. But that point at which history

becomes essential is, I think, reached far sooner

than is often imagined. Beyond a certain point,philosophical understanding must, if it is to sat-

isfy us, become historically sensitive. This would

include an understanding of how and why those

questions came down to us, what presuppositions

must be in place to enable our inquiries, and of why

those questions and their answers matter to us.

A great deal of valuable philosophical work

can proceed without the sort of historical under-

standing just descr ibed. A philosopher would be

foolish to pursue a historical perspective where

that would neither aid nor complement their

concerns. Analytic philosophy, for instance, is of-

ten said to be largely ahistorical, but that is most

often, I think, because its questions and concerns

are not usually of the sort of invite historical

input. The salience of history depends upon the

questions being asked and the kind of answers

one is seeking.

My emphasis on the role of the history of

philosophy is directed at those with more vital,

practical concerns. The refinement of a com-

plex argument about logical relations might not

invite historical reflection; but questions about

the nature of the good life, for instance, surely

are, for the reason that it is questions of this sortthat are perennial, which appear across different


18/36

Understanding that historywill not only illuminate our

contemporary concerns, but,one hopes, also renew our

appreciation of philosophy.

18

cultures and generations. And it is, I suspect, such

big questions which command the interest and

attention of most of those drawn to philosophy.

It is these questions, and the richer conception of

philosophy they reflect, which Kant had in mind

when he wrote of the cosmopolitan sense in

philosophy, which issues in four questions: What

can I know? What ought I to do? What may I

hope? What is man?

The history of philosophy, then, is an es-

sential feature of a certain broad conception of

philosophy. It may be called cosmopolitan, after

Kant, or humanistic, after Bernard Williams, or

it may be judged, following Pierre Hadot, as a se-

ries of spiritual exercises manifesting in a certain

way of life. Whatever its name, it is a conception

of philosophy focused upon questions and con-

cerns of vital importance to thinking, reflective

human beings: questions of beauty, meaning,

goodness, and the like, where these questions are

understood, not as exercises in conceptual inge-

nuity, but as essential components of ones prac-

tical activities within the world. These questions

are certainly not absent from ahistorical philos-

ophising, but arguably they may be better served

by an historical approach. Abstract reflection has

a part to play in articulating and addressing these

questions, but often they cannot be fully appreci-

ated, or answered, without an historical appreci-

ation of those earlier generations of philosophers

who, troubled by similar worries, offered theirown responses.

Sensitivity to the history of philosophy

therefore offers resources for understanding that

may be unavailable to those who forsake context

for raw argument. By neglecting the context of

philosophical inquiry, one deprives many prob-

lems of their urgency and salience. Earlier philos-

ophers, stripped of context, may seem peculiar,

even perverse, for persisting in abstruse intellec-

tual inquiries about flux, haeccities, mind-body

dualism, and the like. However to accuse them

thus does them an injustice, and indicates, at the

same time, our own ignorance. Once Cynic icon-

oclasm, say, or Cartesian dualism is located within

its proper intellectual and historical context, their

urgency and salience may be clarified and ampli-

fied. The result is, argue two recent writers, the

maturing of a kind of modesty or humility, an

increased perception not only of the presuppo-

sitions and prejudices of earlier eras, but also an

increased capacity, on our own part, to expose

similar presuppositions and prejudices that may

be shaping beliefs and commitments today.

Such a historical conception should also

help protect philosophy from certain persistentand ill-informed challenges to it. Those who

object that philosophy is abstract and de-

tached often, I suspect, have certain caricatures

of contemporary academic philosophy in mind.

Certainly successive British Governments since

Thatcher seem to have shared that view, the

present one included. Other philosophers have

also expressed worries about the deleterious im-

pact of certain features of academic philosophy

upon the genuine pursuit of philosophical in-

quiry. However, the objection that philosophy

is detached is invalid because it relies upon a

false conception of philosophy. That image of

philosophy as detached, abstract speculation,

isolated from a practical context would cer-

tainly make it difficult to see what, if anything,

those speculations had to do with the world.

However that conception of philosophy is de-

pendent upon an ahistorical approach to the

subject, one which strips it of context and isolates it

from those real-world concerns which animate it.

HUMILITY AND HISTORY


19/36

PAPERS

Doing Science An Injustice

Educating for Intellectual Humility

Nature, Mystery, and Morality

Epistemic Injustice in Healthcare

Doing Away With Scientism

Politics, Education, and Scientific Culture

Phenomenology and Psychiatric Illness

Feyerabend on Science and Education

Was Sir Crookes Epistemically Virtuous?

Reappraising Feyerabend

Transformative Suffering and Virtue

History and Humility

Emotion and Religious Practice

Illness, Virtue, and

Exemplarist Ethics

Learning from the Best:

Confucius Analects

Epistemic Injustice and

Religious Experience

Religious Beauties

Anthropogenic

Climate Change

Confidence, Humility

and Philosophy

Experiences of Illness and

Narratives of Edification

University of Leeds

25/02/15

Durham University

21/01/15

Durham University

16/01/2015

University of Leeds

20/11/2014

Durham University

31/10/2014

Durham University

17/062014

University of Bristol

9/07/2013

TALKS

19

Reaffirming the contextual and historical na-

ture of philosophy should also help to insure us

against various vices.

The awareness that our problems are not

new and that earlier generations also encoun-

tered them should encourage a certain humility

on our own part. Only presentist hubris could

persuade us that our predilections our anxieties

and insights are privileged guides to the nature

of reality. An appreciation of context should, one

hopes, indicate that our anxieties and insights

arise from ideas and developments which are not

wholly of our making. Our achievements are,

therefore, not ours alone. At the least, we owe a

debt to both the errors and the insights of earlier

generations, a debt which an understanding of the

history of philosophy can help to make apparent.

There is ignorance, injustice and also in-

gratitude in the attitudes of those who deride

the value of philosophy whilst living within a

society so shaped by it. Voltaire urged us, when

considering our history, to admire those who

first brought us to the path of truth as much as

those who afterwards conducted us through it.

To cherry-pick from the history of philosophy

those figures whose views prefigure ours smacks

of what historians of science call Whig history:

a neglect of the role of critics, rival schools and

the like in shaping the ideas that, from a parochial

perspective, won in the end. Failure to acknowl-

edge those who brought us to our current pathreflects badly upon us, especially if, as dAlembert

reminds us, we are but a passing generation, our

concerns being, perhaps, nothing for the next

one, still less for distant posterity.

Once a historical approach to philosophy

is in place, that impoverished view of philosophy

and the stereotypes it sponsors, of philosophers

as intellectual narcissists preoccupied with their

own uncertainties, say should dissolve. There

is a place for abstract reflection, for sure, but

philosophy is, for many, necessarily rooted in

the practical concerns of human beings who are,

themselves, subjects of a history. Understanding

that history will not only illuminate our contem-

porary concerns, but, one hopes, also renew our

appreciation of philosophy. Our participation

in that history will, at the least, enable us to do

justice to those who came before, and hopefully

enable us to endow future generations, as best

we can, with ideas which, in time, may be of use

to those who follow us. At the very least, such

historical philosophising brings with it a set of

intellectual virtues gratitude, humility, and

justice which lend it a moral as well as an

intellectual significance.

IAN JAMES KIDD


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often makes

great errors.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

21


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22

Personhood,Animals and

the Law

CHRISTINE KORSGAARD


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24

BOOKS

Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity

The Constitution of Agency

The Sources of Normativity

Creating the Kingdom of Ends

Skepticism about Practical Reason

The Normativity of Instrumental Reason

pacity to form so-called second order attitudes

for instance, attitudes towards our own desires

that make them liable to normative assessment.

Though I may desire to do something, I may also

disapprove of that desire, and reject its influence

over me.

According to empiricists, second-order

attitudes are what make human beings subject

to an ought. So many philosophers have agreed

that it is in virtue of normative self-government

that human beings count as persons in the legal

and moral sense. Certainly, if something along

these lines is correct, it is natural to think that

only human beings can have obligations. In order

to have obligations, you need to be able to think

about whether what you are doing is right, and

to adjust your conduct accordingly. This requires

a highly developed theory of mind, as etholo-

gists call it. An animal has a theory of mind when

the animal knows that animals (herself included)

have mental attitudes, such as beliefs and desires.

But in order to be rational in the sense I just

described, an animal must not only know that

she and other animals have mental attitudes. She

must also know that her attitudes are connected

in certain ways for instance, that she is inclined

to perform a certain action because she has a

certain desire. To ask whether you have a good

reason for doing what you propose to do, or

whether it is r ight, is to think about and evaluate

that connection, and it seems likely that only hu-man beings can do that.

But it is a much harder question whether

being rational in this sense is necessary for hav-

ing rights, and that is the question most pressing

from the point of view of those who seek legal

protections for animals. The traditional distinc-

tion between persons and things groups the abil-

ity to have rights and the liability to having obli-

gations together. One common view about why

that should be so is that rights are grounded in

some sort of agreement that is reciprocal: I agree

to respect certain claims of yours, provided that

you respect certain similar claims of mine. The

view of society as based on a kind of social con-

tract supports such a conception of r ights. But in

fact our laws do not merely protect those who

as citizens are involved in making its laws: rather,

they protect anyone who shares the interests that

the laws were made to protect.

So for instance, foreigners on our soil have

rights not to be robbed or murdered, regardless

of the fact that they are not parties to our own

social contract. The laws that we make against

murder and robbery are intended to protect cer-

tain human interests that foreigners share withcitizens, and that is sufficient to give them the

relevant rights. Of course, foreigners on our soil

can also be made to conform to our laws reci-

procity can be required of them.

But when we speak of universal human

rights, we speak of interests that are shared by

every human being and that we think ought to

be protected, not merely of the interests pro-

tected under some actual social contract. So it

makes sense to raise the question whether the

other animals share the kinds of interests that our

laws either legal or moral are meant to pro-

tect. Animal r ights advocates urge that the other

animals, like human beings, do have interests. Let

me do a little philosophising about why this is

so. Animals have interests because of the way in

which things can be good or bad for them. Gen-erally speaking, we use the concepts of good-for

PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS AND THE LAW


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one possible answer. Immanuel Kant, who made

the concept of a person central to his ethics, ar-

gued that a person is an end in himself, to be

valued and respected for his own sake, and never

to be used merely as a means. Kant claimed that

the basis of that value is the capacity for ratio-

nal choice, or autonomy. He also claimed that it

is because of our autonomy that human beings

have rights.

Because human beings are rational beings,

Kant argued, human beings, unlike the other an-

imals, are able to choose our own way of life. We

reflect about what counts as a good life, decide

the question for ourselves, and live accordingly.

In the liberal tradition, with its strong emphasis

on toleration, and its antagonism to paternalism,

this kind of autonomy has often been regarded

as the basis of rights. We have the basic rights

of personal liberty, liberty of conscience, and

freedom of speech and association, because each

of us has the right to determine for himself or

herself what counts as a worthwhile life, and to

live that life, so long as the way we act is consis-

tent with a like right for everyone else. Because

the other animals do not choose their own way

of life, they do not have rights grounded in this

kind of autonomy.

But this response is not wholly satisfacto-

ry. I think we do have specifically human rights

grounded in our autonomy. But the trouble with

leaving it at that, is that what makes it importantto us that our rights should be respected is not

just that we value our autonomy. It is also that

we value, to speak almost circularly, our welfare,

our interests, or our good. Rights grounded in

autonomy may often give us an indirect way to

protect what we regard as our good. If someone

cannot interfere with your freedom of speech,

for example, he cannot interfere with you saying

your prayers. It is in part because you care about

saying your prayers, and not just because you care

about your autonomy, that you care about your

right to say them. This is where it becomes clear

that there is a problem with dividing the world

into persons and things. The other animals, who

do not have autonomy, are left with no legal

means of protecting their interests or their wel-

fare. If they have no rights, they are not persons,

and that leaves them to be things. But animals

are not mere things, since they are beings with

interests and lives of their own. Insofar as they

come within the purview of human laws at all, it

is because they are a subject population, and the

only way to afford any effective protection for

their welfare is through human laws.

It is worth emphasising that last thought.The idea of animal rights sounds silly to some

people, because it seems to suggest an insane de-

sire to moralize nature: to imply that we should

declare predation to be murder and to make it

illegal, or perhaps to turn battles over territory

into property disputes that get settled in court.

But an advocate of animal rights need not be

in favour of our trying to protect non-human

animals from each other. Rather, the point is to

protect them from us, from human beings. The

reason only the law can do that effectively is be-

cause in a sense, the law is the reason why many of

the other animals are so completely at our mercy.

What I mean is this: it is not just because

we are individually smarter than the other an-

imals that human beings are able to do as we

will with them. It is because human beings are socooperative and therefore so organised. And the

An advocate ofanimal rights neednot be in favour of

our trying to protectnon-human animals

from each other.Rather, the point is

to protect themfrom us, from

human beings.

26 PERSONHOOD, ANIMALS AND THE LAW


27/36

It is not just because we areindividually smarter than the

other animals that humanbeings are able to do as we willwith them. It is because humanbeings are so cooperative and

therefore so organised.

way that we organise ourselves is by making laws,

which set the terms of our interactions and so

unite us into an effective whole. If the law says it

is permissible for a person to inflict torments on

an animal in order to test a product, for instance,

then there is nothing anyone can do to protect

that animal. So it is one of those cases and there

are certainly others in which the only thing

that can afford protection against the power of

the law is the law itself.

The fact that we have any anti-cruelty laws

at all embodies the idea that the welfare of any

being who has a welfare a non-derivative and

experienced good is worthy of regard for its

own sake. It should be protected unless there is

some good reason why not. It is a further step to

say that all animals are ends in themselves, never

to be used as mere means to someone elses ends.

But once we agree that their welfare is to be re-

garded, then we do need a good reason for dis-

regarding it. And what is that reason supposed to

be? Why should our interests prevail over theirs?

The reason most frequently offered is that hu-

man beings just are more valuable and import-

ant than the other animals. Some theological

traditions have claimed this: human beings are

supremely valuable, and the world and all its con-

tents, including the other animals, were made

for our use. But in the absence of such a con-

text, importance must be importance to or for

someone or something.Perhaps we are more important to our-

selves. But, then, each of us has some small circle

of loved ones who are the most important people

in the world to him, and we do not take that as

a reason to do experiments on strangers, or eat

them, or steal their organs. Something more must

be said to explain the precedence that we give to

ourselves. But mainly I think we should ask our-

selves, on what grounds do we ourselves claim to

be valuable in the way that we claim to be ends

in ourselves, never to be used as a mere means to

someone elses ends? Is it really because we have

the capacity for rational choice, or is it also more

simply because we have a welfare of our own?

If it is the latter, simple consistency de-

mands that, as far as we possibly can, we should

treat the other animals as ends in themselves. The

other animals lack normative self-government,

and in that sense they are not persons; but we

need not accept the idea that the world is divided

into persons and property, or persons and things.

Without reclassifying them as persons, we may

still regard all animals as ends in themselves, and,

as such, the proper subjects of rights against hu-

man mistreatment.

27CHRISTINE KORSGAARD


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Almost One Hundred

BERTRAND RUSSELL gives Lectures onLogical Atomism at Dr Williams Library,

Gordon Square, London.

THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHYis founded. Lectures are held at the

location of Kings Way.

TheJOURNAL PHILOSOPHY is foundedto build bridges between specialised

philosophers and a wider, educated public.

Human beings are born into this little

span of life of which the best thing is its

friendship and intimacies, and soon their

places will know them no more, and yet

they leave their friendships and intimacies

with no cultivation, to grow as they will by

the roadside, expecting them to keep by

force of inertia. WILLIAM JAMES

1916

1920

1925

The reasonable man adapts himself to

the world: the unreasonable one persists

in trying to adapt the world to himself.

Therefore all progress depends on the

unreasonable man. GEORGE SHAW

1926

The Institute of Philosophy is moved to the

location of DR WILLIAMS LIBRARYandLORD SAMUEL is appointed President.

Life is a constant process of dying.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

1927

1930

1938

The Institute of Philosophy is granted

the title of ROYALin recognition of itshaving, like the Wigmore Hall and the

Windmill Theatre, kept going through

the wartime blitz.1947


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Years of Philosophy

Reading is going toward something that is

about to be, and no one yet knows what

it will be. ITALO CALVINO

Every man is a creature of the age in

which he lives and few are able to raise

themselves above the ideas of the time.

VOLTAIRE

PROFESSOR GODFREY is appointed asFellow to the Institute.

LORD HALSBURY is appointed Presidentof the Institute.

1952

1959

1962

LORD QUINTON is appointed Presidentof the Institute.

1979

SIR ANTHONY KENNY is appointedPresident of the Institute.

LORD SUTHERLAND OF HOUNDWOODis appointed President of the Institute.

1991

2006

2009

The Institute holds the event PAST &PRESENT: PHILOSOPHY FOR EVERYONEas a reflection on the past 16 years of

annual lectures.2014


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Whereof onecannot speak,

38


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AfterwordWITH THANKS TO:

Dr William

The Library of Dr William

The University of London

University College London

Cambridge University Press

Joseph Brown

Ted Honderich

Bertrand Russell

James Garvey

Sir Anthony Kenny

Lord Balfour

Steward Sutherland

Imus excerch iciet, soluptat iuscias aut magnis

dolum exceatium expla si od minturi int estio et

que que voluptam, sunt excepudi idebis mo es-

tium hilist, is mo qui corae parcidenihil et elictia

nihillatenda il ipiciam, sum aut harum seque niet

facerunt et volore nonsed quo tem lacea del es

a quodi dest ex ellaboreium eat laut vere, solup-

tium consed undis dolupta turiatur? Quiam qui

omniend icitint quatus, que landiandae optatur, sus.

Ehenis ipitasimet rerunt erem eum que

autatem consequia que es cumqui re, verioremnosandes sequas simus. Molendam volorio

bearumTur? Temquam, atemolo blam fugit volut

aut fugiaepe nobis sitat lita nam, cupta necerchi-

cita volorist omnis aliate nat dist exerrunt optam

sin pra cus as doluptatem fuga. Arum enis veria

nonestrum venis prat.

Testius porrovid quaecto tem conecus eos

debisti oremped igenim quia nonsectur?

Ti re velit, is est, sequi blantotate cum sunt,

occabo. Itatiis maionsed ut ut quos vel inimusd

andignis nem esserore quia nonsequi quia ius

quiassit molupta volupic tempos eiuntis quibuses derupta si iundit re andaepellut rem.

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PAST & PRESENT:PHILOSOPHY FOR EVERYONE

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