Issue Paper on Terrorism - Erasmus Research Institute of … · 2015-11-27 · terrorist attack which introduced the “new terrorism”. This event led to a combination of increasing

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Issue Paper on

Terrorism

Global Business and Stakeholder Management

Professor Lucas Meijs and Professor Rob van Tulder

2th of October 2009

David van Dis - 294677

Amir Hermon - 296356

Mathijs Slomp - 316126

Rick de Vos – 291946

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Table of Contents

Executive summary ................................................................................................................................. 4

1. Introduction......................................................................................................................................... 6

1.1. Definitions .................................................................................................................................... 7

1.2. Types of terrorism ........................................................................................................................ 9

1.3. Causes of terrorism .................................................................................................................... 11

1.3.1. Permissive causes of terrorism............................................................................................ 11

1.3.2. Precipitant causes of terrorism ........................................................................................... 11

1.4. Trends......................................................................................................................................... 13

1.4.1. Kondratieff........................................................................................................................... 15

2. Terrorism in society........................................................................................................................... 17

2.1. Position of terrorism in the societal triangle.............................................................................. 17

2.2. Stakeholders............................................................................................................................... 18

2.2.1. State..................................................................................................................................... 18

2.2.2. Market ................................................................................................................................. 20

2.2.3. Civil society .......................................................................................................................... 22

2.3. Issue life cycle............................................................................................................................. 23

2.3.1. Explanation by phase........................................................................................................... 24

2.4. Who is to blame?........................................................................................................................ 26

2.5. Tensions...................................................................................................................................... 27

2.5.1. State..................................................................................................................................... 27

2.5.2. Market ................................................................................................................................. 29

2.5.3. Civil society .......................................................................................................................... 31

3. Finding solutions................................................................................................................................ 32

3.1. Expression of Leadership............................................................................................................ 32

3.1.1. State..................................................................................................................................... 32

3.1.2. Market ................................................................................................................................. 32

3.1.3. Civil Society.......................................................................................................................... 32

4. Solutions in practice .......................................................................................................................... 33

4.1. State............................................................................................................................................ 33

4.2. Market ........................................................................................................................................ 34

4.3. Civil society ................................................................................................................................. 35

5. Sustainable Societal Story (SSS)......................................................................................................... 37

5.1. Implementation.......................................................................................................................... 37

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6. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 40

6.1. Drawbacks ...................................................................................................................................... 42

6.2. Limitations ...................................................................................................................................... 42

6.3. Further research............................................................................................................................. 42

Appendix................................................................................................................................................ 43

Appendix 1......................................................................................................................................... 43

Appendix 2......................................................................................................................................... 44

Bibliography........................................................................................................................................... 45

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Executive summary

Terrorism is an issue that exists for a very long time already. It has been defined by the U.S. state

department as “Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant

targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”.

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre however confronted the world with an unprecedented

terrorist attack which introduced the “new terrorism”. This event led to a combination of increasing

fear of terrorism, increasing media attention and an increasing scientific debate on terrorism which

forced serious reflection about the institutional framework of civil society. The research question

addressed in this paper is therefore:

How can the consequences of new terrorism be addressed effectively within the societal triangle?

New terrorism is defined in our paper as “actions of Islamic fundamentalist groups which differ from

the more traditional kinds of terrorism because of its amorphous aims, disparate organization and

capacity to strike across different continents”.

In our view, terrorism should be seen as an interplay between the government and the civil society.

Terrorist initiatives are mostly launched by groups within the civil society, while the state is often the

target of these initiatives and it is the responsibility of the government to ensure the safety of its

citizens. While applying the Issue Life Cycle we concluded that terrorism is currently somewhere

between the stages of development and maturity, which means that the government, the market,

and the civil society are all very active on this issue. However, we believe that the cooperation

between these three spheres has not been optimized yet and therefore the issue is not completely

mature yet.

In our research we focus on finding the optimal solution for dealing with the consequences of

terrorism instead of complete eradication of terrorism. Therefore, both the media and the

government can partially be blamed for not addressing the consequences properly. The media is to

blame exaggerating the consequences of terrorism thus making the problem even worse, while the

government is responsible for intruding its citizen’s privacy.

In our view, terrorism is an issue which cannot be solved by state, civil society or markets separately.

We see the government as the only part of civil society which has tools that can fruitfully be used in

addressing the consequences of terrorism. Therefore, the main responsibility in this issue lies with

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the government and they need to take a leadership role here. By activating policies directed at

security, intelligence, education, and creating awareness, they can help society to get better

prepared for terrorist events. To be effective however, the market and the civil society need to work

together to create the needed resilience to be able to deal with terrorism. Governments can come

with initiatives, but it is also the responsibility of markets and civil society to make use of these

initiatives, and to make sure that society is better able, as a whole, to deal with terrorism.

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1. Introduction

Terrorism is a phenomenon that has been around for ages going back as far as the period of the

Roman occupation of Palestine (Laquer, 1999). Throughout history, groups with very different

backgrounds have tried to use terrorism as a mean to fight for what in their perception was the right

cause. Motives for applying terrorism vary from anti-colonial motives to ethnic separatists, and from

left-wing terrorist to right-wing terrorist, and therefore it is not justified to identify a single group

based on motive, religion or ethnicity as the sole practitioners of terrorism.

The first exhibition of modern day terrorism is generally accepted to be the Narodnaya Volya

organization. This group was the first actual movement who moved from propaganda by debate, to

propaganda by deeds. They were well organized and deliberately choose for specific targets and

often succeeded while their most notable “achievement” was the assassination of Tsar Alexander the

second in 1881.

The example of an organized movement designed to engage in terrorism set by the Narodnaya Volya,

has seen many followers since then all across the globe. Since then there were many notable

terrorist groups who were inspired by the operations of Narodnaya Volya and use this way of

operating in order to achieve their own goals. Although all these groups used terrorism, their

motivations were quite different.

Notable examples of terrorist groups that were driven by religious motives are the IRA which was

created in 1919 to liberate the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland from British influence, and the

Irgun Zvai Leumi who fought from 1937 until 1947 for their idea that every Jew should have the right

to enter Palestine,.

A famous example of a terrorist group founded because of anti-colonial motives is the Front de

Liberation Nationale which was an Algerian movement trying to obtain independence for Algeria

from France until 1962.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam which are better known as the Tamil Tigers, is an example of a

terrorist group based on separatist motives. From 1976 until now they are fighting for their own

independent state in the north of Sri Lanka.

Furthermore examples of left-wing ideological terrorist groups can be found when looking at the

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine which is a socialist-secular Palestinian party which is still

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existing, or the Rote Armee Fraktion which was an organization inspired by communist ideas

engaging in armed resistance against the German society which they believed to be a fascist state

until they dissolved in 1998.

However, the most dramatic exhibition of terrorism was the attack on the World Trade Towers on

the 11th

of September in 2001, carried out by Al-Qaeda. The United States and the western world had

relatively not been prone to terrorism until that time. The 9/11 attacks in combination with the

bombings of the train in Madrid in 2004, and the bombings of the London subway in 2005 made

many people in those parts of the world aware of their vulnerability to terrorist attacks even on their

own soil. This type of terrorism was not common until then and has been labeled the “new

terrorism” by Myhten & Walklate (2005).

This new terrorism is typified by actions of Islamic fundamentalist groups like al-Qaeda and differs

from the more traditional kinds of terrorism because of its “amorphous aims, disparate organization

and capacity to strike across different continents” (Lesser et al, 1999). Or as Crenshaw (2000)

describes it: “Whereas the “old” terrorists sought short-term political power through revolution,

national liberation, or secession, the “new” terrorists seek to transform the world. Motivated by

religious imperatives, they are thought to lack an earthly constituency and thus to feel accountable

only to a deity or to some transcendental or mystical idea”.

With the rise of this new kind of terrorism, media attention has increased drastically and the War on

Terror has become an extremely hot issue. Although research on the topic of terrorism dates back to

the early 1990’s, most of the contributions in this field date from after the 9/11 attacks. The

combination of increasing fear of terrorism, increasing media attention and an increasing scientific

debate on terrorism forced serious reflection about the institutional framework of civil society (Davis

& Silver, 2002).

Therefore our research question will be:


1.1. Definitions

Terrorism is a difficult concept to define and has been defined by many scholars and institutions

alike.

“Each of the active groups, while proselytizing and spreading its side-branches to infinity, has as its

task, by a systematic and denunciatory propaganda, ceaselessly to undermine the importance of the

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local powers, to produce bewilderment in communities, to engender cynicism and scandal, complete

disbelief in anything whatsoever, a yearning for the better, and, finally, acting by means of fires as

the popular means par excellence, to plunge the country, at the prescribed moment, if need be, even

into despair.” (Dostoevsky, 1994).

“They strike at the outskirts of the camp. Then when we sound the call to arms, they vanish. This is

the most demoralizing kind of warfare.” (Vidal, 1986).

“Terrorism is theater.” (Jenkins, 2004)

It is difficult to make clear distinctions about what is part of the umbrella term of terrorism and what

not, and is often heavily depending on the perspective of looking at a situation. What separates a

terrorist from a revolutionary? And is terrorism only applicable to transnational conflicts? Can state

policies like the ones applied by the former Soviet Union under the rule of Stalin be defined as

terrorism?

According to the United States Department of State (1997), terrorism is defined as:

“Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by

subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”

With the evolution and the increasing research on this concept, the definition of terrorism has been

redefined. At least four distinctive characteristics have been applied on the definition of terrorism.

First, terrorism is violence or the threat of violence for political effect (Sandler, 2005). Second,

terrorism is “a planned, calculated, and indeed systematic act” (Hoffman 1998). Third, terrorists are

not complying with the rules of engagement or other international laws on warfare. And finally, the

main purpose of terrorism is to achieve deep psychological impacts far beyond solely the direct

victims.

Although all of the definitions above give an insight about the concept of terrorism and do touch

upon important aspects of the concept, subjectivity remains unavoidable. What is perceived by the

one as terrorism, will always be perceived by someone else as a justified fight for freedom. The

definition that we will apply in this paper is the definition as stated by the US State Department,

which is also the one quoted in most research as the general accepted definition of terrorism. We

would like to complement this definition with the notion that terrorism does not only apply to actual

violence, but in our view it is also about the threat of violence and the accompanying level of

insecurity.

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1.2. Types of terrorism

According to Bonanate (1979), there are four distinct types of terrorism which can be identified when

classifying terrorism on the basis of transnationalism and support for the state. This distinction is

made on the basis of the ideology behind the use of terrorism.

TERRORISM Internal International

For the state State Colonialism

Against the state Revolutionary For independence

Table 1: Types of terrorism

State terrorism is terrorism within a country or its administrative borders which is practiced in order

to preserve the power and sovereignty of the state. Examples of which are the Fascist squadrons

implemented by Stalin in order to suppress all possible opposition, and the Ku Klux Clan who claim

that the original American culture is lost by the influx of immigrants.

Revolutionary terrorism is terrorism within a country or its administrative borders which is meant to

overthrow the current regime in order to create a new political equilibrium. One very prominent

group practicing this kind of terrorism is the Taliban in Afghanistan, who want to remove the current

system of democracy and replace it with a society purely based on the rules of the Islam, also known

as the sharia.

Colonial terrorism is terrorism across national boundaries where a state tries to maintain its

dominance in its colony. Examples can be found in many former European colonies but a concrete

one is the Organisation de l'armée secrète who tried to oppose efforts from Algeria into becoming

and individual state.

Terrorism for independence is terrorism across national boundaries where an ethnic group is using

terroristic methods in order to achieve an independent nation. This kind of terrorism is the most

frequent kind and famous examples are Chechnya who want to become independent of Russia, and

the Palestinian issue who are advocating for an independent state for their people, or the Vietcong

who were trying to achieve the withdrawal from the US Army in Vietnam.

Besides drawing distinctions on the basis of the ideology, distinctions can also be made upon the

basis of the way that terrorism is used to achieve the ultimate goal. In other words, the

characteristics of the terrorism that is being applied. Bonanate states that terrorism can be both

tactical and strategic. Terrorism is used strategically by organizations that see terrorism as the only

solution in order to achieve their goals, and therefore the type of war becomes a terroristic one,

since it is their only weapon.

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Terrorism is used tactically by organizations that see the use of terrorism only as one part of a bigger

picture in order to achieve their goals. These organizations have other ways aside from terrorism that

are contributing to the fulfillment of their ambitions, but the combination of these other instruments

with terrorism is regarded as being the most effective by them.

Furthermore, terrorism can be classified as being instrumental or finalistic. Instrumental terrorism is

being described by Bonanate as terrorism which is necessary and sufficient in order to accomplish

the set targets in the perception of the groups practicing these methods. Finalistic terrorism however

is, in the view of terroristic movements, necessary but not sufficient in order to realize the

movement’s ambitions. This kind of terrorism is therefore irrational, but is driven by the motivation

that it is the right thing to do, which makes it the most hardcore kind of terrorism.

The four types of terrorism that have been identified before have been classified in the figure

underneath according to these two dimensions.

TERRORISM Instrumental Finalistic

Tactical Colonialism State

Strategic For independence Revolutionary

Table 2: Characteristics of terrorism

However, the typology used by Bonanate cannot be easily applied on the new terrorism as defined

by Myhten & Walklate (2005). The obvious reasons for this gap is that when Bonanate wrote his

article in 1978, the new terrorism had not made its appearance on stage yet and terrorism was much

more bound to country or regional borders.

We believe that new terrorism is a mixture between the characteristics of terrorism for

independence and revolutionary terrorism. It can be described as terrorism for independence in the

sense that it has an international character and is opposing the policy of a specific government.

Furthermore it matches with the characteristics of revolutionary terrorism since it is can be labeled

as strategic and finalistic.

In our research we want to focus on the consequences of the new terrorism for the societal triangle

since this kind of terrorism has been the most prominent in the last decade and is a very lively issue

within the media and the political debate. Therefore, this kind of terrorism has the deepest impact

and the most consequences for the societal triangle at the moment and thus it provides enough

leads for an interesting research.

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1.3. Causes of terrorism

Ross (1993) conducted an extensive literature research on some of the most important articles that

have investigated the root causes of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Gross, 1972; Hamilton, 1978;

Johnson, 1982; Targ, 1979, ch. 8). Ross identifies ten structural causes for terrorism which he divides

into permissive and precipitant causes.

1.3.1. Permissive causes of terrorism

Permissive causes are causes that in principal are not drivers of terrorism, but the existence of a

certain condition within these variables does increase the possibility of terrorism occurring. In order

from the least important one to the most important one, Ross identifies geographical location, type

of political system, and level of modernization as permissive causes.

In general, cities are more suitable for terroristic activities than rural areas. Advantages than can be

found in cities are numerous but some of the most prominent are the possibility for new

recruitment, the availability of resources, and better logistics.

Surprisingly enough, democracy as a political system has not proven to be the most effective way in

countering terrorism (Li, 2005). On the contrary, more open societies like democratic ones often

proof to be a good breeding ground for terrorism because of the freedom of movement for the

people within such a society. Furthermore the political system can also be a source of frustration for

colonial problems or ethnic conflicts.

The level of modernization is positively related with the possibility of terrorism within a country

because of the possibilities that modernization offers to terrorists. Modern societies have better

logistic networks, more media presence and conflict with the more traditional ways of life, and are

therefore an interesting target for terrorist groups.

1.3.2. Precipitant causes of terrorism

Precipitant causes on the other hand are the main drivers for terrorist and sources of motivation to

engage in terrorist activities. In order from less important to most important Ross identifies the

following precipitant causes; social, cultural and historical facilitation, organizational split and

development, presence of other forms of unrest, support, counterterrorist organization failure,

availability of weapons and explosives, and grievances.

Social, cultural and historical facilitation consists of the shared norms, values and beliefs that are

present within a society. If these are not necessarily opposing the idea of violence and terrorism,

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then the possibility of terrorist activity will be higher than in countries where there is a strong moral

resistance against the use of violence and terrorism.

Most terrorist groups originate from an organization spit within an existing party where a subgroup

believes that the party is not extreme enough. Even though the often share the same goals, the differ

in terms of what the right path is for achieving this goal. This rivalry between two organizations

showing their commitment to the mutual goal, often leads to increased extremism to outcompete

the rival. Therefore, terrorism is reinforced by organizational splits.

The presence of other forms of unrest can be a catalyst of terrorism. Social unrest often goes hand in

hand with violence which increases the legitimacy of the use of violence for terrorist groups.

Furthermore, the unrest is often seen as a motivational source of injustice being done to them and

the need to change the current situation.

Support for terrorism can be a motivational force for people engaging in these activities. Support can

be in many different ways, but its most important effect is the justification for the terrorists that

their view is shared and that they are doing the right thing.

The failure of counterterrorist organizations is often used as propaganda by the terrorist

organizations. By emphasizing the fact that they are being chased by an institution, these groups

manage to increase the motivation for resistance. This of course can only be used in their advantage

if the counterterrorist organizations are unable to eliminate them.

People with radical ideas about change are often attracted by organizations that have power since

they perceive these organizations as movements that are able to accomplish radical change. The

availability of weapons and explosives enables terrorist groups to empower themselves.

Furthermore, the availability of weapons and explosives is luring people away from less violent ways

of achieving their goals to terrorism when they are frustrated about the lack of progress in achieving

those goals.

Grievances can be the result of discrimination, oppression or repression and is the most important

motivation for people to engage in terrorist activities. Grievances unite a sub-group in their

exclusion, which forms an extremely powerful driver for retaliation to those who have excluded the

sub-group from the bigger group. Since these sub-groups feel mistreated, they are driven by anger

and the desire to return the favor to those who have mistreated them in their perception. Therefore,

the road to violent and terrorist activities is not long and grievance should be recognized as a strong

indicator for the existence of terrorism.

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All these causes are influencing the existence of terrorism although they vary in the degree of which

they do so. While the three permissive causes facilitate the existence of the precipitant causes, the

precipitant causes are the main drivers for the existence of terrorism. Apart from directly influencing

the existence of terrorism, many of them are also interdependent and are indirectly reinforcing the

existence of terrorism as well. Ross summarizes his findings in the figure below.

Fig 1: Structural causes of terrorism

1.4. Trends

The concept of terrorism has a long history, but throughout its history it has appeared in different

ways with different motivations. Shughart (2006) orders these different periods in the history of

terrorism into the four modern waves of terrorism, while we would like to complement this theory

with the first wave preceding the four modern waves.

According to Rapoport (2004), the first wave of terrorism started with the French Revolution in 1795

when terrorism was regarded as a necessity in order to establish a democratic society. The Reign of

Terror in France led by Robespierre was the first exhibition of this kind of terrorism where people

from the opposing political party were executed on a massive scale under the accusation of “enemies

of the revolution”.

The second wave of terrorism and the first one labeled as modern terrorism was the period which

Shughart calls the anarchist wave. This wave started with the assassination of Tsar Alexander the

second by the Narodnaya Volya. This wave can be characterized as a period in which terrorism was

used as a mean to establish new political orders within specific countries. This period was defined a

very instable political landscape in many parts of the world and sometimes has been called “the

golden age of assassination”.

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The Paris Peace Conference which concluded the ending of the First World War in 1919 has been the

main catalyst behind the third wave of terrorism. This wave was characterized by mandatory powers

given to western nations in big parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. This caused for an

enormous development of sense for nationalism and ethnic-separatism in countries that we under

the supervision of western countries. The terrorist wave that came forth out of these sentiments is

therefore called the anti-colonialism wave. This wave was reinforced after the Second World War

had been ended because of the efforts of western countries to reestablish their authority in other

countries and by the creation of artificial boundaries of countries. This wave ended around 1965

when most former colonies had managed to establish independence.

The fourth wave of terrorism emerged around in the 1960’s when radical groups in predominantly

western societies started to sympathize with suppressed ethnical groups in other countries across

the globe like in Vietnam or the Palestinians. This wave is called the new-left wave and is further

remarkable because of the appearance of an international dynamic to terrorism. Revolutionary

groups in separate countries started to make connections with each other because they felt they had

the same struggle but just in a different setting. Interlinkages between terrorist groups in different

countries became apparent while terrorist groups started to become active outside their original

territories. This wave ended in the 1980’s when most of these terrorist groups were defeated and

the moral justification to support terrorist activities declined.

The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 was the interlude for the fifth wave which is called the religious

wave, and is the wave we are still in nowadays. The main motivation to become actively involved in

terrorism during this wave was the perception that many Arab leaders were destroying the Islamic

culture by advocating secular states. The initial form of religious terrorism where therefore aimed at

the leaders in Arab countries. These Arab leaders were often supported by America financially and

military in order to remain in power. The combination of a secular policy often combined with

corrupt regimes all supported by America, ensured for an increasing antipathy against America and

its imperialistic governance within the Arab world.

When Khomeini in 1979 in Iran was the first one who managed to remove a government in the

Middle-East supported by America, he set an example to many other countries in the Arab world

struggling with the same issues. He implemented the sharia as the keystone of Iranian policy, and

formed alliances with groups outside of Iran who were trying to achieve the same in their countries.

Groups pursuing terrorism in order to make their extreme interpretation of the Islam as the

predominant ideology in their country, had now found a powerful partner to support them

politically, financially, and military in achieving their goals.

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1.4.1. Kondratieff

These five waves as identified above can be roughly related to the Kondratieff theory as designed by

Kondratieff (1935). One of the key elements in the first Kondratieff is the early mechanization. This

created a more advanced economical organization than had been known previously, and thus

required a more sophisticated way or organization within the society. Therefore, the terrorism in

order to establish political systems, which is the first wave of terrorism, can be seen as a

consequence of the one of the characteristics first Kondratieff.

The second wave of terrorism can be justified as a part of the third Kondratieff. The third Kondratieff

is known as a very unstable political era where a lot of drastic political changes have occurred. The

description of the anarchist wave of terrorism fits very well with the characteristics of the third

Kondratieff, as both have been labeled periods of political opportunism where groups, including

terrorists groups, tried to shape the political landscape according to their preferences and therefore

made the political environment very unstable.

The fourth Kondratieff can be linked very clearly to the third and fourth wave of terrorism. A few of

the characteristics of this Kondratieff are the post-colonialism, and mayor technological

advancements which, amongst other inventions, led to the rise of the aviation industry and the

increasing destructive capability of weapons. The relationship between the theory of Kondratieff and

the waves of terrorism as described by Shughart is very strong in this Kondratieff. The third wave of

terrorism consisted mainly of conflicts in colonies that where struggling for independence and was

heavily influenced by the two world wars. The most obvious link between a Kondratieff and a

terrorist wave can probably be found in the case of the aviation industry and its impact on creating a

relatively smaller world. This industry was born in the third Kondratieff, and since its development in

the 1960’s terrorists have made tremendous use of hijackings and terrorism moved increasingly

adopted an international character.

A strong relationship can also be found between the fifth Kondratieff, and the fifth wave of

terrorism, which is the religious wave. The availability of modern communication tools like internet,

television and satellite, have facilitated the rise of religious terrorism to a large extent. Terrorist

groups who are involved in religious terrorism, need support from powerful allies abroad to supply

them with money, information human resources. The technological developments of the fifth

Kondratieff have given those terrorist groups tools which are very critical for their operations. The

ease of which money is transferred abroad nowadays contributes to the availability for terrorist

groups to receive financial support. The internet and telecommunication has proven to be a fantastic

ways for international groups of terrorists to communicate and share information. And finally,

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Long waves: Five Kondratieffs

Jewish Zealotry

Sons of liberty

Reign of terror

Narodnaya

Volya, Young

Bosnia, Serbian

Black Hand

Irgun

IRA

EOKA

FLN

Viet-

Cong

ETA

RAF

Al-Jihad

Taliban

Hamas

Al-Qaeda

Waves of terrorism

1 2 3 4 5

1880-1940 1930-1980 1980-2015

1770-1840 1839-1890

international television and internet are both very powerful sources for recruiting new terrorist all

across the globe.

Fig 2: Kondratieffs and waves of terrorism

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2. Terrorism in society

2.1. Position of terrorism in the societal triangle

The societal triangle has to deal with three different sectors; state, civil society and market. A

complex issue as terrorism cannot be placed in just one corner of the triangle. The complexity of the

issue is due to the interaction between all three spheres. State, market and civil society all have a

stake in this issue. Terrorism causes fear and a feeling of insecurity, and a major responsibility of the

state is to make sure its citizens are safe. In most cases, terrorist attacks come from a civil society

group (e.g. al-Qaeda, IRA, ETA) and is aimed at states, therefore one could argue that terrorism is an

issue which can be placed at the state.

On the other hand, the people or civil society groups who cause the problem are from the civil

society sphere. They attack states, (innocent) people and therefore the issue of terrorism can be best

placed between state and civil society.

In case of the market, terrorism is not their primary responsibility. There are terrorist attacks that

focus specifically on companies like the Animal Liberation Front or Greenpeace. Although you can

discuss if these actions can be considered as terrorist attacks, they are often illegal and sabotage

orientated. In this paper we focus more on the relation between the sphere which has the primary

responsibility (state), and the sphere where the extreme ideas of terrorist attacks arises (civil

society).

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Fig 3: Societal triangle

It is difficult to address who has the biggest responsibility. Van Tulder & Van der Zwart (2006) define

three categories of issues emerge; stretch issues, institutional issues and agenda-setting issues.

Terrorism is caused by people from the civil society, so according to Van Tulder & Van der Zwart one

could argue that they also have the primary responsibility of solving this problem (stretch issue). But

from experience we know that terrorist have very radical thoughts and do not consider the negative

consequences of their actions as their problem.

The state cannot be held directly responsible for causing the problem. But since terrorism attacks

their way of governing and the lives of their citizens, the state should see this issue as a primary

responsibility (agenda-setting issue). The market does not cause the issue of terrorism either, but are

also sometimes victims of terrorist attacks. For their own employees they see it as their responsibility

to come up with solutions which can reduce the threat of an attack (agenda-setting issue).

2.2. Stakeholders

As has been stated before on in the issue of terrorism, all three spheres are dealing with the

problem. State, market and civil society all have to deal with the problem, and therefore terrorism

also affects their stakeholders. In every sphere of the triangle we have identified the primary and

secondary stakeholders and the consequences of terrorism for them.

2.2.1. State

On state level, there are several stakeholders related to terrorism. There can be made a distinction

between primary and secondary stakeholders.

Primary stakeholders Secondary stakeholders

• National Governments • International institutes, like the United

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• Regional/Local Governments

Nations

• Police forces

• State institutes, like NCTb

2.2.1.1. Primary Stakeholders

State-stakeholders have great stakes in the terrorism-issue. As formulated in the problem definition

part, terrorism is mostly directed to states. The example of the September 11 attacks is clear in this

case, it was an attack on the American society and the American state. As a reaction to this attack,

U.S. President Bush stated: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." Bush’s presidency

was characterized by the ‘War on Terrorism’ and the all American believe of optimizing the

homeland security and punishment for the ones responsible for the September 11 attacks.

States are primary stakeholders, because states represent, or should represent, a country’s

inhabitants. An important role of a government is to physically protect its people from getting killed

or injured. This goes for regulation in traffic, regulation in working environments and regulation in

healthcare. So in the case of terrorism, state governments should try to protect their people from the

event of a terrorist attack. This is not only important for health reasons, but also for economic

reasons.

Terrorism has a great impact on economic growth (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008) and “terrorism can

also lower growth by impacting key sectors, such as transportation, tourism, and trade” (ibid). State

governments are mandated to create laws and regulations which are trying to prevent terrorist

activity. A good example of this can be illustrated by looking at the Dutch government. They have

taken measurements on the area of government (NCTb), tracing possibilities, law and justice and

homeland security. These laws can be an intrusion on privacy issues, which is discussed later.

Regional en local governments have taken action on the particular level they are responsible for. An

example of this is the safety regulations at big events in their region.

2.2.1.2. Secondary Stakeholders

International institutions have high stakes in the terrorism issue. For instance, the United Nations

(UN) was founded to (amongst other things) ‘maintain international peace and security’. Terrorist

attacks are clearly not contributing to the international peace and security, so they are conflicting

with the intentions of the UN, and thereby the UN has a stake in terrorism. Although the UN is not a

direct stakeholder, buildings or employees of the UN were until recent not directly attacked, the UN

is a secondary stakeholder for the above mentioned reasons.

Other secondary stakeholders in relation to states are stakeholders who are executing state policy.

For instance police forces (or in some cases: the army), who are responsible for executing a state

20

anti-terrorism policy or in the Netherlands the NCTb, which is especially involved in preventing

terrorism and coordinating actions related to this topic. Because of the consequences of terrorism,

their role in the societal triangle on the issue of terrorism has been changed.

2.2.2. Market


• Firms and sectors that are being

attacked on a physical level

• Firms and sectors that are being hit in

terms of economic downfall

2.2.2.1. Primary stakeholders

When looking at the market, in principle the firms that are directly hit by a terrorist attack, by means

of their office-building or manufacturing site being attacked, can be identified as primary

stakeholders.

Companies can be the victim of terrorism when they are being attacked themselves. A lot of

companies had offices in the WTC, with people there working for them, and were thus directly

victimized by the terrorist attacks by a loss in human capital as well as physical capital.

Terrorism also influences behavior, from both producers as consumers. There is evidence that after

terrorist attacks, businesses are more likely to locate themselves in less urban areas, to reduce the

risk of getting attacked. Tourists often change their destination after the occurrence of terrorist

activity, and consumers might change their behavior and will not go to areas that are struck or

threatened by terrorism (Greenbaum et al., 2006).

These simple examples all influence businesses to some extent. Real-estate developers who have

invested in large office buildings might find difficulties in selling or renting these offices when the risk

of terrorism is high. Businesses active in the tourist sector will face fewer costumers, and therefore

earn less as a result of it. Businesses that are located in areas that are being hit by terrorists or with

high risk of terrorist activity will have more problems attracting costumers, thus threatening their

profitability.

Furthermore, the cost of doing business will rise in areas that are perceived as riskier, since

companies in those areas face higher interest rates and higher insurance costs (Greenbaum et al.,

2006). As mentioned earlier, terrorism also affects trade by slowing down the movement of goods.

Firms active in sectors that are trade-sensitive are harmed by this.

Another example of direct influence is the (American) airline industry after 9/11. Immediately after

the attack all air traffic in the U.S. was grounded for several days. Besides that, due to flight

21

restrictions, enhanced security procedures and an abrupt decline in passenger traffic, (U.S.) airlines

have made substantial losses after the attack (Guzhva, 2008).

Obviously, businesses can be influenced by terrorism in many ways. However, there are also

industries that are positively influenced by terrorism. Firms active in the security, defense and

counter-terrorism industry are positively influenced by terrorism, since there is more demand for

their services and products after terrorist activity, or when the risk of terrorism is significant (Berrebi

& Klor, 2005). Other possible positive influences can be expected for infrastructure or construction

companies, who will gain extra revenue by repairing the damage done by terrorist activities.

2.2.2.2. Secondary stakeholders

There are however more ways in which companies can be influenced by terrorism. As explained in

the paragraph above, it depends a lot on the kind of context whether a particular company/sector is

a primarily or secondary stakeholder. In this case we define secondary stakeholders as companies

that are not directly influenced by terrorism, but only indirectly when the economy as a whole is

influenced by terrorist activity.

Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) state that terrorism has four main effects from an economic point of

view:

• The capital stock (human and physical) of a country decreases as a result of terrorist

attacks.

• The threat of terrorism increases the level of uncertainty.

• Terrorism promotes an increase in counter-terrorism expenditure, drawing resources

from productive sectors for use in security.

• Terrorism negatively affects specific industries, such as tourism.

The direct impact of terrorism on productive capital is relatively modest. However, in situations

where the threat of terrorism is still severe or sustained, the impact seems to be higher. Why does

terrorism have such a large effect?

Like any other risk, terrorism affects the stock of international investment in a country. Therefore, in

an integrated world economy, international investment will respond to an increase in terrorism

intensity in an area. Since an increase in terrorism intensity will lead to more uncertainty, less capital

will flow to this area (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008). Enders & Sandler (1996) found that the amount

of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Spain and Greece was negatively affected in times of terrorist

activity. They also pointed out that these effects are more severe in relatively small countries.

However, Abadie & Gardeazabal (2008) conclude that “our estimates suggest that a one standard

22

deviation increase in the intensity of terrorism produces a 5% fall in the net FDI position of the

country.”

Terrorism also has a negative influence on international trade. A doubling of the number of terrorist

attacks in a year is likely to lead to a 4% decrease of bilateral trade in the same year. We can identify

three explanations for this phenomenon. First, countries that face an increased risk of terrorism are

less attractive because terrorism causes uncertainty which makes their market less attractive.

Second, the costs of trade will increase in times of increased terrorist activity, due to security

measures. Borders will be partially closed, and exporting or importing will be harder, more time-

consuming, and thus more expensive. Third, terrorists can target trade directly when a country is

vulnerable for disruptions of certain industry supply chains or the destruction of particular transport

modes (Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004).

Furthermore, terrorism has a negative influence on financial markets. Stock prices of firms in

countries victimized by terrorists are negatively affected by terrorist activity (Abadie & Gardeazabal,

2003). This is also the case with stock market returns and volatility, although emerging markets seem

more vulnerable to this (Arin et al., 2008). Moreover, the FED cut interest rates several times after

the 9/11 attacks in order to stimulate the U.S. economy and diminish the effects of the terrorist

attacks which caused a lot of market uncertainty and a decrease in consumer confidence (Virgo,

2001).

Overall, a negative influence of terrorism on a country’s economic situation can be identified. The

country is less attractive for investors, trade becomes more complicated and financial markets are

vulnerable to terrorism.

2.2.3. Civil society


• Citizens in terms of physical attack • Citizens in terms of fear

2.2.3.1. Primary stakeholders

The victims of terrorist attacks are considered the primary stakeholders in the civil. These people are

mostly innocent and are not prepared for the occurrence of a terrorist attacks. As with the market,

one cannot identify which citizens of which country are the primary stakeholders since this depends

on the context of attack.

2.2.3.2 Secondary stakeholders

Civil society is, although mostly unaware, under constant threat of terrorism. But what does this

constant threat do with the attitude of the civil society towards terrorism? Researches on threats

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that involve potential harm of physical damage such as crime, terrorism, and natural disasters

provide clear evidence that personal threat and fear leads to a change in people’s behavior (Huddy et

al, 2002). One of these changes in personal behavior is the issue privacy versus security.

The biggest issue for civil society is the continuous struggle of the balancing trade-off between

citizens’ rights and liberties versus their peace and security (Sniderman et al, 1996). But why are

people willing to sacrifice their civil liberties? Davis and Silver (2002) identify two core explanations.

First, fear and other feelings of threat evoke an intense defensive reaction which makes the more

willing to take drastic measurement to counter the feeling of threat. The second one is trust in

government. If the willingness of people to trade off civil liberties against more power for the

government, trust is very important. Governments need the trust of their citizens in order to achieve

success in difficult times such as a national crisis after a terrorist attack (Hetherington, 1998). If

people do not trust the government, why would they sacrifice their ‘freedom’?

2.3. Issue life cycle

Every (CSR) issue goes through a cycle of rise and decline, this is what Ackerman and Bauer (1976)

and Mahon and Waddock (1992) call the “issue life cycle”. This life cycle goes through four kinds of

stages; birth, growth, development and maturity. In each phase the three different stakeholders

(state, market and civil society) have different views and will adopt a different attitude towards the

issue.

In the birth phase, the issue triggers one of the three main stakeholders (Ewing, 1980; Schwarts and

Gibb, 1999). This changes the attitude of the stakeholder towards the issue and therefore the issue

arrives in its birth phase. In this phase, the problem is hard to define because there are no laws or

regulations yet. This is the area where the state should be active in. Companies have to decide if they

want a stake in this, because it could prove to be of great importance to take part in (solving) this

issue now. On the other hand, NGO’s will play the role of the watchdog. They spotted the issue and

will monitor this.

The growth phase is characterized by media attention and the emergence of the issue in the public

debate (Wartick &Wood, 1999). This is the moment when the first in command fails to address the

issue adequately. The failure of solving the issue in its birth phase attracts attention from the media

and public. Governments in this phase are reactive, making laws and regulations or denying that it is

their primary responsibility. Companies are getting more active, placing the issue on their agenda.

(Van Tulder & Van der Zwart, 2006)

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In the development phase the issue becomes increasingly important. Stakeholders, individually or

collectively, clearly have different attitudes towards the problem and can demand changes

(Eyestone, 1978; Rowley, 1997; Frooman, 1999). The state and the market will become more active

in this phase by searching for solutions or trying to keep the damage minimized. The NGO’s will try to

work together with both state and market to find solutions. Apart from working together, they will

also try to use the media to get more attention for their opinion.

In the maturity phase, the issue has to be addressed and the expectational gap has to be bridged

(Van Tulder & Van der Zwart, 2006). Companies will act defensively and will try to make the best out

of a bad situation. Governments are proactive and will try to, in collaboration with for example

NGO’s, respond more adequately for the current issue and other issues that might occur. Societal

organizations play an important role in this phase because they often represent the problem (Van

Tulder & Van der Zwart, 2006). For terrorism, the issue life cycle could be as depicted in figure 4.

Fig 4: Issue life cycle

2.3.1. Explanation by phase

2.3.1.1. Birth

In the birth phase, companies ‘do not care’ about terrorism, because it is not an issue with big public

awareness. NGO’s sometimes have interests in the issue, but only if they are involved in cases that

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are related to terrorism. For instance human-rights organizations could be involved in the issue when

terrorists violate human rights. Governments are inactive in the birth phase on the issue of terrorism,

but they are always aware of the possibility of the terrorist threat. Therefore they take safety-

measures and have legislation on safety issues. These laws are not that strict though.

2.3.1.2. Growth

In the growth phase, terrorist activity gets the interest of the public and becomes a bigger issue.

Companies act re-active, only if they are primarily involved in the issue, like airline companies after

September 11. NGO’s (besides the NGO’s mentioned by ‘Birth’) get more involved if they directly or

indirectly get involved by a terrorist attack. Governments act re-active. This is a first reaction, also to

satisfy the public. The ‘War on Terror’ is a good example of this.

2.3.1.3. Development

In the development phase, public interest in terrorism becomes significant. Companies try to

cooperate on new legislation to prevent being accused of a lack of urgency. In addition, when

companies are directly involved in the terrorist issue (like airline companies), there is off course a

self-interest aspect related as well. NGO’s try to cooperate with other NGO’s to see if they can help

society deal with the consequences of terrorism. The government tries to legislate to prevent

terrorist attacks from happing. Laws on this issue become more strict and punishment levels rise.

2.3.1.4. Maturity

In the maturity phase, public interest in the issue is very big, comparable in this context with the

situation short after September 11. Companies now also see the impact of terrorism and cooperate

fully with NGO’s and government to prevent terrorism and to deal with the consequences. The same

goes for NGO’s, although they will always be the most active when it is concerning their particular

issues. The government takes the coordinating role and cooperates with NGO’s (civilians) and

companies. This is all happening under total awareness of the problem.

2.3.1.5. Post-Maturity

When terrorist activity continues, the awareness of the issue will also continue. The issue is too

serious en directly involving human life to totally disappear. NGO’s and companies will continue to

cooperate with the government to prevent terrorist actions from taking place. A good example of

this is ‘Nederland tegen terrorisme’. This is a cooperation of government (Dutch state), NGO’s and

companies to get the public’s attention for terrorism. They appeal to the public to be always aware

of possible terrorist activity and handle accurate if so.

When terrorist activity does not continue, the issue life cycle of terrorism will bit by bit return to the

birth phase of the issue, but it will not disappear.

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Based on the descriptions above, we think the issue of terrorism is somewhere between the

development and the maturity phase, since the three spheres are all trying to cooperate with each

other on addressing this issue, although this cooperation is not optimized yet and requires further

improvement.

2.4. Who is to blame?

The answer to the question ‘Who is to blame’ on the issue of terrorism within the societal triangle is

very straightforward: the terrorists. But this answer is limited only to the direct terrorist action. In

this paper we address the consequences of terrorism. Still, the terrorist are first to blame, because

without terrorist action there logically would be no consequences of that. When we look at for

instance privacy issues, the state can be blamed for intruding citizen’s privacy. The question is

whether this intruding is legitimate when trying to prevent a terrorist attack. There is no real answer

to this question, because most of the time this is a political choice. Typically, leftwing politicians have

other opinions on this topic than rightwing politicians.

The same questions can be asked about the costs that are related to the consequences of terrorism.

The previously mentioned precautions that need to be taken cost a lot of money. Also in this case it is

a political question whether there is the willingness to spend a certain amount of the budget on the

consequences of terrorism.

Firms in general are victimized by terrorism rather than they are to blame. However, the media plays

an important role in how severe the impact of terrorism on society is. Since the perceptions about

the threats and risks of terrorism influence consumer behavior, and thus the economy, making sure

that people are informed accurate is an important responsibility of media firms. Therefore they are

to blame when they fail to do so.

Rothe and Muzatti (2004) argue that a moral panic has been created in American society after the

9/11 attacks, and that this is (partly) created by media. They introduce a five stage model, by

combining models of Cohen (1972, in Rothe and Muzatti, 2004), and Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994,

in Rothe and Muzatti, 2004) to evaluate the creation of moral panic after 9/11 in the U.S. A moral

panic can be defined as an exaggeration or distortion of some perceived deviant behavior or criminal

activity (Rother & Muzzatti, 2004).

So what is the role of the media concerning this issue? Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the media

started to define the threat by defining the terrorists and everybody directly or indirectly involved as

evil itself, and enemies of all that America stands for. They also immediately started to define the

events in terms of “war”, “we are in war”, “this is a battlefield”, and the like. This was further

27

increased by the extensive coverage of the events in the media for months after, where ‘objective’

journalists further defined the events in terms of evil, hatred, war on terrorism, fight for freedom and

democracy.

Hollywood also played a role in this by producing all kinds of drama shows based on terrorist events,

like 24, The Shield, Law and Order. Since the media is the principle vehicle for popular views,

ideology, and information, they have a critical role in how the terrorists and the threat they

represent are perceived. The media also focused on patriotism after the attacks, in line with the

Bush-doctrine of “You are either with us, or against us.” Another role the media played in influencing

the people was that every criminal event since then immediately became topic of speculation about

whether or not the event was related to terrorism, adding to the fear and risk-perception of the

people by letting them believe that they were constantly in imminent danger.

By playing this role, the media made the problem bigger, adding to feelings of insecurity and

uncertainty, and thus increasing the problem. Besides that, the amount of media coverage and the

way in which this is done, also triggers other terrorists since they need the publicity and media

attention to get attention for their cause. This implies that the mechanism used by the media can

also increase the problem. However, their main responsibility is to prevent moral panic from

happening. So when it does happen in the way it happened in the U.S. after 9/11, the media is also to

blame (Rothe & Muzatti, 2004). Ultimately, it may not be the terrorism itself that poses the greatest

threat. Rather the greatest threat may be the fear that terrorism incites (Knight & Czinkota, 2008).

2.5. Tensions

Issues can be defined as trade-offs, puzzles, paradoxes or dilemmas. From the social triangle there

are three different ways of looking at the issue. The state has a different view on the problem than

civil society, and their view may differ from the market perspective. Therefore, a distinction is made

for tensions in state, civil society and market.

2.5.1. State

There are different types of tensions in the terrorism issue from a states perspective. The nature of

these tensions can be as follows: puzzle, trade-off, paradox or a dilemma.

Dimension of Amount of Privacy vs. Preventing Terrorism

First a decision needs to be made for which dimensions the tension can be determined by. A problem

concerning a state and terrorism is the tension between having personal freedom (or privacy) and

having the possibility to prevent terrorism. For instance, governments tend to tap telephones from

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innocent citizens to check whether a terrorist activity is taking place, which is a decrease in privacy.

This tension can be illustrated as follows:

Trade-off Dilemma

Amount of privacy Amount of privacy

‘Make a choice’

Preventing terrorism Preventing terrorism

This tension could be a trade-off, because there could be an optimal solution line, which is the line

where the balance between the privacy interests of citizens and the preventing terrorism interests of

governments is appropriate. The problem with this solution is that in case a terrorist attack despite

of all the measures taken does happen, the optimal solution line apparently was not the optimal

solution line. In the case of which another point on the line is chosen, more towards preventing

terrorism, and there is no threat of an attack, the privacy was given up for nothing.

This tension could also be a dilemma. Either the government takes no anti-privacy measures and

terrorists activity that perhaps is taking place will not be discovered, or the government takes all the

privacy of its citizens away (like ‘Big Brother’ in George Orwell’s 1984) which means that all

communication can be checked and all terrorist activity is supposed to be detected. The problem

with this solution is that both choices are not very realistic. A complete non-privacy policy will not be

accepted by many, and the risk of a non-preventing terrorism policy will also not be acceptable for

many.

As stated before, there are two other options for solving this tension, approaching it as a puzzle or

approaching it as a paradox. With the puzzle, the same problem persists as with the trade-off. When

looking for ‘one optimal solution point’, there has to be given up at least some privacy or some

capacity on preventing attacks. In this case, that is not what we want.

This tension is probably solved best by seeing it as a paradox. Best of both worlds should be taken

into account. There should be a search for getting the best privacy protection and also finding ways

to prevent terrorist attacks from happening without contravening in privacy issues.

Dimension Money spent on preventing terrorism vs. Risk of Terrorist Attack

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The tension of giving up privacy for preventing terrorism can also be displayed as a tension between

money spent on terrorism and the risk of a terrorist attack. There is a similar discussion on the

various tensions.

The solution here should also be the paradox solution. There should be an optimal effort on

preventing terrorism (thus lowering the risk of a terrorist attack) by trying to do this as cheap as

possible. In this case, ‘cheap’ should not be confused by ‘making choices in the budget’. Costs that

have to be made, have to be made. That is why the solution is not a ‘Puzzle’.

Paradox

2.5.2. Market

The media is involved in two tensions related to this issue. First, the tension between commercial

interests (sales) and the responsibility to deliver objective and realistic news coverage. Second, the

tension between having to conform to some extent to the governmental propaganda, and the

responsibility to deliver objective and realistic news coverage. When a terroristic event occurs people

often do not want a nuanced picture of the event, but they rather buy papers with sensational

headlines and stories of heroism, revenge and the like. This is a tension for media.

The second tension is created by the will of the government to use the media for propaganda to get

certain laws and regulations approved by profiting from the feelings of the people. Since media are

often depending on support from the government, they need to maintain a good relationship with

Get best

of both

worlds

Lowering Risk of a terrorist attack

Money spent on terrorism

30

the state in order to not be excluded. When that happens, the firm gets news later than competitors,

which will have a negative effect on sales.

The two tensions can also influence each other. For example, when other media are conforming to

state propaganda, and thus achieving higher sales, the commercial interest and the governmental

propaganda are in the same tension.

How can the tensions be classified? The first tension is not a paradox, since meeting commercial

interests while bringing only objective news coverage is in practice not very realistic. Getting the best

of both worlds is therefore not possible. For some firms this tension can be described as a dilemma.

Choosing for objectivity is often not an option for commercial businesses, and although some

companies therefore choose to only satisfy consumer needs and meet commercial interests, most

media are also concerned with good, objective news coverage. This means that for some firms this is

a dilemma, but certainly not for all.

For most firms this tension is a trade-off, where the nature of the news, and the impact it can have,

decides where on the line the balance is found. This means that in some case they will meet more

commercial interests, while in other cases they will choose for more objectivity. Seeing the tension as

a puzzle is not suitable, since every news event is different and requires another solution. Ideally,

media would treat the tension as a dilemma, choosing only for objectivity, but in practice a trade-off

is more likely.

Trade-off Dilemma

Commercial interests Commercial interests

make a choice

Media objectivity Media objectivity

The second tension is also not really a paradox because of the conflicting interests of objectivity

versus propaganda. Here as well, some firms might be inclined to choose the dilemma approach in

order to get the ‘news’ they need to make their sales. Again, for most companies however this will be

a trade off, and thus context specific.

Trade-off Dilemma

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Government propaganda Government propaganda

make a choice

Media objectivity Media objectivity

2.5.3. Civil society

When looking at the different tensions where the impact of terrorism on civil society could be placed,

it is not easy to clearly point out one tension. When putting ‘preventing terrorism’ on one axis and

‘willingness to sacrifice civil liberties” on the other, tension as a trade-off looks the best suitable.

People should strike a balance between the continuous threat of terrorism and losing bits of their

own privacy.

When looking at the tension as a dilemma, it is either not sharing private information with the result

that terrorism becomes more and more a threat, or sharing all private information which is meant to

result in a total ban of terrorism. Both solutions are not realistic for this kind of problem.

In a paradox “the best of both worlds’ is achieved by using multiple innovative reconciliations. In this

case, it would imply that people will not have to deal with privacy problems by reconciliations and

terrorism will be kept to a minimum. Of course this would be the most ideal solution, but again this is

not really realistic.

Finally there is the tension as a puzzle, where there is one optimal solution point for the tension. In

the case of terrorism, where so many views are ‘part of the problem/solution’, one optimal solution

would be unrealistic. For every action group, country, region there will be another optimal solution.

Trade off

Amount of privacy

Willingness to sacrifice civil liberties

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3. Finding solutions

3.1. Expression of Leadership

State, market and civil society all have different leadership roles in addressing the problem of

terrorism. The issue of leadership has of course to do with in the responsibility of people for the

problem. As stated before, the state approaches the issue of terrorism as their main responsibility,

therefore they are also stated as leaders when looking at the social triangle. Within the three spheres

there are also people, governments or companies that take the lead in solving the problem.

3.1.1. State

The issue of terrorism already exists for a very long time, but recent developments have set a new

perspective on this issue. The ‘9/11’ attacks where the beginning of this new view, and the reaction

of the United States made them the leading nation. As a reaction to this attack, U.S. President Bush

stated: "Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists," and initiated the War on Terrorism.

Besides being the visionary leader on the war of terrorism, the U.S are also the most active when it

comes to measures taken after 9/11 in order to eliminate terrorism by for example applying a very

strict entry policy in terms of traveling.

3.1.2. Market

As stated in the chapter on stakeholders, it depends on the kind of attack which sector or (group of)

companies are taking responsibility for solving the issue. It is clear that the airline industry took

important security measures after the ‘9/11’ attacks. They take, under government pressure, lead in

safety measures for travelling. There are several laws and regulations on national and international

level to ensure the safety of the passengers.

3.1.3. Civil Society

Within the civil society there is not really one person or organisation that takes the lead in this issue.

An example of a person that takes a role as a leader is Ingrid Betancourt. She was running for

presidency in Colombia when she was kidnapped by the terrorist group FARC. Now, after her escape,

she is fighting for people who are victims of terrorist deeds. Of course there are a lot of NGO’s that

address the problem and try to reduce the impact of terrorism, as is the case with most issues. One

of the reasons that civil society does not have a clear leader in this issue is the response of the

government. The rise of leaders from civil society is often a result of governments not taking

responsibility for trying to solve an issue, which is clearly not the case with terrorism.

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4. Solutions in practice

4.1. State

Finding a solution on (the consequences of) terrorism is not easy. The real question should be to

what extend a state should take measurements to prevent terrorist attacks. This is most of the time a

political question. There is the ‘Bush-doctrine’, which states that there is no difference between

terrorists and countries that give shelter to terrorists. This is a justification of preventive strikes

against countries, like Iraq or Afghanistan. There is also a ‘left-wing’ solution, which represents the

idea that there should be negotiation which terrorist groups, so that there can be mutual

understanding of each other’s views. Off course, these are two extreme views on how to handle the

consequences of terrorism while it might be that a combination of the two views is the best thing to

do.

As mentioned before, the optimal solution for handling with terrorism depends on the political view

of the lawmakers. In fact, most state-solutions are colored by political opinions. It seems reasonable

to look at successful ways of handling the consequences of terrorism from examples in history. There

are some examples of successful ways that terrorism was addressed, with both right- and left-wing

solutions.

Looking at a ‘left-wing solution’, there is the example of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), who

assaulted the people of Ireland from 1916-1998 with terrorist attacks. After negotiations with the

political division of the IRA, Sinn Fein, there came an end to the attacks. The famous “Good Friday

Agreement” was the result of an eight-month long negotiation. Another example, but from a ‘right-

wing’ perspective, are the United States of America. After the September 11 attacks there has been

no terrorist action on American territory, showing the effects of an ‘all-security’ policy.

An interesting approach for states to handle terrorism, is stated by Sandler & Enders (2004). They set

up a game theory for hostage event. This theory examines governments that choose deterrence (like

airline safety measures) and based on this deterrence a terrorist will decide whether or not to hijack

an airplane for instance. In the case of an attack being planned, the government has a response

towards the terrorist based on the logistical success. Based on this response, the terrorist decides

whether or not to capitulate. This theory provides a theoretical based view on solving some terrorist

issues, but one may wonder to what extend theories like this can be applied in specific cases.

34

4.2. Market

Companies can take measures to address the consequences of terrorism and diminish these

consequences. Since the market is not really responsible for this issue in most cases, the focus needs

to be on measures that organizations can take in dealing with terrorism instead of preventing the

existence of terrorism.

Fleming (1998) provides a model to help organizations assess their vulnerability to terrorism, in order

for them to prepare themselves appropriately. He identifies five relevant categories; targets of

terrorism, organizational exposure, organizational preparedness, environmental factors and threat of

terrorism (see appendix 1).

• Threat of terrorism: three components are identified regarding the threat of terrorism;

potential threats (type of terrorist attack), potential harm (direct damage of the attack) and

business impact (how the organizations operations and profitability can be influenced).

• Environmental factors: effectively scanning the environment helps to address the probability

of a terrorist attack. One way of doing this is PEST-analysis.

• Targets of terrorism: there are three potential target areas; general targets, organizational

targets and facility targets. There is a pattern in targets of terrorist attacks, some locations

are therefore more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These locations are described as general

targets. Organizations can become specific targets, because of what they produce, what they

stand for, or by their attitude regarding certain political or socio-cultural issues. Some

facilities are more vulnerable to a terrorist attack, because of their production (for example,

chemicals), or by geographical location. These are the facility targets.

• Organizational exposure: consists of degree of exposure which is about how (de)centralized a

firm’s operations are, whether mission-critical activities would be affected, which operations

are the most likely to be affected and what the impact of an attack would be on other parts

of an organization. Furthermore it also includes impact of exposure which answers the

questions of whether or not the organization could still operate and what costs would be

involved in continuing or resolving operations.

Each of these components helps in addressing the vulnerability and can help to prepare the

organization for the possibility of a terrorist attack. The outcomes of this analysis could be used to

take action when a terrorist event really takes place. Knowledge of a company’s vulnerability helps a

company to manager it and to diminish the threat.

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The challenges for companies in dealing with terrorism consist of risk-management (Fleming, 1998;

Subhash & Grosse, 2009), risk identification, and risk assessment. The model of Fleming can help in

the steps of identifying and assessing the risks. The outcomes of such an analysis can be used to

design plans to hedge these risks.

Based on the outcomes of the organizational vulnerability model, organizations could decide to

change their location, to take more security measures regarding critical or vulnerable facilities, to

provide evacuation and emergency plans, to avoid certain industries or products, or not to engage in

politics or other measures. Another tool companies can use is resilience management, i.e. building

the risk of terrorism into the strategies and structure the company, and into its supply chains and

operations accordingly. Diagnostic tools can be used to address the desired amount of resilience.

Security measures are also important, but need to be implemented without hindering the

performance of the organization. Furthermore, thinking about possible worst-case scenarios is

important. Thinking about what would happen if suppliers are hit by terrorists and what would that

mean for the organization are important steps in preparing a company for the consequences of

terrorism (Subhash & Grosse, 2009). Overall it is important for companies to be aware of the

existence and threat of terrorism. Companies should think about this, and make some sort of

contingency plan to prepare for the undesired occurrence of a terrorist attack.

Again, the firms in the media have an important role to play. In dealing with terrorism, good

information supply to society is very important for addressing the real threat and risks, since it can

make sure that no unnecessary feelings of uncertainty and insecurity are being spread across the

public. As depicted in the paragraph on economic impacts of terrorism, we have argued that these

kinds of feelings have an influence on consumer behavior. Making sure that consumer confidence is

maintained, or at least not unnecessary undermined, is important in decreasing the economic impact

of terrorism.

The media should therefore strive to make sure that the public is well informed about terrorist

events, that the threat and risks are accurately depicted, and that a nuanced picture of the events is

provided so that the possibility of an exaggerated reaction can be diminished, as well as the chance

of a moral panic to occur. The media should be very aware of its influence on the public, and proper

information supply on terrorism could help to diminish the consequences of terrorism in society.

4.3. Civil society

As been stated before, the issue of terrorism can be placed between civil society and state in the

society triangle. Can the civil society then also be part of a solution?

36

By far the best way to stop terrorism is by getting the terrorists to stop. Pressure from civil society

and state should be so high that terrorist groups stop their violence action and search for other ways

to get heard.

Because the issue of terrorism is placed between the civil society and the state, they also have to

work together to solve the problem. It is of great importance that civil society trusts the government

in their way of dealing with the problem. Trust in the government can resolve in a resource upon

which governments can build their policies to deal with the issue. Tolerance and the believe that by

reducing civil liberties safety can be achieved in a better way, is crucial for governments.

Besides the pressure on terrorists and the trust in government, civil society also has to correct itself.

When people notice that fellow citizens are getting increasingly radical in their believes, they should

report that with the authorities. In The Netherlands there is ‘M.’, which stands for ‘meld misdaad

anoniem’ (report crime anonymous). This is a tool that can be used to report crimes where someone

knows the offender, but the offender does not know this person.

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5. Sustainable Societal Story (SSS)

Terrorism is an issue which cannot be solved by state, civil society or markets separately. Therefore,

there is not something like a ‘sustainable corporate story’ with the issue of terrorism. Rather, the

entire society should collaborate to prevent terrorism and address the consequences of terrorism

effectively. The state should take the lead since they have the power to lead, the legitimacy and the

obligation to their citizens to do so. The combination of leadership from the government and

corporation from the market and the civil society, results in a Sustainable Societal Story (SSS).

5.1. Implementation

To address the issue of terrorism there are several policies that must be addressed if the risk and

effect of terrorism are to be reduced. These policies focus on the three spheres of the societal

triangle and the interaction between these spheres. Branscomb (2004) talks about three difficult and

important tasks:

Bring all the agencies of the federal government into a cohesive plan for solving the most urgent

research problems facing homeland security.

In this solution the state has to take the lead. They have to research the most urgent problems. The

government has to come up with a strategy which addresses all the problems found in the research.

When the government can address problems on its own, they have to do so. When they need

cooperation from the market or civil society, they have to create partnerships.

Devise an industrial strategy that will bring private industry into the discussion of strategy and give it

the incentives to develop and produce the required systems

Companies all have their strengths and often they use them to compete with each other in their

market. In case of terrorism, companies should work more together to develop and produce systems

that reduce the threat and impact of terrorism.

Engage cities, counties, states, and the associations of emergency response professionals into the

setting of both specifications and priorities for the deployed technologies for which these state and

local entities are the purchasers and users.

When companies and governments have to come up with a strategy and their solutions, they have to

work in collaboration with the agencies close to the civil society. Civil society needs to have trust and

38

confidence in the plans of the government and market to complete the circle of trust. With this trust,

the government can build on news ways of addressing the issue of terrorism.

Due to the complexity of the problem, it will be hard to accomplish all three tasks. The stated tasks

above do not only count on a national level but also on an international level. Industrialized

democracies must identify and implement ways to share their counterterrorism technical knowledge

and skills (Branscomb, 2004).

In the article ‘Terrorism and international Business’ by Knight and Czinkota (2008), some more

relevant solutions for addressing the issue of terrorism are identified.

Strengthen the information and communications infrastructure.

Technology helps firms, states and citizens to prevent, help and recover from a terrorist attack. A

highly developed emergency plan is not only effective after an attack but it also gives the people who

are dealing with this plan confidence in their ability to cope with the situation if a terrorist attack

would ever occur.

Next to emergency plans, technology can also be used for detecting and preventing terrorist attacks.

The public sector, in its partnership with the private sector, must encourage R&D and innovative

behaviours that lead to the development of leading-edge technologies that ensure early detection of,

and rapid recovery from, catastrophic events.

Provide better intelligence support.

Federal governments should also provide the private sector with information about the state of

emergency. The internet is one of the places where companies can inform themselves about possible

threats. Nowadays, the new media plays a major role in providing information to the private sector

and civil society. However, media are not always reliable and sometimes focus too much on

sensational news stories. Therefore, the federal government has a role to play in ensuring that the

public obtains news and information which is factual and right and therefore helpful for companies

and civil society in case of an emergency.

Strengthen the partnership between the private and public sector.

In dealing with the effects of terrorism, each sector has its own specialities. Governments are

especially good at gathering intelligence, organizing defence and recovery efforts. However, firms in

private sectors also have specialities. Scientists, doctors, managers and other specialists could be

very important in time of disaster. Some tasks could be performed more efficiently by the private

39

sector than by the public sector. For example, when emergency aid has to be delivered in case of a

terrorist attack, organizations that are working in logistics often have much more experience in

managing and coordinating these kind of activities. Instead of just giving money, engaging in

partnerships based on skills and experiences could be helpful in managing the consequences of

terrorism.

Stimulate educational programs.

All kinds of educational programs can be offered to companies in order to help them prepare better

for emergencies. For example, education in risk management, scenario-planning, and emergency

response can increase the overall responsiveness of firms to terroristic events. By increasing the

preparedness and responsiveness of firms, the chances of survival for firms are higher, thus lowering

the economic impact of terrorist events. Therefore, educating people in society on the risks and

threats of terrorism can help here as well. The creation of more awareness can help in diminishing

the impact of terrorism on society, lowering the chances of people feeling insecure, and allows

society to recover easier from acts of terrorism. The government should take a leading role in this as

well.

40

6. Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to look at the consequences of the so called new terrorism on society

and how these consequences can be addressed, as is reflected in our research question:


After analysing the issue we can conclude that terrorism is mostly directed at the state, but that civil

society and market are in most cases the primary victims, either by physical means or by indirect

downfalls of terrorism like economic problems or fear. Looking at the possibilities that society has in

dealing with these consequences, we can see that market and civil society have relatively few

opportunities to do so. The primary means which they have is risk management, thus diminishing the

risk of being hit themselves, and making sure they are as prepared as possible.

However, the main responsibility in this issue lies with the government, who therefore has to take a

leadership role here. By activating policies directed at security, intelligence, education, and creating

awareness, they can help society to get better prepared for terrorist events. However, it is not a sole

responsibility of the government. Society has to collaborate and work together to create the needed

resilience to be able to deal with terrorism. Governments can come with initiatives, but it is also the

responsibility of markets and civil society to make use of these initiatives, and to make sure that

society is better able, as a whole, to deal with terrorism.

This line of reasoning is reflected in the “Triple-E” model which is depicted in figure 5.

41

Fig 5: Triple E model

• Big Brother: Governments are

increasingly violating people’s privacy in order to be able to better prevent terrorist

attacks.

• Soft Sister: From an ethical

point of view, demanding such privacy violations is not proper; people would rather see

their privacy unharmed by governments.

• Soft Brother: Society should

cooperate as a whole, with people giving up some of their privacy in order to reduce the

risk of terrorism. Governments should make use responsibly of sensitive information

while including the expertise of the market in their task of eliminating the negative

consequences of terrorism. This will lead to a better management of terrorism and

society as a whole will profit.

Therefore, we argue that although government has the mean leading responsibility, all spheres in

society have to cooperate to really address the problems caused by terrorism.

EFFICIENCY

ETHICS

EFFECTIVENESS

Big Brother Soft Sister

Soft Brother

Trade-Off:

Amount of Privacy vs.

Preventing Terrorism

Threat of

terrorism

42

6.1. Drawbacks

We soon found out that our topic, ‘terrorism’, did not have so much overlap with the business-part

of the societal triangle. We decided to split the topic into the three subparts of the societal triangle;

state, market and civil society. We tried to look at those different aspects, to find out the different

solutions for each of the three parts. Ironically, our conclusion is that the three institutional spheres

should cooperate to have an effective answer to the problem of terrorism and dealing with the

consequences.

6.2. Limitations

The issue of terrorism is a very broad issue and has been a problem for centuries. But the issue of

terrorism as we know it nowadays and what we see on the news, has mostly something to do with

new terrorism, as described in the literature review. Therefore we choose to look at the kind of

terrorism that revealed itself from the September 11 attacks on. It was soon clear that much

literature written about terrorism started with a sentence like: ‘after the September 11 attacks,

terrorism….’. This was useful for finding enough relevant literature on our topic, but gave us the

limitation of sometimes missing a historical background from the period before 2001.

Because of our choice to focus on new terrorism, we deliberately left out terrorism issues focused on

animal rights (like the Animal Liberation Front), environment issues (like Greenpeace) and cyber

terrorism. On most on these types of terrorism, public opinion is divided in a group of people who

see these groups as (legal) activist and a group of people who see them as (illegal) terrorist. To avoid

discussions on whether a group of activists are terrorists, we made a choice on a group which (most

of) Western society considers to be terrorists. Because of this, we left out a potential big number of

research areas.

Another limitation of our research is the fact that we decided to look at the consequences of

terrorism in society, and how these can be managed. This means that we focus less on solving the

issue in means of letting terrorism disappear by solving its root causes. Instead we focused on how to

prevent terrorism and how to deal with the risk and threat of terrorism.

6.3. Further research

The issue of terrorism is very broad en requires further research. As described by in the paragraph of

limitations, lots of types of terrorism have not been discussed in this paper. It would for instance be

interesting to research whether our approach on dealing with the consequences of terrorism also

would apply on terrorism linked with animal rights, or environment fundamentalists. Since these

43

types of terrorism have mostly nothing to do with attacks on states, the conclusions on such research

will probably be significantly different.

Appendix

Appendix 1

44

Appendix 2

Group process

Writing this issue paper involved a Group process of approximately one week. After the group

formation a group contract has been made up, identifying our strengths and weaknesses, and

expressing our expectations and ambitions. This helped us to make the group process more

efficiently.

The process has been organized around several group meetings on Wednesday 23-9, Friday 25-9,

Monday 28-9 and Thursday 1-10. These group meetings were designed to evaluate the progress

made, and to make arrangements about the further steps to be taken, and the division of tasks. The

last meeting was used to finalize the issue paper collectively. This way coordination was ensured, and

group members still had the flexibility to plan the work in a way that was suitable and fitted their

schedule. In making arrangements on tasks we have tried to take peoples specific demands with

respect to time availability into account. This way, all group members had the chance to do the same

amount of work in the time that suited them best. For example, Amir had more time available during

the weekend and at the beginning of the week, and Rick had more time available at the end of the

week, so tasks were divided accordingly. This worked out well.

In dividing the tasks, we have also taken the SWOT analysis into consideration. Since we had only a

limited amount of time to finish the paper, we decided that for efficiency reasons it was better to let

people do what were there strengths. Therefore, Amir and Rick were more concerned with the

writing and editing of the paper, and Mathijs and David decided to do the presentation.

On Thursday we put in a group effort to integrate all parts and finalize the paper. Overall the group

process worked well. There was enough flexibility to be able to deal with differences in time

availability, and to consider strengths and weaknesses of group members. Despite the time

limitations, and the fact that a lot of work had to be done in a small number of days, we did not

encounter any serious problems in the process of writing the paper, and were able to get the job

done in time.

45

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Issue Paper on Terrorism - Erasmus Research Institute of … · 2015-11-27 · terrorist attack which introduced the “new terrorism”. This event led to a combination of increasing