ISSN 2502-0722Issue 31/ January 2018

Death Penalty in ASEAN: No

Progress Should be Taken for Granted

Reviewing the Progress of the

Peace Process in Myanmar

Priorities for the New ASEAN

Secretary-General

+INFOGRAPHIC

ASEAN ROUND-UP

A Note From the Editor

Articles

Death Penalty in ASEAN: No Progress Should be Taken for Granted

Reviewing the Progress of the Peace Process in Myanmar

Priorities for the New ASEAN Secretary-General

Infographic

Shrinking Civic Space in Southeast Asia

ASEAN Round-Up

ASEAN and EU: Love is in the air

A Response to an Eroded Nationalism on Indonesian Youth

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Project Supervisors Rahimah AbdulrahimExecutive Director,The Habibie Center

Hadi KuntjaraDeputy Director for Operations,The Habibie Center

Editor in ChiefA. Ibrahim Almuttaqi

Thinking ASEAN Team Askabea FadhillaFina AstrianaMuhamad ArifHana HanifahRahma SimamoraTongki Ari WibowoVierna Tasya WensatamaWirya Adiwena

A note from the editorDear readers:

Happy New Year and welcome to the January 2018 issue of the monthly Thinking ASEAN!

Entering the new year, we are greeted by a sense of hope, excitement, and renewal. In the Southeast Asian region, change is in the air. ASEAN not only welcomes a new Secretary-General but has also begun expanding the ASEAN Secretariat building. Around the region, three countries will also hold crucial elections: Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Whilst we certainly would not take any sides, we hope such elections will be a true celebration of democracy and that the aspirations of the people will be listened to and acted upon.

Speaking of the people’s aspirations, this issue of Thinking ASEAN looks at the sensitive issue of drugs and the death penalty. Taking the view that drugs destroys people’s lives, many ASEAN member-states have traditionally imposed strong punishment for offenders. However there has been growing recognition that the death penalty has not always worked. Our lead article by Rafendi Djamin (Coalition for the Abolition of Death Penalty in ASEAN) and Wirya Adiwena (The Habibie Center) therefore write on ‘Death penalty in ASEAN: no progress should be taken for granted’.

Our second article is by Amara Thiha (William P. Fulluer Fellow - The Asia Foundation and Visiting Research Fellow – Stimson Center) on ‘Reviewing the Progress of the Peace Process in Myanmar.’ After the victory of National League of Democracy (NLD), Myanmar was slated to enter a new era. A key component of this transition is a rejuvenated peace process that was supposed to lead to a ‘Year of Peace’. This includes the 21st century Panglong Conference and dialogues between the government and various ethnic groups in Myanmar. However, conflict seems to be quite persistent as there are still tensions between the government and armed groups. This challenge warrants a review of the progress of Myanmar Peace Process so far. Amara’s article seeks to explain why this has yet to be realized by highlighting a number of recent developments in Myanmar that has or might influence the peace process, such as the involvement of Beijing, the prominence of a relatively new military coalition—dubbed the Northern Alliance—formed by armed groups, and the challenge that Panglong forum faces as a peace building forum.

Finally, our last article aims to welcome the new ASEAN Secretary General Dato Paduka Lim Jock Hoi and outlines some of the priorities he will be confronted with in his first few days, weeks, and months in his new role.

As usual, we present an infographic that this month looks at challenges against democratic spaces in Southeast Asia.Don’t hesitate to drop me a line at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id if you have comments, input, or prospective submissions.

Happy reading!

Best regards from Jakarta

Thinking ASEAN is a monthly publication that aims to provide insightful, cogent and engaging perspectives on issues central to contemporary Southeast Asia and the ASEAN member states. It is a product of The Habibie Center, with the generous support of the Republic of Korea’s Mission to ASEAN.

The content of Thinking ASEAN does not reflect the official opinion of The Habibie Center or institutions related to the publication. The Habibie Center was founded by Indonesian President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental and non-profit organization to promote the democratization and modernization of the country.

Responsibility for the information and views expressed in Thinking ASEAN lies entirely with the author(s). For comments, suggestions and prospective contributions, the Managing Editor of Thinking ASEAN can be reached at thinkingasean@habibiecenter.or.id.

The Habibie Center was founded by Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie and family in 1999 as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. The vision of The Habibie Center is to create a structurally democratic society founded on the morality and integrity of cultural and religious values.

The missions of The Habibie Center are first, to establish a structurally and culturally democratic society that recognizes, respects, and promotes human rights by undertaking study and advocacy of issues related to democratization and human rights, and second, to increase the effectiveness of the management of human resources and the spread of technology.

2Issue 31/ January 2018

The Hangman’s KnotSource: Jimmy/pxleyes.com

Death Penalty in ASEAN: No Progress Should be

Taken for Granted

Rafendi Djamin, co-founder of Coalition for the Abolition of Death Penalty in ASEAN (CADPA)

Wirya Adiwenais Head of International Relationsat The Habibie Center

T he abolition of the death penalty has increasingly become a worldwide trend. Today, 105 countries have abolished the death penalty

for all crimes, with an additional 29 countries abolishing the death penalty in practice – meaning while the punishment is still legal, these countries have not executed anyone in the last ten years, in line with their national policy or a commitment against the death penalty. Indeed, capital punishment is increasingly seen as an exception rather than a norm.

There is an increasing acceptance that the death penalty is no longer appropriate as they go against human rights. Moreover, it also suffers from the challenges that many justice systems face: potential discrimination based on class or ethnicity, and/or the influence of factors not related to guilt or innocence such as mistakes and inaccuracies during legal proceedings that might lead to the execution of an innocent person.

Southeast Asia is not an exception to this trend. Throughout the last decade, the region saw important developments in the legislations concerning death penalty across all ASEAN Member States. However, this progress did not come easily and should not be taken for granted. This article will review the current achievements in regards to the abolition of the death penalty in Southeast Asia, as well as to observe the challenges that it still faces.

The road towards the abolition of the death penalty is moving forward in Southeast Asia

Two ASEAN Member States have abolished the death penalty, namely the Philippines and Cambodia. The former abolished the death penalty in 2006 when President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed an act to downgrade the punishment of the death penalty to life imprisonment instead, citing its failure in deterring crimes.1 Meanwhile, Cambodia abolished the death penalty much earlier. After banning the use of the death penalty in 1989, it further enshrined its abolition in the Cambodian Constitution in 1993.2 Afterwards, Cambodia has been consistent in supporting the worldwide movement against the death penalty by continuously showing its support for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty at the United Nations General Assembly.

Furthermore, Singapore has put

restrictions on the use of the death penalty. The city-state is an interesting case as they have always taken pride on their ability to effectively deter drug trafficking through the strong deterrence effect of the death penalty. However, a key change occurred in 2012 with amendments to the Misuse of Drugs Act. Under the earlier version of the act, capital punishment was mandatory for drug traffickers who possess a requisite amount of drugs. The amendments allow for a less draconian approach as Singaporean courts are now able to impose a life imprisonment instead of a death sentence, on the conditions that the accused is “only a drug courier” or “suffering from such an abnormality of mind that it substantially impaired his mental responsibility for committing the offence.”3 However, it is important to note that this trend happened amidst criticisms by national, regional, and international NGOs. In practice, the discretion given to a judge is still limited and depends on the result of the investigation conducted by the Attorney General’s Office—further increasing the bar to not implement the death penalty.

Vietnam also imposed more legal restrictions toward the death penalty. A revision to the Penal Code abolished the death penalty for seven crimes, including “surrendering to the enemy, opposing order, destruction of projects of national security importance, robbery, drug possession, drug appropriation and the production and trade of fake food.”4 Additionally, a person who is above 75 years old will also be exempted from death penalty.

Meanwhile, Thailand is taking steps toward abolishing the death penalty. At the moment, they have allowed for a judge’s discretion to decide between life or death sentences, instead of prescribing for a mandatory death penalty. The country expects to abolish the death penalty for crimes that do not affect the lives of others in the future.5

A positive development also occurred in Malaysia. An effort to lift the mandatory requirement of imposing the death penalty for a number of crimes—including drug trafficking and murder—was started by the Malaysian government in 2015. More recently in 2017, the Malaysian parliament voted to remove the mandatory death penalty for drug offences and allow judges the discretion to decide sentences for drug offenders.6

In contrast, meanwhile, Indonesia has

resumed practicing the death penalty in 2013 after a four-year moratorium. However, despite this setback it should be noted that a review of the penal code by the Indonesian parliament is currently taking place. A proposed new code would impose a 10-year stay on executions, after which the death penalty could be commuted to a prison term.7 This will allow room for the death penalty to not be used as the primary punishment but only as an alternative to be used in certain cases.

Finally, Brunei Darussalam, Laos, and Myanmar have imposed a de facto moratorium on death penalty. The last known execution in Brunei occurred in 1957 when they were still a protectorate under the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, Laos’ last known execution was in 1990, and Myanmar was in 1993. However it is still legal to hand out death sentences in these countries.

These positive developments suggest that there is increasing support in the region towards the abolition of the death penalty. While the above examples highlight the development in the legislations or policies of each ASEAN Member States, it is also important to note that there is also a corresponding and active movement towards the abolition of the death penalty coming from civil society organisations that conduct their work both nationally as well as transnationally. One recent example is the Coalition for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in ASEAN (CADPA) which launched the ‘End Crime Not Life’ campaign in Southeast Asia. CADPA members are based all around the region advocating for the abolition of the death penalty.

No progress is set in stone

The problem with the movement to abolish the death penalty is similar with other human rights movements in Southeast Asia: no progress is ever set in stone. Thus no development should be taken for granted. This applies to countries that have implemented legislations as well as others that have not.

The Philippines is an important reminder of this. As was mentioned above, they have already implemented legislation to abolish the death penalty. However, the current administration of President Rodrigo Duterte is attempting to reinstate the death penalty for drug-related crimes with some support within Congress. This is part of Duterte’s ongoing strong-armed

policy against drugs.

Indeed, although the new law has not yet passed, this has not stopped Duterte from enforcing punitive actions in drug cases. According to a 2018 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, the Philippine ‘war on drugs’ has claimed more than 12,000 lives in unlawful or extrajudicial killings.8

There is still strong opposition among civil society in the Philippines against the death penalty, including from the prominent Catholic Church which led the abolitionist campaign in the early turn of this century. However, Duterte’s policy towards drugs – and the President’s high public approval ratings - shows that support for the death penalty is also still strong in the Philippines, to the point that legislation outlawing the death penalty may be reversed and where the authorities may conduct unlawful or extrajudicial killings with impunity as long as the purpose is to combat drugs.

This highlights the next challenge: drug-related crimes. Despite the progress outlined above, Southeast Asian states continue to subscribe to the belief that as drugs have a significant impact on society, the punishment for drug-related crimes should be the death penalty. In addition to the Philippines, other countries also often cite combating drugs to justify imposing the death penalty—regardless of whether the suspects are drug kingpins or low level ‘drug-mule’.

One example is Indonesia. The administrations of both Joko Widodo and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono have carried out the death penalties. There were 34 executions carried out in the country since 2007 with a lot more still awaiting their death sentences, many of them are from drug-related offences.9 This position is ironic as Indonesia is also well known for its active diplomacy to free their citizens who are under death penalty abroad under the principle to go ‘beyond protection’ for Indonesians facing legal problems.10

Another example is Singapore. Despite the previously mentioned progress in the country, it has been a difficult one to achieve as Singapore continues to hold strong beliefs toward the deterrence effect of the death penalty against drug-related crimes. Singapore is well known for globally advocating the use of the death penalty to other countries who are fighting drug-related crimes. Furthermore, Singapore is also the current chair of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and also this

year’s ASEAN chair. Their active advocacy for the death penalty will mean that it will be significantly more difficult for abolitionist movements to put their agenda on the regional table.

Finally, the lack of internalization of human rights norms in Southeast Asia means that human rights issues such as the death penalty are often under threat by changing political circumstances. In Brunei, the de facto moratorium against the death penalty does not mean that human rights activists can rest assured. A recent adoption of ‘stoning’ in the increasingly conservative country as a means of execution shows that the Sultanate still considers the death penalty as a viable instrument.

The death penalty has also been considered as a move to bolster the legitimacy/popularity of political figures. While Duterte is a prominent example, he is not alone as Indonesia’s Joko Widodo has also done the same. In 2015, not long after he assumed office, a number of executions were carried out in Indonesia and have been interpreted as a political tour-de-force by Joko Widodo to counter public perceptions that he was not assertive enough and was a weak leader when compared to his political rival during the 2014 presidential election. At that time, Joko Widodo also claimed that Indonesia was in a state of drug emergency to justify the executions of drug-related offenders.

Conclusion

There has been some traction in the movement to abolish the death penalty in Southeast Asia. However, this progress should not be taken for granted. The challenges toward abolishing the death penalty remain as countries still believe in the deterrence effect of the death penalty coupled with the lack of internalization of human rights in general. This situation allows for the exploitation of the death penalty issues for political gains.

Fortunately, the challenges are nothing new. Southeast Asia was never well known for its commitment toward human rights. The road to truly abolishing the death penalty, as ever, will still have a long way to go. As such, it is a path that needs political will by national leadership to expedite the abolition of death penalty.

One silver lining is that this region is also home to civil society organisations that work tirelessly to end the death penalty. They are also supported by the existence of independent national human rights

commissions, who are mostly strong advocates on the abolition of the death penalty, such as the National Commission of Human Rights in Indonesia and the Campaign for Human Rights in the Philippines. In this sense, the traction that the movement has gained so far means that the time is ripe for this movement to keep up their momentum and to stop death penalty: one person at a time, one law at a time, one country at a time.

Endnotes1 Philippine Daily Inquirer, “IN THE KNOW: Death Penalty”,

http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/785954/in-the-know-death-penalty

2 Phnom Penh Post, 2012, “Death Penalty has no place”, http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/death-penalty-has-no-place

3 ABC News, 2012, “Singapore loosens capital punishment laws”, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-11-15/an-singapore-loosens-drug-laws/4374934

4 Aljazeera, 2015, “Vietnam abolishes death penalty for 7 crimes”, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/11/27/new-law-in-vietnam-abolishes-death-penalty-for-7-crimes.html

5 The Straits Times, 2017, “Thailand moves towards abolishing death penalty”, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/thailand-moves-toward-abolishing-death-penalty

6 Channel News Asia, 2017, “Malaysia parliament removes mandatory death penalty for drug offenders

Read more at https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/malaysia-parliament-removes-mandatory-death-penalty-for-drug-9456748”, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/malaysia-parliament-removes-mandatory-death-penalty-for-drug-9456748

7 ABC News, 2018, “Indonesian death penalty laws to be softened to allow reformed prisoners to avoid execution”, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-01-11/indonesia-to-soften-death-penalty-stance/9320900

8 Human Rights Wtach, 2018, “Philippines: Duterte’s ‘Drug War’ claims 12,000+ lives”, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/philippines-dutertes-drug-war-claims-12000-lives

9 Death Penalty Worldwide, 2018, “Indonesia”, https://www.deathpenaltyworldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=Indonesia

10 Retno Marsudi, 2018, “Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI 2018”, https://www.kemlu.go.id/id/pidato/

menlu/Pages/PPTM2018%20MENLU%20RI%20IN.pdf

4Issue 31/ January 2018

Amara ThihaWilliam P. Fuller Fellow - The Asia Foundation, Visiting Research Fellow - Stimson Center

Rebels of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) at a military base in Kokang region in March 2015.

Source: Reuters

Reviewing the Progress of the Peace Process in

Myanmar

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B eginning with the high expectations at the start of 2017, Myanmar’s Year of Peace instead concluded as the castle in the air with

on-going armed conflicts in Kachin and Northern Shan States as well as the humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State. The political commitments of the Government and Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) signatories following rounds of 21st Century Panglong Conferences were still scant to create the synergy for an all-inclusive nationwide ceasefire and political reforms through the dialogues. Although a parallel peace process has been proposed by the Northern Alliance, the NCA Road Map is still the official position of both the Myanmar Government and the military (Tatmadaw), which have kept the NCA-led peace process afloat. However, the turbulence of 2017 has crafted a significant paradigm shift in the Myanmar peace process. These are the crucial factors that have shaped the landscape of the Myanmar peace process in 2017 -

The Rise of the Northern Alliance – The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arkan Army (AA), which had both been considered as the proxy to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) are now taking bold steps, creating a military coalition The Northern Alliance with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). With the political leadership of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) was established with the Northern Alliance, UWSA, National Democratic Alliace Army (NDAA) and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) at the 4th Phangkham Summit. Apart from the Northern Alliance, other members have already signed bilateral ceasefire agreements with the Government and have certain levels of political and administrative autonomy within their control areas. The political ambition of the UWSA, to acquire the Autonomous State from the Self-Administered Division, is the primary factor that led the creation of the FPNCC.

Both the Government and Tatmadaw do not recognize TNLA, MNDAA and AA as official dialogue partners; instead after a request from Naypyidaw, Beijing mediated, insisted upon, and logistically supported the Northern Alliance to participate at the 2nd session of the Panglong Peace Conference. A number of dialogues had been conducted both within Myanmar (Phangsan and Mongla) and China. Having the dialogues through UWSA and Chinese

mediation can be considered as a positive factor, however clashes have intensified between the Northern Alliance and the Tatmadaw during 2017.

The operation area of TNLA has expanded to the west and south of Shan State, reaching the boundary of Mandalay Region. This triggered conflicts between TNLA and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), creating tensions between Palong and Shan communities. Arkan Army also occupied the headquarter of the NCA signatory, the Arkan Liberation Party (ALP) in Palatwa to conduct operations in Rakhine States, which also complicated the situation at a time when the humanitarian crisis in the region was under the spotlight. Minor clashes remain with MNDAA along the China-Myanmar border but the Kokang region may linger for years before it can achieve the tranquility that existed before the 2015 conflict. Tensions between KIA and Tatmadaw remain and in early 2018, the Tatmadaw announced that they had occupied over hundreds of KIA outposts; a claim denied by the KIA.

Reaching a ceasefire agreement with the Northern Alliance and holding political dialogue with the FPNCC are keys to achieve a nationwide ceasefire. However, bringing the FPNCC, particularly the UWSA onboard the NCA roadmap is far reaching. Their proposals at the Panglong conference sought for a revision to the NCA and for an alternative track. Unlike the United Nationalities Federal Council, the FPNCC’s coordination with other Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) is limited, creating northern and southern blocs of EAOs and a distinctive and unique set of peace process roadmap. The rise of the Northern Alliance is the wake-up call to revise the peace process roadmap and spotlight the Government’s lack of peace process strategy to include non-signatories in the peace process.

Beijing’s Active Involvements- Beijing’s involvement during the peace process was low compared with the EU until 2015. However, clashes along the Kokang–Yunnan border, the rise of the Northern Alliance and FPNCC affirmed Beijing’s crucial role in the process. The Northern Alliance’s appeal to involve Beijing in the Myanmar Peace Process shifted the paradigm from the western-led structural peace process (the NCA Roadmap) into more dynamic dialogues with EAOs along with the regional power house. Supporting Beijing’s grand project of OBOR, the Northern Alliance provides guarantees to the strategic interest of ‘the Panda’ over

Myanmar. Mediating with the FPNCC, providing guarantees to support the peace process, and hosting some dialogue meetings in Yunnan may be considered as positive involvements, however, it still falls short. Beijing’s influence over its former ally, UWSA, MNDAA and NDAA is unquestionable, but there is still a big question mark on other EAOs as to what extent Beijing is using them as proxies.

The bumpy relationship with Beijing is over. Beijing has finally won the heart of Naypyidaw, but this time with the bonus. Siding along with Myanmar on the Rohingya crisis, its popularity among the locals has reached peak levels and pro-Beijing rallies were organized in Yangon. China’s courting of Myanmar through multi-level diplomacy has paid off, with the official visit of the State Counsellor to Beijing twice within a year, just a few weeks after the Commander in Chief of the Myanmar Tatmadaw had also visited. This is a major milestone in China–Myanmar relations since they were established in 1948. Beijing’s political will to achieve peace and stability along the border is crystal clear and it has shown its supports to the Myanmar Government’s efforts. However, whether the political capital of Beijing is enough to mediate between the EAOs and the Myanmar government to agree a common political roadmap is still questionable.

Panglong – Dialogue without Framework - Soon after the signing of the NCA, the Framework for Political Dialogue was drafted and adopted shortly after the convening of the first session of the Union Peace Conference. After the National League for Democracy Government took over the peace process, the framework was reviewed and revised with the request from signatories on the assumption that they would join the political dialogue in the near future.

The first session of the 21st Century Panglong Conference was convened without a framework, while the second session used the previously adopted framework as well as a newly drafted framework put forward by the signatories. The Ethnic armed group signatories were also coordinating with non-signatories on the framework, however, only with the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) and not with the FPNCC. This also pushed the FPNCC to not get involved in the NCA peace process roadmap.

The framework is still being reviewed and is unlikely to be adopted before the

Issue 31/ January 2018

next 21st Century Panglong Union Peace Conference. The lack of framework gives the Government the power to control the process. Its efforts to interfere in the national-level political dialogue, for example, have caused tension with the Restoration Council of Shan State and the hosting of consultative meetings in Shan States has also been interfered.

It is still possible to continue the process without a framework by relying on the political capital of the State Counsellor. However, the danger in doing so is that it undermines and diminishes the value of the NCA as a guarantee between the parties to institutionalize the peace process.

Vague Future for the UNFC - KIA and SSPP’s withdrawal significantly weakens the UNFC. The Delegation for Political Negotiation (DPN) from UNFC had been in negotiations with the Government for nearly a year, but no breakthrough on negotiations has been reached. Within 16 months of the NLD administration, 8 official negotiation meetings were convened, but the 9th meeting has been postponed until further notice. Although negotiations are still going on, members of the UNFC are still undecided on the signing of the NCA. The Kareni National Progressive Party (KNPP) may not sign as the implementation of the NCA is seen as weak and there remains a lack of trust in the NCA track and political dialogue to act as a guarantee to achieve their political vision. At the same time, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) hosted a meeting to sign of the NCA at their headquarters. Although other members politically exist, their lack of active forces operating in Myanmar means they do not have leverage to hold the dialogue with the Government.

Violations and lack of implementations of the bilateral agreements as well as no significant progress on the NCA’s implementations are the primary concern for the KNPP and NMSP. The rise of the FPNCC with active forces and mediation from China have lowered the UNFC’s role in the peace process as well as its political leverage. As the attention is on northern Myanmar and the Government has managed to maintain a certain level of tranquility in southern Myanmar, realizing the UNFC’s 9 points proposal may be far reaching. If either of NMSP or KNPP signed the NCA, the UNFC may follow the fate of other ethnic coalitions in history.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugee Return - The return of refugees and IDPs is one of the key points

in the NCA and bilateral agreements as it directly impacts conflict-affected populations. However, the situation has not improved significantly and has even worsened due to conflicts in northern Shan States and Rakhine State. There is no clear plan for the return of IDPs affected by the conflicts in Kachin and Shan State, even though an agreement has been in place since 2012. As of June 2017, there were 166 IDP camps in northern Shan and Kachin states with nearly 100,000 people, as well as 9,000 IDPs in southern Shan State. This figure may increase after the Rakhine Crisis. As the fighting continues, there is little prospect of them returning home soon and the Government has not decided to provide funding to implement it.

Thailand, home to nearly 100,000 refugees in nine refugee camps and probably more who are unregistered, is the another story. Because the situation in southern Myanmar has improved in recent years, Thailand and international donors have begun planning the closure of camps along the border and some have already been returned to Myanmar with their own arrangements. This also creates social conflicts in the region due to land grabbing and ownership issues.

The UN Refugee Agency, the UNHCR, facilitated the return of some refugees in 2016 but there has been no further progress in 2017. Although the UNHCR submitted a list of prospective returnees in January 2017, it took more than six months for government officials to visit the camps in Thailand and verify them. Approval for repatriation is still pending from Nay Pyi Taw and the process has been delayed for a year.

This is mainly due to the unclear responsibilities and lack of coordination

within the administration. In addition, the UNHCR policy of “do no harm” to the host community limits the support it can provide to the refugees. The Government of Myanmar has limited resources to lead the process and it may take many years, even decades, for social services in Myanmar to reach the standard provided in refugee camps in Thailand. This creates an unfavorable environment for the return of refugees back to Myanmar.

The Role of ASEAN- As the Myanmar peace process is homegrown with little mediation from the international community, the role of ASEAN is limited (also due to the ASEAN non-interference principle). Having said that, Thailand may directly impact on the peace process in Myanmar, particularly on the refugee return. The ASEAN Community may also support the process through contributions and investing in the new industry zones along the Thai-Myanmar border and ASEAN highway. This may create jobs, improve the capacity of the locals and most importantly encourage economic growth in conflict affected regions. However, this still requires further exploration as to what and how ASEAN could contribute in peace building.

The “Myanmar peace year 2017” was not as successful as its name suggested but keeping the peace process is fortunate enough. It is clear that a parallel peace process is already taking shape and 2017 was the significant turning point. This is the time for the Government and Tatmadaw to review how to align and accommodate the parallel process along with the NCA roadmap. Implementing the NCA and building institutions to keep the peace process is crucial, otherwise, it may derail the NCA roadmap and may risk bringing Myanmar back to square one.

The “Myanmar peace year 2017” was not as successful as its name suggested but

keeping the peace process is fortunate enough.

8

Secretary-General of ASEAN Lim Jock HoiSource: asean.org

Priorities for the New ASEAN Secretary-General

A. Ibrahim Almuttaqi is Head of ASEAN Studies Program,The Habibie Center

Issue 31/ January 2018

Introduction

O n Friday, 5 January 2018, Dato Paduka Lim Jock Hoi officially assumed the office of ASEAN Secretary-General at a handover

ceremony held at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. Replacing the outgoing Le Luong Minh who served from 2013 – 2017, the former Permanent Secretary at the Bruneian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade faces a number of priorities that will need to be addressed in the coming days, weeks and months. Among them are a number of special summits, the South China Sea, and the RCEP negotiations. Longer term priorities include realizing a people-centred and people-oriented ASEAN. This paper attempts to explore some of these priorities in further details.

Special Summits with Australia and India

All ten ASEAN Leaders are expected to attend India’s Republic Day celebrations on 26 January 2018. Underscoring Indian Prime Minister’s Narenda Modi’s ‘Act East Policy’ and forming the high point of the celebrations to mark the 25th year of ASEAN-India relations, this will be the first time that the celebration’s chief guest comes from a bloc of nations rather than an individual country. Previous leaders that were afforded such honour were then-French President Francois Hollande in 2016, then-US President Barack Obama in 2015, and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2014, while various Southeast Asian leaders have previously attended as representatives of their own country rather than of ASEAN.

Reciprocating the importance that India is placing on its relationship with ASEAN, it was notable that on the very next day

after Secretary-General Lim took on his new position - a day when most were enjoying their weekend – he was instead ‘punching the company clock’, opening the 5th Roundtable of ASEAN-Indian Network of Think Tanks at an event that also featured the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi and the Indian External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj.

Meanwhile from 17-18 March 2018, the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit will also be a first, as Australia looks to reciprocate a similar gathering that took place in Vientiane, Lao PDR in September 2016. Back then, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnball had called for the event to be made a regular one alternating between an ASEAN country and Australia every two years. Like with India, Canberra is seeking to strengthen its strategic partnership with ASEAN and will serve to demonstrate its continued commitment as ASEAN’s oldest Dialogue Partner.

The South China Sea

Secretary-General Lim’s first year in office will also coincide with the 15th year of ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership; a partnership that continues to be overshadowed by the competing claims of Beijing and several ASEAN member-states over the South China Sea. Unlike previous years, 2017 was a relatively quiet one in terms of the South China Sea with no major incident – either militarily or diplomatically – taking place. Indeed the Chairman’s Statement of the 31st ASEAN Summit, which was held on 13 November 2017 in Manila, noted ‘the improving relations between ASEAN and China’ as well as the ‘positive momentum’ with regards to the South China Sea issue.1 Demonstrating such positive momentum was the agreement on a framework for the Code of Conduct in the South China

Sea.

However, it is questionable to what extent this can be considered as an achievement. Sixteen years have passed since the non-binding Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea of 2002 had first called for a Code of Conduct. In that time Beijing has been accused of changing the realities on the ground, reclaiming islands in the disputed area and installing military facilities. China is not alone in conducting such activities – several ASEAN claimants have also done their own reclamations in the South China Sea; any Code of Conduct in the new realities will automatically be rendered irrelevant. The question of how far ASEAN can press on its largest trade partner on the South China Sea issue, whilst taking into consideration the wider strategic partnership, will be a delicate one for Secretary-General Lim to address.

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

Despite high hopes that negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) would be concluded in 2017, it was instead announced that more talks were needed. While the decision of the United States to pull out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) has put greater attention on RCEP, it is now the third time that the deadline for the mega free trade agreement involving ASEAN and its six FTA partners has been pushed back since the first round of negotiations began in 2013.

Indian resistance has in particular been cited as one of the key stumbling blocks with New Delhi insisting that the services sector – where it is a global leader - should be opened up in return for the liberization of tariff barriers for goods.2 Such demands have been made to offset

A Philippine Navy personnel loads bullets for a .50 caliber machine gun during the bilateral maritime exercise between the Philippine Navy and U.S. Navy dubbed as Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) in the South China Sea near waters claimed by Beijing June 29, 2014.Source: Noel Celis/Reuters

10

concerns that India would be flooded by goods produced in China and other RCEP members, however the latter remain sensitive to discussions on services liberalization as well as the associated freedom of movement for professionals.3

One diplomat observed that the TPP’s stalled progress had in some ways removed the urgency to conclude RCEP and may prove a curse rather than a blessing. In the case of Secretary-General Lim, his previous role as Brunei’s chief negotiator in the TPP may prove a valuable asset in pushing for the early conclusion of RCEP.

A People-Centred, People-Oriented ASEAN

The longer term goal of realizing a people-centred, people-oriented ASEAN remains a challenge for the regional organisation. Recognizing criticisms that the regional organisation was elitist and out of touch, ASEAN opened up its interaction with the business community in the early 1970s, and later began engaging with the region’s intellectuals and a handful of so-called ‘ASEAN-affiliated non-governmental organisations’ in subsequent decades. In the late 1990s, ASEAN began its engagement with the wider civil society organisations and by the turn of the 21st century ‘a people-centred, people-oriented ASEAN’ gained in popularity amongst ASEAN policy makers.

It is in this regard that ASEAN’s 50th anniversary attempted to involve the public by holding a number of events. In Indonesia for example there was an ‘ASEAN 50’ parade held on 27 August 2017. However, despite such events putting ASEAN in the public spotlight, it cannot be denied that ASEAN awareness remains low in the region. Indeed much of the fanfare for

ASEAN’s golden celebration quickly has been forgotten despite the best efforts of the regional organization.

While many will argue that the three pillars that make up the ASEAN Community – the political-security, economic and socio-cultural – are equally important and mutually reinforcing, it could also be argued that greater focus should be placed on the economic sector in order to make the public care about ASEAN. Subscribing to the adage, ‘It’s the economy, stupid!’ the best way to raise public awareness of ASEAN is by ensuring the regional organisation matters for them in terms of creating jobs, providing food, and offering greater opportunities. It is in this sense that the early conclusion of the RCEP is crucial as it also relates to raising the public’s awareness of ASEAN.

Concluding Thoughts

It was notable that both the new and outgoing Secretary-Generals called on the ASEAN Secretariat to enhance its analytical and research capacity. Secretary-General Lim, for example, remarked that he would look to ‘enhance the analytical and research capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat.’4 Meanwhile Le Luong Minh stated, ‘ASEAN would benefit from a more professional Secretariat with sufficient expertise and confidence to inject frank and objective inputs.’5 Here it may be argued that the source of such frank and objective inputs should not be from the ASEAN Secretariat alone. Civil society should also be afforded the space to take part, with ASEAN making use of the expertise and knowledge that the former possesses.

It will certainly be a challenging first few days, weeks, and months for the new

Secretary-General but he should know that he is not in this endeavour alone. As he rightly remarked, ‘Let us work together to bring ASEAN to greater heights.’ Indeed, let’s!

http://asean.org/storage/2018/01/ASEAN-SG-Dato-Lim-Remarks-for-the-Handover-Ceremony-5-Jan-2018_FINAL-II.pdf

Endnotes1 ASEAN (2017). Chairman’s Statement of the 31st

ASEAN Summit, 13 November 2017, Manila, Philippines.Retrieved from: http://asean.org/storage/2017/11/final-chairman%E2%80%99s-statement-of-31st-asean-summit.pdf

2 Ranjana Narayan (2017). ‘Is India Demanding Too Much from the RCEP Trade’, The Quint August 29. Retrieved from: https://www.thequint.com/news/india/china-may-be-keen-but-december-deadline-for-rcep-looks-unlikley

3 Ibid.

4 ASEAN (2018). Remarks by H.E. Dato Lim Jock Hoi, Secretary-General of ASEAN (2018-2022), Handover Ceremony for the Transfer of Office of the Secretary-General of ASEAN, Jakarta, 5 January 2018. Retrieved from: http://asean.org/storage/2018/01/ASEAN-SG-Dato-Lim-Remarks-for-the-Handover-Ceremony-5-Jan-2018_FINAL-II.pdf

5 ASEAN (2018). Remarks by H.E. Le Luong Minh, Secretary-General of ASEAN (2013-2017), Handover Ceremony for the Transfer of Office of the Secretary-General of ASEAN, Jakarta, 5 January 2018. Retrieved from: http://asean.org/storage/2018/01/Remarks_Handover-SG-Minh.pdf

The longer term goal of realizing a people-centred, people-oriented ASEAN remains a

challenge for the regional organisation.

Issue 31/ January 2018

Imagine ASEANat your fingertipsthcasean.org

Civic space is the ability of people-based organizations to fight against injustice or for human well-being anywhere. A shrinking civil society space which means restrictions to freedoms and thus increasing governmental control, affect all sectors. Restrictions on the freedom of assembly, expression and association around the world are forms of repression against civil society, and serious threats against civic freedoms and political rights. Closing of civic space undermines human rights in direct manner such as restriction on foreign funding, in the act of repressing such as barriers to registration, arbitrary detentions and discrimination to obtain basic rights, and by neglecting or failing to protect civil actors.

“The escalating conflict in Rakhine State led to massive civilian causalities. The Myanmar government exhibits a lack of humanitarian concern for the future of the Rohingya refugees. More than 600000 Rohingya who lived in Rakhine State were forced to flee to neighboring countries since the situation as the United Nations describe ‘ethnic cleansing’ begin to escalate. While there are talks with the government of Bangladesh about the repartition of the Rohingya people, it does not warrant that the returning Rohingya population would be granted citizenship or that they will be provided protection by the Myanmar government.”

“Little action was undertaken by the government to help the Rohingya refugees within its borders. Local NGO that concern with the refugees provides help without government institution aid fund any legal or administrative frameworks. Poor regulations in accommodating refugee’s rights, violence and discrimination against refugee from Rakhine State by Malaysian police. Malaysia has quietly taken in quite a significant amount of refugees and asylum seekers under its care despite not being a signatory of the United Nations 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Malaysia stance is keep becoming no state to accept refugee.”

“The Election Commission, which should be independent, was totally under government control. The prime minister had been accused to manipulate the democratic system and abusing instruments of government to ensure it remained in power. Dr. Mahathir, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, said that all sources of funds for the opposition are blocked, with potential donors being threatened, forced to pay extra taxes and accused of money laundering.”

Myanmar

Malaysia

12Issue 31/ January 2018

“The ‘death of democracy’ in the Kingdom. Prime Minister Hun Sen seems to be fighting with all his might to secure his position for yet another run at the coming national election. Dissolution of the only opposition party—Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) reaps criticism from some countries. CNRP’s former leader, Sam Rainsy went into exile in 2015 and remains to this day. Other opposition figure, Kem Sokha was captured by police officers and now is detained in a faraway prison on the border with Vietnam with allegations of treason with the support of the United States. Government also forced some news publication to stop its operation because of headlines that assail

government policy and approach in political domestic, ordered some radio

station to go-off air, and banned United States’s funded broadcasters to operate.”

“The fight to eradicate corruption that continues to face obstruction attempts. A large group of members of parliament continued in their attempts to undermine the work of Corruption Eradication Commission by establishment of a special team within parliament to investigate the implementation of the Anti Corruption Law in the context of the work of the Commission. Acid attack on a senior Indonesian corruption investigator, Novel Baswedan, was a form of terrorism and intimidation against the anti graft body. Efforts and further investigation to uncover this attack by the police have not resulted in apprehension of the perpetrators.

“President Duterte’s war-on-drugs had raised the issue of human rights violation. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), since Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency in June 2016, his approach in addressing drugs issues has led to the deaths of more than 12000 Filipinos, mostly from urban poor communities. Police officers have killed about 2555 drug suspects and often falsified evidence to justify the killings. The issue of human rights violation has contradicted ASEAN’s commitment in promoting and protecting human rights. Duterte also seems to develop increasingly hostile relations with media in the country”

Cambodia

Philippines

Indonesia

The Habibie Center 2018Content: Andriani Dyah Arum

Design: Tongki AW

Graphic element:freepik.com, freevectormaps.com

iStock.com

“At the East Asia Summit (EAS) lunch held on the sidelines of the ASEAN gathering last month in Manila, an additional place was kept at the table for a non-EAS leader – Mr. Donald Tusk, president of the European Council. It was a one-time gesture meant to mark the 40 years of ASEAN-EU dialogue that could also have been the start of a longer journey. There is little question that the European Union would not mind turning that invitation into a permanent seat at the high table.”

With indication of being similar regional organizations, ASEAN and EU are willing to obtain a closer cooperation. Although the progress trudges in strategic issues, a further expounding statement is expected. There are possibilities of both sides to engage in a more vivid closeness.

Why it Matters?

ASEAN is often compared to EU, yet as a matter of fact they are different in a number of ways. Indeed, EU as supranational body is different with ASEAN as an inter-governmental organization. ASEAN consists of diverse and multicultural civilizations with relatively brief history to common identity, while EU on the other hand is rallied through longer period of shared history in developing common identity. Nevertheless, ASEAN with its multicivilizational entity has proved to the world that they are able to have cooperation harmoniously without emulating principle of other regional-based

unions. In a time where the world is facing significant changes and challenges, it is timely for these two regional organizations to strengthen their cooperation.

Since ASEAN and EU possess different issues to worry about, it is understandable that they have limited strategic cooperation. However, there are a number of modalities that they can build upon for stronger cooperation. Firstly, both EU and ASEAN have to face the consequences of Trumpist narrow minded nationalism. As the writer rightly argues, trend of Trumpism is not easily extinguished from the United States or other parts of the world. Traditional great and major powers such as the US and UK are facing dwindling international reputation as an impact.

Secondly, in the midst of this change, ASEAN has also to be mindful of another rising powers. In this connection, ASEAN previous priority to simply find the right balance between China and the US needs to be reconsidered. This view was relevant when the US was fully entrenched to the region—while, at the same time, EU is more comfortable in its bilateral relations with ASEAN countries individually. ASEAN cooperation with US under Trump administration must be reconsidered because of the changes, dynamics and unclear approach of US foreign policy; EU-ASEAN relations can be continued to stabilize the ASEAN region.

There is a challenge to this point.

Traditionally, EU prefers China or India to cooperate with when engaging with Asia region. In this regards, recent EU policies toward ASEAN is timely and important. For example, the establishment of SHARE Scholarship—Support Through Higher Education in the ASEAN Region, a grant funded program in Education Sector by EU and ASEAN that enhances mobility for university students across ASEAN, can bring hope for EU-ASEAN relations to the next level.

Thirdly, both ASEAN and EU share common concern regarding refugee issues. Migrant and refugee resettlement is doubly prioritized by the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres. Most of the ASEAN countries commit to help refugee issues as transit states. The refugee and asylum seeker will get a temporary assistance from ASEAN countries like Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia before they are resettled in countries of the west like EU member states. A close relation and regulation among these two regional entities is needed to accommodate and address refugee problems.

Despite of ASEAN and EU far-distanced location and the difference of principles, identity and culture, it is not impossible for them to have close relations and cooperation. Each community has their own values and interest yet closeness and cooperation is expected though it requires a long process to be thoroughly rigorous and rallied

ASEAN and EU:Love is in the air

Straits Times, December 15, 2017http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/asean-and-eu-love-is-in-the-air

A S E A N R O U N D - U P

14Issue 31/ January 2018

A S E A N R O U N D - U P

Andriani Dyah ArumIntern at The Habibie Center

“President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has called on the youth wings of Indonesia’s two largest Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, to continue strengthening their spirit of nationalism and diversity to maintain the unity of the nation.”

With a freedom of expression, opinion and belief and open democracy environment, Indonesia, regardless its big size of territory and population is categorized as a flawed democracy state, the best category for democracy index among ASEAN countries. However, it is always be a challenge for a multicultural country like Indonesia to utilize the name of democracy free from ones particular interest. As digital media plays a quite significant role in people engaging democracy, it adds more tasks for this country to regulate people’s digital activity in terms of herding public opinion. Important values could be eroded and thereby jeopardizes national integrity due to spreading of maligning voices. To strengthen the nationalism of the youth is considered as an accurate measure to restore healthy democracy in Indonesia.

Why it Matters?

Indonesia is a democratic country with the biggest Muslim population in the world. Indonesia has become a source of inspiration on tolerance and solidarity for many countries that are eager to learn about how to maintain harmony amid ethnicity and religious diversity.

This achievement is partly a contribution of Islamic organizations such as NU established in 1926 and Muhammadiyah in 1912. Both parties have roles in Indonesia until now. Their roles become especially important when it comes to integrating Islamic issues in social and educational field.

Democracy in Indonesia faced challenges in the last Jakarta capital gubernatorial elections and ended up dividing public opinion that place nationalism values and religion values opposite of each other. This is antithetical to the perspective of Indonesia’s founding fathers who promoted unity among the multicultural Indonesians.

This division is possible because untruth is spreading more easily through digital platform. Digital world has affected people in engaging democracy. Society can now hide behind screen monitors and keyboards while practicing their rights to have freedom of opinion. A new phenomenon erupted as a consequence when people take this right for granted. The spreading of fake news by interest groups is unavoidable while society is easy to believe such news. A proper regulation and surveillance are needed to make sure that the use of digital media will not lead society to conflict or confrontation when right wing politics inclination or rampant false accusation of sensitive issues regarding identity and diversity take place. However this is tricky because digital

A Response to an Eroded Nationalism on Indonesian Youth

The Jakarta Post, December 17, 2017http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/12/17/jokowi-calls-for-stronger-spirit-of-nationalism-diversity.html

platform has improved people to people connection and spreading of information that made it a significant part of people’s life. On the other hand, some groups and communities of society use digital platform as a tool to reach their personal interest in hating others.

Digital media has role in almost all people’s daily basis activities such as brand visibility, building relationships, adding insight, accessing and spreading information, entertainment and many more. However, important values such as nationalism and unity in pluralistic and multicultural society could be eroded and thereby jeopardizes national integrity. When technology and social media usage have supervision from government and people or even religious activity on digital platform is inseparable from nationalism spirit, the society who’s exposed can contribute more innovative and constructing ideas to development without losing national and religious identity, principle, and values.

The reason why a government official respectively invokes religious institution such as NU and Muhammadiyah to continue strengthen their spirit of nationalism is because religious institutions are very influential in shaping ones outlook about social or even political issues in Indonesia. In order to dissuade extremist views on certain religious values, education that combines religious and nationalist values is important. Youth wings of religious institutions in Indonesia are suitable targets, especially since the participants or the users of digital media is dominated by youth. Therefore, youth wings of NU and Muhammadiyah will be influential in the future of Islam and unity in Indonesia society.

Putting forward unity and integrity of nation is a part of nationalism. But Indonesia was established by the urge to be independent country by emphasizing on morality and religious values as enshrined in Pancasila and UUD ‘45. The country could fall apart if it loses its ability to maintain harmonious multicultural nation due to religious intolerant actions and the eroding nationalism of the youth. They are problems that require the hands of multiple stakeholders including religious institutions to be resolved.

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The ASEAN Studies Program was established on February 24, 2010, to become a center of excellence on ASEAN related issues, which can assist in the

development of the ASEAN Community by 2015. The Habibie Center through its ASEAN Studies Program, alongside other institutions working towards the same

goal, hopes to contribute to the realization of a more people-oriented ASEAN that puts a high value on democracy and human rights.

The objective of the ASEAN Studies Program is not merely only to conduct research and discussion within academic and government circles, but also

to strengthen public awareness by forming a strong network of civil society in the region that will be able to help spread the ASEAN message. With the

establishment of ASEAN Studies Program, The Habibie Center aims to play its part within our capabilities to the ASEAN regional development.

Cover:Balloons float over Bagan, Myanmar’s archaeological zone

comprising over 2000 ancient pagodas.Source: iStock