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Israeli DefenseThe Arab Uprisings’ Impactby Efraim Inbar

Although the wave of mass protests spreading through the Arabic-speaking coun-tries may have begun to recede, it has left a wide-ranging impact on the region. Three authoritarian regimes have collapsed, and the rest are experiencing varying

degrees of duress.This emerging political and strategic landscape has major implications for Israeli

national security. Regional turmoil has effectively ruled out a major advance in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, enabled Ankara and Tehran to expand their influence, continued thedecline of U.S. influence, and emboldened extremists.

Efraim Inbar is a professor of political studiesat Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies. TheTikva Fund generously supported this research.

A ROUGHNEIGHBORHOOD

Though economically and militarily strongfor its size, Israel is a small state with modestresources, limited diplomatic clout, and fewfriends in its neighborhood. As such, it cannothope to influence its environment in the MiddleEast. Unable to shape the world beyond its bor-ders, Jerusalem must be prepared to meet all se-curity threats that could potentially emerge fromthe surrounding Arab-Islamic world. It, there-fore, fears political unrest, which brings a de-gree of uncertainty to the Middle East politicaland strategic landscape.

Israelis are no strangers to the fact that po-litical upheaval in the Middle East can have ma-jor strategic implications. In particular, domesticchanges led to sweeping foreign policy reorien-tation in two important regional powers that were

once Israel’s allies. The 1979 Islamic Revolutionin Iran replaced a pro-Western monarchy friendlyto Israel with a militant Shiite theocracy. In Tur-key, once a major strategic ally of Israel, succes-sive electoral victories by the Islamist Justiceand Development Party (AKP) since 2002 havemoved this pivotal state into the anti-Israel camp.

DANGEROUSOUTCOMES FOR ISRAEL

Arabic-speaking countries lag well behindthe rest of the international community in civilliberties, political rights, education, gender equal-ity, and economic productivity.1 This deplorablestate of affairs is the root cause of discontentand frustration fueling the recent wave of pro-tests. Absent a liberal-democratic political cul-ture, however, mass mobilization in pursuit ofpolitical change is unpredictable. Numerous out-comes are possible, few of which portend wellfor regional stability.

1 Arab Human Development reports, U.N. Development Pro-gram, New York, accessed Oct. 7, 2011; R. Stephen Humphreys,Between Memory and Desire. The Middle East in a TroubledAge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

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The most feared outcome is an Islamist take-over. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahuhas frequently warned of the danger that “Egyptwill go in the direction of Iran.”2 Radical Islam-ists are the most powerful and well-organized

opposition force in mostArab states (due in partto the protection af-forded by mosques) andthe most likely beneficia-ries of regime changewhether it comes peace-fully or violently. Revo-lutionary regimes every-where tend to displaywarlike behavior in theimmediate years aftertaking power;3 in the

Middle East, they are almost certain to do so.The process of democratization can also

have unpredictable effects if secular, liberal po-litical forces are weak or divided. Lebanon’s 2005Cedar Revolution, led by pro-Western politicalforces, ended just four years later when the gov-ernment was taken over by the Shiite Islamistgroup Hezbollah and its allies. The MuslimBrotherhood, whose commitment to democracyis dubious at best, is the most powerful opposi-tion force in Egypt today. Even in the event thata freely elected government comes to power, thehistorical record shows that states undergoinga democratic transition are more war-prone thanautocratic regimes.4

Political turmoil can lead to the collapse orsevere weakening of the state. In a failed state,the government is unable to control security overall its territory and has difficulty meeting thebasic needs of the population in terms of health,education, and other social services.5 The har-

bingers of such a scenario are in Libya andYemen. As states lose their grip over their terri-tory, and their borders become more porous,armed groups and terrorists have greater free-dom of action. In addition, the enormous quan-tities of conventional (and non-conventional)arms typically stockpiled by autocratic regimescan fall into the wrong hands. Following the fallof Libyan leader Mu’ammar Qaddafi, Libyan SA-7 anti-air missiles and antitank rocket-propelledgrenades have reportedly reached Hamas ter-rorists in Gaza.6

Since many Arab countries have ethno-sec-tarian minorities with strong transnational tiesto foreign powers (Lebanese Shiites and Iran,for example), the eruption of civil war can readilyinvite external intervention. Because of their di-versity, Iraq and Syria carry the greatest poten-tial for domestic conflicts in the Middle East toescalate into regional conflagrations.

Even those Arab regimes that manage tostave off serious unrest are likely to be preoccu-pied in the near future parrying domestic chal-lenges. The foreign policy decisions of weak-ened autocrats (none have emerged strongerfrom the turmoil) can be nearly as difficult topredict reliably as those of newly democraticgovernments. Faced with growing internal chal-lenges, both have strong incentives to divertpublic attention from domestic problems by con-fronting Israel.

DECLINING U.S. INFLUENCE

As pro-U.S. Arab regimes stumble and fall,Washington’s influence in the Middle East ison the decline. This is partly due to the Obamaadministration’s deliberate “multilateral re-trenchment … designed to curtail the UnitedStates’ overseas commitments, restore its stand-ing in the world, and shift burdens onto globalpartners”7 and partly to its confused, contra-2 The Jerusalem Post, Feb. 8, 2011.

3 Stephen M. Walt, “Revolution and War,” World Politics,Apr. 1992, pp. 321-68.4 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization andthe Danger of War,” International Security, Summer 1995, pp.5-38.5 For an analysis of this phenomenon, see Robert I. Rothberg,ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2004).

Arab regimeshave strongincentives todivert publicattention fromdomestic problemsby confrontingIsrael.

6 Reuters, Aug. 29, 2011.7 Daniel W. Drezner, “Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?Why We Need Doctrines in Uncertain Times,” Foreign Affairs,July/Aug. 2011, p. 58.

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dictory, and inconsistent re-sponse to unfolding events in theMiddle East. The administrationwas far quicker to call for the res-ignation of Egyptian presidentHusni Mubarak—a staunch U.S.ally for three decades—than thatof Syrian president Bashar Assad,whose role in fomenting terrorismagainst the United States and itsallies is rivaled only by the Ira-nian regime. Washington’s turnagainst Mubarak was viewedthroughout the region (approv-ingly or not) as a betrayal of a loyalfriend.8

The U.S. criticism of Riyadh’smilitary intervention in supportof the Sunni ruling al-Khalifadynasty in Bahrain in March 2011raised eyebrows in Arab capitals,which viewed the emirate’s Shiitesas Iranian proxies.9 Many in the region werealso puzzled by the U.S. abandonment ofQaddafi, who had cooperated with the West bygiving up his weapons of mass destruction(WMD) in 2003. The lesson learned by MiddleEastern regimes—the Iranian mullahs in particu-lar—is that it is better to hold on to WMD pro-grams. Qaddafi’s fate has become a cautionarytale for tyrants.

By contrast, the brutal suppression of thelocal opposition by the anti-U.S. regimes inTehran and Damascus elicited only mild and verylate expressions of criticism from the Obama ad-ministration. Washington’s July 2011 decisionto open a dialogue with Egypt’s Muslim Broth-erhood has further eroded its credibility as anastute political player and credible ally.

Alongside the U.S. retreat from Iraq andAfghanistan, the Obama administration’s pro-clivity for betraying friends and appeasing en-

emies, such as Syria and Iran, strengthens theperception of a weak and confused U.S. govern-ment. Israelis ask whether Washington is capableof exercising sound strategic judgment. The ani-mosity displayed by the Obama administrationtoward Israeli prime minister Netanyahu rein-forces a growing consensus among U.S. friendsand foes alike that “Obama does not get it.”

INCREASING IRANIANAND TURKISH INFLUENCE

The Arab upheavals have facilitated theexpanding influence of non-Arab Iran and Tur-key. The need to focus on domestic problemswill likely reduce the ability of Arab states toproject power beyond their borders and com-bat the growing Iranian and Turkish regionalinfluence.

Both Tehran and Ankara, which are alignedwith radical Islamist forces, have welcomed theArab uprisings and have openly incited Egyp-tian demonstrators to topple Mubarak. An Egyp-tian government beleaguered with domesticproblems has little energy to focus on counter-ing Iranian and Turkish aspirations and influ-

Inbar: Arab Uprisings

The Israeli public is well aware of what can happen whensweeping domestic change engulfs its neighbors. In 1979, apro-Western and Israel-friendly shah was replaced by thehard-line, anti-Israel theocrats of the Iranian IslamicRevolution.

8 Reuters, Jan. 31, 2011; Ari Shavit, “Obama’s Betrayal: AsGoes Mubarak, So Goes U.S. Might,” Ha’aretz, Aug. 10,2011.9 The New York Times, Mar. 14, 2011.

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ence. Both vie for regional hegemony and areinterested in gaining popularity among the Arabstates by vocally criticizing Israel. Moreover,growing influence by the Muslim Brotherhoodin Egypt suits Tehran’s and Ankara’s ideologi-cal inclinations. Indeed, Egypt’s interim militarygovernment quickly undertook a rapprochementwith Iran.

Ankara also encourages Sunni Islamist op-position to the Alawite-dominated Assad regimein Syria,10 Tehran’s main ally. The instability inSyria has renewed to some extent the historicTurkish-Persian rivalry, signaling once more thedilution of Arab power and decreased Westerninfluence. Syria could potentially become abattleground for Turkish and Iranian proxies.

THE END OF THE“OSLO PROCESS”

Diminished U.S. influence in the regiondoes not bode well for prospects of a diplo-matic breakthrough between the Jewish state

and its neighbors, whohave only grudginglycome to accept Israel asa fait accompli that can-not be eradicated byforce. Washington hashistorically played an im-portant role in bringingArab actors to the nego-tiating table, narrowingdifferences during nego-tiations, and reducing Is-raeli anxieties in takingrisks for peace.

However, the Obama administration is de-monstrably less willing and able than its prede-cessor to pressure Arab leaders into compro-mising with the Israelis and less willing to com-pensate Jerusalem for concessions that entailsecurity risks. The U.S. financial crisis furtherlimits the administration’s capacity to provide

economic inducements to both sides.While extremists have been emboldened by

Washington’s perceived departure from the re-gion, pro-U.S. Arab leaders have come to con-clude that U.S. support is ephemeral —hardlyworth the political risks of recognizing Israel andalienating citizens who have been fed a steadydiet of anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic propagandasince grade school. Democratization will notchange this—on the contrary, newly electedleaders will prefer keeping Israel at arm’s lengthso as to curry public favor. According to an April2011 poll, 54 percent of Egyptians favor annul-ling their country’s peace treaty with Israel.11

Clearly, Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt andJordan are under great strain as the anti-Israeldomestic forces become more influential andvocal.12

Whatever the outcome of the escalatingconflict in Syria, no government in Damascus islikely to be strong enough politically to makepeace with Israel. It is equally unlikely that thePalestinian Authority (PA) will do so. The Pales-tinian leadership is divided between Hamas,which took over Gaza in June 2007, and the PAleadership in the West Bank. Additionally, thePA has not reconciled itself to the idea of Jewishstatehood as evidenced by recent statementsby its leaders, notably Mahmoud Abbas’s U.N.speech. With chances of bridging Israeli-Pales-tinian differences growing increasingly remote,13

the PA has defied U.S. calls to return to the ne-gotiating table, opting instead to press its bidfor statehood at the U.N.

As for the Israelis, many fear that theycannot necessarily rely upon the Obamaadministration’s diplomatic, economic, or mili-tary support in the event that their country isattacked or finds it necessary to preemptivelystrike at imminent threats to their security. Notsurprisingly, few are eager to make concessions

10 Ibid., May 4, 2011; The Jerusalem Post, May 8, 2011.

Nuclear weaponswill emboldenTehran and itsPalestinian andLebanese proxiescommitted toIsrael’sdestruction.

11 “Egyptians Embrace Revolt Leaders, Religious Parties, andMilitary, as Well,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, Washington,D.C., Apr. 25, 2011.12 The Washington Times, Feb. 3, 2011; The Jerusalem Post,Aug. 10, 2011.13 Efraim Inbar, “The Rise and Demise of the Two-StateParadigm,” Orbis, Spring 2009, pp. 265-83.

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that magnify those threats. As the re-gion looks less receptive to peace over-tures, Israelis must prepare for greaterregional isolation.

TEHRAN’S NUCLEARCHALLENGE

Arab political upheaval has de-flected attention away from Israel’smost daunting security threat—anuclear Iran. Despite four rounds ofmodest economic sanctions by theU.N. Security Council and frequent dip-lomatic scolding, the regime continuesto develop a nuclear weapons capabil-ity. The international community is un-willing to forcibly block the Islamic Re-public from achieving this goal, whichmost experts expect to happen in anestimated two to three years. Unlike itspredecessor, the Obama administration is un-likely to launch U.S. air strikes to destroy Ira-nian nuclear facilities and may be reluctant tosupport an Israeli military attack to eliminate thethreat.

A nuclear Iran would have far reaching stra-tegic and political implications for the region.14

Although opinions differ as to whether thecountry’s ruling mullahs can be deterred byIsrael’s nuclear arsenal, few doubt that posses-sion of nuclear weapons will embolden Tehranand its Palestinian and Lebanese proxies com-mitted to Israel’s destruction as well as Iranian-backed Shiite movements in Iraq and in the Per-sian Gulf states. Located along the oil-rich Per-sian Gulf and Caspian Basin, a nuclear Iran wouldbe ideally poised to dominate this strategic en-ergy sector,15 particularly if hitherto pro-U.S.Central Asian states gravitate toward Tehran. Inaddition, Iran’s successful pursuit of nuclear

weapons is sure to encourage similar ambitionsby its main regional rivals—Turkey, Egypt, andSaudi Arabia. A multipolar nuclear Middle Eastwould be a strategic nightmare.

MOUNTINGSECURITY THREATS

While the U.S. decline in world affairs ingeneral and in the Middle East in particular mightprove temporary, it is very real for the near fu-ture. This in turn has had a negative impact onIsrael’s deterrence, which relies not only on itsmilitary power and ability to defeat its Arabneighbors but also on the perception that Wash-ington will come to Jerusalem’s aid should theneed arise. The perceived closeness betweenJerusalem and Washington is an important com-ponent of the Jewish state’s deterrent posture,and the Obama administration has cast doubton this long-standing foundation. Jerusalem can,of course, find some comfort in the fact that theMiddle East upheavals have underscored yetagain its position as Washington’s most reliableregional ally, but the Obama administration hasconsistently courted U.S. enemies there at the

Inbar: Arab Uprisings

When states lose their grip over their territory, armedgroups have greater freedom of action. Recent eventsin Libya have reinforced this reality as enormousquantities of conventional (and non-conventional)arms stockpiled by the Qaddafi regime were foundunguarded and ripe for the picking by insurgentsand terrorists.

14 James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran Gets theBomb,” Foreign Affairs, Mar./Apr. 2010.15 Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, Strategic Geographyand the Changing Middle East (Washington: Carnegie Endow-ment for International Peace, 1997), p. 113.

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expense of long-standing allies.While the military forces of neighboring

Arab states would be no match for the IsraelDefense Forces (IDF) should revolutionary up-heaval somehow unite them in war against theJewish state, political turmoil outside Israel’sborders is already beginning to produce a vari-ety of more intractable security threats.

Shortly after Mubarak’s ouster, Egypt’s in-terim military government declared its intentionto honor the country’s international commit-ments (i.e., the 1979 peace treaty with Israel),and most experts believe that an elected succes-sor will do the same if only to preserve currentlevels of U.S. military and economic aid. How-ever, the cold peace between Cairo and Jerusa-lem that existed under Mubarak is sure to be-come even chillier. In order to defuse nation-wide protests, Egypt’s military establishmentformed an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood,the only well-organized political force outsidethe ruling government. The Brotherhood’s grow-ing political power in post-Mubarak Egypt andgreater international acceptance can only be ofdeep concern to Jerusalem.

Under pressure from theBrotherhood, Egypt’s interimgovernment has reduced re-strictions on traffic to and fromGaza, circumventing the Israeliblockade of the Hamas-ruledenclave. This will strengthenHamas, an offshoot of theEgyptian Brotherhood com-mitted to Israel’s eradication,and encourage it to adopt amore aggressive posture to-ward the Jewish state.

In September 2011, theauthorities allowed an angrymob to lay siege to Israel’sembassy in Cairo, forcing theevacuation of its ambassador.Equally disturbing is the Egyp-tian reluctance to maintain se-curity in Sinai, which bordersIsrael and Gaza. Since the fallof Mubarak, the Egyptian-Is-raeli natural gas pipeline has

been sabotaged six times.16 This forced the Is-raelis to rely on more expensive diesel and fueloil to generate electricity, costing the countryan average of US$2.7 million a day during Julyand August.17 As the Eilat attacks last Augustindicate, Sinai may well emerge as a major anti-Israel terrorist base.18

The Israeli military regards Jordan, withwhich Jerusalem signed a 1994 peace treaty, asproviding strategic depth since the twocountry’s long border remains comparativelysecure.19 So far, King Abdullah has been suc-cessful in riding the regional political storm withminimal damage to his rule and without compro-mising his relations with Israel. However, if Iraqor Syria should fall victim to an Islamist take-over or a breakdown of the state, the Jordanians

While struggling to remain in power, the Assad regime inSyria sought to divert public anger against it by busingthousands of ostensibly Palestinian protesters to the Israeliborder, who then proceeded to try to cross into the Jewishstate. Jerusalem will find it necessary to station larger forcesalong its frontiers to defend against an array of security threatsarising from the turmoil in neighboring states.

16 Al-Ahram Online (Cairo), Oct. 3, 2011.17 Globes (Rishon Le-Zion), Oct. 2, 2011.18 The Jerusalem Post, Aug. 18, 2011.19 Amos Gilad, director of policy and political-military affairsat Israel’s Defense Ministry, CNN, Sept. 22, 2011.

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may find it difficult to insulate themselves fromthe contagion. Should King Abdullah be de-posed, hostile forces would be able to straddlethe Tel Aviv-Jerusalem-Haifa triangle holdingmost of Israel’s population and economic infra-structure as Jerusalem is only twenty miles fromthe Jordanian border.

In Syria, the Alawite-dominated Assad re-gime is struggling to suppress predominantlySunni opposition forces. In May 2011, thousandsof ostensibly Palestinian protesters bused in bythe authorities on “Nakba Day”—the anniver-sary of Israel’s founding—stormed into theGolan Heights, attacking IDF soldiers withstones. Four were killed and dozens woundedby Israeli fire. The Syrians are “intentionally at-tempting to divert international attention awayfrom the brutal crackdown of their own citizens,”said an Israeli military spokesman.20 This actionsuggests that Assad is not averse to confront-ing Jerusalem as a means of redirecting publicanger away from his regime.

The West Bank and Gaza have not yet ex-perienced major domestic turmoil. While a re-newed campaign of terror against Israel wouldbe very costly for the Palestinians, the weak andillegitimate PA president Abbas (whose term ofoffice expired in January 2009) is under increas-ing pressure from Hamas to up the ante in com-bating the Jewish state. A Palestinian strategicmiscalculation leading to new round of violenceis always a possibility that Jerusalem cannotignore.

Political turmoil in the Arab world is a warn-ing bell for Israel to bolster its defenses. Israeliswill find it necessary to station larger forces alongtheir borders to defend against the array of se-curity threats that can arise from political tur-moil in neighboring countries. Jerusalem mustalso update its war-fighting scenarios and ex-pand the IDF to be able to deal with a variety ofcontingencies, including a large-scale war. Sinceforce building is a lengthy process, appropriatedecisions on force structure and budget alloca-

tions are required as soon as possible.Jerusalem must insist on defensible borders

in any future peace negotiations with the PAand Syria. Loose talk about technologies thatfavor Israel’s defensive capabilities and the de-creasing military value of territory and topo-graphical assets ignores the fact that contem-porary technological advantages are fleeting.Strategists and militaries around the world stillconfer great importance to the topographicalcharacteristics of the battlefield. The history ofwarfare shows that technological superiority andbetter weapons are not enough to win a war.21

The increased threat of rocket and missilefire from “islands of in-security” across theirborders will require theIsraelis to improve bothpassive protection andactive defense. Passiveprotection refers to con-struction of shelters inhomes, educational insti-tutions, and centers ofcommerce and entertain-ment. Active defense systems prevent incom-ing rockets and missiles from hitting or destroy-ing a target. Israel’s mobile Iron Dome batteriescan intercept short-range rockets while itsDavid’s Sling system under development canintercept longer-range rockets and missiles.22

Jerusalem is working to integrate these lower-tier missile defense systems with componentsof its upper-tier missile defense—the upgradedversions of Patriot Advanced Capability inter-ceptors and the Arrow-2 and the Arrow-3 inter-ceptors—into a single national command andcontrol center.23 Budgetary constraints andstrategic shortsightedness have slowed devel-opment of this multilayered missile defensesystem.

Political turmoilin the Arab worldis a warning bellfor Israel tobolster itsdefenses.

20 The Daily Mail (London), May 16, 2011.

21 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War. From 2000 B.C.to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1989), pp. 311-20;Keir A. Lieber, War and the Engineers. The Primacy of Politicsover Technology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp.155-8.22 The Washington Post, May 12, 2011.23 Defense News (Springfield, Va.), June 20, 2011.

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and poor in Israeli society in order to maintainsocial cohesion.

Whether incumbent Arab regimes stick topower, collapse, are replaced by new dictator-ships, or democratize, Israel’s near abroad islikely to remain in political flux in the comingyears with major strategic and security ramifica-tions. With Washington’s influence in declineand two rising regional powers—Iran and Tur-key—eager to challenge Jerusalem, the newMiddle East promises to be considerably morechallenging to Israeli security than the old.

CONCLUSION

Fortunately, Israel’s flourishing economycan afford larger defense outlays to meet itsnational security challenges. The leadershipshould be courageous enough to explain to itspeople that changing circumstances requiresome austerity measures that might freeze thestandard of living for a while. Israeli society hasshown remarkable resilience and spirit in pro-tracted conflict and might respond positivelyto a well-crafted call from the political leader-ship. Such an address must be accompanied byefforts to reduce the growing gaps between rich

Just Can’t Trust the Saudis TEHRAN—The Jeddah Astronomy Society’s mistake in sighting of the new moon in Saudi Arabiahas angered many Muslim nations who followed suit and pronounced Tuesday as Eid al-Fitrwrongly. The society said that people actually saw the planet Saturn and not the crescent moon thatmarks the beginning of the Islamic month of Shawwal.

Various news agencies such as al-Arabiya and Al Jazeera have also reported that the planetSaturn has been mistaken for the Hilal (crescent moon), and this means that what was announced asthe first day of Eid al-Fitr was supposed to be a day of fasting, rather than celebrations.

Saudi government officials have reportedly apologized to their nation and said that they wouldpay kaffarah (an amount of money paid as expiation for breaking the fast during the holy month ofRamadan) for the entire Saudi nation.

While a number of Muslim countries like Iran announce the new crescent only on the basis offrequent sightings by the people, astronomy societies, and clerics inside their borders, many othersrely on the sightings done by Saudi Arabia and announcement of the Eid crescent by Riyadh.

Thus, those Muslim nations who have followed the Saudis and celebrated the last Tuesday asEid al-Fitr are now angry with the Saudis as Eid al-Fitr is the biggest eve for the worldwide Muslimcommunity.

Fourteen other countries—Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait,Palestin[ian territories], Qatar, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen—followed suit incompliance with Islamic teachings.

Fars News Agency, Sept. 3, 2011