Israel Strategic US Assest Report

7/31/2019 Israel Strategic US Assest Report

1/28

RobeRt D. blackwill& walteR b. Slocombe

iSRaelA Strategic Asset for the United States


2/28


3/28


4/28

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States o America. No part o thispublication may be reproduced or transmitted in any orm or by any means,

electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any in ormationstorage and retrieval system, without permission in writing rom the publisher.

2011 by Te Washington Institute or Near East Policy

Published in 2011 in the United States o America by Te Washington In-stitute or Near East Policy, 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, DC20036.

Cover design: Larisa Baste, Te Washington Institute ext design: Mary Kalbach Horan, Te Washington Institute


5/28

rs

the authoRS

Robert D. Blackwill is the Henry A. Kissinger senior ellow or U.S.oreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. In government, he

served under George W. Bush as U.S. ambassador to India and thenas deputy assistant to the president, deputy national security adviser orstrategic planning, and presidential envoy to Iraq. A ormer senior StateDepartment o cial and National Security Council aide or Europeanand Soviet a airs, he served out o government as a senior ellow at the

Rand Corporation, president o BGR International, and associate deano Harvard Universitys Kennedy School o Government.

Walter B. Slocombe is senior counsel in Caplin & Drysdales Washing-ton, DC, o ce. A Rhodes scholar, his lengthy government resum in-cludes service in the Pentagon throughout the Clinton and Carteradministrations, including his appointment as under secretary o de-

ense or policy rom 1994 to 2001. In 2003, he served as senior advisoror national de ense in the Coalition Provisional Authority or Iraq.


6/28


7/28

Tis report represents the independent judgments o its authors andnot necessarily the views o Te Washington Institute,

its Board o Directors, Board o rustees,or Board o Advisors.

Te authors express their gratitude to Margaret Weiss

o Te Washington Institute or her critical research support.


8/28


9/28

1

s rss

Israel is a small country in a strategically vitaland increasingly inhospitableregion o the world. It is not surprising that doubtsover the wisdom o the United States close relationship withIsrael periodically sur ace. Such concerns may emerge even more

requently as the Middle East passes through a period o greatpolitical volatility and change. As we consider the justi cations

or strong U.S. support o Israel in the current context, this essay argues that in addition to power ul reasons o values and morality,the Jewish state provides signi cant bene ts to the United Statesand its national interests.

Tis aspect o the relationship is too o ten ignored. Overthe decades, American leaders have primarily explained the

oundations o the U.S.-Israel relationship by properly citingshared values: the two countries common democracy, mutualexperience in ghting or reedom, roots in Judeo-Christian cultureand civilization, and commitment to the right o nations, large orsmall, to live in security while mani esting the will o the people.But unlike the ormulations that U.S. leaders use concerning other

a StRategic aSSet

1


10/28

2

Blackwill and Slocombe

countries with which the United States has shared cultural andpolitical valuese.g., Britain and Francearguments in avoro strong ties with Israel usually also include a second pro oundrationale or the depth o the relationship: the moral responsibility America bears to protect the small nation-state o the Jewishpeople. ogether, these two conceptsshared values and moralresponsibilityhave been the pillars on which the United Stateshas built a unique bilateral relationship with Israel that enjoysthe deep, long-standing support o the American people, bilateralties commonly described by a broad, bipartisan consensus o U.S.political leaders as unbreakable.

While accurate and indispensably important, this char-acterization o the core basis o the U.S.-Israel relationship isincomplete because it ails to capture a third, crucial aspect:common national interests and collaborative action to advance

those interests. Shared values and moral responsibility remain

unshakable oundations o those ties, but the relationship standsequally on this underappreciated third leg.

For some, this is a controversial assertion. Within the U.S.oreign policy, de ense, and business communities, some leaders

and analysts have traditionally viewed the U.S. relationship withIsrael primarily as a one-way street, in which the United Statesprotects Israel diplomatically and provides the means or Israel to

de end itsel militarily but Israel itsel contributes little or nothingto American national interests.

We reject that analysis. o the contrary, we believe that theUnited States and Israel have an impressive list o common nationalinterests; that Israeli actions make substantial direct contributions

Wise policymakers and people concerned with U.S. oreign policy...should recognize the benefts Israel provides or

U.S. national interests.


11/28

Israel: A Strategic Asset for the United States

3

to these U.S. interests; and that wise policymakers and peopleconcerned with U.S. oreign policy, while never orgetting theirreplaceable values and moral responsibility dimensions o thebilateral relationship, should recognize the bene ts Israel provides

or U.S. national interests.


12/28

4

mm nn n ln r s s

coMMoN NatioNaLiNteReStS

As a global power, the United States has national interests thatrange ar beyond the greater Middle East, but that region isamong the most critical or our country. U.S. interests that espe-cially involve this vast area include:

preventing the proli eration o weapons o mass destruction,especially nuclear weapons;

combating terrorism and the radical Islamist ideology rom which it is spawned;

promoting an orderly process o democratic change andeconomic development in the region;

opposing the spread o Iranian infuence and that o Iranspartners and proxies;

ensuring the ree fow o oil and gas at reasonable prices;


13/28


14/28

6


and Israel may ascribe di erent levels o threat to the challeng-es they ace, accept varying degrees o risk in addressing thosethreats, and disagree on ways to advance their common nationalinterests. Over the decades, the two sides have periodically hadpolicy fare-ups, some even bitter, on topics ranging rom Israelspreemptive action against Iraqs nuclear reactor to Israeli sales o weaponry and military technology to China. Some o the mostcontentious policy disputes have been about actions a ecting thepeace processthe diplomacy aimed at resolving the many di -

erent aspects o the Arab-Israel confict.

From the Ford administrations punitive reassessment o relations to the George H.W. Bush administrations showdownover loan guarantees, when various U.S. presidents and Israeligovernments have staked out di erent positions on key issues(notably, the wisdom and legitimacy o Israeli settlement con-struction), the disputes unsurprisingly capture the headlines.

But more requent are those instances when the two sides have worked together success ully over more than thirty years toachieve shared policy objectives, especially the series o peacetreaties and agreements that have been an anchor o U.S. infu-ence in the region.

Tis list also includes instances when Israel subordinated itsown policy pre erences to accommodate those o Washington,

such as acceding to the George W. Bush administrations in-sistence that the Palestinians hold legislative elections in 2006,despite Israeli misgivingswhich regrettably proved prescientthat it risked triggering a destructive process that eventually ledto the Hamas takeover o Gaza. Trough it all, decades o experi-

More requent are those instances when the two sides have worked together success ully

over more than thirty years to achieve shared policy objectives.


15/28

7


ence show that the two sides have learned how to manage theirdi erences in the service o their common national interests. Tis commonality o interest has long been the dominant themeo the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship, even on the di cult issueo Israels relations with its Arab neighbors.


16/28

8

In addition to and outside o the peace process, history providesnumerous examples o speci c Israeli actions that have bene tedU.S. national interests.

During the Cold War, the most celebrated were Israels daring

the t o Soviet radar rom Egypt in 1969, Israels positive reply to President Nixons request to fy reconnaissance missions andmobilize troops to help turn around Syrias invasion o Jordanin 1970, and Israels sharing o technical intelligence on numer-ous Soviet weapons systems captured during the 1967 and 1973 wars. More recently, Israeli counterproli eration e ortsinclud-ing bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981have contributed

substantially to U.S. interests. And the 2007 attack on the NorthKoreasupplied Syrian reactor, never ormally acknowledged by Israel, ensured that Bashar al-Asads progress toward a nucle-ar weaponand a very dangerous proli eration move by NorthKoreawas stopped at an early stage.

sr ln r b ns

iSRaeLi coNtRiButioNSto u.S. NatioNaLiNteReStS


17/28

9


On a number o occasions, Israel has also made di cult deci-sions not to actpolicy choices sometimes made in discordance with its own strictly national interests and perspectivesand thatrestraint has been important to U.S. national interests. Such wasthe case with Israels decision to accede to a U.S. request not to re-taliate against Iraqi Scud attacks during the rst Gul War, which American o cials eared would lead to Arab states withdrawing

rom the international coalition. Similarly, a ter a sometimes ugly dispute with Washington, Israel agreed to terminate the sale o problematic weapons and military technology to China and de-prive itsel o both a major market or its world-class military exports and a source o infuence with Beijing.

oday, Israeli contributions to U.S. national interests rangeacross a broad spectrum. For example:

Trough joint training and exercises as well as exchanges on

military doctrine, the United States has bene ted in the ar-eas o counterterrorism cooperation, tactical intelligence, andexperience in urban war are. Te largest-ever U.S.-Israel jointexercise is scheduled or spring 2012.

Israeli technology promotes American interests. Increas-ingly, U.S. homeland security and military agencies are turn-

ing to Israeli technology to solve some o their most vexingtechnical problems. Tis support ranges rom advice and ex-pertise on behavioral screening techniques or airport secu-rity to acquiring an Israeli-produced tactical radar systemto enhance orce protection. Israel has been a world leader

Increasingly, U.S. homeland security and military agencies are turning to Israeli

technology to solve some o their most vex-ing technical problems.


18/28

10


in the development o unmanned aerial systems, or bothintelligence collection and combat, and it has shared withthe U.S. military the technology, the doctrine, and its experi-ence regarding these systems. Israel is also a global pacesetterin active measures or armored vehicle protection, de enseagainst short-range rocket threats, and the techniques andprocedures o robotics, all o which it has shared with theUnited States.

In the vital realm o missile de ense cooperation, the United

States has a broad and multi aceted relationship with Is-rael, its most sophisticated and experienced partner in thispreeminent domain or the United States. Israels nationalmissile de ensesincluding the U.S. deployment in Israel o an advanced X-band radar system and the more than 100 American military personnel who man itwill be an integralpart o a larger missile de ense architecture spanning Europe,

the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Persian Gul that willhelp protect U.S. orces and allies throughout this vast area.For this reason, the director o the Pentagons Missile De-

ense Agency recently praised the speci c contribution thatIsraels integrated, multilayered command-and-control net- work makes to the U.S. militarys ability to de end against theIranian missile threat.

While it is certainly true that Israel gains signi cantly romgenerous U.S. nancial assistance to its militarymost o itspent in AmericaIsraels de ense industries have certainunique competencies that bene t the United States. One re-

Israels national missile de ense will be anintegral part o a larger missile de ense architecture spanning Europe, the Eastern

Mediterranean, and the Persian Gul .


19/28

11


sult is the growing importance to the U.S. military o Israelide ense goods, as the United States has taken advantage o access to unique Israeli capabilities in key niche areas o military technology. Overall, the value o annual U.S. pur-chases o Israeli de ense articles has increased steadily overthe past decade, rom less than a hal billion dollars in theearly 2000s to about $1.5 billion today. Among the Israeli-developed de ense equipment used by the U.S. military areshort-range unmanned aircra t systems that have seen service in Iraq and A ghanistan; targeting pods on hundreds o Air Force, Navy, and Marine strike aircra t; a revolutionary helmet-mounted sight that is standard in nearly all rontline Air Force and Navy ghter aircra t; li esaving armor installedin thousands o MRAP armored vehicles used in Iraq and A ghanistan; and a gun system or close-in de ense o na- val vessels against terrorist dinghies and small-boat swarms.Moreover, American and Israeli companies are working to-

gether to jointly produce Israels Iron Domethe worldsrst combat-proven counter-rocket system.

Counterterrorism and intelligence cooperation is deep andextensive, with the United States and Israel working to advance their common interest in de eating the terrorism o Hamas, Hizballah, and al-Qaeda and its a liate groups by

sharing in ormation, supporting preventive actions, deterringchallenges, and coordinating overall strategy. Joint SpecialForces training and exercises, collaboration on shared targets,and close cooperation among the relevant U.S. and Israeli se-curity agencies testi y to the value o this relationship.

Te United States has taken advantage o access to unique Israeli

capabilities in key niche areas o military technology.


20/28


21/28

13


Looking to the uture, Israels world-class expertise in twocutting-edge areas o national securitycyber de ense andnational resilience planning and implementationwillincreasingly redound to the bene t o the United States.Israel is a primary place where the United States can buildan enduring partnership to try to secure the cyber commons,as enunciated in the administrations International Strategy or Cyberspace . With its world-class in ormation technol-ogy, R&D, and cybersecurity capabilities, Israel will be an

ever more important player in e orts to secure cyberspaceand to protect critical U.S. national in rastructure rom cy-berattack. Trough the Israel-based activities o major U.S.companies or the licensing in the United States o Israelitechnologies, Israels excellence in cybersecurity already bene ts critical U.S. in rastructure such as banking, com-munications, utilities, transportation, and general Internet

connectivity. And i security concerns o both parties canbe managed, Israel can become a major partner in e ortsto exploit the military applications o cyberpower, in thesame way that the two countries have established collab-orative relationships in intelligence and counterterrorism.Finally, drawing on its experience in building a fourishingeconomy and vibrant democracy despite decades o con-

fict and terrorism, Israel has a role to play in helping theUnited States deepen its own internal resilience in dealing with terrorist threats against the homeland and the impacto natural disasters.

Israels world-class expertise in cyber de ense and national resilience planning and implementation will increasingly

redound to the beneft o the United States.


22/28

14


In a political context, it is important to note that Israelunlikeother Middle Eastern countries whose governments are partners with the United Statesis already a stable democracy, which willnot be swept aside by sudden uprising or explosive revolution,a act that may become more important in the turbulent periodahead. Moreover, or all our periodic squabbles, Israels people andpoliticians have a deeply entrenched pro-American outlook thatis uni ormly popular with the Israeli people. Tus, Israels supporto U.S. national interests is woven tightly into the abric o Israeli

democratic political culture, a crucial characteristic that is pres-ently not ound in any other nation in the greater Middle East.

We do not argue that Israels assistance to the United Statesis more valuable to the United States than American support o Israel is to Israel. Nor do we deny that there are costs to the UnitedStates, in the Arab world and elsewhere, or its support o Israel,as there are costs to U.S. support o other beleagueredand some-

time imper ect riends, rom West Berlin in the Cold War toKuwait in 1990-91 to aiwan today. We are, however, convincedthat in a net assessment those real costs are markedly outweighedby the many ways in which Israel bolsters U.S. national interestsand the bene ts that Israel provides to those interests.

In particular, we believe that the United States can have strongand productive relations with Arab and other Muslim nations

while sustaining its intimate collaboration with Israel and thatU.S. support or Israel is not the primaryand probably not evena dominantreason Islamist terrorists target the United States. Te long-standing U.S. commitment to Israel has not preventeddevelopment o close ties with Arab nations who understand that

Israels support o U.S. interests is woventightly into the abric o Israeli democratic culture, a characteristic not ound in any other nation in the greater Middle East.


23/28

15


however much they disagree with U.S. support or Israel, they bene t rom a good relationship with the United States on otherissues. Nor has it made the Arab oil-exporting states any less con-scious o their own economic and strategic interest in a reason-ably stable fow o oil to world markets, or their eagerness to buy

rst-class military equipment rom the United States or to enjoy the bene ts o U.S. protection against Iranian or other aggression.

o put it di erently, would Saudi Arabias policies toward theUnited States be markedly di erent in practice i Washingtonentered into a sustained crisis with Israel over the Palestine is-sue during which the bilateral relationship went into steep sys-temic decline? Would Riyadh lower the price o oil? Would itstop hedging its regional bets concerning U.S. attempts to coerceIran into reezing its nuclear weapons programs? Would it regardcurrent U.S. policy toward A ghanistan more positively? Wouldit view American democracy promotion in the Middle East more

avorably? Would it be more inclined to re orm its internal gov-

ernmental processes to be more in line with U.S. pre erences? We judge positive answers to all these questions as doubt ul at the very least.

Moreover, or all the Arab streets popular attacks on the Unit-ed States as Israels riend, America remains a magnet or young Arabsin popular culture, in education, in commerce, and in

technology. And concern with Israel, though real, remains a lowerpriority in most o Arab public opinion than more immediate pre-occupations with economic progress and pervasive corruption.

In particular, we believe the United States can have strong and productive relations

with Arab and Muslim nations while sus-taining its intimate collaboration with Israel.


24/28

16

w rd d rr n

toWaRD DeepeRu.S.-iSRaeLcoopeRatioN

The conclusion o our analysis is that the U.S.-Israel relationship isa signi cant asset to U.S. national interests. And the potential oreven greater U.S. bene ts rom deeper cooperation is substantial.

In this context:

U.S. political leaders, rom the White House to Congress,should expand the national discussion on U.S. Middle Eastpolicy to include the role o the U.S.-Israel relationship asa strategic asset to U.S. national interests. U.S. nationalinterests deserve equal billing with shared values andmoral responsibility as undamental rationales or thebilateral relationship.

Te U.S. government should seek to maximize the advan-tages the United States can derive rom cooperation with Is-rael and to expand partnerships both in traditional areas (e.g.,


25/28

17


military, intelligence) and in new areas (e.g., cyberwar are,homeland resilience).

U.S. security, strategy, and policy communities should moreseriously engage on the strategic aspects o the U.S.-Israelrelationship: how to urther develop bilateral ties and how to leverage this relationship to advance broader U.S. nation-al interests.

aken together, these measures will ensure that U.S.-Israel re-lations are seen not only as a diplomatic vehicle to express deep-seated values and ul ll Americas moral responsibility, but also asan important means to advance U.S. national interests.


26/28


27/28


28/28

Documents

Israel Strategic US Assest Report