Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina

8/12/2019 Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

ISLAMISM AND SECURITYIN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Leslie S. Lebl

May 2014

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FOREWORD

Many observers viewed the military mission of theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missionto Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia), launched in late-1995, as a test of the international communitys abilityto keep the peace in the post-Cold War world. Thistask proved dif cult: The many obstacles to restoringstability and growth in Bosnia have been thoroughlydissected over the years, from the challenges of tran-sition governments to the dif culties of interethnicreconciliation.

One factor, however, has received but scant atten-tion: the role of Islamism, the political ideology basedon a religion that motivates the Muslim Brother-hood, al-Qaeda, and many other radical groups. Thismonograph will examine the impact of Islamism on

Bosnian security, tracing developments during the 9years of NATO peacekeeping, as well as the ensuingyears. It will also examine the ties between so-callednonviolent and violent Islamismties that havealready surfaced in other countries where NATO orthe U.S. military is engaged. As a consequence, themonograph offers a framework to analyze the poten-tial constraints that Islamism can place on present-dayand future military missions in Muslim countries.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director

Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press


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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

LESLIE S. LEBL is a Fellow of the American Centerfor Democracy and a Principal of Lebl Associates. Aformer Foreign Service Of cer, she now writes, lec-tures, and consults on political and security matters.During her Foreign Service career, Ms. Lebl servedas Political Advisor to the Commander of Stabiliza-tion Forces (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the late-1990s, rst in the American sector in Tuzla and thenat SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo. Her most recentpublications include articles in Orbis on the EuropeanUnion, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Organiza-tion of Islamic Cooperation, and on radical Islam inEurope. A monograph, Advancing U.S. Interests withthe European Union , was published by the AtlanticCouncil of the United States. Other publications in-

clude analyses of European defense policy for the CatoInstitute and of U.S.-EU cooperation in combating ter-rorism for Policy Review. Ms. Lebl holds a B.A. in his-tory from Swarthmore College and an M.A. in foreignaffairs from the Johns Hopkins School of AdvancedInternational Studies.


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SUMMARY

Bosnia-Herzegovina, once thought to be on theway to joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-tion (NATO) and the European Union (EU), is insteadfalling behind, mired in political bickering, economicstalemate, and governmental dysfunction. In this dif-

cult situation, Islamism poses a signi cant threat toBosnias fragile domestic stability. Although the lev-els of Islamist terrorism and separatist movementsare comparable to those elsewhere in Europe, they areparticularly troublesome in Bosnia for two reasons.First, senior political and religious Bosniak (Muslim)leaders have long-standing ties to the Muslim Brother-hood and Islamist terrorism, including al-Qaeda andIran, that they are very reluctant to abandon. Second,Islamism contributes signi cantly to Bosnias dys-function as a country. Calls to re-impose traditionalIslamic law, or sharia, arouse opposition from BosnianSerbs and Croats, as does the nostalgia for the Otto-man Empire and Islamic Caliphate shared by key Bos-niak leaders, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation(OIC), and the Turkish government.

Some analysts think that Bosnias slide can be re-versed by mounting another NATO military mission,while others want the United States to accelerate itsNATO membership. The U.S. Army should be pre-pared to explain why the previous NATO mission wassuccessful, and why, in contrast, another one wouldbe much more dif cult. The European Command andthe Of ce of the Secretary of Defense should alertWashington policymakers to the danger to NATO

policymaking and day-to-day operations arisingfrom the Islamist ties of some Bosniak leaders andrepresentatives.


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ISLAMISM AND SECURITYIN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

BOSNIA IN TROUBLE

Eighteen years after the ghting ended in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia), its territorial integrity and in-ternal stability are not yet assured. Most observershad assumed that membership in the North Atlan-tic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EuropeanUnion (EU) would cement Bosnian security. Althoughother Balkan countries have successfully joined thosetwo organizations, 1 Bosnia is unlikely to follow themany time soon. Instead, reforms that appeared to pavethe way for membership have stalled. The unity ofthe state is in doubt; its governmental structure isunworkable, and its economy is failing.

The Bosnian governmental structure set up underthe Dayton Peace Accords included a weak centralstate, two entities (the Bosniak-Croat Federation andthe Serb Republic), and a separate jurisdiction for thedisputed town of Brko. With the Federation furtherdivided into 10 relatively autonomous cantonsroughly re ecting the territorial divisions betweenBosniaks and Croatsnot only is the result top-heavyand unwieldy, but the structure encourages disputesand tensions framed in terms of ethnicity. Most ob-servers, with the exception of the U.S. Government,have concluded that the cumbersome mechanism oftwo entities and a weak central state agreed to at Day-ton in 1995 simply does not work. 2

If Bosnias economy were thriving, these tensions

would probably recede. But basic requirements forsuch a thriving economy, such as large-scale energyprojects, are frequently blocked by the lack of inter-


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entity cooperation. 3 In addition, the economic lib-eralization required for growth would deprive the

multiple layers of of cialdom of substantial income,whether from controlling state-owned companies in-herited from the communist past or revenues fromthe welter of existing regulations and administrativerequirements.

Strong leadership might overcome this inertia, butstrong leadership is exactly what is lacking. Mean-while, corruption remains widespread, 4 and the aver-age Bosnian faces high unemployment, reaching 57percent among young people. 5 Poverty is mitigated byextensive state subsidies that further weigh down theeconomy and by black market jobs.

Former Serbian president Slobodan Miloevi andformer Croatian president Franjo Tudjman famouslydivided up Bosnia on a napkin in 1991. 6 They failed to

achieve their goal during the subsequent war, but thedivision of Bosnia from within has advanced apace.The poor economy has contributed to this process,but so has the deliberate policy of alienation pursuedby all three ethnic groups. An entire generation ofBosnians has gone through an ethnically segregatededucational system in which each group is taught itsown version of religion, geography, history, and lan-guage. 7 Those divisions are then perpetuated by poli-ticians who exploit ethnic fears and tensions.

Unsurprisingly, the inter-ethnic reconciliationhoped for at Dayton has not come to pass. Rather,an overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs supportthe secession of the Serb Republic. A large numberof Croats have already left the country; they are esti-

mated now to account for only 10 percent of Bosniaspopulation, as compared with 17 percent in 1991. 8 Ofthose Croats still in country, over 40 percent want to


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carve a third, Croat, entity out of the Federation, 9 de-spite the fact that the Dayton quota system currently

grants them outsize in uence (one-third of the state-level positions and half of those in the Federationgovernment).

As Bosnian analysts Anes Alic and Vildana Skoca- jic put it, the majority of Bosnians do not feel that thisis their homeland. 10 This puts an alarming spin onother, already-disturbing data: some 87 percent feelthe country is going in the wrong direction, 11 and 77percent of young people say they would leave Bosniaif they could. 12 Such negative perceptions are also typ-ical of a country in demographic decline, as Bosnia istoday. 13 It may be only mid-ranked on the list of failedstates, but it is clearly in trouble. 14

Neither NATO nor the EU can solve these prob-lems, despite their best efforts. NATO provided rstthe Implementation Force (IFOR) and then its succes-sor, Stabilization Force (SFOR), to maintain stabilityfor 9 years after the war. Today, it maintains a militaryheadquarters in Sarajevo to assist Bosnia with reformsand commitments related to NATO accession.

Bosnia has met all NATO membership require-ments except for the registration of all the defense fa-cilities deemed necessary for future defense as proper-ties of the central state. 15 The Serb Republic has refusedto transfer its properties, and its President, MiloradDodik, has called for Bosnia to demilitarize rather than join NATO. 16 Clearly, the obstacles to NATO acces-sion are political and can be removed only by the Bos-nians themselves. Even if they are overcome, NATOhas no means to solve Bosnias serious social and

economic problems.EU accession, which requires extensive economic,social, and political reforms, is often viewed by U.S.


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policymakers as the critical means to achieve Euro-Atlantic integration. One could argue that the EU is

an unlikely tool for streamlining governments and re-ducing the public sector, promoting entrepreneurshiprather than redistribution, and resolving cultural ten-sions among different groups. Nevertheless, the EUhas prodded Bosnia, inter alia , to strengthen its cen-tral state institutions, reform its public administrationand judicial system, combat corruption, and developa market economy, but with only limited success. To-day, EU of cials appear to have concluded that thereis not much they can do to solve Bosnias problems,given Bosnian politicians lack of vision and interne-cine disputes. 17 The EU of cial in charge of accessionhas warned that, if the present situation persists, Bos-nias application could be frozen. 18

If Bosnia was a just another EU candidate country,

such an assessment would probably attract little atten-tion. But in this case, it is signi cant, given the huge EUeffort to rebuild Bosnia. The EU replaced SFOR withits own military operation, European Union Force(EUFOR); it replaced the United Nations (UN) policemission with the European Union Police Mission, andfor a time it combined the position of EU Special Rep-resentative in Bosnia and Herzegovina with that of theUNs Of ce of the High Representative (OHR). in aneffort to coordinate and direct the civilian internation-al communitys involvement in Bosnia. The failure ofsuch an ambitious effort explains why Europeans nowsay that it is primarily up to the Bosnians, not outsid-ers, to x Bosnias problems.19


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ISLAMISM: MUSLIM BROTHERS, TERRORISTS,AND WAHHABIS

In this precarious environment, the growth of Is-lamism is particularly worrisome. Islamism contrastsstrongly with the more-moderate form of Islam tradi-tionally practiced in Bosnia. A 20th century politicalideology based on a religion, Islamisms ultimate goalis to replace Western law with traditional Islamic law,or sharia, worldwide. Not only would this undermineWestern democracy by rejecting the laws designedby democratically elected representatives, but shariasfundamental principlessuch as inequality before thelaw (more on this topic later in the text)are antitheti-cal to Western law. This transformation to Islamismwould be accomplished by means of a global Caliph-ate, or Islamic empire, headed by a person who is both a

political and religious leader.Most Western observers dismiss warnings aboutthe dangers of Islamism as crude Serb or Croat pro-paganda intended to undermine the Bosnian state. Inso doing, they usually note that Islamism is unlikelyto become a signi cant force because most Bosniakscontinue to adhere to their traditionally moderate andrelatively secular version of Islam. However, evidencedrawn primarily from Bosniak and Western sourcesreveals a more-nuanced and alarming picture. To un-derstand this picture, it is rst necessary to identifythe main types of Islamism in uencing Bosnia today.

Islamists are usually divided into two categories:the violent Islamist who pursues holy war, or jihad,openly, and his nonviolent counterpart who publicly

eschews itexcept against Israel or Western forcesghting in Muslim countries. However, the links be-tween violent and nonviolent Islamism, while often


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Box 1

The Bosnian Connection in InternationalIslamist Terror.

Starting in 1996, senior mujahideen leaderssuch as Abu el-Maali and Abu Sulaimannal-Makki, then living as civilians in Bo-cinja Donja, oversaw plots in France, Italy,and Jordan designed to avenge the deathsof other leaders.

In 2008, the Of ce of the High Representa-tive (OHR) in Sarajevo reportedly uncov-ered evidence that senior Bosniak politicianHasan engi signed off on a money trans-fer intended to nance the attacks of 9/11.

Karim Said Atmani, the document forgerfor the group plotting the 2000 Milleniumplot bombing, was a frequent visitor to Bos-nia. He obtained his rst Bosnian passportin 1995 and subsequently was allowed tostay without a valid passport after he wasdeported by Canada in 1998.

In late-October 2001, Algerians with Bos-nian citizenship were arrested by the Bos-nian authorities on charges of plotting to ysmall aircraft from Visoko and crash theminto SFOR bases in Tuzla and Bratunac.

The 2005 plot to bomb the funeral of Pope John Paul II in Croatia reportedly origi-nated in Gornja Maoa. The plot involved

smuggling rocket launchers, explosives,and detonators into Italy.


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Nor were the Iranians routed after the 1996 raid inPogorelica. Today, both the Iranian Ministry of Intelli-gence and National Security (VEVAK) and the IslamicRevolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have a presencein Bosnia. Of the two, the IRGC reportedly has thebetter, more-extensive network. 24 After the July 2012terrorist attack at the Burgas airport in Bulgaria, in-ternational attention focused on possible threats fromHezbollah elsewhere in the Balkans. An Israeli expert,

cited by Christopher Deliso, concluded that Bosniaposed the biggest danger in the region because Thereremain pro-Iranian elements in the government, and

Also in 2005, Bosnian police raided an apart-ment connected to a group seeking to blowup the British Embassy in Sarajevo, seizingexplosives, ri es, other arms, and a videopledging vengeance for jihadists killed inAfghanistan and Iraq. One of those arrest-ed, a Swedish citizen of Bosnian origin, rana website on behalf of Abu Musab Zarqawi,head of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

In 2006, a group of Bosnians and Macedo-nians linked to al-Qaeda were arrested innorthern Italy after smuggling some 1,800guns into that country from Istanbul.

Sources: Evan F. Kohlmann, Al-Qaidas Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network, New York, Berg, 2004, pp. 176, 199,201-209;Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation public TV , May 5, 2008;

The Washington Post , March 11, 2000; Channel 4 News, Janu-ary 17, 2002; ISN , November 17, 2008; The Washington Post ,December 1, 2005; and Christopher Deliso, The Coming Bal-kan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West,Westport, CT: Praeger, 2007, p. 26.


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Iran is active through the embassy in Sarajevo andcharities. 25

Today, Islamist terrorism persists in Bosnia, wheth-er involving al-Qaeda, Iran, or home-grown sources,but assessments of the threat it poses vary. ManyWestern analysts largely have dismissed this terror-ism as not being a major issue. The 2013 Congressio-nal Research Service report on Bosnia, for example,makes only a brief mention of terrorism, 26 and recentState Department and EU terrorism reports suggestthat the level of terrorism in Bosnia is no greater thanelsewhere in Europe. 27

On the other hand, a leading Bosnian law enforce-ment of cial said that the only reason there have notbeen more terrorist attacks was that Weve had moreluck than brains. 28 The actual number of individualsinvolved is not trivial; Almir Duvo, the director ofthe Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH (OSA),estimated in July 2010 that there were 3,000 potentialterrorists in Bosnia, out of a population of just underfour million people. 29

Two conclusions can be drawn from these assess-ments. First, the level of terrorist activity in Bosniadoes appear comparable to levels elsewhere in Eu-ropealthough, if the Bosnian of cial cited above isright, any optimism should be guarded at best. Sec-ond, just because the terrorist threat is not unusualdoes not mean it is not necessarily unimportant. Com-parisons with Western Europe can be misleading, asterrorism is much more dangerous to a fragile statethan to a robust democracy.


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Wahhabis.

One mujahideen leader predicted in 1996 that[f]oreign ghters will not be a problem for Bosnia.They will move on. But we planted a seed here andyou will have more and more Bosnian Muslims prac-ticing traditional Islam. 30 The most obvious sign ofthis trend are the so-called Wahhabis, adherents of thefundamentalist Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia.

Estimates of the numbers of Wahhabis or membersof similar sects vary widely. Observers were surprisedby the crowd of more than 3,000 people, half of themBosnians, who attended the funeral of a Wahhabistleader in 2007, 31 as well as by a 2013 conference in Tu-zla that drew 500 participants, mostly young men. 32 Given that an estimated 4,000 people gather each Fri-day to hear radical sermons preached at the Saudi-

backed King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo,33

the numberof Wahhabis could be quite high. But the most likelygure is that given by Federation police (not the police

of the Serb Republic), who estimated in 2009 that therewere up to 5,000 practicing Bosnian Wahhabis. 34

Unsurprisingly, the Wahhabis recruit followersfrom the least privileged classes:

Bosnian Wahhabis largely target youth with few eco-nomic opportunities and [the] downtrodden, bothfrom rural areas. They keenly take advantage of pov-erty, lack of education and poor social services, offer-ing young people and refugees a variety of opportu-nities, including jobs, income and fellowship. Therehave been cases in which new members are paid sev-eral hundred euros per month for their loyalty. There

is also evidence that members are paid for convinc-ing their wives to wear the hijab in public, amongother things. 35


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The Saudi role in this process is extensive. TheSaudis nanced an extensive mosque-building pro-gram after the war, of which the $30-million KingFahd Mosque 36 is only the most visible and in uential,and built a parallel religious educational structure tothat offered by the of cial Islamic Community.37 TheSaudis are also believed to fund various Wahhabigroups, to educate young Bosnians in Saudi Arabia,and to send operatives to Bosnia who typically marryBosnian women and blend into local society. 38

As the Wahhabi movement has gained momen-tum, militants have engaged in violent clashes withtraditional Bosniaks and sought to impose their stan-dards of behavior on the public. Young and charismat-ic Wahhabi preachers travel through Western Europeand the Balkans, lecturing and giving sermons; theymaintain popular websites full of jihadist propaganda

and incitement to terror. One prominent preacher isknown for a pro- jihadist, anti-American song that heperforms at weddings and other social events:

American and other adversaries should knowThat now the MuslimsAre one like the TalibanListen, brothers,Believers of the worldWith dynamite on their chestLead the path to dzennet (heaven). 39

Some Bosniaks have always been anti-American,but the vast majority were openly grateful to the Unit-ed States for intervening to stop the war and then tokeep the peace. No recent polls appear to have mea-

sured how these views may have changed. It is, how-ever, unrealistic to expect young people born during


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or after the war to share that sense of gratitude, or in-deed, to expect older people to continue to feel grati-

tude as the political system imposed at Dayton fails todeliver results.While Wahhabi violence and proselytization are

quite visible, these Islamists are even better knownfor their separatist enclaves, which function as no-go-zones. The inhabitants of these enclaves rejectthe authority of the Bosnian government and insteadimpose a strict interpretation of sharia. The rst suchenclave was in the village of Bocinja Donja, formerly aBosnian Serb village, where the Bosniak governmentsettled former mujahideen after the war.

The mujahideen married Bosnian women and soacquired Bosnian citizenship. The village providedthem a safe haven in which to maintain their terror-ist contacts under the guise of simple farmers. In the

1990s, the hostility of the inhabitants of Bocinja Donjato outsiders, including SFOR, was palpable, under-mining their claims of innocence. Eventually the en-clave was closed down, and the village returned toits original owners. Now the best-known enclave is inGornja Maoa, a remote village where native Bosniansreside along with foreign-born former mujahideen.

While the Bosnian Serbs continue to insist thatthese enclaves pose a signi cant security risk, Bos-niak policy has been bifurcated. One the one hand,there has been pressure to isolate and marginalizethe Wahhabis, in the hope of making any problemsgo away. Analyst Stephen Schwartz speculates thatBosniak political leaders have pursued a strategyof trying to con ne the Wahhabi agitators to remotelocations, rather than settling the problem by conse-quential legal proceedings. 40 Not all Bosniak of cialsare willing to settle for this approach, however. The


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authorities have made numerous arrests, includinga massive 2010 raid on Gornja Maoa and the arrestsof two of the enclaves leaders following the 2011 at-tack on the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo. Up to now,though, they have failed to obtain an indictment, letalone a conviction. As a result, a cloud of mysteryis likely to cloak Gornja Maoa and other similarenclaves for some time to come, making it dif cultto determine the degree of danger they pose to Bos-nias internal security or their potential links to inter-national terrorism.

Some observers caution that many Wahhabis arepeaceful and should not be classi ed as terrorists, forfear of driving them into the arms of groups espous-ing violence. 41 The Islamic Community, the of cialMuslim religious organization in Bosnia, has refusedto condemn the Wahhabis and attacks those who

criticize them. But the Bosniak public remains unper-suaded; when last asked, 71 percent rejected Wah-habism, suggesting that this form of Islam remains forthem both distinct from traditional Bosnian Islam andunwelcome. 42

The Wahhabis do not yet appear to have gainedcontrol of any signi cant governmental or of cial re-ligious of ces. Nor, although actual numbers are hardto estimate, have they created no-go zones in urbanareas, as has happened in Western Europe. This lackof progress is most likely due to visceral oppositionfrom local Bosniaks. Attempts to take over mosqueshave ended in violence; in one instance, a residentcommented: They should shave their beards and usedeodorant instead of coming here like dogs. For me,

they are wolf-dogs, they will attack our children. Ihave female children and do not dare to send them to[the religious school] at all. 43 These locals contemptof the Wahhabis is unmistakable.


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Yet, current descriptions of the Federation sug-gest it is much more radicalized than was the case in

the late-1990s. Given that the trend is pointing in thewrong direction, it would be foolish to regard Wah-habism as purely marginal, especially when an expertlike Sarajevo professor Reid Ha zovi describes it asa potentially deadly virus for Bosnian Muslims. 44 When times are hard and the future is bleak, suchmovements can gain momentum quickly.

ISLAMIST TIES OF SENIOR BOSNIAK LEADERS

Islamists are active not only in Bosnia, but through-out Western Europe and the United States. One fac-tor that makes them a greater danger in Bosnia thanelsewhere, though, is their close connection to Bosniakleaders, in particularly three men (Bakir Izetbegovi,

Haris Silajdi, and Alija Izetbegovi). These menhave occupied the Bosniak chair of the central statesrotating presidency since its establishment. The dan-ger of the Islamists in Bosnia has also been increasedby their closeness to Mustafa Ceri, the mufti whountil recently headed Bosnias of cial Islamic Com-munity.

Those men, along with their associates and subor-dinates, have pursued policies inimical to the viewsand goals of moderate Muslims, and those of BosnianSerbs and Croats. They have supported Islamist ter-rorism and Wahhabism, encouraged alienation be-tween Bosniaks and other Bosnians, and sought closerties with Islamist countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Bakir Izetbegovi.

The most prominent Bosniak of cial today is BakirIzetbegovi, the current Bosniak member of the Presi-


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dency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 45 Bakir served dur-ing the war as personal assistant and advisor to his

father, Alija Izetbegovi, who was then President ofBosnia. After the war, from 1999 to 2003, Bakir was amember of the managing board of the humanitarianIslamic charity, Merhamet. Like other Islamic chari-ties, Merhamet used its humanitarian work as a coverduring the war to deliver weapons to Bosnia. 46

It is unlikely that Izetbegovi, as a personal as-sistant to the President, would have been unaware ofthese activities. Nor could he have been unaware ofthe initiative to bring mujahideen into Bosnia. In fact,Devad Galijaevi, a former Party of Democratic Ac-tion (SDA) of cial, in 2008, accused Izetbegovi of be-ing one of the chief protectors of the mujahideen whoremained in Bosnia after the war. 47

Bakir, who for years directed the Construction Bu-

reau of Sarajevo Canton, was involved in the construc-tion of the King Fahd Mosque and reportedly arrangedfor the land on which the complex was built, previous-ly owned by Serbs, to be donated to the Saudis. 48 Thismosque, the largest house of worship for Muslims inthe Balkans, is also known for its key role as the centerof Wahhabi in uence and power in Bosnia.49 As such,it represents the antithesis of the moderate Islam tra-ditionally practiced in Bosnia. Izetbegovis connec-tion to the mosque suggests that he does not share theantipathy of many of his fellow Bosniaks for the typeof Islam that it propagates.

Another indication of Bakirs ideological orienta-tion comes from his involvement in a secular initia-tive to advance the observance of sharia, a key Islamist

goal and one that is vehemently opposed by moder-ate Bosniaks. He was responsible for coordinating theconstruction of the Bosna Bank International (BBI)


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Center in Sarajevo, described as the only commercialshopping mall in Bosnia and Herzegovina that has

prohibited sales of pork and alcohol.50

The BBI Centerwas built by the BBI, the only bank in Bosnia to offersharia-compliant nance.51 Among the principal goalsof sharia-compliant nance is enhancing the appeal ofan Islamic political order. Another is to generate fundsthat can be used to advance Islamist goals. 52

Finally, Bakir Izetbegovi is known for his sym-pathies toward Iran. During his tenure in the BiHpresidency, bilateral ties between Bosnia and Iranhave expanded, including in trade and investment. 53 Izetbegovi called for even closer Iranian-Bosnian tiesduring a meeting with then Iranian president Mah-moud Ahmadinejad in February 2013 in Cairo, Egypt,on the margins of an Organization of Islamic Coopera-tion (OIC) meeting. 54 While a small country like Bosnia

naturally seeks to maintain good ties with powerfulcountries, these initiatives stand out, coming as theydid at a time when the UN, the United States, and theEU have put sanctions in place to isolate the regimein Tehran.

Some of those connections are particularly contro-versial. The Sarajevo weekly Slobodna Bosna reportedthat, according to the Iranian opposition, the IranianIbn Sina Institute in Sarajevo, described as a scienti cresearch institute, is, in fact, the IRGCs headquartersin the Balkans. The magazine also questioned thebona des of some 200 Iranian businessmen whoentered Bosnia in the rst half of 2012, noting that theyappeared to lack business contacts. 55

The controversy only grows when of cial Iraniansare alleged to have connections to Islamist terrorism.In the spring of 2013, Bakir became embroiled in a dis-pute with Bosniak political rival Fahrudin Radoni,


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a former businessman who is currently the state-levelminister of security. 56 Bakir reportedly intervened

to oppose expelling two Iranian diplomats whomRadoni had accused of improper activities and de-clared personae non grata .57 The diplomats eventuallyleft, and a third was expelled in June 2013. 58 Two ofthe three had reportedly made contact with the Wah-habist leader in Gornja Maoa.59 While no one has al-leged any direct contact between Izetbegovi and theIranian diplomats, or between him and the enclave ofGornja Maoa, the reports do raise questions aboutwhether Bosnias most senior Bosniak politician isopening the door to Iranian intelligence services andterrorist operatives.

Haris Silajdzi.

Izetbegovis predecessor in the tri-presidency wasHaris Silajdzi. A prominent SDA politician, Silajdziwas a former close associate of Alija Izetbegovi anda senior member of his wartime cabinet, serving rstas foreign minister and then as prime minister. Dur-ing that time, he also oversaw directly the effort tobring mujahideen to Bosnia. 60 Silajdzi was an effectivespokesman for the Bosniak cause, making the casethat his side was Western, secular, and democratic.However, his true convictions apparently lay with themujahideen: In July 1995, he declared an Islamic holywar on Sarajevo TV and invited all Islamic states to

ght on the side of Bosnias Muslims.61 After the war, Silajdzis political career took sev-

eral twists and turns. He continued to hold high gov-

ernment positions, but in 1997, he left the SDA to formthe Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He resigned his


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government and party positions abruptly on Septem-ber 21, 2001, reportedly because of his radical connec-

tions,62

but remerged 5 years later to win the electionto the tri-presidency.In 2006, Silajdzi ran on a platform to abolish

the Federation and the Serb Republic entities andstrengthen the central Bosnian statean unacceptableproposal for any of cial of the Serb Republic. In of-

ce, he engaged in a very public and polarizing dis-pute with Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik, therebycontributing to the radicalization of Bosnian society.In the opinion of analyst Steven Oluic, Silajdzi tookBosnian society and politics back to the painful daysof 1995. It is also noteworthy that the Iranian gov-ernment not only expressed pleasure at his electionbut pledged him its continuing support. 63 In 2008,Silajdzi was among those identi ed by Galijaevi asone of the chief Bosnian protectors of the mujahideen since the war .64 Looking at all these factors, there canbe little doubt of Silajdis Islamist convictions, de-spite his ability to appeal to Western audiences as asecularist democrat supposedly committed to multi-nationalism. 65

Alija Izetbegovi.

Neither of those men, however, has had as last-ing an impact on Bosnian politics and society as AlijaIzetbegovi, Bakirs father. Izetbegovi, the man af-fectionately called Dedo (Grandpa) by many Bos-niaks, 66 was Bosnias president during the war andthen the rst Bosniak member of the tri-presidency.Throughout, he became the embodiment and sym-bol of embattled Muslims. Many U.S. policymakersconsidered him a leading proponent of multiethnic


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democracy and tolerance. Yet, Izetbegovi left nu-merous signs pointing to his Islamist ideology. Even

more importantly, he succeeded in forming an Is-lamist cadre of insiders, including Haris Silajdzi andBakir Izetbegovi, which remains highly in uentialtoday and has done much to shape Bosnias post-warhistory.

Izetbegovis Islamist ideology is laid out in his fa-mous political manifesto, The Islamic Declaration,67 forwhich, during the 1980s, he was sentenced to 5 yearsin prison. 68 Some excerpts, shown in Box 2, providedisturbing insights into his thinking.

Box 2

The Islamic Declaration on Islamic Governmentand Society.

. . . the Islamic order posits two fundamen-tal assumptions: an Islamic society andIslamic governance. . . . An Islamic societywithout an Islamic authority is incompleteand without power; Islamic governancewithout an Islamic society is either utopiaor violence (p. 26).

There can be neither peace nor coexistencebetween the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions(p. 30).

. . . the Islamic movement should and canstart to take over power as soon as it ismorally and numerically strong enough

to be able to overturn not only the existingnon-Islamic government, but also to buildup a new Islamic one. . . . (p. 56).


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Simply put, Muslims living in a non-Muslim majority country should play by the rules of that coun-

tryuntil they are strong enough to overthrow thesystem and install an Islamic government. Nothingin the Declaration suggested any compromise towardthis goal.

Most Westerners ignored the Declaration or dis-missed its contents on the assumption that it had beenattacked by the Yugoslav government simply becauseit was an anti-communist tract. But the Declaration wasmuch more than thatand it was politically relevantafter the fall of Yugoslavia. It was published in 1990(before that, it was distributed secretly only) 69 andlater distributed to the troops of the Bosniak army. 70 Since then, the Declaration has gured prominentlyin Bosniak-Serb political disputes. Bosnian Serb lead-ers Radovan Karadzi and Milorad Dodik have both

testi ed before the International Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, TheCzech Republic, that Izetbegovi intended to build anIslamic state in Bosnia based on the concepts set out inthe Declaration .71

Accusations of Izetbegovis continued commit-ment to the ideology of the Declaration were consistentwith his marked preference for the Islamist regime inIran. That preference rst surfaced in 1983, when hewas accused of seeking Iranian support for his cause. 72 Izetbegovi visited Iran in May 1991 as president ofBosnia and obtained assurances of Iranian support ayear prior to the outbreak of hostilities. 73 His heavy re-liance on Iran during the war presumably reinforcedhis view of the Iranian Islamist regime as a genuine

ally. This positive view of Iran, as shown previously,appears to be shared by his son, Bakir.


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Ideology is, of course, of little impact without anorganization to implement it. Izetbegovi created suchan organization in the late-1980s: the SDA. Althoughthe SDA gave the impression of being a moderateMuslim party in order to win Bosniak votes and gar-ner Western sympathy, its inner core was comprisedof former Young Muslims.74 The Young Muslims wasthe conspiratorial group, patterned after the MuslimBrotherhood, which Izetbegovi had joined in 1941.It based its operations and program on Islamism, 75 and one of its main principles was the uni cationof the Muslim world through the creation of a largeMuslim state. 76

Although the Yugoslav government did its bestto stamp out the group, it survived underground fordecades. Some of its leading members (Hasan engi,Omer Behmen, Edhem Biaki, Huso Zivalj, and

Ismet Kasumagic), imprisoned with Izetbegovi in1983, were assigned the most sensitive and importanttasks during the war. Hasan engi, for example, saton the board of directors of the Third World ReliefAgency (TWRA). TWRA was the principal conduitfor sending money (much of it from Iran) and armsto Bosnia. 77 Omer Behmen handled SDA personnelmatters 78 before working the other end of the pipe-line as ambassador to Iran. Muhammed Sacirbey,Izetbegovis wartime ambassador to the UN, was theson of Nedib aeirbegovi who had been imprisonedwith Izetbegovi after World War II.79 Nedib was ap-pointed ambassador-at-large to Islamic countries. 80

Several Young Muslims continued their politicalcareers in the post-war period: Zivalj became Bosnias

ambassador to the UN, and Biaki became primeminister of the Federation. After the war, engiserved as Federation deputy defense minister until the


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United States forced his dismissal. 81 Behmen focusedon ideology, working actively with Islamist youth or-

ganizations and educational institutions on a so-calledthird offensive of the Young Muslims movement.82 The fortunes of most of these individuals have

attracted little attention from U.S. policymakers, butthe same cannot be said for the activity that rst drewWestern attention to Izetbegovis Islamist connec-tions: his decision to bring mujahideen to Bosnia. Hispersonal connections reached the very top of al-Qae-da: during the war Osama Bin Laden, who had beenissued a Bosnian passport, reportedly met Izetbegoviin his Sarajevo of ce.83

After the war, all foreign ghters were required toleave Bosnia under the terms of the Dayton Peace Ac-cords. Despite the best efforts of IFOR and the U.S.Government, many still remained in the country

and Izetbegovi protected them. He openly supportedsupposedly disbanded mujahideen military units, 84 while numerous murders and other acts of violence,particularly against Bosnian Croats living in the Fed-eration, were carried out by those same mujahideen and their Bosnian accomplices. 85

These were not just random acts of violence in alawless post-war period. Rather, the SDA was usingthe mujahideen as powerful leverage in a struggleto maintain an ethnic majority in previously mixedregions of Central Bosnia and Sarajevo. . . . 86 In theprocess, Bosnia itself became the victim: IndependentBosniak journalist Senad Avdi reportedly accusedthe party of turning the country into a Europeandump for all kinds of scum, murderers, terrorists,

and adventurers of all sorts who have earned thestatus of equal citizens of this country with selamand tekbir. 87


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identi ed the trials take years.92 The SDA top leader-ship may be innocent of the charges leveled against it,

but it has made no effort to clear the air.Much about Izetbegovis wartime activities mighthave become known had he lived longer: At the timeof his death in 2003, the ICTY was investigating himfor alleged war crimes. However, after he died, theICTY closed its investigation, thus shutting off a majoravenue of inquiry that might have illuminated someof these murky postwar terrorist activities.

Mustafa Ceri.

Much of the support for Bosniak nationalist par-ties and policies comes from former Grand Mufti ofSarajevo Mustafa Ceri. For years, he led the IslamicCommunity, the of cial Muslim organization in Bos-

nia. Despite his position in a religious hierarchy, Cerihas been and is playing an increasingly importantpolitical role among Bosniaks, that often surpassesthat of any politician, according to a Bosnian humanrights advocate. 93 Like Silajdzi, Ceri set himself upin opposition to Dodik, continuing wartime rhetoricby portraying Bosniaks as victims in mortal dangerfrom the Serbs.

Feted in Western Europe as a moderate Muslim,Ceri enjoys a different reputation at home, where heis known as homo duplex, the man with two faces.This nickname arises from numerous indications thathe is anything but moderatea judgment based onhis ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, his view regard-ing the imposition of sharia, and his positions on Wah-

habism. These range from refusing to condemn it tohurling accusations of Islamophobia at anyone whocriticizes it.


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Ceris current ties to the Muslim Brotherhoodarise from his membership in two pan-European or-

ganizations: the European Council for Research andFatwa, a Brotherhood-linked group chaired by SheikhYousef al-Qaradawi, the spiritual leader of the Broth-erhood, and the UK-based Radical Middle Way,which includes a wide range of scholars associatedwith the global Muslim Brotherhood. 94

On several occasions, Ceri has publicly advocatedpositions consistent with Brotherhood ideology. Forexample, in 2006, he issued the document, A Decla-ration of European Muslims, in which he declaredEuropean Muslims (including Bosniaks) fully com-mitted to the values of democracy and human rightsbut called, among other things, for the partial imple-mentation of sharia.95 Several years later he argued, ina speech in Berlin, Germany, that implementing sharia

would not be contrary to Bosnias constitutiona po-sition that would probably surprise most Bosniaks. 96 Over the years, Ceri has refused to condemn

Wahhabism. His position stands in stark contrast tothat of representatives and leaders of the Islamic Com-munity in Montenegro, who did not hesitate to con-demn Wahhabist activities. 97 Ceri has implied thathis stance simply re ects his relative weakness. TheKing Fahd Mosque and many other religious institu-tions funded by the Saudis who spread Wahhabismare not under the control of the Islamic Community.When asked if Saudi funding was deleterious, Cerireplied that Bosnia was in no position to turn downmoney from Saudi Arabia, which, after all, was an allyof the West. 98

But Ceri goes far beyond what would be requiredif he were simply bowing to a stronger player. He at-tacks critics of Wahhabism for being Islamophobes(a well-known, if poorly-de ned, term coined by the


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Muslim Brotherhood), and has led the way in devel-oping the concept of good versus bad Bosniaks.

As the Embassy in Sarajevo reported in a 2009 clas-si ed cable released by Wikileaks:

Good Bosniaks, according to this sentiment, are thosewho espouse conservative political and religious ide-als. More moderate and secular ideals are, by impli-cation, held by bad Bosniaks. Statements from theIslamic Community, particularly its leader, [Grand

Mufti] Ceri, that label those who criticize IslamicCommunity as Islamophobic have sharpened thispolarization among Bosniaks. 99

Indeed, in 2010 and 2011, the Islamic Communityissued reports on Islamophobia, cataloguing all thestatements and actions that it believes express intoler-ance, hate, and hostility against Islam and Muslims.

The de nition deliberately obscures any differencesamong Muslims. 100In 2012, Ceri was replaced as Grand Mufti by

Hussein Effendi Kavazovi, the mufti of Tuzla who isconsidered close to Ceri.101 The well-known observergroup, International Crisis Group (ICG), recently sug-gested that [t]he Islamic communitys best contribu-tion would be to help craft a vision for Bosnia thatCroats and Serbs can share. 102 The Islamic Commu-nity, after years of Ceris leadership, has a long wayto go to address the Islamism in its midst. Until thathappens, the Community is unlikely to produce a uni-fying vision that all Bosnians can support.

In fact, the long-term impact of the Islamism ofthese men and their colleagues, subordinates, and

supporters will most likely be extremely detrimen-tal to the future of the country. Bosniak terror expertDevad Galijaevi describes the danger vividly:


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Active Islamism is pushing ones own nation in thewhirlpool of problems of other Islamic countries. It isgetting Bosnian Muslims interested in events in theArab world, in the Iranian revolution, in the IslamicRepublic of Pakistan. It is bringing Bosnia closer toPalestine. It is turning Muslims true historical broth-ers, Serbs and Croats, into eternal and irreconcilableenemies, and turning Arabs into the only and actualbrothers who look, behave, and talk differently andhave a completely different view of the family, thestate, and themselves. 103

The following section examines in more detail theway in which Islamism promotes alienation amongBosnian ethnic groups.

ISLAMISM AND INTER-ETHNIC TENSIONS

Analysts often blame the failure to build a Bosnianstate on the Serbs and Croats. Certainly, members ofboth ethnic groups have contributed to that failure,in part by their own actions and in part because ofthe external pull from a neighboring state. Croa-tia offers Bosnian Croats refuge in a country that isbecoming Western, joining NATO and the EU, andachieving prosperityunlike Bosniaand some Cro-ats have already left. Bosnian Serbs have not beenso lucky: Serbia and the vision of Greater Serbia arelanguishing in the political, economic, and socialdoldrums. Yet, Serbia was once an economic power-house, and even today Bosnian Serbs dream aboutreuniting the Serb Republic with it, regardless of anypractical dif culties.

It is wrong, however, to disregard the push fac-tors (aside from the poor economy) that also exert apowerful in uence on Bosnian Serbs and Croats. One


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very important factor is embedded in Balkan historyduring the period when the Ottoman Empire enforced

sharia. Sharia covers all aspects of life, not just religiousdoctrine and practice, and applies to non-Muslims aswell as to Muslims. It grants Islam a privileged, pro-tected status, and con icts directly with Western con-cepts such as freedom of speech and religion and uni-versal human rights. There is no equality before thelaw; for example, men have more rights than women,and Muslims have more rights than non-Muslims.Non-Muslims are not allowed to rule over Muslims. 104

Under the Ottomans, in accordance with sharia,non-Muslims were tolerated; that is, they were al-lowed to maintain their religious communities andlaws but enjoyed fewer rights than Muslims in a sys-tem now referred to as dhimmitude. The presence ofnon-Muslims was tolerated as long as they played by

the rules. Failure to do so meant that they were no lon-ger protected and could be killed. 105 Bosnian Serbs and Croats have not forgotten this

system of dhimmitude . When Bosniak politicians talkabout tolerance, Serbs and Croats suspect that they re-ally mean a political system in which Muslims domi-nate. Similarly, Serbs and Croats dismiss Bosniakleaders af rmations of their commitment to multi-ethnicity, since under sharia, multiethnic meansthat many different ethnicities co-exist peacefullybut only under Muslim domination and according tostrict rules.

These tensions would exist to some degree, regard-less of which political ideology was dominant amongBosniaks. As historian Aleksa Djilas described the

problem in 1992:


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Muslims imagined Bosnia as an independent statein which they would predominate. Although it wasonly Muslim extremists who thought non-Muslimsshould be expelled from Bosnia, most Muslim lead-ers believed only a Muslim should be allowed fullcitizenship. Religious Muslims based their demandfor supremacy on the traditional belief that the ruleof non-Muslims over Muslims was blasphemous. Butmost Muslims were typical nationalists. They wantedmore for their group. . . . 106

Islamists do, in fact, hold more extreme viewsthan do traditional Muslims regarding the treatmentof non-Muslims. The results are obvious in numerouscountries today where the Muslim Brotherhood, alongwith other Islamist groups, has contributed greatly tothe destruction of property, torture, murder, and massmigration of non-Muslims from lands where they had

lived for over 1,400 years.In his Islamic Declaration,107 Alija Izetbegovi, tooka less extreme position regarding non-Muslims, butone that nevertheless provides no comfort to BosnianSerbs and Croats. The Declarations message is simple:Muslims should play by the democratic rules untilthey are strong enough to impose an Islamic state.Once there is an Islamic state, non-Muslims may re-main, but only in a subordinate status. If Christiansabandoned their religious organization, Izetbegoviwas prepared to offer them understanding and coop-eration. (See Box 3.)


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Box 3

The Islamic Declaration

on Livingwith Non-Muslims.

Muslims in a non-Islamic state: Muslim minorities within a non-Islamic

community, provided they are guaranteedfreedom to practice their religion, to liveand develop normally, are loyal and mustful ll all their commitments to that com-munity, except those which harm Islamand Muslims (p. 50).

The position of Muslim minorities in non-Islamic communities will always in realitydepend on the strength of the internationalIslamic community and the esteem in

which it is held (p. 50).Non-Muslim minorities in an Islamic state: The non-Muslim minorities within an

Islamic state, provided they are loyal, enjoy religious freedom and all protection(p. 50).

[W]e differentiate between Christs teach-ing and the church. The former we regardas the pronunciation of God, deformed onsome points, and the latter as an organiza-tion, which . . . has become not only non-Islamic, but anti-Christian. (p. 68)

If Christians so wish, the future may offeran example of understanding and coop-

eration between two great religions for thewell-being of people and mankind (p. 68).


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The in uence that Islamists hold in Bosnia is alsokey with regard to their publicly stated goal of estab-

lishing a global Caliphate. The Caliphate last existedunder the Ottoman Empire. While talking about it maybaf e or bemuse Westerners, the reference is all tooclear to inhabitants of the Balkans. This Islamist goalis dangerous because it also appeals to non-IslamistMuslims and because it is shared by two increasinglyimportant foreign players: Turkey and the OIC.

The importance of Bosnia to Turkey has been abun-dantly clear ever since Turkey joined the UN wartimepeacekeeping mission there in the 1990s. The Turkishmilitary remained in its headquarters in Zenica afterthe cessation of hostilities and joined the IFOR/SFORmission. The military transitioned seamlessly to theEUFOR Althea follow-on mission, where Turkey isnow the second largest troop-contributing nation. 108

In recent years, Turkey has used its relative eco-nomic strength to build in uence in the Balkans. Itstrade with those countries has increased, as has itsinvestment in Bosnia. On the cultural side, Turkishcompanies have built the largest university campusin the Balkans in Ilida, a suburb of Sarajevo.109 Thesedevelopments are all the more visible, given the ab-sence of increased investment from Europe or theUnited States. Turkish diplomats have also been veryactive in seeking to promote reconciliation among theBalkan countries.

Regional conciliation and economic developmentare laudable goals, and even cultural ties with Turkeyare welcomed by many ethnic groups. 110 The nostalgiaof Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan and

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolu for the OttomanEmpire, however, is more likely to raise the hacklesof non-Muslims. 111 A good example of this is the con-


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troversy provoked by remarks that Davutolu madeat a 2009 Sarajevo conference on Ottoman Heritage

and Muslim Communities in the Balkans Today. Hisspeech was ambiguous: He proclaimed that [n]ow isthe time for reuni cation in the form of reestablish-ing ownership in the region, through reestablishingmulticultural coexistence, and through establishing anew economic zone. 112 He did not specify what hemeant by reuni cation, nor who the new ownerwould be, but he clearly meant Turkey to dominate.For those Bosnians who put Davutolus remarks ina historical context, his call for multicultural coexis-tence was likely to be interpreted as a reference to theOttoman system of dhimmitude. Nor was it much morehelpful to place the remarks in a modern context, giv-en that Christians feel increasingly endangered in aneven-more Islamist Turkey. 113

Turkish neo-Ottomanism in itself is unlikely tobecome a credible threat to Bosnians, since the Ameri-can Embassy in Ankara described Turkey as havingRolls Royce ambitions, but Rover resources. 114 Butthe topic itself remains sensitive. Were the Bosniakleadership genuinely committed to reconciling Bos-nias ethnic groups, it would presumably nd somediplomatic way to cushion or rebut such statements.

In addition to its bilateral ties to Turkey, Saudi Ara-bia, and Iran, Bosnia has observer status at the OIC,the international organization representing 56 Muslimcountries and the Palestinian Authority. Saudi Arabiaprovides the most funding for the OIC; Iran, Pakistan,Malaysia, Indonesia, and Turkey are other leadingmembers. While not an Islamist organization, the OIC

is dedicated to advancing Islam throughout the worldand to supporting Muslim minorities in non-Islamiccountries. It shares the vision of a global Caliphatethat implements sharia and, indeed, claims to be its


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present embodiment. 115 From time to time, OIC mem-bers may be at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood,

but both organizations nevertheless cooperate to pro-mote mutual objectives.During an April 2013 visit to Sarajevo, OIC Sec-

retary General Ekmeleddin hsanolu urged Bosniato upgrade to full membership. Bakir Izetbegovisuggested that full membership would be useful toBosnia by giving it access to OIC development fund-ing. 116 Were this to occur, Bosnia would presumablyhave to adopt any existing OIC agreements or conven-tions, including the 1990 Cairo Declaration on HumanRights. 117 The Cairo Declaration rules out any rightsincompatible with the Koran. That principle negatesmuch of Western human rights, such as equality forreligious minorities and freedom of speech, includingthe right to criticize Islam.

The OIC reinforces the tenets of the Cairo Declara-tion by means of annual reports on Islamophobia inWestern countries, similar to the reports on Bosniaprepared by the Islamic Community. Bosnian OICmembership would probably give added impetus tothis exercise, making it ever more dif cult to criticizeIslamist policies or groups. The OIC could be expectedto show an active interest in Bosnian internal devel-opments, as it recently resuscitated its Bosnia ContactGroup from the early-1990s. 118 There is little chancethat the OIC would remain neutral regarding disputesbetween Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs and Croats.

Given all these factors, Bakir Izetbegovis com-ments in favor of full OIC membership were hardlydesigned to improve inter-ethnic relations. Bos-

nian Serbs and Croats may exaggerate the threat ofIslamism or potential Islamic dominance, but theBosniak leadership certainly provides them withplenty of ammunition.


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few think that the ethnically integrated commandstructure is likely to do anything rash. Rather, [t]he

general fear is not that the AFBiH will generate insta-bility, but rather that it could fall victim to deepeningpolitical instability. 121

During and after the war, the separate secret policestructures of the three ethnic groups were responsiblefor much mayhem and havoc. Today, they have, atleast formally, been dismantled and their functionstaken over since 2004 by the OSA. The OSA is chargedwith intelligence gathering to protect the security, ter-ritorial integrity, and constitutional order of Bosnia. 122

OSA has been praised for its professional conductand political independence. 123 Unfortunately, it mustshare its responsibility for pursuing organized crimewith the regular police forces and the judiciary, whoremain more vulnerable to political pressure and cor-

ruption.124

In the polarized atmosphere of recent years,there is little chance this will change. OSA must alsoshare its duty to combat terrorism with many otheragencies. While Bosnia has made overall progress inthis area, occasional lapses such as the mysterious dis-appearance from prison of the well-known terroristKaray Kamel bin Ali, aka Abu Hamza, still occur. 125

If Bosnias neighbors and its armed forces appearunlikely to initiate ethnic violence, that does not meanthere is no threat. The authors of the 2011 securitystudy cited previously, worry about the possibility oflower-level violence, which will most likely coalescealong ethnic lines. People who could be drawn intosuch violence include members of various domesticgroups like football hooligans, special forces, and in-

telligence veterans now employed by private securitycompanies, or individuals in the police forces and judiciarytwo key institutions in which reforms to


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establish professionalism and impartiality remain in-complete. 126 Such violence, while short of war, could

nevertheless be devastating to regular, law-abidingBosnians.

THE U.S. POLICY ENVIRONMENT

For most Americans, the Balkans faded from viewa decade ago, and Bosnia is a long-forgotten, remoteplace of no particular interest. At the time, however,the Bill Clinton administration and much of the for-eign policy elite feted making and keeping the peacein Bosnia as a signi cant foreign policy achievement.The George H. W. Bush administration, initially skep-tical, maintained the SFOR mission and then termi-nated it successfully. This success contrasts with thedisillusionment over subsequent U.S. missions in Iraq

and Afghanistan.Indeed, there was reason to celebrate. Conditionsin Bosnia remained largely peaceful throughout the 9years of IFOR/SFOR deployment: SFOR retained itsauthority, kept casualties to a minimum, and helpedbring about signi cant defense and military reforms.When SFOR departed in 2004, the handover to EUFORwas not only orderly and peaceful, but welcomed bythe EU. It was not until 2 years after SFORs departurethat Bosnias political environment began to unravel.

Geopolitically, there is much to be said for seek-ing to ensure that Bosnia retains its territorial integrityand Western orientationthat, like most other Euro-pean countries, it joins both NATO and the EU. Yet,today, these desired outcomes are far from assured.

Calls for a third, Croat entity or other forms of Croatseparatism threaten the current fragile political bal-ance within the Federation. Russia has courted the


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Bosnian Serbs as they call for secession and/or a ref-erendum on NATO accession, 127 and the OIC has done

the same with the Bosniaks. Were Bosnia to split intothree parts, the Bosniak rump state would come understrong pressure to join the OIC and could, in so doing,set a decidedly non-Western course.

The Europeans are as mindful of these risks as arethe Americans, but the EUs recent experiences havemade them very pessimistic about what outsiders cando if Bosnians refuse to help themselves. In addition,the EU is preoccupied with urgent problems of itsown, such as the recurring euro crisis.

Nor is the EU equipped to resolve Bosnias inter-ethnic tensions. On such issues, fuzzy rhetoric prevails,not constructive policies or actions. For example, EUCouncil President Herman Van Rompuy, in responseto a complaint by Bosnian Croat Cardinal Vinko Puljithat Bosnian Muslim discrimination was driving outCatholics, countered that a European perspective(e.g., EU membership) is the only way to overcomethe crisis. 128 Exactly how this transformation wouldwork is unclear, especially since the European Com-mission, in its 2012 annual report on Bosnia, devotedone short paragraph out of 60 pages to the issue ofreligious discriminationand offered a high-level in-terfaith meeting as a remedy. 129

Pulji had linked the tension between Muslims andCatholics to the growth of Islamism, arguing that [t]ime is running out as there is a worrisome rise in radi-calism. Yet, the Bosnian government has done morethan its EU counterparts to combat Islamism. No EUgovernment has conducted a raid like the one in 2010

on the Wahhabist village of Gornja Maoa, despitethe growth in various West European cities of similar,sharia-implementing enclaves.


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Instead, EU governments categorize these areas asno-go zones and advise non-Muslims to avoid them.

They appear to have no plan for keeping sharia zonesfrom undermining the democratic rule of law in theircountries or from incubating or protecting terrorists.Expecting the EU to solve Bosnias current problemstied to Islamism is simply unrealistic.

MILITARY OPTIONS

Given the deteriorating conditions in Bosnia, somehave called for the United States to reassert leadershipthere before violence breaks out again. Two proposalsby experts on Bosnia are worth examining: rst, fora new military mission, and second, for acceleratedBosnian entry into NATO.

A New Military Mission.

Janusz Bugajski of the Center for Strategic and In-ternational Studies argues that ground forces must bedeployed to avert violence. Unlike IFOR/SFOR, Eu-ropean nations should assume primary responsibility,while the United States provides strong diplomatic,political, and logistical support. The exercise wouldbe backed by a rmer trans-Atlantic strategic com-mitment to bringing all countries in the region intoboth NATO and the EU. 130

Bugajskis proposal assumes that an internationalmilitary force would not only forestall violence, butreturn Bosnia to a path of reform that would allowit to join NATO and the EU. However, hopes that a

military mission could restart reforms appear to bebased on a misreading of the past. SFOR and NATOsfollow-on military headquarters in Sarajevo were, in-


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deed, instrumental in pushing for a uni ed Bosnianmilitary, one of the major post-Dayton achievements.

SFOR, however, had the authority to weigh in on de-fense sector reforms because military oversight fellwithin its purview under Annex 1A of the DaytonPeace Accords.

It is by no means clear why another military mis-sion would succeed in putting Bosnia back on trackto join either organization. The stumbling block toNATO accession is purely political: The Bosnian Serbsare not only refusing to transfer military facilities tothe central state but have called NATO membershipitself into question. It would be suicidal for an interna-tional military mission to inject itself into this dispute.

Nor could such a mission help promote EU ac-cession, a far-more-complex and demanding processthan NATO accessioncovering everything from ag-

riculture to nance to transportand in which a mili-tary mission would have neither authority nor exper-tise. A military mission by itself is highly unlikely tosomehow cajole or force Bosnians back onto the pathof reform and nation-building. Although a militarymission is unlikely to advance either NATO or EU ac-cession, it could still appear attractive if an outbreakof violence were to threaten the gains made in Bos-nia since Dayton. Again, the comparison with IFOR/SFOR could prove misleading on several counts.

First, IFOR/SFOR relied heavily on Europeantroop contributors. Yet, the European experiences inBosnia since SFORs departure in 2004 have not beenpositive. The EU-led EUFOR in Sarajevo has not faredwell; it began with 7,000 troops in December 2004 and

has since been reduced to a troop level of 600. 131 Thisreduction re ects its drop in effectiveness. Accordingto Azinovic et al, most observers believe that EUFORs


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visibility is its only contribution; that its ability to de-ter politically directed violence is very limited. 132

In part, this decline is the result of troop require-ments for other missions, as EU military forces arealso required for NATO, UN, and national militarymissions. But it has also occurred because the EU po-litical establishment has failed to support EUFOR. Forexample, in March 2011, the EU Political and SecurityCommittee (PSC), charged with political control andstrategic guidance for the mission, 133 simply did notrespond when told that EUFOR needed three timesthe existing force requirement. 134 EUFORs composi-tion re ects this lack of political commitment: WestEuropean countries have already pulled out, leavingAustria, Turkey, Hungary, and Bulgaria as the maintroop contributors.

Second, after several painful experiences, SFOR

determined that the best units for dealing with low-level violence were paramilitary police or gendarmes(which the United States does not have). These unitsspecialize in subduing civilian crowds like footballhooligans and are much better equipped than regu-lar soldiers to deal with rent-a-mobs that includewomen and children, or with other low-level threatsencountered in Bosnia. Yet, the EUFOR withdrawalsincluded European gendarmerie forces; today onlysome Turkish gendarmes remain in EUFOR. 135 Theiruse against Serb or Croat crowds is probably limited.

Third, the United States cannot expect to projectmuch in uence by means of over-the-horizon forces.NATO now provides EUFOR such support; yet thatalone is insuf cient to boost EUFOR capabilities. Giv-en European Bosnia fatigue, the inescapable conclu-sion is that any new mission would most likely haveto include U.S. ground troops, of which Army unitswould be the principal component.


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Were U.S. policymakers at some point to contem-plate a mission involving U.S. forces, they would need

to factor in the increased danger from Islamism, par-ticularly Islamist terrorism. For much of the 9 years ofIFOR/SFOR operations in Bosnia, the mujahideen wereforced into hiding. Izetbegovi protected them, but hisroom for maneuvering was limited both by U.S. policyand by widespread pro-Americanism and anti-Wah-habism among Bosniaks.

Nevertheless, IFOR/SFOR enjoyed only limitedsuccess in combating terrorismunsurprisingly, as itwas tasked primarily with maintaining a safe and se-cure environment. The list of high-pro le internation-al plots hatched during and after SFORs tenure (seeBox 1) shows the dif culty a military force with onlylimited counterterrorist capabilities has in deterringsuch activity, especially when local of cials shield theterrorists from outside pressure.Todays NATO presence is no better equipped todeal with a terrorist threat. Counterterrorism is noteven among the top three missions of the currentNATO headquarters in Sarajevo. 136 Nor would prepar-ing Bosnia for NATO membership help, as the acces-sion requirements revolve primarily around issues ofdemocratic legitimacy and defense-sector capabilities.

In addition, Islamist anti-Americanism has nowhad a chance to put down roots. How deep those rootsare is hard to determine, but the possibility of jihad-ist violence against U.S. or Western troops is probablygreater than it was previously. Some terrorists wouldlikely be homegrown and able to blend more easilyinto the native population. Any new mission would

have to factor this enhanced threat into its planning.Shortly before the Dayton Peace Accords and thestart of IFOR, General Charles G. Boyd, USAF (Ret.),


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former deputy commander of the European Com-mand, argued that the United States should give equal

weight to the fears and aspirations of Serbs as well asto those of Muslims and Croats. He further arguedthat military action alone would not bring about a last-ing peace. 137 Eighteen years later, his analysis remainsrelevant. Political disputes are at the base of Bosniasproblems, some of which re ect the destabilizing anddeleterious impact of Islamism. Without a policy thataddresses such problems, no military mission is likelyto succeed.

Accelerated NATO Membership.

Balkan expert Edward P. Joseph wants the UnitedStates to refocus on achieving Bosnian membership inNATO rather than the EU, as it is more obtainable. He

predicts that accelerated NATO membership wouldtransform the political climate in Bosnia, ending anydebate over changes to its territorial integrity. 138 In asimilar vein, military expert Steven Oluic writes thatBosnias ability to resist extremism and radical Islamdepends on continued Western engagement in theregion and the recent phenomena of moderate Bos-niaks challenging the radical Islamists and their ide-ologies. 139 Unfortunately, if the West pushes BosnianSerbs to transfer military facilities to the central statewithout acknowledging or countering their concernsabout Islamism or Muslim dominance, this move isunlikely to succeed and may only increase oppositionto NATO.

Bosnias eventual NATO membership would raise

other issues, not only because part of the Bosniak po-litical elite has ties to Islamist groups like the MuslimBrotherhood, but also because Bosnia is openly culti-


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vating closer ties with Iran at a time when the Westernworld is united in applying sanctions to that country.

It is also dif cult to predict how Bosnia and otherBalkan countries with large Muslim populations andgrowing Islamist in uence will react to future NATOcrisis operations in Muslim countries.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY

This monograph has laid out in detail argumentsagainst a new military mission in Bosnia. Neverthe-less, should U.S. policymakers consider the possibil-ity, the OSD and the JCS should point out the fact thatsuch a mission is unlikely to solve Bosnias politicalproblems or expedite NATO/EU membership butwould instead face serious dif culties. Their analysiscould draw on the extensive experience acquired by

the U.S. Army during 9 years of IFOR/SFOR deploy-ment in the country, as well as on the expertise gainedby participation in the NATO headquarters unitin Sarajevo.

The analysis could include: The reasons a military mission would be un-

likely to advance Bosnias accession to NATO.In particular, NATO could hurt the process byputting pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to givemore power to a central state they fear will bedominated by Muslims.

A reminder that IFOR/SFOR and NATO suc-cess in unifying the armies of the three ethnicgroups and in creating a central ministry ofdefense occurred in a sector where they had ex-

pertise and exercised authority. A new militarymission would be unlikely to repeat that suc-cess in nonmilitary sectors.


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The dif cult experience of our European Alliesunder the EUFOR and their decision to disen-

gage from Bosnia make it unlikely that theywould be willing to provide troops for a newmission.

The threat of low-level violence and the limitedability of U.S. military troops to combat it makeEuropean gendarme forces critical. Yet, thosetroops are unlikely to be available.

Security-related developments in the countryhave deteriorated since SFORs departure. An-ti-Americanism has grown as poorer Bosniansare radicalized by Wahhabis or other Islamistgroups, while homegrown Bosnian terroristsas well as former mujahideen may threaten U.S.personnel or facilities.

With regard to the expedited entry of Bosnia intoNATO, OSD and JCS should ensure that policymak-ers focus on broader political issues that to date havereceived insuf cient attention, particularly:

The danger of pushing for a central state thatBosnian Serbs will never accept if they see it asa vehicle to reduce them to the status of second-class citizens in a Muslim-dominated state.

The danger of sharing classi ed informationand decisionmaking with Bosnian politiciansand representatives with ties to the MuslimBrotherhood and Iran.

To prepare for such a debate, the U.S. Euro-pean Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Army Europe

(USAREUR) may wish to retrieve any available in-house expertise and institutional memory on Bosnia,particularly among those who have served or are serv-


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ing in those commands, as well as those who servedon OSDs Balkans Task Force.

Unfortunately, the U.S. military presence in Eu-rope is a shadow of what it was during the IFOR/SFOR mission, and many such individuals have dis-persed or been engaged for years in missions in Iraq,Afghanistan, or elsewhere. However, civilian analystsand political advisers, including individuals whoserved in the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo, mayhave valuable in-country experience to contribute. Inaddition, consulting present and past EUFOR partici-pants could prove useful.

ENDNOTES

1. Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia have joined NATO, while Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Monte-negro, and Serbia are members of the Euro-Atlantic PartnershipCouncil. Of these, only Serbia has not indicated a desire to joinNATO. Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia have joined theEU, and Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia have been accept-ed as candidates. Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina are potentialcandidates.

2. The United States remain[s] committed to the Daytonprinciples of one sovereign and functional Bosnia and Herzegovi-na comprised of two vibrant entities and Brcko District and basedon the equality of three constituent peoples and others. See sara-

jevo.usembassy.gov/speech_20130703.html .

3. Lana Pasic, Sources of Energy in Bosnia and Herzegov-ina, and Implications for Energy Security, Balkananalysis.com,May 9, 2011.

4. Boris Divjak and Michael Pugh, The Political Economy ofCorruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina, International Peacekeep-ing, Vol. 15, No. 3, June 2008, pp. 373-386.


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5. Improving Opportunities for Young People in Bosnia Her-zegovina, World Bank website, February 14, 2013.

6. Ante Markovics testimony, Novi List, October 24, 2003.

7. Ajdin Kamber, Segregated Bosnian Schools Reinforce Eth-nic Division, Institute for War & Peace Reporting , May 3, 2011.

8. Morton Abramowitz and James Hooper, The Death of theBosnian State, The National Interest , July 20, 2011. The next cen-sus was held in October 2013. The State Departments 2012 reporton religious freedom cites a higher number, 15 percent, based oninformation from Bosnian statistical authorities. See www.ecoi.net/ local_link/247588/357813_en.html .

9. Focus on Bosnia Herzegovina, Gallup Balkan Monitor ,GMB Focus on #04, November 2010.

10. Anes Alic and Vildana Skocajic, Understanding Bosnia,

Part One, ISN Security Watch , February 26, 2009.

11. Public Opinion Poll, Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH, Au-gust 2010, Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, p. 5.

12. Independent Evaluation of the National Youth Policy in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN, Sarajevo, April 29, 2005. 13. Index Mundi puts Bosnias estimated 2012 total fertility

rate at 1.24 children born to each woman of childbearing age; arate of 2.1 is required to maintain a population. See www.index-mundi.com/bosnia_and_herzegovina/demographics_profle.html .

14. See The Failed States Index 2013, available from ffp.statesin-

dex.org/rankings-2013-sortable .

15. NATOs Relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,NATO website, available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49127.htm .

16. Steven Woehrel, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Current Is-sues and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service, (CRS) ReportR40479, Washington, DC: CRS, January 24, 2013.


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17. Bosnia and Herzegovina 2012 Progress Report, Europe-an Commission SWD (2012) 335 Final, Brussels, Belgium, October10, 2012, pp. 4-5.

18. Bosnias Human Rights Record Hinders EU talks.EurAktiv.com, May 24, 2013.

19. See, for example, the European Commissions belabored

analysis: [a] shared vision among the political representatives onthe overall direction and future of the country and its institutionalset-up for the qualitative step forward on the countrys EU pathremain absent. Quoted in Commission Proposes CandidateStatue for Albania, EurAktiv.com, October 11, 2012.

20. Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threatof Radical Islam to Europe and the West,Westport, CT: Praeger Secu-rity International, 2007, p. 8.

21. Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qaidas Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network, Oxford, UK: Berg, 2004, pp. xii-xiii.

22. John R. Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qaida, and theRise of Global Jihad, St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007, pp. 295-309.

23. Kohlmann, Al-Qaidas Jihad in Europe, pp. 224-225.

24. Suzana Mijatovic, Tajna Diplomatska Ofanziva Iranaca uBiH, Slobodna Bosna, October 25, 2012.

25. Christopher Deliso, Israeli Security Concerns and theBalkans, Balkananalysis.com, March 31, 2013, p. 14.

26. Woehrel, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

27. Country Reports on Terrorism, Washington, DC: USDepartment of State, May 20, 2013; and EU Terrorism Situationand Trend Report, Te-Sat, European Police Agency, 2013.

28. Quoted in Vlado Azinovi, Kurt Bassuener, and BodoWeber, Assessing the Potential for Renewed Ethnic Violence inBosnia and Herzegovina: A Security Risk Analysis, Berlin, Ger-many: Atlantic Initiative and Democratization Policy Council,October 2011, p. 69.


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29. Azinovi, Bassuener, and Weber, A Security RiskAnalysis, pp. 65-66.

30. Quoted in Vildana Skocajic and Anes Alic, Understand-ing Bosnia, Part Four, ISN Security Watch , March 12, 2009.

31. Anes Alic, Wahhabism: from Vienna to Bosnia, ISN ,April 6, 2007.

32. Robert Coalson and Maja Nikolic, Radical Islamists Seekto Exploit Frustration in Bosnia, RFE/RL, March 1, 2013.

33. Walter Mayr, Islamists Gain Ground in Sarajevo, Is-lamist Watch , February 25, 2009.

34. Skocajic and Alic, Understanding Bosnia, Part Four.

35. Ibid. 36. Sylvia Poggioli, Radical Islam Uses Balkan Poor To Wield

In uence,NPR , October 25, 2010.

37. See Steven Oluic, Radical Islam on Europes FrontierBosnia & Herzegovina, National Security and the Future , Vol. 1-2,No. 9, 2008, p. 42; and Ioannis Michaletos, An Outlook of RadicalIslamism in Bosnia. Pakistan Christian Post , July 2, 2012.

38. Saudis Tied to Domineering Wahabi Presence in Bosnia,WorldTribune.com, March 27, 2007.

39. Nenad Pejic, Wahhabist Militancy in Bosnia Pro ts fromLocal and International Inaction, The Jamestown Foundation,Terrorism Monitor , Vol. 9, Issue 42, November 17, 2011

Documents

Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina