Islamic Republic of Afghanistan United Nations Development ... · Islamic Republic of Afghanistan United Nations Development Programme Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan (JHRA)

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Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

United Nations Development Programme

Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan (JHRA) Phase II

(1st January 2013 – December 31st 2015)

Project Document

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

BRIEF DESCRIPTION Following decades of unrest, civil war, and the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, the International Community (IC) has strongly supported and influenced peace processes, stability and development efforts in Afghanistan. From 2001 to 2011 international aid, security and military resources, totalled around $286.4 billion US dollars. Initially the focus of the political discourse and resources went to the maintenance of security by the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The realization that improvements in governance, socio-economic development and the rule of law are inextricably linked to a successful security transition featured more prominently in political discussions from the 2007 Rome conference onwards and led to a noticeable emphasis on the importance of rule of law since 2010. To date, political discussions focus on financial commitments and support towards Afghanistan’s sustainable economic development throughout the Transition period and the so called ‘Decade of Transformation’ (2015-2024). The re-establishment of Rule of Law is a prerequisite for Transition and beyond. The United Nations (UN) and in particular UNDP as the UN’s development organization have been and will be increasingly requested by the Government and the IC to support Afghanistan in the fulfilment of this task. In explicit recognition of these requests, UNDP has developed a broad strategic programme of assistance in the area of rule of law. The Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan (JHRA) Phase Ii project represents one component of this overall strategic support, and will contribute in particular to the Afghan National Priority Plans (NPP) on Justice (draft NPP 5) and Human Rights (NPP 6). It will seek to increase trust in Afghan justice institutions as the necessary foundation and prerequisite for the re-establishment of State legitimacy and the social contract between the Afghan population and the State. Without trust there is no State legitimacy and no social contract; without social contract it is impossible for a Government to guide a country through transition/transformation without conflict. The project assumes a comprehensive approach to trust building composed of increasing service delivery and access to justice and security, in particular for the vulnerable, combined the facilitation of the necessary political leadership; and balanced with structural and institutional mechanisms and safeguards to ensure sustainable transition and development. Similarly, support to justice sector service providers is balanced with support to ordinary people who would normally not be able to circumvent the current justice institutions and its mechanism to access justice, accountability, gain confidence in the formal justice institutions and gain trust in the State. The project is oriented around four key outputs as follows: Output 1: High-level coordination mechanisms for developing policy and legislation in accordance with international and national standards are established and functional in State justice institutions. Output 2: Mechanisms for providing quality access to justice services to vulnerable groups are established and functional. Output 3: Public participation processes and knowledge base for improving access to justice and human rights compliance established. Output 4: Project Support Unit:Internal oversight, monitoring and evaluation capacity in place.

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Project ID: 00068012

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................ 7

PART ONE ............................................................................................................................................ 9 1. RATIONALE FOR JHRA Phase II ............................................................................................. 9

1.1. Drivers of Conflict in Afghanistan as related to justice: Perceived in-justices ............ 10 1.2. Increasing TRUST: the first goal for the coming four years ............................................... 12

2. CONTEXTUAL REALITIES FRAMING UNDP SUPPORT .................................................. 13 2.1. Institutions, systems and providers delivering justice services ......................................... 13 2.2 Difficulties ............................................................................................................................................... 15 2.3 Opportunities and building blocks ................................................................................................. 18

3. NATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND UN MANDATES FRAMING UNDP SUPPORT ............ 23 PART TWO: ........................................................................................................................................ 24 5 LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM UNDP JHRA PHASE 1 ..... 24 6 METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................................... 27

6.1 Guiding principles ................................................................................................................................ 27 6.2 Geographical criteria .......................................................................................................................... 29 6.3 Intended beneficiaries ....................................................................................................................... 32

7 PROJECT STRATEGY ............................................................................................................. 32 7.1 Outputs .................................................................................................................................................... 32 5.1 Partnerships and coordination strategy ...................................................................................... 50 5.2 Sustainability and exit strategy ...................................................................................................... 52 5.3 Risk mitigation strategy ..................................................................................................................... 53 5.4 Monitoring and evaluation strategy .............................................................................................. 55

PART THREE: .................................................................................................................................... 62 6 PROJECT FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 62

6.1 Results and resources framework ................................................................................................ 62 INPUTS ................................................................................................................................................................... 62 6.2 Project management framework ................................................................................................... 76 6.3 Legal framework .................................................................................................................................. 80 Justice & Human Rights in Afghanistan (JHRA) Organogram ....................................................... 82

ANNEXURE I: CHRONOLOGY OF CONSULTATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS WHICH LED TO DEVELOPMENT OF PROJECT DOCUMENT .............................................................. 83 ANNEXURE II: NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: MANDATES, LAWS, POLICIES, STRATEGIES ..................................................................................................................................... 85 ANNEXURE III: SPECIFIC NPPS AS RELEVANT TO JUSTICE .............................................. 89 ANNEXURE IV: ROAD MAP FOR CHANGE IN JUSTICE SECTOR THROUGH JHRA PHASE II .............................................................................................................................................. 91 ANNEXURE V: General responsibilities of the Government, UNDP and the executing agency .................................................................................................................................................. 97

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGO Attorney General’s Office AIBA Afghanistan Independent Bar Association. AIHRC Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission AII Afghanistan Integrity Initiative ALCO Afghanistan Land Consulting Organization ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy ANP Afghan National Police AWP Annual Work Plan BCPR/UNDP Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery CDC Community Development Council CEDAW Conventions on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against

Women CMS Case Management/Tracking System CPANS Child Protection Networks CPAP Country Programme Action PlanCPD Central Prisons Department CRC Child Right Conventions DDA District Development Assemblies DIM Direct Implementation Modality DLC District Level Components EUPOL European Police Mission to Afghanistan EVAW Elimination of Violence Against Women FMG Feroogh Media Galaxy GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für International Zusammenarbei GOA Government of Afghanistan HRRAC Human Rights Research and Advocacy Council HRSU Human Rights Support Unit Huquq Ministry of Justice Law Department ICCPR International Convenient on Civil and Political Rights ICESCR International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ILO International Labor Organization INLTC Independent National Legal Training Center IPCB International Policy Coordination Board JI Justice Institutions LAD Legal Aid Department LAGF Legal Aid Grant FacilityLOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan MDG Millennium Development Goals MOE Ministry of Education MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOHE Ministry of Higher Education MOI Ministry of Interior Affairs MOJ Ministry of Justice MOLSAMD Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled MOUs Memorandum of Understanding MOWA Ministry of Women’s Affairs NDS National Directorate of Security NJP National Justice Programme NJSS National Justice Sector Strategy NPA National Police Academy

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NPP National Priority Programmes OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PLA Public Legal Awareness PPD Planning and Policy Department ROLIS Rule of Law Indicators Study SC Supreme Court Taqnin Legislative Department UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan UNCAT United Nations Convention Against Torture UNDAF United Nations Development Assistance Framework UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children Fund UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UPR Universal Periodic Review VCA Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment

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PART ONE

1. RATIONALE FOR JHRA Phase II Requests for United Nations and UNDP Rule of Law support in Afghanistan Following decades of unrest, civil war and the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, the International Community (IC) has strongly supported and influenced peace processes, stability and development efforts in Afghanistan. From 2001 to 2011 international aid, security and military resources, totalled around $ 286.4 billion US dollars or $ 9,426 US dollars per Afghan citizen1. Initially the focus of the political discourse and resources went to the maintenance of security by the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The realization that improvements in governance, rule of law and socio-economic development and the rule of law are inextricably linked to a successful security transition featured more prominently in political discussions2 from the 2007 Rome conference onwards and led to a noticeable emphasis on the importance of rule of law since 20103. To date, political discussions focus on financial commitments and support towards Afghanistan’s sustainable economic development throughout the Transition period and the so called ‘Decade of Transformation’ (2015-2024)4. The re-establishment of Rule of Law is a prerequisite for Transition and beyond. The United Nations (UN) has been and will be increasingly requested by both the Government and IC to support Afghanistan in the fulfilment of this task. This will hold in particular for United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), present in Afghanistan for over 50 years5 and mandated to support long-term sustainable development in Afghanistan throughout the transition period and beyond. UNDP approach towards conflict prevention and recovery UNDP’s mission is to help build nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain the kind of growth and development that improves the quality of life for everyone6. Countries such as Afghanistan that are affected by conflict and extreme criminal violence fall far behind in development: no low-income fragile or conflict affected country has yet achieved a single Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and poverty rates are more than 20 percentage points higher in fragile and conflict affected settings7. Conflict is one of the main impediments to development. Accordingly, UNDPs global work in conflict-affected and fragile settings has been focusing on addressing insecurity through conflict prevention measures including political dialogues; strengthening of governance; provision of livelihoods; and basic community justice and security8. Conclusions from research on addressing fragility and conflict

1 Lydia Poole, “Afghanistan, Tracking Major Resource Flows 2002-2010”. Global Humanitarian Assistance; Development initiatives, UK, January 2011. 2 agreement of members of Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board , April 2012; Obama, Address to the Nation, West Point, 1 December 2009 3 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, The situation in Afghanistan, A/66/604-S/2011/722, 13 December 2011. 4 Conference Conclusions of International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn on 5 December (S/2011/762), declaring that the period of Transition should be followed by a Period of Transformation (2015-2024) based on mutual commitments from the Afghan Government and the IC. See also conference conclusions of Chicago 2012 and Tokyo 2012. 5 UNDP continued to operate from Islamabad during the Taliban régime and re-established its offices in Kabul in early 2002. 6 UNDP Mission statement. 7 World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 2011, p. 16. 8 UNDP, Preventing Crisis, Enabling Recovery, BCPR Annual Report 2011

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Recently, these approaches have been confirmed by extensive research conducted by the World Bank. The 2011 World Development Report concludes that violence happens where States and sub-national governments do not provide security and access to justice, markets do not provide employment opportunities and communities have lost the social cohesion that contains conflict9. Accordingly the 2011 World Development Report draws the conclusion that the priority needs for fragile settings are to restore confidence and to transform Government institutions that deliver citizen security, justice and jobs10. Recent discussions led by fragile and conflict-affected countries in the context of the New Deal re-confirmed these findings with the conclusion that ‘legitimate politics, security, justice, livelihoods’ should be the focus for international support. Further, the July 8 2012 Tokyo Conference identified justice for all as an important goal in the partnership framework. UNDP Rule of Law Strategy 2013-2016 and the JHRA Project Within this framework, the UNDP Country Office in Afghanistan developed several strategies with the view to strengthen strategic impact and guide its interventions for the up-coming Transition and Transformation period in Afghanistan. The Rule of Law Strategy is one of these strategies and informs the projects of UNDPs Rule of Law Cluster, which cover a large segment of the spectrum of assistance needs in the practice field, including justice, policing, human rights, anti-corruption, armed violence reduction, and gender justice: the Law and Order Trust Fund in Afghanistan (LOTFA); JHRA Phase II; Afghanistan Integrity Initiative (AII); Gender Equality Project (GEP). The Rule of Law Cluster and Strategy in itself is interlinked with UNDP Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Cluster and Strategy; Sustainable Development Cluster and Strategy; and the Inclusive Politics Cluster and Strategy. The JHRA Phase II Project addresses the justice component of the Rule of Law Strategy and leverages its impact within the ensemble of these UNDP projects and strategies. 1.1. Drivers of Conflict in Afghanistan as related to justice: Perceived in-justices The World Development Report identified individual economic welfare (poverty, unemployment), perceived injustices (including gender inequality and corruption) and insecurity, linked with weak State institutions, as primary drivers of vicious cycles of conflict11. The assumption that perceived injustices are a main driver of conflict in Afghanistan is a strong one: The assumption confirmed for Afghanistan by public perception surveys….. Public perception surveys point out that the government's inability to respond to grievances from constituents or to facilitate dispute resolution, and maintain law and order has been one of the biggest frustrations among Afghans who believe that this core government function can be performed even with limited financial resources12. In addition, public perception

9 World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 2011, p. 16. 10 World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 2011, p. 11. 11 World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 2011, p. 16. 12 UNDP Afghanistan, Sub-National Governance Strategy for Afghanistan, 2012; Giostuzi & Ibrahimi, Thirty Years of Conflict, Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit, January 2012, p. 60

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surveys highlight crucial linkages between unemployment, perceived injustice13 and insecurity14 in Afghanistan. … and practice… Sadly, one of the Taliban’s strengths has been precisely their investment of a significant amount of resources in delivery of ‘rough’ justice15. As their first priority after securing an area, the Taliban seek to control the justice mechanisms16, helping them gain an image of a movement that brings stability and aims to redress injustices17. So indeed the lack of justice provision by the State is one of the reasons that has driven Afghans in the arms of insurgency, directly driving on-going conflict. This is not to say that Taliban justice is the preferred form of justice, but it indicates that it is more available or more preferred than the formal justice18. Support for increased justice services delivery: the solution? As supported by the above analysis, direct service delivery combined with longer term reform of institutions to sustain these services is instrumental in mitigating the main drivers of conflict. To date, some international resources went to direct justice service delivery in Afghanistan; high amounts of United Nations and international aid went to the development of justice and human rights institutions and norms that deliver these services and bind political leaders to a set of formal decision-making processes. However, in fragile settings where trust in national and sub-national State institutions is low, this is not enough19. Even if the international community and the Government develop the perfectly ‘just’ institutions, the actual reality could be that people do not perceive them as just or simply do not trust them to be just according to their standards. In that case Afghans will still not access Government services or be helped by these institutions, despite all international capacity development support to strengthen them. As explained by Amartya Sen, “institutions and rules are, of course, very important in influencing what happens, and they are part and parcel of the actual world as well, but the realized actuality goes well beyond the organizational picture, and include the lives that people manage – or do not manage – to live”.20 The actual behaviour of the Afghan population demonstrates that to date the State institutions are not considered to be of help: 80% of all legal cases in Afghanistan are brought for trial to the Shuras21 and/or Taliban. Public perception surveys confirm a deeply rooted mistrust in the Government and justice institutions in particular. Citizens have seen the Government acquiring finances, equipment and buildings, but have not seen this to be translated into direct public service delivery; at

13 Research and Evaluation Unit, Afghanistan Looking Ahead, Challenges for Governance and Community Welfare, Research Briefs for 2011 Bonn Conference, December 2011, p.4. 14 Research and Evaluation Unit, Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of anti-Government mobilization in Afghanistan 1978-2011, January 2012, p. 60; Human Rights Research and Advocacy Council, Fight Poverty to End Insecurity: Afghan Perspectives on Insecurity, 2009; Oxfam, The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, November 2009; The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2009, 2010, p. 21. More than a third (35%) of respondents identify unemployment among the top two problems at the national level and around a quarter (26%) say the same at the sub-national level. 15 Research and Evaluation Unit, Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of anti-Government mobilization in Afghanistan 1978-2011, January 2012, p. 60 16 Research and Evaluation Unit, Afghanistan Looking Ahead, Challenges for Governance and Community Welfare, Research Briefs for 2011 Bonn Conference, December 2011, p.4. 17 Research and Evaluation Unit, Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of anti-Government mobilization in Afghanistan 1978-2011, January 2012, p. 60 18 IDLO, Erica Harper ed, Customary Justice : from Program Design to Impact Evaluation, 2011, p. 26 19 Camino Kavanagh and Bruce Jones, Shaky Foundations, an Assessment of the UN’s Rule of Law Support Agenda, 2011, Centre on International Cooperation: New-York, p. 6 (hereafter CIC Report 2011). 20 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 2009, pp. 7 and 10 and 18 21 US Department of State, 2007 Report on Human Rights Practices in Afghanistan, 2007

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the same time the biggest perceived injustice is corruption by some Government entities, in particular justice and citizen security institutions22. Taliban and non-State justice systems are seen as more trusted, effective and not dependent on bribes23. 1.2. Increasing TRUST: the first goal for the coming four years Healthy State-citizens relationships are founded on a ‘social contract’ implying that people give up some of their personal freedom (the freedom of anarchy) and promise the State obedience, while the State promises physical protection and good governance including enforcement of laws and agreements24. Without trust, there is no social contract. Without social contract it is impossible for a Government to guide a country through transition/transformation without conflict and there is no legitimacy for the State to govern and deliver public services. Accordingly, trust building should come first after which legitimacy and State obligations can follow. Justice and security services are at the heart of the social contract25. Strengthening the institutional capacities of the State’s justice institutions and increase justice service delivery by the State are interventions that increase trust26. However, this will be empty if people do not trust the State in the first place. More is needed. The below contextual analysis seeks to inform what interventions should be added to the institution building and service delivery aspects to break this vicious circle and increase trust.

22 Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People, 2011, p. 96 23 Ali Wardak, State and non-State justice systems in Afghanistan: The need for Synergy, Journal of International Law 2011 24 J. W. Gough, The Social Contract , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936, pp. 2–3. 25 UNDP, Global Rule of Law Programme 2011, p. 7, 2012 26 World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 2011, p. 16.

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2. CONTEXTUAL REALITIES FRAMING UNDP SUPPORT 2.1. Institutions, systems and providers delivering justice services Historical developments, Government and donor initiatives have resulted in a large number of institutions, systems and providers that are related to justice service delivery. They are indicated in the matrix below. Also those institutions that provide citizen security are included to ensure adequate justice-security linkage and reflection of the criminal justice system: Table 1:

STATE INSTITUTIONS27 that provide justice and citizen security services

Central Institution Provincial Institution District Institution Related State Justice and Security Providers

SC: Supreme Court PCA: Provincial Courts of Appeal28

PC: Primary Courts29 Judge

AGO: Attorney General Office30

Appellate provincial prosecution offices

District level prosecution offices

Prosecutor

MOJ: Ministry of Justice

DOJ: Department of Justice

DOJ: Department of Justice

Huquq officer31 (mediation/ dispute resolution for civil cases)

MOJ Legal Aid Attorneys32

MOJ Legal Help Center Assistant (legal advice for women)

MOJ Juvenile Correction and Rehabilitation Center33

MOJ Juvenile Correction and Rehabilitation Center Officers

MOI: Ministry of Interior

DOI: Department of Interior

DOI: District Ministry of Interior

Police, Provincial and District Commanders

Family Response Unit Police Staff34

Information Desks Police Officers35

MOI CPD: Central Prison Directorate

Prisons Prisons Correction Officer

NDS: National Directorate of Security

Provincial NDS office District NDS Office NDS Prosecutors

MOWA: Ministry of Women Affairs

Provincial Ministry of Women Affairs

Department of Women Affairs

MOWA officers (legal advice for women)

MOWA Legal Help Center

27 Largely taken from ISAF NATO, Rule of Law Field Support Officer Deskbook, 2012 with much appreciation. 28 The courts of appeal are divided by subject into five dewans: general criminal, public security, civil and family public rights, commercial, and juvenile 29 Central primary courts are divided into five dewans: central provincial primary court, juvenile court, commercial primary court, district primary court, and family primary court 30 The AGO is divided into three sections: civil, national security, and military. The civil unit investigates and prosecutes penal code cases in the criminal courts. The National Security Unit is responsible for investigating and prosecuting terrorism cases in the National Security Courts, under the public security section of the courts. The military unit investigates and prosecutes criminal cases against police and other law enforcement officers. 31 resolve civil cases through mediation or conciliation. If resolution is not possible, cases are referred to court. The huquq also serves an important function in recording decisions from the customary system. 32 Includes MOJ Attorneys and State sponsored Attorneys from the ILF-A supported by the World Bank. 33 As per CRC requirement to held children in conflict with law separate from adults. Centers are established in 30 provinces. 34 Supported by UNDP LOTFA, UNFPA and EUPOL. 35 Supported by UNDP LOTFA.

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Assistant(legal advice for women)

MoLSAMD: Ministry of Labour Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled

IDLG36: Independent Directorate of Local Governance

Provincial Governor Office

Governor (responsible for security and development)

MRRD37: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

District Governor Office Governor (responsible for security and development)

INDEPENDENT INSTITUTIONS that provide justice services

Central Institution Provincial Institution District Institution Related Independent Justice and Security Providers

AIBA: Afghan Independent Bar Association

Provincial AIBA Office District AIBA Office Licensed Attorneys

AIHRC: Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission

Provincial AIHRC Office

District AIHRC Office

Legal Aid Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

Paralegals or Licensed Attorneys employed by Legal Aid CSOs

Non-STATE or Semi-STATE SYSTEMS that provide justice and citizen security services

Provincial level District level Community level Related non-State or Semi-State Justice and Security Provider

PDA: Male and Female Provincial Councils38

DCC: Male and Female District Coordination Council39

Community Development Council (CDC): Male and Female CDC

Community Leaders/Elders

Male and Female Peace Councils40

Community Leaders/Elders, with advice from Justice Workers

Police-e-Mardumi Platforms41

Police-e-Mardumi Platforms

Community Leaders/Elders, with Police

CPANS: Child Protection Action Networks42

Community Leaders/Elders with CSOs and MOLSAMD Assistants.

36 The IDLG is charged with establishing and strengthening government institutions at a sub-national level, ensuring public participation in decision-making and access to information, and ensuring delivery of effective public services, including rule of law. 37 Oversees district level staff and is co-responsible for supporting DCCs 38 Elected representatives from DCCs. Have a conflict prevention/resolution function and oversee public service delivery. 39 Elected representatives from CDCs. Have a conflict prevention/resolution function and oversee public service delivery. The DCCs are the former DDAs and have been established through an agreement between IDLG and MRRF as the sole mandated repreentative body. This may be ratified in Parliamentary legislation. 40 are established in Kunduz and Takhar provinces with support from USIP and CPAU with the specific purpose of dispute resolution. USIP trains and funds the “justice workers” that provide objective advice on justice issues to the community leaders. 41 Are established by MOI with support from UNDP LOTFA with the specific purpose of resolution of security challenges. Local CSOs facilitate the meetings and register action points. The consultations were done in a total of nine districts by Tadbeer consulting: Bati Koot, Behsood, Rodat, Sorkh Rud, Kot, Dar I Nor, Kama, Jalalabad City (six police districts) (Nangarhar province) and Mehtarlam (Laghman province). This contract came to an end. Consultations are started by CACSS in the following 12 districts in Kabul province: Farza, Khak-e-Jabar , Paghman, Sorobi ,Guldara,Shakardara,Estalif,Qarabagh,Deh-Sabz,Kalalkan,Mirbachakot & Police District 17 in Kabul City. 42 CPANS are semi-State networks developed by MoLSAMD with support from UNICEF in line with the National Strategy for Children at Risk. CPAN is an inclusive network of State and CSO organizations that perform field interventions in the area of child protection. Between 2008 and 2009 about 4000 cases were referred to CPANs for support to child victims. They operate to date in 28 provinces.

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ALP: Afghan Local Police Afghan Local Police men43

Unofficial militias (arbaki)44

2.2 Difficulties There are several inter-related factors that underlie the weakness and unresponsiveness of the Afghan State that need to be taken into account when designing support interventions in the area of justice. Extensive destruction of Afghanistan’s State justice institutions The long Afghan conflict has resulted in an extensive destruction of Afghanistan‘s State justice institutions that existed prior to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics invasion of the country in December 197945. The destruction has not only included extensive damage to buildings, office furniture, official records, legal resources, and essential office equipment, but also the death, imprisonment, and migration of hundreds of professional justice officials, including qualified judges, prosecutors, police officers, and prison wardens46. More structurally, the organic functioning of the system of justice and law enforcement institutions has been destructed. The justice and law enforcement order/system has historically been referred to as a nezam-e-adlee wa qazaiee, which was central to the maintenance of social and political order in pre-war Afghanistan. To date, there exists little organic interaction among them47. Accountability and legitimacy questions on non-State justice providers While public perception surveys point out that most Afghans perceive non-State justice institutions as more just, less corrupt and more effective, there are also considerable shortcomings. Non-State justice providers in Afghanistan are not linked to the formal State system and can therefore not be held accountable. In addition, research points out that despite the fact that the Constitution is the supreme law, there is often poor knowledge and therefore – when used - improper application of the Constitution and State laws, improper application of shari’a law and in particular when it comes to the rights of women and vulnerable groups.48 Efforts to engage with the non-State system have largely been stalled by Government and international community out of these concerns and fears to threaten State legitimacy.49 Safety and Security of State justice and security personnel Justice and security officials are targets for intimidation, harassment and sometimes assassination. The Supreme Court reports that 26 judges were killed between 2005 and 2010; the Attorney General’s Office reports that 24 employees have been killed since 2005. This is likely to increase with increased publicity, visibility and success of the Afghan justice system50.

43 Decree Number 3196 of the Office of the President authorizes establishment of the Afghan Local Police to secure communities. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) only has authority to detain suspects and should secure the crime scene until the ANP arrive 44 may have not yet disbanded in particular localities and may have sufficient political leverage or financial resources to impede the justice system. 45 Ali Wardak, Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan, 41 J. CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 319, 328 (2004). 46 Ali Wardak, State and non-State justice systems in Afghanistan: The need for Synergy, Journal of International Law 2011. 47 Ali Wardak, Rule of Law in Afghanistan: An Overview, in Petersberg papers on Afghanistan and the region (Wolfgang Danspeckgruber ed., 2009) 48 See contextual analysis Part One and U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Human Rights Report: Afghanistan, 2010, p. 41; ISAF NATO, Rule of Law Field Support Officer Deskbook, 2012, p. 32; CPAU, Opportunities and challenges for justice linkages, Case studies from Kunduz and Takhar, Kabul 2012. 49 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Human Rights Report: Afghanistan, 2010, p. 41 50 NATO RoL Field Support Mission, Rule of Law Field Support Officer Deskbook, Guidelines and lessons learned for Military support to Justice Sector Development in Afghanistan, Camp Phoenix, Kabul, June 2012.

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Escalated corruption Afghanistan ranked 180 out of 180 countries in the 2011 Transparency International’s corruption perception index51 and corruption is one of the main sources of perceived injustices of Afghans52. On top of that, Afghans perceive the main institutions responsible for security and justice as the most corrupt53. The Court system is according to 73% of the Afghans the most corrupted State institution54 and prosecutors, judges and police are seen as taking most bribes of all Government officials55. Politicized governance A governance system, which is highly political and largely driven more by clan/kinship, ethnicity, tribe, factional and patronage interests56 than by considerations of national interest. Relatedly, parliamentary oversight is affected by the strong kin and tribal linkages between the national and sub-national representative bodies and the Government. As such, the systems for holding the Government accountable are weak. Disparity and pluralism in State and non-State governance systems and laws across the country Afghanistan’s legal codes have undergone numerous amendments over the course of the last few decades, reflecting the changing political situation and various Governmental regimes57. In addition, Afghanistan has, over the last several decades, also adopted many laws, in whole or in part, from other countries, notably Egypt, France, Turkey. The result is that some of the codes contain elements which appear, in part or whole, to be: 1) contradictory to each other or 2) no longer relevant for the current conditions and political situation or 3) too unclear to be binding58. Also between the non-State systems there are large disparities in different customary, shari’a, State statutory law, norms values, languages and governance systems used across the country59. The State and the international community have never been able to fully recognize, embrace or consolidate this pluralism into a comprehensive governance system and legislative framework60. Also, the Taliban has not been able to impose its legal system on the entire country and faced strong resistance from several communities successfully defending their local norms and governance mechanisms61. Centralized State; Strong local autonomy non-State Government strategies, policies and budgets on State justice and security delivery are decided upon and managed from Kabul, leaving very little space for provinces and districts to have their priorities reflected in the planning and budgeting process. The distance from the point of delivery and limited communication flows often delay services. At the same time,

51 Transparency International, 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, 2011. 52 Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People, 2011, p. 96. 53 Integrity Watch, Integrity Watch Survey Afghanistan, 2010. 54 UNDP LOTFA, ACSOR, 2011 Police Perception Survey, 2011, p. 18. 55 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Afghanistan: Bribery as reported by the victims, 2010, p. 25. 56 Barnett R. Rubin, The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and Collapse in the International System, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 19. 57 NPP component 4, sub-component 1, p. 79 58 NPP component 4, sub-component 1, p. 79 59 NATO RoL Field Support Mission, Rule of Law Field Support Officer Deskbook, Guidelines and lessons learned for Military support to Justice Sector Development in Afghanistan, Camp Phoenix, Kabul, June 2012. 60 Currently a body of 431 laws (see NPP5, component 4.3). 61 Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, Maine Law Review, 2008, p. 60.

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a strong degree of local autonomy with autonomous tribal leaders62 remained especially in rural areas leading to political tensions between the centre and the periphery, sometimes resulting in conflict. Women’s rights The oppression of women and girls under the Taliban has been extensively documented. After the Taliban was overthrown of, Afghanistan made rapid progress by embedding women’s rights as part and parcel of Afghanistan Constitution. However, as the government has come to rely on conservative factions63 to maintain political control, women’s right have been become increasingly part of political negotiations and trade-offs whereby laws negatively impacting women are traded for other causes64. Women also face discrimination when approaching or working within the Government such as police65 and courts. Police and justice personnel often do not know the Constitution and penalize women according to customary practices. While generally not better or worse than the State system66, non-State justice systems are also often not compliant with Afghanistan constitutional law; inaccessible to women and often counterproductive to women’s human rights. Practices including the use of baad (providing women or girls as compensation for a crime or civil dispute, including in rape cases); honor killings; or encouragement for women who complain about abuse to solve the problem within the family where the abuse has taken place67. Women are largely excluded from participating in decision-making even if the woman is a party in the dispute and despite the fact that women do play a key role as decision-maker in domestic disputes. Women can only approach a jirga when represented by a male family member. Many Afghans claim that the violence against and discrimination of women has increased over the last decades; they stress that Afghanistan is going backwards in terms of women’s rights. The male/female ratio of Afghan population is 1.05 males/females.68 This downwards trend in women’s right and strong fear among women for return of the Taliban is a strong driver of uncertainty and instability that affects the entire Afghan population. External stresses and financing Longstanding regional aggression, foreign military presence, lucrative international poppy seed trade, but also dependency on international donors - who have had decisive influence on Afghanistan’s political direction69 and have been keeping their assistance largely earmarked and off-budget - have undermined the sovereignty and discretion of government,

62 Barnett R. Rubin, The fragmentation of Afghanistan: State formation and Collapse in the International System, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 19 63 Dominant political factions of Afghanistan remain ideologically hostile to many of the rights that many women have started to enjoy since the fall of the Taliban, such as freedom of movement, freedom to work, and the right to education (We have the promises of the world: Women's Rights in Afghanistan) 64 See for instance: Shia Personal Status law in 2009, including the requirement that Shia wives seek their husbands’ permission before leaving home except for unspecified “reasonable legal reasons.” The law also gives child custody rights to fathers and grandfathers, not mothers or grandmothers, and allows a husband to cease maintenance to his wife if she does not meet her marital duties, including sexual duties. 65 UNDP LOTFA, Growing Pains: Police Women in Afghanistan, 2012 66 Center for international governance innovation, 4 the security sector reform monitor: Afghanistan, 2010, p. 6-7. 67 UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Arbitrary Detention in Afghanistan: A Call For Action, Volume I - Overview and Recommendations, January 2009. 68 2009 Central Statistic Organisation, Afghanistan 69 After Bonn 2001, international conferences to discuss and direct progress on Afghan-led inclusive peace processes and governance were held in Berlin (2004), London (2006), Rome (2007), Paris (2008), Moscow (2009), The Hague (2009), London (2010), Kabul (2010), Bonn (2011), Chicago (2012) and Tokyo (2012).

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and its accountability to Afghan citizens. It has compromised the integrity of public expenditure management and the quality and geographic equity of public service delivery. Deep tensions between national security imperatives and local security concerns of the people and communities in Afghanistan and the region, have largely impeded effective engagement of neighbouring countries. Also attempts to bringing together regional civil society groups to discuss mutual challenges and to provide solutions for the many motivations driving radicalization, recruitment into insurgency groups, and growing criminality have failed70. Interaction between Civil Society and State institutions is limited. The lack of authority of elected bodies, the lack of access to information at the sub-national level and the low capacity of civil society organizations (especially outside of main urban centers) have all prevented Afghan society from holding the government, including police and justice institutions accountable. This relative disconnect stems both from lack of guidance to CSOs on how to engage with State institutions, fear and powerlessness and at the sub-national level also from the fact that, currently, un-resourced, un-empowered State institutions are simply “not worth engaging with”. Fragile security situation resulting in limited reach for State institutions While the amount of justice and security personnel has increased over the past ten years, the Government faces considerable challenges to attract and retain capable justice and security staff to remote and / or insecure districts. As President Karzai emphasized: “The reason that the people of Afghanistan in the villages and across the countryside, (even) in the cities, still seek justice through the traditional method is because the government neither has the ability to provide that justice nor can it be addressed on time71.” 2.3 Opportunities and building blocks While development partners cannot hope to address the range of factors underlying the weaknesses of the State’s ability to provide justice and to restore a social contract, there is an important set of opportunities to build upon. These opportunities can be found in lessons learned from UNDPs large portfolio in Afghanistan, international engagement in Afghanistan and global best practices and lessons learned in justice and security sector support72. State Justice capacities strengthened

70 See for instance, Marika Theros and Mary Kaldorills, Building Afghan Peace from the ground up, Century Foundation 2011: “In 2007, Afghanistan and Pakistan held an internationally sponsored Joint Peace Jirga to respond to cross-border violence by bringing together civil society on both sides of the border to discuss mutual challenges and opportunities for peaceful solutions. Unfortunately, the sponsors gave priority to State-centered security concerns and drowned out the concerns and insights of civil society”. 71 Speech President Karzai at the inauguration of an association of Afghan women judges on 18 July, 2012 (AFP). 72 See UNPD, Annual Global Rule of Law Report, 2011.

The UNDP Gender Equality Project took the overarching framework of religion and cultural values as its basis and sought to work within the framework of Islamic Law to ensure appropriate interpretation of gender issues in Islam. This approach enabled engagement of 560 Mullahs in Herat, 1320 Mullahs in Nangarhar, and 250 Mullahs in Balkh that all participated in 3 different phases of training on Gender and Islam. Also visits were made to more progressive Islamic countries such as Turkey and Malaysia. In addition articles on women and Islam were published in MOHRA’s “Payam e Haq” (Message of Truth) magazine. It resulted into more favorable behavior and messaging in prayers and statements towards women’s rights from a central and influential group of traditional leaders in Afghanistani.

With support from UNDP LOTFA, a series of 8 security seminars were held in Kabul, Ningarhar, Balkh, Bamyan and Herat province. Afghan researchers presented security-related papers and research for discussion with MOI officials, members of parliament (MPs) or provincial council (PC members) and civil society members. Although the discussions have not yet translated into actual actions, participation was high and interesting debates evolved on for instance the role of the Shura

CASE STUDY BOX 2: Security Seminars: Potential building blocks for

policy change

CASE STUDY BOX 1: Islamic values as pathway for positive change on

women’s issues

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While the largest part of international support and funding was focused on the military, the defense sector and on counter-insurgency activities, following the London Conference in 2010 a considerable amount went to policing/citizen security and justice. Indeed much has been achieved since the fall of the Taliban: amongst others, Government buildings are built; courts; police stations; anti-corruption units and prisons have been re-established and equipped; basic governance structures have been established; government officials have been paid; and national norm-setting policies and strategies have been formulated. In addition, and while still unsystematic and largely unconnected to each other or to the non-State systems, international support has enabled a strong increase in the number of State justice and citizen security providers available, and the number of offices and trainings/knowledge available to them. A good part of this has been achieved with UNDP contributions: UNDP LOTFA remunerates police and prison personnel, has numerous community policing initiatives and has constructed police offices and posts; UNDP ASGP supported the strengthening of the IDLG and Governors offices; UNDP GEP supported justice and citizen security services for women through the MOWA and DOWAs; and UNDP JHRA supported legal awareness for the public and legal trainings for prosecutors, judges, and Huquqs. Local norms and values: Honour/Respect, Forgiveness and Hospitality While the attention of the international community is often on the informal non-State practices that go against international human rights standards, deeply embedded Afghan personal and societal values are in essence closely linked to principles of human rights and due process. Century long Afghan practices have culminated into an unwritten moral code, an inherited way of life that is sacred and based on concepts of honor, personal autonomy, the protection of women, wealth, and land. Codes and values can differ across the country but concepts such as hospitality, honour, and forgiveness are known to every Afghan (Ehteram, Baksheesh, Mehman Navazi). It is based on these values and respect for these values that community based projects such as the UNDP community policing project and the Gender and Equality Project have been able to harness results (see Case Study box 1&2&3&4). Community Outreach and Responding to Afghan proposals Similarly and relatedly, research supports that inclusive participatory approaches to generate broad based support73 and to identify where the actual problems are; what ‘injustices’ to address74 have been most successful in generating impact and restoring trust. This does not mean that the Government or the international community should do whatever Afghans ask; it rather means that the

73 World Bank, 2011 World Development Report, 2011 74 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 2009, p. 7 and 10

Sports activities with youth and police increase trust in police and therefore citizen security: In Jalalabad, a boy suspected a passenger in a public bus from criminal behaviour. He called the police officer in his football team and the suspect was indeed arrested. In Herat, youth engaged in the sports-policing programme got so excited about the work of the police that 4 of them applied to become a police officer. In Guldara, community elders brought the issue of shops selling drugs to the attention of youth participating in a police-karate programme. The youth engaged the Karate teacher and police and the shops were shut down and drugs was seized.

CASE STUDY BOX 3: Police -e- Mardumi Community Outreach:

examples from small successes with big potential

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Government and the international support providers continuously discuss with ordinary Afghans what is possible and come up with joint solutions75. It means that pragmatic ‘best fit’ solutions need to be sought rather than approaches based on western models, international standards or technical solutions.76 The concept of consultation is very deeply engrained in the Afghan society and indeed projects that embraced consultation, active outreach to the population and discussion had impact and have proven to increase trust (See Case Box 2&3.) State – non-State linkages: an opportunity for change As explained above there are legitimate concerns for engaging with the non-State institutions. And indeed the State institutions including the Parliament should be responsible for and play the most important role in developing legislation and setting the normative framework.77 However, research and cases studies78 point out that when it comes to access to justice, linkages between non-State and State enable considerable improvement when utilizing the relative strengths of both79 (see Case Box 5). In addition, public perception surveys and case studies point out that State-non-State linkages have the potential to increase trust and hence legitimacy back in the State institutions (See Case Box 6). For instance, public perception surveys demonstrate that Afghans perceive an increased sense of security and increased trust in the Afghan National Police (ANP) in the areas where UNDP has supported consultations between the police and community leaders80. Other research demonstrates that community policing and community justice support are in fact one of the best means to fight a war and increase stability81. Although the UNDP community policing initiatives are still embryonic and in the ‘community outreach’ rather than policing stage, they offer interesting best practices and a natural entry point for UNDP to leveraging results on both justice and citizen security side. (See Case Study Box 2&3&4&5). Women Research and past experiences confirm that investing in women’s economic capacities, employment and participation in justice and security initiatives is an investment in long-term peace and recovery82. Afghan Public Perception surveys

75 Marika Theros and Mary Kaldor, Building Afghan Peace from the ground up, A century foundation report, 2011. 76 IDLO Erica Harper ed., Customary Justice : from Program Design to Impact Evaluation, 2011, p. 14 77 OECD DAC, Enhancing the delivery of justice and security, 2007. 78 CPAU, Opportunities and Challenges for Justice Linkages, Case studies from Kunduz & Takhar, Kabul 2012 79 Scheye E., Progamatic Realism in Justice and Security Development: Supporting Improvement in the Performance of Non-State/Local Justice and Security Networks, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2009; Ali Wardak, State and non-State justice systems in Afghanistan: The need for Synergy, Journal of International Law 2011; ISAF NATO, Rule of Law Field Support Officer Deskbook, 2012, p. 32; OECD DAC, Enhancing the delivery of justice and security, 2007. 80 UNDP LOTFA and ACSOR, Afghanistan Police Perception Survey, 2012. 81 Commander, International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF), Commander’s Initial Assessment (August 30, 2009), p. 2-18; RAND National Defense Research Institute, Victory has a thousand fathers: Sources of Success in Counter-Insurgency, 2010; Frank Ledwidge, Justice and Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan: A Missing Link, 2009, p. 154. 82 High Level Meeting of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Executive Board of UN Women, Integrating Women into Economic Recovery, 18 November 2011.

Police-e-Mardumi State-non-Stateconsultation platforms have increased trust and therefore been able to effectively solve security challenges: In Guldara, girls were harassed on their way to school. Parents raised this with the community leaders who discussed the issue at the Police-e-Mardumi consultations. The solution found was that the police should patrol the girls to school, resulting in a 60-80% increase in girls in the 10th, 11th and 12th grades. In Shakardara, mining activities risked damage to a Dam putting the community in danger. Rather than stopping the mining through conflict, community leaders raised the issue in the consultation platforms. The police went out and peacefully stopped the mining. In Dehsub, 40 community elders from 40 villages wrote a letter of appreciation to the District Commander, expressing their gratefulness for visibly improved safety and security in their villages through him coming to the Police-e-Mardumi consultations and platform and addressing the issues.

CASE STUDY BOX 4: Police -e- Mardumi Consultation Platforms:

examples from small successes with big potential

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demonstrate that female government officials can play an important role in bringing trust back into State institutions. The Police Perception Survey 2011 indicates that 53% of Afghans favoured female police officers in their community (up 8 points from 2010) versus 42% against. Support was highest in central Kabul at 67%; lower at around 50% in east and central regions; 46% in south central regions and falling to 37% in the south-west. It was also reported that people expect judgments to be fairer if cases are brought before women police and judges. High quality non-governmental organisations UNDP supported projects within the Government institutions have proven difficult to sustain without continuous financial and project support83. However, many projects that UNDP supported with civil society organisations have been able to become totally independent and self-sustainable. Examples are the Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) that has been supported under UNDP project in 2002 and is now a high quality self-sustaining provider of information management services. Also the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission has been financially supported by UNDP in the past until it could continue as a truly independent organisation by managing its own financial resources. Prospects for increased UN coherency through the UN co-Global Focal Points There were several initiatives in the recent years that aimed at enhancing coordination and joint programming between UNDP and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), as well as other UN country team members. Presently, UNAMA and UNDP have a close working relationship between the UN mission’s human rights component and Human Rights Support Unit (HRSU) and LOTFA community policing and UNAMA Police. However, on the justice side, some UN interagency programmes did not receive a programming follow up. For instance the “Support to Provincial Justice Coordination” was started by UNDP and UNAMA but was continued by UNAMA as the sole implementer. The Peace through Justice MDG Trust fund project included UNAMA, UNDP, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Fund for

83 JHRA mid-term evaluation report 2011

CASE STUDY BOX 4: Police-e-Mardumi information desks were established in Dehsabz, Shakardara, Qarabagh, Guldara, PD17, Istalif, Mirbachakot districts in Kabul province. It was one of the first community policing activities and the MOI at the central level was not very engaged on the concept yet. The information desks were equipped with computers and a desk for 1 police officer with the idea to 1) register complaints in a computerized system 2) provide a one stop shop for citizens seeking information 3) to refer citizens and women in particular to the appropriate place for legal or security related problems. However, several issues emerged. 1) the information desks were not used as offices but as sleeping places for the police. 2) it was difficult to monitor if the desks were appropriately used. 3) the computers were not used. These problems were only solved when the MOI DM Security and the MOI Police-e-Mardumi Secretariat got involved and issued clear instructions on the use of information desks. In dialogue with the central level it appeared that the desks were used as sleeping places as the space was taken from police housing; the computers were not used because of lack of money for fuel for generators. Now Connex containers are used as information desks and computers run on solar. The MOI itself assists in monitoring and to date the desks receive 500-700 people on a monthly basis. The sub-national level activities of the UNDP Gender Equality Project, were supported at the central level by a working group that was established at the Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MOHRA). The working group consisted of members from MOHRA, MOWA, GEP, the Afghan Women’s Network, and the Afghanistan Sciences Academy. It was through this working group that the process was driven internally and catalytic change could happen at the sub-national levels (see Case Study Box 1)

CASE STUDY BOX 5: Central level engagement helps speed up sub-national

work

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Women (UNIFEM) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), but was stopped prematurely. Keenly aware of these shortcomings, UNAMA and UNDP thinking on closer cooperation has regained focus. In the new context, impetus for strengthening joint initiatives is also supported through the UNDP/Department for Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO) Global Focal Point arrangements that assign DPKO and UNDP as lead providers in the areas of justice, policing and corrections84. Prospects for greater State legitimacy through Intequal – policy coherence in justice Impressive work has been done by the Afghan (sub-national) governments in collaboration with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other bilateral partners in Afghanistan. Until to date the Government has not been able to effectively coordinate these partners and use their data, achievements and lessons learned for informed policy making. The 'Inteqal'85 process provides a challenge but paradoxically also an important opportunity for the Government to bring the great amount of data, the different approaches taken and work done together in a comprehensive manner. Prospects for greater State legitimacy through Intequal – budget coherence in justice Similarly, while the ending of aid flows through the PRTs will certainly cause problems, there are also positive outcomes. The cessation of such a large resource flow mainly channelled off-budget, and allocated through various ad hoc, cherry picking mechanisms unconnected to government’s own budget processes – and often causing major geographic inequities, further fuelling mistrust - will pave the way for much greater budget coherence and government accountability to citizens. Prospects for greater political leadership on justice issues Research demonstrates that real trust in the State can only be provided by real political actions that signal a break with the past and gestures that lock in these actions, giving people confidence that they will not be reversed. In Afghanistan this is of particular importance given the centralized nature of the State. Since the Kabul Conference86, the Government of Afghanistan has increasingly demonstrated its political will and its capacity to take the lead on development and governance, combat corruption and increase justice delivery. President Karzai has increasingly admitted that there is currently no legitimacy of the State in justice service delivery and has increasingly stressed the importance of improving justice service delivery and integrity by State institutions87. Afghanistan has also played an important role in discussions around the New Deal principles which recognize national leadership, justice and security as critical for success in fragile States. In addition, recently presidential governance structures have been established by Presidential Decree No. 62, laying out the National State/Cabinet Committees under the Council of Minister and the President. Out of the seven 84 United Nations Secretary General Report on Rule of Law 2012; UNAMA code cable 2012. See also Rawkins & Mohammad, JHRA End-Term evaluation, A7a. 85 The Inteqal process is the transition process, co-led by the ISAF and the Afghan government, which consists in withdrawing international troops and placing the Afghan government in the driving seat for ensuring security and delivering governance and development. 86 July 2010 87 See also President Karzai Speech at 18 July Inauguration of Association of women judges (AFP).

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Committees, two are devoted to justice issues (the Legislative Cabinet Committee and the Justice and Judicial State/Cabinet Committee) and 1 to security (the Security Cabinet Committee). This increased demonstration of political will could provide the building blocks for political action in the area of justice. Political support is in Afghanistan of particular importance given the centralized nature of the State. Paragraph 2.2 sets out that the centralized nature can delay processes. At the same time, when political will is there, central level engagement can also considerably speed up processes and provide an important building block (See Case Box 4). 3. NATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND UN MANDATES FRAMING UNDP SUPPORT UNDP works with governments and people on their own solutions to global and national development challenges. Accordingly, in addition to the UNDP mandate, the UN Charter and UN SC Resolutions, UNDP support to justice and security should take place within the confines of the normative and legal framework as set by the Government and the people of Afghanistan. The Government of Afghanistan for its part has demonstrated a keen commitment to further develop its normative and legal framework in accordance with international rights and global development goals. It has ratified almost all international conventions and treaties and has developed an Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) meant to provide a path to achieving the Millennium Development Goals in Afghanistan by 2020. Most recently, and based on the ANDS, the Government has been developing 22 National Priority Programmes (NPPs) as a starting point for transferring civilian and military responsibilities from international partners to the Afghan government and civil society organizations. Afghanistan has also taken an active role within the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” as one of the G7+ members. In this process governments and organizations agreed on a set of Peace building and State building Goals (PSGs) that would be accompanied by a set of indicators which would allow track progress at the global and the country levels. The Busan agreement prioritizes security and justice issues as investment to ensure resilience, risk reduction and sustainability of development efforts. UNDP helps supporting the Government in the realization of these plans within the framework of UN conventions. Annexure 4 sets out the normative framework of national laws, policies and strategies; UN-Government compacts; and UN/UNDP mandates.

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PART TWO: 5 LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM UNDP JHRA PHASE 1

UNDP has been active on justice and human rights issues through various programming components in Afghanistan since 2003. Its strategic direction and subsequent activities in this area have been informed by the Human Development Report issued by UNDP in 2007, Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice. The JHRA programme was drafted in 2008 and anticipated a number of National Priority Programme deliverables related to justice, to lay the groundwork for long-term assistance. The project consisted of two components: 1. District level Component: focusing on working with the three justice institutions to

strengthen access to justice through a combination of rehabilitation of district-level justice infrastructure, training of district justice officials and community level legal awareness activities.

2. Central level Component: focusing on capacity development of MOJ, SC and AGO in translation of legal documents, procurement and human rights compliance.

The implementation of JHRA began in 2009. In its first two quarters, the project progressed well, however the attack on the Bakhtar guesthouse and the subsequent evacuation of international staff imposed serious delays in its implementation. During this time, JHRA was managed by UNDP national staff under strained conditions. Project activities began in earnest again in July 2010. A mid- and end-term project evaluation has been conducted in July 2011 and July 2012. The overall findings below highlight key achievements and actionable lessons learned and recommendations: Achievements88: National Benchmarks: JHRA’s overall design is well aligned with ANDS, NPP priorities and benchmarks, and contributing to implementation of national frameworks. Country Program Action Plan: JHRA is well situated in the in-country corporate framework and makes a contribution to the UNDP Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP). UNDP Profile in Justice Sector and post 2012 position: JHRA has consolidated strong, enduring, and effective relationships with the MOJ. It has contributed to raising profile of UNDP in the justice sector and provides a solid basis to further support (post-)transition efforts in strengthening justice delivery. Subnational Focus: UNDP engaged at the sub-national level where few donors operate. Implementation Achievements: The achievements of JHRA since September 2010 have been remarkable in terms of the total number of activities implemented (especially given the weak staffing plan). MOJs capacity in professional legal translation increased: The project has supported

the establishment of a Translation Unit. The services of this Unit respond to an urgent need and have been positively evaluated. A request from the President to expand the mandate of the Unit to provide Government-wide services acknowledges the Unit’s endeavours.

88 Rodriguez & Anwari, Midterm JHRA Evaluation, 2011; Rawkins & Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C3; Rawkins & Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, A6c; Rawkins & Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C4.6.14-16; Rawkins & Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C4.6.14-16.; Rawkins & Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C1.5.1; Rawkins & Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C1.7.1

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MOJs capacity to support the Government’s human rights compliance increased: The project has supported the establishment of a Human Rights Support Unit. The services of this Unit respond to an urgent need, have been positively evaluated and are supported by a Presidential Decree. MOJs understanding of Public Legal Awareness (PLA) as a sphere of engagement has increased: Although actual capacity of MOJ to plan for PLA remains weak, the project has increased understanding.

Effective district-level trainings for justice officials and community and religious leaders: Trainings provided at the district level have been evaluated as effective in meeting needs and bringing relevant justice providers together; trainings materials as well as facilitators were evaluated as high-quality.

Infrastructure and construction activities: have responded to pressing needs, despite challenges in implementation.

Lessons Learned and recommendations89: Island Perception of UNDP: MOJ, AGO and SC perceptions of JHRA are less of this being their own project, and more of that of an external UNDP project in terms of direct management and involvement. JHRA needs to become more responsive to MOJ’s vision and needs. Location Issues: JHRA’s geographic location, 15 kilometres, away from MOJ isolates it from its mother institution. While security risks to UNDP staff and lack of space have been the rationale for locating HRSU within the Annexure building of the MOJ. Project planning and design: There is a need to increase the overall project design with a better focus on planning based on needs assessments, coherence, outcome and impact, increasing M&E, and improving impact based project design and a design that corresponds to actual funds mobilized rather than funds projected. Management: has been weak and should be strengthened, both in the project and in the UNDP Country Office to support project implementation operationally (procurement, staff recruitment; work-plans; clearly defined terms of references for individual staff members etc.) and substantively (increased linkage with other UNDP projects, stakeholder relations such as donors, UN family, other partners). Gender /Cultural/Social Sensitivity: There is a need to increase gender equality, balance and sensitivity to the Afghan cultural and social context at the management level (staffing) and activity level generally. Capacity development: HRSU and TU are still fragile and require adequate professional development for staff as well as measures to promote and retain staff. In addition, HRSU and TU should take stock of accomplishments and develop low-key strategies to inform Annual Work Plans and TORs for staff. Sustainability: Some of the activities have not been sustained; moving towards transition it is important to develop a realistic 10-year transition plan to ensure lasting effect of interventions and to complete government financial and human resource integration of established units and practices. Seeking finalizing transition earlier will jeopardize the future of the units as well as capacity built.

89 Rodriguez & Anwari, Midterm JHRA Evaluation, 2011; End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C3; Rodriguez & Anwari, Midterm JHRA Evaluation, 2011; Rawkins & Mohammed, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, B0, B1; Rawkins & Mohammed, End-Term JHRA Evaluation, 2012, A7; A6b; Rawkins & Mohammad, End-Term JHRA Evaluation, 2012, A8; Rodriguez & Anwari, UNDP JHRA, Midterm Evaluation, 2011, pp.3-4.; and End-Term JHRA Evaluation 2012, pp. 7; Rawkins & Mohammad, End-Term JHRA Evaluation, 2012, 4.2.10; Rawkins & Mohammad, End-Term JHRA Evaluation, 2012, 4.2.11; Rawkins & Mohammad, End-Term JHRA Evaluation, 2012, 4.2.15

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Construction and infrastructure: Although responding to a crucial and pressing need, given that UNDP Afghanistan currently lacks the in-house capacity, experience and know-how to manage infrastructure projects, it should cease to undertake such activities. A series of measures have been taken immediately by the CO and JHRA. A model for refocusing was developed through the Strategic programme review of UNDP Afghanistan: The Way Forward – a Transformation Agenda for UNDP Afghanistan. This assessment was conducted by a broad team of UNDP experts in December 2011 and led to strengthened mechanisms for support from UNDP Headquarters and regional offices. Following this review, the CO has been restructured to strengthen programmatic coherence, oversight, operational, staffing and technical support to its projects. Measures have also been taken to increase further the use of local knowledge, and facilitate Afghanization. Others measures are specifically addressed through the new programming round in the project document below.

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6 METHODOLOGY 6.1 Guiding principles The contextual analysis and the UN mandates and national policies as described in PART ONE, provide for the following principles that will be adhered to and mainstreamed in project implementation: 1. Lessons learned and Monitoring and Evaluating The project takes a continuous learning approach based on lessons learned, evaluations and continuous consultations with national and international counterparts and stakeholders. 2. National ownership This is at the heart of the project, and development principles more broadly. Both the mid-term evaluation and the end-term evaluation concluded that national ownership of the JHRA project phase 1 has been weak. Therefore the project has incorporated the latest thinking on national ownership, and will apply the following methods of project design and implementation accordingly90: An inclusive national dialogue (process, not a single event or conference) from which

consensus on project direction and design evolves91. The project has been developed in an inclusive dialogue process that started in January 2012 with a Strategic Mission led by former UN Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, Dr. Kamal Hussein and ended with a conference organised by the MOJ on 24-26 June upon which the project document has been finalized. See Annexure I.

A process of implementation which should involve national stakeholders, as much as possible, and is led/directed by national stakeholders92. Capacity assessment has been undertaken of the lead implementing partner. Based on which a Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) project will be implemented with separate letters of agreement with each of the justice institutions - MoJ, AIBA, AIHRC, Supreme Court. The responsible parties will be the Ministry of Justice, AIBA, AIHRC etc. Based on annual assessments the responsibilities will be progressively transferred to the MOJ and other partners. For all other institutions, direct support will be provided by UNDP Country Office. The MoJ will be the lead partner as it will be jointly co-chairing the Project Steering Committee with UNDP.

A monitoring and evaluation process in which national actors are not only being monitored/evaluated but in which they also function as monitors of the project, including being actively involved in the determination of what needs to be monitored and evaluated93. Sub-output 1.2 and Sub-output 4.2 seek exactly to fulfil this principle.

A process in which national actors, as much as possible, commit financial resources to the reform process on a systemic basis and in accordance with national budgets, as appropriated by appropriate legislative authorities94. The project places particular emphasis on ensuring activities and capacities are adequately reflected in Tashkil and corresponding national budgets amongst others. A letter of agreement will be

90 United Nations Inter-Agency Task Force on SSR, Guidance Note on National Ownership in Security Sector Reform, September 2012. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid.

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undertaken with the MOJ along with budget which will have funds transferred to on budget. On an annual basis an assessment will be undertaken to assess the utilisation of funds, reporting etc. Based on this assessment more funds maybe channelized using on budget mechanisms.

3. Development of sustainable capacities All activities undertaken in the course of the project will be rooted in the need to facilitate long-term sustainability. This includes developing – not supplementing – national capacities, ensuring that training will be on-going, and that assistance is solidly institutionalised in broader national structures and planning processes as well as in UNDPs longer term planning and support for Afghanistan. 4. Human Rights In addition to ensuring that the project itself is executed in full conformity with international Human Rights standards, the project will actively promote human rights in a cross-cutting approach, engaging duty bearers (sub-output 2.2) and rights-holders (sub-output 4.2; 3.3). 5. Women participation, promotion and protection A gender perspective is mainstreamed throughout the project, amongst others through the creation of employment opportunities for women, emphasis on protection and promotion of women’s rights and ensuring the collection and interpretation of sex disaggregated data to better inform programme design. 6. Flexibility While the project aims to support the creation of an environment that is conducive to a transition to greater democracy and development in Afghanistan, transition periods can be highly fluid. Accordingly, project outputs and suggested activities will be adapted, as necessary, to adjust to changes affecting the achievement of overall goals, including vis-à-vis national partners. A thorough risk log will also be maintained and updated, and mitigation measures adopted as necessary. 7. Partnerships The programme should ensure leverage of project activities through the establishment of partnerships at the national, regional and international level. Complementarity - not duplication – should remain central. 8. Project Integrity; conflict sensitive programming and a ‘do no harm’ approach The project adopts a conflict sensitive lens to programming to avoid negative impacts of the interventions and maximise the peace building impacts. It will serve various geographical areas with different levels of security, cultural backgrounds and government capacity. It will serve and recruit95 male and female Afghans from different ethnic and religious groups and will include data to that extent in the M&E framework. An important element of the ‘do no harm’ approach is preventing as much as possible that the project itself is triggering corruption. This is one of the main difficulties experienced by

95 This holds for project staff, staff hired on Government contracts paid for by UNDP and companies and consultants hired through procurement processes.

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international aid providers in Afghanistan and has had negative impact on some UNDP projects96. Based on lessons learned from these experiences UNDP and the JHRA Phase II Project have taken the following precautionary measures: Assessment of the procurement and financing capacities of institutions which will be

disbursing funds based on letters of agreement. The objectives of transfer of funds using letters of agreement with the MOJ will

support in building self-reliance, improve capacity-building and sustainability through integration with national programmes. Through this modality, government rules and procedures will be followed if consistent with international standards, the MOJ will be accountable to its national and international partners through transparent processes which will be discussed at the Project Management Steering Committee Meeting. Further since it will be a partnership with UNDP, the project will also comply to UNDP regulations and rules for UNDP support services.

All procurement transactions will be subject to review Committees based on agreed threshold with MOJ in the letter of agreement. These thresholds will be based on a detailed capacity assessment of the Government Counterpart. Alternative arrangements may be developed whereby some budget lines of the project may be implemented through direct UNDP support which will be clearly detailed in the letter of agreement with the MoJ and UNDP. For all other letters of agreement with other agencies such as AIHRC, the UNDP will be providing direct support of payments and services.

9. Continuity of Engagement and Long-Term Commitment to the Country As it increasingly recognized by the international rule of law community and Member States alike, that respect for rule of law and reform of national justice and security sectors in conflict-affected countries is a generational effort requiring systematic and sustained effort. UNDP has a record of supporting Afghan justice and security sectors for over a decade and is basing its approach on national long-term development goals, including the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and the NPPs in particular 5 and 697. 6.2 Geographical criteria UNDP as a whole and through its sub-national governance cluster will strive to cover the entire country at regional, province, district, and village level98. However, with current project and UNDP Country Office capacity this cannot be achieved in the current project cycle for the JHRA Phase II Project. Hence, for 2013-2015, the project will not focus on village level (only indirectly through districts) and the below criteria will be applied to decide on geographical coverage throughout the course of the project:

1. The geographical area has the support of the MOJ and sub-national authorities

2. The project can leverage on UNDP presence

96 Because of suspected corruption in the Law and Order Trust Fund in Afghanistan 3 UNDP staff members have been fired in June 2012. 97 See also the forward by Dr. Hussein in the Strategic Plan for UNDP Justice and Human Rights for all, January 2012. 98 See also recommendation Dr. Hussein in the Strategic Plan for UNDP Justice and Human Rights for all, January 2012; UNDP Afghanistan, Sub-National Governance Strategy 2012; UNDP Afghanistan, Rule of Law Strategy 2012.

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This holds in particular for efforts undertaken by JHRA phase 1; the UNDP community policing initiatives so as to ensure the justice-security linkage; and the UNDP Gender Project (GEP) so as to ensure a gender-justice linkage. JHRA phase 1 has established relationships with sub-national level justice communities in Badakhshan, Faryab, Jawzjan, Nangarhar, Kunar, Bamyan, Daykundi, Herat and Panjshir. UNDP community policing has established relationships in 14 districts in Kabul99; 7 in Jalalabad100; 8 in Nangarhar101, 1 in Laghman102; 4 in Parwan103; 5 in Pansjir104; 1 in Bamyan105; 8 in Herat106. Activities will be initiated in Kunduz, Takhar and Badakhsan in 2013. Under the GEP project 8 legal help centers were established in the departments of women’s affairs (DOWA) and departments of justice (DOJ) in Herat and Balkh provinces.

The project is not duplicating work of other assistance providers in the area

This holds in particular for the World Bank that has to date the largest justice programme in Afghanistan. The World Bank has selected four pilot provinces, Kabul, Herat, Bamiyan and Logar, and will support in each province two districts that still need to be assigned.

3. The project can work with partners such as NATO and other bilateral partners which will be undergoing transition.

The NATO justice programmes are currently operating in 48 districts in: Kandahar, Nangarhar, Khost, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz and Helmand.

4. The project can facilitate the transition of the United Nation Mission in Afghanistan

UNAMA has offices in Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz, Herat, Bamiyan, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Gardez.

5. The ensemble of the chosen areas has various levels of security, cultural backgrounds and government capacity

6. The project can have impact on highest number of people’s lives

Most impact can be attained at the community level where 70% of the population lives. It is unlikely that the project will have the capacity in the first two-three years to reach the village level. However, it will strive to set the foundation for end of project and future project phases. Also, when a choice needs to be made between areas, the area with the highest number of inhabitants needs to be chosen.

7. Programme criticality for provincial level implementation

99 Dehsabz, Shakardara, Qarabagh, Guldara, Istalif, Mirbachakot, Kalakaan, Sorobi; Farza; Paghman; Khak e Jabar; Bagrami; Charasyab; Kabul city (including all 17 PDs) 100 nangahar, lagman 101 Bati Kot; Behsood; Jalalabad city (includes all 6 PDs); Rodat; Sorkh Rud; Kot; Dar I Noor; Kama 102 Mehtarlam 103 Bagram; Charkar; Jabil Saraj; Salang 104 Panjshir; Bazarak; Rokha; Dara; Khenj; 105 Bamian 106 Enjil; Herat City (includes all 8 PDs); Zinda Janj; Ghoryan; Karukh; Pashtoon; Zarghoon; Kohsan

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While assessing the activities to be undertaken at the provincial and district levels, a programme criticality for determining the level of risk will be undertaken by the UNDP Security Team in consultation with the project team and the Rule of Law Unit. The assessment will not be one off, but an on-going assessment during the implementation period of the project. Further, during the implementation period, some risk mitigation strategies would be included as accept, control, avoid and transfer. Using these strategies, the UNDP security team would provide regular support to the implementation teams at the national level and those UNDP staff at the provinces.

- Areas which have high threat and where the risk would be unmitigated this would be accepted in the planning cycle and close monitoring would be undertaken so that activities maybe implemented at a later stage without the need for any further mitigation measures.

- Where it is feasible, certain control measures will be undertaken such as additional escort from the ANP etc. to undertake missions at the provincial and district levels. Such decisions will be undertaken with detailed ground analysis and discussions with the project team.

- To ensure further mitigation, also other measures such as avoidance from potential targets while undertaking missions will be undertaken.

- For further risk mitigation sub-contracting and implementation through third party will be undertaken such as issuing contracts for regional coordinators from contracting companies. It is expected that this would also mitigate some of the risks and ensure implementation of the project at the provincial and district levels.

For smooth implementation of the security measures, these will be budgeted in the project budget. Prior to each activity or mission that will be undertaken; a series of questions will be assessed to come to a implementation modality: "How important is the activity?" "Will the anticipated gains justify accepting a high level of risk? “Has enough been done to lower the risk to a level that is reasonable to expect staff to take?" "Do we think that the risks we have identified are manageable?" Based on the responses and analysis of these questions, alternative options will also be considered to achieve the project goals. Conclusion Based on these criteria work will be undertaken in Herat, Bagdis, Ghor, Daikundi, Faryab (while using Herat as regional base); and in Samangan, Balkh, Kunduz, Takhar, Badakshan (while using Mazar a Sharif as regional base); and Panjshir, and Parwan (while using Kabul as regional base). In JHRA phase I extensive work has been undertaken in Nangarhar where concerted efforts would be continued. Similarly, during the first phase of the project, interventions supporting civil society groups and community based organisations where made across 12 provinces. Assessments will be made to identify where some handholding would need to be continued. Depending on the security situation, some interventions will

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also be introduced in Kandahar. In the first year work will be initiated in Herat, Mazar e Sharif and Nangarhar only. The Ministry of Justice and the leadership at the provinces will be requested during introductory meetings to identify the districts.

Geographical Area

JHRA phase 1

JHRA Phase II Project Total Expected Intervention Area 20152012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015

Provinces 12 3 8 14 28 Districts 42 12 40 56 112

6.3 Intended beneficiaries The key beneficiary of this project will be the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), which is the principal administrative organ within the government for justice affairs, other target beneficiaries will include: The Ministry of Justice The Supreme Court The General Attorney’s Office / Public Prosecution The Afghan Independent Bar Association The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission Community leaders in targeted districts and provinces Sub-national level government officials in targeted districts and provinces Civil society, non-governmental and women’s organisations Law students participating in law clinics, internship and scholarship programmes

Ultimately, it is the overall population of Afghanistan, with particular emphasis on vulnerable groups.

7 PROJECT STRATEGY

7.1 Outputs In line with the above described rationale and situation analysis, outcome and output areas have been formulated. The outcome and outputs support the National Priority Programmes (NPPs), in particular NPP 5 and 6 and are expected to contribute to the overall normative framework as outlined in Chapter 3. The outcome and outputs have been agreed by national and international partners for support in the context of the JHRA Phase II Project, as follows: Outcome: Afghans have increased trust in State justice and security institutions The outcome area is based on the assumption that trust is needed as a first goal for the coming four years so that eventually the social contract and State legitimacy can be restored so that the State can address injustices perceived by its citizens and therewith mitigate one of the biggest drivers of violence.

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The outcome area is aligned with the outcome area for the UNDP Rule of Law Strategy 2013-2016. The outcome also corresponds to the 5 year goal set by the Government in the Afghanistan Law and Justice for All Program (NPP 5): “To restore the faith of Afghans in the ability of the law to protect and defend their best interests as individuals and as a nation (NPP5)”. The outcome baseline will be established by UNDPs Rule of Law Cluster107 through the Rule of Law Indicators Study (ROLIS). The project will have a comprehensive multi-level approach to bring in change over a 3 year period in the intervention areas both at the national and sub national levels (the provincial and district levels). The project will be operational from January 2013 to December 2015 over a period of 36 months. While the project will be functioning within a larger political framework with multiple levels of external influences such as other projects operating within the same jurisdiction and institutions, however, within this complex frame, certain assumptions maybe made based on which interventions have been planned with potential indicators to measure change. The detailed are elaborated in Annexure V. The change process can be measured against time, in the target areas and against certain programmatic intervention. As discussed earlier, the JHRA project should be seen in the context of Transition and Transformation and in an environment where several projects both those of UNDP and of other agencies will be functioning within a specific jurisdiction or institution. Taken together the project is expected to contribute to social change processes or project level impact. The project level outcome of 3 years may have limited impact, but if implemented through the entire transformation period, impact maybe measured. As discussed in the paper on “Road map for change in justice sector through JHRA Phase II” it emphasizes on the need to identify champions of change both within the system of the justice sector institutions as well as those person in civil society in the country. With the various activities identified over the three year period, it is envisaged that the individual champions of change will be able to draw a network of people who can build a ground swell for quick trust building within the community and improved service delivery within the systems of the various justice institutions. Therefore while the outputs will be the establishing the activities and the expected results against each activity, the overall project objective will be to build trust amongst the Afghan people to use the state justice institutions which in turn will support the legitimacy of the state and the government.

Vulnerable Groups: In JHRA Phase II, vulnerable groups include women, children, differentially abled, youth, Afghan returnees, internally displaced persons, poor and landless persons and others.

Output 1: High-level coordination mechanisms for developing policy and legislation in accordance with international and national standards are established and functional in State justice institutions. (Draft NPP5 component 5.5 and 2.1).

107 These are the Law and Order Trust Fund in Afghanistan (LOTFA); JHRA Phase II Project; Afghanistan Integrity Initiative (AII); Gender Equality Project.

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This output will provide capacity development support for the administrative and coordination functions of the Secretariats of the Cabinet Boards (activity result 1.1), it will provide support to strategic planning, coordination and policy making processes (activity result 1.2). Further under this output, support will be provided to the Taqnin Department and the Translation Unit (activity result 1.3) and to the HRSU to support compliance of treaties and conventions and also ensure that laws adhere to human rights standards.

Further under this output coordinated work will be undertaken through the Rule of Law Cluster of UNDP with the AII project to provide technical support to the MoJ to address corruption in some key departments to improve the service delivery. This work has been detailed in the project document, however, has not been reflected in the results and resource framework as the financial support of this activity will be undertaken from the AII. JHRA will provide coordination and technical support to undertake this work.

Trust increases when the political leadership takes visible political actions that address injustices108. UNDP cannot influence political decision making. It can however develop capacities to facilitate coordination and substantive information-analysis among political decision-makers in the justice sector so they can make informed decisions. As reflected in NPP 5 and 6, coordination and information are needed to resolve gaps and bottlenecks that impede justice service delivery, of which some have been outstanding for many years.109 Presidential decree No. 62 established the Cabinet Boards on Legislation and Justice and Judiciary to resolve some of these issues. However at present the Boards lack the administrative support and information to hold informed discussions and make informed decisions. The Cabinet Board on Justice and Judiciary110

consists of: The Cabinet Board on Legislation111 consists of:

Chief Justice and Head of Supreme Court; M. of Justice

M. of Foreign Affairs M. of Interior Attorney General Head of justice and judicial Board for

President National Security Advisor G. Director of High Office for

Oversight

M. of Justice M. of Haj and Religious Affairs M. of Finance M. of Economic Affairs Director of Legal Advisory Board Office of M. of Parliamentary Affairs

Secretariat: Supreme Court / Director OAA Secretariat: Ministry of Justice / Director OAA of Preservation of Law and Legal Affairs

Activity Result 1.1: Increase capacity of the Legislation and Justice & Judiciary Cabinet Boards to enable sector-wide coordination and strengthen policy making. (Draft NPP 5 - 5.5 p 105)

108 See contextual analysis and CIC report, World Development Report 2011; BUSAN; 109 Draft NPP 5 – 5.5, p 105 110 Presidential Decree No. 62 111 Presidential Decree No. 62.

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The Secretariat of the Cabinet Board on Justice and Judiciary is provided by the Supreme Court. The Secretariat of the Cabinet Board on Legislation is provided by the MOJ Planning and Policy Department (PPD). Under Activity result 1.1 UNDP will provide equipment and capacity development support for the provision of the administrative and coordination functions of the Secretariat. This will include support to112: facilitate that meetings are held regularly and that results are formulated and

forwarded to the appropriate body; facilitate development of an inclusive mechanism to gather information/ concerns/

gaps from all relevant stakeholders in the justice sector about inter-institutional issues so that these issues can be effectively raised and solved;

facilitate the incorporation of sub-national issues into the meeting deliberations, solutions and action plans;

facilitate effective moderation of meetings so that there is consensus on formulating workable solutions to outstanding issues;

facilitate that outcomes of the meetings could serve as proposals for draft regulations, policies, procedures, and potentially proposed legislation;

facilitate monitoring and follow up on these proposals113. In addition to providing administrative functions as Secretariat for the Cabinet Board on Legislation, the MOJ PPD is responsible for the MOJ strategic planning and policy making processes and most of the government’s judicial policy formulation114. UNDP will support the latter function under activity result 1.2. The Supreme Court Secretariat of the Cabinet Board on Justice & Judiciary performs to date solely administrative Secretariat functions but is planning to activate a similar strategic policy formulation function, which UNDP will similarly support should this be the case. 1.2 Activity result : Strengthen MOJ policy making capacity through the Planning and

Policy Department (PPD).

At present the MOJ PPD has limited capacity to conceptualize, provide expert advice and inform the Ministry’s policy and law-making initiatives. Currently, the MOJ PPD is staffed with one staff member and a not-activated mandate. UNDP will provide technical and financial support to the MOJ in activating the PPD. The PPD will report directly to the Minister and Deputies, and will function as a channel for information by providing insights and linkages to other ministries, amongst others through its function as Secretariat of the Cabinet Board on Legislation. The PPD will also harness international expertise from progressive Islamic States and leverage on South-South cooperation. UNDP, UNAMA115 and other partners as the NATO Rule of Law Mission will support the PPD in the initiation of “ROLIS116” as an important tool to provide the MOJ and Cabinet Boards with substance and data to make informed policy decisions. The Minister has

112 NPP 5 Component 5.5 113 NPP 5 Component 5.5 114 NATO RoL Field Support Mission, Rule of Law Field Support Officer Deskbook, Guidelines and lessons learned for Military support to Justice Sector Development in Afghanistan, Camp Phoenix, Kabul, June 2012, p. 34 115 This is also in line with the recommendations of the End-Term JHRA Evaluation Report, recommending a stronger role for UNAMA and UNDP in coordination. 116 The RoLIS has been developed by DPKO and OHCHR between 2008-2011 in collaboration with UNDP and other UN agencies, and has subsequently been endorsed by the United Nations Secretary-General, the World Bank and member States as a UN system-wide tool to be initiatied by national governments and meant to enhance their capacities.

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expressed that one of his main challenges is the effective coordination of the multiple donors and partners working in the justice sector. To date the Minister lacks the overview and comprehensive data to monitor progress and to identify areas for which to request more support. The RoLIS will provide the Ministry with a tool to monitor performance and change over time and will provide a powerful instrument to inform policies and direct donor support. The ROLIS has been implemented in South Sudan, Liberia and Haiti. Unlike other baseline/M&E tools it is designed specifically for and to be implemented by national actors, with the aim to develop their M&E capacities. The ROLIS will be initiated and facilitated by the PPD but its main implementation will be done by independent civil society organisations such as the Afghan Center for Socio and Economic Opinion Research (ACSOR). In itself, the initiation of the ROLIS has already been a means for effective coordination and data collection. NATO has generously provided all its secondary data for this process. Also the UK, UNODC and the AIHRC have generously offered their data in support. Consultations to partner with the World Bank on the ROLIS study are ongoing. 1.3 Activity result : Increase the MOJ’s capacity to effectively reform law through the

Taqnin (including the Translation Unit) (draft NPP 5 component 4.1; 4.2; 4.4; NPP 6) (draft NPP 5 component 4.1; 4.2; 4.4)

This activity result details out the support which will be provided to legislative drafting including the translation of laws. Once political decisions are taken actions need to be translated into policies and institutional and legislative frameworks so that they can be sustained over the longer term, the State can be hold accountable against them and can give people the confidence they will not be reversed117. The World Bank through the JSDP EP project118 provides an important part of the institutional support focusing on reforming Justice Institutions (JI) organizational designs (functions, jurisdictions, organizations, structures, and procedures); and strengthening the JI’s critical capacities (focusing on human capital, equipment and physical infrastructure).

UNDP has a comparative advantage and added value in law reform, through its previous support to the HRSU, the Translation Unit (TU) and the Taqnin in JHRA phase 1. Afghanistan’s legislative framework119 is currently weak and fragmented and hinders to a large extent smooth operation of the Government and economic and social development in Afghanistan120. Examples of laws that are outstanding are laws such as the Law on Fuel and Gas; the Money Laundering Law; the Law of the Municipalities; the Law of Mines; the Banking Law; the Family Law; the Law on Salary of State Authority and the Law of NGOs121. 117 See contextual analysis; World Bank, 2011 World Development Report, 2011. 118 JSDP EP project, component 3: organization and capacity of justice institutions 119 NPP 5 component 4.4. currently the legislative framework holds a body of 431 laws. 120 NPP 5 121 MOJ, Taqnin table 2012.

Gender Dimension Output 1: While expanding the PPD and capacitating the Secretariats of the Cabinet Boards, emphasis will be paid on recruitment and working conditions (including retention and promotion) for women staff to increase women’s participation in national policy making. Further, the RoL Indicator study will collect disaggregated qualitative and quantitative data to reach a more detailed understanding of the justice and security needs of women and girls.

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One of the most important functions performed by the MOJ is through the Taqnin division that drafts laws to be reviewed by the National Assembly122. Before a law may be considered by the National Assembly, the Taqnin reviews the proposed law to make sure it is in accordance with the principles of both the Constitution and shari’a law. The Taqnin has been suffering from a backlog in outstanding laws. In addition, these laws need to be translated in Dari, Pashto,Arabic and English. In phase one of JHRA programming (2009-2012), one significant output has been the establishment of a TU within the MOJ. The TU began its full operations in late 2011, and has provided the Ministry with full Dari, Pashto, Arabic and English translations. The President acknowledged the work of the TU with the request to provide support across the Government. In 2011, 22 contracts and agreements were drafted by the unit. Between January and May 2012, 15 agreements and regulations have been drafted. However, it remained difficult for the TU and the Taqnin to resolve the outstanding backlog, partly because a large amount of staff time has to be used for the translation of donor agreements and contracts rather than outstanding laws. In the JHRA Phase II project, UNDP will provide capacity development support to both the Taqnin and the TU in the establishment of legislative and translation calendars to enable proper work-planning. The professional development of staff capacity123 including coaching and sharing of best practise for Taqnin and TU by MOJ staff from other jurisdictions will be facilitated specifically in the areas of bilingual drafting. Assistance will also strengthen the dissemination and availability of laws by improving the electronic law archive. UNDP will support the Taqnin and the TU to collect translations of laws undertaken by bilateral and other external and/or internal partners for adoption by the Government and to upload these on the electronic archive for public purposes. Finally, inter-departmental communication between the Taqnin, the Translation Unit and the HRSU will be strengthened to ensure efficiency in human rights compliant legislative drafting and bilingual translation. At present the Ministry does not undertake expert consultations for specific laws. In late June 2012, the Ministry has requested UNDP to provide expertise in the interpretation of global best practises in electoral laws. JHRA has been working with the ELECT Project of UNDP to provide the necessary expertise and support a series of consultations on the same. Further in 2011, a three day conference had been organised by the MOJ with the support of JHRA to discuss the criminal procedure code. This support would be continued as the Taqnin would be working with select legislations and policy documents which are of great national significance.

122 ISAF NATO, Rule of Law Field Support Officer Deskbook, 2012, p. 34 123 Rawkins and Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C4.6.16 found that the TU has experienced challenges in attracting staff with top credentials because the salaries offered are less than market rates. The evaluation also found however, that the TU has well-qualified staff that has the capability to improve.The MOJ is currently exploring the possibility of contracting the University of Kabul to organize a professional translation course to strengthen staff skills and knowledge base.

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Taqnin will develop a training for members of parliament to sensitize them on their role as legislator and to support more efficient parliamentary deliberations once the laws are send to parliament. To date, many laws are pending in parliament, as capacity is lacking to perform its legislative functions. Integrity, accountability and transparency of State institutions increased (Draft NPP 2) As explained earlier that under this activity, JHRA will be assisting the Afghanistan Integrity Initiative (AII) to undertake focused activities with the MoJ. This joint coordination between the JHRA-AII through the Rule of Law Cluster of the UNDP will aim in advancing public integrity and accountability. The activity results on accountability and transparency will be implemented by the Afghanistan Integrity Initiative which would also complement the activity result 2.3 which is related to and contributes directly to professional training for justice personnel which would aim towards increased integrity, accountability and professionalism of State institutions. Therefore this activity while implemented along with other activities of the JHRA project will together improve the service delivery of the justice institutions at the national and sub national levels. This activity result has not been reflected in the results and resource framework of this project document as the implementation will be undertaken by AII in collaboration with this project. As mentioned earlier in this document that one of the biggest frustrations and injustices perceived by the Afghan populations is corruption by some State officials124. In addition, one of the concerns that has been highlighted is those institutions responsible for justice have been identified as one of the most corrupt125. Hence, addressing corruption to reduce costs and to gain fair and equitable access to the justice systems and thereby increase trust of the Afghan people in the justice delivery institutions and government as a whole, is among the biggest increases in justice delivery that a justice project could contribute to. Prevention of corruption and establishment of transparent, accountable and well-functioning public institutions is necessary for the government to provide its citizens the public services they are entitled to. Improving accountability mechanisms within public institutions require a thorough understanding of institutional rules and regulations, administrative procedures, and managerial responsibilities and structures. UNDP has conducted a Vulnerability to Corruption Assessments (VCAs) of processes and procedures in a number of ministerial departments with the aim of improving institutional efficiency by diagnosing corruption “hot

spots” and designing rectifying measures. The leadership at the Ministry of Justice has

124 Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People, 2011, p. 96 125 Integrity Watch, Integrity Watch Survey Afghanistan, 2010

Gender Dimension: While capacitating the Taqnin and Translation Unit, emphasis will be paid on recruitment and working conditions (including retention and promotion) for women staff to increase women’s participation in national law making as per the recommendations of the JHRA End-Term evaluation (A8a). The HRSU currently has 4 women among the 12 staff members supported by UNDP. Among the 5 government employees in the Unit, 2 are women. Particular attention will be devoted to their professional development, promotion and retention. The HRSU will continue to support MOWA in assessing and attempting to strengthen the capacity in Gender and mechanisms for enhancing it in all government ministries and agencies. The HRSU will continue to devote particular attention to women’s rights and gender equality.

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shown keen interest to avail of UNDP’s experience to strengthen the ministerial oversight mechanisms in order to ensure a more open and effective provision of justice services which will be available quickly and more easily to the poor, ordinary and the most vulnerable in society. The purpose of this work is to improve justice services by establishing a Justice and Integrity Unit that would be responsible for reviewing prevailing processes and procedures in select departments within the Ministry of Justice to identify key vulnerabilities to corruption, and subsequently develop and implement vulnerability mitigation plans. The Ministry is keen on undertaking VCA in Huqoq Department, government cases department to mention a few. However, analysis is also necessary to understand how even small interventions can have greatest lessons and benefits for the MoJ. These learnings would be used to establish the Justice and Integrity Unit which would be responsible for the monitoring and implementation of the mitigation plans, while also periodically reassess the risks and update the plans. Another tool for the Justice and Integrity Unit is to advance justice services and improve ministerial integrity to create and manage a MOJ specific complaints mechanism. This mechanism would be responsible for detecting and investigating issues of corruption and maladministration as they are perceived and raised by ministerial staff. Once firmly established, the Justice and Integrity Unit is also anticipated to play a lead role in providing integrity management training to ministry staff. The purpose of which is to increase the knowledge about government policies on ethics and anti-corruption, and specifically, about rules and regulations pertaining to the Ministry itself. This activity result will be implemented by Afghanistan Integrity Initiative (Aii), in close coordination with the JHRA Phase II project team and other projects in the Rule of Law Cluster to improve the service delivery of the justice officials at the Ministry and at the sub national levels. Activity result 1.4: MOJ capacity for human rights compliant Government

policies and laws strengthened through HRSU (NPP 6)

The MOJ has the responsibility for ensuring human rights compliant policies, laws and practices, and for implementing recommendations from the International Human Rights Bodies and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission in conformity with the Constitution of Afghanistan126. The HRSU is the Ministry’s means of carrying out that responsibility. It was established in September 2011 with UNDP support and has been officially included in the MOJ’s Tashkeel of 1390. The HRSU reports directly to the Minister. Budget for 5 staff members of HRSU and administration costs are covered by the MOJ and the lease agreement for HRSU office space is signed by MOJ. The HRSU has an inter-ministerial function as it supports all Ministries in realization of human rights related tasks.

126 NPP 6, p. 20

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At the request of the Ministry of Education (MOE) and leveraging the potential of youth to bring about change127, HRSU in collaboration with AIHRC and UNICEF will support the MOE to integrate human rights perspectives and non-discrimination principles in the primary schools in line with the UN treaty bodies’ recommendations to the State. The research will focus on the content of textbooks to reveal whether men and women are equally represented and how men and women are depicted & portrayed in the texts. In addition, collaboration with UNICEF will continue on the Child Act. Relatedly the HRSU will establish a monitoring system to track the implementation of the right to education, as a first pilot and for extension to other rights. This M&E mechanism on right to education is for the purpose of tracking both the status and progress of treaty compliance from the duty bearers’ perspective. Planned activities include a rapid M&E capacity assessment of the HRSU team, the research and design of a manageable tracking system, on-the-job training of HRSU M&E Sub-Unit team, and the development of initial guidance materials to assist with the operationalization of the M&E mechanisms with relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Education, MOWA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and MOLSMD. Similar tools will be developed for United Nations Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Resolution 1325 to facilitate the process of Afghanistan’s Second State reporting to the Human Rights Committee. In the medium to long term, assistance will be provided to undertake consultation meetings with the relevant ministries, civil society groups and AIHRC to gather necessary data for the reporting process on State compliances. The HRSU will continue awareness raising and train the trainer trainings for MOJ, MOWA, MOI, AGO, SC and NDS officials on human rights, gender equality and Islamic values. These trainings have been evaluated well and in line with what was required to enhance the effectiveness of the work of the other ministries.128 The Train the Trainer package will target practicing staff of Training Units and Human Rights Units/Focal Points to address the technical and professional training needs in protection and promotion of human rights in their respective institutions and as relevant to the laws prioritized in the legislative calendar. UNDP will also support continuous capacity development of HRSU staff themselves129. Also, in response to the request of National Directorate of Security (NDS) and MoI, the HRSU will provide technical assistance to both institutions in developing guidelines on the rights of detainees in detention facilities. The HRSU will support its partners in producing and disseminating the guidelines among their relevant institutions. These activities will increase human rights awareness of the NDS and ANP on lawful treatment, the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment of detainees, and children. This effort will be undertaken with the UK Rule of Law Team and UNAMA. In close collaboration with the Taqnin the HRSU will also continue its legislative review work. The HRSU has reviewed over 100 national laws for their compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). HRSU will extend this work to cover all seven international 127 See context analysis. This also builds on previous JHRA work on trianing 465 teachers and 46,500 primary and secondary school students in human rights education. The independent mid-term evaluation team rated especially the children education programmes very high in output and successful impact. 128 Rawkins and Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C4.6.11. 129 As per the recommendations made by end-term evaluators see Rawkins and Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C5.6.6.

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conventions ratified by the Government of Afghanistan. Through coordination the HRSU and Taqnin Departments with, in the MOJ will identify a process by which all legislations and amendments developed will be scrutinized by the HRSU to ensure human rights standards are adhered thereby improving State compliance of treaties and conventions in the long term130. Together with the Taqnin a training module will be developed to sensitize parliament on their role in checking laws against human rights compliance. One of the key roles of the HRSU is to undertake capacity development. Currently, the Project and the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR) are discussing about the areas of possible collaboration for 2013-2014. The DIHR has an extensive experience in developing human rights capacity of state and non-state institutions in the region, such as Turkey, Yemen and Afghanistan. It has a pool of qualified human rights experts, who are ready to provide technical assistance to the HRSU in a number of fields, including development of national human rights structures, policies and procedures in the state institutions; legal review and research skills in analyzing the domestic laws in light of UN Human Rights instruments; human rights education and training of trainers. Preliminary discussions are underway to provide assistance in the state reporting processes of human rights and treaty obligations and DIHR is being considered as a potential responsible party. Other partnerships will also be explored to bolster the capacity of the HRSU staff and the partners during the period of the project. While the current HRSU is part of the Tashkil of the MoJ, efforts will be made to ensure its full integration with the other units of the MoJ. Also, coordination will be undertaken to ensure that the MOJ provides some budget for the HRSU and this maybe increased over the three year period. Output 2: Mechanisms for providing quality access to justice services to vulnerable groups are established and functional. (Draft NPP 5, component 1) This output will support the establishment of Legal Aid Grant Facility (Activity result 2.1); consolidation of State-non-State relationships (Activity result 2.2); and professional development for State justice providers (Activity result 2.3). As explained in PART ONE, one of the main impediments to access to justice in Afghanistan is the lack of trust in the justice institutions. Other factors are the distance and time needed to reach justice institutions, lack of understanding of the benefits of the formal system, the legal process and legal rights and expenses attributed to pursuing a legal case131. In JHRA project phase 1 efforts have been undertaken to increase access through public legal awareness and re-establishment of justice facilities. A total of 17 justice facilities have been rehabilitated in Badakhshan, Faryab, Jawzjan, Nangarhar, Kunar, Bamyan, Daykundi, and Panjshir132 and public legal awareness and education campaigns133 have been held in 12

130 Relationship between the Taqnin and the HRSU has been evaluated as a good after resolution of clarities in working relationship and mandate. See Rawkins and Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C5.6.9. 131 UNDP, Access to Justice Practice Note, 2004 132 They included a detention center including water bore well, a primary court building, four rehabilitated justice residential houses and 5 water bore wells. 133 For instance UNDP helped broadcasting and publishing 26 drama and 28 human rights programs through radio Nawa in Kabul and three local stations; 16 billboards on women and children rights in over 10 provinces; 8 TV and 8 Radio spots in Dari and Pashto for local radio; Legal Dramas, 2 presentations and 3 songs on Radio Nawa, with Saba Media Organization on local radios; 40000 brochures and 40000 posters on human rights at local level; open high attended (13000) theatre presentations on legal rights in 7 districts in Badakhshan and 7 in Jawzjan with FMG; UNDPs District Level Component DLC, in collaboration with HAM, a local NGO, has also trained 465 teachers and 46,500 primary and

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provinces. In addition, conferences on the Legal Aid Policy and Public Legal Awareness Strategy have been organized in Herat, Bamyan and Daykundi. In the JHRA Phase II Project efforts will focus on mitigating costs of pursuing legal cases while at the same time increasing trust by linking State justice institutions with independent134 non-State institutions135in order to increase case flow to State justice providers. Output 2 is mainly focused on the sub-national level. The project will initiate in the first year in 4 to 6 districts in Nangarhar and Herat province. Lessons learned from these initial interventions and consultation with the relevant actors at the sub-national level will determine the substantive course of the work for the following years. UNDP regional coordinators based at regional centres will coordinate each of the pilot provinces and districts and ensure information flow to the central level through UNDP engagement in the MOJ and SC (see Output 1). Depending on the success and the demand, this geographical focus will be expanded to cover other provinces and districts in accordance with the geographical criteria outlined above. Activity result 2.1: Establish independent legal aid grant facility and supporting mechanisms. (Draft NPP 5: 1.5, 2.5)

As stated in Draft NPP 5.1 the Government of Afghanistan is obliged to provide free legal aid for the economically disadvantaged. In order to meet this obligation the Legal Aid Department (LAD) of the MoJ is charged with providing free legal aid to economically qualifying citizens. The legal aid system completely disappeared under the Taliban regime, and has now been gradually build up by the LAD with support from the World Bank. The LAD provides a Government funded legal aid mechanism whereby legal aid is provided by Legal Aid Attorneys employed by the Ministry of Justice (hereafter MOJ Legal Aid Attorneys)136. It is important that this Government Legal Aid Mechanism will be further strengthened and supported and the World Bank will continue to do so in a comprehensive phase 2 of its justice programme. However, in complex, post-conflict environments with weak government institutions and low public trust in the State, complementary, independent137 and flexible systems, have been proven to be useful to provide quick impacts on people’s lives to accelerate reestablishment of trust. Accordingly and at the request of the Minister of Justice, UNDP will establish Legal Aid Grant Facility (LAGF) to enable all Attorneys registered at the Afghanistan Independent Bar Association (AIBA) to apply for legal aid for those cases that require financial support (hereafter Licensed Attorneys). These Licensed Attorneys may work on their own or may be employed by CSOs. In addition, non legal persons such as legal assistants and civil society officials, that have legal and alternative dispute resolution skills could be supported by the LAGF to work closer with the community on awareness, rights, empowerment and referal mechanisms to legal representation when necessary. The LAGF will encourage and secondary school students in human rights education. The independent evaluation team rated especially the children education programmes very high in output and successful impact. 134 See for an overview on State, independent and non-state justice providers table 1, on page 11. 135 See for an overview on State, independent and non-state justice providers table 1, on page 11. 136 The World Bank supports the institutionalization of an NGO, the International Legal Foundation, under the auspices of the Legal Aid Department, which will increase the number of Government Legal Aid officials. 137 See also, UN Guideline 16 of the Draft Guidelines on Strengthening Legal Aid, United Nations Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, E/CN.15/2012/24. Vienna April 2012

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facilitate taking up of cases from Huquq and the labour commission, DOWA, DOJ, MOI Family Response Units, Health Centers, legal help centres, 119, women’s networks, shelters, detention centers, prisons and MOLSAMD. Particular emphasis will be given to cases from women, prisoners, returnees and the labour force. In addition, and as a means to increase employment opportunities in the justice sector and to stimulate student-interest in the legal profession, the LAGF will seek to establish or enhance legal clinics at Kabul, Nangarhar, Herat, Mazar Universities. Paid internships will be provided and scholarships will be provided to women under the condition of servicing as a justice professional upon graduation. The fund will be administered by AIBA with the approval from the Legal Aid Board for proposals and periodic monitoring. The AIBA will receive capacity development support, including in the registration of cases that are taken up by Licensed Attorneys; the opening of provincial branches to increase its reach and in the provision of professional trainings on due process and the use of the LAGF to relevant stakeholders at the provincial/district level. In addition the AIBA and Legal Aid Board will be supported in the communication of data and issues to the MOJ PPD and Huquq department at the central level to inform policy and collect information. Activity result 2.2: Consolidate communication and coordination between State and non-State justice providers at provincial and district levels.

Interventions seek to increase participation and engagement of State justice and citizen security providers in non-State District and Provincial level consultation platforms. This builds on the example of Police-e-Mardumi consultations whereby UNDP LOTFA brings on a bi-monthly basis traditional leadership, including women representatives at the district level together with the National Police to discuss security matters and decide on action plans to be taken up by either police or the community leaders. The consultations are facilitated by civil society organisations (CSOs) that work towards action points that are registered,

monitored and followed-up on and discussed at the next consultation. The Police-e-Mardumi consultation platforms will be augmented with State justice providers to strengthen the justice-security linkage and resolution of in particular criminal justice issues. The use of other existing consultation platforms such as DDA’s, CPAN’s related matters will be explored for in particular civil matters. The consultations could be accompanied with training on the Constitution and relevant State laws for community leaders.

Gender Dimension Output 2:

The LAGF will provide part of its funding for women’s issues specifically. The LAGF will support cases

from women’s networks and shelters; it will provide scholarships for women; and facilitates employment

creation for women in the justice sector. In addition, the community level justice consultations will include

women’s representatives and the experience from the police‐e‐mardumi identifies that women’s cases

automatically feature in large parts of the consultations. Training materials for justice personnel will focus

particular attention on women’s rights as enshrined in the Constitution. SOPs will be developed for the

prosecution of sexual and gender based violence and domestic violence.

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As described in Part One, these increased relationships between the State and non-State institutions have the potential to generate considerable results in restoring trust and legitimacy of the State institutions while increasing access to justice in particular for women138. It is also expected that synergies/harmonies may be formed that bridge Afghan cultural and religious values into modern ideas about justice delivery in post-Taliban Afghanistan139. A lesson learned from police-e-mardumi is that the best results are obtained when central Government institutions are involved in the sub-national level work (See Case Study Box 4). Hence, to facilitate information flow between the sub-national and central levels, meeting minutes and action plans that will evolve from each consultation will be shared with the provincial and central level institutions, in particular with the MOI Community Policing Secretariat (when relevant for criminal matters), the MOJs PPD (see also Activity result 1.2) and the MOJ huquq department140. For the longer term, UNDP will explore possibilities to support the development of a more coherent framework for the relations between State and non-State institutions and expansion to the community level141. To that extent UNDP seeks to facilitate national consultations to generate knowledge on the topic in output 3 and to collect data and information in the ROLIS in activity result 1.2. UNDP will also closely collaborate and feed into the World Bank justice project that seeks to assist the Government in developing and implementing a 3-4 year provincial justice reform strategy, in which it seeks to include a road map for establishing community justice partnership142. Activity result 2.3: Enhance the professional capacity of State Justice service providers (including respect for due process).(Draft NPP 5: 3.1, 3.2)

Justice and security officials fulfil a key role in the society. They should not only have strong technical capabilities in investigation, legal application of the law and law enforcement processes; they should also act with the highest integrity and be able to exert judicial discretion and provide proper and independent judgment that is reflective of societal values and trends. In Afghanistan, the public perception of the State justice service providers is that they are largely corrupt, not acting in accordance with local values and norms,143 and often not in accordance with the Constitution144. Another cause of frustration and hopelessness is the lack of organic interaction between the justice and security institutions145 whereby Afghans feel bringing a case to police is a lost case in the absence of an integer judge and vice versa. UNDP is very well positioned to support the justice and security institutions in the professional training of their staff. Through its LOTFA, GEP and JHRA programmes experience and lessons learned have been acquired on the provision of policing trainings,

138 Harper, Working with Customary Justice Systems: Post-conflict and fragile states, IDLO, 2011; OECD DAC, Enhancing the delivery of justice and security, 2007; United Nations General Assembly Report of the Secretary General, Legal Empowerment of the Poor and Eradication of Poverty, 2009, A/64/133. OECD DAC, Enhancing the delivery of justice and security, 2007. DFID (2004), Non-State Justice and Security Systems, DFID, London. 139 Ali Wardak, State and non-State justice systems in Afghanistan: The need for Synergy, Journal of International Law 2011 140 The Huquq has the function to record decisions from the non-State justice system, such as Shura or Jirga decisions. 141 This cannot be achieved during the course of this project but as said preparatory work will be undertaken for future project development. 142 World Bank, Justice Service Delivery Project 2012, page 11 143 See contextual analaysis and ASIA Foundation., Afghanistan in 2010: A survey of the Afghan People, 2010, p. 134 144 Timothy Matthews, Trouble with the Law in Afghanistan, Yale Journal of International Affairs, October 2011 145 See contextual analysis and Ali Wardak, State and non-State justice systems in Afghanistan: The need for Synergy, Journal of International Law 2011

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gender sensitivity trainings, human rights trainings and trainings in family and land laws. In addition, good relations have been established with high quality146 local NGOs providing the trainings. However, evaluations pointed out that the training activities risked to be of short-term and ad-hoc nature. Accordingly, in the next project particular attention will be given to capacity development for national institutions that can provide trainings in a long-term and sustainable manner. Accordingly, the JHRA Phase II project will support the Independent National Legal Training Centre (INLTC) and the Supreme Court Stage programme in the development, review and coordination of training materials and resources for judges, prosecutors and Huquq staff and in professional skills assessments. In order to extend the reach of the INLTC, sub-national chapters will be established in Herat and Nangarhar Law Faculties which will be based on similar lines as the INLTC in Kabul. In conjunction with the INLTC, efforts will be made to build the capacity of the formal justice institution actors to provide legal education and training through existing legal institutions. This effort will build outreach to Afghan local and national leaders to enhance the administration of justice at the local level. This will also attempt to enhance communication and cooperation between the criminal justice institutions. In addition, the project will work with LOTFA in the provision of consolidated curriculum development and joint training exercises within the INLTC and National Police Academy (NPA) in order to promote better understanding of collaborative work between law enforcement and judiciary. Finally, the AGO office in Herat will be supported in the development and implementation and trainings of SOPs on the prosecution of corruption, sexual and gender based violence and domestic violence.

Output 3: Public participation processes and knowledge base for improving access to justice and human rights compliance established. This output provides the knowledge base for future project development (sub-output 3.1); for advocacy for issues to be placed on the Government and UNDPs agenda (sub-output 3.1 & 3.2); and for increased legal awareness (sub-output 3.3). Implementation and management arrangements for output 3 need to have a less direct link to the State. Output 3, with the exception of sub-output 3.3 is therefore off-budget – for practical reasons of project implementation. Activity result 3.1.: Facilitate national discussions and policy dialogues on socio-economic rights and community dispute resolution mechanisms. (Draft NPP 5: 5.6)

UNDP has a responsibility to ensure that policy-making processes remain sensitive to people’s development needs and wider conflict prevention and peace-building considerations. This sub-output is based on the assumption that socio-economic rights and linkage of community dispute resolution mechanisms with the formal system are two topics that are high on the people’s agenda, but under-represented on the national political agenda.

146 Rawkins and Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C1.7.1.

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Almost on a monthly basis, public demonstrations take place on socio-economic rights related issues, notably on land issues and unemployment147. Public perception surveys and stakeholder interviews148 confirm that these issues are considered among the top problems at the national level and sub-national level149. Consultations with national civil society partners150 confirm that people who live and work in the informal sector find that they are presently unable to rely upon the law and justice institutions to protect their assets, homes, or businesses and cannot benefit from international labour standards or a well-functioning system of land tenure and property rights. Global rule of law research asserts a causal connection between justice, national economic resilience and development.’151 As previously stated, economic disenfranchisement has been identified as driver of both political conflict and extreme levels of organised crime152 – problems that simultaneously carry with them high economic and development costs.153 Knowledge on the exact nature of the problems and how justice sector support can address them is however limited globally and specifically for Afghanistan. Also in the Afghan political arena limited national discussions on the issue take place. Similarly, discussions on community dispute resolutions, once featuring high on the Afghan political agenda, are not discussed at political level anymore. Understanding of those systems and their linkage to the Government institutions is however considered imperative for further development of the justice systems. UNDP will support the facilitation of research, national round-tables, discussion fora, and seminars as per the example of the security seminars (See Case Study Box 2) to generate knowledge, inform future programming and provide for a channel to lobby and advocate for these topics. UNDP through output 1 will also seek to ensure inclusion of data collection on the topics through the ROLIS. This output will also closely link to outputs 3.1 and 3.2 where the CSOs and networks of legal aid could be used for legal empowerment through enabling people’s awareness on the issue; supporting them in finding concrete solutions to issues (legal and non-legal); as well as linking up their experiences to the more high end advocacy work that impacts on public interest litigation, policy making and legislative changes. Organizations, such as the Human Rights Research and Advocacy Council (HRRAC) and the Afghanistan Land Consulting Organisation (ALCO), will be invited to the consultative process. A large part of the work would also be partnered with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) specifically on the advocacy of the labour laws. Activity result 3.2: Increase advocacy and monitoring capacity of CSOs, media, think-tanks and the AIHRC. (NPP 6, component 4)

In May and July 2011, a Capacity Assessment of the AIHRC as part of the “Regional Initiative in Support of the Capacity Development of National Human Rights Institutions in Asia-Pacific”, was held as a joint initiative of UNDP, the Asia Pacific Forum of National

147 See Rawa news – e-newspaper on “the reality of life in Afghanistan”: http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/ 148 The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2009, 2010 p. 21; Human Rights Research and Advocacy Council, Fight Poverty to End Insecurity: Afghan Perspectives on Insecurity, 2009 and Oxfam, The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, November 2009. 149 UNDP BCPR Strategy Formulation Mission January 2012. 150 The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2009, 2010, p. 21; Human Rights Research and Advocacy Council, Fight Poverty to End Insecurity: Afghan Perspectives on Insecurity, 2009 and Oxfam, The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict, November 2009. 151 S. Haggard, A. MacIntyre and L. Tiede, The Rule of Law and Economic Development, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2008.11: 205-234. 152 World Bank, World Development Report 2011, 2011, p. 80. 153 Ibid, at p. 65.

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Human Rights Institutions (APF) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The assessment provides a number of recommendations that would need to be activated through an action plan that will be developed in collaboration with UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok. In addition, in May 2012, the NIBP project of UNDP Afghanistan has assisted in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the National Human Rights Commission of India (NHRC) and the AIHRC to facilitate “twinning” and mutual learning of the two organisations. The AIHRC is keen to activate this MOI and undertake exchange programmes, and staff immersion with the HRCI. One area that will be explored as part of this partnership will be the development of investigations capacity and the development of a coordination mechanism with the judiciary. Further the AIHRC is keen to undertake its first National Enquiry on violence against women and will be using this report for the Shadow reporting process to the Human Rights Committee on resolution 1325. The AIHRC has been restrained due to lack of support to attend the hearings of the Human Rights Committee. However, since the second State report on ICCPR and UNCAT are expected in June 2014 and the periodic report of ESCR in 2014, the project will support the AIHRC in the shadow reporting process. This work is in close complementarity to the HRSU’s work in sub-output 1.3 and contributes to ensuring the project’s balance in its support to State and non-State systems.

Similarly, this output seeks to strengthen citizen and civil society voice and engagement with respect to justice issues generally and the JHRA Phase II Project activities specifically. In collaboration with UNDP sub-national governance cluster it will seek to support civil society – as users of justice services and civil society representatives – to articulate local needs and priorities and generate knowledge. It will support them on the one hand to direct UNDP programming and on the other hand to actively and constructively engage with justice institutions to participate in decision-making and ultimately hold justice institutions accountable for the quality and effectiveness of the services they provide.

UNDP will support the generation of knowledge through national, regional and global knowledge networks and engage CSO’s, media, think tanks in programmatic and policy discussions to generate white papers and judicial reviews. Particular attention will be paid to the inclusion of youth associations, women’s organisations, media and ulema’s and elders154. In addition, regional networks will be included to facilitate regional understanding and knowledge sharing. Activity result 3.3 : Strengthen the public’s awareness of human rights and the

role of the justice system through the MoJ Legal Awareness Unit and media institutions (Draft NPP 5: 1.6)

154 See also UNDP Afghanistan, Sub-National Governance Strategy, p. 20.

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Civic education activities empower rights holders to ask for their rights. It is both an indispensable element for access to justice but also one of most productive methods of enhancing Government accountability. Paradoxically, however, public legal awareness can be counterproductive and decrease trust if citizens know about their rights but there is no way to achieve them. This risk is mitigated if civic education is performed by Government institutions themselves. Increasing the frequency of communication between justice institutions and the public may not only make their performance more accountable but is also a critical part of rebuilding trust. While there has been a large amount of public legal awareness trainings and materials in Afghanistan, these have been mainly on predetermined topics, provided by bilateral and

multilateral actors and not by Government institutions themselves. Building on previous UNDP support in the area155 and as per draft NPP 5.1.6, UNDP will therefore develop the capacities of the MOJ Public Legal Awareness Unit to facilitate a Public Legal Awareness Coordination Board with MoJ, AGO, SCt, MoE, MoI, MoM&C, MoWA, MoHajj and AIHRC with branches at the provincial levels to establish consistent messaging down to the sub-national level. This board will be supported in conducting a mapping and needs assessment to define the topics for public legal awareness156; coordinate public legal awareness materials and develop a communications strategy and PLA implementation plan. The Board will explore initiatives to undertake sector mapping, perception surveys and media monitoring and review existing media products against the Constitution and human rights. A channel for CSO engagement will be established and partnerships with the private sector will be explored to ensure sustainability.

155 Under its 2009-2012 Justice and Human Rights Programme, UNDP provided support to National Legal Awareness Strategy (NLAS) and Operational Manual; the National Conference on Public Legal Awareness and Legal Aid; two provincial consultation workshops on the NLAS in Bamiyan and Daykundi; a workshop with local justice providers in Bamiyan to inform future JHRA public legal awareness programming; development of trainings and communications materials on legal rights, with a focus on human rights and gender targeting religious leaders, teachers, students and the general public in Nangarhar, Kunar and Bamiyan provinces; a communication and stakeholder outreach training session with CACSS to support the development of a strategic mass media public legal awareness campaign. 156 As per the recommendations made by end-term evaluators see Rawkins and Mohammad, End-Term JHRA evaluation, 2012, C3.

Gender Dimension Output 3: Those elements under output 3 that facilitate increase of women justice personnel through scholarships for women and paid internships are expected to contribute directly to output 4, as public perception surveys suggest that Afghans trust female justice providers to be more integer than male. A large part of the support provided to the AIHRC will focus on violence against women and resolution 1325.

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Output 4 Project Support Unit: Internal oversight, monitoring and evaluation capacity in place.

Activity result 4.1 : Ensure project support is conducted in a timely and compliant

manner

Under this output high quality management services and project oversight will be provided through yearly, mid-term and end term reviews of project activities. Also review and analysis of project progress through regular internal assessments through monthly team meetings;

cluster meetings of UNDP will be undertaken. This component will also provide coordination amongst all components of the projects and provide leads and linkages. This will also be the business hub for the project components, technical experts seeking assistance and project related services. This output will also assist in providing logistical services including transport, security advise, technical support for procurement, technical advise in project development etc.

Activity result 4.2: Develop comprehensive monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems. (Draft NPP 5)

Monitoring and evaluating the impact of assistance activities is essential for UNDP to adjust and inform programming but also for national counterparts to monitor chance in justice sector development, impact of assistance activities and to direct UNDP and other aid providers. However, in spite of increasing international experience in this field, justice sector development possesses numerous challenges when it comes to effecting meaningful change157. Collecting baseline and regular follow-up data, and developing the capacity of national counterparts to monitor progress in the justice sector is therefore critical. It also allows assistance to be carefully tailored to the country context, taking account of shifting realities and mitigating the risk of harm. Accordingly, output 4.2 will provide for overall project M&E to assess impact and results of project activities and fulfil the project’s monitoring and reporting requirements as outlined in the M&E framework. The project will conduct review in three stages with the support of

157 UNDP, Global Rule of Law Programme 2012-2014

Gender Dimension Output 4: Monitoring and Evaluation initiatives will as much as possible collect gender segregated data to increase understanding of women’s issues. In addition, particular emphasis will be placed on the inclusion of women’s networks and women’s groups in the consultation and discussion fora. In the Public Legal Awareness work, 30% of the messaging will be focused on women and girls through effective coordination with the Public Legal Awareness Unit of MoJ, AIHRC, MOWA and other ministries. While undertaking perception survey or impact assessment of the media campaign, emphasis will be placed on women’s perception on justice and human rights and their assessment of the media campaign.

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Bureau of Crises Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)/UNDP as technical partners for conducting evaluation and review based on global UNDP processes in other conflict and post conflict countries. In addition, it will also support M&E and baseline efforts that are incorporated in all four project outputs as part of capacity development for the national counterparts158. 5.1 Partnerships and coordination strategy National partners Main partners are the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the Supreme Court (SC) and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) at all levels. However, through inter-ministerial work of the MOJ HRSU and the Taqnin and the work with the Cabinet Boards, partnerships are established with other line ministries, including the MOFA, Ministry of Interior Affairs (MOI) and Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA). Independent partners include the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the Afghan Independent Bar Association (AIBA). In addition the project will have a large number of continued159 and new partnerships with national civil society organisations. The project will also establish partnerships with community leaders in non-State systems such as those provided through PDCs, CDCs, CPANS and Police-e-Mardumi consultation platforms. Coordination will take place through the project board, on a daily basis during project implementation and through the civil society consultation platforms that will be established under output 4. United Nations partners including World Bank As previously explained160, UNAMA and UNDP cooperation has regained focus in the context of the UNDP/DPKO Global Focal Point arrangements on rule of law. For the JHRA PHASE II project UNAMA and UNDP initiated an explicit partnership whereby UNAMA and UNDP jointly support the Government in the initiation of the Rule of Law indicator Study (see output 1). UNAMA will also provide overall political and coordination support to the project as per UNAMAs mandate161. UNDP has been closely coordinating with the World Bank162 to ensure complementarity in project activities and collaboration on strategic issues such as the RoLIS, knowledge generation and sub-national level justice service delivery work.

158 This holds in particular for support to the design and implementation of the RoL indicators study; the legislative archive for MOJ Taqnin/ Translation Unit/PPD; the design and implementation of the M&E tools for MOJ HRSU; the standardization of a centralized database for registration of cases taken up by Licensed Attorneys registered by AIBA; the establishment of qualitative media-monitoring and perception audits within the MOJ Public Legal Awareness Unit. 159 JHRA phase 1 established a large number of partnerships with civil society organisations such as Humanitarian Assistance Muska (HAM) the Educational Training Centre for Poor Women and Girls of Afghanistan (ECW), the Saba Media Organization (SMO) and the Feroogh Media Galaxy (FMG). 160 See page 11. 161 SC Resolution… 162 The World Bank has the largest project in the justice area

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Other partnerships and forms of collaboration are being established with ILO in the area of labour rights; UNICEF in the area of the right to education; UNODC in the collection of data; and UNWOMEN on women’s issues. Bilateral and Inter-Governmental partners, international NGOs and other international assistance providers As recognized by the United Nations Civilian Capacities Review, the United Nations should leverage partnerships with a broad range of partners to leverage programme impact. To that extent, UNDP has developed a preliminary mapping in order to understand better present and planned areas of engagement of international assistance providers in the justice field in Afghanistan and has framed the new phase of the justice programming in a complementary way163. To ensure continuous coordination and avoidance of duplication, UNDP will continuously ccoordinate with these partners through donor coordination mechanisms such as US led Inter-Agency Rule of Law (IROL) Coordination Meeting, the Board of Donors co-chaired by US and UNAMA, EU donor coordination meetings and Coordination Boards as related to the NPPs and other nationally donor coordination mechanisms. Partnerships will be developed with specialized organisations such as the International Development Law Organization. Related to the project, UNDP will have its own donor coordination and consultation forum. UNDP internal coordination UNDP Country Office Afghanistan: The JHRA project is embedded in and contributes to UNDPs longer term Rule of Law Strategy for Afghanistan which will cover the period of Transformation (2013-2024) in a comprehensive coordinated sector-wide approach. The Rule of Law Cluster is the coordination mechanism in the Country Office for the Rule of Law Strategy and consists of the following projects and units: Gender Equality Project, the Afghanistan Integrity Initiative, the Law and Order Trust Fund and the UNDP Policy Unit, Project Oversight Unit, External Relations Unit, Security Unit. The projects provide substantive coherence and crucial linkages with the MOI and institutions dealing with women’s issues and anti-corruption. The units support knowledge products, project oversight, donor relations and programme criticality for the geographical areas of intervention. Some activities will be specifically implemented through the Rule of Law Cluster such as research, discussions which will test new ideas to establish strong justification to be implemented through the project. Also some of the research papers would help to consolidate the coordination and information sharing between the projects. The Rule of Law Strategy and Cluster are for their part closely linked to UNDPs Sub-National Governance; Inclusive Politics; and Poverty Clusters164. This is in line with recent discussions led by fragile and conflict-affected countries in the context of the New Deal that concluded that ‘legitimate politics, security, justice, livelihoods’ should be the focus areas for international support. Further in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, governance,

163 See Strategic Review Mission Report of January 2012 164 This is also in line with recent discussions led by fragile and conflict-affected countries in the context of the New Deal that concluded that ‘legitimate politics, security, justice, livelihoods’ should be the focus areas for international support.

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rule of law and human rights have been clearly identified with goals to improve access to justice for all, in particular women, by ensuring that the Constitution and other fundamental laws are enforced expeditiously, fairly and transparently; ensure that women can fully enjoy their economic, social, civil, political and cultural rights; fight against corruption, including strengthening counter-narcotics efforts; and improve the capacity of state institutions. The JHRA Phase II project has commitments to work with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and civil society organizations to perform their appropriate functions and work with national institutions. Further coordination and support would also be undertaken with the Programme Support Unit, External Relations, Oversight and Compliance Unit and Security Unit (details on coordination provided in section on geographical focus). The monitoring of projects is currently being undertaken by the Programme Support Unit. Based on the Strategic Review mission in January 2012 from HQ, an Oversight and Compliance Unit was proposed and Terms of Reference was subsequently developed and the unit is currently being established. The unit will effectively address oversight issues and put risk mitigation measures in place across all projects including JHRA. Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR): BCPRs Rule of Law, justice and security Unit provides financial support, quality control and expertise through its staff members, its Global Rule of Law Programme and its Express Roster. 5.2 Sustainability and exit strategy The concept of sustainability is enshrined in the principles that guide all interventions envisaged under the present project. Aside from interventions to be implemented to (re)build the trust of the people in the justice institutions, the project looks at longer term interventions that ensure sustainable establishment of democratic governance and rule of law. In the current context, there is a need for supplementary technical assistance through international and national advisors (particularly for training and institution building), as well as for external funding support to kick-start projects during the transition. However, the project is based on lessons learnt from previous initiatives, and is supporting further development of pilot activities, leaving enormous scope for “replicability” and scaling-up. The project will also support the development of strategic planning, in partnership with key stakeholders to ensure that the identified project activities are in line with the country’s strategic priorities for the transition period and beyond. Staff development and participation of stakeholders in all aspects of the project activities will be ensured. The JHRA PHASE II requires deployment of international and UNDP paid national personnel as well as UNDP support for certain administrative functions (through a letter of agreement with the implementing partner) at the beginning of the project. As capacity development is one of the objectives of the Programme and given limited capacity of government institutions, it must be acknowledged that full-scale technical assistance through international and national advisors will be necessary throughout the 36 month period, particularly for training, institution building and making access to justice programming realistic.

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An appropriate strategy for phasing out of these personnel as well as administrative functions will be formulated through consultation with national counterparts after 15 months of project implementation to identify processes and mechanisms for implementation and handing over to MOJ by the end of the 36 months of the project. As discussed earlier, a letter of agreement will be undertaken with the MOJ along with budget which will have funds transferred to of the Ministry of Finance to the MoJ budget. On an annual basis an assessment will be undertaken to assess the utilisation of funds, reporting etc. Based on this assessment more funds maybe channelized using on budget and off treasury mechanisms. Also, the demand for suggested and/or additional personnel is expected to fluctuate, depending on the Transition and Transformation periods. Thus, there will be room for flexibility not only in implementing the project, but also in applying the exit strategy, paying great attention to the needs and requests coming from the justice sector institutions, civil society actors and others. The exit strategy will be revisited and discussed regularly with beneficiaries as well as bilateral donors and relevant UN agencies working in the sector during the 36 month implementation period. The exit strategy would be defined after a thorough capacity development planning exercise for the Ministry of Justice has been conducted and endorsed by the relevant project stakeholders. The Cabinet Boards will also be involved in this process.

Activities for Exit Strategy Timeline Capacity assessment of MOJ Q1 of Project Consultation process initiated with national counterparts on exit strategy; draft exit strategy developed

After 15 months of project initiation

Draft Exit Strategy revisited and discussed with beneficiaries, donors and relevant UN agencies

After 36 months of project initiation

5.3 Risk mitigation strategy Drawing from the lessons of the previous phase of JHRA Phase I and taking into account its growing extent and scope in the current phase which will also cover the transition period, it can be anticipated that the Khadamat Adli may face substantive risks and challenges in the implementation of the project activities, with potential for partial or non-realization of some intended outputs. Therefore, it becomes important to foresee and analyse the potential risks and the measures required to mitigate such risks. The specific risks emanating from the external environment that may affect the project implementation together with the risk mitigation measures are outlined in the chart below, in no particular order or priority. These risks will be observed and regularly updated according to the changing situation. At the same time, there is explicit recognition on the part of Khadamat Adli that the ultimate responsibility and ownership of process lies with MOJ and MOF, which are the key nodal government implementing partners, and that Khadamat Adli can only play a facilitation and support role rather than being in a decision-making position.

54

Risk Mitigation Measures Transition phase in 2014 Close coordination will be undertaken with all

national and international actors to map security risks and undertake joint programming and coordination wherever permissible.

Lack of security in provinces and districts in which UNDP will carry out programming continues to impede project implementation. Subsequently, in addition to implementation, the security situation has also had particular impact on the project’s ability to monitor activities through field assessments.

The project has and will establish strong partnerships with civil society and other partners on the ground. The project will coordinate closely with provincial- and regional-level government partners to increase feedback and data on the impact of UNDP field activities and develop a computerized database for collection of field data to support this.

Funding gaps during project implementation, with potential for immediately risking the ability of the project to produce required outputs.

Promptly alert all major donors about the potential funding shortage, with a view to securing a financial buffer. Identify priority outputs.

Lack of confidence of donors in accountability and transparency of the UNDP mechanisms, risking withdrawal or reduction of contributions.

(a) Significantly improve the monitoring mechanism both in terms of financial tracking systems and on ground verification of activities; (b) establish project baselines and tools (c) Use government channels and offices for verification of activities (d) strengthen UNDP CO Project Assurance role

Insufficient ownership by the designated institution risking full sustainability of UNDP processes.

(a) Establish mechanisms for interventions vis a vis MOJ for greater govt participation in decision making; (b) develop specialized on-job and advanced training for central and provincial MOJ officials with aim of setting up institutional management structures; (b) focus on training of trainers (ToTs) for longer-term sustainability of resource base; (d) encourage project staff to work with the relevant departments of MOJ to ensure skill transfers and progressive hand-over of functions

Resignation of project staff for more lucrative job opportunities, impacting on project implementation activities and risking full achievement of Outputs

(a) Provide performance incentives to staff; (b) provide specialised training opportunities.

Non-implementation of Exit Strategy for JHRA, risking sustainability of activities

(a) Continue to make concerted efforts with GOA and donors towards greater ownership and handing over of administrative and policy functions (b) enforce consequences for non-realization of agreed upon commitments

Systemic constraints in gender recruitments and women’s group coordination at the central, and sub-national levels risking non-achievement of gender targets

(a) Periodically access UNDP gender recruitment plan with MoJ (b) involve civil society organisations to build outreach to women’s groups (c) continuously involve women MPs for influence in their constituencies ;

Partner capacity may risk programme delivery.

(a)Implementation needs to take capacity and available resources into account through capacity analysis of partnering institutions (b) A

55

detailed capacity development plan throughout the implementation period will provide expertise to maximize results.

5.4 Monitoring and evaluation strategy

The project will be executed by UNDP under the overall supervision of the Project Steering Committee. Relevant government ministries and other partners, other UN Agencies, as well as NGOs, will be consulted with regard to the implementation of the activities specified in Annual Work Plans (AWPs). In accordance with the programming policies and procedures outlined in the UNDP User Guide, the JHRA PHASE II project will be monitored through the following: A quarterly quality assessment shall record progress towards the completion of key

results. An Issue Log shall be activated in Atlas and updated by the Project Manager, with

support from the M&E specialist, to facilitate tracking and resolution of potential problems or requests for change.

Based on the initial risk analysis, a risk log shall be activated in Atlas and regularly

updated by reviewing the external environment that may affect the project implementation.

Based on the above information recorded in Atlas, a Project Progress Reports (PPR)

shall be submitted by the Project Manager to the Project Board through Project Assurance, using the standard report format available in the Executive Snapshot.

A Project Lessons Learned Log shall be activated and regularly updated to ensure

on-going learning and adaptation within the organisation, and to facilitate the preparation of the Lessons Learned Report at the end of the project.

A Monitoring Schedule Plan shall be activated in Atlas and updated to track key management actions/events.

In addition to this on-going monitoring, the project will conduct reviews in three stages with the support of BCPR/UNDP as technical partners for conducting evaluation and review based on global UNDP processes in other conflict and post conflict countries. The three stage review will include: Stage 1: Strategic Review Report: This review will be an internal process conducted at the end of fourteen months in partnership with BCPR/UNDP. It will be an opportunity to review the progress to date, provide recommendations for the continuation of the project and strategize with the national counterparts and the UNDP country office to address challenges impacting the project. The team will interview all relevant stakeholders in order to ensure a full range of perspectives are included.

56

Year 1 Review Report: A Review Report of the 1st year of the programme shall be prepared by the Project Manager and shared with the Project Board to feed into the Strategic Review Report. As a minimum requirement, this Annual Review Report shall consist of the Atlas standard format for the quarterly progress report covering the whole year with updated information for each above element of the quarterly progress report. Stage 2: Mid Term Evaluation Report: The interim report will be an external evaluation that will take place at the end of the 2nd year (24 months). This will be an opportunity to highlight the progress of the project and the initial impact of the intervention. It will be a more detailed evaluation focusing more on impact and progress than strategy. While recommendations will cover all aspects of the project implementation process, it will be focused on capturing lessons learned and best practice. Stage 3: End Term Evaluation Report: The production of the End Term Evaluation Report will be conducted with the assistance of external evaluation agency/independent consultants after December 2015. The reporting will involve all stakeholders and implementing partners, to assess the achievement of expected outputs and alignment with appropriate outcomes. The review will serve to assess programme performance and thus allow corrective and/or follow-up action to ensure all outputs and desired achievements are met. Donor reporting: The project will submit regular reports to donors in line with the obligations of any agreements entered into with bilateral partners. In addition, the project will support the overall donor reporting requirements of the UNDP Country Office. Corporate reporting requirements: The project will contribute to all mandatory corporate reporting requirements in under the relevant priority areas of the UNDP Annual Business Plan (in particular ABP Priority 6) and UNDP’s results oriented annual reporting (ROAR) targets. It may also be expected to feed into reporting under BCPR’s multi-year results framework (MYRF) as appropriate. The initial gender marker rating of the project will be reviewed annually. Quality Management for Project Activity Results

Output 1: High‐level coordination mechanisms for developing policy and legislation in accordance with

international and national standards are established and functional in State justice institutions.

Activity Result 1.1

(Atlas Activity ID)

Increase capacity of the Legislation and Justice & Judiciary Cabinet Boards to enable sector‐wide coordination and strengthen policy making.

Start Date: Jan 2013

End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

To develop coordination mechanisms and identified issues for MoJ and Supreme Court

for policy change at Cabinet Boards.

Description

Strategic Policy and Planning Unit (with Advisory Board & Justice Integrity Unit)

operational in the Ministry of Justice. (NPP 5: 4.1, 5.1, 5.2). Issues identified and linked

from the provincial and national levels with rule of law actors to policy making levels.

Quality Criteria

Number of policy notes provided by the MOJ PPD to the Minister

Quality Method

‐RoL indicators study and at least one

annual assessment report

Date of Assessment

Strategic Review: March

2014

57

Interim Review: Jan 2015

Final Review: After Dec

2015

Activity Result 1.2

(Atlas Activity ID)

Strengthen MOJ policy making capacity through the Planning and Policy Department (PPD).


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

To develop capacity of MoJ and coordination amongst rule of law

actors

Description

Strategic Policy and Planning Department operational in the

Ministry of Justice. (NPP 5: 4.1, 5.1, 5.2)

Quality Criteria

Performance evaluation tools on service delivery for justice sector institutions developed and applied.

Quality Method

RoL indicators study and at least one

performance evaluation report.

Date of Assessment


2014



2015

Activity Result 1.3

(Atlas Activity ID)

Increase the MOJ’s capacity to effectively reform law through the Taqnin (including the Translation Unit).


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

To develop mechanisms for coordination between the Taqnin and

Translation Units to streamlined development of legislations.

Description

MoJ Translation Unit integrated into the MoJ Tashkeel and

contributes to the institutional development of the MoJ. (NPP 5:

5.6)

Quality Criteria

Annual translation & legislative calendars activated

Quality Method

‐Stakeholder review

‐Strategic review

‐ Interim review

‐ final review;

Date of Assessment


2014



2015

Activity Result 1.4

(Atlas Activity ID)

Strengthen the MOJ’s capacity to produce human rights compliant Government policies and laws through HRSU.


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

To ensure compliance of treaties and conventions ratified by

Afghanistan

Description

Laws, legislative proposals and policies compliant with human

rights. (NPP 5: 4.1)

Quality Criteria Quality Method Date of Assessment

58

Focal points or human rights units established in select ministries and government institutions

‐‐Stakeholder review

‐Strategic review

‐ Interim review

‐ final review;


2014



2015

Output 2: Mechanisms for providing quality access to justice services to vulnerable groups are

established and functional. (NPP 5, component 1)

Activity Result 2.1

(Atlas Activity ID)

Establish independent legal aid grant facility and supporting mechanisms.


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

To expand legal aid services

Description

Legal Aid Trust Fund established to strengthen the quality and

availability of legal aid services provided through the Ministry of

Justice. (NPP 5: 1.5, 2.5)

Quality Criteria

One Legal Aid Action Plan developed.

No. of activities undertaken under the Legal Aid Trust Fund established.

One capacity development coordination mechanism established and activities conducted.

Quality Method


‐Strategic review

‐ Interim review

‐ final review;

Date of Assessment


2014



2015

Activity Result 2.2

(Atlas Activity ID)

Consolidate communication and coordination between State and non‐State justice providers at provincial and district levels.


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

Rule of Law actors and community leaders engagement for

improved justice delivery at the local levels

Description

Provincial and district level platforms are built between justice

providers and community leaders through using existing platforms

such as the Police‐e‐Mardumi system, CPANS etc

Quality Criteria

Monthly meetings between justice sector actors and key local leadership organized to ensure coordination and enhanced flow of information between the institutions.

Number of cases introduced in the formal justice system.

Support provided to traditional leaders to keep record of cases brought to them and decisions

Quality Method


‐Strategic review

‐ Interim review

‐ final review;

Date of Assessment


2014



2015

59

rendered by them to enable efforts to align resolution of disputes with the human rights of parties involved in those disputes.

Enhanced information flow between police and Huquq at the district level to ensure case flow and coordination

Activity Result 2.3

(Atlas Activity ID)

Enhance the professional capacity of State Justice service providers (including respect for due process).


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

Improve the coordination amongst formal justice service providers

Description

Justice training programmes provided to RoL stakeholders through

government training units, the NLTC model and law faculties.

(NPP 5: 3.1, 3.2)

Quality Criteria

No. of curriculum developed for

training programmes for justice

providers.

Quality Method


‐Strategic review

‐ Interim review

‐ final review;

Date of Assessment


2014



2015

Component 3: Public participation processes and knowledge base for improving access to justice and human

rights compliance established.

Activity Result 3.1

(Atlas Activity ID)

Facilitate national discussions and policy dialogues on socio‐economic rights and community dispute resolution mechanisms.


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

Socio economic issues in access to justice identified in Afghanistan

especially those linked to labour deficit and land rights.

Description

National consultations coordinated to address socio‐economic

issues in peace building in Afghanistan. (NPP 5: 5.6)

Quality Criteria

No. of national experts coordinated on informal employment sector and land rights issues.

Quality Method


‐Strategic review

‐ Interim review

‐ final review;

Date of Assessment


2014



2015

Activity Result 3.2

(Atlas Activity ID)

Increase advocacy and monitoring capacity of CSOs, media, think‐tanks and the AIHRC.


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

To build up programmatic linkages, disseminate information and

receive feedback from CSO’s and think tanks.

60

Description

Workshops and roundtable discussions undertaken on key justice

sector and programmatic issues.

Quality Criteria

No. of issues identified and discussions documented and shared with MoJ and other partners in government.

Quality Method


‐Strategic review

‐ Interim review

‐ final review;

Date of Assessment


2014



2015

Activity Result 3.3

(Atlas Activity ID)

Strengthen the public’s awareness of human rights and the role of the justice system through the MoJ Legal Awareness Unit and media institutions.


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

To ensure rights and responsibilities of citizens are widely

disseminated

Description

Public legal awareness activities expanded nationally to deliver

consistent justice and human rights messaging. (NPP 5: 1.6)

Quality Criteria

‐No. of public legal awareness

campaigns undertaken consistently

through the project period.

Quality Method


‐Strategic review

‐ Interim review

‐ final review;

Date of Assessment


2014



2015

Output 4: Internal oversight, monitoring and evaluation capacity in place

Activity Result 4.1

(Atlas Activity ID)

Ensure project support is conducted in a timely and compliant manner.


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose

To ensure timely and effective operation support to all project

components

Description

Provide financial, administrative support and conduct project

management meetings.

Quality Criteria

Project management board meetings undertaken.

Quality Method


‐Strategic review

‐ Interim review

‐ final review;

Date of Assessment


2014



2015

Activity Result 4.2

(Atlas Activity ID)

Develop comprehensive

monitoring, evaluation and

reporting systems.


End Date: Dec 2015

Purpose To ensure timely and effective monitoring and evaluation

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Description

Comprehensive monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems

developed to track and inform UNDP and partner programming.

Quality Criteria

No. of joint reviews of progress of JHRA undertaken with experts and national counterparts.

Quality Method


‐Strategic review

‐ Interim review

‐ final review;

Date of Assessment


2014



2015

62

PART THREE:

6 PROJECT FRAMEWORK 6.1 Results and resources framework Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resource Framework:

CPRRF 2010‐2013: Effectiveness of the justice system is improved and access to justice is increased.

Outcome indicators as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets:

Outcome indicator CP 2010‐2013: Not Applicable.

Partnership Strategy: The primary partners will be the MOJ, SC, AGO at all levels. Through inter-ministerial work of the MOJ -Human Rights Support Unit, the Taqnin and the work with the Cabinet Boards, partnerships will be established with other line ministries, including the MOFA, MOI and MOWA. Independent partners will include the AIHRC and the AIBA. In addition the project will have a large number of continued and new partnerships with national civil society organisations. The project will also coordinate with UNAMA, World Bank, NATO ROL Mission etc to ensure complementarity in project activities and collaboration on strategic issues such as the ROL Indicators Study, knowledge generation and sub-national level justice service delivery work. Other partnerships and forms of collaboration are being established with ILO in the area of labour rights; UNICEF in the area of the right to education; UNODC in training of justice sector service providers; and UNWOMEN on women’s issues. Project title and ID (ATLAS Award ID):Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan Phase II

INTENDED OUTPUTS

OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS) INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES RESPONSIBLE

PARTIES

INPUTS

Output 1

High‐level coordination mechanisms

for developing policy and legislation in

accordance with international and

national standards are established and

functional in State justice institutions.

Baseline:

1.1.1 Cabinet Board meetings do not have access to sufficient information to make informed policy recommendations.

Targets (2013)

1.1.1 ToR for capacity development assessment finalised and recruitment of expert completed.

1.1.2 Regular Cabinet Board meetings convened.

1.2.1 Partnerships for global RoL Indicators Study identified.

1.2.2 Implementing partners trained in the RoL Indicators Study.

1.2.3 Systems for generation and

1.1 Increase capacity of the Legislation and Justice & Judiciary Cabinet Boards to enable sector‐wide coordination and strengthen policy making.

Undertake a capacity development assessment on systems, procedures and individual staff competencies in the Secretariats of the Cabinet Boards (such as coordination mechanisms and information flows between the Secretariats and different ministries; competency to translate data/information into policy recommendations; capacity to track and

MOJ

SC

UNDP

UNAMA

National and International

Technical expertise

Workshops / coordination

meetings

Office Stationary and

Supplies

63

1.2.1 MOJ decision, policy making and law‐making processes are not informed by data or analysis of bottlenecks on justice service delivery.

1.3.1 The MOJ Taqnin does not have an annual legislative or translation calendar for prioritisation and planning of legislative drafting and review.

1.4.1 HRSU established in 2010, integrated in the Tashkeel in 2011 but no formal regulation and inter‐ministerial business‐processes.

Indicators:

1.1.1 Number of advisory recommendations issued by the Cabinet Boards.

1.2.1 Number of policy notes provided by the MOJ PPD to the Minister

1.2.2 RoL indicators study conducted on an annual basis.

1.3.1 Percentage of documents listed on the legislative and translation calendar that are translated in accordance with calendar.

1.4.1 Number of laws and regulations received or drafted by the Taqnin that are reviewed by HRSU for human rights compliance.

1.4.2 Number of human rights cases or data that are included in the Afghan State Report.

coordination of information established and functional.

1.2.1 Baseline Study implemented

1.2.2 Baseline study report submitted to the Cabinet Board.

1.2.3 TOR for staff for SC Planning and policy unit developed and approved.

1.2.4 SC Planning and policy unit staffed and trained.

1.3.1 MOJ Translation Unit integrated in the Taqnin Tashkiel.

1.3.2 Annual Legislative and Translation Calendar established.

1.3.3 Expert consultation meetings on specific laws supported.

1.3.4 Government officials and legislators identified and trained.

1.3.5 Translations of laws collected standardized and archived.

1.3.6 1‐2 MOU’s between MOJ and Ministries of Justice in other jurisdictions signed.

1.4.1 HRSU regulation adopted.

1.4.2 4 human rights focal points in ministries (MOWA, MOE, MOI, AGO) established and sensitised on their roles and responsibilities.

1.4.1M&E mechanism on right to education piloted and extended to others rights. Technical

monitor implementation).

Design and implement a capacity development plan based on the assessment, including educational exchanges to best practise jurisdictions including South‐South cooperation.

Support CB Secretariats in strengthening and approval of their Terms of Reference.

Support CB Secretariats in planning, organization, coordination and facilitation of meetings by the Cabinet Boards.

Support CB Secretariats in the preparation, coordination and distribution of relevant information and analysis for policy discussions by the Cabinet Boards.

Support CB Secretariats in monitoring the implementation of advisory recommendations from the Cabinet Boards.

Facilitate inclusion of Baseline/RoL indicators study, HRSU regulation, enlargement of Taqnin/Translation Unit, State Reports on Human Rights, provincial and district level platforms, and key laws on the Cabinet Board agenda.

1.2 Strengthen MOJ policy making capacity through the Planning and Policy Department (PPD).

Assess the capacity of MoJ PPD systems, procedures and individual staff competency to analyse justice issues and provide policy recommendations.

Design and implement a capacity

MOJ

SC

AGO

MOI


Expertise

Capacity Assessment

Experiential learning tours

Workshops

Basic and Technical

64

support provided to MOFA on State reports.

1.4.2 Action plan on implementation of Universal Periodic Review (UPR), CRC, ESCR recommendation adopted by Government.

1.4.3 7 trainings provided to state institutions.

1.4.4 Preliminary work on ICCPR/UNCAT undertaken.

Targets (2014)

1.1.1 Cabinet Boards advisory recommendations provided.

1.1.2 Cabinet Boards advisory recommendations monitored and implemented.

1.2.1 Annual RoL indicators study conducted and analytical report published.

1.2.2 Outcomes and recommendations of RoL indicators study deliberated by Cabinet Boards.

1.2.3 Coordination meetings between PPD and SC Policy and planning unit undertaken.

1.3.1 2013 Targets continued.


1.3.3 Annual Legislative and Translation Calendar

development plan based on the assessment, including professional development of staff through educational exposure to international expertise.

Support MOJ PPD in the initiation and facilitation of an annual baseline/RoL Indicators study conducted by qualified independent statistics and public opinion institutes to inform policy and planning.

Train implementing partners in the UNDP global RoL Indicators Assessment tool.

Facilitate commitment to provide data and collaborate on the annual baseline/RoL indicators study from key Government institutions (SC, AGO, MOI, MOJ,MOWA, MOLSAMD) and international partners. (if needed supported by political directive to collaborate on the study from Cabinet Board).

Coordination undertaken with MOJ PPD and SC strategic planning unit.

Support the MOJ PPD in analysis and publication of baseline/RoL report and formulation of policy recommendations.

Support the MOJ PPD in submission of baseline/RoL report and policy recommendations to Cabinet Boards for their discussion and decision making.

1.3 Increase the MOJ’s capacity to effectively reform law through the Taqnin (including the Translation Unit).

Facilitate the official integration of the

UNAMA

NATO‐ROL

Mission

Training


Supplies

Office Furniture and

Equipment

Public opinion company to

perform baseline surveys

Database firms

IT Equipment

Maintenance

Printing/Publication

Transportation

65

implemented.

1.3.4 Digital archive opened up to public.

1.3.5 2 experiential learning visits conducted.

1.4.1 Public education materials reviewed by HRSU.

1.4.2 4 additional human rights focal points in ministries (MOLSWD,MOF, Min of Ag & SC) established and sensitised on their roles and responsibilities.

1.4.3 Two law‐making trainings for Government officials organized.

1.4.4 Seven trainings of the trainers provided to state institutions.

1.4.5 One manual on treaty obligations for parliament developed.

1.4.6 One status update on implementation of action plan on ICCPR, UNCAT developed.

Targets (2015)

1.1.1 Cabinet Boards advisory recommendations provided.

1.1.2 Cabinet Boards advisory recommendations monitored and implemented.

1.2.1 Annual RoL indicators study conducted and analytical report published.

MOJ Translation Unit into the MOJ Taqnin Tashkeel and expand the TOR of the MOJ Translation Unit to become the main source of certified document translation for the MOJ.

Support the Taqnin and the translation unit in the establishment and implementation of an annual legislative and translation calendar to plan law‐making.

Support the Taqnin in the updating and maintenance of a physical and digital archive of legislative documents in Dari, Pashto, Arabic and English.

Mentoring, coaching and sharing of best practice for Taqnin and Translation unit staff by staff from ministries of justice from other jurisdictions specifically in the areas of legislative drafting, bilingual drafting, translation and interpretation etc.

Support the Taqnin on global legislative best practices during law making process.

Support the Taqnin Department and the Translation Unit to collect translations of laws undertaken by bilateral and other external and/or internal partners for adoption by the Government and to upload these on the digital library for public purposes.

Establish business process to ensure laws entering Taqnin are reviewed by HRSU on human rights compliance when relevant to human rights.

Support Taqnin and HRSU in the

MOJ

UNDP


Expertise


Workshops/Expert

Consultation meetings

Basic and Technical

Training


Supplies


Equipment

Data collection software

IT Equipment

Maintenance Costs

Printing/Publication

Transportation

66

1.2.2 Outcomes and recommendations of RoL indicators study deliberated by Cabinet Boards.

1.2.3 Coordination meetings between PPD and SC Policy and planning unit undertaken.


1.3.2 Annual Translation Calendar implemented.

1.3.3 Digital archive opened up to public.

1.3.4 Two experiential learning visits conducted.

1.4.1 Public education materials reviewed by HRSU.

1.4.2 Four additional human rights focal points in ministries (MOLSWD,MOF, Min of Ag & SC) established and sensitised on their roles and responsibilities.

1.4.3 Two law‐making trainings for Government officials organized.

1.4.4 Seven trainings of the trainers provided to state institutions.

1.4.5 One manual on treaty obligations for parliament developed.

1.4.6 One status update on implementation of action plan on ICCPR, UNCAT developed.

organization of trainings in law‐making and law‐making processes for Government officials and legislators that are involved in law‐making of laws identified by the legislative calendar.

1.4 Strengthen the MOJ’s capacity to produce human rights compliant Government policies and laws through HRSU.

Facilitate the adoption of the Regulation on HRSU and sensitisation of Ministries.

Support the HRSU to establish regular liaison with and provision of expertise to human rights focal points across key ministries at the national level.

Facilitate internal communication flow between the Taqnin and the HRSU to ensure that the HRSU reviews all laws with human rights implications.

Support the HRSU in the development, adoption and maintenance of M&E mechanisms and transfer knowledge to key ministries, AIHRC and other stakeholders.

Support the HRSU in provision of technical support to MOFA to develop and submit State Reports on the UNCAT/ICCPR and UN Res. 1325.

Support the HRSU in the facilitation of approval of the action plan on implementation of recommendations from UPR, CRC, ICSCR bodies and monitoring of its implementation.

MOJ

UNDP

UNAMA

UNICEF

AIHRC

DIHR

National and international

expertise


Basic and technical training

Workshops

Publication/printing

IT equipment

Communication and Web

designer

Security related costs

Transportation

Maintenance

67

Support HRSU in provision of human rights and gender perspectives in the teaching and public education materials developed by MOE with AIHRC.

Support Taqnin and HRSU in the organization of trainings in law‐making and law‐making processes for Government officials and legislators as relevant to legislative calendar.

Support the HRSU in the organization of regular training, sensitization and information sessions for state institutions on the implementation of treaty recommendations.

Support the HRSU in the development of a manual on treaty obligations for parliament.

Sub‐Total Output 1 (USD) 11,054,712

Output 2

Mechanisms for providing quality

access to justice services to vulnerable

groups are established and functional.

Baseline:

2.1.1 Legal Aid Grant Facility does not exist.

2.2.1 No mechanism that links State

and non‐State justice systems.

2.2.2 Police‐e‐Mardumi exists in 64

districts but no inclusion of justice

providers.

2.3.1 No formal coordination currently

Targets 2013

2.1.1 Mechanisms, implementation modality and funds for Legal Aid Grant Facility established.

2.1.1 Letter of agreement with AIBA for core funding established. Assessment of programmes of existing Legal Clinics and internship conducted.

2.1.3 Parameters for legal aid criteria for lawyers established

2.1.4 Discussions and exchange programmes for students, professors, legal professionals conducted. Action plans for expansion of

2.1 Establish independent legal aid grant facility and supporting mechanisms.

Undertake capacity development assessments in LAB and AIBA on requirements for adequate functioning of Legal Aid Grant Facility.

Design capacity development plan and implement accordingly.

Parameters for prioritisation of legal aid cases to be subsidized by the Legal Aid Grant Facility established.

Support AIBA in the tracking and registration of cases taken up by AIBA lawyers.

Support the LAB in the provision of policy direction on use and implementation of

LAB

AIBA

MoJ/DoJ

AGO

SC

UNDP


Expertise

Basic and Technical

Trainings

Workshops

Law Clinics

Honorarium

General Fund Management

services

68

exists between NLTC and Supreme

Court Stage programme

2.3.2 One NLTC chapter exists in Kabul University

Indicators:

2.1.1 Legal Aid Grant Facility established.

2.1.2 Number of cases taken up by

Legal Aid Grant Facility Lawyers,

disaggregated by criminal and civil and

detention, labour and women’s cases.

2.2.1 Number of justice and security issues that are registered as action points in district and provincial level platforms, disaggregated by women’s issues, justice sector security issues, civil and criminal issues..

2.2.2 Number of provincial and district level platform meetings are held that include State and independent justice providers.

2.2.3 Number of national policy making processes that are informed by data from community level platforms.

2.3.1 Number of NLTC chapters.

legal clinics developed. 2.2.1 Provincial and district level

consultation platforms identified.

2.2.2 Cases and action points from platforms registered and segregated by women, labour, land, justice sector security, returnees and children.

2.2.3 Registered cases communicated to MOJ PPD and Huquq.

2.2.1 Mechanisms for coordination of cases between State and non‐State justice providers established.

2.3.1 Existing curricula for judges,

prosecutors and Huquq officials

mapped

2.3.2 TOR developed to undertake

assessment of existing curricula for

judges, prosecutors and Huquq

officials mapped.

2.3.3 Coordination with MoJ, AGO,

Supreme Court Stage programme and

Ministry of higher Education (MoHE)

initiated.

Targets (2014)

2.1.1 Cases are processed and funded through the Legal Aid Grant Facility

2.1.2 Action Plans for legal clinics in Nangarhar, Bamyan and Herat supported.

Trust Fund. Support AIBA lawyers and legal aid

providers in taking up and processing cases financed by the Legal Aid Grant Facility, including cases from Huquq and the labour commission, DoWA, DOJ,

Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) Units, Health Centers, legal help centres, 119, women’s networks, shelters, detention centers, prisons and Ministry of Labour.

Facilitate establishment or enhancement of legal clinics at Kabul, Nangarhar, Herat, Mazar Universities through Legal Aid Grant Facility.

Facilitate discussions and exchange programmes for students, professors, legal professionals to identify and explore different models for legal clinics.

Establish scholarships for women to be received under the condition of servicing as a justice professional upon graduation through Legal Aid Grant Facility.

Facilitate paid internships for law students at Afghan Law Faculties to be undertaken through Legal Aid Grant Facility.

Facilitate communication flow from AIBA and LAB on issues in service delivery to the MOJ PPD to inform policy and law making processes.

Support the AIBA in opening provincial chapters to facilitate access to Legal Aid Grant Facility by AIBA lawyers and legal aid providers.

Support the AIBA in the provision of professional trainings on due process and


Supplies


Equipment

Data collection software

IT Equipment

Maintenance Costs

69

2.2.1 Cases from non‐State justice providers taken up by State justice providers.

2.2.2 Cases and action points from consultation platforms registered and communicated to MOJ PPD.

2.3.1 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Nangarhar and Herat Law and Sharia Faculties established.

Targets (2015)

2.1.1 50% more cases are processed and funded through the Legal Aid Grant Facility.

2.2.1 More cases from informal justice providers taken up by formal justice providers.

2.2.2 Cases and action points from consultation platforms registered and communicated to MOJ

2.2.3 Cases taken up by State justice providers resolved.

2.2.4 1 Cabinet Board meeting on community level justice issues held.

2.3.1 Revised curricula integrated into State certification and training systems

2.3.2 NLTC chapters in Nangarhar and Herat established.

use of Legal Aid Grant Facility to lawyers at the provincial/district level.

2.2 Consolidate communication and coordination between State and non‐State justice providers at provincial and district levels.

Identify provincial and district level consultation platforms, such as Police‐e‐Mardumi, DDA, CPANS that could serve as platforms to coordinate with State and non‐State justice providers on community justice and security matters.

Facilitate mechanisms to ensure coordination and enhanced flow of cases from State to non‐State justice institutions and increased information flow between the justice and security sectors.

Facilitate registration of and follow up on action points from provincial and district level platforms.

Facilitate information‐flow from provincial and district level platforms to the MOJ PPD to inform policy making.

Facilitate flow of cases from community leaders to State justice providers for dispute resolution grounded in principles of Afghan law.

2.3 Enhance the professional capacity of State Justice service providers (including respect for due process).

Assist NLTC and Supreme Court Stage programme in the creation, review and coordination of training materials and resources for judges, prosecutors and

UNDP

MOJ

AGO

SC

MOI

IDLG

MRRD

MOWA

AIBA

UNAMA

Implementing:

CSOs

MOJ

SC

UNDP

UNODC

National and international

expertise

Consultation Meetings

Trainings & Capacity

development for facilitating

CSOs

Trainings for community

leaders

Books/Printed Laws for

community leaders

Travel

Publication/printing

Transportation

Security related costs

70

Huquq staff. Support NLTC and Supreme Court Stage

programme in the implementation of capacity and professional skills assessments of judges, prosecutors and Huquq staff.

Support the establishment of NLTC chapters in Herat and Nangarhar Law Faculties.

Support the AGO office in Herat the development and implementation of SOPs on the prosecution of corruption, sexual and gender based violence and domestic violence.


Expertise

Trainings/Workshops

Books/Supplies


Output 3

Public participation processes and

knowledge base for improving access

to justice and human rights

compliance established.

Baseline:

3.1.1 Limited discussion in parliament or in Government on land and labour rights.

3.1.2 Limited discussion in parliament or in Government on Community dispute resolution mechanisms.

3.3.1 No project knowledge products available.

3.3.2 Limited regional and international collaboration.

3.3.3 Limited investigative capacity in particular on violence against

Targets (2013):

3.1.1 One discussion forum with national and international experts held on each of the focus areas.

3.1.2 One South‐South conference on knowledge sharing with justice sector institutions, media and CSO’s.

3.2.1 5 knowledge fora (1 per area of M&E engagement) conducted.

3.3.1 Sector mapping, perception survey undertaken.

3.3.2 Ongoing qualitative media monitoring initiated.

3.3.3 Communications strategy for

MOJ developed.

3.3.4 Partnerships identified for

coordination and dissemination of

3.1 Facilitate national discussions and policy dialogues on socio‐economic rights and community dispute resolution mechanisms.

Establish networks to facilitate knowledge generation, collect data, identify issues and advocate on community dispute resolution mechanisms and socio‐economic rights, including labour and land rights.

Facilitate research, roundtables and high‐level discussions on community dispute resolution mechanisms and socio‐economic rights, including labour and land rights.

Advocate for and facilitate the adoption and implementation of labour‐related laws in coordination with MoJTaqnin and ILO.

Support analysis of cases relevant to the output areas brought to Government officials and community leaders.

ILO

UNDP

AIHRC

CSO’s

Media


Expertise

Workshops/Consultations

South‐South cooperation

Publication/Printing

71

women.

3.4.1 A Public Legal Awareness Strategy from the MOJ PLAU exists, but no plan for strategic and coordinated implementation of public legal awareness activities.

Indicators:

3.1.1 Number of discussions undertaken on socio‐economic rights by Standing Committees/Cabinet Committees or Special government committees.

3.1.2 Number of discussions undertaken by Standing Committees/Cabinet Committees or Special government committees on community dispute resolution mechanisms.

3.2.1 Number of analytical reports generated.

3.3.1 Number of coordinated forawith CSOs, media and think tanks conducted.

3.3.2 Number of media articles/broadcasts on AIHRC shadow reports and national enquires.

3.4.1 Number of trainings held to CSOs and the media on fair representation of justice and

information.

3.3.5 Tools for messaging developed and approved.

3.3.6 Production, pretesting undertaken;Pilot campaign, impact assessment undertaken.

Targets (2014)

3.1.1 Two discussion fora with national and international experts held on each of the focus areas.


3.1.3 Areas(s) of focus discussed by parliamentary standing committees and cabinet boards.

3.1.4 One self‐generated research product published by a national or regional think tank engaged on areas(s) of focus in Afghanistan.

3.2.1 National conference on violence

against women held.

3.2.2 1violence against women report launched.

3.2.3 CSO/AIHRC discussions on

ICCPR shadow report held.

3.2.4 One experiential learning tour to regional HRC held.2 Regional HRC experts training on enhancement of

3.2 Increase advocacy and monitoring capacity of CSOs, media, think‐tanks and the AIHRC.

In‐depth impact assessments of State and non‐State UNDP programming to share lessons learned and best practices for replication in future programming.

Facilitate knowledge fora between project team, CSO’s, media, think tanks, regional and global knowledge networks.

Engage CSO’s, media, think tanks in programmatic and policy discussion to generate white papers and judicial reviews.

Identify national and local level civil society networks and media to develop networking, coordination on measuring performance on the state justice and security institutions to address accountability.

Develop capacity assessment action plan for AIHRC based on capacity assessment strategy supported by UNDP in 2011.

Provide technical and financial assistance to AIHRC to undertake national enquiry on violence against women.

Develop and implement an action plan to advocate on violence against women based on National enquiry.

Activate in collaboration with NIBP the MOU on knowledge transfer on complaints mechanism, investigations between AIHRC and the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), India.

UNDP

AIHRC

CSO’s

Media

Think Tanks

UNAMA


Expertise

Workshops/Conferences

Company to perform

baseline studies

Database firms

72

rights issues.

3.4.2 PLA coordination board established.

AIHRC business processes and thematic issues.

3.3.1 Ongoing qualitative media monitoring conducted.

3.3.2 Coordinated PLA campaigns conducted.

3.3.3 Dipstick perception survey conducted.

Targets (2015)

3.1.1 Two discussion fora with national and international experts held on each of the focus areas.


3.1.3 Areas(s) of focus discussed by parliamentary standing committees and cabinet boards.

3.1.4 One self‐generated research product published by a national or regional think tank engaged on areas(s) of focus in Afghanistan.

3.1.5 Five knowledge products developed.

3.1.6 One or two white papers on labour, land and community dispute resolution issues undertaken for high‐level discussions.

3.2.1 One advocacy action plan

implemented.

3.2.2 (3‐4 persons) Human Rights

Facilitate MOU’s with other regional Human Rights Commissions for knowledge transfer on business processes, thematic areas of work etc.

Facilitate experiential learning tour on HRC response to violence against women and judicial coordination with other regional Human Rights Commissions.

Provide assistance to AIHRC to attend UPR review, ESCR and ICCPR periodic review process.

Support the AIHRC in development of and advocacy around shadow reports.

Facilitate one experiential learning tour to regional HRC to develop guidelines related to civil and political rights.

3.3 Strengthen the public’s awareness of human rights and the role of the justice system through the MoJ Legal Awareness Unit and media institutions.

Undertake sector mapping, perception survey, media monitoring.

Facilitate a Public Legal Awareness Coordination Board with MoJ, AGO, SC, MoE, MoM&C, MoWA, MoHajj and AIHRC at the national and provincial levels to establish consistent messaging down to the community level.

Conduct a workshop with officials to develop the foundations for a communications strategy and PLA implementation plan and identify partnerships for coordination and dissemination.

Review existing media products developed

MoJ

UNDP

AGO

SC

MoE

MoI

MoMC

MoWA

MoHajj

AIHRC


Expertise

73

Committee meetings on ICCPR, UNCAT, ESCR attended.

3.3.1 Ongoing qualitative media monitoring conducted.

3.3.2 Coordinated PLA campaigns conducted (con’t).

on human rights and justice. Support PLAU in the development of a

pilot campaign in consultation with the PLA Coordination Board.

Provide technical advisory support for the development of communications packets, including backgrounders, key messages, talking points and fact sheets on key justice issues.

Expand PLAU and PLA Coordination Board engagement with CSOs and media houses for PLA activities.

Develop understanding of the value and access points for CSR sponsorship to secure sustainability for State‐driven PLA campaigns.

Conduct trainings on “peace journalism” and “rights reporting” to Afghan journalists.

Conferences


Workshops/Meetings

Basic and Technical

Training

Publications/Printing

Mapping and Perception

Survey

Production, pre‐test and

pilot campaign

Workshops/meetings

Dipstick audit

1 Monitoring Firm

Communication and Public

Outreach Materials

Transportation

Maintenance


Output 4 Targets:2013

4.1.1 Develop TOR for recruitment

4.1 Ensure project support is conducted in a UNDP National and International

74

Project Support Unit: Internal

oversight, monitoring and evaluation

capacity in place.

Baseline:

4.1.1 JHRA Phase 2 signed Project Document

4.1.2 No project M&E systems.

Indicators:

4.1.1 Number of M&E systems established and functional.

4.2.1 Annual Progress reports

4.2.2 Mid Term evaluation

4.2.3 End term evaluation

of staff.

4.1.2 Finalise templates, forms, tools etc for implementation.

4.2.1 M&E systems for 3 areas of engagement established and baseline‐data collected.

4.2.2 Government officials responsible for M&E systems trained.

4.2.3 UNDP Annual Work Plan tracking systems established and maintained.

Targets:2014

4.1.1 Review and analyse project systems.

4.1.2 Review and analyse government ownership. Implement mid‐term review.

4.2.1 Data through M&E systems for 3 areas of engagement collected (ongoing).

4.2.2 3 in‐depth impact assessments informed by M&E data held.

4.2.3 3 knowledge fora (1 per area of M&E engagement) conducted.

Target: 2015

4.1.1 End‐term perception survey conducted.

4.1.2 Implement end‐term evaluation.

timely and compliant manner.

Undertake and review yearly, mid‐term and end‐term reviews of project activities.

Undertake, review and analyse project progress through regular internal assessments, UNDP monthly team meetings, and cluster meetings.

Provide management support to the project components.

4.2 Develop comprehensive monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems.

o Support the design and implementation of M&E systems used under the project programmatic components or establish new ones to inform programmatic and policy priorities for National Partners and UNDP, as follows:

Support the design and implementation of the RoL indicators study.

Support the design and implementation of a legislative archive for MOJ Taqnin/ Translation Unit/PPD

Support the design and implementation of the M&E tools for MOJ HRSU.

Support the standardization of a centralized database for registration of cases taken up by defence lawyers registered by AIBA.

Support the establishment of qualitative media‐monitoring and perception audits within the MOJ

MOJ

AGO

SC

AIBA

AIHRC

Expertise

75

4.2.1 Data through M&E systems for 3 areas of engagement collected (ongoing).

Public Legal Awareness Unit to inform messaging and outreach strategies.

Annual report, quarterly reports developed.


Total Budget Costs (USD) 34,402,039

76

6.2 Project management framework Project Management Arrangement: The project will be implemented through UNDP Direct Implementation Modality (DIM). The audit arrangements will follow the UNDP audit regime for Direct Implementation. Since the justice sector has multiple partners, the project will be working with responsible parties viz. MoJ, AIHRC, AIBA, and Supreme Court, AGO etc. But there will be one lead partner, the MoJ which will co-chair the Project Steering Committee with UNDP. Separate letters of agreement will be undertaken with each of the partners. In the case of MoJ, funds maybe channelized from UNDP for implementation of specific activities which will be jointly monitored by UNDP and MoJ. For all other project partners letters of agreement maybe drawn up and funds will be disbursed directly by UNDP. The following roles explain the normal responsibilities and tasks of each member of the project management structure. An organogram is also provided on page (80). Project Steering Committee: The Project Steering Committee is the group responsible for making executive management decisions165 for a project when guidance is required by the Project Manager and Chief Technical Advisor, including approval of project revisions. The Project Steering Committee will be the highest-level policy and oversight body. It will provide policy guidance, review progress against targeted results, and ensure coordination with other national initiatives and development projects. Project assurance reviews by this group are made at designated decision points during the running of a project, or as necessary when raised by the Project Manager and Chief Technical Advisor. This group is consulted by the Project Manager and Chief Technical Advisor for decisions when project tolerances have been exceeded. The Project Steering Committee is responsible for the overall direction and management of the project and it covers the following three roles:

The Executive is ultimately responsible for the Project supported by the Senior Beneficiary and the Senior Supplier.

The Senior Beneficiary represents the interests of those who will ultimately benefit from the outputs of the project.

The Senior Supplier represents the interests of those designing and developing the project deliverables and providing Project resources.

Specific responsibilities of the Project Steering Committee:

At the beginning of the project:

Approve the start of the project Agree on Project Manager’s and Chief Technical Advisor’s responsibilities Appraise and approve the project plans submitted by the Project Manager and

Chief Technical Advisor Delegate any Project Assurance roles as appropriate

165 Where there is no consensus, in order to ensure UNDP’s ultimate accountability, final decision making rests with UNDP in accordance with its applicable regulations, rules, policies and procedures.

77

Commit project resources required by the plan As the project progresses:

Review reports from the Project Implementing Committee and provide policy direction; Provide overall guidance and direction to the project, ensuring it remains within

any specified constraints Review each completed project stage and approve progress to the next Provide ad-hoc direction and advice for exception situations when tolerances are

exceeded Assess and decide on project changes Assure that all planned deliverables during each stage are delivered satisfactorily

At the end of the project:

Assure that all products deliverables are delivered satisfactorily Review and approve the end project report (if required) Make recommendations for follow-on actions if required

The Project Steering Committee shall meet two times a year and will receive reports from the Project Implementation Committee. The Chief Technical Advisor and project staff will attend and prepare presentations and other documentation for the Committee. Composition of the Project Steering Committee: Minister of Justice and UNDP Country Director will co-chair the committee. The other representatives of the Project Steering Committee are:

- Ministry of Justice - Ministry of Interior - Ministry for Women’s Affairs - Representative of Supreme Court - Representative of Attorney General’s Office (not below rank of Deputy Attorney

General) - Representative of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission - Ministry of Finance - Ministry of foreign Affairs - 2 Nominated members of civil society; - Donor representatives.

Technical Coordination Committee The Technical Coordination Committee will meet four times a year and will report to the Project Steering Committee. The main responsibilities of the Technical Coordination Committee are: Effective delivery of the programme with a special focus on resolving problems and

bottlenecks between national and international agencies Ensuring relevant approvals are given for project activities Effective communication, coordination and co-operation between the various justice

institutions. Identifying cross-institutional problems and solutions and recommend low/no cost

mechanisms for problem solving and agreeing on way forward. Ensure necessary actions on audit findings and their follow up which will be reported to

the Project Steering Committee.

78

Take relevant action based on issues referred by the Project Steering Committee. The membership of the Technical Coordination Committee will be chaired by National Project Director at the rank of Deputy Minister of Ministry of Justice and include officials from the following: Ministry of Justice Ministry of Interior Ministry for Women’s Affairs Representative of Supreme Court Representative of Attorney General’s Office Representative of Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission Ministry of Finance Ministry of foreign Affairs 2 Nominated members of civil society; Donor coordinator for project Chief Technical Adviser UNDP (Programme and Operations) staff Chief Technical Advisor The project team will be under the overall supervision of a Chief Technical Adviser who will function as a secretariat for the implementation of the project and ensure efficient and transparent administration and management of project funds. To assist in this function and to ensure national ownership to the project, a Technical Coordination Committee which includes various justice sector institutions will be established. The Technical Coordination Committee will report to the Project Steering Committee for policy directions. The Chief Technical Advisor will be an international professional who will lead the project, reporting directly to the UNDP Country Director through the Deputy Country Director (Programme) as per UNDP rule and guidelines. The Advisor will supervise and work closely with the National Project Coordinator (from the MoJ) with the support of the Project Manager. The Chief Technical Advisor’s prime responsibility is to ensure that the project provides the right advice to the Project Steering Committee and produces the results specified in the annual work-plan, to the required standard of quality and within the specified constraints of time and cost. The main responsibilities of the CTA are:

o Provide technical advice to the Project Steering Committee and Technical Coordination Committee in line with international best practice and lessons learned;

o Ensure, in consultation with the Chair/s of the Project Steering Committee, technical soundness of project activities and achievement of project outputs and outcomes;

o Support the Chair/s of the Project Steering Committee on policy related issues; o Assist the Chair/s of the Project Steering Committee by leading day to day

management of the project, including in administrative and financial affairs with the support of a national project manager.

o Liaison with key justice sector agencies directly benefitting from the project and concerned Government agencies and counterparts;

o Formulate, operationalize and maintain monitoring and evaluation process of the project; with the support of project manager/s and project teams.

o Prepare various required reports including Progress reports, Financial Reports, Annual Progress Report, etc. and organize timely completion of technical reports with the support of project manager/s and project teams.

79

Project Assurance role supports the Technical Coordination Committee and the Project Steering Committee by carrying out objective and independent project oversight and monitoring functions. This role ensures appropriate project management milestones are managed and completed. The role for project assurance is usually executed by a Programme Officer of the Rule of Law Cluster. The following list includes the key suggested aspects that need to be checked by the Project Assurance throughout the project as part of ensuring that it remains consistent with, and continues to meet, a business need and that no change to the external environment affects the validity of the project.

User/Beneficiary needs and expectations are being met or managed Risks are being controlled Adherence to the expected achievements The right people are being involved An acceptable solution is being developed The project remains viable Focus on the development need is maintained Applicable standards are being used Adherence to quality assurance standards

UNDP will undertake project implementation with the national partners through technical advice, development partner coordination, administration of the resources allocated by development partners, procurement, recruitment and the mobilisation of additional resources and project assurance. UNDP will provide service delivery under the arrangement of a letter of agreement as agreed in annual work plans. In consultation with Project and the Chairs of the Steering Committees, UNDP may call upon other specialised UN agencies for additional support if and when necessary. National Project Manager: The National Project Manager has the authority to run the project on a day-to-day basis on behalf of the Project Steering Committee within the constraints laid down by the Project Steering Committee. The National Project Manager will be responsible for day-to-day management and decision-making for the project. The National Project Manager’s prime responsibility is to ensure that the project produces the results specified in the project document, to the required standard of quality and within the specified constraints of time and cost. Specific responsibility would include: Overall project management and planning: of project/project components

Manage the production of the required deliverables Report to the Chief Technical Advisor and liaise with the appointed Project

Assurance roles to assure the overall direction and integrity of the project Identify and obtain any support and advice required for the management,

planning and control of the project Be responsible for project /project component administration Prepare Project Plans and report to Chief Technical Advisor and liaise with the

project assurance. Project monitoring:

Plan and monitor the project

80

Record progress Manage the risks Take responsibility for overall progress and use of resources and initiate

corrective action where necessary Be responsible for change control

Project reporting:

Report to the Chief Technical Advisor and provide necessary support for reporting to the Project Steering Committee and the Project Implementation Committee according to agreed mechanisms and frequency

Prepare any Follow-on Action Recommendations as required Component Managers: There will be four international component managers supporting the 6 outputs areas. All the component mangers will be reporting directly to the National Project Manager on a regular basis. The component managers will be responsible for the overall delivery of the output areas and will ensure oversight and accountability of the procurement and quality of the deliverables as per project outputs or sub outputs. Project Support The Project Support role provides project administration and management support to the Project Managers and Chief Technical Advisor with the help of an international operations manager and a team, as required by the needs of the individual project or Project Manager/s. Specific responsibilities: Provision of administrative services:

Set up and maintain project files Collect project related information data Update plans Administer the quality review process Administer Project Board meetings

Project documentation management:

Administer project revision control Establish document control procedures Compile, copy and distribute all project reports

Central source of expertise in:

Specialist knowledge (for example, estimating, risk management) Specialist tool expertise (for example, planning and control tools, risk analysis) Specialist techniques and standards

6.3 Legal framework This document together with the CPAP signed by the Government and UNDP which is incorporated by reference, constitute together the instrument envisaged and defined in the Supplemental Provisions to the Project attached hereto and forming an integral part hereof, as “the Project Document” UNDP as the Implementing Partner shall comply with the policies, procedures and practices of the United Nations safety and security management system.

81

UNDP agrees to undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the project funds are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.

82

PSC

National Project Manager (SB5)CTA

Component 3 (P3) Public Participation &

Knowledge Mgmt Specialist

Component 2 (P4) Access to Justice Specialist

Component 1 (P4) Policy, Legislations & Human Rights Specialist

Project Support Unit Operation Manager (P3)

Admin/Logistics Associate (SB3) Admin/ Logistic Associate Drivers (SB1 10 Posts)

Procurement Officer (SB4) & Contract Analyst (SB4) Procurement Officer Finance Officer (SB4) Finance Assistant (SB3) UNV / (P2) Finance Officer Fi OffiIT Officer (SB4) IT Associate

HR Associate (SB3/4)

Capacity Development Specialist HRSU (P3)

National Capacity Dev Coordinator HRSU (SB4)

UNV (I) Legal/reporting 20 LoA Staff

International Legislation Specialist (P3)

National Legislation Officer

(SB4 1 Posts)

Translation Associate (SB3)

Unit + 10 LoA staff

Legal Researcher (UNV) (I)Legal Research Officer (SB4)

Strategic Policy Department (5

Post)

National Officer: Coordination

Cabinet Secretariat (SB4)

Legal Aid Officers (SB4 2 Posts) Finance Associate & Case management LAGF

National Capacity Dev Officer (SB4)

Trainers (2 Posts)

National Community Dev Officer (SB4)

Gender Officer (SB4)

Regional Provincial

Coordinator (SB4 5 Posts)

10 LoA Staff

NPO PLA (SB4)National Communication Officer (SB4) 4 LoA Staff

DCD P

Translator/ Admin (SB3)



Justice & Human Rights in Afghanistan (JHRA) Organogram

Public Participation & Knowledge Mgmt Coordinator (SB5)

Access to Justice Coordinator (SB5)

National Policy, Legislation & Human Rights Coordinator (SB5)

Coordinator to PSC on

ESCR P2 National Civil Society Coordinator (SB4) Justice & Integrity Officer (SB4)

UNDP: LoA:

CTG:

Technical Coordination Committee

Reporting/Communications Officer UNV (I) Reporting Officer UNV (I) M&E Officer (P2) M&E Officer (SB4) Exe Ass/Translator (SB3)

International Staff will be reporting to CTA:

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ANNEXURE I: CHRONOLOGY OF CONSULTATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS WHICH LED TO DEVELOPMENT OF PROJECT DOCUMENT Date Consultations / presentations place February 2012 2 week Strategic Mission to identify strategic

areas for consideration by UNDP Afghanistan when developing the new Justice project. Mission members: Professor Hussein, former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights Situation in Afghanistan, UNDP Regional Bureau Bangkok; UNDP BCPR. Consultation meetings were held with: Senior Minister Arsala; Minister of Justice; Minister of the Interior; Chief Justice and the Judges of the Supreme Court; Attorney-General; Human Rights Commission and its Chair; Members of Parliament; President of the Afghan Independent Bar Association; Civil Society organizations; UNDP Country Office Rule of Law Cluster; JHRA Team; UNAMA; World Bank (via email); US, UK, EU and Japan.

Kabul

March 26-30 BCPR Mission: to review UNDP Law and Order Trust Fund and the Rule of Law Cluster and follow up on the February 2012 justice mission. Mission members: BCPR Rule of Law Advisor and Programme Analyst. Consultation meetings were held with: General Bismullah Muhammady, Minister of MOI; Colonel Hamayon Ayni, Chief Kabul 119 Centre, Chair of the Police-e-Mardumi Secretariat; Brigadier General Abdul Wasee Raufi, Deputy Minister of MOI (Strategy); Governor and Police Commander of Kalakan district; UNAMA; SSMI; EU; Norway; IPCB; US Embassy; Canada; Netherlands.

Kabul / Kalakan

10th May 2012 Consultation of Pro Doc with IROL members and JHRA team

ISAF HQ Kabul

17th May 2012 Presentation of Pro Doc with donors at monthly donor meeting by JHRA team

UNDP-CO Kabul

30 May 2012 Consultation with Worldbank and JHRA team to identify areas for collaboration and partnership for the new JHRA Phase II Project.

World Bank premise, Kabul

03rd June 2012 Consultation with AIBA and JHRA team AIBA Kabul 04th June 2012 Consultation with MOJ Directors and JHRA team MOJ Kabul 06th June 2012 Presentation and consultation on Justice Integrity

Board with MOJ minister and JHRA and AII teams. MOJ Kabul

20th June 2012 Presentation and consultation on Pro Doc with LAD, Legal Aid Baord and AIBA and JHRA team

MOJ Kabul

21st June 2012 Presentation and consultation of Pro Doc with UNDP-CO Kabul

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donors and JHRA at monthly donor meeting 24-26 June 2012

Presentation and consultation with MOJ officials at provincial and central level at the National conference on justice service delivery.

Continental Hotel Kabul; Provincial representatives from X provinces

26th June 2012 Consultation meeting with Legal Aid Board and JHRA team

Kabul University

27th June 2012 Presentation and consultation with CSOs and JHRA team

ACBAR Kabul

28th June 2012 Consultation meeting with PIP LPAC and JHRA team

UNDP-CO Kabul

July 2012 BCPR Mission to start consultations on the UNDP Country Office Rule of Law Strategy and assist in the finalization of the justice Pro Doc. Consultation meetings were held with: MOJ; MOI; AGO; HOO; APPRO; Afghan Centre for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research Surveys (ACSOR); AHRO; LAOA; UNAMA; ILO; Worldbank; EU; NATO; UK United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Kabul; SSMI;

Kabul

2nd July 2012 Presentation and consultation with EUPOL ROL Team and JHRA team

EUPOL HQ Kabul

3rd July 2012 Consultations with UNDP Country Office Project staff during the ROL strategy development workshop organized by the Country Office Rule of Law Cluster.

UNDP-CO Kabul

May, June, July Consultation with World Bank Senior Management and UNDP Senior Management in Kabul on collaboration in justice sector.

Kabul

10 July 2012 Consultations with donors, UNICEF, AIHRC, UNODC and World Bank to inform the JHRA End Term Evaluation and initiate partnerships for Rule of Law indicator work in the new project document.

UNDP-CO Kabul

11 July 2012 Consultation with ILO ILO-Kabul 12th July 2012 Consultation with End term Evaluators and District

Level Component partner NGOs to inform the end term evaluation of JHRA project phase 1

UNDP-JHRA Kabul and Nangarhar

18th July 2012 Consultation with World Bank on partnering on the new JHRA Phase II Project in general and the Rule of Law indicator project in particular.

World Bank premise, Kabul

25th July 2012 NROLFSM presentation and consultation with JHRA

UNDP-CO Kabul

30th July 2012 Consultation meeting on Trust Fund with LAB and JHRA team

GIZ Kabul

06th August 2012

Consultation meeting on Trust Fund with LAB and JHRA team

GIZ Kabul

12-17 August 2012

Consultation round on final-draft ProdoC with entire JHRA project team and BCPR ROLJS Team, BCPR Gender Specialist and BCPR Justice Expert in Bangkok Regional Centre.

UNDP Kabul, NY, Bangkok,

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ANNEXURE II: NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: MANDATES, LAWS, POLICIES, STRATEGIES National Laws, Policies and Strategies The Constitution of Afghanistan is the supreme law of the country. The 2004 Constitution consists of 160 articles and constitutes Afghanistan as an Islamic Republic with an elected President and National Assembly. A system of civil law is described, but no law may contradict the beliefs and provisions of Islam that are sacred and State religion166. Article (56) calls upon all citizens of the country to constructively cooperate with the Government. The aim of this article is amongst others to ensure public order and security167. Article (7) of the Constitution declares that “the State shall abide by the UN charter, international treaties, international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. Afghanistan has ratified most of the core international treaties: International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights - ICESCR

Acceded: 24 January 1983.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - ICCPR Acceded: 24 January 1983.

International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination - CERD Acceded: 6 July 1983.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women - CEDAW Ratified: 5 March 2003.

Convention on the Rights of the Child - CRC Ratified: 28 March 1994.

Convention Against Torture Ratified: 26 June 1987

This commitment to international agreements is further reinforced by the government’s pledge to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and further elaborated in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and in its Second Pillar –“Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights.” The Government has developed an Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) for 2008-2013 that describes a vision for 2020 of a stable Islamic constitutional democracy at peace with itself and its neighbors. The pillars and goals of the ANDS are the following: 1. Security: Achieve nationwide stabilization, strengthen law enforcement, and improve personal security for every Afghan.

166 The Constitution of Afghanistan, http://www.afghan-web.com/politics/current_constitution.html#chapterone 167 Terms of Reference Community Policing Secretariat, MOI

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2. Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights: Strengthen democratic processes and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and government accountability. 3. Economic and Social Development: Reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private sector-led market economy, improve human development indicators, and make significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The narcotics industry is considered as a vital cross-cutting theme. Most recently, and based on the ANDS, the Government has been developing 22 National Priority Programmes (NPPs) as a starting point for transferring civilian and military responsibilities from international partners to the Afghan government and civil society organizations. The NPP’s are currently being finalized through focus groups with Government institutions for discussion at the Tokyo Conference168. Final formulation and sequencing of the NPPs is of key importance for the Tokyo and Chicago conferences as it has become increasingly clear that financing will not be available for full NPP funding169. The NPPs are subdivided into Clusters as follows: Security (1. Peace and Reintegration); Human Resource Development (2. Skills Development and Labor, 3. Education for All, 4. Higher Education, 5. Women Affairs, 6. Capacity Building for Health); Infrastructure Development (7. National Regional Resource Corridor, 8. Extractive Industries, 9. National Energy Program, 10. Urban Development); Private Sector Development (11. Trade Facilitation and SME, 12. E-Afghanistan); Agriculture and Rural Development (13. Water and Natural Resource Management, 14. Comprehensive Agriculture, 15. Rural Access, 16. Strengthening Local Institutions); Governance (17. Economic and Financial Reform, 18. Transparency and Accountability, 19. Efficient and Effective Government, 20. Local Governance, 21. Justice for ALL, 22. Human Rights). The NPPs have been developed as program proposals and should, as such, provide a road map to convert the concepts into concrete, implementable and practical plans with associated costing/budgets. Government institutions and donors are currently finalizing the NPPs through focus groups170. The sequencing of the NPPs is of key importance for the Tokyo and Chicago conferences as it has become increasingly clear that financing will not be available for full NPP implementation171. In particularly relevant for Rule of Law in Afghanistan are the NPPs 5, 6, 2 (See below). A National Police Strategy and Plan has been finalized in 2010. The strategy identifies specific threat areas and priorities, and divides the ANP into 4 pillars: (i) Civilian Police; (ii) Gendarmerie; (iii) Border Police; (iv) Anti-Crime Police. An “Enabling Force” (i.e. the administrative and institutional reforms required to support the expansion of the police), and sub-pillar (a) Public Protection Force and (b) Afghan Local Police (ALP)172. In addition, a Senior Police Advisory Group is developing a white paper for Afghan National Police development and reform beyond 2014, outlining steps for future requirements from the international community. The paper is to be presented to the International Police

168 Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, “The situation in Afghanistan”. A/66/604-S/2011/722, 13 December 2011. 169 UNAMA situation report February 2012. 170 United Nations Secretary-General, December 2011 171 United Nations Secretary-General, February 2012 172 Afghan National Police Strategy 2012, p. 23

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Coordination Board for consideration173. While the NPPs in the Security and Governance Cluster are important for and will influence the National Police Strategy and Plan, the Policy Plan is not incorporated in the NPP process. As such, the National Police Strategy and Plan do not have a connection with any budgets or other resources. A National Police Code of Conduct was developed and approved in July 2011. The code of conduct sets out nine basic principles for the police: 1) Respect for the Rule of Law; 2) Impartiality (Non-Discrimination); 3) Use of Force only when necessary 4) Responsibility for health and safety of citizens; 5) Confidentiality and protection of privacy of police members; 6) Obedience to Orders; 7) Service to the Community; 8) Honesty; 9) Discretion (decision-making based on the principles of being reasonable; being proportional; and being documentary). A National Justice Sector Strategy (NJS) and a National Justice Program (NJP) have been developed. The July 2010 Kabul Conference added new dimensions to the existing unmet need to improve the rule of law and access to justice, including advancing a legislative reform agenda, improving the provision of legal aid services and completing an informal justice strategy. Compacts between UN and Government A UNDAF has been concluded between the government and the United Nations Country Team for 2010-2013 and based on the ANDS. UNDAF priority 1 is Governance, peace and stability. Gender, human rights, mine action, anti-corruption and border management, and counter-narcotics are identified cross-cutting issues174. Of direct relevance to the justice and security sectors are UNDAF outcomes 1) Stabilization process is strengthened through effective integrated UN support to the Government and communities. 2) Government capacity to deliver services to the poor and vulnerable is enhanced, and 3) The institutions of democratic governance are integrated components of the nation-State. UNDP is among the UN entities that are identified as responsible UN agencies for these outcomes. A Country Programme Document (CPD) for Afghanistan has been approved by the UNDP executive board for 2010-2013. The CPD identifies two outcome areas for UNDP that are directly relevant to the Rule of Law, Justice and Security Sectors and that are directly linked to the above mentioned UNDAF priority area on Good Governance, Peace and Stability and the corresponding UNDAF outcomes: CPD outcome 1: Capacity in State and non-State institutions increased to contribute to overall stabilization and peace-building and CPD outcome 2: Effectiveness of the justice system is improved and access to justice is increased175. UN Mandates, Policies, Strategies UNDP rule of law programming is conducted in the frame of and in compliance with relevant Security Council Mandates; applicable UN instruments, Security General Reports on Rule of Law of 2004, 2006, 2010 and 2012.

173 UNAMA situation report February 2012 174 UNDAF, p. 13 175 Country Programme Document for Afghanistan, 2010-2013

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The most recent UN Security Council Resolution 2041 on Afghanistan was adopted on 22 March 2012. The Security Council provides UNAMA amongst others with the mandate to coordinate the UN system, amongst priority areas in which Rule of Law and justice issues feature prominently. Mentioned are amongst others: support to fulfilment of commitments as stated at London, Kabul and Bonn

Conferences to improve Governance and rule of law, including transitional justice, budget execution and the fight against corruption176.

cooperate with and build capacity of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), to cooperate also with the Afghan Government and relevant international and local non-governmental organizations to monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection, to promote accountability, and to assist in the full implementation of the fundamental freedoms and human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a State party177.

Support to the full, sequenced, timely and coordinated implementation of the National Priority Programme on Law and Justice for All, by all the relevant Afghan institutions and other actors in view of accelerating the establishment of a fair and transparent justice system, eliminating impunity and contributing to the affirmation of the rule of law throughout the country178.

The Secretary-General Guidance Note on Rule of Law of 2008 prescribes adherence to the following principles for the development of rule of law programmes: 1) Base assistance on international norms and standards. 2) Take account of the political context. 3) Base assistance on the unique country context. 4) Advance human rights and gender justice. 5) Ensure national ownership. 6) Support national reform constituencies. 7) Ensure a coherent and comprehensive strategic approach. 8) Engage in effective coordination and partnerships.

176 UN SC Resolution 2041, paragraph 7b 177 UN SC Resolution 2041, paragraph 7b 178 UN SC Resolution 2041, paragraph 37

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ANNEXURE III: SPECIFIC NPPS AS RELEVANT TO JUSTICE

NPP 5: Afghanistan’s Law & Justice for All Program:

component 1: Increasing access to justice

1: JI infrastructure in provinces and districts improved and expanded for a wider range of services, with priority given to transitioning areas. 2: Presence of judiciary personnel increased to mirror infrastructure expansion at provincial and district levels for a wider reach of services, with priority to transitioning areas. 3: Judicial security enhanced for all three JIs (personnel and infrastructure). 4: Gender issues, positions and services are addressed, established and/or strengthened in the JIs. 5: Defendant Defense System strengthened through further provision of legal aid and support to defense advocates of the Afghanistan Independent Bar Association. 6: New legal awareness strategy (including partnership with Ministry of Hajj) to increase awareness of larger segments of the population, particularly in rural areas of the provinces. 7: Administrative remedies strengthened for suing State agencies and administrative bodies. 8: Livelihood and industries training/ rehabilitation opportunities for prisoners expanded. 9: Provide support for the operationalization of all 8 Anti-Corruption Tribunals (courts). 10: Alternatives to incarceration applied for minor offenses/petty crimes. 2.1: Statistical collection and analysis capabilities improved within the Judiciary.

Component 2: improve efficiency of judicial system (especially courts) for better service delivery

2.2: An improved court case management system developed and implemented to improve courts’ efficiency. 2.3: The issue of in absentia cases remedied and notifications systems strengthened (delivery of service for the accused and notification of court dates). 2.4: Prisoner and detainee tracking system improved through Criminal Case Management/Tracking System (CMS) 2.5: Paralegal program developed to strengthen the court systems, the AGO, the AIBA, Legal Aid and the Central Prisons Department. 2.6: The donor-supported prisoners’ data collection/repository system is assessed, amended as necessary, and transferred to the CDP. 2.7: Mechanism developed for remedying unlawful detainment of prisoners. 2.8: Technical archives and tamper-proof evidence preservation facilities established within AGO offices. 2.9: Crime Scene Investigation Laboratory established for the AGO.

component 3: improving technical capacity of judicial staff

3.1 Law/Shariya facilities/curricula strengthened to better meet the needs of the JIs. 3.2: Legal training and standards in legal training are strengthened and coordinated through the National Legal Training Center (INLTC) 3.3: Quality of judicial processes and sentencing improved through trial monitoring. 3.4: Materials developed and disseminated for improved application of the law. 3.5: Model Courts (in Kabul and Heart- Primary and Appeals) established

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to demonstrate best practices in court administration and processes. Component 4: law reform and legislative effectiveness

4.1: The modality by which new laws are created, reviewed and revised is strengthened. 4.2: Quality/quantity of legislative output of Taqnin improved. 4.3: Strategy formulated for reviewing/revising Afghanistan’s existing legislative framework (body of 431 laws). 4.4: Legal reform of legislative priorities of the Government completed or timelines revised based on mutual agreement with international community. 4.5: Judicial standards for sentencing improved.

Component 5: institutional strengthening

5.1: Managerial, operational and administrative processes and procedures are improved. 5.2: Financial management systems and procedures improved. 5.3: Human Resources personnel, processes and systems improved. 5.4: Translation Units in the JIs established and/or operationalized and sustained. 5.5: Inter-Institutional relationships and coordination strengthened. 5.6: Professional support tools provided to the AGO, MoJ, SC & AIBA, such as the publication of Prosecutors' magazines & other resources.

NPP 6: Afghanistan Programme for Human Rights and Civic ResponsibilitiesComponent 1: Strengthen Afghan State Institutions

1.1. The Human Rights Support Unit is institutionalized within the Government of Afghanistan 1.2 Domestic laws and policy are harmonized in line with Afghanistan’s human rights obligations 1.3 Human rights and civic education programs across the Government are undertaken

Component 2: Raise awareness among the general Afghan population on human rights and civic responsibilities

2.1 Human rights and civic education program to target communities across Afghanistan and to ensure greater Government accountability is undertaken 2.2 Human rights and civic education program is undertaken that targets formal education and media institutions in Afghanistan

Component 3: Strengthen the independence and sustainability of Afghanistan’s national constitutional and other specialized institutions

3.1 The institutional and human resource capacities of AIHRC are strengthened

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ANNEXURE IV: ROAD MAP FOR CHANGE IN JUSTICE SECTOR THROUGH JHRA PHASE II JHRA Phase II has a comprehensive multi-level approach to bring in change over a 3 year period in the intervention areas both at the national and sub national levels (the provincial and district levels). JHRA Phase II will be operational from January 2013 to December 2015 over a period of 36 months.

I. Background

JHRA Phase II will contribute towards the Afghan National Priority Plans (NPP) on Justice (draft NPP 5) and Human Rights (NPP 6). Through the project interventions in three years it will seek to increase trust in Afghan justice institutions as the necessary foundation and prerequisite for the re-establishment of State legitimacy between the people, (in particular those who are vulnerable) and the State. The assumption is that without trust there is no State legitimacy and without state legitimacy, it is impossible for a Government to guide a country through transition and transformation without conflict. The 2011 World Development Report draws similar conclusions that the priority needs for fragile settings are to restore confidence and to transform Government institutions that deliver citizen security, justice and jobs. The project is oriented around three key outputs as follows: 1: Sector-wide strategic coordination and human rights compliant policy and law-making enabled. 2: Public access to justice strengthened, with a focus on vulnerable groups. 3: Advocacy and knowledge base established for improved rule of law. Through these outputs, the project assumes a comprehensive multi-level approach to trust building composed of increasing service delivery and broadening access to justice and security-related information and services, in particular for the vulnerable. The institutional capacity development and local level empowerment is combined with the facilitation of the necessary political leadership and balanced with structural and institutional mechanisms and safeguards to ensure sustainable transition and development. Accordingly, support to justice sector service providers is balanced with support to ordinary people who would normally not be able to circumvent the current justice institutions and mechanisms to access justice and accountability, and gain confidence in the formal justice institutions and the State. Comprehensive multi-level approach - The JHRA Phase II will operate in a transition and transformation period for Afghanistan and its interventions will consequently be affected by the political, social and economic situation. Within these parameters the project seeks to consolidate effective governance and State authority through a comprehensive multi-level approach:

Sub-national level / national level: The project interventions take place in targeted sub-national level areas at the provincial and district level and attempt to create a sense of stability and connection to the governance systems.. Through built-in feedback and coordination mechanisms, information acquired through the project at the sub-national level

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will assist the national level justice coordination forums (such as the Cabinet Committees179) and the planning and policy department of the Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court to address bottlenecks through policy formulation and sector wide coordination.

Sector-wide level / institutional level: Focused support is given to the justice institutions. However, connections with other national institutions are made through the project or supported through UNDPs ROL Strategy. This holds in particular for those national institutions dealing with citizen security, gender and anti-corruption but also for instance for the Ministry of Education and Foreign Affairs.

State / non-State: The project balancing support to duty bearers and right holders and State and non-State justice providers. Support is provided to community leaders and independent institutions such as the Independent Bar Association, the Independent Human Rights Commission, the Independent Institute for Socio-Economic Opinion Research and CSOs.

Institutional level / individual level: In addition to institutional capacity development, interventions target the individual justice service providers and the general public through experiential learning, community outreach and broad and narrow cast messaging.

National level – International level: The project connects national level justice institutions, civil society and human rights organisations to international counterparts and knowledge providers through partnerships and global knowledge networks. National ownership - The three year intervention will be targeting certain key institutions and geographical areas. However, since the project will be implemented with the government is assumed that there will be expansion of the project interventions to other areas, not necessarily using identical processes or implementation mechanisms but contextualized to the local areas which maybe adapted by the government or local community. Embedded in a longer term vision - The project will be undertaken through the period of Transition and will cover the first year of Transformation. However, the project will be embedded within the overall UNDP Rule of Law Strategy which will cover the period of Transformation (2013-2024) in a comprehensive coordinated sector-wide approach. The Rule of Law Cluster is the coordination mechanism for the Rule of Law Strategy and covers UNDPs Gender Equality Project, the Afghanistan Integrity Initiative and the Law and Order Trust Fund. UNDPs Rule of Law Strategy and Cluster are for their part closely linked to UNDPs Sub-National Governance; Inclusive Politics; and Poverty Clusters. This is in line with recent discussions led by fragile and conflict-affected countries in the context of the New Deal that concluded that ‘legitimate politics, security, justice, livelihoods’ should be the focus areas for international support. In this context and in the context of the global commitments to Afghanistan during the transformation period, the three year intervention through JHRA Phase II should be seen as contributing to the entire chain on rule to law and longer term peace, stability, access to justice and sustainable development for Afghanistan.

II. Road map for change in justice sector

179 There are two Cabinet Committees directly related to the justice sector: the Legislation Cabinet Committee (Chaired by the MOJ) and the Justice & Judiciary Cabinet Boards chaired by the SC. Of relevance for the justice sector and supported through UNDPs ROL Strategy is the Cabinet Board on Security chaired by the MOI.

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While the project will be functioning within a larger political framework with multiple levels of external influences such as other projects operating within the same jurisdiction and institutions, however, within this complex frame, certain assumptions maybe made based on which interventions have been planned with potential indicators to measure change.

1. Assumptions: - That the traditional or informal justice systems are functioning with varying levels of

effectiveness at the provincial, district and village levels which engage in informal dispute resolutions which are acceptable by the people accessing them.

- That the ordinary people and the justice providers will be ready and willing to share their problems while engaging with justice institutions (both formal and informal).

- That the local security and justice institutions are available and operating in most districts having minimum levels of skill who maybe further trained in conflict resolution, laws and due process.

- That the leaderships of the justice systems and ministries are receptive to bring in change in policy, implement laws and regulations according to treaties and conventions signed by Afghanistan.

- That the leadership of the formal justice institutions are ready to incorporate mechanisms of transparency and accountability in systems.

- That there are multiple projects and agencies which are willing to share their problems and challenges through cooperation and national coordination.

2. Interventions:

The inventions which are envisaged in the Project Document are classified under the following thematic areas:

-Capacity development: Interventions will be undertaken at the individual level through trainings, workshops, experiential learning, expert coaching and mentoring etc. At the institutional level support, coordination, mentoring and through south south cooperation, sound policies, better functioning organizational structure and effective methods of management will be undertaken. At the societal level discussion forums and cooperation between the justice sector actors and the traditional justice institutions will be established for improved cooperation, sharing of incidences and cases. These local forums will also identify champions of change who will encourage the communities to access formal institutions, coordinate with the state agencies. While the champions of change within the formal justice institutions would be role models who would be people within the closed institutions of the justice system using their skills and knowledge to inform peers.

- Direct service delivery:

Actual cases will be taken up through the Legal Aid Trust Fund by Afghanistan Independent Bar Association Lawyers and those from Civil Society both for criminal matters and civil cases. Further legal interventions will be promoted on a pilot basis to establish the informal employment sector through legal empowerment for the poor programmatic interventions.

- Awareness and legal education:

Multiple channels will be established both narrow cast (developing and disseminating standardized posters, flyers etc through Public Legal Awareness Board of the Ministry); workshops and trainings for beneficiary groups through public-private partnership and using

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mass media mechanisms such as radio, television, short message services (SMS), community radio etc to disseminate information on citizens rights and obligations and duties of the justice providers.

- Research, data-collection and public perception surveys:

All interventions will be backed by research which will be based on action research to develop policy documents, white papers which will be disseminated for consultations within the government and to think tank groups in Afghanistan. The research will be important especially to test new ideas or those which are contentious therefore evidence and theoretical examination would assist in informed discussions which may assist in policy formulation. The project will be based on a national baseline and each programmatic input will be tested for its contribution to progress within a specific time. M&E mechanisms will be an integral part of the project and will be nationally led. The data will be collected through government channels, international agencies and through public perception surveys, case study documentation etc. - Advocacy, dialogue, discussions:

All research, trainings would identify opportunities of intervention in policy level dialogue to advocate with a wide range of stakeholders to create a network and group who will help in building a ground swell for change. Therefore in the entire project there will be continuous dialogue and discussions which will be balanced with research, knowledge sharing at multiple levels of stakeholders and beneficiary groups.

III. Social change based on timeline:

The change process can be measured against time, in the target areas and against certain programmatic intervention. As discussed earlier, the JHRA project should be seen in the context of Transition and Transformation and in an environment where several projects both those of UNDP and of other agencies will be functioning within a specific jurisdiction or institution. Taken together the project is expected to contribute to social change processes or project level impact. The project level outcome of 3 years may have limited impact, but if implemented through the entire transformation period, impact maybe measured.. Some of the expected social change processes have been identified below. However, early in the project, this common vision will be discussed and validated with project stakeholders and especially with the project stakeholders and the MoJ (the main implementing partner) so that the common ideas are translated through collective actions. Outcome: Afghan men and women in target areas have increased trust in State justice and citizen security institutions. Indicator: Increased numbers of Afghan men and women will access formal justice institutions to seek information and will report cases. Target beneficiaries: Afghan men and women especially the poor, Afghan returnees, prison population and youth. Target stakeholders: Justice sector institutions, civil society organizations, international community including donors and national counterparts in other countries.

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Baseline: At present there is no national baseline on the justice sector, therefore in the first year of the project (2013) a national baseline will be established. According to the Asia Foundation Afghanistan in 2011 Survey, it has recorded an increase of disputes from 16% in 2007 to 25% in 2011. The most frequently identified problems are disputes over land, reported around (21%) of those who had sought assistance with dispute resolution. Problems related to public infrastructure were also commonly cited including disputes related to lack of water and electricity (18%) and reconstruction of roads and bridges (7%). Security problems were cited by 7%, and a further 5% specifically cited robbery/burglary. Of the 25% of the people interviewed who mentioned that there was increase in dispute, 66% went to the local Jirga, 35% went to the district authorities and 28% went to the local malik/khans while 17% visited the provincial governor’s office. According to the survey, of those who approached a government agency/office to resolve community problems a quarter of the respondents said that they approached the district governor (24%) or the courts (24%). It is evident from the survey results that the people are not confident to use the justice institutions for dispute resolutions. Therefore through the project period trust building will be undertaken so that Afghan men and women, especially those who are vulnerable access the available forms of dispute systems and justice institutions which should uphold the rule of law and due process. Expected impact during the project period: Impact of interventions in First year

- Networks and champions of change at the national and subnational levels identified who may assist in implementing the project and facilitate attitudinal change within the justice sector institutions and the local community in future. The champions of change may be from within the formal, traditional justice institutions, Afghan think tank organization or may also be a part of the political leadership of the country.

Impact of interventions in Second year: - Champions of change and beneficiaries accept and participate in identified activities

and programmes. The champions of change will facilitate the process of opening up of justice institutions as they are provided trainings and skills on improving existing systems.

Impact of interventions in Third year: - Champions of change and beneficiaries participate in project related programmes in

large numbers and also seek information and share information with justice sector actors especially the police, Huqoq offices, legal aid services. Some of the champions of change may opt to become trainer of trainers and undertake voluntary dissemination of information being part of the justice institutions or may join the project activities based on some incentives. These champions of change and their extended networks would help in achieving each of the outputs and the activity results of the project.

- The champions of change and their extended networks once convinced on the project objectives will assist in achieving the results.

Therefore during the project period it is important to establish a database on pro-active reform minded individuals who can take ownership of the project activities and bring some results. These pro reformers are role models in the system and help in shaping the change in the institutions and community.

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Since the Rule of Law strategy extends from 2013-2024, the JHRA project may function in phases and provide the following impact based on similar programmatic interventions as will be implemented in JHRA Phase II: Impact of interventions in Fifth year: -Specific laws which are in compliance with human rights standards adopted through consultation process and implemented with reported benefits based on case studies and surveys. - Individual agents of change become practitioners for change process which impact ordinary people in provinces, districts and village levels and these best practices in justice sector institutions (both formal and informal sector) are documented and government adopts these best practices in policy formulation for wider replication. Impact of interventions in Eight Year - Select national institutions and provincial and districts level justice institutions have

effective and efficient justice delivery systems where people have reported confidence in using them.

Impact of interventions in Tenth – Twelfth year: -State justice systems (including institutions at national and sub national levels) recognize, accept and establish coordination of informal justice systems through legislation. - This would lead to visible, effective, functional oversight mechanisms across the country which will reconfirm state legitimacy through people’s trust in the state and establish democracy.

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ANNEXURE V: General responsibilities of the Government, UNDP and the executing agency 1. All phases and aspects of UNDP assistance to this project shall be governed by and

carried out in accordance with the relevant and applicable resolutions and decisions of the competent United Nations organs and in accordance with UNDP's policies and procedures for such projects, and subject to the requirements of the UNDP Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting System.

2. The Government shall remain responsible for this UNDP-assisted development project

and the realization of its objectives as described in this Project Document. 3. Assistance under this Project Document being provided for the benefit of the

Government and the people of Afghanistan, the Government shall bear all risks of operations in respect of this project.

4. The Government shall provide to the project the national counterpart personnel, training

facilities, land, buildings, equipment and other required services and facilities. It shall designate the Government Co-operating Agency (hereinafter referred to as the "Co-operating Agency"), which shall be directly responsible for the implementation of the Government contribution to the project.

5. The UNDP undertakes to complement and supplement the Government participation and

will provide the required expert services, training, equipment and other services within the funds available to the project.

6. Upon commencement of the project, the Executing Agency (UNDP) shall assume

primary responsibility for project execution and shall have the status of an independent contractor for this purpose. However, that primary responsibility shall be exercised in consultation with UNDP and in agreement with the Co-operating Agency. Arrangements to this effect shall be stipulated in the Project Document as well as for the transfer of this responsibility to the Government or to an entity designated by the Government during the execution of the project.

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7. Part of the Government’s participation may take the form of a cash contribution to UNDP. In such cases, the Execution Agency will provide the related services and facilities and will account annually to the UNDP and the Government for the expenditure incurred.

(a) Participation of the Government 8. The Government shall provide to the project the services, equipment and facilities in the

quantities and at the time specified in the Project Document. Budgetary provision, either in kind or in cash, for the Government's participation so specified shall be set forth in the Project Budgets.

9. The Co-operating Agency shall, as appropriate and in consultation with the Executing

Agency (UNDP), assign a national project director for the project on a full-time basis. He shall carry out such responsibilities in the project as are assigned to him by the Co-operating Agency.

10. The estimated cost of items included in the Government contribution, as detailed in the

Project Budget, shall be based on the best information available at the time of drafting the project proposal. It is understood that price fluctuations during the period of execution of the project may necessitate an adjustment of said contribution in monetary terms; the latter shall at all times be determined by the value of the services, equipment and facilities required for the proper execution of the project.

11. Within the given number of person-months of personnel services described in the Project

Document, minor adjustments of individual assignments of project personnel provided by the Government may be made by the Government in consultation with the Executing Agency, if this is found to be in the best interest of the project. UNDP shall be so informed in all instances where such minor adjustments involve financial implications.

12. The Government shall continue to pay the local salaries and appropriate allowances of

national counterpart personnel during the period of their absence from the project while on UNDP fellowships.

13. The Government shall defray any customs duties and other charges related to the

clearance of project equipment, its transportation, handling, storage and related expenses within the country. It shall be responsible for its installation and maintenance, insurance, and replacement, if necessary, after delivery to the project site.

14. The Government shall make available to the project - subject to existing security

provisions - any published and unpublished reports, maps, records and other data, which are considered necessary to the implementation of the project.

15. Patent rights, copyright rights and other similar rights to any discoveries or work resulting

from UNDP assistance in respect of this project shall belong to the UNDP. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties in each case, however, the Government shall have the right to use any such discoveries or work within the country free of royalty and any charge of similar nature.

16. The Government shall assist all project personnel in finding suitable housing

accommodation at reasonable rents. 17. The services and facilities specified in the Project Document which are to be provided to

the project by the Government by means of a contribution in cash shall be set forth in the

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Project Budget. The Government shall make payment of this amount to the UNDP in accordance with the Schedule of Payments.

18. Payment of the above-mentioned contribution to the UNDP on or before the dates

specified in the Schedule of Payments by the Government is a prerequisite to commencement or continuation of project operations.

(b) Participation of the UNDP - the executing agency 19. The UNDP shall provide to the project the services, equipment and facilities described in

the Project Document. Budgetary provision for the UNDP contribution as specified shall be set forth in the Project Budget.

20. The Executing Agency shall consult with the Government on the candidature of the

Project Manager or Chief Technical advisor a/ who, under the direction of the Executing Agency, will be responsible in the country for the Executing Agency's participation in the project. The Project Manager or Chief technical Advisor shall supervise the experts and other agency personnel assigned to the project, and the on-the-job training of national counterpart personnel. S/He shall be responsible for the management and efficient utilization of all UNDP-financed inputs, including equipment provided to the project.

21. The Executing Agency, in consultation with the Government, shall assign international

staff and other personnel to the project as specified in the Project Document, select candidates for fellowships and determine standards for the training of national counterpart personnel.

22. Fellowships shall be administered in accordance with the fellowships regulations of the

Executing Agency. 23. The Executing Agency may, in agreement with the Government, execute part or all of the

project by subcontract. The selection of subcontractors shall be made, after consultation with the Government, in accordance with the Executing Agency's procedures.

24. All material, equipment and supplies which are purchased from UNDP resources will be

used exclusively for the execution of the project, and will remain the property of the UNDP in whose name it will be held. Equipment supplied by the UNDP shall be marked with the insignia of the UNDP.

25. Arrangements may be made, if necessary, for a temporary transfer of custody of

equipment to sub-national authorities during the life of the project, without prejudice to the final transfer.

26. Prior to completion of UNDP assistance to the project, the Government, the UNDP shall

consult as to the disposition of all project equipment provided by the UNDP. Title to such equipment shall normally be transferred to the Government, or to an entity nominated by the Government, when it is required for continued operation of the project or for activities following directly there from. The UNDP may, however, at its discretion, retain title to part or all of such equipment.

27. At an agreed time after the completion of UNDP assistance to the project, the

Government and the UNDP shall review the activities continuing from or consequent upon the project with a view to evaluating its results.

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28. UNDP may release information relating to any investment oriented project to potential investors, unless and until the Government has requested the UNDP in writing to restrict the release of information relating to such project.

Rights, Facilities, Privileges and Immunities 29. In accordance with the Agreement concluded by the United Nations (UNDP) and the

Government concerning the provision of assistance by UNDP, the personnel of UNDP and other United Nations organizations associated with the project shall be accorded rights, facilities, privileges and immunities specified in said Agreement.

30. The Government shall grant UN volunteers, if such services are requested by the

Government, the same rights, facilities, privileges and immunities as are granted to the personnel of UNDP.

31. The Executing Agency's contractors and their personnel (except nationals of the host

country employed locally) shall: a) Be immune from legal process in respect of all acts performed by them in their official

capacity in the execution of the project; b) Be immune from national service obligations; c) Be immune together with their spouses and relatives dependent on them from

immigration restrictions; d) Be accorded the privileges of bringing into the country reasonable amounts of foreign

currency for the purposes of the project or for personal use of such personnel, and of withdrawing any such amounts brought into the country, or in accordance with the relevant foreign exchange regulations, such amounts as may be earned therein by such personnel in the execution of the project;

e) Be accorded together with their spouses and relatives dependent on them the same

repatriation facilities in the event of international crisis as diplomatic envoys. 32. All personnel of the Executing Agency's contractors shall enjoy inviolability for all papers

and documents relating to the project. 33. The Government shall either exempt from or bear the cost of any taxes, duties, fees or

levies which it may impose on any firm or organization which may be retained by the Executing Agency and on the personnel of any such firm or organization, except for nationals of the host country employed locally, in respect of:

a) The salaries or wages earned by such personnel in the execution of the project; b) Any equipment, materials and supplies brought into the country for the purposes of the

project or which, after having been brought into the country, may be subsequently withdrawn there from;

c) Any substantial quantities of equipment, materials and supplies obtained locally for the

execution of the project, such as, for example, petrol and spare parts for the operation and maintenance of equipment mentioned under (b), above, with the provision that the

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types and approximate quantities to be exempted and relevant procedures to be followed shall be agreed upon with the Government and, as appropriate, recorded in the Project Document; and

d) As in the case of concessions currently granted to UNDP's personnel, any property

brought, including one privately owned automobile per employee, by the firm or organization or its personnel for their personal use or consumption or which after having been brought into the country, may subsequently be withdrawn there from upon departure of such personnel.

34. The Government shall ensure: (a) prompt clearance of experts and other persons performing services in respect of this project; and (b) the prompt release from customs of:

(i) equipment, materials and supplies required in connection with this project; and (ii) property belonging to and intended for the personal use or consumption of the personnel of the UNDP, its Executing Agencies, or other persons performing services on their behalf in respect of this project, except for locally recruited personnel.

35. The privileges and immunities referred to in the paragraphs above, to which such firm or

organization and its personnel may be entitled, may be waived by the Executing Agency where, in its opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the successful completion of the project or to the interest of the UNDP.

36. The Executing Agency shall provide the Government through the resident representative

with the list of personnel to whom the privileges and immunities enumerated above shall apply.

37. Nothing in this Project Document or Annex shall be construed to limit the rights, facilities,

privileges or immunities conferred in any other instrument upon any person, natural or juridical, referred to hereunder.

Suspension or termination of assistance 38. The UNDP may by written notice to the Government suspend its assistance to any

project if in the judgment of the UNDP any circumstance arises which interferes with or threatens to interfere with the successful completion of the project or the accomplishment of its purposes. The UNDP may, in the same or a subsequent written notice, indicate the conditions under which it is prepared to resume its assistance to the project. Any such suspension shall continue until such time as such conditions are accepted by the Government and as the UNDP shall give written notice to the Government that it is prepared to resume its assistance.

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39. If any situation referred to in paragraph 1, above, shall continue for a period of fourteen days after notice thereof and of suspension shall have been given by the UNDP to the Government and the Executing Agency, then at any time thereafter during the continuance thereof, the UNDP may by written notice to the Government and the Executing Agency terminate the project.

40. The provisions of this paragraph shall be without prejudice to any other rights or

remedies the UNDP may have in the circumstances, whether under general principles of law or otherwise.

Documents

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