Upload
ahsan-akram
View
130
Download
2
Embed Size (px)
DESCRIPTION
Analysis on the factors resulting in the formation and breakdown of the Khilafat Movement (1919-1924) resulting in the eventual mobilization of the minority Indian Muslims towards the creation of Pakistan.
Citation preview
ISLAMIC POLITICAL ACTIVISIM IN INDIA The Rise and Fall of the Khilafat Movement
Ahsan Akram
History and Development of Islamic Political Thought
Saeed Khan
December 7, 2012
Akram 2
Introduction
The Khilafat movement, beginning in 1919 and ending in 1924 is viewed as a “flash in
the pan” movement in Indian history. Its causes can be debated ranging from purely political and
nationalistic to unequivocally theological. Many papers have debated the true nature of the
movement along with its lasting impact on the constantly evolving Indian subcontinent. This
paper will attempt to dissect the underlying causes of the Khilafat movement along with focusing
on the presiding framework in the Indian subcontinent that allowed for such a movement to
occur.
It is important to first define the word Khalifa. Khalifa derives from the Arabic root
khalafa, which means “to follow” or “to come after”.1 It means “successor” in the sequential
sense, not in the sense of inheritance of properties or qualities.2 In the terms of Islam, the Khalifa
was the sequential successor of the Prophet Muhammad after his death. As a result, Abu Bakr
was a Khalifa of the prophet, therefore Khalifat al-Rasool Allah. His successor would be labeled
in a literal term as “Khalifat al-Khalif al-Rasool Allah”. Instead of using the “title” of Khalifa,
Abu Bakr and his subsequent three elected successors utilized the title of “Amir al-Mu’minin” or
“the Commander of the Faithful”.3
After the rise of the Ummayad Empire, the title of the leader was again in question. In
order to provide legitimacy to the new monarchy established under the Ummayad Dynasty, the
title of Khalifa was adopted. In this sense, it did not signify a successor, as the monarchy was a
new phenomenon after the rule of the Khulafa-e-Rashidun. The term “Khilafa” was now
transformed to represent an emperor or monarch, not a successor as the original meaning had
1 H. Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 1 (1997), 4 2 Ibid, 4 3 Ibid, 4
Akram 3
intended it to be. This claim to the term “Khalifa” provided the Umayyad Dynasty the legitimacy
they were seeking as it connected their monarchy to the original leadership of Islam following
the death of the Prophet. As a result, it is necessary to understand that the title of Khalifa
throughout the Ummayads, Abbasids, and Ottomans was as a term representing the monarch, not
“successor” as originally intended.
Particular to the Khilafat Movement, the term Khalifa essentially expands and holds a
different defination for each class of society. The term is no longer associated or viewed
specifically as defining a leader, successor, or monarch. Instead, it stands as a symbol of Islam.
For the Ulema, the Khilafat represents a role of leadership as pertaining to the Islamic shari’a.
For the western-educated leaders of the Khilafat movement, the term holds an abstract idea of
self-determination for the Indian Muslims. Finally, the general masses that were for the most part
ignorant of what “Khilafat” actually meant, viewed the Khilafat as the direct representation of
Islam. This plays a major role in the mobilization of the masses during the Khilafat movement.
Connection Between the Ottoman Khalifa and the Indian Muslims
After the death of the Prophet in 632 AD, the budding Islamic state of Medina was faced
with a dilemma of what style of governance should be utilized. The Rashidun Caliphs tried to
maintain the traditional simplicity of Islam and the tribal values of an earlier age.4 By the abrupt
conclusion of Ali’s caliphate, the Islamic state transitioned into a monarchy beginning with the
Umayyad Dynasty. Arab expansion and wars of conquest resulted in a tremendous increase in
their wealth and the monarchy (caliphate) by the time of the Abbasids developed a “succession
from God” ideology.5 Social hierarchies developed as a result, the caliphate wearing the political
4 M. Shakir, Khilafat to Partition: A Survey of Major Political Trends among Indian Muslims During 1919-1947 (Kalamkar Prakashan, 1970), 3 5 Ibid, 3
Akram 4
crown and simultaneously wielding a spiritual influence over the general population. This model
of the social and political hierarchy extended to the Indian subcontinent in the form of Mughal
shahs.
In pre-British rule, the Mughal emperors occupied themselves with political governance
while the Ulema handled Islamic jurisprudence in a favorable manner to the Shah’s ideology.6 As
a religion, Islam was spread to the common man through regional Sufis and Pirs rather than the
Ulema.7 This key point is very important in later understanding the process of Muslim
mobilization in India. Despite the separations in region, linguistics, class, and sects, the Muslim
minority was held together by the common religion of Islam and the connection to the religion of
the ruling Empire.8 This commonality, although not visible in everyday life for the common
Muslim, was a strong point in keeping a direct loyalty to the Muslim Shah. Minority status for
the Muslims allowed for the extraterritorial loyalty to the community of Islamic believers.9
The Muslim Mughal Empire held social, political, and economic power in India prior to
the British Raj. For example, the British East India Company derived authority in India from the
Mughals.10 In religious terms, the Mughal Shah’s name was used in the weekly sermon during
Friday jumma (congregational prayer). At face value, the divided Muslim minority shared the
common denominator of Islam amongst themselves and with the Shah. When this focal point of
connectedness was lost after the fall of the Mughals, the Muslims turned their association to the
Ottoman Empire and its hold on the Islamic Caliphate.
6 Ibid, 11 7 A.F. Buehler, Sufi Heirs of the Prophet: The Indian Naqshbandiyya and the Rise of the Mediating Sufi Shaykh (Univ of South Carolina Press, 1998), 169 8 M. Mujeeb, The Indian Muslims (Allen & Unwin London, 1967). 9 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 2 10 Ibid, 5
Akram 5
The legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate in the Indian subcontinent is a topic worthy of
discussion. By the late 19th century, the Ottoman sultans decided to lay claim to the Universal
Caliphate.11 In order to establish legitimacy, the Ottoman Empire launched a campaign of the
mythical transfer of the Caliphate to Selim by al-Mutawakkil in 1517.12 The Ottomans had to
show that the transfer of the Caliphate was a legitimate process from the Abbasids, the former
owners of the position of Caliph. Heavy propaganda was distributed in India through Urdu
journalism, the main form of Muslim media. During this time period, Indian Muslims were
devoid of a symbolic religious commonality after the fall of the Mughal Empire in 1857. As a
result, the story of the transfer of Caliphate power from al-Mutawakkil to Selim was generally
accepted in India without much questioning or backlash.
Two groups of thought did emerge on the topic of the Ottoman Caliphate. The first group
subscribed to the Barelvi tradition, refusing to accept the legitimacy of the Ottoman claim on the
Caliphate by not questioning the story, but by affirming the Prophet’s saying pertaining to the
title of Caliph staying within the Quraysh clan.13 The Ottomans, not being of Qurayshi descent,
failed to qualify for the position of Caliph. The second group however believed and readily
accepted the story presented by the Ottomans. This allowed for the void of the Mughal
figurehead to be replaced with one from the Ottoman Empire.
Growing Ottoman sympathies from India were demonstrated with Imams beginning to
use the Sultan’s name in Friday congressional prayers. Muslims launched funds to provide for
11 H. Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 1 (1997), 2 12 Ibid, 2 13 Ibid, 3
Akram 6
Turkish relief during the Turkish War of 1877-78 and during the Greco-Turkish war of 1897.14
This developing support for the Ottoman Empire was a clear sign of the religious alliance
forming within Indian Muslims towards Turkish causes. When it was claimed that the Muslims
of the Indian subcontinent owned allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey, no British or Hindu
eyebrows were raised and the claim was accepted at its face value.15 Sultan Abdul Hamid II also
became very active in flexing his proverbial caliphate muscles in order to gain pan-Islamic
support from India and abroad against encroaching European powers. Ultimately, Muslims in
India began to view the Ottoman Caliphate and as an extension, the Ottoman Empire as the
symbol of Islamic unity and international power.
Dynamics Between the Indian Muslims and the British
The relationship between the British rulers and English residents of India with the Indians
was a strained and distant one. Imperial domesticity was believed superior to native Indian
domesticity for the English.16 Areas with British population had detailed set of rules and
regulations enacted that upheld a British standard in English homes along with maintaining a
superiority complex with the native Indians. British individuals prevented their children from
spending too much time with other Indian children or with their ayah (nanny) in fear that their
children would learn the Hindi language.17 The Hindi or Urdu languages were looked down upon
along with the people who spoke such languages. Surprisingly, English-speaking Anglo-Indians
14 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 5 15 I. Rome Sultan, "The Role of the North-West Frontier Province in the Khilafat and Hijrat Movements," Islamic Studies 43, no. 1 (2004), 51 16 Blunt Alison, "Imperial Geographies of Home: British Domesticity in India, 1886-1925," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 24, no. 4 (1999), 422 17 Ibid, 434
Akram 7
were not considered equals either as they were often deemed untrustworthy or castigated for their
distinctive accent.18
Despite all of this hostility towards the locals, it is surprising that the Indian Muslims
were still somewhat supportive of the British prior to the beginning of World War I. Although
there was a Muslim mutiny in 1857 against the British, the Muslims largely were not militantly
rebellious to the British. They were more concerned with purifying their own religion against a
backdrop of threats from Hinduism and Christian Missionaries. The development of the local
sufi sects after the decline of the Mughals created an initiative to promote a purer vision of
Islamic life and society.19
Along with Islamic reforms domestically, the Ottoman Empire also played a role in
increasing Muslim India’s support for the ruling British. During the mutiny in 1857 for example,
the Ottoman sultan called Indian Muslims to remain loyal to British rule.20 A direct intervention
by the Caliphate allowed for the settling of the mutiny. A divergent result was that the anti-
western Ulema lost power and influence over Indian Muslims after the fall of the Mughals.21,22
Due to the political alliance of the Ottoman Empire and Britain during the time period, the
Muslims viewed the British as an entity that was attempting to help maintain the Ottoman
Dynasty and as a derivative, the Muslim Caliphate. Thus, the British were not viewed in a
negative light.
18 Ibid, 434 19 R. A. Geaves, "India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective," Islamic Studies 35, no. 1 (1996), 31 20 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 6 21 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 43 22 Mushirul Hasan, "Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement," Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 20 (1981)
Akram 8
Muslim opposition to the British began to grow in the years 1911-1913 when the Balkan
wars became another source of anxiety to Muslims.23 Muslims began to believe the conspiracy
that encroaching Christians were ultimately pursing the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and
along with it, the Islamic Caliphate. With the loss of another major Islamic identifier, Indian
Muslims were highly nervous of losing their Islamic identity with the large Ottoman Empire and
ultimately losing out to the majority Hindus.
The rift between Indian and British relations further splintered in 1912 when the British
Empire refused to grant Aligarh Muslim University the licensure to become an educational
institution. The Aligarh movement originally displayed a firm loyalty to British rule.24 Students
of Aligarh were considered westernized products from the education received at the institution.
Surprisingly, many of these westernized students were the ones to denounce their loyalty to the
British Crown and instead begin supporting an anti-British stance. Many of these rebelling
students would go on to begin the foundations of the Khilafat movement and help it become
mainstream in Indian society. These Aligarh products included Muhammad Ali, Maulana Abdul
Bari of Firangi Mahal, Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan of Deoband, and Maulana Abdul Kalam
Azad.25 It is important to note the distinction of the Islamic schools of thought that each
individual belonged to and the developing cooperation and unity between the different sects in
order to attain their goals.
Aligarh Muslim University
The shift in alliance of the Muslim University against the British Raj can be attributed as
the biggest chain reaction that helped kick-start Muslim political activism. It makes sense to
23 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 10 24 Ibid 25 Ibid
Akram 9
breakdown the leadership of the Aligarh Muslim University and understands why it became the
roots of a major movement in India.
The attempted creation of a Muslim University was an effort on the part of the founders
to create an all-India Muslim constituency and to carve out for it a decisive piece of political
power.26 The Western-educated founders of the University believed that it was necessary for the
cultivation of cultural and philosophical ideals in an institution grounded to an internationally
recognized political and educational powerhouse. The University would also serve as a direct
challenge to the British control of the educational access to power.27 The education establishment
would also serve as a “factory” in developing the next generation of Muslim political thinkers. It
was becoming a priority for the Muslim leaders in India to establish a social and political hub
and stake their claim in the discourse of developing Indian politics in order to prevent
marginalization by the Hindu majority. Thus, it was necessary to develop an educated youth in
order to maintain autonomy in the political scene. The Muslim leaders understood that the
minority Muslims could only stay relevant and with specialization in their social and political
ranks.
The Muslim University was created to function as a base for emerging leaders of Muslim
India. There was no distinction set for the cultural or political identities that each individual
could choose. The proposed university would be modern, but it would be universally Muslim.28
These ground rules from the University establishment allowed for the spread of ideas and
26 Gail Minault and David Lelyveld, "The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920," Modern Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (1974), 145 27 Ibid 28 Ibid, 149
Akram 10
inadvertently resulted in bitter factionalism, which became a chief characteristic of the
University.29
Aligarh served as a hotbed for ideologies from differing sects of Islam. For example,
students of the Deoband and Firangi Mahal schools of thoughts both studied at the University.
The differing religious viewpoints resulted in divisions in the University. The rifts in ideologies
led to the formations of leagues within the University, ultimately nurturing future development of
political parties such as the Muslim League. These parties would later go on to play a role in the
political landscape of India post-British Raj and into the partition arguments.
In 1911, the Government of India submitted a request for Aligarh Muslim University to
be recognized as an official international University in the British Empire. Britain instead
decided that the University should instead remain a ‘federal’ university of closely neighboring
colleges.30 The British also were not keen in including the term “Muslim” in the title of the
University, rather preferring it be named ‘The University of Aligarh’. The Muslims representing
Aligarh University quickly grew impatient and took to the Urdu newspapers in demanding the
development of the University on their own terms. Muhammad Ali, the head of the Old Boys
Association at Aligarh, reiterated the demand for an all-India affiliating institution run by
Muslims with minimum of government interference in his newspaper Comrade.31
By June 1912, the British Empire had decided to reject the University proposal according
to what the Muslim leaders of Aligarh were demanding. The Muslim University movement had
aimed at the development of a distinguished educational institution which would be the outward
and visible sign of Indian Muslim cultural and political regeneration as well as the center of an
29 Ibid, 145 30 Ibid, 169 31 Ibid
Akram 11
autonomous network of Muslim educational institutions throughout India.32 By rejecting the
proposal for the University, the British reaffirmed their authority over the Muslims and
inadvertently stripped the minority Muslims of their attempted establishment of a source of
identity. The British were not supporting Islam in India as the Indian Muslims once thought,
instead they were taking away the identity marker and grounding establishment the Muslims
were trying to claim. This event, along with the growing British threat towards the Ottoman
Empire helped create a massive push towards heavy anti-British sentiment in Muslim society.
Development of the Khilafat Movement
Following the breakdown of the establishment plans for Aligarh University, the divided
Muslim community of Aligarh gradually became united under the banner of anti-British rule.
Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, Abdul Bari, and Maulana Mahmud al-Hasan emerged as the
leaders of the anti-British movement.33 The Ali brothers along with Abdul Bari and Maulana
Mahmud al-Hasan took a theological approach against the British. They believed politics could
not be divorced from religion unlike what western thought presented.34 The post-Aligarh
political activism obtained a new rally point against British Raj after the Ottoman Empire
declared war on the British during World War I.
Indian Muslims began to believe their religion was on a decline due to expanding western
powers. Fazlul Haq, President of the annual session of the Muslim League in 1918 said “the
future of Islam in India seems to be wrapped in gloom and anxiety. Every instance of a collapse
of the Muslim powers of the world is bound to have an adverse influence on the political
32 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 54 33 Ibid, 10 34 Ibid, 56
Akram 12
importance of our community in India”.35 There was a direct threat on the Muslim identity and
political strength in India due to the dwindling political powers of their international Islamic
associates. To make matters worse, the symbolic head of Islam was now under attack from
Britain during World War I. It became the duty of the Indian Muslim to not only take a stand for
their symbolic head in Istanbul, but also fight to maintain their own weakening identity.
Although this identity crisis was taking center stage for Muslims in India, it is important
to realize that this was not the case for the rest of the world. Most Muslims outside of India
rejected the pan-Islamic ideology. For example, developing Arab nationalism resulted in Arabs
having no desire to be ruled by Turkey and felt no allegiance to the Sultan of Turkey as their
Khalifa.36 Even inside the Ottoman Empire, Turkish nationalism led by the Young Turks was
developing, resulting in the idea of having a sovereign Turkish state without ties to the rest of the
Muslim world. On the contrary, the Muslims in India were not familiar with the concept of
Nationalism because of their isolation in the Indian commonwealth along with the resistance
against British cultural influence. As reiterated before, the Muslims in India were devoid of a
social or political identity, thus seeking to connect themselves with extra national entities such as
the Ottoman Khalifa. It is from this non-connectedness on the part of the Indian Muslims that an
attempt to save the Ottoman Khalifa, their only identity marker, emerged.
The main catalysts for the development of the Khilafat movement were the Aligarh
educated Ali brothers. Both Muhammad and Shaukat Ali took upon roles as “Maulanas” and
began preaching their anti-British ideologies through khutbas at jumma prayers. The brothers
would reiterate the message of objections against the government and “pray for God to grant
35 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 38 36 Ibid, 39
Akram 13
victory and succor to the caliph”.37 In some instances, the Ottoman Sultan would be praised and
prayers offered for the success of his sword and his armies and the destruction of the infidels.38
The British, although aware of such actions, did not act against the Ali brothers due to the
sensitive issue of tampering with religious sermons. As a result, the Ali brothers were able to
spread their message through local mosques without much resistance from the British.
The Ali brothers stated the Indian Muslims’ demands for the Khilafat to Britain through a
series of letters. They demanded that: there should be no attempt by non-Muslims to interfere in
the free choice by the Muslims of the Khalifa, the sovereignty of the Khalifa over the Holy
places should not be dismembered “even among Muslim governments”, Egypt and the other
territories of the Ottoman Empire should be restored to the Khalifa, Muslim religious places
should not be occupied or controlled by non-Muslims, Muslims should not be asked to assist in
the prosecution of war against the Khalifa, no Muslims should be punished for promoting
sympathy with his brother Muslim, and the British Government should pay more respect to the
sentiments of Muslims in India.39 The failure of the British government to respond to these
demands touching the fate of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the emergence of the Khilafat
Movement.40
In order to increase Hindu awareness for the Khilafat cause, the Ali brothers decided to
enlist the support of Gandhi, a Hindu lawyer. Although neither Muhammad nor Shaukat Ali were
able to personally contact Gandhi, they were able to communicate with him through their
spiritual mentor and fellow Aligarh alumnus Abdul Bari.
37 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 55 38 Ibid 39 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 40 40 Ibid, 41
Akram 14
With support from Gandhi, it became easier for the Muslims and Hindus to begin talks
for an alliance against the British. In 1916, the Muslim League, with Muhammad Ali in
representation, and the Indian National Congress met in order to discuss the potential self-
government goals of India. The resulting Lucknow pact allowed for the control of all India’s
internal affairs by these legislatures through the power of the purse and furthermore, agreed that
Muslims, who comprised a minority of some 21 percent, should have constitutional safeguards in
form of separate electorates with weighted seats.41 The pact not only insured that the Muslim
voice would be heard in the developing all-India governing body, but helped the Muslims gain a
larger voice then their collective minority population would normally allow for. Although this
caused some nervousness within the Hindu community leading to riots and Hindi uprisings, it
essentially put both Muslims and Hindus on a level playing field in the game of politics. The
concerns of the Muslim minority would now have to at least somewhat have an impact on the
national conversation of India.
After the enactment of the Lucknow pact, tensions between the Muslims and Hindus
heightened. In September 1917, Hindu’s began objecting the Muslim slaughtering of cows in
Shahabad, resulting in riots erupting throughout the city.42 Relations between the Hindus and
Muslims continued to deteriorate in October of 1917 when the Hindu festival of Dussehra and
the Shia Muslim observance of Muharram coincided.43 Further violence and protesting erupted
from this exchange between the two faiths. The Muslim Ulema, now headed by Abdul Bari
claimed that there was oppression of Islam resulting from the Hindus. These riots and protests
41 Hugh F. Owen, "Negotiating the Lucknow Pact," The Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (1972), 561 42 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 58 43 Ibid, 59
Akram 15
caused two changes to occur in the political landscape of Muslim India. First, the Muslim
population began to look to the Ulema for leadership and guidance (a first since the 1857
mutiny) instead of the Muslim League. The Muslim population placed some of the blame on the
occurrences of rioting on the Muslim League because it was their Lucknow pact that began the
animosity of Hindus towards the Muslims. Second, the Muslims again affirmed their alliance
towards Istanbul, as they no longer viewed themselves as an autonomous group among the
“infidels” in India.
Following the increasing animosity and rioting between Hindus and Muslims between
1917 and 1919, one major event occurred in 1919 that helped unify the bickering sides along
with uniting them on a common goal. On March 18, 1919, the British government passed the
Rowlatt Act. Rumors about the Act spread throughout India. It was said that the police would be
free to search and arrest whomever they pleased and keep him under lock and key without trial,
and that the law abolished the right of appeal and imposed new and severe taxation.44 All aspects
of Indian society, whether it was the prince or peasant, Hindu or Muslim, were fervently opposed
to the passage of the Act.45 These bills helped unite the divided Indian population towards one
goal of eliminating British rule and establishing Indian independence.
The one symbol that quickly connected both Hindus and Muslims was the Khalifa. The
symbolic Khalifa was the epitome of anti-Britishness. The Hindus embraced the symbol because
it represented an enemy to the British Raj. The Muslims on the other hand continued their
support of the symbol because it was symbolic of their religion identity. If the Khilafat was to be
damaged by the British, so to were the Muslims. The Muslims needed the assistance of the
44 Ibid, 69 45 L. Rai, The Political Future of India (BW Huebsch, 1919), xi
Akram 16
Hindus in mounting an agitation to bring pressure on the British while the Hindus could not build
an all-embracing national movement without the cooperation of the Muslims.46
Gandhi was quick to act on the connecting point of the Caliphate. He turned to the Ali
brothers’ camp to gain their support in his satyagraha (non-violence) technique of resistance and
was also quick to enlist Abdul Bari and the Ulema to his principles of satyagraha.47 Gandhi was
intelligent in understanding that not only was he enlisting the support of the “western” political
activists in the Ali brothers, he was also insuring the support of the Muslim masses through the
now allied Ulema. Gandhi also viewed India as a whole, thus it was necessary for both the
Hindus and Muslims to act together because without one, there was no whole.48
On September 21, 1919, a conference of Muslim leaders was held in Lucknow pertaining
to the developing Khilafat movement. The group set October 17 as Khilafat day, a day of fasting
and prayer.49 Gandhi also urged Hindus to join the observation, stating, “Their sorrows must be
our sorrows”.50 Throughout India, Muslims and Hindus both observed Khilafat day, symbolizing
the beginning of a political collaboration between Hindus and Muslims. October 17, 1919 can
also be viewed as the official beginning of the Khilafat Movement. Hindu-Muslim relationships
were forged along with adapting Muslim-Muslim relationships, allowing for the powerful
beginning of the movement.
46 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 41 47 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 69 48 K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 575 49 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 41 50 Ibid
Akram 17
Within the Muslim community, the Ulema and Western-educated politicians drew closer
together after the beginning of World War I and continued the relationship into and throughout
the Khilafat Movement. The old Muslim League was soon replaced with the All-India Khilafat
Committee, a politically oriented party, and Jamiat al-Ulama-e-Hind, an Ulema influenced party.
In February 1920, the Khilafat Conference, led by Shaukat Ali, established the Khilafat
Manifesto listing the goals of the Khilafat Movement.51 The constitution of the All-India Khilafat
Committee spelled out four aims of the organization: to preserve the Khilafat as a center for the
Muslim world, to keep the jazirat al-Arab free from non-Muslim control, to work in India for the
attainment of self-government, and to organize Indian Muslims for religious, educational, social,
and economic benefit.52 These claims first and foremost laid out a plan for the establishment of
Muslim identity and sovereignty in the developing Indian social, political, and economic climate.
Second, the pan-Islamic connection was also necessary for Muslim identity and the preservation
of the Khilafat along with Khilafat control over Arab lands maintained that. Finally, the All-India
Khilafat Committee acknowledges the establishment of India as a sovereign nation, mainly in
order to align themselves against British rule. These set goals somewhat overlap with the
demands presented by the Ali brothers during the outbreak of World War I.
Role of the Ulema in the Khilafat Movement
Although the Ali brothers were powerful in the terms of leading the Muslim League,
helping push the All-India Khilafat Committee, create alliances with Gandhi, and become the
strategists behind the Khilafat movement, the Ulema played a massive role in the mobilization of
the masses.
51 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 93 52 Ibid
Akram 18
For the majority of Muslims in India, neither the state of the Ottoman Empire nor the
description of the caliphate mattered. What mattered was the connection to the symbolism of
Islamic figures, sanctuaries, and holy places in the area known as Jazirat al-Arab.53 The Khilafat
played a role as the symbolic head of Islam and the protector of the holy places of Islam. This
figurehead was the all-encompassing earthly entity that a Muslim could look towards in relating
with pan-Islamism. Any danger presented to these symbols or sanctuaries by foreign influence
such as the British was a motivating factor in rebelling against such transgressors.
The Ulema played a heavy influential role for most Muslims because they were directly
involved with the weekly sermons, daily prayers, and religious identity on a local level. They
were also teachers, writers, and preachers in the local communities. The leaders of the Khilafat
Movement made it a point to urge Maulanas, Sufis, and local Pirs to lead their congregations and
spread the message of the Khilafat Movement.54 The Ulema developed a powerful political
mobilization from the use of religious rhetoric.
Jamat al-Ulama-e-Hind developed as a political party bringing together different schools
of though for the Ulema and allowing for the unification of voice and ideas. Leaders of the
Ulema, such as Maulana Abdul Bari emerged with the reins of politics in their control. Abdul
Bari along with the Ulema and its associations with local pirs helped bring the Khilafat
Movement from the western-educated and middle-class Khilafat campaigners to the isolated
rural Muslims.55
53 Mushirul Hasan, "Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement," Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 20 (1981) 54 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 130 55 Shabnum Tejani, "Re-Considering Chronologies of Nationalism and Communalism: The Khilafat Movement in Sind and Its Aftermath, 1919–1927," South Asia Research 27, no. 3 (2007), 253
Akram 19
The Ulema and local pirs issued fatwas (juristic ruling) calling on thousands of spiritual
disciples to participate in demonstrations and boycotts.56 Fatwas became a major tool for
implementing control over the Muslim population. There was a proliferation of the direct issuing
of fatwas from the Ulema to the believers.57 For example, in order to rally Indian Muslims
following the Barelvi tradition of rejecting the Ottoman Caliphate, Maulana Abdul Bari issued a
fatwa in February 1919 laying down rules clarifying that Qurayshi descent was not a necessary
condition for the Khilafat.58 The Ulema’s support also allowed for the strengthening of Gandhi’s
non-cooperation movement in the Muslim community after the passage of fatwas by Abdul Bari,
considering it Islamically unlawful to buy foreign goods.59This allowed for Barelvi Muslims to
join the forces with the majority in upholding the Ottoman Caliphate.
The support from the Muslim Ulema allowed for the Khilafat Movement to gain a strong
and influential religious tone. This was not only appealing to the masses, but also to the
Westernized Muslims leading the Khilafat movement. These men began to grow a beard and
otherwise conform to the tenants of orthodoxy.60 For example, a picture taken of Muhammad Ali
in 1913 shows him in a Western style dress along with a large moustache. By 1921, he was
wearing a full beard with traditional Indian clothing in his portrait. The shift in attention to
religious affiliation and symbolism was very prominent from the way the style of clothing and
appearance changed dramatically. The beard and traditional dress became memes for the Khilafat
Movement and representation of Islam.
56 Ibid 57 R. A. Geaves, "India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective," Islamic Studies 35, no. 1 (1996), 35 58 H. Alavi, "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement," Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 1 (1997), 6 59 Ibid 60 Mushirul Hasan, "Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement," Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 20 (1981)
Akram 20
The Hindu-Muslim Alliance
In order for any powerful activism to occur in India, both the Hindu and Muslim
population realized that they needed the support of each other. Although the Hindus were the
majority religion, they could not stage an all-Indian movement without including the largest
minority present in the country. Similarly, Muslim political activism in support of the Khalifa
would not contain any weight if they created powerful demands from the position of a minority.
It became necessary for the cooperation of both sectors of society and leaders from both sides
understood this. Thus, the opportunity for an alliance emerged within these circumstances.
The major figures forming the Hindu-Muslim alliance were Mohandas Gandhi and
Muhammad and Shaukat Ali. Gandhi took the Ali brothers as his own brothers during the course
of the movement in order to set an example for the Hindu population.61 Gandhi understood that
the unity of the nation was important in order to represent a powerful and undivided force acting
against the British. In order to gain the trust of the Muslims, Gandhi picked up the idea of saving
the Khilafat in Turkey, despite knowledge of the Ottoman Empire falling apart and newfound
Turkish nationalism finding no use for the Ottoman sultan.62 Although Gandhi claimed that “the
Muslim’s goal is a Hindu’s goal”, it seems he was only playing on religious emotions to create
alliances.
The Muslims, in return of Gandhi’s extension for alliance, symbolically made him
president of the first All-India Khilafat Conference held in Delhi on November 23-24, 1919.63
Whether or not the Muslim leadership understood the level of Gandhi’s genuine attachment to
61 K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 578 62 D. Barsamian, Eqbal Ahmad: Confronting Empire (South End Press, 2000), 24 63 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 42
Akram 21
their cause, they knew that Hindu support was necessary in order to gain ground. The Muslims
made appearances at Hindu temples and participated in their worship while the Hindus began
visiting Muslim mosques.64 The alliance became more known for their superficial acceptance of
each other, masking the tensions hidden underneath symbolic gestures. The Khilafat and the Cow
became interchangeable collective representations in the terminology of Indian nationalism.65
The major opposition Gandhi and the Ali brothers faced in the formation of the Hindu-
Muslim alliance was Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Gurudev Tagore. Jinnah claimed Gandhi was
bringing religion into politics, saying it was a method likely to backfire.66 Jinnah understood that
although Gandhi was upholding Islamic symbols in order to appease the Muslims, his switch to
Hindu symbols to maintain majority Hindu support would cause massive paranoia in the Muslim
population. The Muslims were likely to begin fearing a Hindu Raj following the overthrowing of
the British Raj.67 Tagore also was vocal in claiming that Gandhi’s movement would also tend to
divide the Hindus from Muslims and create deep fissures in Indian society.68 Tagore argued that
nationalism tended to created emotions of exclusion and separation based on differences, not
commonality.69
Despite the claims against Gandhi’s political ideas, which would prove to be correct after
the collapse of the Khilafat movement, the Muslim leaders remained in support of Gandhi. They
64 K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 579 65 K. L. Motvani, "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement," Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930), 579 66 D. Barsamian, Eqbal Ahmad: Confronting Empire (South End Press, 2000), 24 66 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 24 67 P. Kidambi, "Nationalism and the City in Colonial India Bombay, C. 1890-1940," Journal of Urban History 38, no. 5 (2012), 962 68 Gopal Krishna, "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968), 25 69 Ibid
Akram 22
viewed Gandhi’s policies as an infallible way to gain British attention and put pressure on
Britain. Gandhi was skilled at speaking in accepted British terms to a British audience, leaving
them uncomfortable with their own conscience.70 His non-cooperation movement allowed for
demonstrations to occur without having entered into a war against Britain. The Muslims were not
attempting to break away cleanly from British rule as the Hindus were, they were instead
attempting to maintain their sovereignty and identity in the social and political landscape in India
and internationally through the Ottoman Empire. By participating in a national movement allied
with the Hindus, the Muslims could voice their opinion with a greater authority and not fear
discrimination in favor of the Hindus as the British rule previously did against Muslim
uprisings.71 The Muslims understood that their role in the non-cooperation movement put them
on the proverbial loudspeaker and gave them leverage by having the power to potentially disrupt
Britain’s own colonial rule.
Urdu Media and its Role in Mobilization
Despite Muslim alliances with within themselves and with the Hindus, the true essence of
the Khilafat movement spread through the Urdu media, allowing for mass mobilization of the
people. Major political figures such as Muhammad Ali, Shaukat Ali, and Maulana Abdul Azad
were able to spread their ideas to the Muslim masses through Urdu newspapers such as
Comrade, Hamdard, Al-Hilal, Al-Balagh, and Zamindar.72 These papers were widely read by the
Muslim middle-class, the major actors at the political forefront. They became a means of
communication between political elites in a public atmosphere. The middle class, on both the
70 Vithal Rajan, "Gandhi: The Colonising Object," Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 15 (2006), 1426 71 D. Barsamian, Eqbal Ahmad: Confronting Empire (South End Press, 2000), 28 72 ijaz Ahmad, "Frontier Gandhi: Reflections on Muslim Nationalism in India," Social Scientist 33, no. 1/2 (2005) 23
Akram 23
Hindu and Muslim side were the western-educated lot who were in position to take over the
government positions that would be vacated from the departure of colonial rule.73 They stood to
gain the most from these movements and thus were open to the ideas presented by the Ali
Brothers and religious leaders such as Maulana Abdul Azad and Maulana Abdul Bari. The
religious Ulema, also active in publications, were the means used to communicate with the
majority lower class through published fatwas and religious essays.
One major literary technique the political activists and the Ulema used in obtaining
support for the Khilafat Movement was Urdu poetry. Poetic recitation became a part of political
mass meetings; poetry became a means of communicating between the politicized elite and their
common audience.74 Poetry also spoke to the emotions, resulting in the connection forged with
the hearts of Muslims who prior to the poetic recitation were uninterested in the political
movements. These forms of communication allowed for the public discourse between political
leaders of the Khilafat movement and between the leaders and the rest of the community.
Fall of the Khilafat Movement
As predicted by Jinnah and Tagore, the Hindu-Muslim alliance was built on an unstable
religiously symbolic base, resulting in an easy break in the association from a few violent
setbacks. Although Gandhi called for non-violence in his non-cooperation movement, he failed
to realize that any violent threat to the Hindu or Muslim commonwealth could result in a
pushback to maintain their place in society. Gandhi also was relying on the fact that the majority
Hindu and minority Muslims would maintain a balanced alliance without allowing for their
73 Sukumar Muralidharan, "Religion, Nationalism and the State: Gandhi and India's Engagement with Political Modernity," Social Scientist 34, no. 3/4 (2006), 14 74 Gail Minault, "Urdu Political Poetry During the Khilafat Movement," Modern Asian Studies 8, no. 4 (1974), 461
Akram 24
majority/minority status to interfere. The alliance enjoined by a thread came crashing during the
Mappilla Rebellion.
In the South Indian Malabar district, this disparity in the balance of power between the
landlord Hindus and peasant Muslims (Mappillas) was at a high tension in 1921. On August 20,
the Hindu police raided a mosque to find the Khilafat leaders who were claimed to have a hand
in a recent burglary of a Hindu landlord’s house. A rumor spread of the desecration of the
mosque, causing a rebellion by the Muslim pheasants. During the rebellion, Khilafat flags were
in evidence and in a couple of villages, “Khilafat kingdoms” were proclaimed.75 Although the
name of the Khilafat was used as a reason for rebelling, the true reason behind the pheasant
rebellion was social and religious unrest between the two groups resulting from distress caused
by recent monsoon and resulting famine. The Hindus throughout the country began to fear a
massive Muslim rebellion while the Muslims were again uneasy about their delicate position in
society.
Further weakening the movement was the arrest of the Ali brothers in the month
following the Mappilla rebellion. Without a strong leadership, the Khilafat movement began to
unravel. Maulana Abdul Azad took over leadership of the Khilafat movement, yet he did not
have a clear goal or vision of where to take the movement. Gandhi’s plans for his Civil
Disobedience demonstration was put on indefinite hold because of various outbreaks of violence
and escalating arrests in November 1921.76 Furthermore, a money scandal erupted in the Khilafat
movement leading to distrust developing within the leadership. After Gandhi’s arrest and
sentencing in 1922, the movement lost its only link with the Hindus, resulting in widespread riots
75 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 147 76 Ibid, 177
Akram 25
and unrest throughout the country. A large power vacuum developed with the absence of the Ali
brothers and Gandhi, resulting in the destabilization of the political structure.
Post-Khilafat Movement
On March 3, 1924, the newly established Republic of Turkey formally passed a motion
for the abolition of the Caliphate.77 The original goals of maintaining the Ottoman Khalifat and
control of the Ottoman Empire over the jazirat al-Arab had both failed. What was left of the
Khilafat Movement was not only thunderstruck, but also unable to take a strong new position.
The Khilafat Committee’s new leadership decided to transition into a pro-Indian movement. The
Ulema however maintained that the goal should still be the implementation of a new caliphate
according to shari’a.78 This caused a major divide in the movement: first removing the purpose
of the movement for which it was named after, and second losing support of the masses which
looked to the Ulema for guidance.
With the loss of support from the Ulema, the Khilafatists were reduced to an isolated
faction.79 Further divides rocked the fragile Khilafat committee after Sharif Husain of the Hijaz
claimed the caliphate. Husain was viewed as an instrument of the West, thus resulting in his
damnation by one side of the committee. The other side was supportive of Husain however due
to the reestablishment of the caliphate. Further bickering tore the committee apart, ultimately
resulting in the death of the Khilafat Movement.
77 "The Destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate," Advocate of Peace through Justice 86, no. 4 (1924), 215 78 Mahmoud Haddad, "Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashīd Riḍā's Ideas on the Caliphate," Journal of the American Oriental Society 117, no. 2 (1997), 273 79 G. Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India, vol. 16 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 206
Akram 26
Conclusion
Although the Khilafat Movement seems to be a failure in creating a united Muslim front
in India, upholding the power of the Ottoman Khilafat, and erecting a permanent Hindu-Muslim
alliance, it played a major role in helping mobilize the Muslim masses for radical changes further
down the road. The major debate pertaining to the Khilafat Movement is whether it was a
religious or nationalistic movement. In my opinion, the Khilafat Movement was more religious
than nationalistic. Although the phenomena of nationalism was spreading through the Arabs and
in Turkey, the Indian Muslims were not privy to that idea. If it was not for religious fatwas for
supporting nationalist mobilization, the movement would have died a while before the
abolishment of the Ottoman Khilafat. Further, when the Ulema pulled their support from the
movement after the change of vision to nationalism in 1924, the movement lost its legs and was
more or less considered dead.
The Muslims of India were desperate for a connection to a body of power that they could
relate to while living as a minority in a Hindu dominant country. After the fall of the Mughal
Empire in India, the Muslims felt marginalized in their own homes. The only “stable” structure
that was visible to them was the Ottoman Khilafat. By utilizing the idea of equality in Islam,
Indian Muslims took upon the pan-Islamic ideology not to challenge the British or Hindus for
their own power, but rather develop their own identity as a force in the social and political
discourse backed by the international Muslims powers. Once the Khilafat was abolished, the
Muslims hit a dividing wall. The Ulema continued to fight for authority by demanding the
reconnection to a pan-Islamic religious identity while the westernized Muslim leaders began to
view national freedom as the only opportunity to gain leverage in visibility in a Hindu dominant
Akram 27
country. This nationalistic attitude further cultivated into the development of an all-Muslim state
called Pakistan.
Although the Khilafat Movement began and maintained itself as a majority religious
movement, it planted the seeds for future nationalistic mobilization. The movement allowed for
Indian Muslims to cultivate their own sense of nationalism over the course of Muslim-Hindu
alliances and further Muslim-Hindu turmoil. It was necessary for the cultivation of the idea of
nationalism to occur for the Muslims in order for there to be an understanding of a post-
Caliphate world without a pan-Islamic identity but a nationalistic identity. For the majority of
Muslims, the use of religious symbolism allowed for the mobilization of masses, resulting in a
first hand experience of entering the social and political discourse, rather than being isolated as
was the case pre-Khilafat Movement. Although the Khilafat Movement did not attain its set of
goals, the activists were successful in incubating the raw idea of nationalism through a religious
oriented movement, resulting in a minority Muslim population gaining a new, yet mature
independent identity.
Akram 28
Bibliography
Ahmad, Aijaz. "Frontier Gandhi: Reflections on Muslim Nationalism in India." Social Scientist 33, no. 1/2 (2005): 22-39.
Alavi, H. "Ironies of History: Contradictions of the Khilafat Movement." Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 17, no. 1 (1997): 1-16.
Ali, M. Muhammad Ali: His Life, Services and Trial. Ganesh, 1930. Alison, Blunt. "Imperial Geographies of Home: British Domesticity in India, 1886-1925."
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 24, no. 4 (1999): 421-40. Barsamian, D. Eqbal Ahmad: Confronting Empire. South End Press, 2000. Buehler, A.F. Sufi Heirs of the Prophet: The Indian Naqshbandiyya and the Rise of the Mediating
Sufi Shaykh. Univ of South Carolina Press, 1998. Choudry, A. "Brown Skin, White Masks." Cultural and Pedagogical Inquiry 3, no. 1 (2011). Das, Taraknath. "The Progress of the Non-Violent Revolution in India." The Journal of
International Relations 12, no. 2 (1921): 204-14. "The Destruction of the Ottoman Caliphate." Advocate of Peace through Justice 86, no. 4 (1924):
215-16. Geaves, R. A. "India 1857: A Mutiny or a War of Independence? The Muslim Perspective."
Islamic Studies 35, no. 1 (1996): 25-44. Haddad, Mahmoud. "Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashīd Riḍā's
Ideas on the Caliphate." Journal of the American Oriental Society 117, no. 2 (1997): 253-77.
Hasan, Mushirul. "Religion and Politics: The Ulama and Khilafat Movement." Economic and Political Weekly 16, no. 20 (1981): 903-12.
Kidambi, P. "Nationalism and the City in Colonial India Bombay, C. 1890-1940." Journal of Urban History 38, no. 5 (2012): 950-67.
Krishna, Gopal. "The Khilafat Movement in India: The First Phase (September 1919-August 1920)." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1/2 (1968): 37-53.
Minault, G. The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India. Vol. 16: New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
Minault, Gail. "Urdu Political Poetry During the Khilafat Movement." Modern Asian Studies 8, no. 4 (1974): 459-71.
Minault, Gail, and David Lelyveld. "The Campaign for a Muslim University, 1898-1920." Modern Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (1974): 145-89.
Motvani, K. L. "Propaganda in Mahatma Gandhi's Movement." Social Forces 8, no. 4 (1930): 574-81.
Mujeeb, M. The Indian Muslims. Allen & Unwin London, 1967. Muralidharan, Sukumar. "Religion, Nationalism and the State: Gandhi and India's Engagement
with Political Modernity." Social Scientist 34, no. 3/4 (2006): 3-36. Owen, Hugh F. "Negotiating the Lucknow Pact." The Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (1972):
561-87.
Akram 29
Pernau-Reifeld, Margrit. "Reaping the Whirlwind: Nizam and the Khilafat Movement." Economic and Political Weekly 34, no. 38 (1999): 2745-51.
Qureshi, M.N. Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924. Vol. 66: Brill Academic Pub, 1999.
Rai, L. The Political Future of India. BW Huebsch, 1919. Rajan, Vithal. "Gandhi: The Colonising Object." Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 15
(2006): 1425-27. Rauf, Abdul. "The British Empire and the Mujāhidīn Movement in the N.W.F.P. Of India,
1914—1934." Islamic Studies 44, no. 3 (2005): 409-39. Sarkar, Sumit. "Book Reviews : A. C. Niemeijer, the Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-1929, N.
V. De Nederlandsche Boek-En Steendrukkerij V/H. H. L. Smits 'Sgrav Enhage (Netherlands) 1972, Pp. 263. Price Not Stated." Indian Economic & Social History Review 10, no. 1 (January 1, 1973 1973): 92-94.
Shakir, M. Khilafat to Partition: A Survey of Major Political Trends among Indian Muslims During 1919-1947. Kalamkar Prakashan, 1970.
Sultan, I. Rome. "The Role of the North-West Frontier Province in the Khilafat and Hijrat Movements." Islamic Studies 43, no. 1 (2004): 51-78.
Tejani, Shabnum. "Re-Considering Chronologies of Nationalism and Communalism: The Khilafat Movement in Sind and Its Aftermath, 1919–1927." South Asia Research 27, no. 3 (November 1, 2007 2007): 249-69.
Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. "Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Move." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 11, no. 1 (2001): 101-03.