Is an Indian Ethics of Virtue Possible

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Journal of Human Values

DOI: 10.1177/097168580501200108 2006; 12; 91 Journal of Human Values

Dipasikha Chakraborty Is an Indian Ethics of Virtue Possible?

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JOURNAL OF HUMAN VALUES 12:1 (2006)Sage Publications New Delhi/Thousand Oaks/LondonDOI: 10.1177/097168580501200108

The last decade has witnessed a dramatic revivalof philosophical interest in virtues. Ethics of vir-tue was initially introduced to distinguish an ap-proach in normative ethics, which emphasizesthe virtues or moral character, in contrast withan approach that emphasizes duties or rules(deontology) or one that emphasizes the conse-quences of actions (utilitarianism). The emphasisstarted shifting from ‘norms’ to ‘character traits’of moral agents. Virtue ethicists started asking‘How should we be?’ rather than ‘What shouldwe do?’ Moralists supporting this contentionlooked to Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethics for amore promising ethical account of virtue. ForAristotle the fundamental question is not, as forMill, Hobbes or Kant, ‘What is the fundamental

Is an Indian Ethics of Virtue Possible?

DIPASIKHA CHAKRABORTY

The recent revival of interest in the importance of virtues marks a shift of substance and method in thinkingabout it. The shift is away from discussion of rules and principles and focused on a discussion of traits,character and conditions of their excellence. This article attempts at unfolding the exact nature of an Indianethics of virtue, which is yet to be explored in a systematic way. This enquiry into the exciting terrain ofIndian philosophy inevitably leads to the interesting debate regarding the very possibility of an Indianethics of virtue.

Dipasikha Chakraborty is Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Ranchi University, Ranchi, Jharkhand. E-mail:[email protected].

principle of moral right or duty, and how mightthis be defended philosophically?’ Aristotle asks,‘What is the goal of life? What kind of life is thebest for human beings?’ or ‘What is good for man?’(Irwin 1985: 2).

In Indian philosophy it is very difficult to findout an exact counter-part of the word virtue—gen-erally it is identified with the word dharma,whereas in other cases it is described as ‘sadguna’or ‘kalya-nguna’. The word ‘dharma’ is formedfrom the root ‘dhr’ or ‘to hold’, meaning therebythat which holds a thing and maintains it. Everyform of life, every group of being has its owndharma, which is the law of its being. Dharmaor virtue is thus said to be ‘conformity with thetruth of things’; adharma or vice is opposition to it.



92 � DIPASIKHA CHAKRABORTY

Dharma is the basis of order—whether social ormoral—‘dharma-t dharmam itya-huh, dharmenavidhrta praja-h’ (Radhakrishnan 1926: 78). Some-times the Upanishads make a distinction betweensatya and dharma, the latter representing the prac-tice of virtue, and the former, the principle under-lying it. But the Upanishads also claim that bothconstitute dharma in the complete sense of theterm. Similarly, virtue in Indian ethics is invari-ably related with some form of activity, andalways refers to actions associated with it. Forexample, in the Taittiriya Upanishad we find,‘satyam bada’ (speak the truth), that is, the pri-mary virtue in the life of a student is truth or satya.Truth helps the disciple develop his soul force bycontrolling his speech and mental state under theguidance of reason. The second instruction of ateacher to his disciple is ‘dharmam cara’ (practicevirtue). Dharma is related to truth as action isrelated to knowledge.

In ancient times when the society had a simplestructure, virtues were merely the characteristicfeatures conducive to good human life. But soona simple social structure came to be differentiatedinto four classes or castes—Bra-hman, Ksatriya,Vaisya and Su-dra. Accordingly, virtues also be-came specific—each class became marked withspecific virtues. This also stood for the fact thatforce is not the stronghold of the government, butthat right alone is true might. The power ofdharma was greater than that of the king of thestate. It is ‘universally binding’ (sarva-niyantr)as Sankara says in his commentary, for it rules eventhe rulers. From this we can deduce that dharmais higher than the external authority of the kingand is therefore internal. It should signify thesense of right and wrong, which is naturally thecharacteristic feature of humans as compared withthe rest of sentient creation. Thus, dharma orvirtue is presented as the ultimate guide toright living and the stability of society is tracedto this moral idea of dharma as implanted in

the human being—‘dharma-t param na-sti’(Mukhopadhyay 1960: 157).

It is not wise to look for a distinct well-formulated ethics of virtue in Indian philosophythat can be said to directly correspond to the ethicsof virtue in the West. This does not imply thatIndian philosophy does not have any ethicalframework or moral grounding. On the contary,we can legitimately claim that Indian ethics ofvirtue is intimately connected with its meta-physics. Indian sages turned on the one hand toDharmasa-stra, and on the other hand to the meta-physical approaches to ultimate problems, with-out giving much importance to a philosophicaltreatment of ethical norms. Accordingly, Indianethics of virtue is very much related with Indianmetaphysical concepts and has a strong meta-physical foundation. Since ancient times Indianseers were involved in the search of truth—theywere attracted by the questions of inner spirit or‘being’ or ‘atman’. Spiritual reflection and medi-tation led them to the conclusion that this ‘a-tman’or ‘self’ is Absolute or Brahman, which is pureconsciousness, pure knowledge and pure bliss(Sacchida-nanda). From it all things flow: by itall things are sustained; and into it all things aredissolved. ‘All parts in the universe share in thelife of this universal spirit and possess specificfeatures on account of the special functions, whichthey have to perform’ (Buhler 1964: 25). ‘As allspokes are contained in the axle, and in the fellyof the wheel, thus also all beings and all gods, allworlds and all organs also are contained in theSelf’ (Madhavananda 1983: 63). This meta-physical background makes Indian ethics of virtueethico-metaphysical in nature—a synthesis ofintellectual understanding and self-realization.The highest good is the achievement of moksa orliberation, which means perfection, not in thetheoretical sense of intellectual achievement, butin the practical sense of rising above all contra-dictions and uniting with the Absolute or



Is an Indian Ethics of Virtue Possible? � 93

Brahman. This realization of the oneness withBrahman is the ideal of man. Taittiriya Upanishaddescribes it as, ‘pra-na-ra-mam mana-a-nandam,sa-nti samrddham amrtam’—‘The delight of lifeand mind, the fullness of peace and eternity’(Gambhirananda 1966: 270).

Critics, however, raise the question—if all isOne, how can we have moral relations? If theAbsolute is perfection, what is the need for anyeffort to realize what is already accomplished?In answer we can say that if humans were reallyexternal to each other, then it is impossible toachieve the ethical ideal. If we are called upon tolove our neighbour, it is because all are one inreality. Moksa literally means liberation—liberationfrom bondage of our individual finite self to theidentification with the infinite, eternal Self. ‘Tolive in perfect goodness is to realize one’s life inall’ (Jolly 1880: 20). The Absolute is present in aperson only as a potentiality or a possibility; andit is one’s primary duty to achieve this potentiality.It is the task of moral life, under the guidance ofvirtues, to eliminate the non-divine element, notby destroying it but by suffusing it with the divinespirit. Different systems of Indian philosophystress the importance of ethics of virtue as the step-ping stone to moksa. For example, the Upanishadsstress the importance of knowledge as the meansof salvation, but they do not advocate knowledgein the narrow sense of the term. The pursuitof knowledge has been advocated along withupholding of virtues. It has been urged that theSelf cannot be gained by the knowledge of theVedas, or by understanding or by learning, butby adherence to the eternal virtue.

Dharma is also considered to be a part of struc-ture of values or what W. Norman Brown calls‘the four motivations of human activity’ (thepurusa-rthas): dharma, artha, ka-ma and moksa.The four-fold classification of the purusa-rthamust not be allowed to obscure the fact that thereare in fact two dimensions of virtues that are quite

distinct—the temporal and the eternal, centringround dharma and moksa. Thus, dharma seemsto imply temporal virtues or socially prescribedroles, along with two other dimensions of virtue—aesthetic and sensual satisfactions, and economicpursuits. In principle, all three are dharma orordinary norms or motivations, in contrast to thetranscendent norm, moksa. Abundant meta-physical reference in this context encouragedsome thinkers to hold that Indian ethics of vir-tue is merely transcendental in this widely vaguesense. But a proper study of Indian ethics of virtuewill reveal that it is not so. The virtues are pri-marily instrumental and indispensable for thewell-being of man. Since ancient times Indianthinkers have been attracted by the quest of theinner self or atman, and spiritually advanced sagesrealized after deep meditation that this self oratman is Brahman or the Absolute. This fact en-hances the dignity of human beings and so Indianethics of virtue can rightly be said to be monisticand agent-centred since its primary concern isgood qualities and moral character of the moralagent. Although agent-focused ethics of virtueemphasizes the character at the core of moral-ity, it nonetheless is often charged with un-codifiability. It is often argued that agent-focusedvirtue ethics does not seem to provide us withexact and detailed guidance for action. But thischarge is not applicable to an Indian ethics ofvirtue. We should accept that codifiability isalways a matter of degree. On the one hand thereare true moral generalizations in the Indian ethicsof virtue; on the other hand it is very clearly seenin the Vedic prescriptions that Indian ethics ofvirtue pays equal importance to the aspect of prac-tical guidance in daily life. So Indian ethics ofvirtue can be said to be agent-centred and agent-based simultaneously.

In fact, the dynamic aspect of the ethics ofvirtue, which reflects an agent-based stance, is




represented in the system of the varna-srama-dharmas, that is, virtues related to the varna orclass, and a-srama or virtues related to a particularstage of life. The virtues of varna and a-sramatogether constitute the code of relative virtues,being related to the varna and a-srama respectively.They are to be distinguished from the commonvirtues of humans, called sa-dha-rana-dharmas;these are the virtues that are obligatory to allequally, irrespective of class or station in life. Thepurpose of this classification of virtues is that twokinds of service are obligatory for each individual.First of all, one should pay off one’s debt to theparticular community in a specific way, accordingto one’s own capabilities (social virtues). Besidescommunity, one is also indebted to humankindin general for overall well-being and the oppor-tunities of life. The sa-dha-rana-dharmas andvarna-srama–dharmas together constitute theobjective morality of the Indian ethics of virtue,that is, morality as represented in a code of ex-ternal acts, which demand external confirmation.But objective morality is not enough—the ethicsof virtue demands that the individual look inwardsinto oneself and pays attention to inner purity andan inner ability to excel. Indian ethics of virtueprofesses an elaborate system of virtue along withpractical schemes through the performance ofwhich an individual can subordinate lower im-pulses to higher and spiritual ones and attain innerpurification or ‘cittasuddhi’. But even this sub-jective purity is also not enough; it is only a meansto moksa or Absolute Reality. In a sense, it is asupra-moral plane of being in which the indi-vidual becomes one with the Absolute and thusattains freedom from mere duty and obligation.The realization of the social self or [man quasocial being] and, through it, the realization ofthe Supreme Self or [man qua Ideal Being] to-gether makes a unique agent-based ethics ofvirtue.

Further, analysts have often argued that anIndian ethics of virtue encourages an anti-theorystance. It is noteworthy that, as seen earlier, Indianethics is intimately connected with metaphysicalsystems and, accordingly, Indian ethics alwaystried to lay down codes and patterns of behaviourin accordance with their inherent metaphysicaltheories. But the hindrance to developing a moraltheory of virtue in Indian ethics is due to thefact that the highest ideals of human life as wellas the social ideals have been expressed in variousways by different systems. The situation seemsto be more confusing when they seem to overlapand create vagueness. But the difficulties in form-ing an ethical theory should not be taken as ahindrance to form an ethics of virtue of Indianphilosophical systems. This is an anthropocentricworld where humans construct their own world,and establish their own relations with things andwith others. In a sense all philosophical systemsaccept this position. In such a world we think ofwhat is and what ought to be, what we must doand how we should behave. So it is obvious thatwe should believe in the concepts of general vir-tues and obligation to survive, interact and passon to eternity.

Critics often argue that an Indian ethics ofvirtue paves the path to fatalism because mostclassical Indian philosophers resolve the problemof human suffering and evil by taking recourseto the law of karma, which states that nothingcan happen without a sufficient cause in the moralas well as in the physical world. Each life with allits pleasures and pains is the necessary result ofthe action of past lives and becomes in its turnthe cause of future births. The fruits of action carryover from one life to the next. The Brhada-ranyakaUpanishad says: ‘The soul passes at death toanother body whose character is determined byits former deeds and thoughts and there is nointerval between the end of one life and the begin-ning of next’ (Maitra 1963: 103).




But then, is an Indian ethics of virtue fatalistic?To answer this question we should try to under-stand what is meant by freedom. Freedom doesnot mean total absence of determination. To actwith ever-changing motives would mean actingfrom impulse and such freedom will completelydisrupt social life as it would imply that anyonecan do anything at any time. So freedom shouldnot be used as unrestricted licence, but as deter-mined by oneself, that is, self-determination isdetermination by one’s will or moral character,and not self-determination in general. So whenwe ask whether the law of karma results infatalism, all we mean is whether it implies self-determination. If we confine our attention to asingle life then it will omit self-determination, forit is evident that all good and evil that may befalla person cannot be explained by his or her presentactions. But that is not the only option for explain-ing the discrepancy between virtue and successin life. We can very well conceive of one’s con-tinued existence in a series of lives, and this beliefeasily wards off the difficulty of fatalism. Thelaw of karma not only demands that the eventsof our life are determined by their antecedentcauses, but that there is perfect justice in the re-wards and punishments that happen to us. Theimplication of this idea of reward and punishmentis grounded in the moral view of the universe.When we consider the fact that virtue is not alwaysrewarded in this life nor vice always punished,the belief in the continued existence of the self isforced upon us and we can rightly justify theIndian belief in transmigration of the soul. Thus,the law of karma and the belief in transmigrationare the necessary postulates of the ethics of virtueof classical Indian philosophical systems.

The Indian ethics of virtue should be given creditfor laying the foundation of a universal ethics ofvirtue by trying to synthesize the ethics of com-munal good and the ethics of self-culture. Theindividual becomes a useful member of society

by performing a-srama duties as well as commonduties. Therefore, the Indian ethics of virtue isnot an abstract scheme of ethical duties that applynowhere; on the contrary, they seem to apply toeach and every human being. It also seeks to com-bine ethical consequentialism with ethical dis-interestedness, that is, it recognizes the purity ofunconditional duties and at the same time providesmoral significance to conditional duties. Theutility of the varna system lies in the developmentof a certain sense of vocation, in whatever spherethe individual has found oneself. This sense ofvocation is very important in inculcating stabilityand usefulness of any society, and for the dignityof the individual life. We can also hope that thevarna-srama-dharmas will still be able to controlthe tendency of too much liberty, which is oftenresorted to in the guise of ‘human rights’.

However, it may be pointed out here that it isvery difficult to set rules in the domain of a per-sonal ethics of virtue. No two beings are alike;their degrees of inner development are differentfrom each other. We are all on different rungs onthe ladder of life—ascending from the uncon-scious matter to absolute consciousness andspiritual progress has little to do with varna ora-srama duties. A shoemaker may well be closerto sainthood than a proud Bra-hman. The PadmaPura-na explains that during the present kali yugawomen and Su-dras have the greater advantagebecause their duties are easily fulfilled, while itis almost impossible for princes and priestsnot to fail in their external obligations and intheir dedication to inner advancement (Barlingay1966: 98).

The law of karma is often criticized as theweakest point in the Indian ethics of virtue. In itswidely accepted form it is found to be false andmisleading because it has been associated withenormous eschatological conceptions. Moreover,it has been applied unethically because it is con-ceived as operating in a rigid and mechanical way.




It is not very clear why the universe is constitutedon moral lines. It is noteworthy that it is in theworks that manifest the spirit of earnestnessthat the tendency has been most marked to departfrom the rigidity of the doctrine of karma and togrant a place to the ‘grace of god’, which is givenfreely—not according to merit. A verse in theGi-ta- says:

Yad karosi yad asna-si yaj juhosi dada-si yatYat tapasyasi kaunteya tat kurusa-vamadarpanam (Chinmayananda 1992: 585)

(Whatever be thy work, thine eating, thy gift,thy mortification, make thou of it an offeringto me, O son of Kunti. Thus, shalt thou be re-leased from the bonds of works, fair or foul offruit, thou shalt be delivered and come to me.)

This quote does refer to grace—a conceptionthat transcends the domain of the law of karma.

The dichotomy of temporal and eternal virtuesoften creates a problem in the Indian ethics ofvirtue. How can moksa be trans-moral and yetthe experience of moksa regulative for morality?If the seer’s experience of the Supreme Realitytranscends ordinary life, it is difficult to see therelevance of his experience for the realm of dharmaor virtue. If the saint’s experience is in a trans-moral realm, its only relevance to those still underthe sway of morality would seem to be as a mentorin the process of moving beyond samsa-ra (thecycle of birth and death). If the achievement ofmoksa gives the seer credit both for the processof transcending samsa-ra and also regulating lifein samsa-ra, we have a departure of no small mag-nitude from a classical ethics of virtue.

Thus, a great deal of controversy has centredround the question whether the virtues of theIndian ethics of virtue have intrinsic value, andwhether an Indian ethics of virtue is at all possible.The Indian philosophical systems are quite

explicit in pointing out that virtues are only aprerequisite for philosophical enquiry andspiritual realization, while moksa is the highestgood and the only intrinsic value. The meaningof disinterested action or niska-ma karma in theBha-gavad Gi-ta- is that, instead of actions havingspecified material goals, all actions have one andthe same end, that is, perfection. In that case,we are bound to reach a point ‘beyond ethics’ be-cause from this point of view, all virtues are finitegoals—to be eclipsed by the supreme ideal. Thus,if we strictly adhere to the Indian ethics of virtue,we are automatically led to the region beyondethics. So morality becomes a ‘footstool’ and vir-tues are converted to the ‘gateway to moksa’.Thus, the Indian ethics of virtue ultimately seemsto aim at a goal that lies beyond the norms ofethics because ethics of virtue belongs to a worldof relativity—a world of claims and counter-claims, with its imperfections and contradictions.So long as one is content to belong here, one can-not attain perfection. Hence, there seems to be widegulf between the complete realization of moksaand the life governed by virtues. So the question isoften raised, is an Indian ethics of virtue possible?

Moreover, it is often argued that we fail todraw a line between the various ascetic disciplinesof the ethics of virtue and the philosophicalnotions that had grown simultaneously. The dis-ciplines that later came to have a more strictlymoral appearance were in some cases practisedoriginally with the belief that they had magicalefficacy. So the ethics of virtue had to deal withthe lower sphere of experience. It serves as a plat-form over which one may climb to a position fromwhich it becomes easier to reach the higher zone.When this position is reached, it is no longerneeded.

We can try to solve this problem in a positivemanner. The Indian ethics of virtue can be treatedas a practical pursuit whose object is to overcomethe radical unrest of life The ultimate good of




moksa helps one to see the importance of sub-ordinating virtues to it. We should view virtuesas intrinsically valuable. Duty for duty’s sake orniska-ma karma alone is a psychological impos-sibility. Virtues must always be instrumental—the means to an end—and the highest concept ofvirtue is that it is instrumental to moksa, to thesupreme spiritual ideal rather than to any secularend. Moksa is related to the eternal virtues, thebeautiful, the true and the good. These virtuesmay be realized and yet one may remain in ignor-ance. The highest service they can render is ashandmaids to moksa. Moksa is seen to consist ofthese eternal, though not ultimate, virtues; but theideal of moksa is not just a mere combination,but a creative synthesis, a new unity that includesyet transcends them. A jivanmukta person trans-cends all personal or subjective valuation. Theseer engages in spontaneous and selfless serviceand works in a spirit of disinterestedness, whichis rooted in all-encompassing love, resulting fromcomplete enlightenment.

We can conclude this discussion by saying thatit is a unique feature of the Indian ethics of virtuethat almost all virtues are conducive to spiritualdevelopment. They are necessary but insufficientconditions for spiritual life in India. Ethical acti-vity and spiritual activity overlap as they are dif-ficult to be delineated. Ethical activity is spiritualonly when performed with the realization of its

relation to the inner spirit; or when directed to therealization of God or atman, inasmuch as spirit-ual activity is defined as the activity of a-tman-realization.

If we take the Indian ethics of virtue as a newface in the milieu of contemporary ethical dis-course in the way it has been depicted here as ananti-theory stance—its complex dynamics andtranscendentalism all giving a new dimension—then it is indeed the latest possibility. Thus, anIndian ethics of virtue transcends virtues at thecorporeal level, but finds consummation in thetranscendental realm where it is hardly differ-entiated from the metaphysical. Herein lies itsuniqueness as different from the Aristotelianvirtue ethics. In fact, there has been no ethics ofvirtue in the East as well as in the West until itwas given the much-needed thrust by ElizabethAnscombe, Foot, McIntyre and other virtueethicists. It has been a matter of interpretation,whether or not Aristotle had an ethics of virtue,and we have taken a positive position. Similar isthe case with the Indian ethics of virtue. It is reallya matter of finding out whether Indian ethics fitsin the jigsaw puzzle set by us in the name of adefined ethics of virtue. But certainly it is not ahazy or a nebulous situation. On the contrary, itis a very significant and critical issue, and de-serves further investigation, interpretation andpromotion.

REFERENCES

Barlingay, S.S. (1966), A Modern Introduction to IndianEthics (New Delhi: Penman Publishers).

Buhler, G. (1964), The Laws of Manu (New Delhi: MotilalBanarasidass).

Chinmayananda, Swami (1992), Commentary on Bha-gavadGi-ta- (Mumbai: Sai Enterprises).

Gambhirananda, Swami (trans.) (1966), Taittiriya Upanisad,I, 6–10, in Eight Upanisads (Kolkata: Advaita A

-srama).




Irwin, Terence (trans.) (1985), Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,1094a 1–3 (Indianpolis: Hackett Publishing Company).

Jolly, Julius (1880), ‘The Institute of Visnu’, in F.M. Muller,ed., The Sacred Books of the East (London: OxfordClarendon Press).

Madhavananda, Swami (trans.) (1983), Brhada-ranyakaUpanisad II, 5–15, (Kolkata: Advaita A- srama).

Maitra, S.K. (1963), The Ethics of the Hindus (Kolkata:Calcutta University Press).

Mukhopadhyay, G. (1960), Studies in the Upanisads(Kolkata: Calcutta Oriental Press).

Radhakrishnan, S. (1926), Hindu View of Life (London: Allenand Unwin).



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Is an Indian Ethics of Virtue Possible