Irurozqui Political Leadership and Popular Consent Party Strategies in Bolivia, 1880-1899

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Political Leadership and Popular Consent: Party Strategies in Bolivia, 1880-1899Author(s): Marta IrurozquiReviewed work(s):Source: The Americas, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Jan., 1997), pp. 395-423Published by: Academy of American Franciscan HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1008031 .

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The Americas53:3 January1997, 395-423Copyrightby the Academy of AmericanFranciscanHistory

POLITICALLEADERSHIPAND POPULARCONSENT:PARTY STRATEGIES N BOLIVIA,

1880-1899*

T h e governmentalera of the Bolivian conservative parties-Constitutional,Democrat,andConservative-encompasses the his-torical period from Bolivia's withdrawal from the Pacific War(1880), which saw a Peruvian-Bolivianalliance againstChile, to the out-breakof theFederalWarof 1899 betweenconservativesand liberals.Withinthis period of infighting lies the genesis of the Bolivian political partysystem. With the establishmentof a trucein 1880 between Chile and Bo-livia, withoutwhich Bolivia would have hadto definitivelywithdraw romthe conflict and break its Peruvianalliance, two positionsaroseconcerninga resolutionof the conflict: thecontinuation f the warorpeace. Thesepolarsolutions adhered o thefirstideologicalsubstratum f theBolivianpoliticalparties,makingit possible to define thevariousfactions of theelite' in lightof the new political restructuring nd the role of the State.The initialpartydifferenceswere due less to interest n Bolivia's national

* This study was carriedout underResearchProjectPB94-0060 (DGICYT).The term "elite" designates a social group defined by its access to power and resulting fromconsensuses arrived at throughits internalrivalries after each has resorted to employing, against theother, the supportandpublicaspirations f thesubordinated lasses. It is partof a global concept dealingwith those social sectors that position themselves at the helms of the various hierarchiesof prestige,power, andproperty,andothers thatconstitutea margin or recruitment ndreserves. When one speaksof the elite, one is making reference to a social group that, despite its heterogeneity, possesses acorporativeheritagethat lends to its members a strongsocial and psychological cohesion. It does notconstitutea monolithicentitythatacts with internal onsensusandis, therefore,coordinated n its mutualrelations. Rather,among its factions there is mutualsupportwhen commonobjectives arise relatingtopower. Its greatestweaknessesarepersonaland class competition.The constantnecessity to defend itsactivities, property,and social position againstrival interests n the local and regional spheres, obligesan elite to employ forced, political interventionat the national evel. In short,the termconcerns variousgroupingsof power thatextend to all facets of the developmentprocess and thatmanage very diverseeconomic interests.

395


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396 PARTY STRATEGIES N BOLIVIAdestiny than in reformulatingntra-eliterelationsvia clashes betweenthoseholdingpowerandthose removedfromandaspiring o power-all of whichwas taken up in the conservative-liberal ivalry. In brief, those who de-fended the war's renewalwere not only the militaryandgroupswith com-mercialinterests n southernPeru,but also familyclans with heterogeneousregional origins seeking to share the privileges of the southernoligarchy.Meanwhile those defendingthe peace were those groupsof miners, land-owners, and import-exportmerchantswith links to the Chileaneconomy.The former, the anti-Chileand anti-pacifistbloc, were later known as lib-erals, aligning themselves with Colonel Eliodoro Camacho, leader of therevolt againstGeneralDaza. The anti-pacifistasarrangedhemselves, underthe title of conservatives,aroundAniceto Arce and GregorioPacheco, theprincipalowners of the silver mines, andMarianoBaptista,lawyerfor andshareholderof various mining firms. One cannot make a strictlyregionaldivision in describingthe contentionbetween conservatives and liberals.The two consisted of contradictions:ectorswith links to the postwarmod-ernizationprocess combined with those who profitedfrom the caudillistadomination that had prevailedsince the country's independence.It was abattle between those who controlledthe means of production,who saw inthepartysystem a mechanism or seizing politicalpoweranda guaranteeoftheirlegitimacyas the dominantgroup,andthoseto whomthe instabilityofthe caudillistaregimehadgiven hopes of social ascent andrestructuring.Aconflict hadbegunbetweenthosepossessingthepowerandthoseaspiringtoit within the elite-a conflict channeledthrough he political parties.

Given that the conquestof centralpower-expressed by the demandforthe traditionalrepresentativesystem of democracy and embodied in therepublicanelectoralsystemadoptedby the Constitutionof October18392-was one of the objectivesof the Bolivian elite, this work tackles the partyproblems, takinginto account the motivesbehind the alliancesbetweenthevarious political parties. The result is a reconfigurationof the manner inwhich thedifferences,contents,andpracticesof thepartywereinvented anddiscursivelyconstructed.Thispropositionassumesthat the issues alluded towill be discussed with the absence of social and professionaldifferences,includingplatformdifferences,betweentheBolivianparties.Theirapparentideological distinctionsresponded o theelite's need to groupthemselves indistinct bandsso as to define the internalredistribution f its privileges andcompetitions, while simultaneously regulating popular participation, asmuch in theirfuturedesignsforthenationas in theirown class restructuring.

2 RamiroCondarcoMorales,AnicetoArce (La Paz: Ed. Amerindia,1985), p. 429.


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MARTA RUROZQUI 397To avoid the same pace of social mobility of the caudillistaperiod, itbecame necessaryto reduceopportunitiesor social ascent throughthe po-

liticalpartysystem. This was donein two ways. First,representatives f theconservative parties developed a strategy designed to limit the liberals'electoral successes. The most prominentmembersof the silver-miningfac-tion divided themselves in two, andboth factions sought to reach separateagreementswith the oppositionLiberalParty.Theyhopedthus to neutralizeits capacity to obtain a large marginof votes. Whateverthe results of theballoting,however, theparty n poweralwayswas influencedby a sectorofthe mining elite. Moreover, the opposition as well as the winning partymaintained imilarpoliticaldirectionsandobjectives, somethingthatwouldhave not occurred f the DemocratsandConstitutionalshad come togetheragainstthe Liberals.

Second, the conservatives' clash with the LiberalParty generateda dis-course in opposition to "el absolutismode las masas populares" and the"revoluci6ndesde abajo," necessitatingthe presenceof the popularsectorfor definingwhich faction of the elite garneredhegemony. This sector wasa valuable instrument or the partycontenders n negotiatingand acquiringpolitical power, as well as legitimizing theircandidatesas nationalrepre-sentatives of the "people's" opinion. The elite group that monopolizedpopularconsensuswon a means for pressuring he others,althoughthis didnot translate into recognitionof the subordinategroup's right to politicalinterventionorcitizenship.Thesubordinatedroupwas consideredessentialwhen it favoredtheinternal unctioningsof theelite, but it was pushedasideas soon as it presenteddemandsquestioningits lack of real public repre-sentation and participation.The less-privilegedclasses contributedto theelite restructuringand, consequently, to their own marginalizationn thecourse of theirrole as involuntary rbitrators f theconflict. Sucharbitrationtransformed he rural and urbanmasses into a source of supportthat thevariousfactions of theelite used to threatenandcompeltheiropponents-ifnot throughan outrightdefeat then throughnegotiation-into sharingtheprivileges of power. This attitudewas summedup in publicationsandpar-liamentaryand news column debatesthatmade the expansionof suffrageand the educationof the popularclasses the impetusfor a universal, "civ-ilized" movement directedtowards abolishing authoritarianism nd eco-nomic backwardness.As thoseobjectiveswerebeing limitedto educationalandmilitaryreforms,theiractualmanifestation lwaysremained n questiondue as much to the political exclusion of the subordinated lasses, whosemajority was represented by the Indians, as to the contempt raised againstthese classes when their votes were needed.


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398 PARTY STRATEGIES N BOLIVIAOf the two forms of regulatingthe political scenario, this studyconcen-trateson the latter,articulatedn anti-militarist,anti-oligarchic,antiperua-

nos, and anticaudillistasdiscourseswith origins in the War of the Pacific(1879-1883). These allow one to distinguish the various factions of thedivided and contentiouselite, as well as to establishthe ideological suste-nance that eachpartydevelopedto confirm tself andface upto theelectoralcompetition.Political discoursereceives greatattentionbecause it can pro-vide an avenue for understandinghe prioritiesandnecessities of the elite,and, specifically, thepacetia elite, who prevailedregionallyafterthe Fed-eralWar of 1899. At the sametime, I contendthat theprincipalcontributionof the conservatives to the internalrestructuring f the Bolivian elite be-tween 1880 and 1899 was theirrole in regulatingsocial mobility, which theinstabilityof the caudillistaregime had made inordinate.Andeanhistoriographyin its treatment f Ecuador,PeruandBolivia) hasin thepast marginalized he role of politicalparties.Theexcessive zeal withwhich Marxistdependencymodels areemployedhas resulted n the linkingof political and cultural themes of the elite with intellectuallyreactionarypositions.3Withsome exceptions, themajorityof thesepositionstacklesthequestionfrom an institutionalandnarrativeperspectivethat, thoughessen-tial, says very little aboutthe internal ogic of the political phenomenon.4Despite this, therehave recentlyappearednew focuses thatmakethe studyof political sociabilitya centraltheme. Althoughinvestigationof late nine-teenth centurypoltical party dynamicsin LatinAmerica in generalis alsorecent, there do exist important tudiesthat tie its developmentas muchtothedailypracticesof clientelismoandpatronage5 s to generational onflictsand, in periodsof political agitation,withviolenceandelectoralcorruption.6

3 Jorge Basadre,Elecciones y centralismoen el Perti. (apuntespara un esquemahist6rico), (Lima:Centro de Investigaci6n de la Universidaddel Paciffico1980); HerbertKlein, Parties and PoliticalChange in Bolivia, 1880-1952, (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1969).

4 With respect to this: the argumentof MartaIrurozqui,La armonia de las desigualdades. Elites yconflictos de poder en Bolivia, 1880-1920. Cusco, CBC-CSIC, 1994; or the minutes of the CongresoInternacional"De reino a repiiblica: a independencia n el Perni,1750-1850," (Universidaddel Pacf-fico, Lima, Agosto, 1994).5 Helen Delpar,RedAgainstBlue. TheLiberalParty in ColombianPolitics, 1863-1899. (Tuscaloosa:

The University of Alabama Press, 1981); RichardGraham,Patronage and Politics in Nineteeenth-CenturyBrazil. (Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress, 1990).6 PaulLewis, Political Parties and Generations nParaguay'sLiberalEra: 1869-1940. (Chapel-Hill:University of North CarolinaPress, 1993); P. Alonso. "Politics and Elections in Buenos Aires, 1890-1898: The Performanceof the RadicalParty,"Journalof LatinAmericanStudies, 25:2 (1993); RichardJ. Walter"Politics, Parties,and Elections n Argentina'sProvinceof BuenosAires, 1912-42," HispanicAmericanHistorical Review, 64:4 (1984).


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MARTARUROZQUI 399The majorityof such analyses are local studies of Colombia, Mexico, andArgentina concerningelections andparties.7

NATURE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN BOLIVIAEntrenosotrosiempree ha consideradoomoun dealdepazy concordiaaausenciade antagonismooliticos.8The majorityof the historiographicanalyses dealing with the study ofLatinAmericanpolitical partiesat the end of the nineteenthcenturydo notconsiderthe social repercussionsentailed in elite infighting. They are lim-

ited to dividing theirmembers into conservativesand liberalsaccordingtotheir economic andsocialbackgrounds,gnoring herangeof bipartisanplayor the importanceof political partyalternatives.Generallyspeaking, theyidentify the conservativepartieswith groupsof bankers,aristocrats, ndus-trialgiants, andinfluentialclergymen,andthe liberalor radicalpartieswithsmall businesses and industries,civil servants,professors, lawyers, jour-nalists, andwriters,amongothers.9This categorization an also be appliedto the clash between an industrialor export-businessoligarchyand a tradi-tional landowningoligarchy.10Such a polarization s not viable in dividingup Bolivian supportersn which one encounterscompetitionbetween indi-viduals with equivalenteconomic, political, andculturalbackgrounds.Theeconomic diversitythatcharacterizedhe Altiplanoelite forces one to con-sider whether the political differences were born more of similarities oforigin and intereststhan of inequalities,as this diversitywas the point offriction in the regionalcompetitionsand in the attainment f traditionalandauthoritativeprivilegesthathelp to define a hegemonicelite. The economicsituationwas importantnsofaras it supporteda preponderantoliticalpres-ence. Economic circumstances,in turn, controlledconditions so that theprocess of reconstituting he elite would not sufferdisruptions hroughthedemocratizationof social participation.

Far from representingdifferenteconomic interests,the Bolivian politicalpartieswere, like theiropponents,the expressionof elite controlover the7 An example of the multitudes of perspectives concerning the issue is the workshop "Partidos

politicos y elecciones en AmericaLatinay la peninsula berica, 1830-1930" organized n February1995by the InstitutoUniversitarioOrtegay Gasset (Madrid)and the Congreso "The Expansionof PoliticalCitizenship n LatinAmerica," presented n August 1995 by la UniversidadNacional de BogotaiandtheSSRC's Joint Committeeon LatinAmericanStudies (JCLAS).8 BautistaSaavedra,La democracia en nuestrahistoria (La Paz, 1921), p. 109.9 MauriceDuverger,Los partidospoliticos (Mexico: FCE, 1987), p. 50.10EfrainKristal, Una visidn urbana de los andes (Lima:IAA, 1991) p. 26.


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400 PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIApolitical system. The partylines did not correspondwith social or profes-sional divisions, nor, in the strict sense," with ideological ones. If ideo-logical divisions arose, they were not as muchideologies of differentsocialgroups as successive ideologies, differentand interchangeablewithin thesame social category.12The fact that some respectedthe denominationofconservativesandothers thatof liberalsdid not implya complete acceptanceof theirrespectiveplatformsbutrather,and moreappropriately,he searchfor an approveddividingnomination hat had universalcharacterand legit-imacy.'3 Beneath the variations and substantivedifferencesbetween con-servatives and liberalslay a similarculture,a set of practicesand concep-tions thatshapedthe collective imaginationof theprivilegedgroupandthat,after the electoral contest, forced a politics of conciliation, ensuring thecohesion of the elite.14 The differences thatseparated he members of thisgroupwouldhave to be found, then, within the contextsof theiroriginsandfamily traditionsand, aboveall, relations o political power:thosewho wereexcluded or those who were membersof theclientele in power.'5Access tonational power was based on the legitimacy that one was able to obtainwithin the society; thus the partyleaders did nothingbut express the rulesand guidelines for political conduct existing within society. This fact isexemplified in the attemptby Aniceto Arce who, beginningwith the elec-tions of 1883, tried to create a bipartisanpolitical regime permittingthestrongestmine owners to fight amongstthemselves,or at least to attempt ounite under one partypower sufficient to make the oppositionpartyinto amerely symbolic presence. In both cases, Arce was attemptingto reduce

" The issues of religion and the origins of power were not debated. AlbertoCornejo, Programaspoliticos de Bolivia, (Cochabamba: mp. Universitaria,1949), pp. 19-27; Programade gobiernofor-muladopor Fernando E. Guachalla, efe delpartidoLiberaly candidatoa la presidenciade Bolivia, (LaPaz, 1908), p. 6; Reflexionessobrepolitica nacional. Articulospublicados en "El Tiempo," (La Paz,1915), p. 12.

12 "En nuestra America los partidosse formanpor motivos o pretextos;raravez deben su origen aprincipioso interesesgenerales. Todos descansamosen una constituci6nrepublicanay en este orden,cuanto mais,ha habido una cuesti6n de forma:federal o unitaria. Como el programade ellos ha sidoidentico, para distinguirsealgunavez, se han mostradoseparadospor asuntos de administraci6no depolitica: ferrocarrilistas,pacifistas;anticaministasy guerreros"(Letterfrom MarianoBaptistato LuisPaz, Cochabamba,April 19, 1904).13 "Era16gicoe inexcusable,sifquerifanonstituirseverdaderas ntidadespoliticas que los ciudadanosse agrupasenen tornoa las banderas radicionales hist6ricas,afiliaindose los principios iberaleso alos principiosconservadores" in Alberto Cornejo, Reflexionessobre politica nacional. Articulospub-licados en "El Tiempo", (1915), p. 10.'4 Saavedra, "El partidoconstitucionalno ha sido un partidoconservador,como el llamadopartidoliberal no ha sido una agrupaci6nnetamente iberal. En Bolivia, maisque los principioshan sido lassimpatifas las personas, las adherenciasa los caudillos, las que han determinado a formaci6nde lospartidos politicos," La democracia, p. 133.15 La politica y los partidos. Articulos de actualidadpublicados en "La Tarde", (La Paz:Tip. JoseManuelGamarra,1910) pp. 3, 17, 28, 33; Saavedra,La democracia, pp. 135, 173, 195.


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MARTA RUROZQUI 401initial partydifferencesby sealing off any uncontrolledavenue of govern-mentalparticipationor the risingsocial sectors.16By conjoiningwithinthesame grouptwo apparently onflictingpolitical positions, he was appealingfor the continuityof social status and for the conformationof Bolivia underthe interestsof a fractionof the dominantclass. Suffice to say thatdirectelectionsdid notgive themajorityrequiredby law to either of thecandidates

paraquelos circulosquese habian puesto l dineroaldinero,guerredindoseencarnizadeamente,omenzasen aproximarsel uno alotro,trabajandoonempefiio araexcluir a candidaturael quellamabanl presitigioso meri-torio GeneralCamacho . . es asi quelos partidos ojo-arcista pacheco-corralista anllegadohoyal mismo 6rmino.17Robert Michels' work suggests that the fight for power was a fight be-tween minorities, i.e., factions, of the same group, in this case conflictingfactions of the elite,18 reinforcingwhat has been saidup until now.19In hisview the organized battle would be sought between the political partiesestablished around 1880 that, independentof the ideology and preceptsoutlined in theirprograms,leaned necessarilytowardconservatism or theconservationof the political system. In otherwords, they tendedtowardtheperpetuationof a hierarchical ystem with a meansof social climbing con-trolled from above andbased on the imitationof the modes of living of theprivileged sectors. This tendency is consolidatedthroughcontrol of theState. Consequently,the availabilityof economicresources s subordinatedand dedicated to the conquestof politicalpowerthat, in turn,will providethe elite with a large degree of flexibility to define itself as a social groupcapable of giving collective oppositionalresponsesto subordinatesectorsaspiring o the sameprivileges.Thus, thepoliticalpartyacts as an institution

whose purposeis the conquestandexercise of political power.20This defi-nition invalidates Giovanni Sartori'sconception of the Bolivian politicalpartyat the turnof the twentiethcentury.His assertionconcernswhetheror16 With respect to this Aniceto Arce says: "Amenaza a nuestropais un grave peligro. La cuesti6neleccionaria esti dando margena una propagandadesorganizadora e nuestraconstituci6n social. In-dispensable parece combatirlasin dividirnos." La coalici6n. Articulospublicados en "El Progreso"6rgano del Partido Liberal. (Cochabamba:Tip. "14 de septiembre," 1884, p. 2.17 Arce, La coalici6n, pp. 3, 12.18 RobertMichels, Los partidospoliticos (Buenos Aires: Ed. Amorrortu,1983).19 "Ni 61(el conservador),ni su contendiente,el liberal,puedenserdiscutidosen raz6n de principiose institucionesqueambos invocan. Ambosreconoceny proclamanas mismas ibertadesptblicas; ambosse declaransus tinicos sostenedores,acusaindosemutuamentede haberlasconculcado. La cuesti6n entreambos no viene a ser te6rica ni de programaspoliticos; versa sobre hechos; es una cuesti6n de con-ducta." "Deslindando[1904]," in MarianoBaptista,Obrascompletas.Documentosdepolftica externae interna (La Paz: Ed. Renacimiento, 1933, T. V, p. 306.20 Duverger,Partidospoliticos, p. 15.


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402 PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIAnot a party is capable of governing at the level of national interest in amannerany differentfrom that of a faction:21 ot only in revealingcharac-teristics appropriateo a patrimonialsociety with a restrictedelectoral re-gime,22but also bearing n mindthe risks anddistortionsresultingfrom theapplicationof evolutionarymodels to realitiesthatdid not possess the em-pirical foundationsfor a theoreticalconstructionof partymodels.

Following the corporativeconceptionof the "nation" heldby the Boliv-ian elite upon assumingtheirobligation(in theory)to convert the countryinto a modem nation, and given that for them the prioritywas the recon-version and restorationof the elite as a dominantsocial group, the partiescould not have been instruments or the attainment f collective benefits orfor preventingtheirtransformationnto a privilegedgroupof combatants.23The political partiesnever intended to create ties between the governmentand the Bolivian population.Establishment f the partiescreated as muchaneed to legitimize those possessing the country'seconomic power throughthe recognitionof theirpoliticalpresenceas it did to producea medium fornegotiationbetween themselves and their class competitors.24This act oflegitimizationwould also entail the delegitimizationof all the other socialsectors aspiringto the same privileges. This was to become a judgementagainstmilitarismandcaudillismowhen the latterwas identified as respon-sible for political instability,andthereforeas favoringsocial disorderwhichwould dismantle the privilegedpositions of the elite. Moreover, the gov-ernment'sattemptsto discredit the opposition-as well as similarattemptsagainstthe governmentby theopposition-consisted of accusingeachotherof militaristicbehavior,an accusationwhich in turngave recognitionto theidea that such behaviorcontradicted he appropriateole of the military.25The change in the political structurecreated the necessary stability toassure the various elite groupsthat their opportunities or renovationandsocial definition were not closed. Thus, the alternativeBolivian partiesdid

21Giovanni Sartori,Partidos y sistemas de partidos (Madrid:Alianza Universidad, 1987) vol. 1.22 RigobertoParedes,Politica parlamentariade Bolivia. estudiode psicologia colectiva (La Paz: Ed.CERID, 1992) p. 77.23 C. WrightMills, La Elite del poder, (M6xico: FCE, 1957).24 GaetanoMosca, La clase politica (Mexico: FCE, 1984), p. 131.25 "Ese pasado adn persiste, con la s61adiferenciade que a la guerracivil ha sustituidoel fraudeelectoral, realizadoalgunasveces dejandocharcos de sangre.Los impetusguerreroshan sido remplaza-dos con la venalidad y el envilecimiento del elector. No es coraje del soldado sino la concienciapervertidadel ciudadano o que hace ahoraal mandatario.En este se halla siemprelatenteel cesarismo,o con maispropiedadel espifritu ulgar, testarudoy arbitrario el cholo mand6n,que rasga las leyes yahoga las manifestacionesaisladasde resurgimiento,porqueasi conviene al papel omnicientey volun-tariosoque representa."Paredes,Politica parlamentaria,p. 133.


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MARTARUROZQUI 403not jointly look out for the national ntereston the basis of some particularprincipal on which all could agree, but ratherthey were interestedin asuitableclimate for the consolidationof theirprivate ntereststhat, in turn,wereunderstoodand believedto be theinterestsof the nation.26This didnotcontradictthe political intention of achieving consensus. The means forreaching a consensus were to obtain electoral votes or create widespreadmodes of conductso as not to threaten he elite's ideas of self-reproduction.Elections were held with the purposeof attaining he subordinated ectors'recognitionand consent that their demands were being channeledthroughthe political parties, now that the partieswere the only ones with the ca-pacity to give the sectors' petitionssome sortof politicaldimension.27Thesector of the elite with the greaterelectoralsupporthad moreopportunitiesto pressurethe elite in power and negotiateprivileges for itself.

One notes, then, a stronginterestin popularizinggovernmentmeasureswith regardto the elections and an initiativein channelingpossible discon-tent throughthe networks of clienteles of each party. Consequently, theconceptionof the traditional lite installedby birthrightwas verballyaban-doned and replacedwith the conceptof an institutionalelite restingon theconfidence of theorganizedmasses, themajorityof whichduring hisperiodwere made up of mestizo artisans.28 n time, this system came to formallyreplacethe one based on arrangements f clients aroundan influentialbossor cliques brought togetherunder a militaryhead. The two modes persist,however, under a bipartisanor multipartisanonstitutional ramework hat,above all, intendsto break with political instability.With this, the variousfactions of the elite sought guarantees or a suitable medium for their in-fightingandreconstitutionwithout the threatof emergingsectorsincreasingthe competitionfor power.

26 This affirmationquestions the assumption hat liberals, as much as conservatives, supported heidea of a representative overnmentas promoterof the nation'seconomy. More thanthe recognition bythe two parties of the need for a governmentsensitive to civil direction that could promote nationaleconomic development, the party system guaranteed he continuing growthof the economy's privatesector. See HerbertKlein, Parties and Political Changein Bolivia, 1880-1952 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1969).27 "Vosotros (los artesanos)sofs la porci6nde la clase social que maisama mi coraz6nporque,comovosotros, tambi6nhe vivido escaso de fortunay soy artesano,con la diferenciade que mi talleresti enel seno de la tierra.Si Dios me destinagobernaros,procurar6mejorarvuestrasituaci6n,proporcionandolas mayores facilidades a vuestrasindustriasy planteando,con profesoreseuropeos, colejios paraquevuestroshijos se dignifiquen por medio del trabajo .. Parami valen tanto el humilde artesanocomoel ricopropietario,cuandoestos se handignificadoporla honradezy el trabajoporqueel trabajo s virtudy porquetodos tenemos un s6lo padreque es Dios." La bandera nacional. Organodel "ClubIndustrialFusionista." candidaturapresidencial del ciudadanoGregorioPacheco en el Departamentode La Pazpara las elecciones de 1884. (La Paz: Tip. Religiosa, 1883) pp. 7-8.28 Rossana Barragin, Espacio urbanoy dindmica itnica. La Paz en el siglo XIX (La Paz: Hisbol,1990).


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404 PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIAPOLITICAL DISCOURSE AND PARTY STRATEGIES

Una de las tareaspermanentes caracteristicase los congresosquees lasupervijilanciae laadministraci6ndblica,hasido,eninter6s, jercitadaonimparcialidad,espetoy eficacia.Se ha comprendidouela moderaci6nsuna uerza,que os odiosy lac61era unca stablecenutoridad;olosuscitanel despecho.29The formalized rules comprisingthe internalfunctioningsof a politicalpartysystem servedto protectthe hegemonicgroupnot so much fromthesubordinate ectors as fromtheotherclass factionsor the "parvenu"of theirown faction. In this competitivecontext, the principalpreoccupationof the

said sectors was the acquisitionof legitimacythroughdelegitimizationanddefamationof the opposition. However, the hostility between these com-petitorswas a result of the weighty issue of whetherto continue or end thewar with Chile.30With the solution of this conflict31 he principalaccusa-tions turningone partyagainstthe other and characterizinghe argumentsbetween the parliamentmembersconcerned the persistenceof caudillismowithin the governmentandthe existence of electoralbribery.Once the legitimacyof the liberalandconservativepartieswas establishedby virtue of abandoningmilitarismand continuingto accuse the opposingpartyof representing he preservationof caudillismo, this debate becamecentral. The anti-militarist rgumentwas employedprincipallyby the con-servatives, with Aniceto Arce as theirforemostarchitectanddesigner.Thisposition was not meant to be monolithic, but was structured n two wayswhich were used successively in the electoral campaignsof 1884, 1888,1892, and 1896. First of all, anti-militarism ignified antiperuanismo.TheBolivian conservative\pacifistswanted a quick peace accord with Chilewhile the guerristas (war-hawks)proposedthe continuationof the war inalliance with Peru. As a meansof delegitimizingthe opposition,the formeraccused the latterof maintaining he principlesof the caudillistaregimes.Since the guerristasdefendedthe maintenanceof ties with Peru, the anti-militaristposition ended up, then, identifyingthemselveswith antiperuan-ismo.Beneathsuchapparent ymbiosislay a criticismof thedesiredorientation

29Discursopronunciadopor el presidentedel Congreso,doctordonMarianoBaptista, en la clausurade las CdmarasLegislativas de 1882, (La Paz: Imp. de la Uni6n Americana, 1882) p. 1.30 Saavedra,La democracia, p. 240.Y3. . Y aquf se presenta la ocasi6n de hacer notar que, si bien han sido divergentes nuestrasopiniones polifticas,en el hecho hemos marchado,aunquepor caminos distintos, hacia el mismo obje-tivo-la salvaci6n de la patria" Contestaci6ndel Presidente Constitucionalde la Reptiblica, Generaldon Narciso Campero, (La Paz: Imp. de la Uni6n Americana, 1882) p. 5.


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MARTA IRUROZQUI 405of the La Paz region (largely liberal and guerrista) with the rest of thecountry. This region competed directly with the southern elites and hadgreaterpossibilities for success. Peruvianmarketswere not prioritiesforthese elites, who preferred o maintain heirChileanand Argentinian ies.To the extent that the silvermarketwas losing strength, his did not preventthechuquisaquefiosromorganizing hemselvesto activelyparticipaten thepacehiamarket as demonstratedby Aniceto Arce's role in the foundingofthe first banks of La Paz. The controlthey desired to have over this marketcan also be understoodas a wish to subordinate t to southernhegemonysoas to block its potentialas a competitor, negating the pacefio advantage.Thus constituted,the regionalelite with the greatestpotentialfor econom-ically carryingthe weight of the otherBolivian districts and with greaterpossibilities for snatchingaway the hegemony of the silver miners, wasitself in dangeras the world price of silver fell.

Secondly, anti-militarismwas destinedto undermineheopportunitiesorsocial ascent of the subordinatesectors. Its condemnationdiscredited theearliermodes of socialcompetition.Thesocial andpoliticalinstabilityof thecaudillistregimesnot only hadgiven betteropportunitiesor improvingthestatusof populargroups, therebycalling into questionthe state's rights topower, but caudillismoalso no longer guaranteedhe continuationof eliteprivileges. At any momentthis instabilitycould have disruptedeverything.In both cases, efforts were made to drawup new guidelines concerningthe obligations and roles of the armedforces. The rejectionof militarismshould not be understoodas a critiqueof the militaryclass, but ratheras adesire to safeguard ts role of order-keepingwithina constitutionallyestab-

lished government.In no case did anti-militarismntendto negate the im-portanceof the military.Rather,its proponents oughtto limit and restruc-tureits responsibilities,so that it would be an institutionmore in line withthe civilian interestsof the partyregime, just as the meansof social ascentwere also regulatedto conformwith the elite's restructuring f its power.Therefore, the attack on the caudillist positions came accompaniedwithpraisefor themilitaryclass, wantingto separate hemrhetorically romtheirearlierpracticesin orderto makethem more viable for the interestsof thecivilian elite.On the other hand, the denunciationsof the civilian-pacifistoption hadtheircounterpartsn the speeches of the LiberalParty,which reignitedtheissue of the guerrista legacy. To discredit the conservatives of the govern-ment, the opposition accused them of electoral bribery and abuse of theirgovernmental powers, means by which the liberals searched for a way to


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406 PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIAjustify the use of a coup d'etat. The aim of this attack would be to offer ajust solutionto electoralfraud,and in time, wouldresult n a bloc againsttheLiberalPartyas alliances formedamongthe conservativeparties.

Despite their differences, the two bands aided in the creationof a per-manentparty system, which in turngave institutional egitimacy to theirpositions. The two participantgroups, in a purely competitive act, recog-nized the legitimacy of the ends pursued by the other and, consequently,defendedthat "el derechopdbliconatural,que arranca l poderde la fuentedel pueblo, admiteen sus doctrinas a coexistencia necesariadel gobiernoyde la oposici6n.'"32However, to this assertion hey were appendinga seriesof conditions that allowed the political parties to discredit one another,therebydemonstrating otonly a lack of class coherencywithin theelite, butalso the view thatpopularparticipationwould act as an obstruction n thisquarrel.A partywould not be acting legitimatelyin turningthese sectorsagainst the government, for it would threatentheir own explanation ofthemselves as a dominantclass. Thesocial battlebetween the elites was not,therefore,a threatto the perpetuation f the establishedorder.On the con-trary, the permanenceof this orderwas assuredby change and its powerstructurewas perpetuatedby political movement.33ANTI-MILITARISM OR THE REJECTION OF THE

PERU-BOLIVIA CONFEDERATIONOf all thepropositions orpeacewithChileputforthby theconservatives,that which had the greatestresonance and was moldedby party ideology,was expressed by Aniceto Arce, Vice-Presidentof the Republic during

Campero'spresidency.It consistedof an alliance with Chile thatpermittedthe rectificationof theboundariesbetweenPeruandBolivia so thatthe latterwould secure TacnaandArica.34This positioninvalidateda treatyin 1873between the two states and dissolved plans for a Confederation.35Arce'sargumentwas justified by the searchfor solutions to the possible "Polan-dization" of Bolivia:32Mensaje del PresidenteConstitucionalde la Repalblicade Bolivia al Congresoordinariode 1887.(Sucre:El Progreso, 1887) p. 5.33 PierreBourdieu,La distinci6n (Madrid:Taurus, 1988) p. 164.34 "Bolivia sin litoralcorre a su ruina.Morirnahogada,despu6sde habersedespedazadoen convul-siones polifticas,presade la ambici6nde los infinitoscaudillos que tiene . . . No ful nuncaafecto a laalianza, porquenunca la cref provechosa,ni siquieraconvenienteparaBolivia. El Pernsiempre se haesforzado por explotar, deprimiro anulara Bolivia .. ." Luis MarianoGuzmin, Cr6nica nacional de1880 (Cochabamba: mp. de Los Amigos, 1881).35 El Comercio, La Paz, June28, 1881.


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MARTA IRUROZQUI 407Boliviano nte odo,he creidoquedebiamosxigir arectificaci6nenuestrasfronteras,in la cualBolivianopuedeaspirar llamarse aci6nndependiente.La zonaqueBolivianecesitay que comprende Tacnay a Aricano puededecirsequese la arrebatemosPerdi, ueses yacosaaveriguadaueChileseapoder6de ellay no la devolveraiPeri.36With this plan, presentedin 1883, economic relations with Chile wereintendedto continue, in time blocking the hopes of pacefios, whose com-mercial interests were linked with those of southern Peru. This market

comprisednotonly theexchangeof mineralssuch as gold, but also the tradein wool, cotton, and otheragricultural ndindustrialproducts.Thus it wasthat, althoughLa Paz possessed a naturaloutlet to the sea via the port ofArica, the area's activities were not exclusively dependenton it. However,with the south's devotion to the exportationof silver, this port, or the portof Antofagasta,was necessary.On the otherhand,Bolivian trade with Peruwas enjoying free transitthroughMollendo and the goods introduced romtherepaid duties at the Bolivian rate. With the truceagreementwith Chilein 1880, the latterimposed tariffs in its commercialtransactions,and be-cause these tariffs were quite high, Bolivian preferencefor Peruvianportsfollowed, with the majorityof goods passing throughMollendo. The ini-tiative of Campero's government o create uniformtariffsmeant, then, theloss not only of "la soberaniacomercialaduanera"but also of thePeruvianmarketand thereforea decline in profitsfor the La Paz district.37However,these economic prioritieswere concealedby demagogyaimed at stirringupthe populationby calling attentionto violations of the public faith such assnatchingup money in compulsorydebentureoans andincreasing axes notto defraycosts of war butto createostentatiousbatallionsandjobs for thosewith governmentconnections. Fromdenunciationsof immoralityandpolit-ical corruption herefollowed a delegitimizationof the government'smea-sures.38On the otherhand, denunciationof the suppressionof public lib-erties and individualguarantees,andthe squandering f Statefunds for theaugmentationof ministerial ncomes underthe pretextof war,39 aidedArce

36 El Comercio, La Paz, September3, 1881.37 Nataniel Aguirre and Fidel Aranibar,Intereses nacionales (La Paz: Tip. "14 de septiembre,"1884), pp. 3-4.38 ConcerningAniceto Arce's tendencies in internationalpolitics, Felix Avelino Aramayowrites in1919: "Viene otravez nuestro nfatigableenemigo, con su habilidadpolitica, a imprimira la diplomaciabolivianael rumboque le conviene a sus propios nteresesa fin de mantenerdesunidosa Bolivia y el Peril" Letter from F61ixAvelino Aramayoto Jose Paravicini,February9, 1919, in A. Costa du Rels,Filix Aramayo y su epoca, 1846-1929 (Buenos Aires: Ed. Domingo Viau Cia., 1942), p. 153.39 "En efecto: a pesar de la penuriade nuestro erario, se ha tenido en pie de guerra la naci6n,quedandoasif atisfechoel programa razadoal Ejecutivoporla Convenci6ndel 81; se ha salvadola navedel Estado a traves de mil escollos; las libertadesy las garantiasdel ciudadanohan venido a ser una


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408 PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIAin linkingthe guerrista positionto thepreviousbadadministrations,hatis,caudillismo.40This relationship ncreasedthe need to quickly conclude adefinitive peace treaty with Chile, the only way to gain respect for theachievementsof thepartysystem.Withthat,theArceoptionappearedas theopportunity or change, for progress,for a break with the shadycaudillistawho denigrated he image of Bolivia at the internationalevel.41Therefore,those who opposedthesereforms,that is to say, "el gobierno[theCamperogovernmentwhich was consideredpolitical]y los escritoresquesostienensupolitica," would be participatingn a politics of favoritism,a continuationof thepreviousdisorderandun-governability.Consequently, hey wouldnothave "derechospara imponera la naci6n sus caprichosy opiniones; y quela llamadahonranacional,que se invoca por los que sostienenel estado deguerraa todo tranceno es maisqueunaparadoja, ncompatiblecon el inter6sy las conveniencias del pais."42 Thus, the stated parallels between thecaudillos of the periodprecedingthe PacificWar and Ministers of War andGovernmentNatanielAguirreandNdifiezdel Pradorespectively(as a resultof their pro-war stances), corroborated he same strategy, charged withdelegitimizingthose in power, the samepeopleas before, in theirattempt orevive the past.43In all, this was equivalentto denyingBolivia an outlet tothe sea, and thereforewas an impediment o nationalprogress:

Enposesi6nBoliviadeTacna Arica,construidaa linea erreade lacostaalinterior,l progresonvadiri sepais,susriquezasedesarrolarin,entoncespodraobrarcomonaci6n ibree independentienteseri respetada orsusvecinos. Eso es lo que yo ambiciono aramipaisy no su desmembraci6nruina.44In addition to associating the Peru-Boliviaalliance with the image ofdismemberment,ruin, and impossibilityfor convertingthe countryinto anation,Arce attemptedo provethatPeruhadalwaysforcedBolivia throughexploitation, deprivation, and repeals, thereby counteractingthe call by

realidad;ha renacido a confianzaptiblica, y el nombrede Bolivia empiezaa Ilamar a atenci6nhasta delos pueblosmis lejanos, que, antesde ahora,o no la conocian o apartaban e ella la vista" Contestacidndel PresidenteConstitucionalde la Republica,GeneraldonNarciso Campero La Paz:Imp. de la Uni6nAmericana, 1882), p. 3.40 Candidaturadel Doctor AnicetoArce. (Sucre:I. Col6n, 1880).41 Ibid. p. 8.42 "La treguay la honranacional," El Comercio, La Paz, July 6, 1882.43 "En los tiempos transcurridos,dos fuerzas se han disputadoalternativamente l mando supremo:la una, el caudillaje, que buscaba la base del poderen el pronunciamiento; la otra, el civismo, quetiende a constituir la magistratura oliftica,desenvolvidndose,desde Sucre, por ensayos mis o menoseficaces." "Deslindando 1904" in Baptista,Obras completas. V, p. 301.44El Comercio, La Paz, September13, 1881.


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MARTA IRUROZQUI 409GeneralCampero or solidaritywith thatcountry,45romwhich a greatdealof militarysupporthad been obtained o defeat PresidentDaza (1876-1879).To remove any lingeringdoubts about his image, Arce admitted o makingwar loans to the governmentfor the purchaseof arms duringits Chileancampaign.46However, the loans were presentedin a manner that wouldreinforce his patrioticdiscourse favoringprogress, a progresswhich wasincreasinglylinkedto mining activity.47MinerGregorioPacheco similarlyexalted progressbut did not advocatebreakingwith Perubecause "a6n enla hip6tesis de que Bolivia hubierapodido rompersu pacto de alianza conel Peru'para aceptarde Chile los territoriosde Tacnai Arica, no es posiblesuponerque tantagenerosidadde parte suya no hubierabuscado su com-pensativo en nuestras ricas provincias de Lipez i Porco.'"48 Against theconservativeformulations,the argumentof the guerristaslliberals nsistedthat

la f6rmulaquepuederesolver l problemas la conservaci6ne la actitudbelica, a lealtad la alianza,acircunspecci6nactividad elgobiernon ladiplomacia.. [yaque]o venceel pensamiento ampero, ueestaapoyadoporla mayoriade los politicosy del pueblo,es decir a actitudbelicaparasalvar l honornacional, vence a oposici6n,quees la paza todotrance.49This line of thought in favor of continuingthe war was endorsed on thewhole by members of the military,who saw in the fulfillmentof the inter-nationaltreaties heconfirmationof their social andpolitical legitimacy, andby the pacefios involved in diverse economic activities, whose interests inregionalmercantile ntegrationclashedwith the miningsector. Thepaceriodiscourse focused on patriotismas fundamental o an ideology removedfrom all factions andfromall partisanship.They wantedtheirconduct to beapolitical, since they legitimizedtheiropinionthrough heirenmity towardcomplete disorder.50They presented hemselvesas citizens disinterested n

45 "Abandonaral Perni n los supremosmomentosde angustia,cuandoexhalabasus tiltimosalientos,bajo el peso de todas las calamidadesacumuladasporla guerra,y entrarpornosotros solos en acuerdoscon el enemigo comdtn,y nadamenos que paracooperaren la consumaci6ndel sacrificio a mutilarelterritorioperuano y tomar en nuestroprovechoun pedazo de 61,como gaje de infidelidad, habriasidoun procedersin nombre, un enorme crimen sin precedentesen la historia, que habriamanchadoparasiemprela purezade nuestrabandera,y precipitadoa Bolivia en el abismodel deshonorante propiosyextrafiios."Narciso Campero,Mensajeespecial dirigido al Congreso, (La Paz: s.p.d.i, 1884).46 El Comercio, La Paz, September14, 1881.47 ((No nacifminero, sino agricultor;pero comprendiendoque la mineriaes hoi la tinica fuente denuestrariquezanacionalme consagr6a ella," El Comercio, La Paz, March5, 1885.48Mensajeespecial del PresidenteConstitucionalde la Repdblica.Agosto6 de 1884, August6, 1884,(Sucre:El cruzado, 1884), p. 11.49 El Comercio, La Paz, July 6, 1881.50 Reflexiones sobre Politica Nacional. Articulospublicados en "El Tiempo", 1915, p. 9.


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410 PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIAgovernmentparticipationand, therefore,enlargedtheir halo of purityandpoliticalinnocence, sacrificing orthepublicgood, freeof worldly,materialinterests.Theirobjectivewas to support he alliance with Peruand to con-tinue the war with Chile until victorywas achieved.51Contrary o the con-servativegroupheadedby Aniceto Arce, the pacefiosat first discardedalldirectpolitical links so as not to be identifiedwith such clubs as La Uni6nNacional, since they based the legitimacy of theirpropositionson the re-jection of all politicalaffiliations.Theymadetheiroptionappearmuchmoreimpartial hanthat of the pacifists:

. . protestandoo afiliarnos banderfolgunoy respetara opini6nde lospueblosde la Repuiblica,ometi6ndonoslas resoluciones e la mayorfa.52Their later identificationwith the LiberalParty magnifiedthe characterand image of this partyas an honest, patriotic,andredeemingassociation,uniquely capableof addressing heexcesses of theconservativesandreturn-ing to thepopularsectorstheirusufructrights.53Thus, ateverymoment,theliberals sought to link themselves to the "pueblo:"iQuereisunapazsinhonra?oscontestarninvacilar:no,milvecesno. Estehombre s el pueblo.54

This behaviorwas taken on much laterby the liberalson the eve of andduring the Federal War of 1899 in a political, anti-oligarchical dis-course55 hat shouldnot be confused with a rejectionof the elite principlesof power. These principleswere defendedat all times by liberalsas well asconservatives of every region of Bolivia. The discourse consisted of anelectoral strategywhich tried to balancethe economic power of Arce andPacheco, employed not only in theircampaigns,but also in the campaignsof MarianoBaptistaandSeveroFernandezAlonso, throughaninvocationofa popular, anti-oligarchicBolivian spirit. The political opposition of the51 In 1880, whendiscussingwhich Boliviancity wouldhost theAsambleaConvencional,the pacefiosexploitedtheirapoliticismby presenting hemselves as neutralpoliticalcoparticipants: Sea dondefuerela AsambleaConvencional,concurranos representantes el pueblocon todas las abnegacionesexigidaspor la situaci6n, y sea la primerael imperio de si mismos, el dominio de las pasiones polifticas,laabdicaci6n del espiritu de partido. Esa abnegaci6n moral es la primeraque impone la patria," ElComercio, La Paz, April 10, 1880.52 El Comercio, La Paz, February27, 1880.53Alberto Cornejo,Programaspoliticas, p. 31.54 "El gobierno y la oposici6n," El Comercio, La Paz, 6 de July 6, 1881."Este partidoha sido bautizado de oligarquifa, oncretindose particularme a designaci6n a losperiodosde Pacheco, Arce y Alonso." "Deslindando 1904" in Baptista,Obrascompletas, p. 306; "Encambio, parano perder a costumbre,siguen peleandocontrala actualoligarquifantendi6ndosepor talel conjunto de los hombresque han tenido la suertede Ilegaral poder." La Politica y los partidos.Articulos de actualidadpublicados en "La Tarde", (La Paz: Tip. Jose ManuelGamarra,1910), p. 19.


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MARTA IRUROZQUI 411liberals was conscious of this device and, therefore,attempted o identifythis populismwith caudillistabehavior.

In accordancewith that strategy,the pacifists, representedby the Con-stitutional ConservativePartyof Aniceto Arce and MarianoBaptista de-clared the existence of two adversefactorsthat the State neededto exorcizeif it wantedto link itself with a politicaltide of progressive mprovement:hechaos bornfromthe anarchicrevolutionsstirredupby militarismon the onehand, and the dangerof social subversionfed by demagogy on the other.The two declarationswere the result of the adoptionof principlesconsistentwith the elite's need for stabilityas a politicalclass.ANTI-CAUDILLISMOOR THE REJECTIONOF POPULIST DEMAGOGY

Aniceto Arce tried to confront internaldangers, specifically, degradedmilitarism and degradingdemagogy. In his opinion, both factors had beenfed by anarchyand chaos within the countryandresultedin the ingressionof upper-and middle-class idleness into the ranks of the official class, andthe ingressionof middle- andlower-class dleness into thesoldiery.Militaryapprenticeship ventuallyconvertedthe soldiersinto dangerousmob agita-tors in urban slums. In contrast was the decent and dignified workerwhoenjoyed the fruits of his labor, makingpossible the growthof the nation,always keepingout of all politicalactivity, for otherwisehe would becomea "cholo arribista,"and an appallingparasiteon those who lived as hon-orable artisans. 6 The differencesbetween these two types of individualsdistinguished by Arce allows the establishmentof a relationbetween thecritiqueof caudillismo and the exaltationof the artisan's work. Moreover,the anti-militaristpropagandawas shapedby the desire to regulatethepros-pects of social mobility for the rising classes.

The greatestdangerto theelite's restructuringroject ook shapewith theinstabilityof the caudillistaregime, given thatit permitted he absence ofinstitutionalmechanisms o regulatesocial ascent. The society's permeabil-ity amplified the number of aspirants o the positions of privilege of thehierarchical society. The dialectic of "de-classment" and "re-enclassment," found at the base of all forms of social processes, impliedandimposedthatall of the affectedgroupsadvanced n the same sense andtowards the same objectives, privileges, and properties.These prioritiesmarked he groupoccupyingthe firstrungof the ladder,theelite, andwere,by definition, positions and merits inaccessible to other contenders. Once

56 CondarcoMorales,AnicetoArce, p. 542.


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412 PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIAthese privileges or privileged positions were increased and popularized,makingthem accessible to groupsof inferiorrank,they would be modifiedand lose their distinctiverarity.57 n short, the increasedenjoymentof ex-clusive privileges by many people diminished the value of these preroga-tives, andthereforedidnot give to these newparticipantsn powerthe sameauthorityand statusas was conferredupon fewer aspirants.The dangerof"democratization"of social privilegesderivedfrom the politicalinstabilityof the caudillistaregime,aninstabilityagainstwhich the discursivecriticismof Aniceto Arce was directed as it threatened he viability of the elite'sreconversionplans. The overall issue was a result not of the strengthof thepopularsectors, but ratherof the power struggleamongthe elite factions, astrugglewhich squandered, hroughpopulistliberalization,all of the prog-ress made in definingthe elite as a socially-dominant lass. Thatis to say,the elite had the abilityto create avenues for andhopes of social ascent forthe popularsectors, when it was very possible that these groupsthemselveshad not realizedeithertheirsubversivepotentialor theirrights.58Despite theinherentrisk of the move, the oppositionin powerdid not seek to paralyzethe social movement,but rather oughtto regulate t so as not to contradicta logic of social inequality hatguaranteedheexistence of select privileges.In this way, the maintenanceof order,thatis, the maintenanceof the entiresystem of differentials-the differences,the ranks,the pointsof origin, thepriorities, the exclusivities, and the distinctionsthatgave their structureasocial format-all of this was left assured in hopes of social ascent. Eachsocial grouphad as a pastthe group mmediatelybelow, and as a future,thegroupabove, and maintaining his relationshipwas necessaryto the oppo-sition because it foiled anytype of horizontalor intra-classalliancebetweenthe excluded sectors. Thus, they permitted he hierarchical ocial order toremainunquestionedand, consequently,it was the dominatedgroupswhosupportedandfueled its exploitation-with the principalobjectiveof steal-ing a privilegedposition-not its elimination.

For the pacifists, militarismhadannihilated he principleof healthyobe-dience and, with that, had also endedup turningupside-down"the rule ofthings." For them as well, thereexisted withinthe countrya latentdangerof the revolution "of a political nature"headedby some demagogic cau-dillo. The disorderandanarchy mposedby militarismwere the factorsthatsparked desires by the "masa ignorante," by "aquella inclinada a laociosidad, and a la vagancia," to "pescar en rio revuelto." In answer tothis, the constitutionalist party is said to have "liadado con el militarismo y

57 Bourdieu, La distinci6n, p.163.58 FranqoisXavierGuerra,Mexico: delantiguoregimena la revoluci6n Mexico: FCE, 1991), p. 181.


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MARTA IRUROZQUI 413el populacho" opposinga "ciega disciplinade cuartely al rudoimpetudelarrabal" since "el golpe del praetorianoy el frenesi del sans-culotte sehabiandado cita parahacergironesel estandarte el progreso."59Thiseffortby the elite to design and select the characteristicsof the political partici-pantsentailed, therefore,contemptfor all those comprisingthe populacho,the unemployedmobs of thecentralurbanslumsthat actedas clienteles andwho were used by dictators as instruments or matonaje.60 Thus, it wasintendedthat, within the political definitionof Bolivia, therebe no partic-ipation by "la soldadescay el populacho," thatis, the elements of "esta-cionario despotismo y de la demagogia retr6grada.'"61This concept of"populacho"was alwayscontrastedwiththatof the "artisan,"meaningtheindividualworker,who hadnothingto do with partydisputesor the funda-mental elements of progress.62The artisan'slove of order,respect for thelaw and job security were values praised by the political parties, whichfought, withoutexception, to monopolizehis sympathyand vote. For thatreason, honor ceremonies were conductedin which the President of theRepublic or the heads of the opposition held banquets for the artisanguilds.63 The objective of these ceremonieswas to guarantee he group'spublic favor and loyalty "a fin de consolidarmaisy mis el gobierno delpuebloparael pueblo," andat the sametime to assure thecontinuityof jobavailability so as to dissuadethem from participatingpolitically, because"solo el trabajoy la honradezennoblecenal hombre,y que estascualidadesson la base del progresode los pueblos."64Thisdiscursivedeterminationomake them constitutionally egitimate65 lso entailedremovingthem fromall caudillo and partypolitics, that is, keeping them in the marginsof thenationalpolitical sphere. At the beginningof the 1880s, this attitudeper-

59 "El ejercito," El Constitucional,Cochabamba,July 25, 1884.60CondarcoMorales,AnicetoArca, p. 533.61 "Los tres partidos,"El Constitucional,Cochabamba,July 4, 1884.62 El Comercio, La Paz, May 20, 1880 andJune 12, 1883.63 The artisancorporationsusuallyreproduced fficial partypolarization,guaranteeing he protectionand electoral propagandaof the governmentand oppositioncandidates. In turn, there were spaces forrecruitment n the networks of loyalty competingfor social ascent,just like the means of incorporatingnew social actors into the political dynamics,each timecharacterizedmoreandmoreby the force of theState in puttingunder its guardianship he still-embryonicworkers'movement. These functions weregrowing as the political party system was solidified andtherebymade moreeffective duringthe liberalperiod (1899-1920) than it had been duringthe conservative(1880-1899). Despite possessing a name

with popularovertones, such associations were circles frequentedby lawyers, journalists, doctors andcivil servants,until the names of its presidentandprincipalspokespersonswere connected with recog-nized personalitiesin public life. All of this suggests the fluidity of the urbanworld, where the linesbetween the professionalelite and workinggroupsare not clearly defined.64El Comercio, La Paz, April 10, 1880.65 "Convencidos de queno puedehaberprogresoen ramoalgunode la actividadhumana,sino cuandoreinainalterableel ordenptiblicoy las instituciones uncionandentrode la 6rbitade la Constituci6n,losartesanosde La Paz toman su puesto de honor y de patriotismo,y se colocan al lado del gobiernoconstitucional," El Comercio, La Paz, January4, 1882.


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414 PARTY STRATEGIES N BOLIVIAmeatedthegovernment,although o a lesser extenttheopposition,due to thepopularsupportof the LiberalParty.66The conservatives,conscious of thissupport,progressivelysubstituted he praise for artisanapoliticism with adesire to make them electoral participants,albeit controlledparticipants,subjectto the watchfuleye of party eaders so as not to strayin supportinganother caudillistaregime. Henceforth,therebegan to appear n the pressnumerous articles combining praise for the worker with hints about thedeceits behind the political promises:

. . nuestro brero s inteligente, ero a escuelaquele proporcionamossrelativamenteeficiente.67Si los quetratan eencumbrarselos primeros uestos chanmanode61, eacarician halagan,y despu6squehanlogrado l colmode susdeseo, sar-casticamenteos designan onel nombre e chusma.Es llegadoel momentoquela honrada laseartesana, ebepensar n su porvenir el de sus hijosdesignando, epositandoonconciencia ecta nlas urnas lectorales uvotoen favor,del que puedahacer u felicidad.68Theartisansrepresenteda majorityof theBolivianvotingpopulation,andthereforeconstituteda threat o the elite-a threat hat had to be neutralizedin some way.69 Since the praise of their workingconditions and of theirhonor as laborers did not guaranteethat they would voluntarilyexcludethemselves from the country's political life, the conservatives turned todisqualifyingthem, adducingtheireducationaldeficiencies and, moreover,their ethnic origins. These factorsnot only impededthe understandingofartisans'rightsand the role they shouldhave playedin the nationalcollec-tive, but also made them vulnerable o any cruel opportunist,so that theirignorancefavoredthe returnof the caudillos. An apparentack of organi-zation amongthe artisansmade it possible for the elite to pressthis apoliti-cism on them, to interfere n theirelectoraldecisions, and to invalidate hesedecisions if thedesiredresultswerenotobtained.Thus,as muchimportancewas placed on capturing he artisanvote as on declaring t illegitimatedueto coercion:". .. esos buhonerospoliticosquevendian a conciencia de losartesanosque Ilegarona corromper."The threatof popularparticipation,

" In the liberalpressfrequently mployed phrasessuch as "la clase laboriosa,aquellaque maneja osnobles instrumentosdel trabajomanual es la base principalde las democracias. . . alma y brazode lademocracia,paladinde las libertades,soldadoincorruptible e la ley y del derecho." Alcides Arguedas,Historia general de Bolivia. El proceso de la nacionalidad, 1809-1921 (La Paz: Ed. Puertadel Sol,1922), p. 488.

67 El Comercio, April 28, 1901.68 La Vozdel Pueblo, La Paz, February6, 1904.69 "Gratonos fue encontrar ntre la inmensamuchedumbre ue vitoreabaa los candidatos iberales,a muchos artesanos, viejos ya, que habiamosconocido 1888, formandolas masas populares que se-cundaron la revoluci6n del 8 de septiembre," La Politica y los partidos. Articulos de actualidadpublicados en "La Tarde" (La Paz: Tip. Jose ManuelGamarra,1910), p. 24.


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MARTA IRUROZQUI 415identified with caudillismo, was counteracted, hen, with warningsof im-pendingdegradationand vice if one allowedoneself to be taken in by thosewho "repartendidivas a los holgazanes, hacen la vista gorda para loscrimenes y halagan a los criminales.'"70 In this manner, three objectiveswere achieved that ensuredthe importanceof the partysystem:1. The politicalinterventionof the subordinated ectorswas manipulated oas to determinewhich sector of the elite ended up with political hege-mony.2. The winningpartycountedon the supportof its electorateandclientele,andin case these sources becamehostile, it could turnto accusingthemof selling votes to the opposition,whichprovided egal recourseagainstthe opposition and thereby defended the former's political preemi-nence.713. The oppositioncould always toy with the threatof popularmobilizationto achieve accordsconcerningthe division of power.

In conclusion, the paternalisticdiscourse about the importanceof theartisans to the life of the nation permittedthe political parties, and thedistinctfactions of theelite thatsupportedhem,to define theirpositionsanddetermine heir conflict's end result.Within the instrumental trengthof theartisan,embodyinga threatof oppositionandpolitical subversion,also layhis weakness, since artisanswereneverrecognizedas directparticipantsbutrather as allies. Therefore,theirneeds and petitionswere subordinated othose of the political partythatsoughtto win their vote. The culminationofthis politics of mediationwas the attainment f laborparticipationwithout72demandingthe political involvement of the citizenry,or betterput, withoutrequiringpublic representativeparticipation.In the conservative era, thecaptureof the artisanvote was not as much a controversyconcerningthisgroup's political participation,as it was an elite wish to establishits legit-imacy as a function of thedelegitimizationof thepreviousgroupsin power,the caudillos.73However, it was the battle against the promises of social

70 "Honradoartesano," La Vozdel Pueblo, La Paz, 1904.71 "Execremos, en fin, a los negociantespoliticos que especulancon la conciencia, con el voto y aincon la sangrede los ciudadanos,ora pararendira la patriaa los pies del tirano o del enemigo exterior,oraparaentregarlaa los furoresdemag6gicos, oraparasacarpinguiesutilidadesdel sudorde la Naci6n,"Eliodoro Camacho, "Honradoartesano,"La voz del pueblo, La Paz, February2, 1904.72 El ataque al alcoholismo de los artesanospor parte de la prensa estaivinculado con el posibledescontrolque puedeocasionaren el trabajoy su repercusi6n n las rentasde la el1ite,"si consideramosel inmenso desperdiciode inteligencia y actividadque es la consecuencia de ese vicio" El Diario, LaPaz, May 31, 1904.73 "Si era inmoral esta manerade conquistaradeptos, se tratabade uno de los vicios de la vidademocraitica,quizaismenos grave que la suplantaci6nde la voluntadpopularpor la violencia del ofi-


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416 PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIAascent thatpermitteda politicallyunstableregime.To achieve thefruitionofthe oligarchicreconstructionplan, it was necessaryto accept, collectively,a political system that made this plan possible. This was the party systemandthe assertionof its legitimacywas given priority.In admitting his, thelegitimacy of ballot-box winnerswas also guaranteed:

Lahistoriade Bolivianosdemuestraueha sido titinica a luchadel sablecontra a idea,del parlamentoontra l cuartel,del gobierno ivil-simboloperfectodel liberalismo--contral podermilitar-reflejode la autocraciamonirquicay del predominioporla fuerza . ... El partidomilitares el Uinicoque hastahoy ha gobernadoBolivia, salvo dos o tresadministracioneseraquitica ersoneriaivil.74Against these accusationsof continuingmilitarismandbefore the agree-ments and party alliances between constitutionalistsand democrats, theLiberalPartydefended its legitimacyas a competing partyin the electionsthrougha reformulationof the coup d'etat based on the electoralcoercionexercised by theiradversaries:MientrasArce atraea los venalescon su plata,Pachecoalejaa los liberalescon los soldados,con los policiales,calabozos, ablazos,multas torturas,con el reclutaje, on la persecuci6norlos jueceso denegaci6n ejusticia,.etc., todoejecutadopor ajentesa quienespagala naci6ncon el sudordelpueblo.Asies que aplatadeestei deaquel onvergenontraosliberales ueno tienenmasquesuentereza,uhonradez susdesnudos echosqueopon-erles.Colocados n estasituaci6n uecarcome ondamenteosici6n e hacesobremaneraenos. . . Solo Diospodra efialarnosl rumboquehemosdeseguirparasalvarla.Pocashorasfaltanpira que ingresemos n luchatandesventajosamentereparada;l resultado o puedesernosdudoso.Preveoque a abstenci6nndicada prescritaara l casoenque a violenta oacci6nimposibilitel sufrajioe haraindispensable.ntonces,qu6 seri delpais?75The liberal'spoliticalcoup was not alwayscarriedout, as it was consid-ered a pretexttoo close to the commoninterestswith which, in analogouscases, the dictatorshad justified the uprisingsof the emerging interests.However, when it was used, the liberalsresponded hatit was more than awish to seize power, it was also anaugmentation f the liberalforcesagainstthe other parties. It was known in advance that the coup was aimed atconflicting with the forces of two powerfulcivilian parties, the Democratand the Constitutional,with the aim not of triumphingover, but ratherofredefining,the elite. Speechesaboutthe continuationor thecessation of thewar, conflicts between pro-Peruviansand pro-Chileans,the persistenceof

cialismo o porlos pronunciamientos e cuartel"EugenioGomez, BautistaSaavedra, (LaPaz:Bibliotecadel Sesquicentenariode la Repdtblica,1975), p. 51.74 El Constitucional,Cochabamba,June 18, 1884.75ANB (Archivo Nacional de Bolivia). "Carta de EliodoroCamacho a Escalier," La Paz, May 4,1888.


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MARTA IRUROZQUI 417the caudillos, and the disasters of militarismwere rounded out with thesupposedmisuse of libertiesby the partiesand illicit attemptsto spoil therightof free suffrage.Thesespeechesconsisted of arguments upporting heestablishmentof closed blocs of competitorswithin the elite that, in turn,would restructurehe restof the populationso that it remainedsubordinateto the elite's intentions.76The coup d'etat also signified an imposition oflegitimacy, valid in anunequal ight, where the acts of politicalproselytismhad increased. The coup was attemptedwith the understanding hat theparticipants/victims e theirspokesmen,therepresentatives f eachpoliticalparty,capableof giving to thearbitrarympositionof determinednecessitiesthe appearanceof a liberationmission. This quasi-revolutionaryrientationmade the aims of the LiberalPartya collective necessity againsta vigilantsocial order, because it recognizedthe rightof the dispossessed to happi-ness, althoughonly in the long run.This did not deter them fromcontinuingtheir confidence in political promises since it was not an acceptanceof afuturebut rather an acceptanceof the present.77On the other hand, theConstitutionalPartyof Aniceto Arce triedto delegitimizethe liberaloptionconnected with the revolution and the autocraticand despotic abuse ofliberty. This conservativestrategywas roundedout by makingthe LiberalPartyappearopposedto the interestsof the armyand the popularsectors,78an act thatpermittedArceto affirmhis partyas the moralpersonificationofconstitutionality,equalitybefore the law, anddemocracy.Thenext stepwasto proclaimthemselves heir to all of the liberalprinciplesreferring o prog-ress which did not contradict heprinciplesof libertyandauthority, herebyannullingthe LiberalParty'srhetorical ontrolof them.79Arcepracticed hesocial philosophyof positivism and this doctrinecontributedgreatlyto thethoughtof his politicalgroup.His program ummarized he pathfor Boliv-ia's transformation hroughjobs, industry, associations, foreign capital,improvements n the means of communication,y por la iniciativaenergica,fecundae ilustrada:

... mi s61lo nheloconsistirdi,i Ilegoal poder,enorganizarlo,nsancharloy protegerlo,ambiandoorcompletoa fazecon6mica elpaispormediodela industriaintrabas el establecimientoeviasdecomunicaci6nueaprox-imando lospueblosdelaRepdiblicantre i, los unana lasnaciones uenosson limitrofes.80Thus, one can say that the usurpationof ideologies andprogramseffec-

76 Exposici6nque dirige a sus conciudadanosel jefe del PartidoLiberalGeneral Eliodoro Camacho,(Puno:Ed. Juventud, 1889) p.43.77Bourdieu,La distincti6n, p. 163.78 El Comercio, La Paz, April 26, 1897.79El Comercio, La Paz, January11, 1892.80 CondarcoMorales, AnicetoArce, p. 530.


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418 PARTY STRATEGIES IN BOLIVIAtively made both partiesredundantn thatthere were no significantdiffer-ences between the Bolivian political parties, and therefore they neitherserved as instrumentsof expressionfor the distinct social classes nor didthey permit the country's populationto make its presence felt within theState. On the contrary, they were a form of serving one sector-the dom-inant class-that neededthemto establishthe termsby which its restorationandreconversiondesigns were to be carriedout. And withinthese designs,stabilityand order were to be central to the achievement of elite cohesionand subsequentmodernization of the structuresthat ensured its preemi-nence. This idea gains validity if one examines moments such as that inwhich colonel Pando assumedthe leadershipof the LiberalParty,replacingGeneral Camacho. One substitution was enough to keep this party frombecoming an instrumentof a traitor to peruanismo, that is, "un 6rganodisolvente en lo social, revolucionario en lo politico, y ateo en lo reli-gioso."'81 Immediatelyacceptedwere the differences between the previousheadandthe "honrada,sanay decente" leaderwhom the rest of the partiessupported,recognizing "la legalidadactualdel orden de cosas, bajo cuyoamparose proponePandounaobra de alientonacional." And froma "mi-noria revolucionariaque no es la expresi6n genuina de la opini6n ni elpensamientorealizadode ciudadanosbolivianos," theLiberalPartybecame"un verdaderopartido,digno de aprecioy respeto.'"82This changeof atti-tude may have been related to the dropin silver and the gradualadvance-ment of La Paz thatobligedAnicetoArceand othermembersof the southernelite to search for alternativemeans to realize their economic objectives.Their principalsolution proposedretentionof theircontrolof the govern-ment in anattempt o avoid thenullificationof earlierprojectsundertaken ytheemergingelite. Theireconomicfoundationswere in a decadentstate andmade presidentialaid more necessary each time, as the southernminingzones were losing thecapacityto support hemselveseconomically.At first,the conservative elite requiredpolitical stability to guaranteethe correctfunctioning of its economic mining establishment, stability achievedthroughthe implantationof a politicalpartysystem. In a second stage, thissame elite made Presidentialinvolvement essential to prevent the worldsilver market's collapse from dragging under its principal beneficiarieswhile also allowing them to diversify investments nto otherareas.

Theneutralizing lementwas, in bothcases, thesame-the LiberalParty.The Party'sprincipal hreat ay as much in the development,by manyof its81 CondarcoMorales, AnicetoArce, p. 530.82 El Comercio, La Paz, May 10, 1892.


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MARTA IRUROZQUI 419members,of an increasinglyaggressiveanddynamiceconomicbehavior,asin its capacityto mobilize thepopular ectors,thanks o its deepconnectionswith the urban and peasantcommunities. Theirinvolvementwith the sub-ordinatedgroups was attributed o the desire to see these groups inheritamilitaristic system with great social mobility. Consequently, means bywhich to nullify and subordinate he ConstitutionalandDemocraticParty'sability to neutralizepotentialsubversiveswere sought, therebyprovokingthe discontentedand marginalelite, and its network of clients, into ques-tioning the existing order. But if on previousoccasions the conservativesemployeddirect criticismandrhetoricalmanipulation, his time, withPandoas head of the LiberalParty,the government oughtto politicallydefuse thethreatby publiclyrecognizing ts value. Thiswas a means for presenting heLiberal Party to its electoratewith the characteristicsand supportof theConservativeParty,that is to say, contradictingts initialprinciples.How-ever, the conservatives' change of attitudealso could be viewed as thesimplest way to maintainthe social order,recognizingthe equal statureofthe LiberalPartyso as to attack t. And this came about, for so long as theLiberalsbelieved they hadanequalchance to runcompetitivelythrough heballot, they would not think of resortingto a coup d'etat, a threatwhoselikelihoodincreased,moreover,due to thecontemporaneous eterioration fthe elite's foundationsof governmentalpower. The crumblingof its powerforced the elite to go to illegal extremeswith official measures in order tomaintain ts presencein the government, n turn,forcingthe competitiontobypass constitutional ormulas.

The change in attitudeby the conservativeshad its parallelin the liberalranksthat, in appearance,was manifestedas a more compromisingdispo-sition duringpoliticalnegotiationsanda decreasedalacrity n resorting o amilitary coup "desde abajo.'"83 The softening of the group's belligerentconductdid not signify therecognitionof its conservativepoliticalpracticesnor of its social legitimacy, but ratherheralded he realizationof the pro-gressive loss of economic livelihood and electoralsupportfor the conser-vative parties against the liberals. They began to believe that they hadconstitutionaloptions as a legitimateoppositiongroup.This did not mean,however, that they believed they could win in the ballot boxes due to theprevalence of electoral fraud-they would have greatersuccess with aninsurrection:

Este programapolitico puedeser o no de oposici6nen el terreno egal o puedeserlo de oposici6n armada,o, en fin de combinaci6nde fracciones de otro83 El Comercio, La Paz, February11, 1897.


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420 PARTY STRATEGIES N BOLIVIAcirculo.Llegadoel momentooportuno, o daremi opini6n, a que ha deconformarsee seguro onlasqueheprofesado esdequeingres6 n la vidapiblica.84This transpirednot only because of the continuingdissolutionof the con-servatives' materialbase, but also because of the progressand moderniza-tion this sector had beendevelopingwhichendangered he reciprocitypactsof the State with the less privilegedgroups,i.e. the peasantcommunities.85The LiberalParty,throughspeeches opposingthe breachof those pactsanda long campaignto proselytizethe ruralcommunity,would obtainthe sup-portof theindigenouspopulationas anauxiliaryarmy.Inaddition,theParty

would receive the supportof the diverse, politically-marginalizedelitesduringthe elections of 1884, 1888, 1892, and 1896, as well as the previ-ously conservative elites, who saw in a change of party orientation theopportunityto conserve its privileges and augmentits future options forpower.86Despite its populistappearance, he liberals' promiseof politicalrevitalization was circumscribedby and directedtowards elite cohesion,representing, or once, a momentin which the governmentdid not abandonits earlierpolitical measures-measures which were reinforcedby the ac-quisitionof legitimacy.This legitimacy was closely tied to the discourseconcerningwhat to dowith the Indian and the exploitationof the internalized ears of the criollo-mestizo association.87Thusdevelopeda cycle of panic in which each indi-vidualpartof thisassociationcontributed o thatwhich was mostfeared,thatis, each helped to increase the dangerthat the subordinatesectors woulddestroy its privileges. The immediateconsequencewas an atmosphereofsocial insecuritythat favored the elites in its process of internalreorgani-zation. This occurredbecausethe opposition,whatevermeasurethe elite inthe governmentwished to pass, was immobilizedby the fear this produced.These internalizedfears made possible a consensus within the elite that,thoughvariedin representation ver time, maintained ntactthe means forexcluding ethnic groups from public participation,thereby guaranteeingtheirsurvival.

84 Carta de Jose Manuel Pando a Lisimaco Gutierrez,Antofagasta,January8, 1889.85 TristanPlatt, Estado bolivianoy ayllu andino: tierray tributo en el norte de Potosi, (Lima:IEP,1978). "La experiencia andinadel liberalismoboliviano entre 1825 y 1900: raices de la rebeli6n deChayanta Potosif)duranteel siglo XIX" in Steve Stern(comp.) Resistenciay conciencia campesinaenlos Andes, siglos XVIII-XX. Lima:Institutode EstudiosPeruanos, [IEP] 1990).86 MartaIrurozqui,"Guerrade razas en Bolivia: la (re)invenci6nde unatradici6n,"RevistaAndina,21 (Cusco, 1990), pp. 163-200.87 "La experienciadiarianos muestraque un abuso traeconsigo otro abuso, que tras una estralimi-taci6n vienen otrasextralimitaciones,"El Comercio, November 18, 1898.


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MARTA IRUROZQUI 421THE MILITARYAND THE ANTI-MILITARISTDISCOURSE

Anotheraspectwhich should be considered s the positionof the militarywithin the dynamicsof anti-militaristdiscourses.The suppressionof mili-tarycaudillismoas a dominantsystemof politicalcontrol was initiatedwiththe defeat in the Warof the Pacific that revealed the backwardnessof theBolivian military.88This event solidified the idea that it was now no longernecessary to risk governing throughthe supportof a militaryfaction.89Inthis way, the post-warpolitical logic and theabsence of a professionalarmycaused the party regime to reinstatethe old militarism. But if it was theinstallationof a civil oligarchicalsystem, reducingthe political aspirationsfor social ascent within the variousmilitarygroups, it nonetheless offeredthose in the militarya place in guidingthe partysystem: thejob of super-vising the elections. This act permitted he armyto acquirethe capacitytoact as arbiter n the political system, simplyin terms of its relativestrength.The reconstructionprojectof the criollo elite found in this institution aninstrument or purgesanddeliberations hat it utilizedin the "revolutions"of 1899 and 1920 to ensureits reconversion.In the process, the expansionof landownerpropertywas essential, and was achievedthroughthe seizureof communalland. This measureformedan unavoidablepartof the liberalideology thatconsideredthedestructionof thematerialist oundationsof allinstitutionalizedcollectives andjudicial suppressionof its corporateprivi-leges fundamental to the installation of a modem regime.90 The disap-pearanceof the indigenouscommunitieswas thereforenecessaryas muchfortheeconomicmodernization f Bolivia as fortheregeneration f theelitewhich was to supportthis process. To suffocate the uprisingsthis wouldprovoke, the aid of the militarywas necessary.Its actions on the side of thelandowners,as well as its presencein the colonizationof the East,91wouldend up defining these as its characteristic ctivities.

Above all, avenues were examinedthroughwhich the militarycould bemade useful in the new politicalregimewhile at the same time eradicatingits tendency to overtake the government-therefore, the militarywas as-

88 "El militarismo," EL Constitucional,Cochabamba,July 4, 1884.89 "El lado flaco en este partido(Liberal),y que fue admirablemente xplotadopor los adversarios,era que para aspiraral poderIlevabacomo candidatoa un militar,siendo asi que la tendenciacomdin,elanhelo vivamente sentidopor todos era acabarya con las candidaturasmilitares." Arguedas,Historicageneral, 1922, p. 425.90Guerra,Mexico, pp. 229-30.91Erick Langerand RobertJackson,"El Liberalismoy el Problemade la Tierra en Bolivia, 1925-1920" Siglo XIX. Revista de Historia, (Monterrey1990).


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422 PARTY STRATEGIES N BOLIVIAsigned functionsthatwould favorthe elite's primacy.These new delegatedresponsibilitieswere inspiredby threefundamental deas developedby Nar-ciso Campero: he armed orces shouldnot interfere n partypolitics, norbeled blindly by thosemaking up the government,noract as anythingelse butthe nationalarmed orcesin thedefenseof thecountryand the law. Camperoadvised, in short,theabsoluteremovalof themilitaryclass's electoralrightsand the conversionof the class into a nationalistBolivian force:

Convienepredicar nuestros migosy compafierose armasdel ej6rcitoamis tranquilaumisi6n acendradaealtad laley.Bolivia esalvard etodossus malesy se presentardespetablelextranjerouandohagamos raicticolsufragioy ofrezcamos uestra dhesi6n l designado or mayoria.Qu6 lesimporta los militares ingunaandidatura?92Thus, withthe consent of the conservativesandliberals,the armybecame"el guardiaine la ley y el defensorde la integridaderritorial,93once moreregeneratingits caudillista antecedents.While the importanceof a non-caudillistamilitarywas admitted,the army's supportfor the LiberalPartyremaineddivided and was retractedn cases of a coup d'etat:No entraademrisn nuestros rop6sitos resentarl crimen n toda su ver-gonzosadesnudezparaprobar ueel militarismosabavilmentede la tinicaarmaqueposefahaciendovictimasdel honradoiudadano uevive de susrentascomo del proletario, el indioque vejetaen nuestrasierrasdiridas.Hemosvistopasardelante enosotros omoaterradoresantasmas,obiernossin ley, blandiendoa espada obre nocentes abezase imponiendou vol-untad omoel amoal esclavo.Todoesto lo recordamosonespanto,peronoamenguamosos m6ritosdel actualmilitarismo, o somos sus detractores.Hemosuchado lucharemosontra61,noporque l dehoysea el mismoqueayer,ni porque urepresentante,l dignogeneraldel27 de diciembreea nien poco, semejante los dominadores e otrotiempo.Perosi porquean-helamosqueel militarismoesaparezcaelaescenapoliticadeBoliviamien-trasse olvideunpasadodecrimenes;orque spiramosladelanto elaclasemilitarque no ha negadoatina la categoria e instituci6nntrenostoros;porquedeseamosveren Boliviatriunfantea bandera e las verdades e lademocracia, la sombrano ya de las bayonetas, ino del pensamiento laidea.94The conservativedenunciationof the popularvote's corruptionby theheirs to caudillismo-that is, the liberals--criticized above all the salvationof the armedforces. For them, the militarywas to be not only a guarantorof constitutionalorderbut also theprincipal orceagainstthemilitarism hat

92Aguirreand Aranibar, ntereses nacionales, p. 4.93Aguirreand Aranibar, ntereses nacionales, p. 3.94El Comercio, La Paz, April 10, 1880.


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MARTA IRUROZQUI 423precededthe Pacific War. The liberals' measurewas favorable as much tothe civilians as to the militaryclass, for it reduced the risk of legitimizinguprisings while also presentingthe military with an ideal opportunitytopurge their caudillista past and thereby regain the prestige lost after thePacific War debacle. The recognitionby the civil governmentof the neces-sity of maintainingcontrol of the armydid nothingbut confirmthe elite'sneed to find a way to solve its partyrivalries.CSIC-IUOYG MARTA IRUROZQUICentro de Estudios Hist6ricosMadrid, Spain

Documents

Irurozqui Political Leadership and Popular Consent Party Strategies in Bolivia, 1880-1899