irish english battle of hastings

The Battle of Hastings: Math, Myth and MeleeAuthor(s): Edd WheelerSource: Military Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jul., 1988), pp. 128-134Published by: Society for Military HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1988246 .

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First Scene in the Bayeux Tapes- try: King Edward the Confessor

e B eo o as i atinS Math, Myth and MeZee by Edd Wheeler

FORTY weeks after his coronation, Harold Godwinson, king of England, was in defensive formation, northwest of Hast-

ings, awaiting attack by William of Normandy and his army. The contest was to prove to be "one of the battles which at rare intervals have decided the fate of nations." ' The compost of the battle has smoldered in the inkpots of historians, especially during the past century. Thrust and parry are terms which have taken on new and personal meaning for some of the contending scholars. This article is not intended to join the fray but rather to help clear the debris from around one of the persistent questions on the battle, namely, what number of contestants stood and fought near Hastings on 14 October 1066?

The question has not lacked those who proffer answers, and some have answered very ably.2 My purpose here, though, is to cast the discussion in fresh terms and to present an analysis that is more readily comprehensible to the general military historian than studies which rely, and I think overly rely, on assumptions about the probable caloric intake of the Norman shipwright, the forest reserves of the Seine basin in the 11th century, and whether the Normans loaded their vessels in rotations to ten ships using exactly 40 ramps.3

This article uses quantification techniques merely to estab- lish credible orders of magnitude. It also addresses the Saxon side of the equation. In making this investigation, I am aware of the imagined perils among medievalists. "Never was there a more treacherous bog to stray into than this," warned an anonymous critic to those who would write about the Anglo- Saxon army.4 But to look only at William's forces is to shun an integrated view of Hastings. It is true that an investigation of the Saxon side presents special difficulties; however, this does not mean that the quest is useless or hopeless. Besides, the dangers are not too formidable, even when venturing against eagle-eyed and assertive scholars, because all sights are varyingly blurred in this hunt for small game with large bores on remote slopes.

The Window to Events T HE window opening on Hastings is small but not closed. We know, for example, the following facts with reasonable

certainty. Upon Harold's crowning, William was stirred to war. He spent several months marshalling his fleet and men on the Norman coast. Harold expected the attack. Overcoming difficulties, William crossed the English Channel and debarked at Pevensey on 28 September 1066. The invaders marauded the countryside and forced Harold, recently come from battle at distant Stamford Bridge, to confront them. Duke William pre- vailed after a desperate, day-long struggle in which victory was several times in doubt.

Estimates of the contending forces vary widely. A contemporary to the Conqueror, William of Poitiers, says that the Normans numbered about 60,000.5 Wace, the French poet who wrote of Hastings toward the end of the 12th century, tells of a grander scale. In the Roman de Rou, Wace's William refers to his army as "Sixty odd thousand and more." Wace portrays a Harold who wildly exaggerates the English host at 400,000.6 Modem historians assign decidedly smaller numbers to both sides, with estimates generally in the range of 7,000 for each army.7 One scholar attributes "perhaps 7,000 men and as many as 3,000 horses" to William, while estimating Harold's force at "possibly 8,000 men."8 Another, though, propounds "that the English army was not much more than 3,000 strong; and it is unlikely that the effective Norman strength was very much greater."9

The battle most comparable to Hastings in size and scope was that at Stamford Bridge, less than three weeks beforehand. The importance of Stamford Bridge was immense, first in diverting Harold from the south where he had been on invasion watch against William, next in sapping Harold's resources through combat and long march, and lastly, in conveying to Harold expectations which may have proved fatal in his preparations

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From the Bayeux Tapestry: Ships of William's Invasion Fleet Crossing the English Channel.

for Hastings. The Northmen under Harald Hardrada came into Yorkshire

with a fleet of 300 ships. There is no clear evidence on the size of these ships, although several Norse vessels have been exca- vated. A Skuldelev ship (c. 1000) measures about 50 feet in length and approximately 13 feet in width amidship. The Goks- tad ship (c. 900) was larger. A royal ship of royal proportions, it was 76 feet long and more than 16 feet wide."' Not every vessel, however, was of ducal design. Care then must be exercised in forming conclusions about the size of Norse ships. Imagine archeologists of the future finding a silent-screen star buried in his Duesenberg, and concluding that folk of the early 20th century drove sleek, 20-foot-long sports cars.

The Skuldelev ship is likely more representative of the large, ocean-going craft of the period. It might be expected to transport a contingent of perhaps 40 to 45 armed men, or alternately about 10 to 12 knights with their mounts. Ships of only slightly more than half this capacity, though, were reported in use as military transport in the 12th century."

If one assumes that Harald Hardrada's fleet consisted of ships all roughly of the Skuldelev class, then it is conceivable that more than 13,000 Northmen may have fought at Stamford Bridge.'2 However, it is more likely that Hardrada's ships and those of William as well were of varying size. Let us assume, therefore, that half the Norse fleet consisted of Skuldelev-type ships and the other half were of less capacity - say, on average, one-half the capacity of the larger ships. Using this scenario, Hardrada's force might have numbered something like 9,000 or 10,000 men." In the event, Harold marched north over a distance of 200 miles in four days, and won a victory so complete at Stamford Bridge that 24 ships sufficed to return the survivors to Norway. 4

For Hastings, however, the annals record neither the number who fought nor the number who fell. The annals do suggest that William's venture was without precedent in 11 th-century Eng- land. The Normans came in a manner unpracticed among Vik- ings. They came as an army of invasion and rule rather than of plunder. They came after extensive maneuvering, careful prep- aration, apparently by night, in great numbers, and very significantly, with cavalry. According to the Anglo-Savon C/liloni- icle, fleets of even 20 to 30 ships were large for the decades preceding the Conquest."l There of course were exceptions. The chroniclers report that in 911 King Edward the Elder sent about 100 ships against the Danes and that in 1047 King Swein of Denmark asked Edward the Confessor to contribute 50 ships to assist him against the Norwegians.'Ih The Vikings rarely brought mounts with them by ship, choosing instead to capture horses as one of the initial objectives of their raid.

The Normans W E return to Wace to measure the Norman effort. It is true that Wace was not an eyewitness to Hastings nor even to

occurrences of the 11th century. Wace in fact begins his account more than a century after Hastings. His father was not bom at the time of the battle. The facts and faces of the battle reached Wace through those who, at best, received them secondhand. In addressing the numbers and deeds at Hastings, Wace already was looking into a crevice of math, myth and melee. And so do we still.

Nonetheless, Wace cannot be discounted as a source. If Homer held close communion with heroes dead for at least six centuries, it is reasonable to suppose that Wace was sufficiently familiar with his subject across a more narrow space. In many ways, people of previous centuries stood closer to their great- grandfathers. Hence, when Wace speaks we might listen. He alludes to ships promised by the nobles of France to support William, but acknowledges about the total that "the number so promis'd, I never could hear." "All Summer and August," the Normans, "labor'd and wrought" the invasion fleet in the "Ports of all Normandy." Wace says that his father often spoke of William's 696 ships, but adds that "I find it recorded that three thousand Sall.' 1 7On this point, Gillmor states that "Wace's reference to contemporary disputes about the number of ships strongly suggests that even the approximate number of ships cannot be determined.'"8 But why Wace's musings make intelligent approximation impractical is not at all clear. The poet probably did not set up the recurring figure from his father's memory as a kind of straw man. It is likely that Wace put the stated Norman host of 60,000 men and 696 ships, figures attested to by William of Poitiers and Wace's father, respect- ively, in a more certain category than. for example, single and palpably questionable allusions to 3,000 invasion craft against 400,000 Saxons. Actually, 700 ships is not an unreasonable number. Given the importance of the prize, months of prep- aration, and the resources not only of Normandy but of French and other allies as well, William would have been quite capable of assembling a fleet greater, and maybe decidedly greater, than the 300 ships Hardrada is said to have commanded. This is especially the case when we consider that William's plans, though fraught with peril, involved negotiating a Channel crossing of some 60 to 80 miles instead of the North Sea passage by Hardrada across a distance of more than 300 miles.'9

William's forces were prepared for a crossing many weeks beforehand. Harold had expected them during the Summer, but William's plans were delayed by bad weather. William of Poitiers, writing in the decade following the invasion, tells of storm and travail. But he records that the Conqueror was "daunted neither by the delay, nor by the contrary wind, nor by the loss of ships, nor even by the craven flight of many who broke faith with him.' '2 William of Poitiers refers to the French fleet as greater than the thousand vessels which followed Aga- memnon to Troy, though this comparison may be intended more to set the Norman venture within an heroic tradition than to render an accurate accounting of size.

It is possible of course that the estimates of the Norman fleet may be reconciled, at least in part. The figure of 3,000 ships which Wace mentions in passing is implausible. The poet notes the number but gives no indication of adopting it. As I have pointed out, the 700 ships cited by Wace's father is more feasible. This number at any rate is in the same order of magnitude as the thousand plus ships to which William of Poitiers alludes. It is entirely possible that the invasion force was dissipated. The French may have managed at some point to assemble in excess of a thousand vessels in their ports; but through delay, doubt and chance, their force was whittled down to a lesser size. Seen in this vein, the figure of 700 ships appears as reasonable as any in the literature.

If we assume then that the Normans sailed with about 700 ships, what forces did they transport'? We learn from William of

JULY 1988 129



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From the Bayeux Tapestry: Use of Bipennis against the Normal Cavalry at Hastings.

Poitiers that the Norman host consisted of three ranks: bowmen, armed infantry, and knights. We do not know their ratios, but the size of the total force was necessarily a function of its configuration. That is, knights and horses occupied more space than identical numbers of archers or pikemen. The larger the commitment to cavalry, the smaller the total force.

F rom that great gauge of art and history, the Bayeux Tapestry, we know that the Norman ships were of single

mast and sail. The tapestry also shows what logic would suggest, namely, that the ships were of different sizes. Gillmor observes that the tapestry "portrays four sizes of horse transports with capacities of three, four, eight, and ten horses,"~ but adds that "there is no sound method for indicating the numerical distribution of these vessels.' '21 Actually, one of the Norman craft is shown transporting only two horses; another is shown debarking two horses. But Gillmor is obviously correct about lack of certainty. Even so, it is highly probable that the invasion craft were relatively small. Some may have been of the Skul- delev class, but others doubtless were smaller. All the ships were intended for simple debarkation. There would be no dock- ing upon arrival. Even in the larger ships, the movement of horses was a novel operation and posed special problems. Vessels with high sides would have been very difficult to unload. Then too, it is almost certain that the Normans would not have loaded their desginated horse transports to full capacity. They far more likely would have followed a relatively conservative approach in executing an untested operation, especially on such an unprecedented scale. The sea passage of horses in open boats might well prove more unruly than that for accustomed, stoical Vikings.

The Bayeux Tapestry (c. 1070) is, of course, commemoration, not graphics. Yet as a testamental document, it gives an interest- ing picture of William's fleet, indeed of the entire battle. The 11 ships depicted under way from Normandy seem about equally divided between larger and smaller vessels.22 I therefore will speculate for purposes here -and I would not claim that it is anything more than reasoned speculation -that William's fleet consisted of about equal numbers of large and smaller vessels. If my assumptions hold, this means that approximately 350 of the Norman ships were comparatively large, perhaps of the Skul- delev class, and the remaining half were of a smaller variety. The precise sizes of these vessels must remain an open question. However, I believe it is significant that the smaller ships in the tapestry seem, on average, about half the size of the larger vessels. This perceived symmetry is consistent with the smaller size of the 12th-century military transport alluded to earlier. These ships, again, apparently were about half the capacity of the Skuldelev vessels. The comparison is also consistent, for

the larger ships, with scholarship on the English overseas expeditions of the 13th century, when larger ships were judged to carry about 44 men.23

We are now prepared to move toward a calculation of the size of William's army. I will do so by examining three scenarios, one involving a proportionate use of transport, another feat- uring the equal sizing of components in William's army, and a third scenario involving half of the Norman fleet used as horse transports. All of these scenarios are guided by the following threshold assumptions. First, William's larger ships, as pre- viously stated, were capable of transporting from 40 to 45 armed men, from 10 to 12 knights, or some combination thereof. Second, the smaller ships had about half of the capacity of the larger ones on average, i.e., 20 :o 22 soldiers or five to six knights in each vessel. Third, for such a momentous under- taking, all troop transports sailed loaded to capacity; but, for reasons stated above, the horse transports sailed at something less than full capacity. I shall assume, for purpose of this demonstration, that these transports were generally loaded to, say, three-fourths capacity. Finally, I also assume that few, if any, ships were lost in crossing the Channel.24

The first scenario supposes that the Normans used their fleet proportionately and that equal numbers of ships were com- mitted for transporting each of the army's three components. The approach is given in tabular form below. I follow this format not to infuse obviously subjective data with false certainty but rather for purposes of simplification. The proportionate-use scenario suggests that William's army may have consisted of roughly 15,000 to 17,000 men.

First Scenario: Proportionate Use of Fleet by Normans Bowmen Armed Cavalry Army

Infantry (knights with

Number of men in

I) 350 large ships: 1/3, 4,680-5,265* 4,680-5,265 877-l,053** 10,237-11,583 or 117 ships, to each component

II) 350 smaller ships: 1/3, 2,340-2,574 2,340-2,574 438-526 5,118-5,674 or 117 ships, to each component

Total (Range) 7,020-7,839 7,020-7,839 1,315-1,579 15,355-17,257

. The simple math used for bowmen and armed infantry is as follows: 117 ships x 40 men per ship = 4,680 men; 117 ships x 45 men per ship = 5,265 men. ** The computation for cavalry in large craft loaded to capacity would be 1,170 to 1,404 (i.e., 117 x 10 to 117 x 12). However, since I assume that all horse transports were loaded to only 75 percent capacity, the range becomes 877-1053 (1,170 x 75/ to 1,404 x 751).

The second scenario emphasizes the cavalry component. Its attractiveness is its projection of the era's ideal instrument for shock and foray. The age of knighthood was in ascendancy. The longbowman had not yet asserted himself. In addition, the English, who relied on the shield wall in battle, would be expected to field little or no cavalry. William might be interested in pressing his advantage in this category. Another at- tractive feature of this scenario is that it presents a symmetrical force. There is no overreliance on any of the three components.

But the equal-sizing scenario calls for over 70 percent of the entire Norman fleet to transport the cavalry.25 We see, therefore, that this approach yields an army of about 8,500 to 9,500 menr.

I n MILITARY AFFAIRS



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Second Scenario: Equal Sizing of Forces by Normans

Bown|s Arned Cavalry Army Infantry (knghts with

horse)

Number of men in

I) 350 large ships:

A) More than 13.6%o of ships for bowmen* 1,904-2,142** 1,904-2,142

B) More than 13.6% for armed infantry 1,904-2,142 1,904-2,142

C) Less than 72.8%o for cavalry 1,904-2,142 1,904-2,142

II) 350 smaller ships:

A) More than 13.6% of ships for bowmen 952-1,047*** 952-1,047

B) More than 13.6% for armed infantry 952-1,047 952-1,047 C) Less than 72.8%o for cavalry 952-1,047 952-1,047

Total (Range) 2,856-3,189 2,856-3,189 2,856-3,189 8,568-9,567

Or, .75 divided by 5.5 equals just over 13.6 percent.

The computation is approximate: 350 ships x 13.61 x 40 [or 451 men per ship = 1904 to 2142 men. All component forces in large ships are equally sized for this scenario.

That is, 350 ships x 13.61 x 20 [or 22] men per ship = 952 to 1047 men. All component forces in smaller ships are equally sized.

This scenario more than doubles the size of the cavalry; though as indicated, the resulting army is smaller, in fact about 45

percent smaller. It is hardly likely that William would have used almost three-quarters of his fleet to transport 3,000 knights with horses, even assuming that the realms of the Normans and their allies were capable of committing such a large number of cavalry for the invasion.

It is more likely that William would have been willing to commit some large portion of his fleet, but less than three- quarters, in order to maximize his advantage in cavalry. Many scholars argue that about half of the fleet was used as horse transports.26 The third scenario accommodates this notion. This scenario illustrates that, by using half of his ships to transport cavalry, William might have been able to field about 12,500 to 14,000 men. It is worth noting that, as seen in the Bayeux Tapestry, William would not have used his larger ships exclusively in pursuing this course. Hence, in this scenario and in the others as well, I have used both large and smaller ships proportionately by category.

Third Scenario: Use of Half of the Fleet as Horse Transports

Bowmn Annr Cavalry Army Infantry (knights and

Number of men in

I) 350 large ships:

A) 1/4, or 87 3,480-3,915* 3,480-3,915 ships

B) 1/4, or 87 3,480-3,915 3,480-3,915 ships

C) 1/2, or 176 ships 1,320-1,584*- 1,320-1,584

II) 350 smaller ships:

A) 1/4, or 87 1,740-1,914 1,740-1,914 ships

B) 1/4, or 87 1,740-1,914 1,740-1,914 ships

C) 1/2, or 176 ships 660-792 660-792

Total (Range) 5,220-5,829 5,220-5,829 1,980-2,376 12,420-14,034

That is, 87 large ships x 40 [or 45] men per large ship = 3480 to 3915 men. Similarly, for smaller ships, the math is: 87 x 20 [or 22] = 1740 to 1914. . Or, 176 shipsx 10 [orl2]cavalrypershipx .75 = 1320 to 1584 cavalry. Forsmallerships, the math is: 176x5 [or6]x .75 =660 to 792.

Duke William did not use a calculator. He was unfamiliar with the modern language - or jargon - of "force maxi- mization."' Norman commanders were not accountants. There is no evidence even that the Normans knew basic algebra. But William's abilities went beyond mere quantification. The evidence shows prima facie that he knew what was required and how to extract it. It would not have occurred to him to strive for a proportionate or symmetrical army. It certainly did occur to him, however, to muster enough bowmen or infantry or cavalry. Sufficiency of course may be either proportionate or symmetrical.

My point is simply that effort is determined in huge part by one's resources. William raised as many fighting men as possible and doubtless then assembled a fleet to transport them. It was an expansive fleet. William of Poitiers likened its masts, clustered together during the Channel crossing, to a forest.27 We began with a reasoned estimate of the size of this fleet (700 ships) and proceeded to examine how it might have been used. The first scenario emphasizes transporting the largest army possible, with a solid contingent of cavalry. The second emphasizes greatly increasing the cavalry. The last scenario at-

.*-iIY IQAR 131



tempts to strike a balance between total numbers and strong cavalry. Of the three scenarios, the first and third correlate most closely to my own view of the invasion force. William of Normandy would have been interested surely in pressing his advantage in cavalry, but he probably was even more interested in putting ashore, and in decisive numbers, the proven stock for Viking invasion, his bowmen and pikemen. Looking for ranges in the subjective margins where the first and third scenarios seem to merge, I would conclude that William may have landed at Pevensey with an army of about 14,000 to 15,000 men, perhaps 1,500 to 2,000 of whom were on mounts.

Harold and the Saxon Band I Ethe size of William's fleet and the extent of his commitment to cavalry are keys in determining the number of Normans,

then some of the answers in measuring Harold's army are found in an investigation of the available levies, the terrain on which the battle was fought, and the effect of the reliance of the English on the shield wall as a defensive formation. Before proceeding, however, we must recognize that the inordinate pressure of events prevented Harold from fielding a larger force, although it is problematical that he could have matched the Norman invaders under the best of circumstances. The road to Hastings was by way of Stamford Bridge for Harold and his stalwarts, the housecarls. The joumey took them across 500 miles and a violent clash with perhaps 9,000 to 10,000 Norse, all in the space of less than four weeks. The obstacles leading to Hastings were surmounted, but the housecarls were much taxed and thinned in the process. The same chronicler describes Stamford Bridge and Hastings. He refers to Harold in both instances only as leading "a great host," and records for each battle that the victor "had possession of the place of slaughter.''21 We cannot be certain whether this language is a conscious comparison between the two events or merely a convenient form of short- hand. For our purpose, though, it seems likely that, to have won such a signal victory at Stamford Bridge, Harold must have led a host somewhere on the same scale in size with the Norse.

Would not Harold have attempted to raise an army of at least comparable strength to confront William, his archenemy, in the south? The answer is clearly, yes, unless Harold had become overconfident by the victory over Hardrada - or unless there simply was insufficient time in which to prepare.

Some of the English whom Harold led at Stamford Bridge were surely levies raised in the north, possibly even followers of Harold's allies, Edwin and Morcar. It is doubtful that many of these men from the northern shires marched southward with Harold to meet William. Many of the housecarls had fallen at Stamford Bridge. It seems improbable that more than 2,000 housecarls29 accompanied Harold back to London, where for six days the English made preparations. Harold doubtless was able to raise some levies, even at harvest time, on the march from Yorkshire to London, but most of his force would be expected to come from levies in the south. The southern counties were, and remain, the most populous in England. Yet given the limitations of time, Harold was prevented from raising the army he otherwise might have rallied to his cause.

The forces which a leader might gather in medieval England, even given adequate time, were limited. According to Domes- day references, substantial towns such as Cambridge and Col- chester would contribute only 20 men each under the normal system of levying by "hide" in the 11th century. Round estimates that under Henry II, a century after Hastings, "the whole servitium debitum, clerical and lay, of England can scarcely have exceeded, if it indeed reached, 5,000 knights."'" To be sure, the levying for knights and that for infantry are different propositions. Nevertheless, in 1339, Edward III mustered only slightly more than 2,500 soldiers from the 11 English counties touched by a 75-mile radius drawn from Hastings.3' Oman claims that these men were trained and "not hasty and miscellaneous shire-levies." The soldiers of Edward III were in-

tended for the king's campaigns in France. Edward II earlier raised significantly larger levies, especially in the northern counties, against the more proximate Scots.2

William posed a danger at least as imminent to the crown as that posed later by the Scots, but Harold had nothing like the time enjoyed by Edward II to gather forces. Hence, it can be argued that Harold indeed would have been fortunate, at harvest, to raise 2,500 men in the southern counties from which Edward III more deliberately mustered a similar number almost 275 years later. And it must be emphasized that Harold's levies were hardly well-equipped. They in fact were precisely the "hasty and miscellaneous shire-levies" to which Oman alludes. In any event, adding this number to, say, Harold's 2,000 housecarls, the scant levies from the north, and the probably some- what more substantial levies from London, it is difficult to attribute to Harold more than about 5,000 or 6,000 men. I will test this tentative number against the terrain of the battlefield and the likely alignment of the English on it.

It is necessary to discuss fully the reasons for Harold's haste to confront William. Harold may have wished to push the Normans into the sea before they could be reinforced, or he may have been anxious to strike against the ravishers of his native Sussex. It might also have been that, flush with recent victory, Harold thought himself capable of repeating the lightning success of Stamford Bridge. Whatever his motives, Florence of Worcester says of Harold that, even though '"one-half of his army had not yet arrived, he did not hesitate to advance with all speed into Sussex against his enemies." But if Harold left London in confidence, he soon must have realized that he faced a host superior to the foes he had vanquished in Yorkshire. It is highly erroneous to assert, as does one historian, that "Hastings was an altogether slighter affair than Stamford Bridge.""

Sensing himself outnumbered and with many raw recruits, it was natural for Harold to draw his forces into the traditional English defensive formation, the shield wall. Florence of Wor- cester writes that "the English were drawn up in a narrow place."34 The English in fact were aligned in a concentrated formation atop a glacial slope, near the high ground of Telham Hill, with the great forest of the Weald to their backs. The forest offered refuge in case of rout.

Harold's housecarls, however, would not be easily over- whelmed. The housecarl was the mainstay of the English army. His great axe, the bipennis or Danish axe, was a fearsome instrument, a weapon about four feet in length and, according to Wace, "with a Blade a foot long."' 3' The axe was swung with both hands. It worked havoc on man and mount. The housecarls thus armed would form the front line of Harold's defense, poised to hack down the leading edge of the French attack.

The French are often pictured as advancing in three separate columns at Hastings. Actually, there is no compelling evidence for this view. They might just as well have advanced in a serried mass in order to concentrate for breakthrough against the oppos- ing shield wall. This formation would have served as well as any, and better than most, for the purpose of staggered yet focused attack by archers first, then by pikemen and finally by knights. It is also true that we are uncertain about the configuration of Harold's shield wall. It may have been, as Round points out, "a crescent or semi-circle . . . or even a 'wedge' "', I believe, though, that Harold probably arrayed his forces to form a relatively straight line. This configuration is logical for three reasons. First, Harold would want to present the most concentrated and least exposed defense possible against the more numerous attackers. Concentrating his forces along the shortest distance between two points accomplishes this objec- tive. Second, a straight-line defense allows the most efficacious closing of ranks to compensate for casualties and the falling of defenders. The outnumbered English would be especially conscious of this fact. Lastly, a straight shield wall would allow for the free employment of the two-handed axe. That is, the axe was best employed in formation when swung straight ahead and

132 MILITARY AFFAIRS



without impediment. Comrades situated out front affect the field of usage, narrowing the corridor into which the housecarl might make his lethal swing. Indeed, the defender out front might be inhibited as well. It is an added distraction when one must think not only about disfigurement by the approaching enemy but also about the misdirected blade of one's associate a pace to the rear. The straight-line shield wall does not cure anxieties about mayhem, but it keeps the problem to the front.

The English defended a space compatible with their numbers. Determining the configuration of the shield wall is important if we are accurately to gauge its frontage and thereby estimate the number of men along its length. If one assumes, as reasoned here, that Harold's army was deployed along a straight line, then we may calculate, from what is known of the terrain and Harold's position, that the shield wall was about 800 to 900 yards in length.

The English, girded in their shield wall, posed a dense formation. William of Poitiers says that they were wedged together so tightly that the dead could scarcely fall and the wounded could not move.37 Some room for movement, though, was essential if the bipennis was to inflict its punishment. A housecarl defending a space two to three feet wide would be able both to swing his axe and to maintain a tight wall. Assuming one housecarl at every two and a half feet along an 850-yard line, it seems apparent that not many more than 1,000 housecarls could have formed Harold's first line of defense. This conclusion suggests either that Harold employed housecarls elsewhere in his defenses as well or that the initial estimate of 2,000 housecarls was high.

H AROLD would have chosen his ground carefully. My own conclusion is that he marched into Sussex planning to

attack the invaders, much as he had done at Stamford Bridge. But when confronted with the superior numbers of William's army, Harold prudently decided to assume a defensive position. In this posture, Harold would have wanted his most reliable soldiers out front in order to absorb and then repel the attack. Maintaining a solid line was essential to the concept of the shield wall. The more numerous ft\rd levies would form the rear ranks, in support and standing in the breach as required. Seen in this light, and allowing that I have given Harold the benefit of any doubt in his ability to raise levies on short notice, it may be that the English formed a thin force indeed at Hastings. Harold might have stood with no more than 5,000 followers and very possibly fewer.

If the English were outnumbered, perhaps by three to one, they nonetheless offered stiff resistance."' The traditional view of the battle is that the English held their own until the inex- perienced f'rd levies on Harold's right broke formation to pursue fleeing Bretons and were cut down. This view is certainly plausible. As the housecarls suffered losses, they would have closed ranks to the center, leaving the flanks to be manned by the less experienced recruits.

But another explanation is possible, one which suggests that the housecarls themselves may have broken ranks - not of fear but in valor. We are not to accept unquestionally that the French attacked Harold across the breadth of his half-mile front. They more likely would have massed to suit their own purposes, perhaps in something like a wedge, in order to shatter the line of defenders. What would be the reaction of even veteran defenders to see a superior force, at a couple of hundred yards distance down the line, attempting to punch through the middle of the formation? The center holds, even after initial assaults. The defensive wall too holds all along the line. Yet what of successive attacks against the center - perhaps against the banner of Harold himself? It is intriguing that the break in ranks apparently came from the English right. Would not thost housecarls on the right, maybe especially on the right,39 have been anxious to join the melee, to rush forward and to the left after a while in order to assist their comrades and to strike forcefully

against the enemy? The housecarls were proven as combatants not as spectators.

In the language of battle, such an attack by the English on the French flank might be termed an envelopement. But a small force whose strength is stationary does not readily envelope a larger force whose strength is movement. The result was not envelopement but massacre. The curling of the English right and its subsequent destruction was the turning point at Hastings.

The above explanation, to be sure, is but a theory, a novel theory and one that is, as were many of the English levies, untested. However, neither new notion nor taxing reason nor sleight of hand or foot is necessary to explain the victory of 15,000 well-armed French over fewer than 5,000 English, many of wom carried clubs. Both the numbers and the Fates were decisive is killing Harold and his band.

REFERENCES 1. F. Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, 3rd ed. (Oxford, 1971),

596. 2. Two of the most cogent of recent studies are C. Gillmor,

"Naval Logistics of the Cross-Channel Operation, 1066," in Anglo-Norman Studies, 7 (1984); and B. Bachrach, "Some Observations on the Military Administration of the Norman Conquest," in Anglo-Norman Studies, 8 (1985). Gillmor suc- ceeds in establishing the unlikelihood that the Normans were able to build from scratch the number of vessels required for an exceptionally large-scale invasion with the limited time and resources available to them. Bachrach gives a penetrating and broader analysis of the logistics of the entire invasion force.

3. Gillmor argues that Norman laborers required about 3,500 calories daily (118). But is this figure based on the requirements of 20th-century man or on the needs of considerably smaller workers of the 11th century? What Norman forests were like is, at root and branch, largely guesswork. And to quantify Norman ship-loading operations, as does one scholar, is to dock at the pier of pseudo-science. See R. Fumeauz, Invasion, 1066 (En- glewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), 98-99.

4. Quoted in C. Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Militarv Institutions (London, 1962), vii.

5. For a digest of this estimate and of several which follow in this paragraph, see R. Brown, The Normans and the Norman Conquest (Woodbridge, Suffolk, 1985), 130.

6. A. Malet, ed., The Conquest of England: From Wace's Poem of the Roman de Rou (London, 1 860), 81, 151.

7. Brown, 130. 8. John Beeler, Warfare in England, 1066-1189 (Ithaca, N.Y.,

1966), 12, 16. 9. C. Brooke, From Alfred to Henrv III, 871-1272 (New York,

1961), 88. 10. Gillmor, 114. 11. I assume that a horse would occupy the space of about

three men. This computation is consistent with excavations from the ship-graves of Viking Norway, where occasionally "the remains of as many as 12 horses are found in one of these graves." See B. Phillpotts, "Scandinavian Civilization," En- cyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed., 29 vols. (New York, 1911), XXIV:290. William of Malmesbury writes that in 1142 the Earl of Gloucester used 52 vessels to transport 360 knights - or about seven knights with horses to each ship - from Cherbourg to Wareham. See W. Corbett, "The Development of the Duchy of Normandy and the Norman Conquest of England," in J. Bury, ed., Contest of Empire and Papacy (London, 1964), 498.

12. Some 300 Skuldelev vessels might be expected to transport from 12,000 to 13,500 men (40 to 45 men per ship x 300 ships). No cavalry was reported at Stamford Bridge.

13. That is, 150 Skuldelev vessels might carry roughly 6,000 to 6,750 men (40 to 45 x 150), while an equal number of vessels with half the attributed capacity would carry from 3,000 to 3,375 men.

14. G. Garmonsway, ed., The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle (Lon- don, 1975), 199.

15. Edward the Confessor is said to have had "forty small vessels fitted out" in 1052, while Harold, during the previous year, "landed at Porlock with nine ships, and there slew many." Ibid., 178-179.

JULY 1988 133



16. Hollister, 123, 125. 17. Malet, 43, 55, 61. 18. Gillmor, 105. 19. Hardrada might have been more reluctant to use smaller

vessels from crossing the North Sea, even by way of the invasion route through the Shetland and Orkney Islands, than would have been William in crossing the English Channel.

20. D. Douglas and G. Greenaway, eds., English Historical Documents, 2 vols. (New York, 1953), 11:220.

21. Gillmor, 109. 22. F. Wormald, "Style and Design," in F. Stenton, ed., The

Bayeux Tapestry (London, 1957), 34. The smallest of the seven "large" Norman ships, as depicted in the tapestry, carries three horses and two men; the largest ship carries ten horses and nine men. The five "smaller" craft depicted in this sequence carry from four men to two horses and two men.

23. Lt. Colonel C. Lemmon, The Field of Hastings (St. Leonard-on-Sea, Sussex, 1956), 85.

24. The assumption that William's fleet, once launched, enjoyed safe passage finds support in at least one of the chroniclers, who attests that William lost only two ships in the English Channel. See D. Howarth, 1066: The Year of the Con- quest (New York, 1978), 150.

25. The fleet of 700 ships is structured in this case to carry numbers of bowmen, infantry and knights. Recall that a horse is assumed to occupy the space of three men. In addition, we must add the knight. But recall too that horse transports are to be loaded to only 75 percent capacity, which means that, to achieve equal sizing of the army's components, a given vessel for bowmen or infantry would be three-quarters full, with the remaining space occupied by cavalry. Expressed algebraically, the number of ships required by component is: .75x [bowmen] + .75x [infantry] + 4x [knights and horses] = 5.5x. Thus, the portion of the fleet reserved for cavalry would be four divided by 5.5 or about 72.7 percent.

26. See Gillmor, 108. 27. Gesta Gillelmi, 164; see Gillmor, 128. 28. Garmonsway, 197, 199. See also note 13. 29. Lemmon estimates the number of huscarles at something

over 2,000 (p. 20), but he does not seem to account fully for the cruelly attritive effects of Stamford Bridge on Harold's ability to fight a second major battle.

30. See Hollister, 46; J. Round, Feudal England (London, 1895), 230.

31. These are the counties of Berkshire, Buckinghamshire,

Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, Middlesex, Suffolk, Surrey and Sussex. Nothing of course says that these were precisely or exclusively the counties from which Harold raised levies. However, they are completely representative of the southern counties to which Harold would have looked most readily for levies and from which he probably expected to receive assistance.

32. C. Oman, A History of the Art of War (New York, 1898), 593-594.

33. Douglas and Greenaway, 11:213; Brooke, 88. 34. Douglas and Greenaway, 11:214. 35. Malet, 175. 36. Round, 282. 37. See Brown, 143. 38. There may be an intriguing, and as yet unexplored, ex-

planation for part of the English success in the face of such superior numbers. They literally may have been able to put their best foot forward - or at least to plant their collective best feet before wielding the axe. The explanation is both speculative and physiological. The evidence suggests that the French probably approached diagonally and from the left, thus enabling the majority of right-handed (then, as now) English to brace the right foot and swing forcefully to the left. Left-handed defenders would have had a similar advantage against an attack from the right diagonal.

39. See note 38.

Edd Wheeler is an attorney in At- lanta and an active member of the State Bar of Georgia. A 1962 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, he is a retired Air Force lieutenant colonel. He received his J.D. degree from The American University and the Ph.D. degree from Emory University. His many published articles deal with law, public administration, history, and defense policy. This article was accepted for publication in January 1988.

A Forest of Anderida (the Weald)

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William's attack

Marsh

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scale

BATTLE OF HASTINGS

134 MILITARY AFFAIRS

