Iranian Military Capability 2011

3. SHORAD Short Range Air Defense

Open Source Intelligence Project Independent and objective analysis of current Iranian military capability using open-source non-classified information.

Assessments and views expressed represent those of the authors and are not affiliated with any special interest group or

political agenda.

Version 1.0 January 2011

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About the Project The Open Source Intelligence Project 2011 is an attempt to draw together the most salient bits of currently available

Open Source material to piece together a broad and largely complete analysis of Iranian military capability. Open Source

refers to unclassified, public sources.

The co-authors and reviewers come from a wide range of backgrounds, including in some cases extensive military

intelligence experiences and/or relevant specialist knowledge. However, their primary connection is an appreciation and

active participation in the Open Source intelligence scene. All those involved have contributed on an amateur/civilian

basis. Some have requested to remain anonymous, for various reasons, which we must respect.

The project was started in April 2010 and took months of writing, research, drafts and revisions to make it into the form

you are reading. We have attempted to provide a single text that will be easy to navigate and digest. However, it is the

work of multiple people and this may be apparent in different writing styles and minor formatting differences. We

apologize for this, but believe it is inevitable in this type of undertaking.

We hope that you find the document interesting and informative – we are hopeful that there is some information and

analysis which although open source in nature, is fresh and stimulating to even a highly informed reader.

Author (This Section)

· Anonymous (1)

Main Reviewer (This Section)

· Anonymous (4)

Reviewing Pool (No order)

· Sean O’Connor

· Anonymous (2)

· Galan Wright

· ‘TLAM Strike’ (Pseudonym)

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3. SHORAD (Short Range Air Defenses)

3.1 Organization All branches of Iranian land forces and air forces employ some degree of point air defenses, although units defending

strategic targets have been substantially consolidated under a single independent command known as the Air Defense

Force, split off from the Air Force (IRIAF). This new force includes both area-defense (covered in IADS section) and point

defenses (SHORAD) and operational control of IRIAF interceptors. For SHORAD the new force has acquired much

equipment previously employed by the IRGC and Army as well as the IRIAF. The new force was first reported in

September 2009 and is likely still in transition.

Increasing separation of air force and ground-based air defenses is a sign that Iran places little faith in the IRIAF aircraft

inventory to meet air threats, echoing Iraq’s similar move in 1990s.

The Air Defense Force has adopted new camouflage schemes which are characterized by their inclusion of blue. In many

cases blue spray paint has been added to previous camouflage schemes on equipment. Although in some circumstances

blue can be camouflage, it seems likely that the adoption of this scheme and painting of inherited equipment has more

to do with branding and esprit de corps.

Blue camouflage applied to Rapier SAM system. Source Military.ir

Limited organic point air defense (SHORAD) for ground forces remains within the relevant branch although the IRGC still

has SA-15, SA-6, HQ-2 (all dealt with in IADS section) and various AAA including Oerlikon 35mm and Zu-23.

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3.2 Employment Iran operates large numbers of anti-aircraft artillery (AAA, guns), as well as shoulder-launched missiles and to a lesser

degree short range SAMs such as Rapier.

During the Iran-Iraq war anti-aircraft defenses were deployed at air bases, along the front line and around strategic sites

such as oil refineries. Most of the air defense positions from this era are now long since disused; Current deployments

see the vast majority of active SHORAD assets deployed around static sites of strategic importance, particularly the

nuclear related facilities at Natanz, Arak, Parchin, Bushehr and Esfahan. In times of war it is likely that reserve AAA units

may be deployed to some of these sites, but the focus is likely to remain the nuclear sites. Some nuclear sites, such as

Qom, do not have visible air defenses.

Some air bases do retain active air defenses (notably Mehrabad in Tehran), and several which previously had Skyguard

systems now have Zu-23 23mm sites – a downgrade.

Many other strategic sites such as naval bases, oil refineries and large military bases still have the scars of Iran-Iraq war

air defenses, mostly 23mm. Some of these are likely maintained and employed sporadically during peacetime for

training purposes. In general naval facilities, including IRGC-N, do not have significant shore-based air defenses, although

they are often sited near to other air defenses. Bandar Abbas has had air defense sites added since 2000 but these have

not been seen occupied.

Many fixed SAM sites for HQ-2 and I-Hawk have Zu-23mm AAA co-located for point defense, typically a battery of four

guns.

The army/IRGC land forces do retain organic air defense capability, particularly in MANPAD S Man Portable air Defense

Systems). Zu-23 23mm AAA and Shilka 23mm AAA are also employed, along with an assortment of heavy machine guns

(mostly DShK 12.7mm). Many of these are vehicle mounted. In general however air defenses, particularly AAA, have

been centralized under the air defense command for deployment in fixed sites.

3.3 Asymmetrical warfare potential Air defenses do not form a large part of the Iran’s asymmetrical

warfare doctrine, although the large arsenal of shoulder launched

SAMs does pose a threat to helicopters and some fixed wing

operations in guerilla warfare scenarios. This is particularly true in

the mountains where relative altitude differences are generally

reduced. The IRGC practices deploying MANPADs using

motorcycles which does offer the potential for hit-and-run anti-air

operations.

Additionally Iran has shown great interest in heavy machine gun

AAA primarily involving the mounting of multiples of DShK

12.7mm machine guns. Many of these systems are unlikely to be

in regular service but may represent “desperate measures”

wartime emergency production designs, suitable for ambush

attacks on transport helicopters.

SA-14 MANPADS. Source FARS

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Among the more unlikely asymmetrical air defenses are gas-filled barrage balloons designed to explode near enemy

aircraft (or missiles). The explosive force of the blast is limited and there is inherently no shrapnel effective. It is unlikely

that these are in service and their effectiveness is extremely doubtful.

A barrage balloon exploding near a model aircraft during a demonstration. Source: FARS

Within Iran’s asymmetrical doctrine, it is likely that the supply of MANPADS and light AAA to groups such as Hamas in

Lebanon and insurgency groups in Iraq and Afghanistan would likely occur in times of actual conflict.

3.4 Ability to defend strategic sites against US or Israeli air strikes

The political merits or likelihood of such an attack are not discussed here, but rather Iran’s physical ability to defend

against one by means of SHORAD.

Iran places great emphasis on its IADS (including SHORAD) to defend key nuclear facilities from the threat of US or Israeli

air action. Both air forces have superior assets than Iran’s own and even operating over their own territory the IRIAF is at

something of a technological disadvantage.

In recent years the number and capability of systems deployed to key facilities has increased dramatically. In general

new systems are added around the facilities without the old ones being removed. Consequently some facilities now

have several concentric rings of SHORAD around them.

New systems such as automated 100mm KS-19s having increased the range and altitude reach of SHORAD, and various

attempts at an anti-missile “CIWS” have yielded the Mesbah-1 system although the effectiveness of that system is

doubted by some observers.

Iran’s emphasis on massed SHORAD probably reflects the Iranian defense industries means better than the threat; with

the addition of GPS guidance to air delivered ordnance, striking aircraft no longer have to come in at low altitude to

obtain the desired weapon accuracy against a target. Third generation laser-guided PGMs can also be delivered at

altitudes where the AAA cannot hope to reach. By releasing their ordnance from high altitudes the attacker can gain

significant standoff range, even with free fall JDAMs.

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Most analysis of potential attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure concentrate on Arak and Natanz as the obvious

targets. The constantly increasing air defenses at Natanz support this hypothesis whilst defenses at Arak, Esfahan and

Parchin have remained largely unchanged for the past several years. However some observers suggest Esfahan is a more

plausible target. With Iran’s (alleged) nuclear weapons program viewed a process flow chart, Esfahan is the critical path.

The UCF is there, as is the FMP and the ZPP. If the attacker can destroy these targets and you have nothing to enrich and

no near-term ability to make the necessary fuel for the IR-40 Reactor – both the uranium and plutonium paths are

neutralized at one place. Furthermore, the enriched uranium would be converted to UO2 here as well.

To make Esfahan more attractive, nearly all current facilities there are soft targets. The tunnels are more of a challenge

but the bulk of the key activities probably concentrated in the above ground facilities.

The below analysis however will concentrate largely on Natanz as it is more heavily defended, both in terms of SHORAD

and by the extent of underground hardened facilities.

3.4.1 Israeli Air Force In July 2007 Israel demonstrated her ability to strike (alleged) Syrian nuclear facilities at Dayr az-Zawr despite the relative

depth of Syrian IADS. The Israelis flew through Turkish airspace to circumvent Syria’s Soviet supplied IADS. The main

Syrian systems were SA-2 GUIDELINE (equivalent to HQ-2 in Iranian service), SA-3 GOA, SA-6 GAINFUL (also employed by

Iran), SA-8 GECKO and SA-5 GAMMON (also operated by Iran). Syria does not deploy AAA in anything like the same

numbers or concentration of Iran and that facility did not have the massed AAA that Natanz and most other Iranian

nuclear facilities have. Qom is a notable exception having no identified air defenses.

The primary strike assets of the Israeli air force are the 24 US supplied F-15I Ra’am

(equiv F-15E Strike Eagle) and 96 F-16I Sufa. Both types have been subject to

upgrade and have night strike capability, and self-escort capability with advanced

air-air missiles easily superior to those fielded by Iran.

Israeli’s main limitation is that to strike Natanz (widely regarded the most likely

target) the F-15s would have to operate at the extremes of their operational radius

even if In-flight refueling were employed. They could shorten the trip by landing in

another country such as Turkey or one of the Gulf States although every option

incurs serious political difficulties. Thinking more laterally the jets could be flown

to a designated position out to sea where the pilots could eject and be picked up

by Israeli submarines – this is very expensive but plausible if Israel deems the

reward warrants the price.

Israel has significant numbers of GBU-28 5,000lb ‘bunker buster’ bombs which are probably capable of destroying

Natanz’s underground complexes. Israel originally received 100 GBU-28s but many were expended in the 2006 war and

50 more were delivered to replenish stocks. The current arsenal is probably less than 100 bombs. Israel could also

acquire the enhanced EGBU-28 model with improved penetration and guidance although follow-up orders for the GBU-

28 have in the past been blocked by the US Administration. Other weapons such as anti-radiation missiles, various PGMs

and stand-off attack missiles are also fielded.

F-15I. Source Wikipedia

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An Israeli strike would likely involve neutralization of Iran’s medium/high altitude SAM systems such as I-Hawk and SA-5.

If Iran’s area defense SAMs are neutralized and Israel can come in high, the AAA batteries will have no impact

whatsoever. Therefore operating with heavy ECM and from medium/high altitude the inbound package of F-15Is would

have little to worry about from Iran’s SHORAD assets, or the wider IADS.

SA-15 is by far the biggest threat to the IAF, but have limited altitude capability and only 12km range. It is much less of a

threat to the aircraft themselves due to its limited engagement envelope but is almost certainly the best chance Iran

has to intercept incoming bombs and cruise missiles. The fire-units and supporting Kasta and Nebo radars are in known

(to IAF) locations which themselves could be targeted with stand-off weapons carried by the strike package. It is possible

that some bombs or missiles could be intercepted by SA-15, Mesbah-1 or even other AAA assets but they present far

from an impenetrable umbrella. Mesbah-1 is not known to be deployed at Natanz or any other high value site and is

unlikely to have anything like the effectiveness of a “CIWS”.

If Israel cannot neutralize the area air defense, it is possible that the combined efforts of IRIAF, and Iran’s I-HAWK, HQ-2

and SA-5 SAM systems could convince the IAF to approach the target at lower altitudes. This would render them more

vulnerable to Iran’s AAA when close to the target.

Alternative strikes could be conducted by submarine launched cruise missile (unconfirmed capability) or conventionally

armed Jericho SSMs but neither is as well suited to destroying Iran’s underground complexes as the air launched GBU-

28. Israel’s sub-launched cruise missiles reportedly come in two flavors, the locally improved Harpoon Extended

Performance (HEP) that gives the Harpoon missile a secondary land-attack role. The HEP program reportedly includes a

GPS/upgraded INS, a two-way data link, and a cohesive radar seeker . The HEP has a short range so whilst it could be

used against coastal targets such as Bushehr, it is not viable against Arak, Natanz or Esfahan. The other SLCM is the

“Turbo Popeye” development of the air-launched Popeye missile, and which is widely speculated about but not

confirmed. The warhead of this system is thought to be nuclear which makes it a less likely choice.

If Esfahan were attacked instead of Natanz Israel would be better able to employ its wide range of stand-off low-

penetration munitions such as Popeye missile and JDAMs.

The main defense against Israeli strike is therefore not SHORAD, but deterrence in the form of Iran’s strategic missile

forces and to a much lesser extent, asymmetric warfare waged via Hezbollah or other Palestinian groups. In the

aftermath of an Israeli strike Iran might also be able to galvanize stronger and more proactive alliances with Arab states

allowing a widening of the conflict – an outcome Israel would presumably prefer to avoid. It follows that the threshold

for striking Iran is quite high for Israel, and it would prefer someone else (ie US) to do the task.

3.4.2 US strike The USAF B-2 Spirit Stealth bomber, armed with two Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) GBU-57B bombs is a threat

that, for the moment at least, Iran appears ill-equipped to directly counter. The 30,000lb MOP is purpose designed to

penetrate heavily buried structures. The bomb can penetrate between 7 and 60 meters of reinforced concrete or rock.

The B-2 can also carry the EGBU-28 ‘bunker buster’ which could also be used.

8 Operating from medium/high altitude the stealthy B-2 is virtually impervious to Iran’s SHORAD assets, even the

enhanced KS-19 100mm AAA. It is possible that Iran’s recently

acquired Russian Nebo radar systems or even the VHF modified

‘SPOON REST’ could provide warning of attack, but there would be

little that Iran could put up there which could effectively counter the

B-2. Scenarios where the B-2 is detected by Nebo and intercepted by

fighters with IR missiles, or fired at by SAMs, can be imagined, but

Iran’s SHORAD assets would not likely play a part. They could

attempt to intercept the incoming ordinance but this seems less

plausible considering the hard case of the MOP.

The US also has substantial quantities of Tomahawk cruise missiles

which can be fired from ships and submarines. These are effective against non-hardened targets including above ground

facilities at Esfahan and Natanz. Although the SA-15 system is capable of intercepting cruise missiles the US has a

substantial advantage in quantities and could target the SA-15 itself.

A USN destroyer launches a Tomahawk cruise missile. Source US DoD

3.4.3 Strike by Persian Gulf states

Whilst the overall military capability of the US backed Persian Gulf countries is often questioned, two

countries in particular have the means, on paper, to launch a credible strike against some of the softer targets

in Iran’s nuclear Program. As before the likelihood and politic dimension is not considered here.

B-2. Source Wikipedia

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Saudi Arabia has significant interdiction assets in the form of Tornado IDS strike aircraft, F-15S Strike Eagles

and Eurofighter Typhoons.

The UAE also fields an array of highly capable strike assets in the form of F-16s and Mirage 2000s. The latter

are equipped with the Black Shaheen cruise missile offering extended stand-off ranges and reputedly

incorporating radar cross-section reducing technologies to make them even harder to intercept.

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3.5 Equipment

Misagh-1 (QW-1) Iranian produces Chinese QW-1 shoulder launched SAM, which is itself influenced by both the Russian Igla-1 (SA-16) and

American Stinger. The system is in widespread use among Iranian forces and likely the most common MANPADS in

Iranian service. The system was first produced in China in mid 1990s. Typical operation involves a two-man team

although the system can be operated by a single person, or mounted on vehicles. The system uses an all-aspect cooled

IR seeker.

Source: Modlex

Specification

Diameter: 0.07m

Length: 1.477m

Operating attitudes : 30 > 4,000m

Effective range: 0.5 > 5km

Weight: 10.68 kg (16.5 kg w/launcher)

Warhead: 0.55kg HE Fragmentation

Misagh-2 (QW-1M) Chinese designed, Iranian produced MANPADS loosely

equivalent to Russian SA-18 GROUSE. This system is probably

the most lethal MANPADS in Iranian service. A step-

improvement over the QW-1, the QW-1M has improved

seeker, sights and general performance, particularly in high

ECM environments. The system is considered for the export

market only in China with Iran as the main customer – an

improved version, QW-18, has been sold to other countries.

The main external differentiator compared to the Misagh-1 is

the ‘T’ shaped battery.

Specifications:

Misagh-2. Source FARS

11 Length: 1.477m

Operating attitudes : 10 > 4,000m

Effective range: 0.5 > 5km

Weight: 12.3 kg (18 kg w/launcher)

Warhead: 0.55kg HE Fragmentation (TBC)

Vehicle-mobile twin pedestal mount. This configuration increases crew readiness and caries a larger battery. Source FARS

Sahand-3 / SA-14 GREMLIN (9K34 Strela-3) Russian supplied 1970s era MANPADS in service with

Iranian forces, locally produced as Sahand-3. Based on

SA-7 but featuring more advance seeker with limited

all-aspect capability, and general performance

improvements. Generally older and less capable than

Misagh series.

Specification

Length: 1.47m

Range: 4.1km

Altitude: 30m > 2.3km

Weight: 10.3 kg (16 kg w/launcher)

Warhead: 1.17 kg directed energy blast fragmentation

Other MANPADS Iran uses a multitude of legacy MANPADS, mostly acquired during the Iran-Iraq war. Although Iran, generally speaking,

possesses the industrial base to refurbish many of these types, their shelf-life and general obsolescence makes their

deployment increasingly scarce.

FIM-92 Stinger

SA-7 Grail

RBS-70 (TBC, widely reported)

Oerlikon GDF series 35mm AAA / Samavat (“Skyguard”) The foremost air defense gun employed by Iran, the type is less numerous than the ubiquitous Zu-23, but significantly

longer ranged and more effective. The type is generally capable against low altitude air threats although its effectiveness

SA-14 in Iranian service. Source MEHR

12 is reduced against small, stealthy or high speed targets such as cruise missiles – Iran is not reported (and not likely) to

have AHEAD ammunition now available for manufacturer supported operators for anti-missile defense.

Originally the system was deployed to paved fixed sites at Iranian air bases, but was also deployed to ‘field sites’ during

the Iran-Iraq war. More recently the fixed sites at air bases are usually empty, but the system is deployed in great

numbers to key nuclear facilities particularly Natanz, Arak, Parchin, Bushehr and Esfahan.

Specification:

Round: 35mm

Effective range (AA): 4km

Effective relative altitude (AA): 3km

Rate of Fire: 1,100 rds/min

Elevation: -5°/+92°

Traverse: 360°

Crew: 5 (min: 1)

Mobility: Towed mount, deployed to fire

Targeting: Super-Fledermaus or Skyguard

radar cuing with electro-optical and IR back-

up. Manual transverse and elevation.

Optical sights on-mount.

A camouflaged GDF cannon. This framed netting has been standard on the type

for many years among most operators but only recently seen in Iranian service.

Source FARS

Iran originally acquired GDF-001 systems with Fledermaus radars which

were primarily deployed to defend air bases. Iran later received 24

Skyguard systems, possibly with GDF-002 cannon. It is hard to estimate

Ground level view of Samavat site. Source ISNA

13 current inventory but the system is widely deployed, particularly to defend nuclear sites.

An Iranian copy of the GDF-002, known as Samavat, is being manufactured. Together with original and remanufactured

examples these are deployed in a seemingly mix-and-match fashion with little operational distinction between variants.

Samavat. Source FARS GDF cannon defending Natanz.

The generic Skyguard site layout used by Iran is approximately “A” shaped with the radar placed centrally and to the rear

of two gun emplacements. The radar and the gun positions are all raised in a manner often described as ramps. The gun

positions are surrounded by a low wall. Numerous tents, huts and bunkers are positioned on the site. Towed generators

and ammunition storage is located near the gun positions. Of course individual sites differ, but the composition and

approximate layout makes identification relatively easy.

The type is also often deployed in single-gun emplacements, though often with a radar. In these instances it is likely that

the radar used is the less capable Fledermaus type.

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Example Skyguard site near Esfahan seen in Google Earth. The basic layout can be identified.

This annotated view of part of the Esfahan defenses shows two Skyguard sites (top left).Also circled are other AAA sites

(Zu-23) illustrating the integrated layering of defenses typical at these sites.

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Skyguard Radar (source MEHR) Iranian made radar (FARS) Fledermaus radar (MEHR)

Oerlikon 35mm GDF cannon being towed with generator unit. Source ISNA

Training. Source MEHR Defending a strategic site, likely Arak. Source FARS

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Modified KS-19 100mm AAA Iran has a stock of obsolete Soviet KS-19 100mm anti-aircraft guns,

some likely captured from Iraq during the 1980s. These have

significantly greater range and altitude than more typical 23mm to

57mm AAA but a slower rate of fire and cumbersome transverse

and elevation making them generally inadequate against fast

moving targets.

Recently Iran has started a major upgrade program making these

fully-automated, both in target alignment and firing. A crew is still

required for reloading. With automated targeting and alignment far

greater accuracy should be obtainable, likely increasing effective

range and altitude. The system is still unsuited to “CIWS” type

employment but a useful stop-gap addition to Iran’s more capable SHORAD missile forces like SA-15 Tor deployed at

Natanz.

Specification

Effective range - 12km (est)

Rate of Fire - 15 rds/min

Elevation -3°/+85

Traverse - 360 degrees

Weight – 9.5 t

Typical battery layout is 4 guns in a line, with a command post and radar at rear. The exact radar employed has not been

identified but could be Skyguard or a local type.

Observers differ in assessing the operational deployment of this system. The most likely location is Natanz where an

outer ring of AAA has been added over the past few years with several sites fitting the KS-19-Mod’s footprint.

Upgraded KS-19. Source FARS

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Google Earth imagery of a suspected KS-19-Mod site near Natanz, and 3D model representation.

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Zu-23 23mm AAA The most common air defense gun in Iranian service is the Russian Zu-23 twin gun, which is also manufactured locally

and deployed in multiple sub-variants including automated versions. The baseline version is a towed configuration which

is deployed in static positions. Typically the system is optically targeted and only has voice communication with early

warning systems. The wheels are often removed when deployed in static positions.

Noted variants:

Baseline – twin cannon mounted on towed chassis with two road wheel. Optically sighted.

Mesbah – Automated twin mount with EO targeting and capable of integration with surveillance radars and IADS

networks.

Mesbah-1 – Automated 8-barral mount using Oerlikon GDF 4-wheel chassis. See separate entry.

Alternative automated arrangement with different EO sights and control box in place of seats.

‘Zu-23-1’ – Iranian Single barrel version. Seen on some vehicle mounts and also used by naval forces for small

craft.

‘Zu-23-6’ – Iranian six-barrel version. Possibly interim design leading to Mesbah-1 system. Not confirmed in

service.

Zu-23 deployed near strategic site. Source MEHR Zu-23 during training. Note rust. Source FARS

Vehicle configurations vary from the back of a truck, to bolted onto the top of an APC. Common configurations use

Toyota off-road pick-up trucks as a base.

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Zu-23 mounted on Toyota pick-up. Source FARS Zu-23-1. Source IRNA

Zu-23 fixed sites typically consist of a single crew-hut (often with a blue corregated roof making site hunting quite easy)

and elevated firing position. The firing position has a low wall or revettment around it and is accessed by a ramp. The

wheels are often removed if the gun is to be emplaced for any length of time.

Field deployment. Source FARS Zu-23-1. Source Modlex

Zu-23 mounted on Boragh APC hull. Source IRNA. Alternative mount. Source FARS

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Mesbah – 1 (Zu-23-8) 23mm AAA Recently deployed system using four Russian Zu-23 twin cannon (Afanasyev-Yakushev 2A14) mounted on a Swiss

Oerlikon GDF cannon mount which itself is locally produced as the Samavat. This system is one of several Iranian

sometimes described as a “Frankengun” as in Frankenstein’s monster due to it combining components from different

existing AAA systems to create a ‘monster’.

Described by the Iranian press as a “missile shield”, this system is often likened to the Chinese LD2000 or American

Centurion land based Phalanx CIWS (C-RAM) because of its autonomous nature and incredibly high rate of fire. Whilst

the last point is spot on, the gun mount is not stabilized and the round-to-round dispersion is likely very great compared

to other anti-missile systems. The Oerlikon mount is not designed to handle the torque these guns will generate due to

their dispersed arrangement.

Having said that, the system will all the same, likely be deployed as point defense against bombs and missiles for high

value targets. The positioning of the system will likely be much closer to the defended location than typical Zu-23 and

Skyguard sites which are placed on the perimeter.

Unlike most other Zu-23 systems in Iranian service the gun is fully integrated with surveillance and targeting radar which

is mounted on a towed cabin suitable for fixed site deployment. The system also includes back-up EO tracking and fire

control. The gun mount itself is fully automated.

Mesbah-1 Slotted-array radar system. Source FARS

Specifications

Effective Range – 3km (est)

Effective altitude - 2km

Rate of fire (cyclic) – 8,000 rds / min (some Iranian

sources say 4,000)

Rate of Fire (practical) – 800 rds in 6 seconds)

Mesbah-1. Source MEHR

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It appears that the system can be integrated with 35mm AAA to form a layered point-defense.

Zu-23-6 23mm AAA Not thought to be in widespread service, this mount

consists of 6 Afanasyev-Yakushev 23mm

autocannons mounted on a Russian 4-wheel chassis.

The configuration is likely very unstable when firing

due to torque caused by the wide placement of the

guns, resulting in a very high rate of fire but poor

accuracy.

Specification

Effective range - 2.5km

Effective altitude – 2km

Rate of fire (cyclic) – 6,000 rds / min

Rate of Fire (practical) – 600 rds

Zu-23-4 (Shilka) Iran has around 30 (some sources say 100+) Zu-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns

(SPAAG) providing point defense for maneuver forces. There are reports that Iran

produces these but it seems unlikely. The type can also be used in mountains and

built-up areas to provide high-angle direct fire support as demonstrated by the

Russians in Chechnya and Georgia. The tracked chassis is lightly armored and lacks air

conditioning. Technologically the system is now very dated but still considered a

credible threat to low-flying

aircraft and UAVs, particularly

helicopters.

Specification

Armament- 4 × 23 mm 2A7

autocannons with 2000 rds

Crew – 4

Effective range – 2.5km

Effective altitude – 2km

Zu-23-4. Source Iranmilitaryforum.com

Zu-23-4. Source IRNA

Zu-23-6. Source FARS

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Rapier Before the revolution Iran had planned to mass produce the Rapier system under license, but when the regime change

put paid to that only a small number of British assembled launchers had been delivered. The planned technology

transfer required for local production had not taken place. Unlike other systems it is not thought that any extra missiles

were delivered during the Iran-Iraq war.

Specification

Effective range – about 6km

Effective attitude – 3 km

Missile speed – Mach 2.5

Warhead – none

Iranian Rapier systems were the original “Mk 1” system

but with added ‘Blindfire’ tracking radars (sometimes

retrospectively described as FSA; Field Standard “A”). This

is essentially the same system that Britain used with modest (often over-stated) success in the Falklands war. However,

several design flaws were found and subsequent modifications made, in particularly to increase the range, the addition

of a warhead with proximity fuse. Iranian Rapiers however still use the non-warhead “Mk 1” missile that has to hit its

target to inflict any damage (a “hittle” not a “miss-ile”…). Iran has developed local production of missiles and possibly

fire units, but it is likely that the Rapier is not very widely deployed, not least because it is becoming obsolete, although

some degree of operational service remains, evidenced by the routine inclusion of the system in military parades and

recent live firing demonstrations. Relative to the Shahab Thaqeb (FM-80) program the Rapier is much shorter ranged

and has less modern electronics.

Iran experimented with a fully mobile Rapier system employing an all-terrain 8 wheel drive truck, with a distinctive

tandem stepped cockpit reminiscent of an attack helicopters on the left hand side of the vehicle. There were four

reloads in protective boxes on the back of the truck. It’s not clear if there was an additional search radar.

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Although this variant improved mobility it reduced the arc of

fire and for whatever reason does not appear to have made it

into production.

Rapier deployed with Oerlikon 35mm AAA as part of Skyguard. Note

that the Rapier launcher cannot function with the radome open like

this – None of the photos from this ‘demonstration’ suggest an

operational capability. Source: MEHR

FM-80/Shahab Thaqeb (Matra R440 Crotale) Iran had attempted to purchase the Crotale (Rattlesnake) short range SAM system from the French in 1985 but appears

to have been rebuffed. However, Iran subsequently purchased a number of FM-80 (HQ-7) Crotale short -range SAM

systems from China and more recently succeeded in reverse engineering the system under the Ya-zahra project. There is

speculation that Iran also captured French made Crotale units from the Iraqis, and it is possible that Libya, who also

operate Crotale and where allied to Iran in the 1980s also supplied equipment and/or technology.

The system, which differsfrom standard FM-80 in the coupling with the Oerlikon Sky Guard radar instead of the original

French surveillance radar, is often called Shahab Thaqeb although it is not clear whether this refers to the whole system,

fire unit or just the missile. It is also not clear what the operational status of either the Shahab Thaqeb/FM-80 systems is,

and for years it has been speculated that they are not in widespread use. However in 2010, under the new Air Defense

Force, the system was paraded in public and participated in major air defense drills finally confirming some degree of

operationalization.

It is possible that they are present at some known Skyguard sites but not conclusively identified in open source satellite

imagery. If this is the case, it is likely that a single launcher is attached to a Skyguard radar and two GDF series 35mm

cannon in a similar manner to Sparrow/Aspide SAM in other countries.

Specification

Effective Range – 12km

Effective altitude – 5km

Warhead – 13kg

Missile Speed – Mach 2.3

24

Shahab Thaqeb missile. Source Modlex

The Shahab Thaqeb uses autonomous tracking and Radio command to line of sight guidance. The system can control

two missiles in flight simultaneously, and engage 3 targets. Reaction time is about 6 seconds and maximum target speed

440 m/s. Media reports, collaborated by photographic evidence, suggest some degree of upgrade with additional

electro-optical sensors although the materiality of any increase in overall capability is unconfirmed.

The system is offered for export but no sales have been reported.

8 x 12.7mm Light AAA mount Some ZPU-4 14.5mm quad AAA mounts have been rebuilt to carry 8 DShK ‘Dooshka’ 12.7mm cannons. Although the

system has a phenomenal rate of fire, the manual aiming with basic “iron sight”, and small magazines limit its military

utility; despite a high rate of fire this system does not appear to offer any advantages over MANPADS or other HMG

systems.

ZPU-4 carriage retrofitted with 8 DShK 12.7mm machine guns. Sources: MEHR & FARS

Specifications

Effective range (AAA): 1.6km

Rate of fire: 4,800 rds/min (cyclic)

Elevation : +90 to -10

DShK 12.7mm Light AAA machine gun Iran mass-produces the DShK and it is standard fit to most Iranian built armored vehicles including MBTs, providing

reasonable anti-helicopter defense although it is generally insufficient against armored helicopter gunships such as the

Apache.

25

Specifications

Effective range (AAA) –

1.6km

Weight (gun only) – 32 kg

Rate of fire – 600 rds/min

Elevation (mounted) - -26

to +78

Other systems & notes Iran still operates limited numbers of ZPU-4 14.5mm quad AAA, and S-60 single 57mm AAA. Some self propelled ZSU-57-

2 57mm AAA may be in reserve.

Dated photo of IRGC S-60 AAA (background). The Missile TEL in the foreground is the SA-6 SAM. Source ISNA

Iran may have numbers of M1938 and/or Type-74 37mm AAA guns still in service. Additionally unmodified KS-19 100mm

guns may be in limited or reserve use.

DShK 12.7mm AAA. Source Modlex DShK. Source FARS

26 Iran experimented with using some form of MRLS as an ambush weapon against helicopters. This system does not

appear to have been successful and has not be seen since the press unveiling several years ago. Some observers

speculate that the system combined an MRLS rocket motor and launcher with a MANPADS missile seeker.

Iran also deploys SA-15 and SA-6 systems, which could be regarded as SHORAD, but which are covered in the IADS

section because of their deployments.

Reports that Iran was to receive some of Syria’s Pantsyr -S1E SAM systems have not materialized. Our current

assessment is that Iran does not operate this type.

Similarly, reports that Iran operates QW-2 MANPADS are in err, with confusion surrounding the identity of the Misagh-2

system which is in fact QW-1M not QW-2.

27

3.6 Notable defended locations

Iran deploys SHORAD assets as part of static defensives to several strategic targets, and has empty emplacements at

many more. Some sites date from the Iran-Iraq war, particularly on Islands and oil facilities along the Persian Gulf coast.

More recently the focus has been on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Generally speaking these AAA positions also provide

significant ground defenses against commando raids.

Natanz Nuclear Facility General coordinates: 33°43'30.81"N, 51°43'33.03"E

Uranium Enrichment plant

Natanz represents the singularly most densely defended airspace in Iran, and probably in the World.

Defenses form an inner-ring of closely-placed Zu-23 23mm AAA sites with Skyguard/35mm AAA sites to their front. Zu-

23 sites are placed at 300-400m intervals and Skyguard at 2,000-3,000m. These distances correspond to the effective

ranges of the respective systems and the pattern reveals that the radar-directed Skyguard systems are the primary

defense, with the Zu-23s representing a backstop.

An outer ring was later added consisting of 100mm AAA sites with 23mm AAA sites filling the gaps along a long

perimeter road approximately 10km out from the main facility. Identification of the 100mm AAA sites is not conclusive

and they may be another system such as Mesbah automated Zu-23s. No Mesbah-1 sites have been identified but it is

highly probable that one or more systems are now active there. If our understanding of the role of Mesbah-1 is correctly

understood, the system will be placed relatively close to the main facility to fire at incoming missiles and bombs. This

deployment pattern is overlaid by SA-6, SA-15 and I-Hawk SAM sites, the latter having their own Zu-23 23mm AAA sites.

There are several radar sites notably with at least three Russian supplied KASTA-2E2 systems at any point in time, which

are moved around periodically and mostly closely related to the SA-15 deployment but also likely providing general data

to other systems. At least one NEBO long range radar system is present, which too is moved around periodically.

The outer defensive ring does not extend into the mountains to the southwest of the site. In general defenses are most

dense on the East of the site and weakest on the southwest.

Google Earth analysis confirms the following chronology:

Feb 2003: early construction of site. Few/none AAA

Oct 2003: Still under construction. No AAA seen although main track for what is later "inner ring" is present.

Presumably this doubles as fence line for general security. Main underground complex now covered.

Jan 2004: Some single AAA positions, likely all Zu-23 23mm AAA around 'inner ring'. Some of these sites still under

construction at this stage. A couple of Skyguard sites added further out and some single 35mm sites added.

Feb 2004: Little change from above but AAA sites are generally more 'settled in'

July 2004: I-Hawk SAM site to north had been added. This is not a SHORAD system but forms part of the area-air-

defense of the site.

April 2006: Several of the AAA sites had been re-modeled, principally the Skyguard sites.

Sept 2006: A few more AAA sites found but no major evolutions. Watch towers have been added around inner AAA

ring.

28

May 2009: First of 5 SA-15 sites now visible. These sites appear Static. Outer ring of AAA added about 10km from

facility (incomplete coverage but confirmed to south-east of facility. Curiously helipads at NW corner of facility now

relocated to SE corner. I-Hawk SAM site to north still in use. Separate update of May imagery shows SA-6 SAM site

to west also.

July 2009: Imagery update covers eastern side of area showing SA-6 site on East, two more I-Hawk SAM sites,

occasional 100mm AAA sites and the 4th SA-15 site. Likely most of these are from 2006-9 period as per May 2009

imagery discoveries above.

Sept 2009 (2 updates): Extends coverage of outer ring, showing parts of western side.

Oct 2009. Confirms more of the Western outer ring showing large gap due to unfinished construction at that time.

March 2010. No substantial developments

Inner and outer SHORAD rings (white lines) in relation to integrated air defense sites.

Image: Google Earth

Arak Nuclear Facility General Coordinates: 34°22'23.49"N, 49°14'27.07"E

Heavy water plant and research reactor

SHORAD consists of inner perimeter of about 20 single Zu-23 23mm AAA sites and various 23mm and 35mm AAA sites

distributed along the adjoining ridge lines and valley floor. There are also two I-Hawk SAM sites on the high ground to

the north providing area-air-defense.

SHORAD site placement began in late 2003 and was substantially complete by 2009.

SHORAD sites:

4 x Skyguard sites (2 x 35mm AAA, radar controlled)

29 10 x 35mm AAA (single emplacements, often radar controlled)

38+ x Zu-23 23mm AAA (single emplacements. Typically optically controlled)

Image: Google Earth

Esfahan Nuclear Facility General Coordinates: 32°34'51.31"N, 51°49'36.10"E

The complex is partially buried with the main site on the south side of a mountain. Inner defenses primarily consist of a

string of Zu-23 23mm AAA sites along the perimeter track. There are 7 Skyguard 35mm AAA sites and 6 other single

35mm AAA sites.

SHORAD sites:

7 x Skyguard AAA sites each with two 35mm AAA guns

6 x single 35mm AAA sites, possibly with Fledermaus fire control radars

36 x Zu-23 23mm single gun emplacements

35mm AAA piece in raised platform. The camouflage net canopy is clearly visible. Source Google Earth.

30

Key: Orange diamond = Skyguard, Orange square = 35mm AAA, white square = 23mm AAA. Blue diamond = radar site

Bushehr Nuclear Site General Coordinates: 28°49'48.36"N, 50°53'38.68"E

Civilian application

nuclear reactor site under

construction for many

years,near the town of

Bushehr on the Persian

Gulf Coast. The town, a

few km NW of the site, is

also home to a large air

base, naval HQ and port,

which have their own

systems of air degenses

including SHORAD.

Bushehr’s SHORAD

consists of an inner ring

of Zu-23, with Skyguard

35mm AAA and single

35mm AAA sites in the

surounding area.

31

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END