Iran' s newspeak

8/23/2019 Iran' s newspeak

1/23

Islamic 'Newspeak': Language and Change in Revolutionary IranAuthor(s): Haggay RamReviewed work(s):Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Apr., 1993), pp. 198-219Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4283557 .Accessed: 01/08/2012 05:55

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toMiddle Eastern

Studies.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancishttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4283557?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4283557?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis


2/23

Islamic'Newspeak':Languageand Changein Revolutionary ranHAGGAY RAM

TheIranian evolutionof 1978-79,whichwassupportedbynearlyalltheideological rends nthecountry,religiousandsecular, sconsideredoneof themost mportant vents nthe modernhistoryof IranandtheIslamicworldat large.Although t gaverise to anIslamicregime,thisrevolutiondoubtlesswasaproductof the effortsof variousmovementsandgroups,manyof whichneither intendednorplannedto bringabout an 'IslamicRepublic'such as that which has taken shape in Iranduringthe pastdecade. The ascendancyof Ayatollah Khomeini'speople to powerfollowingthe demiseof the monarchical rder, markedthe end of theheterogeneouscoalitionwhich oppledtheancienregime.In the internalstruggleswhich ensued, the followersof ImamKhomeini's line havegraduallybeen able to deprivetheircounterpartsn the revolutionarymovementofvirtually llpoliticalpowerandconsolidate heirpositionasthe sole rulersof the 'new'Iran.Islamicrevolutionaryndoctrinationhas thereforebeen andstill is acrucialdevice for the solidificationof the new regime, a means forfosteringpopular upporton the one hand,andforsubduing he diverseoppositionmovements o theirruleon the other.The increasingaliena-tion and resentmentof manyIraniansowingto the regime'sfailure toresolve the mounting ocial andeconomicproblemsand,until1988,thelack of a significantbreakthroughn the war againstIraq, have onlyintensifieddomestic indoctrination o keep revolutionaryardor alive.Intensiveandeffective ndoctrination,writesD. Menashri, considerablyworked for the success of Khomeini's ollowers n the processof estab-lishing[their] nstitutionsand in supplantingheiradversaries'.'Variouschannels throughwhich political instruction s propagatedhave beeninstituted n Iransince 1979.Amongthese, the massmedia,the educa-tionalinstitutionsandeven the military stablishment the Revolution-aryGuards,the Basij(mobilization)units,andthe army arenotewor-thy. Fridaycommunal ermonsdelivered n differentcitieson a weeklybasiswere also institutionalized s majormodesof Islamicpersuasion.'Naturally,the employmentof Islamic deas andthemesby the Iranianregime s intended o advance ts ownpoliticalends of massmobilizationMiddle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No.2, April 1993, pp. 198-219PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON


3/23

ISLAMIC NEWSPEAK' N IRANandregimesupport.Itseffectiveness,however,stems not so muchfromthe regime'sconstancy,as from the strongreligioussusceptibilitiesofmost Iraniansand theirattachment o the ulama.Indeed,the profounddevotion of the popular classes in Iran to Islam cannot escape theattention of the Iranianregime, which, in turn, utilizes it for its ownpurposes.This articlewill examine how the regime is seeking to enhance itslegitimacywithin Iranby employingcertainIslamic erms n its politicalrhetoric.The basicassumptions thatlanguage s dynamicandflexible,its expressiveness an be intensifiedor diminishedby circumstances.notherwords,underconditionsof socialchangethe meaningsand inter-pretationsof culturallyfamiliarwords tend to be modified as eachgeneration reinterprets he past in terms of its currentpremisesandvalues.As A. Ayaloncontends,'Languagemirrors ts speakers'under-standingof theirculture,theirpast, and theirpresent. As the "cycle"movesandthe historical ituationchangesso does language.New wordsare coined, old wordsacquirenew meanings,theirintellectualor emo-tional "loadedness" accumulating or waning.'3The terms whichI intendto examinein a historicalcontextmay begrouped n twocategories.First,termswhicharedesignedto depictanddefinethecharacteristics,onstituentsand virtuesof the Islamicregime.Representingthis group are the terms velayat,Imam, and hokumat.Although the origins of the term 'republic'(jomhuri)are traced toWesterncivilization, hemeaning t hasacquirednpost-Pahlaviranwillalsobe analyzedunder hiscategory.4The secondgroupare termswhichthe Islamicregimeemploysas rhetoricalweaponsaimed at discreditingthe government'salleged internaland external opponents. The twoQuranic ermsmunafiqun nd ihadwillbeexaminedunder hiscategory.The terms n bothgroupswerenotchosenat random. The headsof the[Iranian] egimerepeatedly tressthe identitywhichexists,intheirview,betweentherevolutionand Islamon the one hand,andtheopponentsofthe revolutionandthe unbelieverson the other.'5Followingmyexamina-tion of several political speeches and declarations ssued by Iranianspokesmen ince1979,Ihave come to the conclusion hat,quantitatively,both groups representthe most commonlyused and defined Islamicterms n thegovernment's ampaign f distinguishingetween us'(Islamor Iran)and 'them'(unbeliefor Iran's nternaland externalenemies).Thesourcesusedforthearticleare variouswritings nddeclarations ykey Iranianspokesmenand leaders, but my main focus is on Fridaycommunal sermons (khutbas) delivered in Iran since 1979. Specialemphasis s laidonFriday ermonsbecause heyhaveemerged,followingthe ousting of the Shah, as the most important element in the Iranian

199


4/23

MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESmass media, designed to expound and legitimize the policies of theIslamicgovernment.As P. Chelkowskiexplains,

[T]hough radio, television, and newspapers are the mouthpieces ofthe Islamicgovernment,majorpoliticalpronouncements nd con-demnationsare made at Fridaycommunalprayers hroughout hecountry,often making ocal Fridayprayer eaders morepowerfulthanthe provincialgovernors.6THE DIVINELY ORDAINED GOVERNMENTThe extensive iteraturealreadygeneratedbythe IslamicRevolutionhasshownhowthe revolutionarymovement n Iranmadesophisticateduseof Shiite sentiment n order to further heir cause. Hence theiremploy-mentof the most evocative hemesof Shiite Islam.Indeed,bycalling heShah 'Yazid',and, conversely, by equatingthe struggleof the Iranianpeople with that of the martyredImamHusayn,the clericsmade thebelieversunderstandwhere theirobligations ay.The very samethemeswere reactivated ollowingthe ascendancyofKhomeini'speople to power. With the increasing challengesby thedomesticoppositionandof war withIraq,these themeshelpedto unitethe massesagainst nternaland externalenemies. Butuponthe removalof the Shah'sregimeandthe establishment f an Islamicgovernment,anew discoursewas also required.The clerics were now called upontolegitimizeandperpetuate heir new politicalorder, in addition o theireffortto keep aliverevolutionaryeal against he new'Yazidof the age'(the Iraqi eader,SaddamHussein)andother'enemiesof Islam';hencetheir appealto other Shiitemotifsand, more specifically, o culturallyfamiliarterms, designedto portraythe new regime'sself-proclaimedcharacteristics ndvirtues.

Velayat wilaya nArabic) sperhaps hemostbasictermemployedbythe Islamicgovernment n order to depict its self-proclaimed harac-teristics andvirtues.This termis a derivativeof the Arabic root w-l-i,which literallymeans 'to be near or close'. But it also acquiredthefollowingmeanings: o govern,to rule,andto protect.7 nshort,velayat,as it appeared n the Quran,the hadithandthe earlyliterature,came to'denote, respectively, he rulerandthe exercise of rule.'8In twelver-Shiism,he rightto assumethe velayatexclusivelybelongsto the Prophet,and after him to the Imams.In this respectthe mostinnovativeaspectof the politicalsystemdevisedbyAyatollahKhomeiniis hisdoctrineof theivelayat-efaqih, hichprovides or theestablishmentof the ulama as the supreme politicaland legal authority n the state.

200


5/23

ISLAMIC NEWSPEAK' N IRANThus, Khomeiniproclaimed,the ulama are 'the legitimaterulers(al-hukkamal-haqiqiyun)and authoritymust be in their hands.'9Yet,velayat,according o the Islamicregime,acquiredan additional ignifi-cance- beyondthatof the officeandthe functionof government,or theexerciseof stateauthority.By velayat,Khomeiniandhisdiscipleshaveinmind the functionof overseeingandsupervisinghe implementation fthe Sharia(the Divine Law) as well. Velayat,therefore, also means'guardianship'r 'trusteeship'.Thevelayatwhich s granted o thefaqihby the Imam',Khomeiniexplainedin February1979in most generalterms, 'is for fulfillingour sacredduty, which is the preservationofIslam.'10

In his famoustracton the natureandfunctionof Islamicgovernment,Velayat-eFaqih(1971),Khomeiniassigned heofficeof thevelayat o thedoctorsof the Holy Law(fuqaha)collectively.Nevertheless,article107of the 1979constitution f theIslamicRepublic,whichgrantedKhomeiniexclusivepowers o thispost, totallychanged hepurportandmeaningofvelayat.It is true, the constitutiondefinedthis position as a 'leader'(rahbar).However, we must bear in mind that so long as Khomeiniserved as the single and supreme aqih, the office of the velayatwasoccupiedbya charismatic ersonality bya manwhowas called'Imam'.Thecontentof numerousFriday ermons aithfully eflect hisvenerationtowardsKhomeini- or what Weber defined as 'the appearanceof apersonalsaviour'1 and by implication,the new meaningof velayat.First,Khomeiniwasplacedin the samerankwiththe Prophetof Islamsince,asone prayer eader(Imam-eJom'eh)putit, 'bothareresponsiblefor the revivalof faith andhumanity',andfor 'awakeninghe depressedpeople(mardom-ekhofteh)'. Within hisframework f equationsof theProphetwithKhomeiniwas theassessmentwhereby dentical rendsandcircumstancesn thelives of thetwohad edto therevolutionsunder heirleadership.Forinstance,someprayereadersspokeof theProphet'sandof Khomeini's emigration' hijrat) the firstfromMeccato Medina in622,and thelatter romIran o Turkey andlaterto Iraq) n 1964- asthepreconditionorthe subsequent riumphantIslamicRevolutions'undertheircommand.Both hadto live in exile only to return n lateryearstooverthrowheexistingorder.Indeed,theyconcluded,a 'revolutionsnotpossible'without a prior 'emigration',as the experienceof the Prophetand Khomeiniclearlyillustrated.13Second, Khomeini was frequentlyequatedwith the main heroes ofShiiteIslamand, particularly,with the Imams.Variousprayer eadersconstantlymaintainedhatdisbelief nKhomeini s, ineffect,disbelief nthe Imams.'4Furthermore,hey often concluded hatthe 'linkbetweenthe HiddenImamandthe Islamicnationof Iran s maintainedbythe ...

201


6/23

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESImam[Khomeini].'15ne of the membersof the Assemblyof Guardianseven impliedthatthe velayat-e aqihwas in factthe Hidden Imam: TheIraniannation',heannounced, knows hat all theofficials n thecountryaredependenton thevelayat-efaqih,hatis, the Vali-ye Asr[theHiddenImam].'6 Moreover,the victoryof the IslamicRevolutionwasregardedby many prayer eadersas the result of a joint enterpriseby Allah andKhomeini. Allah, it was argued, bestowed his grace (lotf) upon theIranianpeople, while Khomeini awakenedthem from their 'negligentsleep' (khab-eghaflat).'7Finally,the velayat-eaqih was describedas acatalyst or the returnof the HiddenImam.'8Hence in Weberian erms,the velayatwasreinstated n the handsof a manpossessingsupernaturalandsuperhumanpowers- as was the case in the age of the immaculateImams.

Indeed,most sermonsreferred o Khomeiniplainlyas 'Imam'withoutcalling him by name. Thus, when prayerleaders wished to turn theattentionof their audiences o topicswhichwere discussedbyKhomeini,they usuallyannounced hat 'the Imamsaid' or the 'Imamcommanded'(this or that). It is possible that by calling Khomeini 'Imam'prayerleaders had in mind the conventionalmeaningof religiousleader orprayereader.Nevertheless, t seemsthat,withregard o Khomeini, heyhaveexpanded he useof the termbeyond ts commonmeaning o implythathe was of the samerankof the eleven'rightful' uccessorsof Ali, thedivinelyappointedguidesof the Shiitecommunity,orperhapsof the lastImamwhois to return romoccultationas the expectedmessiah.Withinthiscontext,M. Fischer nformsus that on the eve of Khomeini's eturnto Iran in 1979'Thiswaiting or the returnof the marja'-ye aqlid ed toelaborationsof similaritiesbetween 'Imam'Khomeini andthe awaitedTwelfthImam,who willusheranera of justicebefore finaljudgment."'Inanycase it seemsthatthe abstention romreferringo Khomeinibynamewaspremeditated,n orderto create anindirectequationbetweenthe Imams andKhomeini,or at least betweenthe Imams'decreesandthoseof Khomeini.Indeed,the apparent quationof Khomeiniwith theHidden Imam cited above may lead to this conclusion,as well as thefollowingdeclarationmadebyMohammedYazdi: Thevelayat-efaqihsexercised odayby... aloftyperson,who hasturned he IslamicRepublicof Iran nto the governmentof the Imamat.'2"o sumup, on accountofKhomeini'sproclaimedqualities, heoffice of the velayat-efaqihametopersonifythe imageof the Imam,as it was interpretedby the late AliShariatiand his followers:

Accordingto the followersof Shariati,an Imam is a charismaticfigurewho arises out of the peopleandexpressesthe generalwill.

202


7/23

ISLAMIC NEWSPEAK' N IRANFor Shariati himself this is only a translationof the traditionaltheological erm,Imam, nto the Weberian ociologicalcategoryofcharismatic eader.2'

Anothertermwhichwasfrequently mployedbytheIslamicregime norder to depict its constituentsand virtues is hokumat. This term is aderivativeof theArabicrooth-k-m,originallymeaning wisdom',andbyextensionto pass judgment,to adjudicate, o haveauthority, o govern,to rule and to command.In its politicalconnotation,hokumat(or itsArabicequivalent,hukuma)has, since the nineteenthcentury,becomethe most commonwordfor 'government'.22In conformitywith the generalIslamicdoctrine,the Islamicregimerecognizes heabsolute egitimacy f onegovernment hokumat) thatofGod. As Khomeiniwrote in 1943, 'the only governmentthat reasonacceptsas legitimateandwelcomesfreelyandhappily s the governmentof God....'23 According o the politicaltheoryof the Shia, the Prophetand the Imamsalonehadall legitimaterule as God'sdeputieson earth,divinelyprotectedagainst in anderror.Thus,with the occultationof theTwelfthImam Muhammadal-Mahdi n 874, all legitimateexercise of

power disappearedromtheworld.Hence alltemporalgovernments reirredeemablyusurpatory, ven those of formalShii affiliation.Inpractice,however,the Shia have beenwillingto accorda degreeoflegitimacyo anystatethatattempted o governaccordingo Islam,sincethe politicalorderof the Imamwas viewedasan unattainabledeal in hisabsence.As S. Akhaviexplains,To besure,thegovernment f theImam sheldupasanexample otry to approximate,but there is no illusionthat the ideal can berealized.In the absenceof the Imam,therefore,twelverShi'ismaccepts he existenceof atemporal uleras anecessity ororderandprosperity, even if it denies his legitimacy in the ultimate sense.24

Thus, in the aftermath of the ConstitutionalRevolution in Iran(1905-11), a substantialnumberof ulamawereprepared o endorsetheconstitutionalmonarchyas an acceptableform of government.In theabsence of the Imam, they argued, a Western-styleconstitutionmayensurethatlegislationdoes not runcontrary o the laws of Islam.It willalsoprovide or thepresenceofjustmojtahedsntheassemblywho wouldensurethat all legislationconformsto the Sharia.25Ayatollah Khomeini himself did not offer a form of governmentalternative o the constitutionalmonarchyuntil a relatively ate stageinhiscareer.Whilehe never refrainedromcriticizing ndcondemninghepoliciesof theShah,heviewed theinstitutionof monarchy s a relatively

203


8/23

MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESlegitimateform of government n the absence of the Imam.In fact, hischiefconcernwas to enforcethe constitutionof 1907whichgrantedtheulamathe authority o overseelegislation,not to abolishthe monarchy.'Accordingto Article 2 of the SupplementaryConstitutionalLaw',Khomeinirepeatedlycomplainedn the 1960s, no law is validunlessthemojtahedsxerciseasupervisoryole inthemajlis.From hebeginningofthe constitutionalperioddown to the present, has any mojtahedeverexercisedsupervision?'26From the end of the 1960spoliticalunrestandsocial tensions'helpedKhomeinireverse the officialShia attitudeof acquiescence,and recap-ture[whathe believedto be] theearlyImams' piritof revoltagainst he"unrighteous"government'.27The relative legitimacy he had oncegranted the monarchywas, henceforth,null and void. The despoticnatureof the government,Khomeiniconcluded, made nugatory anyeffortto enforcethe constitution,andconsequently he Sharia.Monar-chy, therefore,came to be regardedas the antithesisof an acceptableform of governmentin Islam; as a corruptand oppressiveform ofgovernmentwhich kill[s] slam nthe nameof faithandtheProphet'." nshort, monarchy, accordingto Khomeini, had become 'the greatestdisaster hat befellIslam',evengreater thanthe tragedyof Karbalaandthe misfortune hat befell the Lord of the Martyrs ImamHusayn]....'2Thegovernmental lternativeo themonarchywasfound n an'IslamicGovernment'Hokumat-eslami),as it existed nthebeginning f Islamin the daysof the ProphetMuhammad nd ImamAli. 'TheidealIslamicregime',Khomeiniannounceda few daysafterhis triumphant eturn oIran, 'is the regime which was headed by Muhammad ... and Ali....'"Ayatollah Taleqani(d. 1979)explainedthe essence of such a govern-ment, contrastingt to a monarchy.LikeKhomeini,he announced hatthe idealgovernment xisted in thedaysof theProphetand theFirstShiiImamAli. And he added:

This governmentbegan sufferingfrom defects (naqsha) in theperiodof the first[three]caliphs.After themcame thecaliphateofAli which was exemplary. After Ali all Islamic governmentsdeviated[fromthe straightpath], because the rulersturnedtheminto ahereditary ossession, hat s, theyestablishedarulebasedonthe predominanceof [one] family.In SaudiArabia,for example,there exists a governmentof one family.... FromthestandpointofIslam, this government is non-Islamic.... An Islamic governmentdoes notmeanthesovereignty hakemiyyat)ofone family]over...[the] people. Sovereigntybelongsto Allah only....3'Hence amonarchybasedon 'hereditary ossession' s forbiddennIslam,

204


9/23

ISLAMIC NEWSPEAK' N IRANinasmuchas it usurps he sovereigntyof God over the governmentandthepeople.Numerous ermons ince 1979haveprovidedmoreexamplesof the alleged oppositionbetween monarchyand the Islamicgovern-ments of the the Prophetand Ali. Thisis, for example,how Montazeriexpressedhimselfin a sermonhe delivered n October1979:

Thegovernment f theCommander f the Faithful i.e., ImamAli]... was not a form of monarchy. n a monarchyherulersseize thepropertyof theirpeople,and if theywishto do so, they maysimplydisposeof the people. Moreover, n a monarchywe findpalaces,servants ... and all sorts of luxuries which are paid for from thenationalbudget.However,if we consider he form of governmentwhich Aliinstitutedwedonot findsuchthings.TheCommander fthe Faithfulruledover a vast countrywhichincluded,amongitsotherprovinces,Egypt,IranandArabia.Yet he lived as a humbleand a simple man. ... This man who ruled over a vast land used towear a torn and timeworngarb.32

Inshort,monarchy,accordingo the Islamicregime,issynonymouswithdespoticandarbitraryule,whereas he governmentof the ProphetandtheFirstImam the idealform of governmentn Islam denotesjusticeandequaldistribution f wealth.Yet, even in the very last stagesof the struggleagainstthe Shah nounanimousagreement existed among the senior IranianAyatollahsconcerning he typeof governmentpreferred n Iran.Amongthe latterthere were those who dissociatedthemselves from Khomeini'scall toestablish an Islamic government. For instance, Ayatollah KazemShari'atmadarid. 1986)maintained hat 'anIslamicgovernment n thepresentage is a Utopia'.33Althoughhe was quotedas sayingthat 'thepeople aspireto overthrow he autocraticand colonialregime [of theShah] ... and establish an Islamic government ...',4 it is clear that hisultimategoalwas muchdifferent. Ourobject',he repeatedlyargued, isto establish a free country,where men and women are free.... Thestruggle,therefore,is for the practicalenforcementof the Iraniancon-stitution[of 1907].'35 hus Shari'atmadariemained oyal to the tradi-tional political outlook of the ulama earlier in twentieth-century Iran,whomaintained hata constitutionalmonarchywhichrestricts he auto-cratic endenciesof the kingis thedesirable ormof government o longas the Imam s in occultation.In the aftermathof the resistanceperiod,however, it becameclear that Khomeini'sviews prevailed;an Islamicgovernmentwasestablishedon the ruinsof the monarchy.On 30 and31 March1979,a plebiscitewasheld in Iran in whichthe

205


10/23

MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESvoters 'wereasked to approvea singleproposal o replace he monarchywith an Islamicrepublic'.36 n 1 April, followingthe countingof thevotes, Khomeiniproclaimed he establishmentof an IslamicRepublic,andstated: TheSatan[monarchy]s buried; hisis the firstdayof God'sgovernment. '37The term 'IslamicRepublic'(Jomhuri-yeslami)was firstutteredbyKhomeini in October1978, upon his arrival o Paris from his exile inIraq.38 ntil thenKhomeinihadremainedambiguousn clarifyingwhathe actuallymeantby Islamicgovernment.When asked, for example,'what is your political program,and what type of governmentwillsubstitute thatof theShah's]?',he replied: Our deal is the formationofan Islamic tate.... As a first tagewe have toestablishagovernmenthatwill meet the basic needs of the nation.'39During his stay in Paris,however, he was alreadypreparedto declare that a republicwas hischosen alternative o the monarchy.He explained:

By republic,I meanthe sametypesof republicswhichexist inothercountries.Thisrepublic,however, s basedon a constitutionwhichis Islamic.... [Beyondthat]the regimewillbe a Republic ust likeone anywhereelse.4Upon his returnto Iran on 31 January1979, Khomeiniresumedhiscampaignor anIslamicrepublic.By now,however,he wasalreadyableto definetheuniquenessof the republiche had in mind.'Thenation',hesaid, 'wantsan IslamicRepublic;not just a republic;not a democraticrepublic,andnot a democratic slamicrepublic.'41What, then, is the significanceof this republic,andwhy was it per-ceived asanalternativeo theconstitutionalmonarchy?According o themost generaldefinitions,a republicmay be: any regimein which thegovernmentscarried,at leastnominally,bythepeopleorthrough heirelectedrepresentatives, nd,moresignificanto the caseof Iranand theIslamicrevolution,a non-hereditaryorm of government.These twocharacteristicsclarify why Khomeini and his disciples chose therepublicanas theirpreferred ormof government:a republic,in theirview,meantthegoodof thewhole, incontrast o thehereditary,despoticformof monarchy,whichmakes hegoodof thesovereign,orof oneman,the only object of the government.A. Ayalon writes that followingthe emergenceof variousforms ofrepublics n the Muslimworld, 'Manya Muslimtook partin the livelycontroversy bouta republic's bility o be truly"Islamic".'42ranwasnoexception. Indeed, since 1979 several Iranianfigureshave providedample argumentsto prove that the twofold term ('Islamicrepublic')meant no necessarycontradiction that an Islamic republic,where

206


11/23

ISLAMIC NEWSPEAK' N IRANgovernments God'salone, is, infact,agovernment f thepeopleandforthepeople.Consider hefollowingwordsof Hojjatol-IslamKhamenehi:

Not only is a governmentof God not incompatiblewitha govern-ment of the people (hokumat-emardomi), but it is the mosteloquentmeansof safeguardinghe participation f the people inthe administration f the affairs.In an Islamicsocietythe ruler iselected in accordancewiththeconfidenceof thepeople.Intheearlydaysof Islamthe personwho was elected to be a ruler, take theProphet [for example], enjoyed the confidence of [all] thepeople.... All the people in that societywere believersand theyaccepted Islam.... [Also in our society] the leader ... is anindividualwho is acceptedby the decisivemajorityof the people.Hence,whentheleader... wieldspower... [itactuallymeansthat]the decisivemajorityof the people have the last word.

The sameholds,Khamenehi ontinued,withrespect o legislation.In anIslamicsociety,he said, laws areenacted in conformitywithIslam;andsince the people profess Islam, they 'acceptwhateverconformswithIslamandrejectwhatever s not'. Thepeople, therefore,have a share nthe executive and the legislativebranches.In short,as in the daysof theProphet, thegovernmentof the IslamicRepublic s a governmentof thepeople ... the governmentof the people'svoice'.43To sumup, it seemsthat the Iranian egime'sviews on anIslamicrepublic argelycorrespondwith those of the renownedPakistani hinkerAbul 'Ala Mawdudi d.1979).Indeed,approximately decadebeforethe Islamicrevolution nIran, twas he who claimed hat 'inIslam,wheregovernmentandlawareGod'sonly,eachmemberof thecommunityhas a share ntheCaliphate;hence the Caliphate is not an individual but rather a communalmatter....'44

Notwithstandinghe Islamicregime'ssomewhatapologeticviews onthe issue, the questionstill remainswhichsovereignty that of God orthat of the people - is preferred n Iran'sIslamicrepublic.Numerousdeclarationsssuedbythe Islamicregime llustrate,byimplication,whichof thetwosovereigntiesssuperiornitsview.Consider, orinstance, hefollowingwordsof Khomeini(December1980):

The preservationof the IslamicRepublic s a divinedutywhichisabove all other duties.Thisdutyis even moreimportant hanthepreservation f the [Hidden]Imam,because even the Imamof theage (Imam-e 'Asr) will sacrificeeverythingfor Islam. All theprophets ... were sent in order to preserve God's words ... Islam is

207


12/23

MIDDLEEASTERN STUDIESa divinegrace.... Thepreservation f Islam s anindividual bliga-tion (vajeb-e eini).45

Thusthe ultimategoal is not to preserveor protectthe individualandsociety; it is to promote and enforce God's given laws. Indeed, thesovereignty f thepeopleisvaluable,but tsfunctionsmerely nstrumen-tal. This is to say, onlyif it advances he divinelawis it accepted; f not,there snovalue to thelife of theindividual o longas the Shariascarriedout in practice.This also accounts or the repeatedargument n Fridaysermonswhereby obedienceto the laws andregulationsof the govern-mentis a religiousobligation vajeb-edini),andtheirviolation s a sin'.4In the beginningof the revolutionaryperiodin Irana Westernjour-nalistrightlyobservedthat 'theIraniandissidentsaremakingextensiveuseof religious ymbolism nd idiomasmeans orexpressingopposition,since they are devoidof other modes of protest'.47However, after thevictoryof the 'dissidents'and the ascendancyof Khomeini'speople topower,Islamic ymbolism nd diomcontinued o playanimportant ole,particularlyn the constructionandlegitimization ampaignof the newpoliticalregime.In viewof theprofound eligiosityof theIranians,t was

onlynatural hatthe Islamic egimeshouldattempt osanctifytself ntheeyes of the masses by definingits constituentsand virtueswith suchculturally amiliar terms as velayat,Imamand hokumat.Likewise, itseemed naturalfor the Islamic regime to ascribe to their preferredjomhuri a notion whichwas absent romtheMiddleEast until ts recentimportation nto the area - Islamicqualities, so as to adapt it to theculturalexperienceof Shiite Iran.

THE OPPONENTS OF THE IDEALThecampaign o assertthe legitimacyof the Islamicgovernmentn Irancame hand in hand with renewed efforts on the part of the Iranianleadership o maintain he revolutionaryervorof the people in the faceof internaland external threats to the stabilityof the regime. In otherwords,justasShiitethemesandtermshavebeenutilized orstrengthen-ingallegiance oclericalrule,sohaveotherculturallyamiliarhemesandtermsbeeninstrumentalnthecampaignocondemn heallegedenemiesof the Islamicregime.ThemostcommonQuranic ermemployedbythe Islamicgovernmentinorder odenounce tsalleged nternal nemies smunafiqun.Thiswordis directed in the Quran against those in Medina whose faith, loyalty anddedication Muhammad could not completely trust. The meaning of

208


13/23

ISLAMICNEWSPEAK'N IRANmunafiq n the Quran s 'a waverer'and 'a doubter',while the conven-tional translationto 'a hypocrite'suits only a few verses.4 AnotherQuranicportrayalof suchpeople is those in whose hearts'is a disease'(2:9), asopposedto theMuslimswho are firmand resolute n theirfaith.The munafiqunn the Prophet'sage werenot a homogeneousgroup:some becameenthusiastic dherentsof the newreligion,onlyto abandonit lateron, some, no doubt,remainedpagans,andmanymoreremainedskepticalor half-committedo the Prophet'scause. They are thereforedepicted n the Quranasthosewho 'saywith their mouthswhat is not intheirhearts' 3:164).Becauseof their ndecisivenessheysometimes ointhe Prophetand sometimeshis enemies- and all for practicalreasons.They disregardall the obligationsof the true believers,and utter evilremarksabout the Prophetand his companions.In short, they are notbetter than the unbelievers,andthereforetheywill roast in 'the lowestdepthsof the fire'(4:145).The Islamicregimerefusesto distinguishbetween the variousgroups,organizations ndpersonswhichoppose the revolution.In its view, allare the 'enemies of God' and are grouped under one category asmunafiqun.Hence prayerleaders feel free to ascribe to organizationssuch as the Mujahidin-eKhalqthe title Munafiqun-eKhalq,and styleothers(suchasPeykar,Jabheh-yeMelli,andtheSAVAK)asmunafiqun,without makinga distinction between the structural, deological andother differencesbetweenthem.49The versionspresentedin sermonsconcerningthe activities of themunafiqun suallycorrespondo thetraditional ccounts.Morefascinat-ing, however, s howprayer eadersequatetheearlymunafiqunwiththeinternal nemiesof theIslamicregime.Prayereadersusuallycommencebyexamininghe characteristicsf theearlymunafiqun ndconsequentlypointattwomajorgroups: he firstarethemunafiqunwho didnotacceptthe newreligionfrom the outset,butembraced t outwardly darzaher)because heywerecompelled o do so;and thesecond arethemunafiqunwho became zealousadherentsof the Prophet,but on accountof hard-ships and afflictions ater abandoned Islam. Having establishedthis,prayereaders henturn omaketheaforementionedquation,andthis show it is usuallydone:

In our own society too, there were the [same] two groups [ofmunafiqun]. omehadnofaith .. fromthebeginning,not inIslam,not in Islamicgovernment,not in the IslamicRepublic,andnot itthe Imam [Khomeini]. These [people] ... had fled Iran [because]... the Islamic government did not take them into account....There were also some who had faith in Islam and in the Islamic

209


14/23

MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESRepublicfrom the beginning,but [because]of covetousness[and]hearts overflowing with personal desire ... they joined the ranks ofthe munafiqun.5'

The equationof the early munafiqunwiththe regime'scontemporaryenemies fulfillsanimportantunction ormass-mobilizationurposes.Itis partof a broadereffortmadebythe Islamicregimedesigned o depictthe IslamicRevolutionand the IslamicRepublicas a realizationof theProphet'sdivine mission, as a resumptionof Muhammad's o-calledIslamicRevolution.Tothisend,prayereadersrepeatedlyargue hatthefeatures,achievementsand leadershipof Iran'sIslamic revolutionareidentical o those of theProphet's evolution.5Thus,notonlyare thetworevolutionsdenticalbuttheiropponentsareidenticalaswell- both aremunafiqun.Accordingly,the contemporarymunafiqun,as one prayerleaderputit, 'resist hedivinemissionof ournation,'andwillcommit hemost despisedcrimes:Thecursedmunafiqun,heunbelievers,haveburnedabusbecauseof their unfathomablehatred towardthe people of God (khalq-eAllah). In this manner heycaused hemartyrdomshahadat) f...a baby.... Themunafiqun redetermined o slaythe nationof theoppressed. We must say to [them]: you will never succeed indeviatingusfromthepathof Islam.O munafiqun!wewillcontinueto cherishIslam.52

Consequently,the crimesof the neo-munafiqun,according o manyprayer eaders,provethattheyrejectIslam,or, moreprecisely, hattheyseek to 'exterminate slamandtheQurannthenameof Islam,theQuranand the Nahj al-Balaghah[the sermons, sayingsand letters of ImamAli]'.53 This fact- the concealment of their hostility toward Islam- makesthe newmunafiqunhe mostdangerous nemiesof theIslamicRepublic,equalto theirpredecessorsntheageof theProphet,whosaid'with heirmouth what is not in their hearts'. Considerthe followingwords ofKhamenehi:When the enemydeclareshisanimosityopenly, it is rathereasytoresist him. But when the enemy, like Mamun the 'Abbasid,pretends o be a devoutMuslim, hen it isverydifficult o recognizehim as your enemy. In our age ... we are seeing [people] whopractice deceit and hypocrisy (hileh va-nefaq).... [Shahpur]Bakhtyar ... was an agent and a slave of imperialism, but hepresentedhimselfas a manwho supports he nationandIslam.Inreality, however, he operated againstthe nation and sought toweakenit fromwithin.... It was extremelydifficult o knowand

210


15/23

ISLAMIC NEWSPEAK' N IRANrecognize this act]. TodaymanyBakhtyars ursueoppressionandexploitation,but tell the people that they supportIslam.54

Thusthe new (justas the old) munafiqun reworsethanthe infidels;the latter,atleast,openly proclaim heirobjectionto Islam.55herefore,Allah decreedthat the believers[theIranianpeople]wagewar[againstthem] to the bitter end.'56Moreover, in view of the fact that theirhypocrisymakes t difficult o discover hem,all areobligedto handovertheirmunafiqun elatives o the authorities:Those fathersandmotherswhose childrenare munafiqun,or those childrenanddaughterswhoseparentsaremunafiqun,will not be consideredbelievers .. if theyrefrainfromhanding hemover to the RevolutionaryCourts.'57n anycase, thenewmunafiqunmustknowthateventually hey,justlike theirpredeces-sors, will be defeatedby Islam:'O munafiqun!'Rafsanjaniannounced,'the strengthof the thirty-sixmillion members of the Party of God(Hezbollah)will reduceyouto ashes;youwillcompletelydisappearromthe pages of history.'58Theeight-yearwarbetweenIranandIraqprovided ranampleoppor-tunityto characterizehe Iraqiregimeanditshead,SaddamHussein,asmunafiqun.Thus the term was also employed againstIran'sexternalIslamicenemies,again,for thesakeof equating he conflictwiththeearlywarsof Islamagainst he apostatesandthe infidels.This is to say,justasthe munafiqun ought 'to deceive the Prophetand lead his followersastray,so does Saddamadornhimselfwith theplumesof Islam,while allhisactionsareinfact directedagainstIslam....'59Within hisframeworkof presentinghe conflictasa warbetween Islamandunbelief(kufr),theIslamic regime has repeatedly arguedthat its struggleis a jihad, asopposedto a conventionalwar harborjang- betweentwostatesover aparticular erritory.The termjihad is an Arabic wordwith the literalmeaningof 'effort', 'striving'or 'struggle'.However, because in theQuranandthe hadith he term soften'followedbythe words"in hepathof God", it has usuallybeen understoodas meaning"towage war"'.6In classical times jihad, as an offensive war 'in the path of God',evolvedinto a full-fledgeddoctrine.It emergedas a religiousobligationimposed on the Muslimcommunityas a whole, a fard kifaya. Thisobligationderived romtheuniversality f theMuslimrevelationandtheclassicalMuslimconceptionof what we call todaythe 'Law of Nations'.Since Islamwas seen as the one true, final,and universalreligion,Ultimatelyall mankindwouldadoptit; in the meantime heymustbe made to recognize the supremacyof the Muslims and thesovereigntyof the Muslimstate. The worldwas divided nto two-the house of Islam daral-lslam),where he truefaithprevailedand

211


16/23

MIDDLEASTERNTUDIESthe Muslimcaliphruled,and thehouse of war(daral-harb),whereunsubjugatednfidelsstill remained.Between the two there wasperpetualand nevitable tateofwar,whichmightbeinterrupted ytruce,but couldneverbe endedby peace. It wouldend onlywhenthe whole world was brought nto the house of Islam.6'

That sto say,in contrast o the modern awof nationswhichpresupposesthe existenceof different tates,theMuslimaw of nationsrecognizes noother nation than its own, since the ultimategoal of Islam was thesubordination f the wholeworldto one systemof law andreligion....'62Inshort,the Muslim aw of nationswasbasedon thetheoryof auniversalstate; mankind, targued,constitutesonecommunity,boundbyone law,Islam,andgoverned by one ruler- God or his vicegerent.Thusthe Islamicstate mustbe in a constantlyexpandingprocessuntilit establishesIslam as the dominantreigning deology over the entireworld. Jihad was thereforeenforced as a means to achieve that end.As M. Khaddurinotes, 'the jihad may be regardedas Islam'sinstru-ment for carryingout its ultimateobjective by turningall people intobelievers....'63And until that goal is achieved ihadwill remain a per-manentobligation uponthe entireMuslimcommunity.The Islamicregimehastime andagainstressedthat its war withIraqwassnotsimplyan armedconflictbutajihad againstunbeliefas outlinedabove (althoughthe doctrineof jihad in twelver Shiism is somewhatdifferent romtheclassicalnotions).This s, forexample,howthe formercommanderof Iran'sgroundforces, SayyedShirazi,put it:

There are people ... who refer to the war as a cause for the grief offamilies,[theyreferto it]in termsof manywars hatoccurrednthepastand werenot wagedfor God'ssake;like WorldWarII whichcausedthe deathof millions andbroughtdestructionanddemoli-tion.... Today,however,we havechanged hemeaningof war,forwe consider t a greatblessing .. ajihadin the wayof Allah. If itwere not for [this]jihad how would we be able to distinguishbetween those who tell the truth and those who lie, or separatebetweencompanionsand traitors.M

Consequently, hisjihad, according o Iranian tatements ssuedfrom1980 to 1987, must be waged until the final annihilationof the Iraqi'polytheists'. The Imam-e Jom'eh of the Caspian coastal town ofHashtpar, or instance,cited the Quranicverse'Fight hem untilthereisno more subversionand religion is wholly God's' (2:193), and thenannounced:Allahenjoinedthe believers o fightthemunafiqun ndthe

212


17/23

ISLAMIC NEWSPEAK' N IRANpolytheiststo the bitterend; we should not be merciful towardthoseSaddams Saddamiyan).'65nd in the words of anotherprayer eader,MostafaShakeri,'We mustcontinuethis holyjihaduntil we crushthepolytheist regimeof Saddam'66hus the war had become a 'religiousobligation'(vazifeh-yedini), and as such, 'we have a decisive respon-sibilityto wage [it]'.67 s a result,no one has the rightto preventothersfrom eaving or thefront.Khamenehi, orexample,appealed nNovem-ber 1980 o theparentswhosechildrenwererecruited o the armed orcesand said: 'Ifyourchildrenwishto advance o thefrontof thejihadpermitthem. Thisjihadbrings hemjoy. Those whowageajihadin the pathofGod will be rewarded,as opposedto the shirkersof military ervice(al-qa'idin).'6Finally, n accordancewith the classicaldoctrineofjihad,theIslamicregimedepicted hewarasa meansof expandinghe realmof daral-Islam.As Taheri stated in September,1980:

Wedo not covetone inchofIraqi erritory.... Ourwish s toexpandthe bordersof the landof the believers khak-e manan).... Wewillnot be contentwith the expulsionof the Ba'thi infidels fromourterritory; his is becausethereare no borders n Islam.6Inorderto underline he Islamiccharacteristics f thewar,the Islamicregimeplaced t inthesamerankwith thecelebratedwarsof earlyIslam.It was, therefore,describedas 'anotherchapterin the wars of Islamagainstheresy'.70Or as one prayer eader,Emami-Kashani, ut it afterthe recoveryof the Khuzestani own of Bostan in November1981:

O Mujahidin f Islam!With theoccupationof Bostanyourglory sguaranteed, ustastheglorywasguaranteedo thosewhofought nthe Battleof the Trench Jang-eKhandak).... You are thewarriorswhom the Prophet had sent to protect Islam against the infidels, themunafiqunandthe polytheists.7i

And as Khamenehi added:We believe that this [War] s the first[confrontation] f truthandfalsehood (haq va batel) after one thousand and five hundredyears.... In theageof 'Ali all the forces of kufrweresummonednorder to launch a war against the Commanderof the Faithful.Nevertheless,Ali massacred hem (ba khak va khunkeshid),andthereafterthe conquestsof Islamcommenced.... Likewise, ourbraveMuslimsoldiers areencountering he infidelswithfaith andresolution. No doubt, they will vanquishthe enemy just as Ali'ssoldiershave.72

Accordingly,Iranexplainedits policies in the war, its achievements

213


18/23

MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIESand failures, in terms of an 'Islamic strategy', as was conducted in the ageof the Prophet and Imam Ali. This is, for example, how the Islamicregime explained why, contrary to Iraq, it was not willing to bombardcenters populated by civilians:

We do not take such evil measures. We are not allowed to attackareas which are inhabited by helpless women and children. This isnot the way a Muslim soldier fights. O you wicked Saddams! It isclear that you never bothered to learn the history of the wars ofIslam. Otherwise, you would have known that when the Prophetsent an army to war he did not allow his soldiers to cut trees, topersecute refugees, or to strike the injured.73

In Iran'sview, itsjihad against Iraqwas by no means an offensive or anaggressive war- although its underlying goal, as we have seen above, wasthe expansion of dar al-lslam. A few words about the doctrine of jihad intwelver Shiism may clarify the point.The doctrine of jihad in twelver Shiism is fundamentally similar toclassical notions. Two differences, however, are apparent: in the firstplace, the Shiites added dar al-iman (the house of faith - where the Shiisreside) to the traditional dichotomy of dar al-Islam and dar al-harb.Accordingly, they are permitted to wage a non-violent jihad, a struggle ofpersuasion, aiming at the conversion of dar al-lslam (the Sunnis) to daral-iman.74And in the second place, the twelver Shiites hold that theobligation of jihad is conditional upon the manifest presence of the ShiiImam. Thus the doctrine of jihad has lost its practical character since thelast Imam went into occultation in 874AD. However, armed defenseagainst foreign aggression, or a defensive jihad, remains permissible.7-This theory became the basis of all later Shii views on war andjihad. Thatis to say, the distinction between an offensive war, for the expansion ofdar al-Islam, and its defense, meant that the former cannot be launchedwithout the Imam's presence or his direct command.This restriction on the launching of a jihad was strictly observed bysuccessive generations of Shii jurists. For instance, when the Iranianulama proclaimed a jihad against Russia in 1825-26, they stressed thattheir object was the defense of Islam and the Muslims.76Khomeinihimself had recognized this distinction between the offensive and defen-sive jihads in the beginning of the 1940s. He wrote:

There are two types of wars in Islam: one isjihad; that is, the war ofexpansion ... and the other is defa', struggle to preserve one'sindependence. Jihad means expansion and the taking over of othercountries, which will be carriedon by the Imam himself or under his

214


19/23

ISLAMIC NEWSPEAK' N IRANcommand.... The second type, what we call defa' ... does notrequirethe Imamor his command.77

The defensive dimensionof the jihad was underlinedduringthe laststagesof the struggleagainstthe Shah as well. For instance,when theulamaproclaimedajihadagainst he governmentof ShahpurBakhtyar,Ayatollah Taleqaniannounced:Bakhtyarand his people do not know the real meaningof jihad.When they foolishly say that a jihad is an obligationwhich isenjoinedon the Muslimsonlyin theirstruggleagainst he infidels,they display heir gnorance.Jihad senjoinedfor the defenseof theMuslims'rights, the very rightswhich others plundered.In thiscase, the launchingof a jihad is an obligation.78

TheIran-IraqWarwassimilarly onceivedas a defensive ihad.As R.Ramazanicontends,the Islamicregime'considersresorting o holywar(jihad)as the prerogativeof onlythe infallibleImam,and in hisabsencethefaqihisestoppedfromwaginganoffensivewar. But defensivewar ...is anothermattersince it is in self-defenseandhence thefaqih is duty-boundto resort o itbyall means.'79ndeed,it is anindisputableactthatIraqwas first to launch its attackagainstIran in late September1980,leaving he latterno choicebut to defend tself. Itwastherefore ogical orIran to refer to the war as an 'imposedwar'(jang-e ahmili).80ut evenwhen Iranfirst invadedIraqiterritory n July 1982,the Islamicregimejustified its actions in terms of defense. This is, for instance, whatAyatollahMosaviArdebilihad to say in August 1982:Certainndividuals ave setforth[the idea]thattheaggressors avebeen driven out from ourcountryever since we set foot on theirterritory ... They say, 'Is this not in itself an aggression? Have wenotcalled t anaggressionwhenIraqattacked ran onits ownsoil]?What, then, is the difference between us and them now? ...Everybody knows that Saddam is an infidel and that ... his masters[theUS] areeager... to destroyus. [Forthisreason] hey placedusunderaggression.What, then, arewe supposed o do in the faceofsuchaggression?Ali saidin regard o thisissue:'Eitheryou acceptabjectness,or resistwithswords n yourhands.'We too, either wesurrender to the Saddams or resist them with the sword ... [Sad-dam]startedthe war andwe have been defendingsince thatday.Also today,we aredefendingon Iraqisoil;andif we takeone stepforward, it is [because] we recognize the aggressor ... As long asSaddamattacksusfrom the rear ine,we willalsofighthim. For ...Ali said: 'The aggressor should be destroyed on his own soil.'

215


20/23

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIESThe defensive,albeit universalgoalsof the war, were furtherunder-lined by two other arguments.First, it was said that SaddamHusseinlaunched his war againstIran by the commandof his 'masters',the

superpowers,who feared lest the IslamicRevolution would extend toother Islamicandoppressedcountriesandliberate themfromsubjuga-tion and exploitation.Hence 'the Islamic nation of Iran is defendingIslam and the Quranon behalfof the Islamicnationsand the oppressed...82 And second, it was argued that the Iraqi Ba'th was collaboratingwith'thearch-enemy f Islam',Israel,inorderto 'preventIslamicunityand exterminate slam'.Thus 'thewarwithIraq s, ineffect, apartof theoverall Muslim defense against Zionist aggression'.83ndeed, Iran'swartime logan,'The roadto JerusalempassesthroughKarbala', houldalso be seen in this light.When the Iran-Iraq War entered into its sixth year, Rafsanjanidevoted,in a mosttypicalmannerat thattime,an entiresecondsermonattheFridayprayerso theissueof thepeople's preparedness'amadegi) ocontinuethewar until'finalvictory.'He stressed hat the Iranianpeople'have not grownweary'of the war, and that 'Theenemyis horrifiedofyour presence in the front.' This is so, he explained, because the enemyknows well that 'should the Imam [Khomeini] raise his finger', theIranian mujahidin 'will storm the strongholds of Saddam and the Ba'thlikea flood whichstormsa house'.84 o doubt,by 1985-86the Iran-IraqWar had alreadybecome a majorsource of resentmentand a burdenrather hana 'divineblessingbestoweduponthe Muslimnationof Iran'.Indeed, the continuousIraqimissile attackson Iraniancities, the Iraqiuse of chemicalweapons and the mountingcasualtiesof war finallyeroded the very same 'preparedness'of the people Rafsanjanihadpointed to. Nevertheless, it remains a fact that a substantial number ofIranianswere still enthusiastic about going to the war fronts. Newspaperphotographsof the multitudesof people attendingthe Fridayprayers,many of whom were dressed in white shrouds so as to show their readinessto be martyred in battle, attest to that. And it was largely the clerics'sophisticatedandefficientuse of the people'sreligioussentiments theharnessingof the most evocative themes of Shiite Islam(and Islamatlarge) to their cause - that have kept alive the mass supportand therevolutionary-religiouseal of the Iranianpeople.

NOTESI wish to thank Professors David Menashri, Aryeh Shmuelevitz and Ami Ayalon of theDayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University and ProfessorPeter Chelkowski of the Kevorkian Center for Near Eastern Studies at New York

216


21/23

ISLAMIC NEWSPEAK' N IRANUniversityfor takingtime out of busy schedules to read the paperand offer helpfulcomments ndcriticisms.A special hankss alsodueto MrYigalShefiandMrHaimGalofthe DocumentationCenterat the DayanCenterwhosevaluableassistance nabledme tocollectthe primary ourcesfor the paper.1. D. Menashri, ran n RevolutionTelAviv:HakibbutzHameuhad,1988),p. 126. [inHebrew.]2. For the variousmodesof persuasionn the IslamicRepublicof Iran,see Menashri,ibid., pp. 126-31.3. A. Ayalon,Language ndChangen theArabMiddleEast:TheEvolutionof ModernArabPoliticalDiscourse Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1987),p. vii.4. A. Ayalonexamineshe evolutionof the ideaof 'republic'nthe ArabMiddleEast. SeeA. Ayalon,ibid., pp. 97-109,andidem,'Semantics nd the ModernHistoryof Non-EuropeanSocieties:Arab"Republics"s a CaseStudy',TheHistorical ournal,Vol.28, No. 4 (1985),pp. 821-34(henceforth ArabRepublics').5. Menashri, bid., p. 128.6. P. Chelkowski,Khomeyni'sranas SeenthroughBankNotes', inD. Menashried.),TheIranianRevolution ndtheMuslimWorldBoulder:WestviewPress,1990),p. 90.7. B. Carrade Vaux, 'Wali',The ShorterEncyclopaedia f Islam.8. B. Lewis,ThePoliticalLanguage f Islam Chicago ndLondon:University fChicagoPress,1988),p. 34.9. R. M. Khomeini,Al-Hukumaal-lslamiyyaBeirut:1979)p. 46.10. Kayhan Tehran),27 Dec. 1979 Kayhans also the nameof the Iranian ppositionalnewspaper ublishedn London.All referenceso Kayhanbelowrelateto theTehranKayhan).Alsosee, R. M. Khomeini, IslamicGovernment',nIslamandRevolution,trans.andannotatedby H. Algar (Berkeley:MizanPress,1981),p. 53.11. Cited n N. Cohn,ThePursuit f theMillenniumNewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1970), p. 51.12. SheikhMohammedYazdiin a Friday ermon n Shiraz,Ettela'at,10 Jan. 1981.13. SeeHojjatol-IslamMahfuzi,Ettela'at, Oct., 1986;Hojjatol-Islam AliKhamenehina Friday ermon nTehran,Kayhan,6 Nov. 1982;alsosee Meshkini's ermon nQom,Ettela'at, 7 June 1981.14. MohammedTaqiNateqiin a Friday ermon n Hashtpar,Ettela'at, 6 Dec. 1981.15. Khamenehi n a Fridaysermon n Tehran,Ettela'at,5 June 1980.16. Hojjatol-IslamYusofSane'i,Kayhan,23 Nov. 1980.17. Madani n a Fridaysermon n Tabriz,Kayhan,14Aug. 1981.18. Rabbani-Amleshin a Fridaysermon n Tehran,Kayhan,26 Nov. 1981.19. M. Fischer, ran romReligiousDispute o RevolutionCambridge,Mass. & London:HarvardUniversityPress,1980),pp. 177-8.20. Friday ermon n Tehran, Ettela'at, 1 March1981.21. Fischer, bid., p. 6.22. On Hukuma, ee B. Lewis,ThePoliticalLanguage f Islam,pp. 36-7;and J. Benda,'Hukuma',TheEncyclopaediaf Islam,2nd edition.23. An extract romKashfal-Asrar,as citedin IslamandRevolution,p. 170.24. S. Akhavi,Religionand Politics n Contemporaryran:Clergy-State elationsn thePahlaviEra(Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress,1980), p. 13.25. See H. Algar,'TheOppositionalRoleof theUlama nTwentieth-Centuryran', n N.Keddie ed.), Scholars,Saints ndSufis Berkley,LosAngelesandLondon:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1972),pp. 238-9.26. A declarationssuedon 27 Oct. 1964,as cited in Islam and Revolution,p. 188.27. M. Bayat, 'The IranianRevolutionof 1978-79:Fundamentalist r Modern',MiddleEastJournal,Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter1983),p. 35.28. Khomeini,Al-Hukumaal-lslamiyya,p. 122.29. A declarationssued n31Oct. 1971,IslamandRevolution, . 200. An examination ftheunderlyingeasons or the overall ransformationn Khumeini'shoughts found nD. Menashri,Khomeyni'sVision:Nationalism r WorldOrder',n D. Menashried.),TheIranianRevolutionandthe MuslimWorld,pp. 40-57.

217


22/23

218 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES30. Kayhan,6 Feb. 1979.31. Ettlea'at, Feb. 1979. Forsimilar xpressions, ee Khomeini,Ettela'at, 0Jan. 1979;The Observer, 4 Feb. 1979, and Ettela'at, 10 Feb. 1979.32. Montazerin a Friday ermon nTehran,Ettela'at, Oct. 1979.Forsimilar xpressions

see sermonsof Khamenehi,Kayhan,29 March1980;Ettela'at,26 April1980.33. Kayhan International, 2 Sept. 1978.34. Kayhan International, 12 Sept. 1978.35. KayhanInternational, Sept. 1978. For similarexpressionsby Shari'atmadari,ee,Guardian, 5 May 1978; Sunday Times, 21 May 1978; Jerusalem Post, 26 June 1978;Kayhan,7 Feb. 1979;andEttela'at, 1 May1979.36. S. Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York:BasicBooks. 1986),p. 73.37. Washington Post, 2 April 1979.38. See, for example, Guardian,14 Oct. 1978;New YorkTimes, 16 Oct. 1978;andInternationalHerald Tribune, 21 Oct. 1978.39. ForeignBroadcastnformation ervice FBIS),DailyReport,SouthAsia,5May1978.40. Le Monde,13 Nov. 1978.41. Kayhan,11 March1979. Also see Guardian, Feb. 1979.42. Ayalon, 'ArabRepublics',p. 833.43. Khamenehi n a Fridaysermon in Tehran, Ettela'at,18 June 1983. For similarexpressions ee Khamenehin a Friday ermon n Tehran,Ettela'at, Sep. 1983.44. Ayalon,'ArabRepublics',p. 833.45. Kayhan,23 Dec. 1980.46. AsadollahMadani n a Fridaysermon in Tabriz,Ettela'at,11 April 1984.Also seeKhamenehin Tehran,Kayhan,3 Dec. 1982.47. 'Moslemsor Marxists',ArabiaandtheGulf,3 March1978.48. F. Buhl, 'munafiqun', The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1st edition.49. See sermonsof Hajj Mosavi in Khodabandeh,Ettela'at,27 June 1981 (on theMujahidin-eKhalq);AsadollahMadani n Tabriz,Kayhan,10 July 1981 (on theMujahidin-3 Khalq, Jabheh-ye Melli and Peykar); and Rafsanjani in Tehran, Ettela'at,31 July 1981 (on the Mujahadin-e Khalq and the SAVAK).50. Khamenehin aFridayermonnTehran,Ettela'at, May1981.Forsimilar xpressionssee sermons ivenbyMontazerinQom,Ettela'at,8 Feb.1981;andKhansarinArak,Ettela'at, 21 Aug. 1981.51. See my forthcoming book, Islamic Mythology: A Study of the Friday CongregationalSermon in Post-RevolutionaryIran, scheduled for publication by the American Univer-sity Press n Autumn 1993.52. Abd al-HusaynDastgheybn a Friday ermon n Shiraz,Ettela'at,15 Oct. 1981.53. Khansarin aFriday ermonnArak,Ettela'at,1Aug. 1981.Alsosee MosaviArdebiliin a Friday ermon n Tehran,Ettela'at, Sept. 1981.54. Khamenehin a Friday ermon nTehran,Ettela'at, 1 Oct. 1980.Also see his sermoninTehran,Ettela'at, 8April1981.Forsimilar xpressionsee AhmedYazdi naFridaysermon n Borujord,Ettela'at, 1 July1981.55. HajjMosavi n a Friday ermon n Khodabandeh,Ettela'at, 7 June1981.56. MuhammadTaqiNateqiin a Friday ermon n Hashtpir,Ettela'at, 7 June1981.57. HajjMosavi n a Friday ermon n Khodabandeh,Ettela'at, 7 June 1981.58. Friday ermon n Tehran,Ettela'at,14Sept. 1980.

59. Hojjatol-IslamEidollahMohammedinaFriday ermon nMeinab,Ettela'at,5April1981.Forsimilar xpressionsee sermons fAyatollahQazi nDazful,Ettela'at, 0July1981;andDastgheib n Shiraz,Ettela'at,24 July1981.60. B. Lewis, The Political Language of Islam, p. 72.61. B. Lewis.TheMiddleEastand the West New York:HarperTorch-books,1966),p.115.62. M.Khadduri,War ndPeace ntheLawofIslam Baltimore:TheJohnsHopkinsPress,1955),p. 45.63. Khadduri,bid., p. 64.


23/23

ISLAMIC NEWSPEAK' N IRAN 21964. Kayhan,25 Sept. 1982.For similarexpression ee Khamenehi's ermon in Tehran,Ettela'at, Nov. 1980;andLt. ColonelReza Sa'edi's peachprior o sermonnTehran,Ettela'at,5 Sep.65. Hojjatol-IslamNateqi,Ettela'at, 4Sept.1981.Also see Khansarin aFriday ermonn

Arak,Ettela'at, 1 Aug. 1981.66. Hojjatol-IslamMostafaShakerinaFriday ermon nChalus,Ettela'at, 5 April1981.67. MostafaMir-Salim,Ettela'at, April1981.68. Friday ermon n Tehran,Ettela'at,16 Nov. 1980.69. Taheri na Friday ermon nEsfahan,Ettela'at, 0Sept. 1980.Forsimilar xpressionssee sermonsof Madani n Qom, Ettela'at,10Jan. 1981;and Rafsanjanin Tehran,Kayhan,20 Nov. 1982.70. Khamenehi n a Fridaysermon n Tehran,Ettela'at, 7 Sept. 1980.71. Emami-Kashanin a Friday ermon n Tehran,Ettela'at,19 Nov. 1981.72. Friday ermon nTehran,Ettela'at, 7Sept.1980.Forsimilar xpressions, ee sermonsof Meshkinin Qom, Ettela'at, 7 June1981;andRafsanjanin Tehran,Kayhan,18Sept. 1982.73. Rafsanjanin a Friday ermon n Tehran,Kayhan,25 Sept. 1982.Forsimilar xpres-sions,see thesermonsof MeshkininQom, Ettela'at, 7 June1981;andRafsanjaninTehran,Kayhan,25 Sept. 1982.74. A. Arjomand,TheShadowof God and the HiddenImam:Religion,PoliticalOrder,andSocietalChangen Shiite ranromtheBeginningo 1890(Chicago:TheUniversityof ChicagoPress,1984),pp. 61-64.75. S. Hunter,Iranandthe World:Continuityn a Revolutionary ecade Bloomington&Indianapolis:ndianaUniversityPress,1990),p. 41.76. H. Algar, Religionand State n Iran,1785-1906. The Roleof theUlama n theQajarPeriod(Berkleyand Los Angeles: Universityof CaliforniaPress,1969),pp. 86-87.77. Kashfal-Asrar,squotedby,F. Rajaee,IslamicValues nd World iew:Khomeyni nMan,theStateandInternational olitics Lanham,New YorkandLondon:UniversityPress of America,1983),p. 89.78. Ettela'at, Feb. 1979.79. R.K. Ramazani,Shi'ismn the PersianGulf, in J.R. Cole andN.R. Keddie(eds.),Shi'ismand SocialProtest NewHavenandLondon:Yale UniversityPress,1986),p.36. For theIslamic egime's iewsondefensiveihad,see R. K. Ramazani,Revolution-aryIran:Challenge ndResponsen the MiddleEast(Baltimore& London:The JohnHopkinsUniversityPress,1988),pp. 24-7.80. See, forexample,sermonsof RafsanjaninTehran,Ettela'at, 1Oct. 1980;Montazeriin Qom, Ettela'at, 1 Jan. 1981;andKhamenehi n Tehran, Ettela'at, April1981.81. Friday ermonnTehran,Kayhan,14Aug. 1981.Forsimilar xpressions, ee sermonsby Rafsanjanin Tehran,Kayhan,25 Sept. 1982;and Emami-Kashanin Tehran,Kayhan,13 Nov. 1982.82. Khomeini,Ettela'at, Sept.1981.Forsimilar xpressions,ee sermons f RafsanjaninTehran, Ettela'at,11 Oct. 1980; Kayhan,25 Sept. 1982;and Emami-Kashani nTehran,13Nov. 1982.83. Ali AkbarVelayatin aspeechbeforeaFriday ermon nQom,Ettela'at, Dec. 1981.84. Friday ermon nTehran,Ettela'at, 6 Nov. 1985.Forsimilar xpressionsee Tehransermons of Khamenehi,Ettela'at,15 March1986;Ettela'at,29 March1986;andRafsanjani,Ettela'at,17May1986.

Documents

Iran' s newspeak