24 Jan 2017

Iran and the Developments in Syria

Policy Studying Unit

Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies is an independent, nonprofit, research, cultural and media institution. Its main focus is to conduct studies and researches about the Arab region, especially Syria. It also works towards cultural and media development, enhancing the civil society performance, and spreading democratic awareness and values of dialogue, as well as respect for human rights. The Centre also provides consultation and training services in political and media fields to all Syrians on the basis of Syrian national identity.To achieve its objectives, the Centre conducts its activities through five specialized units, (1) Policy Studies Unit, (2) Social Researches Unit, (3) Books Review Unit, (4) Translation and Arabization Unit, and (5) Legal Unit.A set of action programs are also adopted, such as the program for Political Consultations and Initiatives; Program for Services, Media Campaigns, and Public Opinion Making Program; Program for Dialogue Support and Civil and Cultural Development Program; Syria Future Program. The Centre may add new programs depending on the actual needs of Syria and the region. In implementing its programs, the Centre deploys multiple mechanisms, including lectures, workshops, seminars, conferences, training courses, as well as paper and electronic press.

HARMOON CENTER FOR CONTEMPORARY STUDIES

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Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 2

First: Safety easures ................................................................................................................................... 3

Second: Retreating to the benefit of the ally ........................................................................................ 4

Third: Fearing the enemy ........................................................................................................................ 6

Fourth: minimizing losses and maximizing gains ............................................................................... 7

Conclusion and Recommendations ...................................................................................................... 9

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Russia, Iran and Turkey seem to be in a race against time, to set an unchangeable reality,

before the President-elect, Donald Trump, is handed his duties. Despite their different

motives, they found themselves concluding an agreement among themselves for a common

interest which is to deal with the harmful effects of the war in and around Syria, and pre-empt

the United States attempts to continuing wearying them out in the Syrian conflict, and create

permanent problems for them all. In addition to that, each of them is trying to benefit as much

as possible from the Syrian file 1; and take the best possible position, because their concerns

of the United States is what initially connects them, followed by trying to convert their

obligatory convergence into a mechanism of extracting gains.

In this paper, we approach this part of this scene, where we review the developments in

Iran's policy regarding Syria, to try to understand its obligations, and how the will of the

Iranian regime bended so far without being broken, in addition to exploring the threat it poses

to the future of Syria.

Introduction Until recently, the US president's policy, Barack Obama2, was to drain to all those involved

in the Syrian war and that was running on full swing; an in this context the dispute between

Russia and Turkey was on the brink of explosion, having collided following the downing of

the Russian jetfighter by Turkey. A failed military coup took place in Turkey afterwards, which

was according to the views of some analysts, one of the reasons for the Turkish president,

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “converting” from confronting Russia to becoming its ally. But this

analysis ignored the fact that the man had already began a new course by apologising to

Russia a month before the coup; a more viable assumption is that the coup which has been

always a possibility within the “deep state”, throughout the rule of the Justice and

Development Party, actually came to cut off this transformation (the alliance with Russia), and

1- A working team, Conferences and International Decisions, Democratic Republic Study Centre,

https://goo.gl/eoxIX2 2 Yussef Fakhr Eldeen, Syria and Iran Under the US Repositioning, democratic Republic study Centre,

https://goo.gl/eoxIX2

https://goo.gl/eoxIX2https://goo.gl/eoxIX2

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unexpectedly its failure pushed the alliance forward, directing a fatal blow to the "deep state".

However, the Turks have entered into Syrian territory after a long hesitation, and with the

blessing of Russia -which came to light shortly after- leading to the siege of the organization

of the Islamic State in Al-Bab City, coinciding with the Assadi- Russian-Iranian coalition

invading the East of Allepo, backed by the game changing participation of (Shiite militias), and

the Russian airline, and then getting the militants out by a Russian-Turkish agreement,

accompanied by the civilians who were under their rule.

But what concerns us within the scope of the task we have set for ourselves is to approach

"Iran’s obligation" as we mentioned before, including the main pressure factors on the Iranian

regime, that are forcing it to more than absorb its anger of the Turkish military penetration,

when the reached Al-Bab city recently, bearing in mind that Iran had repeatedly threatened

Turkey against any military intervention in Syria, by taking into account Russia's rush for a

ceasefire and the making of a settlement process.

First: Safety easures The Russian journey to overcome Iran in Syria, in the context of their alliance, began when

the commander of the "Quds Force" of "the Iranian Revolutionary Guard," Gen. Qassem

Soleimani, visited Russia to ask for their urgent support in July 2015, followed by the Russian

intervention in September 2015 to prevent the fall of the military alliance in Syria, led by him

against the armed opposition, who in turn had seized control of Idlib and Shgour Bridge. Up

till that point Iran had no partner in controlling what is left of the Syrian regime’s decision and

will, and which the people were revolting against.

If the Iranian request was confirmed, Iran’s submission to the Russian demands at the time

was indisputable. Then, Iran seemed to accept more than the Russia partnership in influence

in Syria to ward off the possibility of its enemies’ victory. However, the Iranians were relying

one fact to reduce Russia's share, which was nobody was willing to get involved in the fighting

by Bashar Al-Assad on the ground from outside Syria apart from their own militia and soldiers

(Iran), giving them the illusion that they had more power, believing that Russia was not able

to own the land, as long as they confine their role in the air bombardment.

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Even Russia's desire to organize the rest of Assad's forces, or the Syrian militia supporting

him -which could be one of the conditions set by the Russian President Vladimir Putin- to

meet Iran's demand for military intervention, and frankly it was his condition to continue to

intervene, did not initially cause any doubts – more likely- by the owner of the Iranian

decision, who knew that those forces have become, or almost became, the "allied forces" of

his attacking forces in the decisive battles, which turned the formations towards making the

Revolutionary Guards, and militias affiliated to it, including the Syrian ones, as the central

military party, while the regular army was reduced to being merely a "reserve", ie the

secondary and the less important, which constituted the core of the Iranian influence that it

has sought to enshrine in the region3. Hence the Assad's “army” was unable to make up the

shortfall in manpower and military forces with elements that could not be trusted, and be able

to stop the deterioration of the military unit cohesion and coherence. Moreover, the Iranians

were since controlling directly some of the old regime tools, notably "the Air Force

Intelligence," which played a crucial role in the formation of the "National Defence Forces"

and the strengthening of Iranian influence on this militia, including the "Tiger Force" led by

Brigadier Suhail Hassan, who became a phenomenon for a period of time, and was presented

as a "saviour", before being pulled out and returned to the Air Force Intelligence, claiming he

was promoted. Iran also had hoped that the Russian intervention would either resolve the war

quickly to their advantage, or would lead to drastically swinging of the equations allowing

Iran to achieve the greatest possible benefit, reduce its losses, and then reduce the size of its

compromises.

Second: Retreating to the benefit of the ally The events of the war did not completely come as the Iranian wished, and Russia did not

show a lot of generosity, instead it linked its steps tightly with the implementation of its

demands, not only those relating to gradually gripping tightly on the remains of the collapsed

regime institutions, in particular the military institution, and building new institutions that

3 A Working team, Iran and Its Allies (1): Shiite Militias in Syria (Case Study), Harmoon Centre for

Contemporary studies, 2016 http://harmoon.org/archives/3411

http://harmoon.org/archives/3411

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were linked to it, but also, and with every move it made, through the implementation of

agreements concluded with Israel, and the US administration when finding that useful.

In this context, and in order for Russia to extend its influence via the "military militia"

organisation under the leadership of the "Assad Army," which it has the ultimate say in it, came

the establishment of "Fourth Legion - Raids ", then the recent announcement of the formation

of the "Fifth Legion - Raids", and the diligent promotion to join it, encouraged with high

salaries and financial compensation, which contributes to the reduction of the Iranian

influence, weakening the warlords, and putting the irregular forces under the leadership of

the army, even though Iran would try to reach out in any of these new formations.

Iran found itself this time, contemplating its Iraqi experience after Saddam Hussein4, when

it had run a proxy war against the United States, but now unable to run a proxy war against

Russia to achieve what was not possible by other means, and even if we assumed that there

were extremist jihadist organizations ready to be entrusted with this task. In addition to that

Iran is not yet able to break from the alliance with Russia, the silence of the United States

previously in Iraq was due to the large number of enemies that America found itself facing in

its Iraqi dilemma; while Russia will find itself in the position of the "saviour" who is backed by

the people of the region before its governments, if Russia slapped the hand of Iran, and not

only this, but there are some exaggerated reaction in the Syrian spheres towards the recent

Russian steps, expressing their views that the Russians could save them from Iran and its

militias, this must be very pleasant to the Russian "intelligentsia" who rejects the Russian

nationalist right policy, and the Ministry of defence and its institutions, and defend the idea of

Russia leading the "alliance of minorities"5 including Iran.

It was not possible for the beleaguered state of "Iran" to strongly fight its strong ally in the

Syrian war, who was summoned to save it, especially after finding out that its bid to take

advantage of the Russian-US dispute on Syria was useless. As for Putin, he imposed a medium

4 A working team, US Iranian Relations: Between Containment and Creative Chaos (case study), harmoon

Centre for Contemporary Studies, 2016 http://harmoon.org/archives/2661 5 For more information about divisions in the Russian ruling regime, please read the article by the

Lebanese Journalist, Mustafa Fahss (Interests and Creeds Under the Kremlin’s Roof) Middle East

newspaper, ،https://goo.gl/HSGG3c

http://harmoon.org/archives/2661https://goo.gl/HSGG3chttps://goo.gl/HSGG3c

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speed for the war that would allow him to decorate every step of it, and invest in it by extorting

his partners and opponents, in addition to preventing Iran from dictating its own pace, and

preferred fronts, even he left its fighters without air cover to be killed when it tried to do so,

and the Russian air force did not hesitate to hit Hezbollah and other Shiite militias, when they

disobeyed the Kremlin.

Third: Fearing the enemy We should bear in mind that Iran’s fear of the United States was the decisive motive behind

Iran’s the alliance with Russia, who is competing with them in many geopolitical areas. This is

evident in its request for help from Russia for its alliance ground forces in Syria, as it was

unable to engage its air force in the Syrian war for several reasons, including: its weak

potential, and the fear of being crushed by the United States and Israel. We have seen Israeli

prevention for what is less than an Iranian aviation domination over Syrian airspace, when

the Israeli air force bombed high-ranking Iranian officers and leaders of "Hezbollah", every

time it seemed to Tel Aviv that they went over, or came close to crossing the Red Line, which

was endorsed by Russia. This red line allows them to fight on land in Syria to support the

regime without posing a suspected network of resistance, or convert to a worrying military

presence. We are not exaggerating when we say that these strikes have revealed the level of

agreement and coordination between Russia and Israel, and consequently revealing a hidden

side of Russia’s military intervention, which is to monitor the military activity of Iran and its

followers in Syria.

But Iran's rulers who cried help to the Russians to save them in Syria, had great hopes to

reach a nuclear agreement with the United States to improve the terms of their alliance with

Russia, taking advantage of the "tolerances" that was granted to them by the US President,

Barack Obama, to achieve. As they had to accept the return of the United States military to

Iraq, under the pressure of their inability to solve the problems created by their interventions,

hoping that would also be a factor in bridging the gap with them. However, the victory of the

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far-right business man, Donald Trump, in the last election6 , who rejects the nuclear deal,

which was held by "the Obama administration" with the Iranian government, and calls to

weaken Iran, sharply reduced the room for Iran to manoeuvre against its Russian ally, when

Trump is threatening to end its dream of US accepting its participation in the elimination of

"terrorism", which it participated in its launch, and put out the fire in Syria, which it played a

pivotal role in igniting, and not only this, but that this win has threatened to return Iran to the

embarrassing square one, where it was during the rule of "George W. Bush,". At that time it

worked on two overlapping tracks, seemingly contradictory, on the one hand dedicated part

of its energies to the service of the United States in several files, on the other hand, dedicated

another part to form affiliated forces, and support its allies when possible, in the region and

the world, to pose a threat of the United States and its allies, and step out of the square.

Fourth: minimizing losses and maximizing gains For Each of the above so far, Iran abided by a policy of self-restraint with the Russian

unilateral steps, including the agreement with Turkey on the cease-fire in Syria (29 December

2016, while the Moscow "Statement", which included a trio of Iran, Turkey and Russia signed

on 21 December 2016); it is the agreement that followed the evacuation of east of Aleppo of

the armed opposition and most of the civilians, leading to the entry of forces of the Russian

military police to these neighbourhoods, to be a strong indication of the desire of Russia to

monitor the military force in its alliance including "the Shiite militia." The Russian context in

this regard had violated Iran's desire to complete the "victory" that has been made by invading

eastern Aleppo, Idlib in the West or in Daraa in the South. After it became clear that Putin

would not be holding Iran’s hand to deliver it to an impossible victory in the current situation,

and all it could do was to pull it towards a settlement where there were some benefits to them,

and they were keen to take advantage of what was available, and looking for ways to

maximise them.

6 A working team, Trump between Continuity and Seizure, Harmoon Centre for Contemporary Studies

http://harmoon.org/archives/3050

http://harmoon.org/archives/3050

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Although Iran has always preferred to complete the war to perpetuate its influence

without retreat, it would not face openly the Russian rush to take advantage of its agreement

with Turkey (and what was made available by Russia's victory in Aleppo, and the cease-fire

after that, and to agree on the launch of negotiations sponsored by it, even within the scope

of the Security Council Resolution 2336 describing it as "an important part of the political

process led by Syria, and an important step that is carried out before the resumption of

negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations in Geneva on the eighth of February

2017" 7, and that is a great opportunity to dedicate itself as an international player, and devote

its influence in Syria, and to avoid Syria turning into a new quagmire), and will be keen instead

to reserve a seat in the negotiations, and focus its attention on maintaining the gains on the

ground to improve their conditions, and grapping what is available of strategic areas, provided

this does not require a Russian help that is hard to come by, threatening its victory as

happened previously in several areas. The attempts of Hezbollah, with the participation of

forces from Assad's army, to invade "Barada Valley" in Damascus, and using the pretext of a

fighting Fatah al-Sham (Al-Nusrah Front), is an example that is unlikely to be repeated, as

there are besieged opposition military forces that Iran could have on their own.

There is no doubt that the "Shiite militias" are Iran’s tool to achieve the above, therefore it

will defend them fiercely; just like its aggressive reaction towards Turkey, delivered by the

Iranian defence minister, Hassan Dehqan, in response to the Turkish Foreign Minister's

remarks, Maolood Jawish Oglu, about including Hezbullah in the cease-fire in Syria, and to

stop supporting it. Dehqan responded in an interview with "Russia Today" TV (published on

its website on Thursday, 27 December 2016): "I think that the Turks should answer an

important question before making such request. Was their entry into the Syrian territory

requested by the Syrian government? or was is unilaterally decided? If it was requested by the

Syrian government, they should get out as soon as the Syrian government tells them to, unless

they are aggressors, and an aggressor is not to decide on behalf of others "8. In this statement,

7 “The Russian-Turkish resolution about Syria wins an overall majority in the Security Council”. News and

Media of the UN Security Council https://goo.gl/dWWRCa 8 Iranian Defence Minister: ”the Turks should leave Syria if requested by Damascus”. Russia Today TV

https://goo.gl/GYqPr8

https://goo.gl/dWWRCahttps://goo.gl/GYqPr8

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we see a threat to Turkey to return to square one, prior to the Turkish-Russian understandings

which endorsed the Turkish military incursion up to Al-Bab City, if it politically interfered with

the most important element of Iran's power in the Syrian conflict and throughout the region.

Even more, Ali Akbar Welayati, the Senior Advisor of the Iranian supreme guide Ali Khamenei,

went as far as describing those who demand the removal of Hezbollah from Syria by "the

enemy", according to a statement at a press conference in Tehran which included the Iraqi

Vice President Nouri al-Maliki (on 3 January 2017) where he said: " to remove Hezbollah from

Syria, after the cease-fire agreement, is the propaganda of the enemies"9.

Also, Iran will continue to focus on manufactory its own agents and spies at all levels, and

in the rest of the state institutions. They will not succumb to their failure to create an affiliated

political Alawait sect, after their militia projects, the "Coast Shield ", which was desired to be

Alawait, and "the Syrian Hezbollah," supposedly Shiite-Alawait, all failed, but still Iran

continues working on this file.

Conclusion and Recommendations If Iran was forced to accept the Turkish Russian convergence which had led the opposition

out of the east of Aleppo, and the cease-fire, there are indications that Iran will be working on

turning that into a war of attrition to their advantage, and to agree on the launch of a

negotiations process in the "Astana" the capital of Kazakhstan, whereas with regard to

negotiations, Iran is striving to collect all its power elements and develop them and turn them

into an opportunity to consolidate its influence; because Iran would never retreat one step

from its regional ambitions without being forced to, than it would "reposition" its forces and

sources of power in Syria, and will protect them with all its energy, being the main guarantee

towards its goals, and it is a guarantee to maintain influence on other areas in Syria including

its influence over the rest of the regime.

In addition to its interest to keep what it has of the will of some of the collapsed regime

parties, Iran will continue to use its usual policy with regards to militias, and its quest to 9 Khamenei’s Councillor: “Hezbollah is not going to leave Damascus”. Russia Today TV

https://goo.gl/cb7UmC

https://goo.gl/cb7UmC

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"integrate" them within the Syrian society, with what is needed so that it is continuing to push

towards more distortion of the conflict and relate it to sectarianism. It also will continue to

seek to take advantage of the absence of the Syrian National overarching framework in a bid

to attract the social sectors, and strive to bribe other sectors across various institutions, directly

or through local agents. As long as power has not been monopolising by a democratic state in

which all Syrians can benefit, Iran will continue to offer its services and refuge to the social

sectors.

If the condition of the Iranian-Russian alliance still exist, which is the need of both of them

to put pressure on the West, both of them will be keen not to push the other out of the

obligations of the alliance between them; and as long as this is the case, the Iranian regime

will keep manoeuvring the Kremlin, and trying to pull it into its battles, and perhaps play the

same games it does with the West, by agreeing with it through its "liberals" while breaking the

agreement partly through the "hard-liners". In any case, there is a large space for Iran to deal

with various dynamic conditions as usual, and it is undoubtedly looking for any opportunity

(and this needs to develop a surplus of power to be used when it thinks appropriate) to push

its tools to open a limited battle with Israel as a tool to sort alliances in Syria and the region as

a whole, on different bases; and only then it will liberate Hezbollah, albeit relatively speaking,

of the obligations of its alliance with Russia.

In all cases, foreign influence and the Iranian influence could only be confronted from a

position within the collective democratic national state, which is required from the national

forces (groups and individuals), who are rushing to read the failed experiment of the Syrian

opposition and the fast-changing Syrian reality, to produce the required national democratic

front, and the development of its vision and programs. One cannot confront Iran without

legally considering it as an occupying power in Syria, which requires active political and media

mobility leading to demarcate it as an occupying force by the international community, which

will make it easier to negotiate with them to evacuate, rather than be at the negotiating table

as a sponsor. Bearing in mind that even if the classification campaign did not lead to an

international recognition of Iran as an occupying force, the demands for negotiating its

evacuation at the negotiating table could still be understandable and acceptable by the

international community.

harmoon.org

IntroductionFirst: Safety easuresSecond: Retreating to the benefit of the allyThird: Fearing the enemyFourth: minimizing losses and maximizing gainsConclusion and Recommendations