International Relations and Selecting Liberal, Constructivist, and Realist Assumptions

International Relations is filled with theories that try to explain the reality of the states’ relations with each other and the international events. Many paradigms, such as realist, liberalist, constructivist, feminist, among others, exist as the theories in International Relations. All these paradigms attempt to explain the events anchored with their assumptions and theories that build on those assumptions. John J. Mearsheimer is a realist, whose paradigm focuses on balance of power, relative power, and a host of other postulations. In this paper, I argue that, although Mearsheimer’s assumptions describe much of the international politics today, his points fail to account for the changes within the international system.

His five “bedrock” assumptions may adequately explain certain international relations but others, such as third imaging, do not fully represent the reality. Mearsheimer’s first of the five foundations for his theory is an international system that does not contain a central authority, in other words, an anarchy, which is agreeable since no institution today acts as the world’s global authority to whose law every state has to submit to (Mearsheimer 31). The second assumption is states can destroy each other due to the great power’s inherent possession of offensive military capabilities, which gives the states the power to annihilate other weaker states (Mearsheimer 32). This is also true since the great powers contain strong military prowess that was used to conquer other states in the past; for example, Russia conquering Central Asia during the Great Game and destroying the khanates to establish the Soviet Socialist Republics. The third one is that states will always remain uncertain of other states’ intentions and that this uncertainty coupled with other factors can lead to aggression (Mearsheimer 32). Agreements, alliances, and conditions of states change with the passing time and, thus, states have to be careful with indefinitely and wholly trusting other states since circumstances can alter existing treaties and promises. For example, Hitler invaded Russia even though the two states had signed a non-aggression pact. Last two assumptions are that the survival of the state is its primary goal and that great powers act rationally (Mearsheimer 32). For Mearsheimer, survival means that states maintain political autonomy in their territories (Mearsheimer 32). Once a state has been conquered, it loses its sovereignty and thus cannot do what the leadership wants to do.

Although the aforementioned points are valid, his theories are based only on third level imaging, which focuses only on the international system. For Mearsheimer, first level imaging, or how individuals act, nor second level imaging, in which state actors are the ones being examined. The state’s leadership plays a minimal to no role in the international arena; he or she is only a pawn in the hands of the international system, which to him is ruled by fear and mistrust of other states as well as intense competition to be “the most powerful (Mearsheimer 33). Yet, personalities do play a role. As Alexander Wendt points out if someone who was not Gorbachev and who would not have taken degradation of Soviet Union’s central authority well took power, the Cold War could have ended differently (Wendt 307). In Hitler’s cabinet, people opposed his expansionist policies that would agitate France and Britain, but he fired the protestors and continued on with his policies (Bullock 411-12). Would someone who was not Hitler fire them still or would that someone listen to his cabinet members? Hitler’s personality played a big role; he was a fiery speaker, who got people riled up. If it were someone weak and meek, assembling such a strong Germany in such a short time, would not be possible. Not only do individuals matter, so do other non-state actors, which may or may not increase cooperation.

For Mearsheimer and fellow rationalists, cooperation is hard to achieve due distrust and alliances are for a short-term only. Although, that may hold for certain instances, such as Nazi

Germany invading the Soviet Union despite signing the non-aggression pact and the League of Nations failing to prevent the second World War, long-term cooperative steps have been taken by states and their leaders. International organizations (IO) do not seem to play a minimal role in the international arena so as to earn a disregard for them. The growth of international organizations and their powers is not missed by the liberals, who believe that IOs can sometimes influence states and act as independent variables in the system (Viotti and Kauppi 144). NATO, for example, has served as Sweden’s provider of defense, even though, for realists such an action by a state, which relies on another for its defense, is a suicidal endeavor (Murdoch and Sandler 602). Obviously, Sweden finds such a cooperation, in which it provides some funds to NATO, and gets defense as a return, as a favorable option.

Additionally, states are integrating economically, which would again be counterintuitive for a realist, because states’ dependence on each other decreases the likelihood of survival if its partners drop out of the arrangement. But Brooks argues that autarky in weapons manufacturing is in decline and that it is impossible to remain on top of arms production if one state decides to do it alone; in this case, integration decreases weakness and possibility of the state’s destruction (Brooks 173). These examples would refute Mearsheimer’s claim that states are in security competition due to their mortal enmity since such cooperation and trust between states would not be possible if they felt mortally threatened by other states. Furthermore, other non-state actors, such as terrorists, who are powerful enough to withstand United State’s onslaught and strike back in certain situations, are also important due to their security threat. Sometimes, these nefarious non-state actors, increase the cooperation between states as evidenced by rhetoric of European Union, which says its joint ventures in combating terrorism have helped to prevent some attacks (Consulium), and in Kuwait, in which defense cooperation was signed with United States (Cassata). Both have increased their cooperation. Another player that matters in the international arena is ideology, which is disregarded by Mearsheimer.

As the individuals in power influence the state’s actions, so does ideology influence the leadership and, consequently, the international system. Indeed, one study found that different regimes, in this case whether authoritarian or democratic, coupled with the states’ leaders and their reactions to changes in power, influenced states’ responses to attacks (Tessman and Chan 137, 151). Liberalists would argue that liberal democracies are prone to long-term cooperation between each other than with non-liberal states to the point that democracies would not usually go to war with each other (Viotti and Kauppi 154). For example, mature liberal democracies such as France, United Kingdom, and United States have refused to start wars with each other for some time now. Liberals would call this kind of peace between mature, liberal, and democratic states as the Democratic Peace (Viotti and Kauppi 154). These states do not seem as worried about each other as John Mearsheimer would suggest; after all, the United States finds North Korean nuclear weapons more dangerous than United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons, whose arsenal exceeds the former’s cache (Wendt 306). Thus, a long-term cooperation between states is possible and liberals say that the liberal democracies “are able to establish peaceful relations among themselves based upon their shared values and common approach to establishing legitimate domestic political orders” (Viotti and Kauppi 154). Thus, Mearsheimer’s assumptions that the international relations are characterized by distrust and perpetual enmity are exaggerated—states can cooperate with each other without severely fearing each other.

The field of International Relations is comprised of many ideas and scholars tend to pick between one field or the other. Yet, the world is not so black and white; as yin and yang, which contain the opposite colors within each other, so does it make it sense for the world to be

authoritarian Communist state, which allows for capitalism to flourish in different degrees in its territory, i.e. China. Therefore, scholars can borrow ideas from each other and build a new theory from there. Thus, Mearsheimer’s five assumptions can be adopted and applied for certain situations, while his other ideas can be refuted with concepts and examples observed by other schools of thought. To explain international phenomena, it is good to include first and second level imaging, since these two also influence the system in which they reside. Factors that affect the outcomes, whether they seem miniscule to some or not, must be taken into account when trying to explain the world.

Bibliography

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Counsilium. EU Fight against terrorism. 8 March 2013 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/fight-against-terrorism?lang=en>.

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Murdoch, James C and Todd Sandler. "The Political Economy of Scandinavian Neutrality." The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 88.4 (1986): 583-603.

Tessman, Brock F and Steve Chan. "Power Cycles, Risk Propensity, and Great-Power Deterrence." The Journal of Conflict Resolution 48.2 (2004): 131-153.

Viotti, Paul R and Mark V Kauppi. "Liberalism and Global Governance ." Viotti, Paul R and Mark V Kauppi. International Relations Theory. New York: Longman, 2012. 129-166.

Wendt, Alexander. "Constructing International Politics." Viotti, Paul R and Mark V Kauppi. International Relations Theory. New York: Longman, 2012. 303-308.

Roksana Gabidullina

March 9, 2013Introduction to International PoliticsProfessor Fuentes-George

I have neither given nor received unauthorized aid on this assignment.

Roksana Gabidullina