IOM #Publications - Migration Outlook for 2015

IntroductionSolon Ardittis and Frank Laczko

Outlook on global migration policy challenges in 2015William Lacy Swing

Outlook on global asylum/refugee policy challenges in 2015António Guterres

Outlook on migration in Africa in 2015Aderanti Adepoju

Outlook on migration in Asia in 2015Manolo Abella

Outlook on migration in the Caribbean in 2015Joanne van Selm

Outlook on migration in Europe in 2015Elizabeth Collett

Outlook on migration in Latin America in 2015William Mejía

Outlook on migration in North America in 2015Demetrios G. Papademetriou

PublicationsMPP Readers’ Survey

MIGRATIONPOLICY PRACTICEISSN 2223-5248

Joint Managing Editors:• SolonArdittis(Eurasylum)• FrankLaczko(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Advisers:

• JoannevanSelm(Eurasylum)• KarolinePopp(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Coordinator:

• ValerieHagger(InternationalOrganizationforMigration–IOM)

Editorial Assistants:• MyleneBuensuceso(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)• AnnaLynConstantino(International

OrganizationforMigration–IOM)Editorial Committee:

• AderantiAdepoju(HumanResourcesDevelopmentCentre,Lagos,Nigeria)

• RichardAresBaumgartner(EuropeanAgencyfortheManagementofOperationalCooperationattheExternalBordersoftheEuropeanUnion–FRONTEX,Warsaw)

• PeterBosch(EuropeanCommission,Brussels)

• JuanCarlosCalleros(StaffOfficeofthePresidentofMexico)

• DavidCostello(Commissioner,OfficeoftheRefugeeApplications,fromtheGovernmentofIreland)

• HowardDuncan(Metropolis,Ottawa,Canada)

• NeliEsipova(GallupWorldPoll,NewYork)

• AraceliAzuaraFerreiro(OrganizationofAmericanStates–OAS,Washington,D.C.)

• PhilippeFargues(MigrationPolicyCentre–MPC,Florence)

• LukasGehrke(InternationalCentreforMigrationPolicyDevelopment–ICMPD,Vienna)

• ShahidulHaque(MinistryofForeignAffairs,GovernmentofthePeople’sRepublicofBangladesh)

• MichelleLeighton(InternationalLabourOffice–ILO,Geneva)

• WilliamMcClure(AustralianDepartmentofImmigrationandBorderProtection)

• JenniferMcDonald(Passport,ImmigrationandCitizenshipAgency,MinistryofNationalSecurity,Jamaica)

• SankarRamasamy(DepartmentofLabour,NewZealand)

• DilipRatha(WorldBank,Washington,D.C.)

• CécileRiallant(EC-UNJointMigrationandDevelopmentInitiative,Brussels)

• NandKishoreSingh(MemberoftheIndianParliament,NewDelhi)

• SimonTonelli(CouncilofEurope,Strasbourg)

• AdrianavanDooijeweert(DutchAdvisoryCommitteeonMigrationAffairs–ACVZ,TheHague)

• MaiaWelbourne(CitizenshipandImmigrationCanada–CIC,Ottawa)

Published jointly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Eurasylum Ltd.

A Bimonthly Journal for and by Policymakers Worldwide

CONTENTS

Vol.IV,Number5,December2014–January2015

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MIGRATION OUTLOOK FOR 2015

Vol. IV, Number 5, December 2014–January 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE2IntroductionSolon Ardittis and Frank Laczko1

Whatwillthekeymigrationpolicychallengesbe in various regions of the world in thecourseof2015?Arethelevelsandstructure

of migration flows likely to evolve, for example interms of types of migration, source countries, andnumber and profiles ofmigrants? Andwhatwill bethe key policy debates around migration policy in2015, for example in termsof draft legislation and/ornewpolicyandprogrammeinterventions,politicalmilestones(e.g.nationalorlocalelections)andpublicopiniontrends?

These are the questions put to six distinguishedexperts inAfrica,Asia, theCaribbean, Europe, LatinAmerica and North America, in addition to theDirector General of the International Organizationfor Migration (IOM) and the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees, in this special issue ofMigration Policy Practice.

Inhisopeningarticleontheglobal migration policy challenges in 2015,AmbassadorWilliamLacySwing,the Director General of IOM, highlights four keychallenges that the world faces in 2015. First, theevolution of severe and varied humanitarian crises over the past year has highlighted the crucial needfor coordinated and efficient response mechanismsand innovative solutions to address the challengesfacing humanitarian actors. Second, urgent actionneeds to be taken to reduce the rising number of migrant fatalities alongthemigratoryroute.Lastyear,worldwide,morethan5,000migrantsdiedtryingtoreachtheirdestinations.Third, inordertoavoidtherisk that immigrationpolicies inmanycountrieswillgradually be shaped by fears and misconceptionsrather than facts and a strategic outlook for thefuture, there isaneed tochangepublic perceptions of migration and encourage political courage andaccountability. Fourth, 2015 will provide a historic

opportunity to integrate migration into the post-2015 global development agenda.However,thiswillrequireanagreementonappropriate,sufficient,andeffectivemeasures tomonitor and evaluate progress againstthe goals and targets set out in the new agenda.AccordingtoWilliamLacySwing,“migrationremainsa defining feature of the twenty-first century, andtheway inwhichweapproach itwillhavepowerfulimplications for societies around the globe and forgenerationstocome.”

Discussing the global asylum and refugee policy challenges in 2015, António Guterres, the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees, foreseesthat the key challenges in 2015will focuson issuesofprotection at sea, access to territory and the future course of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).Theneedtoendroutinedetention of asylum-seekers, improve child protection safeguards and increasethe focus on durable solutions will be additionalmattersofconcerninthecourseof2015.MrGuterresfurthernotes that the institutionofasylum is todaybeingheavily tested, including inmanyparts of thedeveloped world. This underlines the responsibilitythat falls to mainstream politicians, journalists,educators and civil society leaders in fosteringtoleranceanddialoguetocountersuchtendencies.Atthesametime,governmentshaveadutytomanagetheirbordersinawaythatnotonlyensuressecuritybutalsorespectstherightsofpeoplewishingtoseekinternational protection. According to Mr Guterres,“thewaygovernmentsandtheirpopulationsrespondtothesechallenges– in2015andbeyond–willnotonlybeanindicatorofoursocieties’strengths,butadeterminingfactor inthefuturecourseofacenturythatisalreadybeingshapedsofundamentallybythephenomenonofpeopleonthemove.”

InAfrica,accordingtoAderantiAdepoju,Coordinatorof the Network of Migration Research on Africa(NOMRA), the most important challenge in 2015will relate to the weak governance structures andinadequate institutional capacity of officials andkey stakeholders to formulate and implementcomprehensive migration policies, coupled withinadequate public support for migration issues, asreflectedinthelargelyinsufficientpublicfundingfor

1 Solon Ardittis isManaging Director of Eurasylum Ltd. FrankLaczko is Head of the Migration Research Division at IOMHeadquartersinGeneva.Theyaretheco-editorsofMigration Policy Practice.

Vol. IV, Number 5, December 2014–January 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE 3

migrationconcerns.Thiswillcontinuetotranslateintopoor coordination, participation and collaborationin subregional agendas such as those promotedby the Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS), the South African DevelopmentCommunity(SADC),theEastAfricanCommunity(EAC)and,tosomeextent,theCommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica(COMESA),whichaimtosupportfreeor “facilitated”movementofpersons, and toavaryingdegree,residenceandestablishment.

In Asia, Manolo Abella, Senior Research Associateat the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society(COMPAS), Oxford University, and former Directorof the International Migration Programme at theInternational Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva,identifies threemain challenges for2015: the steepdecline in oil prices, which will likely affect theimplementationofmanyconstructionprojectsintheGulfStates;theestablishmentoftheASEANEconomicCommunity(AEC)in2015,whichisexpectedtoraiseoverall incomes and employment across the wholeregion; and the curbing of the thriving business ofsmuggling of asylum-seekers through Asia and theneedtoprovideasafehaven for thosefleeing fromviolenceandpersecution.However,accordingtoMrAbella, it is difficult to predict the size ofmigrationflows in 2015 since governments are only able toreportonthenumberofworkerswhoregister theircontractsprior to going abroad, and therefore theirstatisticsdonotincludethosenotrequiredbylaworregulationstoregisterbeforeleavingorbeforedoingclandestinemovementsacrossborders.

IntheCaribbean,thekeypolicychallengesidentifiedbyJoannevanSelm,AssociateDirectorforResearchatEurasylum,include:theboatdeparturestotheUnitedStates,particularlybyCubanmigrantsattemptingtoreach Florida, following the political developmentsbetween Washington and Havana in late 2014,whichhave translated intouncertaintyabout futurechanges in the “wet foot–dry foot” approach toCubanslandinginFlorida(wherebyparoleisgrantedtothosewhomakeittoland,andtheirimmigrationfuture is assured,whereas those intercepted at seaare returned to the island); trafficking in humanbeings,consideringthatsome10percentofvictimsworldwidearefromLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,and thatCaribbean countries areall at eithertier2(notcomplyingwithminimumstandards,butmakingeffortstodoso)ortier2WatchList(requiringgreaterefforts) on theUSDepartment of State’sTrafficking in Persons Report 2014;andmanagingthestatusand

situation of Haitians, particularly in the DominicanRepublic,theBahamas,andTurksandCaicosIslands,taking account of the hundreds of thousands ofHaitians who remain internally displaced five yearsafterthedevastatingJanuary2010earthquake.

InEurope,accordingtoElizabethCollett,DirectoroftheMigrationPolicy Institute Europe, the three keymigration policy challenges for 2015 will include:issuesofmaritimemigration,inviewoftheescalatingnumberofbothirregularmigrantsandasylum-seekersfromacrossAfricaandbeyond–over160,000wererescuedin2014alone–andthenewurgencythatthishas created for European policymakers; asylumandhumanitarianaid,aftertheEuropeanUnion(EU)hasseenanincreaseinasylumclaimsoverthepastcoupleofyears,andinparticularanincreaseby50percentduringthethirdquarterof2014comparedwiththesameperiodayearearlier;andissuesofmobilityandsecurity,particularlyaftertheParisattacks,whichhavecreatedanewmomentumfordiscussionsonhowtoeffectivelypreventfurtherterroractsintheabsenceofinternalbordercontrols,andtakingaccountoftherelatively limited checks on citizens arriving at theexternalbordersoftheEU.

In Latin America, William Mejía, Director ofthe Research Group on Human Mobility at theTechnological University of Pereira, Colombia,identifies the followingkeychallenges for2015: theenforcement of the rights of migrants and otherpopulationsthatmovewithintheregion,followingthecommitmentsmadein2014bytheMemberStatesofComunidaddeEstadosLatinoamericanosyCaribeños(CommunityofLatinAmericanandCaribbeanStates,CELAC)todevelopnewpoliciestorecognizemigrantsassubjectsoflawandfacilitatetheregularizationofimmigration; the linking of migration policies withothersocialandeconomicpolicies,includingafterthecommitmentsmadebyCELACrecentlytopromotetheinclusionofmigrationinthepost-2015developmentagenda;andthepromotionofincreasedintraregionaland South–South cooperation on migration policy,including on issues of governance, with a view toachieving a progressive harmonization of publicpolicies,standardsandproceduresfortheprotectionof refugees, and displaced and Stateless personsacrosstheregion.

In North America, Demetrios Papademetriou,PresidentoftheMigrationPolicyInstituteEuropeandPresidentEmeritusof theMigrationPolicy Institute,identifies the keymigrationpolicy challenges in the

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United States, Mexico and the Northern Trianglecountries of Central America (i.e. El Salvador,GuatemalaandHonduras),andinCanada.AccordingtoMrPapademetriou,themostfundamentalmigrationpolicy challenge for the United States in 2015 willbe toagreeona legislativepackageof reformsthatupdates and refocuses the US immigration systemon immigration’s contributions to economic growthand competitiveness. In Mexico and other CentralAmerican countries, a key challenge will relate toimproved border controls along the United States–Mexico and Mexico–Guatemala borders, followingthedramaticsurgeinillegalflowsofunaccompaniedmigrant children and family units in the springandearly summerof last year. InCanada, themainchallenge will be the successful rollout of the keyelementsofthecountry’sre-engineeredimmigrationprogrammes,particularlyitsExpressEntryprogramme(whichcameintoforceinJanuary2015)andCanada’shighly innovative experiment with a new investorprogramme,alsoduetocommencein2015.WethankallthecontributorstothisissueofMigration Policy Practice andinvitereaderstospareacoupleof

minutestoparticipateinasurvey,whichaimstohelpusidentifyourreaders’profiles,theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimary interests inour journal.Shouldyouwishtoparticipate inthissurvey,pleaseclick here.

Finally,theeditorsofMigration Policy PracticewouldliketopaytributetoProfGraemeHugo,DirectoroftheAustralianPopulationandMigrationResearchCentreat the University of Adelaide, who passed away on20January2015,attheageof68.Graeme,whowillbeknowntomostMigration Policy Practicereaders,waswidelyregardedasanoutstandingacademicandpolicythinker.Hehadauthoredover400articlesandbooks onmigration policy andwas a regularmediacommentatorinternationally.In2012,hewasnamedOfficer of the Order of Australia for distinguishedservicetopopulationresearch,particularlythestudyon international migration, population geographyandmobility, and for leadership roleswith nationalandinternationalorganizations.Whileatthehospitalin January of this year, Graeme was preparing theAustralian entry for this special issue of Migration Policy Practice.n

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/J3M7PS5

5Vol. IV, Number 5, December 2014–January 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE

Asweenter2015,thechallengesintheareaofmigration are varied and complex. Last yearsaw thecontinuationof serioushumanitarian

crises and the emergence of new ones, leading tomass displacement at an unprecedented scale. Arecordnumberofmigrants lost their lives inborderregions,andattitudesinmuchofthedevelopedworldtowards those arriving have hardened. It is hard tobehopeful inthiscontext,butweshouldnotforgetthat much migration is necessary and desirable,andbringshugebenefits ifwell-governed. Iwant tohighlightfourkeychallengesfor2015:1)recognizingthemigrationimpactofhumanitariancrises;2)savingmigrants’ lives; 3) changing public perceptions ofmigration;and4)integratingmigrationintothepost-2015developmentagenda.

1. Recognizing that humanitarian crises have migration consequences

We are faced with an unprecedented number ofhumanitarian crises in which international migrantsare especially vulnerable. Migrants may be unabletoleavethecrisisarea,unwillingtoleave,unabletoaccess humanitarian assistance or may seek refugeacrossbordersinadjacentcountries.

Ongoing and new crises in 2014 contributed to arecordlevelof51millionpeopledisplacedbyviolence,conflict and human rights violations – the highestsince World War II. According to the InternationalOrganization for Migration (IOM) data, over1.7millionpeoplewerenewlydisplacedbytheconflictinIraqbetweenJanuaryandendofSeptember2014.The insurgency of Boko Haram, centred in north-easternNigeria,hasdisplacedover1millionpeopleand threatens the subregion. In its fourth year, theconflict intheSyrianArabRepublichaspushedover3millionpeopleoutthecountry.Worseningsecurityconditions in Libya threaten to tip the country intoturmoil for the second time in only a few years. Inaddition,22millionpeopleweredisplacedbynaturaldisasters in 2013, bringing the total number ofdisplacedpeopletoatleast73million.Thissituationshowsnosignsofabating.

Outlook on global migration policy challenges in 2015William Lacy Swing1

1 WilliamLacySwingistheDirectorGeneralofIOM.

The severe and varied humanitarian crises of thepast yearhaveexposed theweaknessesand lackofpreparedness of the international community todealwithsuchahighnumberoflarge-scale,complexand protracted crises. It highlighted the need forcoordinated and efficient response mechanismsand innovative solutions to address the challengesfacinghumanitarianactors.IOMhasmovedswiftlytorespondtotheseneedsbydevelopingtheMigrationCrisis Operational Framework (MCOF) in 2012 andsupporting the State-led Migrants in Countries inCrisis(MICIC)Initiative.ThelatteraimstoimprovethecapacityofStatesandotherstakeholderstoprepareforandrespondtocrisissituationsaffectingmigrantsby alleviating their suffering and protecting theirrights.2. Saving lives

In the context of mass migration, the most urgentpriority – a humanitarian imperative – is to savelives along migratory routes. Last year, more than5,000migrantsdiedtryingtoreachtheirdestinationsworldwide.Therealfigurecouldbemuchhigher,butofficialstatisticsareveryhardtocomeby.Analarmingnumber of people have risked their lives in 2014,drivenbyconflict,oppressionandpoverty.Lastyear,3,300migrants–women,menandchildren–diedintheMediterranean, fourtimes thenumber in2013,andover twice thedeaths in2011,during theArabSpring.

This loss of life is outrageous – an emergency thatremains hidden to most. While the Mediterraneanhas received considerable attention, the tragicphenomenon of migrant death at land and sea ispresent throughout theworld – the Caribbean, theRed Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Bay of Bengal, theSahara, Central America and the southern bordersof the United States.Many survivors have enduredhorrificabuse.

Thedesiretoensuresafepassageatseahasalreadystimulated increased inter-agency collaboration andmustbecoupledwithpoliticalwillandcommitmentto reduce loss of life. The humanitarian imperativeof saving migrant lives at land and at sea requiresa comprehensive and coordinated approach atall phases of migrants’ journey. This will require a


crackdown on smugglerswho putmigrants’ lives atrisk:theestimatedprofitsofthisglobalindustryareinthebillions,andresearchsuggeststhatthereislittleriskofbeingcaughtandpunished.Wemustworkinpartnershiptobringcriminalsmugglerstojustice.

The second pillar is facilitating regular migrationfor those seeking international protection andbetter economic opportunities. Rather than closingborders, we need to develop the means to bettermanage human mobility by facilitating legal andorderlymovementsofpersons. In fact,anapproachthat targets smugglers exclusively may have theunintendedconsequenceofpushingtheseprocessesdeeperunderground,causingroutesandoperationalmodestochange,therebymakingthejourneymoredangerous.

Thethirdpillarofsavinglivesrequiresaddressingthecauses of “desperation migration” – inequality andthelackofopportunitiesincountriesoforigin.

3. Change public perceptions of migration

Third,wearewitnessingatroublingriseofanti-migrantsentimentinmuchofthedevelopedworld.Weneedafundamentalshiftinperspective.Migrationisoftenviewedasaproblemratherthananinevitableprocessthatcarriesvastpotentialtostimulatedevelopment,addresslabourmarketgaps,fosterentrepreneurshipandinnovation,promoteinterculturalunderstanding,andfacilitatepolitical,socialandeconomic linkages.Althoughmigrantsareproductivemembersofsociety,theirvalueisfartoooftenmisunderstood.Poorpublicperception of migrants has restricted the ability ofpoliticians to develop realistic and evidence-basedpolicies tomanagemigrationand integration.Thereisa risk that immigrationpolicies inmanycountrieswill be shaped by fears and misconceptions ratherthan facts and a strategic outlook for the future.Wemust therefore encourage political courage andaccountability.

4. Integrating migration into the post-2015 global development agenda

Despite these challenges, I remain highly optimisticfor 2015.Migration is a vital lifeline for more than1 billion people today, offering opportunities toescape poverty and conflict. When the MillenniumDevelopmentGoalswereadoptedin2000,migrationand its linktodevelopmentreceived littleattention.Sincethen,thebenefitsofmigrationfordevelopmenthave been increasingly recognized, and now weseerealsignsthatmigrationcanbepartofthenewdevelopmentagendaforthenext15years.

There are important references to migration inthe report of the Open working Group (OWG)on Sustainable Development Goals: combattingtrafficking in persons, protecting migrant workerrights, reducing remittances transaction costs, andfacilitating orderly and safe migration. There areeffortstodisaggregatedata–includingbymigratorystatus –which is vital in ensuring thatmigrants areaccordedtheirfullhumanrights, includingaccesstohealthservices,educationandsocialprotection.Theinclusion of migration in the OWG report marks acriticalsteptowardsensuringaplaceformigrationinthepost-2015agenda.

Much work remains – including an agreement onappropriate, sufficient and effective measures tomonitorandevaluateprogressagainstthegoalsandtargets,andtoensuremigrationremainsinthefinalagendatobecompletedlaterthisyear.

Conclusion

In conclusion, migration remains a defining featureofthetwenty-firstcentury,andthewayinwhichweapproachitwillhavepowerfulimplicationsforsocietiesaroundtheglobeandforgenerationstocome.Wearecalledtobetterrespondtothecomplexhumanitariancrisescurrentlytestingtheinternationalcommunity;notonlycanwehelpmorepeopletosafety,butweneed to ensure the vast potential of those living indisplacement is expressed. We need to save livesandensuremigrationissafeandhumane.Finally,weneedtocommunicateeffectivelyaboutmigrationsopoliciesarebasedonevidenceandforesight. Ifwellmanaged,migration has great potential not just formigrants but also for their societies of origin anddestination.

References

InternalDisplacementMonitoringCentren.d. Global figures. Available from www.

internal-displacement.org/.

WorldBank2014 Migration and Remittances: Recent

Developments and Outlook – SpecialTopic: Forced Migration. Migration and Development Brief, 6 October.Available from http://siteresources.w o r l d b a n k . o r g / I N T P RO S P E C T S /Resources/334934-1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief23.pdf.

http://www.internal-displacement.org/

http://www.internal-displacement.org/

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-1288990760745/MigrationandDevelopmentBrief23.pdf





Refugee and asylum issues are at the centreofpublic debate today inways theyhavenotbeeninmanyyears.Withseveralregionsofthe

worldshakenbymetastasizingconflicts,andoldcrisesdragging onwithout being resolved, the number offorciblydisplacedpeopleworldwide–51million–ishigherthanatanytimeinourhistory.

At times like these, respect for the principles ofrefugee protection is more important than ever. Ithastobeapplaudedthat,byandlarge,firstcountriesof asylum continue to keep their borders open torefugees and communities the world over go onshowing remarkable generosity and solidarity withthe plight of peoplewho have been forced to flee.This is especially the case in the world’s poorestregions,wherenearly90percentofallrefugeesfindshelter,andwheretheirpresence,oftenreachingthehundredsofthousands,overstretchesthecapacityofgovernmentsandlocalcommunities.

But the institution of asylum is also being heavilytested, not least in many parts of the developedworld.Moreandmorepeoplearebeingdriven intothehandsofpopulistsandxenophobes,andagrowingnumberofpoliticalpartiesandirresponsibleelementsof the media are fuelling such sentiments. Thesechallenges sharply underline the responsibility thatfallstomainstreampoliticians,journalists,educators,and civil society leaders in fostering tolerance anddialogue to counter these tendencies and buildsocietiesthataretruetotheirownvaluesandopentoall.Atthesametime,governmentshaveadutytomanagetheirbordersinawaythatnotonlyensuressecuritybutalsorespectstherightsofpeoplewishingtoseekinternationalprotection.

In this context, the rising trend of asylum-seekersand migrants arriving in Europe by boat acrossthe Mediterranean highlights some of today’s keychallengesinasylumpolicy:protection at sea, access to territory and the future course of the Common

Outlook on global asylum/refugee policy challenges in 2015António Guterres1

1 AntónioGuterresistheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR).

European Asylum System (CEAS). More globalchallengesforasylumpolicymakersincludetheneedtoendroutinedetentionofasylum-seekers,improvechild protection safeguardsandhaveastrongerfocusondurable solutions.

Lastyear,nearly220,000peoplefledtheircountriesby unsafe boat across the Mediterranean – morethan three times the previous record during theLibyan civil war of 2011. Over half of them camefromrefugee-producingcountries,mainlytheSyrianArab Republic, indicating that a majority of peoplenow embark on these dangerous journeys out offearofpersecutionandforlackofalternativeroutesto safety. Increaseshavealsobeen seen in theGulfof Aden, South-East Asia and the Caribbean, with360,000 peopleworldwide estimated to have takentotheseas.Globally,morethan4,300personswerereporteddeadormissingatsealastyearasaresultofthesemovements,andtherealnumberisprobablyconsiderably higher. Countless others were abusedand beaten by smugglers, or kidnapped and forcedintotraffickingnetworks.

Much of the public debate today focuses on whatmustbedonetocurbsmuggling,andindeedamuchstrongerresponseisneededinthisareatoaddressthecurrent tragedy. But notwithstanding these efforts,themosturgentprioritywithregardto protection at sea mustbetosavelives.AfterthephaseoutoftheItalianMareNostrumoperation,whichrescuedsome160,000people,itisworryingthattherearecurrentlyno European plans to maintain a similarly robustsearchandrescuecapacityintheMediterranean.Thisgapmusturgentlybefilled,ormanymorepeoplemaydietryingtofindsafety.

TheresponsetoboatmovementsinEurope–likeintheAsia-Pacificandotherregionsoftheworld–mustalso include more predictable regional frameworksforrescueandsafedisembarkationandforaccesstoprotectionandsolutionsforthoserescuedatsea.ThiscannotbedonewithoutclosecooperationamongtheaffectedStatestoensurethatcommonresponsibilitiesareshared fairly.Governmentsshouldalso focusonstrengtheningreceptionconditionsandensuringthat


peopleinneedofinternationalprotectionhaveswiftaccesstoasylumprocedures.

The need for improved access to territory for thepurpose of seeking protection is related to thechallengeofmixedmaritimemigration,andalsogoesbeyondit.Mostfundamentally,thismeansprotection-sensitive border management and abstention fromsuch practices as push-backs and denial of entry atborders. But beyond this, governments must alsocreate more legal alternatives for entry, to helpreducethenumberofpeopleresortingtosmugglersand unsafe means of travel. Resettlement andhumanitarianadmissionplaces,flexiblevisapolicies,expanded family reunification, private sponsorshipandacademicscholarshipsaresomeofthemeasuresgovernments and civil society should strengthen toensure people in need of protection are not forcedto risk their lives to reach safety. This would alsocontributetoreducingtheriskofhumantrafficking.

Inadditiontotheseglobalchallenges,2015isalsoakeymoment in Europe for defining the next phaseof the CEAS, with the deadline for transposing therevisedEuropeanUnion (EU) legislation set for July.Many EU Member States are progressing on theimplementationoftheCEASintheirnationallawsandpolicies.However,agenuinecommonsystemwillonlyemerge through full and effective implementationby all EU Member States, based on responsibility-sharing, solidarity and trust. At the moment, thequalityof receptionconditions, asylumpracticeandintegrationconditionsvaryenormously,whichcausesdeepimbalanceswithintheUnion,withtwocountries(Germany and Sweden) receiving half of all asylumclaimslodgedin2014.

On a global level, other asylum policy challengesdeservetobehighlightedatleastbriefly.Theroutinedetention of asylum-seekers, including children andfamilies, is still awidespreadpractice thathasbeenfoundtohaveadevastatinghumanimpactonpeoplewithoftentraumaticexperiencesofpersecutionandflight. UNHCR’s global strategy Beyond Detentionaimstosupportgovernmentsinendingthispractice–most urgently for children – and use appropriatealternativestodetention.

Another challenge is child protection. The numberofrefugeesandasylum-seekersundertheageof18has been on the rise for several years, reaching 50per cent of the world’s refugee population at theendof2013. In addition,moreunaccompaniedand

separated children are claiming asylum than everbefore. Caring for and finding durable solutions forthesechildren,consideringtheirbestinterests,inlinewiththeConventionontheRightsoftheChild,posesmanypracticalchallengestonationalasylumsystems.There is an obvious need for strong safeguards,practicalapproachesandchild-sensitivemechanisms.UNHCR and UNICEF have collaborated on guidancetoEuropeanStatesonrespectingthebestinterestofunaccompanied and separated children which putsforwardpracticalwaystohelpaddressthisproblem.

Afinalchallengefor2015relatestorefugees’accessto durable solutions.With seriousobstacles to safeand sustainable return remaining inmany countriesoforigin,voluntaryrepatriationtrendshavebeenlowin recent years. This underlines the need for moreeffective conflict prevention and conflict resolution– essentially a question of political will. With sofew refugees able to go home, improving access todurablesolutionsrequiresmorerobustresettlementprogrammes aswell as better integration in asylumcountries. But given the increased complexity andprotractedness of displacement today, we need abroader emphasis on solutions that goes beyondtraditional approaches. The focus should also beon supporting refugee self-reliance and livelihoods,forgingcloserpartnershipswithdevelopmentactors,andfosteringcreativeapproachessuchasthelabourmobility schemes for refugees currently beingexploredinLatinAmerica.

The unprecedented magnitude and complexityof forced displacement today, and the importantprotection dimension within it, has an enormousimpact on asylum countries and host communities– but even more so on the lives of the individualrefugeesconcerned.Formanysocieties,thewelcometheygivetoasylum-seekersandotherforeignershasbecome the frontline in a battleof values. Thewaygovernmentsandtheirpopulationsrespondtothesechallenges–in2015andbeyond–willnotonlybeanindicatorofoursocieties’strengths,butadeterminingfactorinthefuturecourseofacenturythatisalreadybeingshapedsofundamentallybythephenomenonofpeopleonthemove.n


Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in Africa in 2014, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2015, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?

Aderanti Adepoju: There are many importantpolicy challenges in Africa in 2015, but the mostimportantonerelatestoweakgovernancestructuresand inadequate institutional capacity of officialsand key stakeholders to formulate and implementcomprehensive migration policies. The lack ofawareness within government departments atnationalandespeciallyatsubnationallevelsisevidentinthefewcountriesthathaveformulatedamigrationpolicy, albeit in draft form (such as Liberia, Nigeria,Rwanda,UgandaandZimbabwe)orareintheprocessof crafting such policy, as in Burundi, Ghana, MaliandtheUnitedRepublicofTanzania.Alliedwiththisis thefactthatup-to-datemigrationdataarescantyandwhereavailablearenotcollectedandanalysedinuser-friendly format to inform appropriatepolicymaking.

Thesecondkeypolicychallengerelatestoinadequatepublic support for migration issues manifest ininsufficient public funding or, in some cases, zerobudget allocation for migration concerns. Thissituationwillworsen;withausteritybudget in2015,migration matters will receive lesser attention.Countries have relied on the international donorcommunity toprovide funding formigration, forcedmigration and asylum matters. Few countries haveallocatedregularbudgetsfortheseactivities,relyinginstead on the European Union DevelopmentFund/IOM Development Fund. In general, Africangovernments have not factored migration issuesinto national development programmes, except formigration,diasporaandremittancesissues.

The third policy challenge is the lacklustre politicalwill, support and engagement inmigrationmatters,

which also translates into poor coordination,participationandcollaborationinsubregionalagendasas in the Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS), the South African DevelopmentCommunity(SADC),theEastAfricanCommunity(EAC)and,tosomeextent,theCommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica(COMESA),whicharepromotingfreeor “facilitated”movementofpersons, and toavaryingdegree,residenceandestablishment.Thereisamanifest disconnect between the political leadersandthegeneralpopulationonmigrationmatters:thelatterdonotseemtotrust–orhaveconfidencein–theirleaders,andtheleadersdonotcarryalongthepopulation,andhavefailedtoengageandinvolvetheyouthwhoarethetargetformigrationprogrammes.

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in Africa likely to evolve in the course of 2015, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and number and profiles of migrants?

Aderanti Adepoju:Severalelementswoulddeterminethe migratory configurations in terms of levels andstructureofmigrationflows.Theseincludetheeffectsof the rapidly declining oil prices in Africa’s majoroil-producing countries, namely, Angola, Libya andNigeria; the lingering consequences of the Ebolacrisisontravelrestrictions,productionandmobility;insecurity, especially the spread of the Islamicfundamentalistinsurgency,initiallylocalizedinNigeriabut gradually assuming a subregional dimension (inWest and Central Africa); and uncertainties aboutthepresidentialelectionoutcomesinseveralAfricancountries.

Thevolumeof intra-Africanmigrationwill shrink,asthemajordestinationcountriesexperienceeconomicdifficulties. High domestic unemployment willexacerbatexenophobicreactionsagainstimmigrants.Concurrently,failurebyAfricancountriestogenerate,in general, viable youth employment will triggerincreasedemigration,mainlytodevelopedcountries,some ofwhich are also facing economic stagnationand sluggish recovery. These migrants will includeyoungercohortsofboysandgirlswhohavestruggled

Outlook on migration in Africa in 2015Aderanti Adepoju1

1 Aderanti Adepoju is the Coordinator of the Network ofMigrationResearchonAfrica(NOMRA).


unsuccessfullytosecureemployment,andworststill,failed to secure admission into, and dropouts from,tertiaryeducationalinstitutions,asinNigeria.

The triggers for emigration – young population,excruciating poverty and high unemployment –willintensify in 2015. The vast majority of the millionsofAfrica’syouthtobereleasedintothelabourforcedo not possess the skills to enhance the prospectsfor employability. All over the region, the bleak jobmarketsituation,alsoaresultofeconomicslowdown,willpushmanyyouthtojointhequeueofjob-seekerssurreptitiously into more prosperous parts of Asia,EuropeandNorthAmerica. The spectreof irregularmigrantsriskingtheirlivestoforciblyentersouthernItalyonovercrowdedricketyboatsoracrossthedesert(witnessed in 2014) would intensify, in large partbecauseofthehugeemploymentdeficitinAfrica,inthefaceofbourgeoningyoungschoolleavers.Manyof these youth will be more desperate, hoping toexchangemiseryandthebleaklifeathomewiththeuncertainfutureinEurope.Forthesereasons,severalcountriesofemigration–suchasBurkinaFaso,Chad,Ethiopia, Lesotho,Mali and Somalia –will continuetoexperienceperhapshigher levelsofemigrationin2015.

Libya, once a major migrant-receiving country, isvirtually a failed State, with many of its nationalsfleeing internecine wars, seeking refuge in Europe.Côte d’Ivoire, anothermagnet formigrants inWestAfrica,isjustrecovering,albeitsluggishly,fromyearsofinstability.Itisnowacountryofimmigration,transitandemigrationas isNigeria,regardedashavingthelargest (services sector-based) economy in Africa.In all these countries, unemployment is a majordevelopmentchallengeandatriggerforemigration.

Take South Africa, for example –more than 50 percentofitsyouthaged15to24areunemployed,thethirdhighestintheworld,afterGreeceandSpain.InNigeria,over1millionunemployedyouthareapplyingforjobswherefewerthan5,000peopleareneeded.In 2012, 11.1million youth (23.9%) inNigeriawereunemployed,andtwothirdsof themwere15 to24yearsold.Thebleakpictureisreflectedinthefigurethatabout20percentofyouthunemploymentconsistsofuniversitygraduates,whoremainunemployedforupwardsoffiveyearsaftergraduation.This is tobeadded to another 20 per cent of unemployed withsecondaryschooleducation.

Renewed conflicts in South Sudan and the CentralAfrican Republic, and conscription in Eritrea, willpropel youth emigration, refugeeism and internaldisplacement.Theinsurgencyinnorth-easternNigeriahas forced thousands across borders into Chad,CameroonandNiger,andthereseemstobenoendin sight. Several thousand others remain internallydisplacedinneighbouringStatesofthecountry.

Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in Africa in 2015, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?

Aderanti Adepoju: Many African countries, withassistancefromIOM,haveproducedMigrationProfiles(Benin, 2011; Cameroon, CaboVerde, Côted’Ivoire,theDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,Ghana,Mali,Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 2009; Ghana,2006; Namibia, 2014; Sudan, 2011; Uganda, 2013;Zimbabwe,2010),whichareexpectedtoformthebasisfortheformulationofmigrationpolicies.Sofar,draftmigration policies exist in Burundi, Ghana, Liberia,Mali, Nigeria and Uganda. Botswana, the UnitedRepublicofTanzaniaandZimbabweareintheprocessof formulating such policywith strong emphasis oncurtailing irregularmigration and human trafficking,aswellasfosteringthemigration–developmentnexusviathediasporaandremittances.However,manyofthesedraftshavenotbeenapprovednorendorsedbygovernment.

Thegoodnews,however,isthatafewAfricancountrieshave now signed memorandums of understanding(MOUs) on mobility partnership with the EU topromoteenhancedregionalmobility,employmentandintegration,andbolsterpoliticalwillandmomentumamongAfricanleadersandplanners.2015andbeyondwill featureaseriesofMOUsonmigrationbetweenAfricancountriesandmultilaterallywiththeEUandbilaterally with individual European countries (e.g.Nigeriaand theNetherlands inMarch2014;Nigeriaand Finland in January 2015) on irregularmigrationandhumantrafficking.

The populations of major migration-receivingcountries are likely to be more intolerant, withmigrants and asylum-seekers being targeted andharassed, as in South Africa, while hatred betweenlocalpopulationsandimmigrantswillbeontherise.


The consequences of joblessness and diminishedwelfare for the working poor will heighten frictionwith immigrants being scapegoats for failures toimprove incomes, living conditions and welfare ofthe people. With job losses looming in both thepublic and private sectors inNigeria, 2015 is set towitness stronger resentments against immigrants,especially from ECOWAS Member States that havetaken advantageof the protocol on freemovementofpersons,residenceandestablishmenttoresideinthecountry.

InSouthAfrica,thelingeringdistrustandfearbetweenand within various groups – nationals, immigrants,and unskilled and skilled persons – is amplified bytherealitythattherearenotenoughrightpeopleforthejobs,andtherearenotenoughjobsfortherightpeople. Economic growth in South Africa, a majorcountryofimmigrationinAfrica,isstuntedbydifficultlabour relationsand, recently, inadequateelectricitysupply.

Unlikethecurrenttrend inEuropewherepoliticianscan no longer ignore migration issues in electioncampaigns,onlyinSouthAfricahavemigrationissuesand discourse featured in municipal and nationalelections,andeven then the focushasbeenon thenegativeperspectivesofmigration–theusualclichéthatmigrants are scavengers who steal jobsmeantfor the local population, exploit the social services,increase crime and “swarm the cities”. As nationaleconomiesinmajoroil-producingcountries–Gabon,Libya, Nigeria– as well as in South Africa and Côted’Ivoire, continue to shrink, politicians may oncemoreturnthesearchlightontheimmigrantsaseasyscapegoats for all the economic woes and failingsof governments to provide jobs for nationals. Theconsequence is to further strain relations betweenimmigrantsandlocalpopulation.

The simmering public discontent with the Chinese“invasion” of Africa’s small and medium-sizedenterprise business could culminate in openconfrontation with Chinese migrant workers andtraders.Withover1millionChinese,mostlyinAngola,Mozambique,NigeriaandZambia,thepoorandharshlabourconditionsofChineseemployerscouldfurtheraggravate the resentment to aggressive and smartChinese practices. The case of counterpart trainingis beingneglectedand themultiplier effectofmostprojects on local economies is severely limited. Inofficialbutmostlyprivatediscourse,theChinesearealsoperceivedaswooingandsustainingcorruptand

dictatorial leaders, for example in Zimbabwe andSudan.

2014 witnessed unprecedented Ebola-relatedcasualties in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, andinfectionsinNigeria,promptingmanygovernmentsinandoutofAfrica to close theirbordersand imposerestrictions on movement of persons living in ortransiting from the worst-afflicted areas. Countriesaround the world reinforced border controls toregulatetravelfromandwithinWestAfricatopreventthe spreadof the Ebola virus. ThehighmovementsbetweenGuinea,LiberiaandSierraLeonegeneratedthe infection of 18,000 and the death of 6,400 by7 December 2014. While laudable progress hasbeenmade in curtailing the scourge, precautionarymeasures may trigger additional restrictions ratherthanarelaxationofexistingmeasuresonmobilityofpersons.NationalsofmostWestAfricancountriesarestigmatized inmany countriesof theworld, a trendthatmaypersistdeepinto2015andbeyond.

About 14 presidential, legislative and municipalelections are scheduled for 2015 – in BurkinaFaso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Côted’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guinea, Lesotho, Nigeria, SouthSudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Togo andZambia.Electionsinsituationsofprevailingconflicts,ethnoreligious tensions, opposition to dictatorialand corrupt regimes in power, and attempts tofalsifytheelectoralprocessandelectionresultsortounconstitutionallyprolongtenureinofficecouldfuelcivilunrest,leadingtopopulationdisplacementsacrosstheregion,goingbyexperienceinBurkinaFaso,Côted’Ivoire, Kenya andGuinea. The intelligentsia, tradeunionistsandactivistsattheforefrontofthecrusadefordemocraticgovernancemaybe forced intoexileindrovesandseekasylumindevelopedcountries,aswas the case inNigeriaduring thedespoticmilitaryrule.

Internally displaced persons would escalate, asconflicts continue to rage in the Central AfricanRepublic,Libya,SomaliaandSouthSudan,aswellasthe insurgency inNigeria that isgraduallyspreadingtoChadandCameroon.Manymaybeseekingrefugeacross national borders. In a situation of scarceand dwindling resources, friction between localpopulations,overwhelmedbytheinfluxofdisplacedpersons, is likely to inflameexistingmistrust amongbothpopulations.


ThediscourseaboutAfricansinthediasporahasbeenovershadowed by the huge remittances they sendhome, their skills, transnationalpractices, tradeandinvestment.Theflipside,relatingtotheirinvolvementin the political process in their countries of origin,is increasingly assuming centre stage, more so as2015 is a year ofmultiple elections at thenational,provincial and local levels in over 14 countries. Thediaspora populations are calling for recognitionas economic actors, and also as importantly forlegislationrelatingtodualcitizenship,diasporapolicyespeciallyonvotingrights,citizen-foreignerrelationsandparticipation in thedemocraticprocess.NigeriahasmovedaheadtoestablishadiasporacommitteeintheNationalAssemblyto,amongotherfunctions,foster closer collaboration with nationals in thediaspora.ADiasporaDayisobservedannuallyon25July, andaDiasporaPolicyhasbeendrafted.On20January 2014, Kenya’s President officially launched

the country’s Diaspora Policy, designed to tap theenormouspotentialofthediasporaintermsofskills,knowledgeandexpertise.ThehugeremittanceflowsfromthediasporatotheircountriesoforigininAfricawillencourageothercountriestofollowtheexampleof Kenya in formulating and officially endorsingdiasporapolicies.

With concerted advocacy, many more Africancountries should ratify the International Conventionon the Protection of the Rights of AllMigrants andMembersoftheirFamilies,andfactormigrationintothe post-2015 Millennium Development Goals andSustainable Development Goals by mainstreamingmigration as an enabler at local and national levelsfordevelopment.Thiswillimplyimprovingmigrationgovernanceandinstitutionalcapacityandpromotingandprotectingmigrants’rights.n

“The huge remittance flows from the diaspora to their

countries of origin in Africa will encourage other countries to follow the example of Kenya in formulating and officially

endorsing diaspora policies.”


Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in Asia in 2014, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2015, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?

Manolo Abella:Inmyviewthethreemostimportantpolicychallengesfor2015inAsiaare:

•The steep decline in oil prices, which will likelyaffect the implementation ofmany constructionprojects in the Gulf Stateswheremore than 10percentofthe11millionmigrantworkersareintheconstructionsector,six inevery10ofwhomare Asians. The majority of these constructionworkers come from South Asia, especiallyBangladeshand India,and fromSouth-EastAsia,notably the Philippines and Indonesia. As inprevious downturns, project contractors with aweakfinancialbasewill likelyfind themselves introuble,leadinginevitablytodelayedpaymentofwages if not outright abandonment of workerswhomayhaveworkedwithout receivingpay forsome months. Authorities in the Gulf will needto closelymonitor these developments, developstrategiesforminimizingbankruptcies,andinsurethatworkersarepaidthewagesandsalariesdueto them. Foreign workers laid off prematurelywouldnothavehadanopportunitytorecouptheirinvestments inmigration and are likely to try tostay,eveninanirregularsituation,unlessassistedinfindingalternativeemployment.OthersectorsintheeconomiesoftheGulfregionthatemploylargenumbersofforeignworkers–likeretailtrade,transport and domestic services – have provenmore resilient in past economic downturns, andthemigrantworkers theyemployedhave largelymanagedtostayintheirjobs.

Outlook on migration in Asia in 2015Manolo Abella1

1 ManoloAbella is a SeniorResearchAssociate at theCentreonMigration,PolicyandSociety(COMPAS),OxfordUniversity,andformerDirectoroftheInternationalMigrationProgrammeattheILOinGeneva.

The halving of crude oil prices from 2012 toJanuary2015isatthesametimeaboontoothercountries, including the migrants’ countries oforigin.Nevertheless,itisunlikelythatsatisfactoryalternative employment, at home or elsewhere,willbecreatedintimetoabsorbthosedislocated.Authorities in countries of origin will need toprepare for significant increases in return flowsandnon-extensionof contracts during the latterpartof2015.

•For the Member States of the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), theestablishmentoftheASEANEconomicCommunity(AEC) in 2015 presents opportunities andchallenges.Thecompleteremovaloftariffbarriersandthecommitmenttobringdownprogressivelynon-tariff barriers to trade among the MemberStates is expected to profoundly impact on theeconomies of the region. These measures andother related commitments under the AEC areexpectedtobringaboutanywherefrom3percentto12percentriseinGDP,dependingonthecountry.Studies undertaken by the Asian DevelopmentBank and the International Labour Organization(ILO) project that some of the biggest gainswillbe made by the new members of ASEAN likeVietNamandCambodia,whichhavelaggedbehindthe original members. The creation of a singlemarketforASEANfarmersandmanufacturerswilllead to significant restructuring of industries, aseach country exploits its comparative advantageintrade.Asaconsequenceofthefreemovementof goods and services across national borders,somesectors/industries(orcrops)ineachcountryare likely to expand while others are likely tocontract. While some jobs will be lost, on thewholetheestablishmentoftheAECisprojectedtosignificantlyraiseoverallincomesandemploymentacrossthewholeregion.

Economies of scale and the economics ofagglomeration are, in the short to mediumterm, likely to bring about a concentration ofinvestments in the economies that have well-developed infrastructure, ready supply of skilledworkers, and advanced logistics and business


networks in the region. The major challengefor policymakers in these countries is how toprogressively steer industries away from pathdependenceinaccesstocheaplow-skilledforeignlabour,encourageindustriestomoveupthevaluechains,andassistworkers likely tobedislocatedwhenlabour-intensiveoperationsareoffshoredtoothercountries.Thesechallengesareparticularlycogent forMalaysia and Thailand, twoMemberStatesofASEANwhereagglomerationadvantagescompounded by low wages for foreign workerslead to maintaining low-productivity industries.As Thailand has much better infrastructure andaccesstocheapmigrantlabourthanMyanmarortheLaoPeople’sDemocraticRepublic,itmakesforanexcellentproductionbaseforindustriesaimingtotaptheASEANsinglemarket.

ASEAN has made less progress with creating asinglemarketforservicesevenifthereisalreadyan ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services(AFAS) aimed at liberalizing trade in servicesamong the countries.Although inpractice somecountriesarequiteliberal,asawholetheASEANregionappearstohavemorerestrictivepoliciesonservicestradethanotherregions.Thereareshiftstowards openness in some fields and towardsmore restrictions in others, although Singaporeand Cambodia are the two countries that haveconsistentlybeenopentoimportingservicesfromothercountriesinandoutsideASEAN.Thechallengeisfortheothercountriestoresistpressuresfrombusiness lobbies at home for protection andseriouslyliveuptotheircommitmentsundertheAFAS.All theMember States stand to gain fromsharingexpertisethroughthefreermovementofskilledandprofessionalpersonnelinmanyfields,frommedicinetotransportandtourism.

•Thethirdchallengein2015isthatofcurbingthethriving business of smuggling asylum-seekersthroughAsiaandprovidingasafehavenforthosefleeing from violence and persecution. There isthe plight of Rohingya refugees fromMyanmar,more than 140,000 of whom are now living intemporarycampsandsheltersinSouth-EastAsiaaccordingtotheOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees.AfterbeingforcedoutoftheRakhineStateinMyanmarbutrefusedentryintoBangladesh,most are “Stateless”. Thereareabout200,000RohingyaslivinginBangladesh,ofwhomonly32,000aredocumented.TheconflictintheSyrianArabRepublichasdisplacedmillionsofpeople, someofwhomfind theirway toAsia

inthehopeofbeinggrantedasyluminAustralia.It is difficult to have a reliable estimate of theirnumbers,butthelastfewyearshaveseengrowthofathrivingbusinessinthesmugglingofrefugeesthrough Indonesia,MalaysiaandThailand.Giventheveryslimchanceofobtainingasylumthroughestablished formal channels, many Syrian andAfghan families are forced to rely on peoplesmugglers who extort enormous sums for theirservices.Australiahas adopted the controversialstrategy of discouraging smuggling by refusingadmissionintoAustraliaofapprehendedasylum-seekers and instead keeping them offshore, inparticularinNauruandPapuaNewGuinea.

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in Asia likely to evolve in the course of 2015, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and number and profiles of migrants?

Manolo Abella: I think that in2015wewill see thefollowingmigrationtrends:

• In 2008, the six Gulf Cooperation Council Statesreportedhaving11millionnon-nationalworkersontheirterritories,ofwhomatleast60percentwereAsians. I foreseea significant slowdownofthe Asian worker flows to the Gulf States, withincreasing return flows towards the latter partof the year. Since domestic service workers areunlikely to be affected by economic slowdown,the composition of Asian workforce in the Gulfwill become increasingly female. There will besomeincreaseinthenumberofAsianworkersinanirregularsituation,aslaidoffworkerstrytofindalternativewaysofrecoupingtheirinvestmentsinmigration.

•A slowdown in theflowsofworkers to Thailandfrom neighbouring Myanmar and Cambodiaon account of the sluggish growth of the Thaieconomy on the one hand, and the increasingemploymentopportunitiesinthesourcecountriesontheotherhand.

• Increasing flows of production workers to theRepublicofKoreaandTaiwanProvinceofChina,whose economies are closely tied to theUnitedStatesandChina.

•Continuing shifts in the composition of migrantworkersadmittedtoSingaporefromlow-tohigh-skilled workers drawn not only from within theregionbutalsofromoutside.


• IncreasingflowsofhighlyskilledAsianmigrantstotheUnited States, especially from India and thePhilippines,astheUSeconomycontinuestogrowatarapidpaceandthelabourmarkettightens.Ontheotherhand,Canada’soil-richprovinceswillbeunlikelytocontinuebringinginforeignworkersasoilpricesplummet.

• Increasing outflows of Chinese youth wishingto study abroad, especially to the Anglo-Saxoncountries; at the same time, increased flows ofAsianandotherforeignstudentstoChina,whichhas launched a programme to promote suchexchanges. China already hosts more foreignstudentsthanAustraliaorCanada.

Since there are large flows over porous borders inmanypartsofAsia,itisdifficulttohaveafirmestimateofthesizeofyearlymigrationflows.Governmentsareonly able to report on the number ofworkerswhoregistertheircontractspriortogoingabroad;hence,their statisticsdonot include thosenot requiredbylaworregulationstoregisterbeforeleaving(suchasin India) and doing clandestine movements acrossborders. Over four years, from 2005 to 2009, thenumber of workers reported by nine South- andEast-Asian governments as migrating abroad foremployment rose by over 40 per cent, from 2.7millionto3.9million.Thegrowthisunlikelytobeasfastin2015.Thiswillalsoholdtruefortheinformalmovements such as those of Burmese workersmigrating toThailandand IndonesianworkersgoingtoMalaysia.

In 2013, intra-ASEANmigrants numbered some 6.5million. It is unlikely to increase in 2015 since oneof the biggest destination countries, Thailand, isunlikelytoabsorbmore.Countriesthatwill increaseabsorptionofforeignworkerswillbeselectiveofthehighly skilled whose numbers still represent but asmallproportionofthetotalflows.

Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in Asia in 2015, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?

Manolo Abella: In the ASEAN, themost immediateissueistheseriousimplementationoftheagreementsonmutual recognitionofprofessionalqualifications.TheASEANmembershaveagreed to allow the freemovement of the highly skilled and to facilitate

such movements through mutual recognition ofqualifications earned in another Member State.Mutualrecognitionagreementshavebeenreachedinsevenprofessions–medicaldoctors,dentists,nurses,architects,engineersandsurveyors,accountantsandtourismprofessionals–butadoptionofthenecessarymeasuresatnational levels togivesubstancetotheagreements has been slow and many regulationsremainopaque.

Although the large majority of the estimated4.5millionintra-ASEANlabourmigrantsareinmanualorlow-skilloccupations,allowingtheirfreemovementamongtheMemberStatesisnotyetontheagendaoftheassociation.

TheGulfStatesarethemainsponsorsoftheso-calledAbuDhabiDialogue,whichhasyettofindaconcreteprojectwhichtheAsianandtheArabsidescanjointlydevelop.Whattodowiththerecruitmentsystemtocurbabusesandminimizerecruitmentcostspaidbythe workers remains a fundamental concern of allparties and would ideally be the common projectfortheAbuDhabiDialogue;however,theconditionsin the labourmarket likely to emerge following thecollapseofoilpricesdonotaugurwellforitssuccess.

In Thailand, the Government is giving priority tocombatting human trafficking including curbingterrible abuses of migrant workers in the fishingindustry. Getting Thailand off the United Statestrafficking in persons tier 3 placement is the mainconcern because, as the PrimeMinister put it, thecountry’s reputation is at stake. There is also anongoing campaign to register and regularize thestatus of undocumented migrants in Thailand. TheGovernmenthasreducedfeesandtaxestoencouragemoreemployerstoregisterthemigrantstheyemploy.

InJapan,consultationsarebeingheldonthematterof establishing a specialized agency to oversee theforeign traineesystem,whichhasbecomethemainchannel for small and medium-sized companiesto access unskilled foreign labour, even for shortdurations.n

Vol. IV, Number 5, December 2014–January 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE16

Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in the Caribbean in 2014, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2015, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?

Joanne van Selm: The Caribbean region will faceseveralmigrationpolicychallengesin2015.Someofthesewillberegionallyspecific,otherswillstemfromexogenousfactors,andparticularlytheconsequencesof policy changes and media messages from theUnitedStates.

Starting with one of the major outside influencesandits impactonirregularmigrationflowsfromtheCaribbean in particular – recent years have seenincreases in boat departures to the United States from various Caribbean nations (3,378 migrantswereinterceptedin2014,upfromjustover2,000in2013).Mostprominentamongthesestatisticallyandpolitically are Cuban migrants attempting to reachFlorida.PoliticaldevelopmentsbetweenWashingtonandHavana in late2014 translated intouncertaintyabout future changes in the “wet foot–dry foot”approach to Cubans landing in Florida (wherebyparole is granted to thosewhomake it to landandtheir immigration future is assured, whereas thoseintercepted at sea are returned to the island).PeopleworriedthataneasyavenuetoachievelegalimmigrationtotheUnitedStates,albeitbyadangerousand irregularentry,might soon closeare rushing toavail themselvesof theopportunity.A spike inboatdeparturesand interceptionswasseen(therewasathree-foldincreaseininterceptions–117peoplewereinterceptedinDecember2013,and481inDecember2014).Thistrendislikelytobesustaineduntilthereismoreclarityontheimpactofthere-establishmentofdiplomaticrelationsontravelandimmigrationstatusforCubansarrivingintheUnitedStates.

Outlook on migration in the Caribbean in 2015Joanne van Selm1

1 Joanne van Selm is Eurasylum’s Associate Director forResearch,andisoneoftheEditorialAdvisersofthe Migration Policy Practice.Shealsoworksasanindependentconsultantoninternationalmigration,asylumandrefugeepolicies,andiscurrentlybasedinKingston,Jamaica.

Citizensofotherislands,aswellasMexico,havealsobeen intercepted at sea in greater numbers thanpreviouslyinlate2014,andthereisnoreasontothinkthattheirdepartureratewillbestemmedunlesstherearesignificanteconomicandsocialdevelopments inthe Caribbean nations, or greater enforcement anddiscouragement on the US side. Haitians, fleeingtheendemicpoverty in theircountry,aswellas thelingering impacts of natural disasters and politicalturmoil, havebeen statistically second toCubans ineffortstoreachtheUnitedStatesbyboat,followedbycitizensoftheDominicanRepublicandMexico.

Thepolicychallenges for theCaribbeanStates lie inresolving those factors that stimulate the desire toleave in an irregularway–but given the significanteconomic and social gaps between developingcountries and highly developed neighbours, that isgoing to be difficult. Obviously, the consequenceof interceptions, whether at sea or in the form ofapprehensionsatsomepointduringanirregularstay,becomes deportation, with the associated policychallenge of reintegrating those people to theirCaribbeanhomeland.

Another migration area that will pose policychallengestoCaribbeannationsisthatoftrafficking in human beings. The phenomenon ofmodern-dayslaveryhasbothdomesticandinternationalfacetsinthe region.While relatively little research has beendoneontraffickingintheCaribbeanascomparedtoEurope,AsiaandNorthAmerica,it isestimatedthatsome10percentofvictimsworldwidearefromLatinAmerica and the Caribbean. Caribbean countriesareallateithertier2(notcomplyingwithminimumstandards,butmakingeffortstodoso)ortier2WatchList(requiringgreaterefforts)ontheUSDepartmentof State’s Trafficking in Persons Report 2014, withtheexceptionofCuba,whichisontier3,foritsnon-compliancewithinternationalminimumstandardstopreventtraffickinginpersons.

Children appear from the reports available to beparticularly vulnerable, being abducted or soldinto forced servitude and sexual exploitation bothdomestically and internationally. Haitian childrenhavebeenparticularlyprominentinresearchtodate,

Vol. IV, Number 5, December 2014–January 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE 17

butthesituationisnotlimitedtoHaiti,andtraffickingtakes place from all islands, as well as mainlandCaribbean countries. A number of factors specificto the Caribbean play into the way trafficking andexploitation are propagated, including the relativeease,andlackofcontrolon,departuresandarrivalsby boat, and particularly smaller craft; the links todrugtraffickingandotherorganizedcrimewithmajorCaribbeanislandssuchasJamaicabeingconvenientlylocated on routes between supply in Latin Americaand demand in the United States and Europe. TheCaribbeanisnotonlyasourceofvictimsoftraffickingbutalsoatransitlocation,includingforvictimsfromChina and elsewhere in Asia being taken to NorthAmericainparticular.

Informationcampaignsarebecomingmoreprominenton the Caribbean islands, educating the populationand encouraging the ability to both identify victimsandreporttoeithernon-governmentalorganizationsor national authorities. However, both preventionand prosecution are low, and protection of victimsis also lacking. Governments in the Caribbean willbe challenged to strengthen both policies andimplementationinordertobringthesehumanrightsviolationstoanend.

Thethirdofwhatarelikelytobethemostimportantpolicy challenges for 2015 is more specific to theCaribbean region in many ways, namely managing the status and situation of Haitians, particularly intheDominicanRepublic,theBahamas,andTurksandCaicos Islands,and indeedfindingwaystomeetthechallenges of Haitian migration for both economicandprotectionpurposes.

Five years on from the devastating January 2010earthquake, hundreds of thousands of Haitiansremaininternallydisplaced,livinginveryelementaryshelters, without a real solutionwithin the countryto their loss of housing and often livelihoods, too.Answers, reconstruction and development arerequiredwithinHaiti,butresponsesarealsoneededto thosewhoseekabetter lifeelsewhere.Notonlyrecentofcurrentmigrantsneedalong-termsolution,beitthroughsustainablereturnorstatuselsewhere.

In2014,theGovernmentoftheDominicanRepubliccrafted legislation to reverse a previous decision,which had essentially rendered people born in theDominican Republic of Haitian parents who hadimmigrated irregularly Stateless. In practice, thesituationremainsproblematic. Intheory,the24,000

or so people of all ages who suddenly becameStatelessin2013,duetooneorbothoftheirparentsbeing Haitians who had entered the DominicanRepublic illegally, should have been re-regularized.Another21,000whocandemonstratethattheywereborn in the Dominican Republic between 2007 and2010shouldalsobeonapathtocitizenship.However,that still leaves about 200,000 people, according toaUNsurvey,whocannotprove theirplaceofbirth,and whose situation remains precarious. Some120,000peoplehaveapparentlyappliedtoregularizetheirsituation,butonlya fewhundredhavepassedthrough the process to do so,with the rest lackingidentitypapersalthoughtheyhavelivedtheirentirelivesintheDominicanRepublicandclaimtheywerebornthere.

TheDominicanRepublicisdealingwithbothlong-termcitizenship and integration issues, and new arrivalsfrom Haiti. The Governments of both the Bahamasand the Turks and Caicos Islands in particular alsofacefrequentattemptsbyHaitianstoarriveontheirshores.BothGovernmentsheldtalkswiththeHaitianauthorities in 2014, aimed at forging agreementstoprevent theflowofHaitianswilling toundertakeoftenperilousboat journeys inordertoenterthoseterritoriesirregularlytoseekabetterlife.

Inaregionofdisparitiesandextremeinequalities,Haitistandsout for itsdifficultieswithpoverty,historyofweakorpoorgovernance,andfrequentconflictsandnatural disasters. This leads tomigration challengesfortheregionasawhole,and2015couldeitherseerelative stability with associated opportunities forbilateral and multilateral political agreements onmigrationofHaitians,ormoreproblemsandgreatermigrationchallengesforall.

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in the Caribbean likely to evolve in the course of 2015, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and number and profiles of migrants?

Joanne van Selm: There is no reason to anticipatethattheexisting levelsandstructureofmigration intheCaribbeanwillchangesignificantly inthecourseof 2015. Some slight changes could be felt due, forexample,toincreasingeconomicstability,thestrongdollar and greater attention to the ease of doingbusiness on several islands. However, in the globalscheme these are, barring a major unforeseeableevent,likelytobeoflittleimpact.


The most significant migration-related change thisyear might well be in the level of remittances tothe region. Themajority of remittances come fromthe United States, so with the American economylookingset to revive.Given that there iscurrentlyaremittance levelofaboutUSD2billiononaUSD14billioneconomyinJamaica,forexample,evenquiteasmallpercentageincreasecouldhavequiteanimpactforfamilies,communitiesandthecountryasawhole.

TheWorldBankpredictsanincreaseinremittancestotheCaribbeanofsome3percentin2015,followinga 5 per cent increase in 2014 over 2013. In 2015,remittances to the Caribbean are predicted to totalsome USD 67 billion. Surveys have suggested thatabouthalftheCaribbeandiasporasendremittances,andthediasporaisestimatedtoincludeonepersonwith Caribbean roots abroad for every individuallivingintheCaribbeantoday.

Actual migration flows and their structure are,however,notanticipatedtoshowmuchchange.Oneof themost publicly obviousmigration flows in theCaribbeanislikelytoremainreturns,particularlyfromtheUnitedKingdom,Canadaand theUnitedStates.These returns include both people going “home”voluntarily–perhapsconsequenttotheclimate,forexample in retirement,orafteraperiodof studyorwork elsewhere – and people who are deported,consequent to irregular movements as describedaboveaswellasvisaoverstaysandcriminality,linkedtothebroadlypositivehumanrightssituationintheregion.

The Caribbean region (including Central Americancountries) has to take back the largest number ofdeportees from the United States annually, withMexico, Honduras and El Salvador leading thesestatistics.TheDominicanRepublicandJamaicatopthelistinrecentyearsamongtheCaribbeanislandstakingback justover2,000and1,000citizens respectively,deported from the United States. The UnitedKingdomhasdeportedabout500Jamaicansperyearinrecentyears,eitherforcriminaloffencesorduetotheir immigrationstatus,andCanadaseveraldozen,by way of comparison. There are also deportationsbetween Caribbean islands – for example, some3,000Jamaicansweredeportedbyotherislandsoverthe four-year period (2008–2012), again either foroverstaying legal residenceor for criminal activities.Thesestatisticsarelikelytoremainatsimilarlevels.

Some islands remain administrative elements ofEuropean countries – for example, Aruba, Curacao,Sint Maarten and other smaller islands are part oftheKingdomof theNetherlands,whileGuadeloupeand Martinique are French Departments, whileother islands are collectives or dependents. Peopleoriginating from those islandswho are found to beinvolved in criminal activities in the European Stateinquestion cannotbe removedunder current laws,although some politicians would like those laws tochange.

Wealthier Caribbean nationals, often with familyconnections to particular European countries suchastheUnitedKingdom,FranceandtheNetherlands,or to Canada and the United States, often turn tothose countries for a university education, andindeed inmany cases for secondary or high school(boarding school). Although the numbers are notsignificanteitherforthereceivingcountriesorreallyfortheislandsthemselves,theydoconstituteaquiteimportantformofbrain drain,particularlyaspeoplefrequentlycontinueinemploymentinthosecountriesaftertheirstudies.Thecombinationofclimate,familyties and economic opportunities stimulate someentrepreneurial returns, which are encouraged asthey can create further employment opportunitiesfor less advantaged locals. Others in the diasporaofferfinancial support to start-upenterprises in theCaribbeanwhile remaining overseas. All the islandshave some form of return facilitation programme,including tax concessions. Among the premises forsuch programmes are the idea that returnees bringnetworks and connectionswith them. However, forreturningretirees,ofcourse,thesearelessusablebytheworkforceatlarge.Thereisnoobviousreasontoanticipatemuchchangeinreturnprogrammesduringthecomingyear,nortoanticipatethatthoseseekingskills will do anything other than continue to leavethe islands and pursue their talents in developedeconomieswherepossible.

Intermsofeconomic migrationwithintheCaribbeanregion, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago are seeingincreasing immigration fromthe regiondue to theirrelativeeconomicsuccessandlevelofdevelopment.Much of this economic migration is facilitated bythe freedom of movement under the CaribbeanCommunity (CARICOM) treaty, which allows formovementofhigh-skillednationalsofthe14MemberStates.TherevisedTreatyofChaguaramasrestrictedthis free movement somewhat in comparison tothe initial agreement, and was put to the test in a


2013 case brought by a Jamaicannational removedfromBarbados.ShaniqueMyrietookhercasetotheCaribbean Court of Justice, and won in a landmarkjudgementbothforfreemovementrightsandforuseoftheCaribbeanCourt,whichisinitsinfancyandnotyetmuchusedbytheCARICOMStates.

Finally, in terms of structure and flows, it is to beanticipated that the Caribbean islands might see asmall increase in investor citizenship, if not actualimmigration and residence. Several of the islandshaveestablishedinvestmentprogrammeswherebyacertainleveloffinancialcontributionmakesavailablea second or alternative citizenship and passport towealthy individuals who see advantages in alteringtheir citizenship situation. Antigua and Barbuda,Dominica,andSaintKittsandNevisoffercitizenshipthrough investment programmes, facilitated byHenley&Partners.Thesecountriesofferadvantagessuch as no capital-gains tax and no worldwidetaxation,butrathertaxonlyincomegeneratedontheislandsthemselves.

Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in the Caribbean in 2015, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?

Joanne van Selm:Amajorpolicydebatefor2015willbeonethatcarriesoverfrom2014,aboutmigration and health. Thirteen Caribbean nations are amongthe30orsocountriesworldwidethathaveimposedsomekindoftravelbanoncitizensof,orpeoplewhohavebeento,theWestAfricancountriesaffectedbyEbola. Thebans vary in termsof the lengthoftimefor which people must have been outside Guinea,Liberia, Sierra Leone and, in some cases, Nigeriaand/or the Democratic Republic of Congo, as wellasthelengthofquarantinesthatwillbeimposedontravellers,includingreturningnationalsoftheislandsandcountriesinquestion.

Thisapproachhasillustratedseveralissues.OneistheclosetiesbetweentheCaribbeanandWestAfrica.Inparticular,manyentertainersfromcountriessuchasJamaica travel regularly to West Africa to perform.Anotheristherelativelypoorstandardofhealthcareintheregion,wheregovernmentsacknowledgedtheirinabilitytoeffectivelyisolateandhandlesuchadeadlyvirus.Theydidthis,inseveralcases,atpreciselythemomentthattheywerefailingtomeettheneedsof

populations severely impacted by the usually non-fatal but nonetheless debilitating mosquito-bornechikungunyavirus.

The case of a cruise ship denied landing in bothMexico and Belize because a passenger on boardwasunderstoodtohavehandledbloodsamplesfromtheEbolacaseofThomasDuncaninTexasalsodrewattention to the somewhat vague status of cruisearrivals.Generally, spendingonlyaday inanygivenCaribbean country, and sleepingon ship, thousandsof simultaneous tourist arrivals in ports around theCaribbean give rise to many immigration controlquestionswhere the import of contagious diseases,and other unintended consequences, is concerned.In most cases, if a person will be leaving again onthe same shipwithin24hours, theydonot requireavisa(evenifcitizensoftheircountryusuallydoforgeneraladmittance),andimmigrationproceduresarequitedifferentfromarrivalatanairport,forexample.However,passengersdo sometimesgomissing,andwhether it is a disease or some kind of smugglingsituation, for example, the ease of entry for cruisepassengers (generally desirable from a tourism-income perspective) becomes an immigrationheadache.

AsecondissuefortheCaribbeanregionisagainonethat is rolled over from previous years: the role of Chinese investment in the region and its relation to immigration.Contractshavebeenestablished,orareintheprocessofnegotiation,onmanyCaribbeanislands for Chinese investment in infrastructure ofvariouskinds.Oneexampleof this is thenewmegaresort Baha Mar, in the Bahamas, financed andconstructedbytheChinese,withmajorinternationalhotels,suchasHyattandRosewood,andthelargestcasino in the Caribbean operated by an Americanconsortium.Theprojecthasemployed4,000Chineseconstructionworkers–whohavebeenisolatedwithinthe work zone, not integrating locally at all – andprovidednojobsintheconstructionphaseforlocals,whiletheunemploymentrateisatabout15percent.Another example is the road building (including amajor north–south toll road), and potential futurelogisticshub,GoatIsland,inJamaica.Again,ChineseworkersareemployedontheNorth–SouthHighway2000, although there are also Jamaican workersinvolved, and a greater level of integration on theisland.


SomeoftheChineseinvestmentintheregionisaimedatsecuringrawmaterials(suchasbauxite),andmuchofitinvolvesdevelopinginfrastructure.

The impacts of climate change and the role ofmigration(emigration)inhandlingthoseimpactswillcontinue to be a subject of discussion.Most of theCaribbeanhasnotseenanymajorhurricanesfortwoseasons(2013and2014).OnlyhurricaneGonzalohadstrengthandmadelandfallintheLesserAntillesandin the north-eastern Caribbean, particularly PuertoRico,in2014.Whattheweatherwillbringin2015isnotpredictable,butanymajortropicalstormwouldboth involvedamage topropertyand some levelofdisplacement, intheshortterm,aswellaspotentiallossoflife.Anotherconsequenceofanymajorweatherincident will be renewed focus on climate change,both in termsofwhat islands cando themselves toreduceemissionsandinvestinrenewableenergy,and

intermsofextremescenariosthatrequiremovementwithin,betweenandawayfromislandswhereseriousflooding and reduced coast lines could become arealitywithindecades.

Finally,with2014havingbeenthethirtiethanniversaryof theCartagenaDeclarationonRefugees, States inthe region have been encouraged to consider anddeveloptheirapproachesto mixed migration,aswellas to establish clearer refugee status determinationprocedures(mosthavenoasylumlaworregulationsassuch,sincethesehavehadlimiteduseinnumericaltermsatleast),considerdurablesolutionsincludingaroleinrefugeeresettlement,andengageproactivelyto resolve Statelessness. Caribbean States will beencouragedbytheOfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissioner forRefugees toenhance their role inrefugeeprotectionin2015andbeyond.n

“The Caribbean region will face several migration policy challenges in 2015. Some of

these will be regionally specific, others will stem from exogenous

factors, and particularly the consequences of policy changes

and media messages from the United States.”


Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in Europe in 2014, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2015, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?

Elizabeth Collett:AstheeconomicrecessioncontinuestodragthroughoutEurope,governmentsarefacinganever-tightening knot of migration policy challenges.Intheory,thesearedistinctphenomena;inpractice,thecomplexrealitiesunderpinningcurrentmigrationtrendsmeanthatadiverseandcoordinatedresponsewillbeneededtoensurelastingchange.Thisprocesswill also require significant political leadership, inshortsupplyduringayearwhengovernmentswillbedealingwithcompetingeconomicandsocialpriorities,aresurgenceofpopulistpolitics,andloweredpublicconfidence in policymakers’ ability to respond tothe impactsofmultipleandoverlappinggeopoliticalcrises.

Maritime Migration

The phenomenon of Mediterranean migration isneithernewnorstatic.Sincetheearly1990s,therehasbeenapersistentflowofbothirregularmigrantsandasylum-seekers from across Africa and beyond. Theroutesandcompositionoftheseflowshavechangedovertime,andthetotalnumberhasfluctuatedyear-on-year, but the essential characteristics remaintroublingly consistent, and fatal.2 Over the past18months,escalatingnumbers–over160,000wererescuedin2014alone–havecreatedanewurgencyforpolicymakerstorespondin2015.

The most preferred route in 2014, from Libya toItaly,hasalreadybecomemoredangerousforthosetransitingthroughthetroubledNorthAfricanregion.MountinginstabilityinLibyameansthatthoselookingfor passage to Europe are increasingly vulnerable.In addition, those who board boats on the Libyan

2 International Organization for Migration, Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost through Migration(Geneva,2014).

Outlook on migration in Europe in 2015Elizabeth Collett1

1 ElizabethCollett isDirectorof theMigrationPolicy InstituteEurope.

coast are less likely to be rescued following thereplacementofthe ItalianGovernment’ssearchandrescueoperation(MareNostrum)bythemorelimitedEU-coordinatedOperationTriton.

In light of this, smuggling networks have provedresilient and flexible – over the past fewmonths, anumberoflargecargoshipshavebeenfoundstrandedintheMediterranean.3Thisisnolongeracaseoftheshortest possible journey; these large ships set offfromTurkey,bypassedbothGreeceandCyprus,seenasundesirabledestinations,andtookthelonger,moreperilousjourneytoItaly.Thisnewlevelofinvestmentreflects stable and increasing demand, and a moredesperate clientele; the options for those displacedfrom theSyrianArabRepublic arenarrowingas thecoldwintersetsin,asLebanonclosesitsgatesandasthejourneythroughNorthAfricatoLibyahasbecometoo risky.With the global populationof refugees atrecordhighs,thoseseekingprotectionwilljoinothermigrants in increasing numbers through 2015, andseek evermore creative (and dangerous)means ofentrytoEurope.ThediscoveryofboatscrossingtheBlackSeatoRomaniainlate2014suggeststhatthisphenomenonwillnotbelimitedtotheMediterranean.

It has become evident to policymakers that bordermanagement policies are an inadequate response,capableofreactingonlyoncemigrantsarealreadyindeep distress. Instead, interior officialswill need towork closely with foreign policy, maritime, securityand humanitarian colleagues to develop a multi-pronged response fromprevention to rescue,andaconcerted effort to extinguish pervasive smugglingnetworks.InOctober2014,InteriorMinistersagreedonaseriesofprioritiestoaddressmaritimemigration;the extensive list of disparate actions highlightedthe complexity of the challenge.4 In November, the

3 Frontex, “Operation Triton: Winter developments”,12 December 2014. Available from http://frontex.europa.eu/feature-stories/operation-triton-winter-developments-qXDamY.

4 European Council, Council Conclusions on Taking Action toBetter Manage Migratory Flows, JHA Council Conclusions,10 October 2014, Brussels. Available from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/145053.pdf.

http://frontex.europa.eu/feature-stories/operation-triton-winter-developments-qXDamY



http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/145053.pdf




sameministersmetinRomewithboththeirnationalforeignpolicycounterpartsandthekeypolicymakersfrom third countries, and articulated a similar setof goals.5 Having done this, 2015 will be the yearwhensomeofthesegoalsaretranslatedintoaction,and policymakers begin to cooperate more deeplyacross government portfolios, as well as across theMediterranean.Thesolutionsmaybedecadesaway,buttheworkmustbeginnow.

Asylum and Humanitarian Aid

Fromtheperspectiveofglobalprotection,maritimemigration has become an unpalatable symptomof broader challenges concerning proliferatinghumanitarian crises worldwide. While it remainstrue that the vast majority of the world’s refugeesareprotectedintheirregionoforigin,theEuropeanUnionhasseenanincreaseinasylumclaimsoverthepastcoupleofyears,thoughstillalongwayfromthelevelsseenduringthe1990s.TheEU-28received50percentmoreasylumclaims(57,800)duringthethirdquarterof2014thanthesameperiodayearearlier.However, the responsibilities have fallen unevenlyacrossthecontinent,andtheselocalizedpressuresonnationalasylumsystemsarelikelytocontinuein2015.

There are several dimensions to this challenge.Though the EU has set common standards forreception and processing and has created a systemof responsibility determination (referred to as theDublin system), each EU Member State managesits own asylum system independently. A number ofcountries are experiencing significant increases inapplications–notablyinGermany,SwedenandItaly–andarestrugglingtoensurethatallthosewhoarriveareeffectivelyaccommodatedandtheirapplicationsprocessed.Atthesametime,thereistheconcernthatanumberofEUMemberStateshaveyettoproperlyimplementthestandardsestablishedattheEUlevel,leavingasylum-seekersininadequateconditionsand,in some cases, precipitating onward movement tomoreexperiencedMemberStates.ThemajorityofEUMemberStatesstilldealwithaverysmallproportionofthetotalnumberofnewasylum-seekerseachyear.AccordingtoEurostatdata,atotalof434,160asylumclaims were lodged in 2013; eight EU countries,including the CzechRepublic and Portugal, receivedfewer than 1,000 applications each, and a further

5 See http://italia2014.eu/media/3775/fr_declaration_prog_rome_final_27_11_2014.pdf.

seven, including Spain, received fewer than 5,000.6

In anumberof countries, thereare concernsaboutcapacitytorespondshouldthenumberofclaimsriseunexpectedly in 2015. The Bulgarian Governmentstruggledwhenthenumberofarrivalsrosefromanannualaverageofaround1,000applicationstoover7,000 in 2013. Thus, ensuring system capacity andfinding ways to share responsibility more equitablyacrosstheEUwillremainatthecoreofthedebate.

In2015,nationalpolicymakerswillhavetosquarethecircleofprovidingeffectiveprotectiontoanincreasingnumber of asylum-seekers in a context of limitedpublic resources and uncertain public support. Thisisalsoachallengeforlocalgovernmentstaskedwithprovidinghousingandsupport.AttheEUlevel,asylumpolicywillremainasignificantdebatecloselylinkedtobroaderhumanitarianandforeignpolicyresponsesincriticalregionsoforigin,aswellasthemanagementof the EU’s external borders (including maritime).Given the prevalence of protracted displacementaround the world, increasing focus will be given tothepotentialoflegalchannelsofentryforrefugees,suchasresettlementandhumanitarianvisaregimes.The EUwill propose a pilot resettlement project inearly 2015, which will incorporate a “distributionkey”tocalculaterefugeequotasforeachEUMemberState.This,inturn,mayheraldanewphaseinasylumcollaborationwithinEurope.

Mobility, Cohesion and Security

The growing number of EU citizens who havedepartedtofightwith insurgents intheMiddleEasthas catalysed a series of linked policy challengesrelatedtothemobilityandcohesivenessofEurope’spopulationsthatwilldominate2015.

The attacks in Paris in early January brought homethe potential dangers of returning foreign fighters,andthepolicyresponseislikelytobemultifaceted.Atthecommunitylevel,thereareinitiativestopreventyoung people from departing, as well as effortsto rehabilitate those who return. At the nationallevel,anumberofgovernmentshavediscussedandimplementedpoliciestoconfiscatetraveldocumentsfromthosewhointendtotraveltotrainorfightwith

6 Eurostat,“Asylumapplicationsandfirstinstancedecisionsonasylum applications in 2013” (Data in Focus, March 2014).Available from http://www.emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/publications/eurostat_2013_data_in_focus.pdf.

http://italia2014.eu/media/3775/fr_declaration_prog_rome_final_27_11_2014.pdf

http://italia2014.eu/media/3775/fr_declaration_prog_rome_final_27_11_2014.pdf

http://www.emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/publications/eurostat_2013_data_in_focus.pdf

http://www.emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/publications/eurostat_2013_data_in_focus.pdf


extremist groups in theMiddle East, and withdrawcitizenshipfromthosewhochoosetoreturn.Finally,attheEUlevel,anumberofdiscussionsareemergingastohowtoeffectivelypreventfurtherviolentattacksin the absence of internal border controls, and fewchecksoncitizensarrivingattheexternalbordersoftheEU.While it is deeply unlikely that internal borderswillbere-established,thegrowingnumberofradicalizedindividualswithinEuropehasonceagainbroughttheissuesofmobilityandsecurityintocloseproximity.Inadditiontothis,theoverarchingdebatehasre-igniteddiscussionsonculturalandreligiousaccommodationwithinEurope,whichareinturncloselylinkedtothesuccesses (and failures) of integration policy. Theenduring effects of stagnating labour markets aremanifold, and young second-generation immigrantsstill find themselves marginalized in both theeducation and employment spheres. Policymakersare increasingly aware that discontented immigrantyouth are more susceptible to radicalization, andperhapsultimately violence,but todraw too stronga link can in itself be counterproductive. The corepolicy challenge for European governments willbe to effectively address the security threat whilepreventing negative spillover effects for Europe’sdiverse communities. Finally, while many of thelegislative changes regarding rescission of Europeancitizenshiphavebeeneffectedquietly,itislikelythattheimpactswillhaveastrongrippleeffect,notleastinthenationalandEuropeancourts.

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in Europe likely to evolve in the course of 2015, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and number and profiles of migrants?

Elizabeth Collett:

Asylum

Intheabsenceofanyresolutiontothemajorconflictscausing displacement around the world, asylumclaimsarelikelytoremainstrongwithintheEU,andpossiblyincrease,withsignificantnumbersexpectedfromtheSyrianArabRepublicandIraq.Akeyvariablein the size of this flow is the ability of strainedcountries, such as Lebanon and Jordan, to continuetohostlargepopulationsofSyrianrefugees:broaderinstability in the region is likely to have a knock-on

effectforasylumapplicationsfurtherWest.AsecondvariableremainsthedeterioratingsituationinLibya,thoughtheexperiencefromtheArabSpringsuggeststhat themajorityofanypeopledisplacedwillmoveto neighbouring countries rather than across theMediterranean.7 Italywill continue tobeahot spotforSouthernarrivals,due inpart to its readiness toconductsearchandrescue,butalsoopportunitiestotravelonthroughtotherestoftheEU.

OutsideEurope,TurkeywillremainoneofthebiggesthostsofSyrianrefugees,whiletheRussianFederationhas seen significant asylum applications from thosedisplaced from Ukraine. While a large number ofUkrainianshavebeendisplacedinternally,theconflicthas not resulted in huge numbers of Ukrainiansseeking asylum within the EU (though Polish workpermitallocationstoUkrainianshaveincreased).Thisisunlikelytochangein2015.

Free Movement

Despite the vocal debate in the United Kingdom,GermanyisprovingasattractivetomobileEUcitizens,inatrendthatislikelytocontinue.Moreestablishedpatterns of mobility from Central and EasternEuropearenowcomplementedbynewdynamicsofemigration from crisis-hit countries across the EU,notably Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Despiteexpected improvements in employment levels in2015, unemployment is still driving young peopleto seek opportunities elsewhere, in what some areheraldingasaneweraofEUmobility.However,oldchallenges–suchaslanguagebarriersandrecognitionofexistingskills–areprovingenduring,whichinturninhibitfreemoversfrommaximizingtheirpotential.

Legal Migration from Third Countries

Dynamics of labour migration differ broadly acrosstheEU,anddependtoagreatextentontheeconomicstrengthofeachMemberState.StrongereconomiessuchasGermany,PolandandtheUnitedKingdomwillseelargernumbersofthird-countrynationalworkersthanthosecountriesstillstruggling.Familymigrationwill remain dominant, including family members ofthosegivenrefugeestatuswithintheEU(creatingamultipliereffect in thosecountriescurrentlyhostinglargerpopulationsofrefugees).

7 See http://heindehaas.blogspot.be/2012/03/arab-spring-and-migration.html.

http://heindehaas.blogspot.be/2012/03/arab-spring-and-migration.html

http://heindehaas.blogspot.be/2012/03/arab-spring-and-migration.html


Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in Europe in 2015, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?

Elizabeth Collett: Political upheaval is likely todominate the immigration policy landscape, withquestions of public confidence in the ability ofincumbent governments to manage immigrationandasylumsystemsemerging (even)more strongly.However,theparametersandcharacteristicsofsuchadebatewilldiffersignificantlyacrossthecontinent.Theflashpointformanyofthesedebateswillbetheseries of national elections across Europe in 2015,in largeStatessuchasPoland,SpainandtheUnitedKingdom, through to politically significant electionsinDenmarkandGreece.Allofthiswilltakeplaceasgovernmentsattempttograpplewiththemajorandvolatilechallengesthathavebeenoutlinedabove.

In the United Kingdom, the public debate over itsEU membership has become conflated with publicconcerns about immigration. The result is a heavyemphasis on the impacts of free movement oncommunities and public services within the UnitedKingdom. In the months leading up to the Mayelection, it is likely that this national debate willhave a ripple effect across Europe; key questionswill include whether to place numerical limits onthe freemovement regimeandmanaging access topublicbenefitsmoreeffectively.ThereissomelimitedsupportfortheUnitedKingdompositioninGermany,Switzerland and some other Northern EuropeanMember States, but the issue remains deeplycontentious;itisunlikelythatanybroad-basedreformwilltakeshape,thoughsomenarrowconcessionsarepossible.

Anti-EU sentiment is a strengthening theme amongpopulistparties,fromthefar-rightnationalistgroupsofFrance’sFrontNationalthroughtotheNetherlands’Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party for Freedom),and is closely linked to negative attitudes towardsimmigration. Anti-establishment parties Syriza andPodemos,inGreeceandSpainrespectively,arebothpoisedtomakesignificantelectoralgains;whiletheseparties are sceptical towards the economic aspectsof the EU, they remain broadly positive towardsimmigration. Protestmovements, such as Pegida inGermany,andmanyofthepopulistpartiesofCentralandEasternEuropehaveastrongethnictone,whether

directed towards Muslim or Roma populations.Somepartiesingovernmenthavealsoadoptedanti-immigration positions, notably in Hungary. ThesechangingpoliticaldynamicsacrossmuchofEuropearelikely to distractmainstream parties in governmentfrom strategic and long-term thinking in 2015, at atime when strong political leadership and effectivecommunicationwillbemorenecessarythanever.

With the advent of a new Commission within theEU in late 2014, a new immigration agenda is settoemerge in2015.TheStrategicGuidelinesof June2014, heralded as a new vision for EU immigrationpolicy, offered very little in terms of direction andcontent.8 However, the new Commission President,Jean-ClaudeJuncker,hasexpressedadesiretorevamplabour migration policies within the EU as part ofhis five-point plan on immigration, and investigateoptions to reform the EU’s Blue Card system forhigh-skilledmigrants.9Thereiscurrentlylittlepoliticalsupport at national level for major overhaul oflegal migration, and deep opposition to promotingintra-EUmobilityforthird-countrynationalsatatimewhenfreemovementforEUcitizensisinquestion.

In 2015, a European Agenda on Migration will bepublished, setting out a stronger vision for action.However,as thepastfiveyearshavedemonstrated,even the most concrete legislative and operationalplanscanquicklygoastrayinthefaceofunexpectedgeopolitical shifts in the European neighbourhood.The stark challengesposedbyevermoredesperatehumanitarianflows,facilitatedbysmugglingnetworks,andtheemerginghazardofEuropeanforeignfighters,arelikelytodominatethe2015agenda.MuchofthenextyearwillbetakenupwithensuringthatthereisasufficientnationalandEUresponsetohumanitariancrises, management of Europe’s external bordersand cooperation to counter smuggling networks.The choices facing EU governmentswith respect tomaritimemigrationarepoliticallyunpalatable–thereareno ideal solutions,merelya setof“leastworst”options.Butignoringthephenomenonisnolongeranoption,evenforthosecountries,suchastheUnitedKingdom,thataregeographicallydetachedfromthe

8 E. Collett, “The strategic guidelines on migration:Uncontentious consensus but missed opportunity”(Migration Policy Institute, June 2014). Available fromhttp://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/european-union-strategic-guidelines-migration-uncontentious-consensus-missed-opportunity.

9 Seehttp://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities.

http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/european-union-strategic-guidelines-migration-uncontentious-consensus-missed-opportunity



http://juncker.epp.eu/my-priorities


issue,andthesilentmajoritythatcurrentlyofferverylittleintermsofasylumprotection.

Thecurrentrefugeecrisisrequiresanurgentresponse,onethatisalreadyoverdue,buttheEUisaccustomedtoworkingataglacialpaceandnationalgovernmentsaremorecomfortablewithincrementalchangethanmajor swings in asylum policy. Having realized theimportance of a faster, more coherent, whole-of-governmentapproach, thenewHighRepresentativeforExternalAffairs,FedericaMogherini, isemergingasaleaderwithrespecttothenewpolicyagendaonimmigration.Migration issueswill bemore strongly

integrated into foreign policy dialogues led by theExternalActionService,andtherewillbearenewedeffort to integrate development, humanitarianand foreign policy agendas to improve migrationmanagement.Thoughthisworkwillbeginin2015,itwillstilltakemanyyearstorealizeanyrealimpacts.

Thepolicychallengesthatdominate2015willcontinuetopreoccupypolicymakersthrough2016andbeyond,andthescarringeffectsofEuropeanrecessionwithinthe past five years will continue to weigh uponimmigrantpopulationsfortheforeseeablefuture.n

“Migration issues will be more strongly integrated into foreign

policy dialogues led by the External Action Service, and

there will be a renewed effort to integrate development,

humanitarian and foreign policy agendas to improve migration

management.”

Vol. IV, Number 5, December 2014–January 2015MIGRATION POLICY PRACTICE26

Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in Latin America in 2014, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2015, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?

William Mejía: The spirit of partnership andintegration in Latin America and its neighbouringcountries today brought to light in 2014 the issueof population movements across the region. Thishas been triggered by a range of factors, includingthe increasing intraregional migration and theimportance of some countries and territories astransit areas, including extracontinental flows, withthemaindestinationslocatedintheperipheryoftheregion(Argentina,Brazil,ChileandMexico)oroutsidetheregion(UnitedStatesandCanada);theexistenceof large groups of displaced persons and refugeesasaresultofinternalandexternalconflicts;andtheincreaseinStatelessnessacrosstheworld.

Basedontheprincipalintergovernmentalagreementsanddeclarationsmadein2014,therearethreemajorchallengesforpolicyandactionsonmigrationin2015:

1. Enforcement of the rights of migrants and other populations that move within the region

This matter was debated in January 2014 at theSecond Summit of the Comunidad de EstadosLatinoamericanos y Caribeños (CELAC, Communityof Latin American and Caribbean States2), whereMember States made a commitment to engage inthedevelopment of newpolicies and to strengthenexisting ones, in order to recognize migrants assubjects of law and facilitate the regularization ofimmigration(CELAC,2014a).

2 CELAC isan intergovernmentalmechanism fordialogueandpoliticalcooperation,workingonthebasisofconsensusandmeetspermanentlyat33countriesinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.

Outlook on migration in Latin America in 2015William Mejía1

1 WilliamMejía isDirector of theResearchGrouponHumanMobility at Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira (UTP,TechnologicalUniversityofPereira),Colombia.

ThiswasfurtherconfirmedattheXIVSouthAmericanConference on Migration (SACM3), which alsoconsideredthesocialinclusionofmigrantsasoneofthe bases of the process of regional integration. Toachieve this, States “should promote access, equalfooting with nationals, all rights, among others, towork, to social security, health, justice, housing,education, social and political participation andcultureinhostsocieties”(CSM,2014).

Twomigrantgroupsdrewparticularattentionofthecountries of the region in terms of the urgency ofsecuring their rights: unaccompanied children andadolescentmigrants, particularly thosemigrating tothe United States; and displaced persons, refugeesandStatelesspersons.

CELAC agreed to work on a regional protocol forattentiontounaccompaniedchildrenandadolescentmigrants (CELAC, 2014b). A similar claimwasmadeby Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR, CommonMarket of the South) (2014a and 2014b), theOrganization of American States (2014) and theRegionalConferenceonMigration (RCM4).TheRCMcalledit“achallengethatrequiresaregionalresponsein prevention, protection, return and reintegration”(CRM,2014a)andadoptedaSpecialStatement(CRM,2014b)toprioritizeactionsinthisarea.

With regard to displaced persons, refugees andStatelesspersons, LatinAmericaand theCaribbean,gathered to commemorate the thirtieth anniversaryoftheCartagenaDeclarationonRefugees,andagreedon important commitments (Cartagena +30, 2014a)and an action plan, whose resulting programmesindicate their objectives: asylum quality; solidarityand secure borders; voluntary repatriation; localintegration; solidarity resettlement; labourmobility;observatory for human rights for the displacement;

3 The SACM consists of Argentina, the Plurinational State ofBolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru,Suriname,theBolivarianRepublicofVenezuelaandUruguay.

4 TheRCM,also called thePueblaProcess, consistsofBelize,Canada, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and theUnitedStates.


prevention;decentandsafecrossing;anderadicationof Statelessness (Cartagena +30, 2014b). ThecommitmentwithbothdocumentswasemphasizedbythePresidentsoftheMemberStatesandAssociatedStatesofMERCOSUR(MERCOSUR,2014b).

Such commitments involve, among other actionsand as agreed in several of the documents cited, acampaign for regional accession or ratification byStates,whichhasnotbeendoneyet,aswellas theprogressive improvement in the interpretation,at least, of the following instruments: the UnitedNationsConventionontheProtectionoftheRightsofAllMigrantWorkersandMembersofTheirFamilies,1990;theConventionontheRightsoftheChild,1989;theConventionrelatingtotheStatusofRefugeesof1951andits1967Protocol;theConventionrelatingtotheStatusofStatelessPersons,1954;theConventionon the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961; and theUnited Nations Convention against TransnationalOrganizedCrimeandtheProtocols(2000)toPrevent,SuppressandPunishTraffickinginPersons,EspeciallyWomenandChildren, and against the Smuggling ofMigrantsbyLand,SeaandAir(PalermoProtocols).

2. Linking migration policies with other social and economic policies

Governments in the region should move forwardin 2015 to link migration policies with other socialand economic policies, and integrate them intotheir development plans. This also results from thecommitments made under the Declaration of theHigh-level Dialogue on International Migration andDevelopment5 (CELAC, 2014a), which promoted theinclusionofmigrationinthepost-2015developmentagenda6 (CSM, 2014), particularly in cases such asrefugees,displacedandStatelesspersons(Cartagena+30, 2014aand2014b), or unaccompanied childrenandadolescentmigrants(CRM,2014b).

Considering the importance of labour in migrationissues,thereisaspecialchallengetoadvanceintheassociation of policies on both issues, particularlyin the Central American region, where there is amemorandumofunderstandingwiththeInternationalLabourOrganization(ILO).Thismemorandumseeks,among other things, to increase the incidence of

5 Seewww.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=A/68/L.5.

6 See http://beyond2015.org/sites/default/files/Post 2015GuidelinesSP.pdf.

labourdepartments, representativeorganizationsofemployers,andworkers indiscussion forumsand inthe development of labour migration policies; bindthepublicemploymentserviceintheprovisionofcarefor migrant workers, especially women and youth,and train staff in the area of labourmobility; openspaces for discussion on social security for migrantworkers and their portability; and design effectivesocialprotectionmechanismsfortemporaryworkers(OIT–SICA,2014).

3. Progress in intraregional and South–South cooperation in general

ThethirdmajorchallengeinmigrationpolicyinLatinAmericain2015willbetogobeyondthesubregionalambits of cooperation, particularly the oldestintegrationagreements(SICA,7CAN8andMERCOSUR),andtoconcretizeinwiderinstitutionalsettings,suchasComunidadSudamericanadeNaciones(UNASUR,South American Community of Nations) and CELACandoutsidetheregion,South–Southcooperationontopicsthatwerehighlightedinseveraldocumentsin2014.

For example, the commemorative meeting of thethirtiethanniversaryoftheCartagenaDeclarationonRefugees appealed for deeper levels of articulation,complementarity, cooperation and convergencebetween regional and subregional integrationmechanisms, including issues related to migration,refugees,displacedandStatelesspersonsandproposedto “move towards a progressive harmonizationof public policies, standards and procedures byexchanging best practices for the protection ofrefugees, displaced and Stateless persons”, takinginto account, inter alia, a comprehensive approach,differentiatedbyage,genderanddiversity(Cartagena+30,2014aand2014b).

TheSACMconsideredtheimportanceofmaintaininga comprehensive approach to addressing thechallenges of international migration, as from theconcept of governance, and stressed that effortsshould articulate the joint work of States, withcontributions by international organizations and

7 The Central American Integration System includes Belize,CostaRica, theDominicanRepublic,ElSalvador,Guatemala,Honduras,NicaraguaandPanama.

8 TheAndeanCommunityconsistsofthePlurinationalStateofBolivia,Colombia,EcuadorandPeru.

http://www.un.org/es/comun/docs/?symbol=A/68/L.5

http://beyond2015.org/sites/default/files/Post 2015 Guidelines SP.pdf

http://beyond2015.org/sites/default/files/Post 2015 Guidelines SP.pdf


otherstakeholders involved inthe issue,andshouldemphasize the importance of consular cooperationand horizontal cooperation as tools that contributeto the comprehensive treatment of migration bydeepeningSouth–Southcooperation(CSM,2014).

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in Latin America likely to evolve in the course of 2015, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and number and profiles of migrants?

William Mejía:Circumstancessuchastheexpansionof the MERCOSUR Residence Agreement and theaccessionofnewcountriesintheregiontoagreementson educational integration and recognition ofcertificatesand studydiplomas,andothers, suggestthat in 2015 the Andean migration flows of bothlow-skilled workers and workers with technical andprofessional training in various areas, includinghealth,willbeconsolidatedtowardsthesouthofthecontinent.

By contrast, two of the largest extraregional LatinAmericanflows–theMexicanstotheUnitedStatesand Ecuadorians to Europe, especially to Italy andSpain–maycontinuetodecline,dueto,amongotherthings,therelativeimprovementintheeconomiesoftheircountries,comparedwiththeslowrecovery inthenorth.

Generouspoliciesof countries likeArgentina,Brazil,and Uruguay on refugees and displaced personscanmaintainflowstowardsthesouthoftheregion,fromHaiti(specificallytoBrazil)andothercountries,includingtheSyrianArabRepublic.Conversely,refugeeflows from Colombia, particularly to neighbouringcountriesandespeciallytoEcuador,mayexperiencelower volumes and even a reverse trend towardsreturn,duetoprogressinpeacetalksinthecountry.

The implementation of immigration reforms in theUnited States might mark the end of hope for theregularization of many Latin Americans and couldincreasethepersecutionofnon-beneficiariesofsuchmeasures.Thiscouldinturngenerateanincreaseinreturn,particularly toCentralAmericaandnorthernSouthAmerica.

However,thereareotherflowsthatmightexperienceanincrease,albeitlimited:youngmigrantswithhighprofessional qualifications and their families fromdifferent parts of the region to Canada, as a result

ofthenewimmigrationsystemcalledExpressEntry,whichprioritizestheimmigrationofthosewithajobofferinthecountry;ColombianandPeruvianmigrantstoEurope,especiallyFrance,ItalyandSpain,forfamilyreunificationandeventuallywork,dependingontherecoveryof employment there, andon theplannedliftingoftherequirementforaSchengenvisaforthetwo nationalities mentioned; and Cubans trying toreach theUnited States,motivatedby the fear thatthenewbilateralrelationswillleadtotheeliminationof the immigration policy known as “dry foot–wetfoot”,whichestablishes thatCubanswho reach theUSsoilcanstay,whilethoseinterceptedatsea,evenafewmetresfromtheshore,arereturnedtoCuba.

Smallerstreamsofmigrationthatmightnotexperienceanysignificantchangesin2015wouldinclude:thoseheading to Panama from Colombia; flows fromNicaraguatoCostaRica;andthereturnofColombiansfrom the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, coupledwiththemigrationofVenezuelanskilledworkersandentrepreneurs to Colombia and the United States,duetothegloomyVenezuelaneconomicsituation.

Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in Latin America in 2015, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?

William Mejía:Oneofthekeydebatesin2015mightrevolvearoundthenewimmigrationlawsinBrazilandChile,whicharetwooftheLatinAmericancountriesthathavemostreaffirmedtheirstatusaskeymigrantdestinations,particularlyatan intraregional level. Inbothcases,thenewimmigrationlawshavesoughttoreplaceexisting lawsestablishedunderdictatorship,which were largely focused on issues of internalsecurity. The new laws have been conceived undertheparadigmofhumanrights(Brazil,2014),followingtheexampleofArgentina.

Another debate in Brazil will relate to theStatelessness Law, which provides for proceduresto determine Statelessness on the same criteria asfor refugees. This could encourage neighbouringcountries to follow suit, as had happened with theRefugeeLawof1997,ofwhichBrazilwasapioneerintheregion.Ontheotherhand,thediscussionsabouttheregularizationprocessintheDominicanRepublic,which compromises the citizenship of people withirregular immigrant parents, especiallyHaitians,willmostlikelycontinuein2015.


Other important, albeit less impactful, debatescould include: the discussion in Puerto Rico aboutthe Governor’s proposal to grant voting rights toimmigrants regardless of their legal status (Noticias24/7, 2015); the discussions in Panama to establishguidelinesfora“coherent”nationallabourmigrationpolicy, forwhich theGovernmentappointedahigh-levelcommissionandwhichaimstopromotedialogueamong different sectors and to review existingregulations; and the discussions in Costa Rica andNicaraguaontheregularizationofmigrantworkers.

Several countries are also due to discuss theiraccessiontoorratificationoftheinternationaltreatiesmentionedabove,withaviewtocreatingacommongroundfordialogueabouttherightsofpeopleonthemoveintheregion.

Finally, the immigration reform in theUnited StatesandanyregulatorychangesthatmayoccurinEurope,as a result of the recent fundamentalist attacks inFrance,mightfeedexistingdebatesorgeneratenewones,duetotheirimportanceforLatinAmerica.n

References

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RepúblicaconelqueiniciaunProyectodeLey de Migración y Extranjería. Santiago,20 de mayo. Mensaje Nº 089–361/.Available from www.camara.cl/pley/pdfpley.aspx?prmID=9175&prmTIPO=INICIATIVA.

ConferenciaRegionalsobreMigración(CRM)2014aDeclaración Por una Región libre de Trata

de Personas, XIX Conferencia Regionalsobre Migración, 27 de junio. Availablefrom www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/scripts/doc.php?file=t3/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2014/9605.

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y Estados Asociados del MERCOSURsobre la Situación de los Niños, Niñas yAdolescentesCentroamericanosMigrantesRetenidos en la Frontera Sur de losEstadosUnidosdeAmérica,BuenosAires,7 de octubre. Available fromwww.mercosur.int/t_generic.jsp?contentid=6075&site=1&channel=secretaria#.

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centroamericanos migrantes noacompañados, Consejo Permanente dela Organización de Estados Americanos,24 de julio. Available from www.oas.org/es/centro_noticias/comunicado_prensa.asp?sCodigo=D-008/14.

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Migration Policy Practice: Based on policy and legal developments in North America in 2014, what are the three most important migration policy challenges for 2015, including labour migration, forced migration and asylum, and migration and development?

Demetrios G. Papademetriou:

United States

The most fundamental migration policy challengefor the United States in 2015 remains the sameone that has eluded solution for nearly 10 years –agreeing on a legislative package of reforms thatupdatesandrefocusestheUSimmigrationsystemonimmigration’scontributionstoeconomicgrowthandcompetitiveness.Andasinthepast,doingsorequiresagreeing first on how to resolve the status of thenearly12millionpersonswhoreside in thecountryillegally.

The two political parties are not far apart onmostcomponentsofimmigrationreform.Bothpartiesputdomesticsecurityandpublicsafetyatthetopoftheirpolicyagendas.Asaconsequence,theybothsupportstrongborder enforcement and the enforcement oflaws that protect the public from “criminal aliens”and thosewhowish theUnited States ill. PresidentBarackObamamaybecloser to theRepublicansonkeypartsofthisissuethanhispartymaybe,makinga compromise agreement on these elements evenmorelikely.AndwhiletheremaybedisagreementsonhowmuchtotilttheUSimmigrationsystemtowardshigher skills and greater responsiveness to labourmarketneeds,thegulfbetweenthetwopartiesalsoappears manageable. How much to retreat fromthe US system’s long-standing emphasis on familyreunification (about two thirds of all US permanentvisasgotofamilymembers,theinverseofhowCanadaandAustraliaselecttheir immigrants)will likely leadtoadisagreement,butthisisalsobebridgeable.

Outlook on migration in North America in 2015Demetrios G. Papademetriou1

1 Demetrios G. Papademetriou is President of the MigrationPolicy Institute Europe and President Emeritus of theMigrationPolicyInstitute(MPI).

Yet, if reform is tobe agreed to in 2015, twootheritemswillneedtobealignedproperly.First,whateverlegislative “package” might move forward, it is notlikelytobeasingle,massive,all-inclusivebill.Instead,theapproachwilllikelyhavetobea“piecemeal”one,withaseriesofindividualbillsthatallowthosematterswidelyunderstoodtobemosturgentbeingenactedfirst.Yet,forthattobepossible,eachpartymustfirsttrusttheother,anextremelydifficultthingintoday’sWashington.Second,acompromisemustbereachedon the fate of most unauthorized immigrants. Thisis anonnegotiableprecondition to anythingmovingforwardas faras theDemocratsareconcerned,buta political anathema to the hardline conservativeRepublicanbase.

Moretothepoint,thisissuehasbecomeevenmorecomplicated following the President’s unilateralactioninNovember2014,toshieldfromdeportationnearlyhalfofthatpopulation.Hereiswhathappened.Aftermany years of false promises,miscalculations,acrimonyandrecriminationsinvolvingthePresident,theCongress,andtheeverbetterfunded,organizedandmorepowerfulconstituencyinterests(almostallofwhomfallinthevery“progressive”endofthepoliticalspectrum), the Democrat-led US Senate passed amassive immigration bill with a strong bipartisanmajority in mid-2013. This created expectations inmost quarters that the House of Representatives,whichhasbeencontrolledbyRepublicanssince2010,would followsuit.Thisexpectationwasanchored inlargepartonpoliticalself-preservationgrounds.Thepost-2012electionnarrative,sharedbyanalystsandpolitical elites from both parties, argued that theelectionresultshadmadeclearthattheRepublicansneededtoattractmoreLatinovoters–thecountry’slargest and fastest-growing minority – in order tobecomemore competitive in presidential elections.(Large majorities of America’s ethnic and racialgroupshad voted for PresidentObama.) TheHouseleadership appeared to have understood that pointwell, but was nonetheless unable to persuade itsown caucus to act on immigration because of theunyielding opposition by its most conservativememberswhorejectanyreformthatgrantslegal,andmorespecifically,permanentresidencetosignificantportionsoftheunauthorizedpopulation.Theresulting


impassebecameanincreasinglypoliticalproblemforthePresidentwhohadbeenunder intensepressurebytheprogressivecommunitytoprotectsubstantialproportions of that population from deportationunilaterally.

The legal basis for such action stems from thePresident’s authority to exercise prosecutorialdiscretion on whether to invest the Government’slimited resources to remove individuals whoseprincipal violation was being in the United Statesillegally. The President had already exercised suchdiscretioninmid-2012,whenheoffereddeportationrelieftothoseyoungpersonswhohadbeenbroughttotheUnitedStatesillegallyaschildren,orwhohadenteredlegallybuthadstayedlongerthantheirvisaallowed,andmettheprogramme’srequirements.(Sofar,more than600,000persons–outofapotentialpool of about 2 million – have benefitted underthis programme.) That grant had generated littleopposition, in large part, due to the sympatheticnatureofthebeneficiaries.Unsurprisingly,themoreobvious the immigration impasse in the House ofRepresentatives became, the more intense thepressure grew for the President to reprise his 2012“executiveaction” forabroadersliceof the illegallyresident population. He did so in November 2014,by grantingparentswith aUS citizenor permanentresidentchildwhohadbeenintheUnitedStatesforat leastfiveyearsa renewable three-year residenceand work permit – a grant that might potentiallyprotect an additional 4 million persons fromdeportation.Thistime,however,hisactiongenerateda vehement reaction by broad segments of theRepublicansinCongress,whohadbeenemboldenedbymassivevictoriesintheNovember2014midterm(congressional) elections that gave them control oftheUSSenateandanevermorelopsidedmajorityintheHouseofRepresentatives.

Thisisthepoliticalcontextinwhichtheimmigrationreformbattlewillbefoughtin2015.Ontheonehand,theRepublicancongressionalleadershipmustmollifythose that view the President’s actions as a powergrabandprobablyevenunconstitutional,anddemandthattheybereversed.Ontheotherhand,Republicansmustdemonstratetothepublicthattheycangovernresponsiblyandonbehalfoftheentirecountry,inthehopethattheycanmaintaintheircontrolofCongressafterthe2016elections.Togovern,however,requiresworking with the President to enact legislationbecause a presidential veto requires a two-thirdmajority ineachofthetwochamberstooverride,a

thresholdthatcanbeachievedonlywiththesupportofsubstantialnumbersofDemocratsoneachissue.

These realities can either be a recipe for anotherimpasseonimmigrationpolicyfor2015ortheperfectset-up for the Republicans to identify a number ofissues on which they will be willing to isolate theextremists inside their delegations and find thecompromisesthatwillleadtothepassingofimportantlegislationwithbipartisanmajoritieswhilemanagingasbesttheycantheinevitableopenrebellionwithintheirranks.

Itisclearlytooearlytomakeprognosticationsbutforboth the country and the future of the RepublicanParty, the longer-term benefits of action clearlyoutweighanyshort-termpoliticalgainsfrominaction.

United States, Mexico and the Northern Triangle Countries of Central America

Asecondmigrationpolicychallengepotentiallyfacingthe United States in 2015 but strongly implicatingmuchoftheregionisthesetofissuesassociatedwithbordercontrolsalongtheUnitedStates–MexicoandMexico–Guatemala borders. The dramatic surge inillegalflowsofunaccompaniedmigrantchildrenandmothers travellingwithoneormoreyoungchildreninthespringandearlysummeroflastyearcreatedanenormoushumanitariancrisis. Italsoposedadirectchallenge to theborder controlmodel inwhich theUnited States has invested approximately USD 120billion between 2004 and 2014. That model, likevirtually all other approaches to border control, isdesignedtodeterillegalentriesandinterceptasmanyaspossibleofthoseattemptingtoenterillegally.Itwasneverdesignedtodealwithlargenumbersofpersonswhose intent was not to evade controls and arrestbuttopresentthemselvestoborderauthoritiesandaskforasylum.Whilesuchcasesarenotuncommon,the systematic nature of the flow and its scale –roughly137,000cases,almostequallysplitbetweenunaccompanied migrant children and motherstravellingwithachild(upfromabout25,000in2013and nearly 14,000 in 2012 of just unaccompaniedmigrantchildren)hadanimmediateandsharpeffecton the politics of immigration. The Governmentstruggledtofindsafeandhumanewaystodealwiththesurge–asrequiredundera2008lawdesignedtoprotecttherightsofminorsintraffickingsituations–while rampingup itsadjudicationsystemtoprovideproperbutexpeditedreviewofasylumclaimslodgedbythenewcomers;humanitariansdeployed in force


toargue forproper treatmentand legalprotectionsfor detainees, and immigration skeptics and theirsupporters in theUS Congress, began to attack theAdministrationforhavinginvitedthecrisisinthefirstcasedue to their “lax treatment”of thispopulationduring theprevious twoyears.Meanwhile, theflowkept growing as children, with and without theirmothers, kept coming, expecting the US asylumadjudication system to offer them a pathway tostaying in theUnited States “indefinitely”, either byreuniting themwith their illegal resident familiesorwithothercaringfamiliesuntilahearingdatefortheirasylumcaseseveralyearslater.

Taken together with solid evidence that, indeed,childrenwhohadpreviouslytriedthisroutehadbeenabletojoinrelativesorotherwisestayintheUnitedStates, and the intentional misrepresentation bysmugglingsyndicatesofthePresident’sofferofrelieffrom deportation for certain young unauthorizedimmigrants (discussedearlier), theflowsbuilt up tonumbers that simply overwhelmed the capacity oftheGovernmenttohousethemtemporarily,letalonedeal with their asylum claims. The phenomenonshattered the increasingly dominant narrative thatthe border was fundamentally “secure” and led tothe resumption of dumping ever more resourcesintobordercontrols.Evidencethatthelownumbersof border apprehensions earlier in the decade hadbeen gradually butmeasurably increasing, and that“other than Mexicans” (overwhelmingly citizens oftheNorthernTrianglecountriesofCentralAmerica–namely, El Salvador,Guatemala andHonduras) nowaccounted for the majority of such apprehensions,strengthened the sense that allwasnotwell at theborderafterall.

ItisunclearhowmuchtheUSGovernment’ssuccessin dramatically reducing new flows while preparingtomanagebetterthenextsurgewithmoreadequatefacilitiesandmuchquickeradjudicationswillbetestedin2015.Whatisclearisthattheothergovernmentsin the region stepped up to rarely seen levels andforms of cooperation in migration management.Mexico engaged the crisis in an unprecedentedmanner,givingfullmeaningtothenotionof“sharedresponsibility”, a phrase used all too often by bothcountriesinthepastbutusuallywithoutasubstantivemeaning. Specifically,Mexico deployedmuch largerenforcement resources at and near its border withGuatemala and thereby intercepted, disrupted thetraditional routes of, and deported unprecedentednumbers of immigrants from the region heading

for theUnitedStatesduring the late spring toearlyfall months of 2014. At the same time, and at thestrongurgingofPresidentObama,thethreeCentralAmericanPresidentsengagedinasetofcoordinatedactions designed to disrupt smuggling networks,increase citizen security, and improve efforts toreceive back, protect, and reintegrate those beingreturnedbytheUSandMexicanenforcementactions,whileatthesametimepubliclyemphasizingtheperilsandlikelyfailureofeffortstoreach,remainandgainstatus in the United States. While many of thesehighlycoordinatedactivitiesweredirectlyorindirectlyunderwrittenbytheUnitedStates, it isnotablethattheUS President’s budget proposal for the nextUSfiscalyear(whichstartson1October2015)includesUSD1billionforassistancetoCentralAmerica–theywereofaformandreachseenbeforeonlyonsecuritymattersofdirectinteresttotheUnitedStates.

It will be interesting to observe bothwhether suchcooperation from the Central American countrieswillcontinuein2015andhowsuccessfulitwillbe.Asfor Mexico’s continuing cooperation, there is everyreasontoexpectthatitwillcontinue,asprotectingitsbordershasbeenamajorobjectiveunderPresidentPena Nieto. Moreover, Mexico’s abiding interest inhelping its nationals residing illegally in the UnitedStates obtain legal status of some form (more thanhalfof theUSunauthorizedpopulation isMexican),and the US President’s unilateral efforts to protectnearlyhalfofthatpopulationfromdeportation,makeMexicaninvestmentsinsecuringitssouthernborderevenmoreunderstandable.

Canada

WhiletheUnitedStates,MexicoandCentralAmericaare expected to continue to deal with the policyissues identified earlier, Canada is expected tocontinuetorolloutkeyelementsofitsre-engineeredimmigration programme. Two such elements areworthwatchingclosely–itsExpressEntryprogrammeand its highly innovative experiment with a newinvestor programme. Express Entry came into forcein January 2015. It is intended to help Canadachoose immigrants with the highest probability ofsuccessfully integrating into Canada’s economy andsocietybycreatinganonlinepoolofapplicantswhomeetminimum selection criteria under all three ofCanada’s major economic migration programmes– the skilled worker programme, the skilled tradesprogrammes and the Canadian Experience Class.Applicants that meet the programmes’ minimum


requirementsarethenrankedaccordingtolanguage,education and work experience attributes – thethree strongest predictors of successful integration– and those ranked highest are asked to apply forpermanentresidence.ExpressEntryisalsointendedto leadtomuchfasterdecisions (withinsixmonths)andsignificantlyreduceapplicationbacklogs,therebyallowing Canada’s immigration system to be moreresponsive to employment conditions and bemoreemployer-friendly at both national and provinciallevels.

AsecondCanadianprogrammealsotocommencein2015 and worth observing closely is a pilot projectintended to test the proposition that investor visascould be about more than just persons willing toinvest funds passively and without strict residencystipulations inreturnforanewpassport thatwouldin effect offer the investor an “insurance” policyagainst changing political circumstances at homewhile also making international travel easier. Giventhe popularity of investor visas (more than 30countries now have such programmes), Canada’snewestexperimentislikelytobewatchedcloselybymanyotherStatesandinvestorsalike.Specifically,thefocusand requirements for investors seekingaccesstoCanadaweresubstantiallychanged,with50visasmade available for individuals who are willing tocommitCan$2millionfor15yearsinanactivitythatwill support innovation and entrepreneurship, haveprovable assets of Can$10 million, will commit toreside in Canada, andmeet a number of predictorsof societal and economic success, such as languageskillsandpreviousexperience inestablishingand/ormanaginginnovativeenterprises.

Migration Policy Practice: Judging from current and anticipated trends, how are the levels and structure of migration flows in North America likely to evolve in the course of 2015, for example in terms of types of migration, source countries, and number and profiles of migrants?

Demetrios G. Papademetriou:ThelevelsandstructureofmigrationflowsinNorthAmericaarenotlikelytochangemuchin2015.TheUnitedStatesandCanadahavehighlystructuredimmigrationsystemsthathavepredictability at their core. Canadawill continue toaimtoadmitcloseto300,000permanentimmigrantswhowill come from roughly the same countries astheyhaveinrecentyears.Anyfluctuationswillbeatthemargins,althoughCanada’sopeningtoresettlingsome10,000Syrianrefugeesoverthenextthreeyears

is,bydefinition,notable.Similarly,theUSimmigrationsystem is equally predictable in both number andcomposition. And while there is some variability inthenon-immigrant(temporary)visasystem,it isnotlikelytobenotableinanyparticularway.

Regarding Central America, most migration will beoutmigration,anditssizeandcompositionwillcontinuetobeshapedbyopportunitiesatthereceivingcountrylevel.Theseoutmigration“opportunities”arelikelytocontinue to be overwhelmingly in the unregulated/illegalimmigrationrealms.Thereisnothingthatonecananticipateatthistimethatwillchangethe legalroutesin2015inameasurableway.

Mexico,however,isadifferentcase.Mexicoisgraduallybecomingasignificantimmigrantdestinationcountryandmanyoftheissuesdiscussedinthisinterviewwilllikelycontributesignificantlytoitsmovementinthatdirection. For instance, someof those third-countrynationalswhomigrate toMexicowith the intent toenter theUnitedStates illegally,butare interceptedbyMexicanauthoritiesordeniedentrybytheUnitedStates,willendupstayinginMexico,oftenasaresultof pressure by non-governmental organizations onthe Government to build a robust humanitarianprotectionsystem.(TheelementsofsuchasystemarealreadyembeddedinMexicanlaw.)Moreover,Mexicoalreadyhasahighlydevelopedmigrationlaw,ineffectsince the end of 2013, which aspires to make thecountryadestinationforforeignstudentsandskilledand talented people. At the same time, increasingnumbers ofMexicans now appear to shun difficult,poorly paid and seasonal jobs, with the result thatsubstantialnumbersofGuatemalanandotherCentralAmerican migrants work in Mexico’s agriculturalindustry and in poorly compensated jobs in theservicesandtheconstructionsectors.Finally,thelargeandevergrowingMexicanmiddleclassisdevelopinganeverstrongerappetiteforpersonalservices,whichwillputpressureonthesupplyofMexicanswillingtodosuchjobsatthewagesandworkingconditionsonoffer.Manyoftheseimmigrationdriverswillcontinuetogathersteamin2015andwillmoveMexicoclosertobecominganimportantregional(andincreasinglymoreglobal)migrationplayer.

Migration Policy Practice: What are likely to be the key policy debates around migration policy in North America in 2015, for example in terms of draft legislation and/or new policy and programme interventions, political milestones (e.g. national or local elections) and public opinion trends?


Demetrios G. Papademetriou: In theUnited States,the policy debates will be completely political innature.Thisistheonlyconclusionthatonecandrawfromtheresponsetotheeditors’firstquestion.Hereare some of the parameters that will shape thesedebates.ItisextremelyunlikelythattheUSPresidentwilltakemoreexecutiveactionsin2015.Consideringthat the primary pool of potential beneficiaries oflast November’s actions will not begin applyinguntilMay of this year, and given the Government’slimited capacity to process somany applicants, anythoughtsofbroadeningexecutiveactionwouldhaveto be abandoned.Moreover, some in Congress areaiming to try to cut funding of the U.S. Citizenshipand Immigration Services despite the fact that theagencyoperatesalmostentirelyonfeescollectedbythoseseekinganimmigrationbenefitorservice.Theonly counter-scenario is that the President wins alllegalandlegislativechallengestohisactions,aratherunlikely outcome. And even then, the most thatcouldhappen istheannouncement,ratherthantheimplementation,ofabroaderprogramme.

Themoreimportantquestions,therefore,arewhetherPresidentObama’sNovember2014executiveactionwill survive legal and legislative scrutiny,whether itwill do so relatively intact, and how the Republicanpartywill handle the following three related issues.First,how itwill calculate the relativepolitical costsand benefits of taking broad legislative action onimmigrationreformthatincludesprovidinglegal,butnotnecessarilypermanent,residenceforarelativelybroad segment of the illegally residing population,whichwouldeffectivelynegatethePresident’sactions.Second, whether the Republican leadership in bothchambersoftheUSCongresswillbeabletosidelineorotherwisetametheimmigrationextremistsineachcaucuswithoutdoingirreparabledamagetotheparty.Andthird,whatthetenorofdebatesonthisissuewillbeinthealreadyunfoldingcampaignforrepresentingtheRepublicanPartyinthe2016presidentialelection.Theanswerstoallofthesequestionsareunknownatthistime,makinganypredictionunwise.

While this set of political issues will define the USimmigration policy landscape in 2015, there are anumberofperhaps lesscritical issues thatare likelytogainstrengthduringtheyear.Twoofthemmaybeofparticularinteresttomigrationobservers.ThefirsttouchesonthechangingtoneofUSstatesandlocalitieson immigration.Manyof these jurisdictions, deeplyfrustratedwithWashington’simpasseonimmigrationreform,havebeenmoving indirections that canbe

describedasanemerging“powerinversion”betweensubnational political entities and Washington.This is playingout in initiatives that range from theproliferationofnon-cooperationwithWashingtononmany enforcement matters centred on immigrants,to offering unauthorized residents drivers’ licensesandin-statetuitionsforhighereducation,andissuingthemmunicipalidentificationcardsthatallowthemtoaccessmanyservicesandbenefitswithgreaterease.Moretothepoint,theseactionsaregoingentirelyinthe opposite direction than actions taken by manyjurisdictions in the latterpartof the lastdecade.Atthat time, states and localitieswere often trying toplace tough legal and regulatory obstacles on theabilityofillegallyresidentpersonstoworkandevenlivethere,withArizonatypicallyleadingthewaywithnumerousdraconianmeasures.

Thisisaratherdifferenttime.ManyofArizona’sandother states’ measures have been reversed by thecourts,andthecourtofpublicopinionappearstohaveshiftedstronglytowardsfindingpracticalsolutionstothepresenceofunauthorizedimmigrants,ratherthanjustpenalizingthem.Moreover,thestrengtheningUSeconomic recovery is working in favour of seekingwaystokeepsuchworkersintheUnitedStates,whileseveralstatesandlocalitiesaretryingtofindlegalwaystoattractbothmoreestablishedandnewimmigrantstorelocatethereoutofconcernaboutdemographicdecline and hopes that newcomers might revitalizetheir economies. Finally, the secular trend in publicopiniononthisissueistowardssupportingsomeformoflegalization,althoughitisstillsensitivetosystemicshocks,suchaslastyear’ssurgeinasylumapplications(discussed earlier) and any rapid growth in illegalbordercrossings.

Lastly, a significant political event in North AmericaisCanada’snationalelection,whichmust takeplacebyOctober2015.However, the consensus in favourof large-scale immigration that is managed well byacompetentclassofpublicservants,andthestrongbut steady growth in the political power of “newCanadians”,guaranteesthattherewillbenosurpriseswithregardtoimmigrationthere.n


Publications

IOM-MPI Issue in Brief No. 11 – A ‘Freer’ Flow of Skilled Labour within ASEAN: Aspirations, Opportunities and Challenges in 2015 and Beyond2015/12pagesEnglishAvailableforPDFdownload

In2007, theAssociationof SoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN) agreed on an ambitious goal to fast-trackthe creation of the ASEAN Economic Community(AEC) by 2015, which would transform the ASEANregion into a single market and production base.This transformation would be based on five corecomponents,includingafreeflowofskilledlabour.

In A ‘Freer’ Flow of Skilled Labour within ASEAN:Aspirations, Opportunities and Challenges in 2015andBeyond’, authorsGunturSugiyartoandDovelynRannveigAguniasarguethatinpractice,theAEChasnotmademuchprogresstowardsfull labormobilityevenamonghighskilledmigrants.Instead,theyarguethat the steps taken so far haveonly facilitated themovementofhighskilledlabour,ratherthanallowingafreeflowofskilledmobility.

ThisissueinbriefistheeleventhintheseriesofpolicypapersbytheMigrationPolicyInstitute(MPI)andtheInternational Organization for Migration’s RegionalOffice for Asia and the Pacific that offer succinctinsightsonmigrationissuesaffectingtheAsia-Pacificregiontoday.Toreadearlierbriefsintheseries,visit:IOMOnlineBookstoreorMigrationPolicyInstitute.

vol. 53 (1) February 2015

INTERNATIONALMIGRATION

EDITORIAL1 Editorial for International Migration

Howard Duncan

STUDENTS AND ACADEMIC MOBILITY3 Incorporation of Migrant Students Returning From the United States to High Schools in Mexico

Aldo Bazán-Ramírez and Gabriela Galván-Zariñana14 Managing International Student Migration: the Practices of Institutional Actors in Denmark

Ana Mosneaga29 International Student Mobility and Tertiary Education Capacity in Africa

Mary M. Kritz50 The Ethnic Composition of Science and Engineering Research Laboratories in the United

StatesZeynep Esra Tanyildiz

66 Migration Motives of University Students: An Empirical ResearchDjula Borozan and Ivana Barkovic Bojanic

83 The International Mobility of Academics: A Labour Market PerspectiveHarald Bauder

97 Trends in International and Internal Teacher Mobility in Three Pacific Island CountriesRobyn R. Iredale, Carmen Voigt-Graf and Siew-Ean Khoo

DEVELOPMENT AND MIGRATION115 Towards a Socio-Economics of the Brain Drain and Distributed Human Capital

Carolina Cañibano and Richard Woolley131 Mobilities and Knowledge Transfer: Understanding the Contribution of Volunteer Stays to

North–South Healthcare PartnershipsHelen Louise Ackers

148 Argentine Migrants to Spain and Returnees: A Case for Accumulation of Civic AssetsJorge Ginieniewicz

171 Remittances, Transnational Dahiras and Governance in SenegalAlpha Diedhiou

187 International Economic Assistance and Migration: The Case of Sub-Saharan CountriesFilippo Belloc

CONTENTS

imig_53_1_ofc_Layout 1 1/30/2015 6:25 AM Page 1

International Migration, Vol. 53(1) 2015ONLINEONLY2015/201pagesEnglishElectronicversiononlyavailablefromWiley-Science

International Migration is a refereed bimonthlyreviewoftheInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM) on current migration issues as analysed bydemographers, economists, and sociologists allovertheworld.Thejournal iseditedatGeorgetownUniversity’s Institute for the Study of InternationalMigration (ISIM) and published and distributed byWiley. The editors at ISIM are responsible for thedirectionandcontentofthejournal.

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=49&products_id=1437

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page=index&language=en

http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/policy-briefs

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/imig.2015.53.issue-1/issuetoc


Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Policy Brief Series Issue 1 | Vol. 1 | December 20142014/6pagesEnglishAvailableforPDFdownload

The Migration, Environment and Climate Change:Policy Brief Series aims to contribute to the globalknowledge base on the relationship betweenmigration and environmental change, includingclimate change, and the formulation of relatedpolicy options. The series is produced as part ofthe Migration, Environment and Climate Change:Evidence for Policy (MECLEP) project fundedby theEuropean Union, implemented by IOM through aconsortiumwithsixresearchpartners.

The first issue by Jane M. Chun, PhD, examinesrelocation programmes undertaken due to heavyseasonal floods in the Mekong Delta of Viet Nam.Basedontheauthor’sownempiricalresearchintworural communes in upstream areas of the MekongDelta,thearticlediscussesthekeyhouseholdassetsthatdeterminethehouseholdvulnerability,livelihoodoutcomesandmobilitydecision-makinginconditionsof environmental stress. The study measuresdifferentialvulnerabilityamonghouseholds,andhowlivelihoods are pursued and responses undertakenin conditions of environmental stress. According toChun, “by identifying key assets and appropriatepointsofentryforintervention,itispossibletomoresustainably decrease vulnerability in an informedmanner,ratherthanproducevulnerabilityshifts.Thisisrelevantforrelocationprogrammes,specifically indetermining whether they are appropriate, and forwhomandhowtheyshouldbeimplemented.”

Handbook to develop projects on remittances: Good practices to maximize the impact of remittances on development2014/84pagesEnglish,EspañolAvailableforPDFdownload

The purpose of this handbook was to present adocument designed to serve as a guide for peopleworking to promote and strengthen the positiveimpact of the link between remittances, migrationand development. The handbook also promotesthe creation of partnerships between membersof the diaspora, government stakeholders actingin the area of remittances and development, theprivatesector,anddevelopmentorganizationsincivilsociety, including NGOs, academic institutions andfoundations.

In particular, the handbook was created to achievefourobjectives:

1. Provide a conceptual framework which explainsthe relationship between sending money, orremittances,andeconomicdevelopment;

2. Present a summary of good practices indevelopment projects leveraging remittances,accompanied by a brief explanation of theirsuccess;

3. Share a partnership model for carrying outdevelopmentprojects;

4. Designamodelforthepreparationofdevelopmentprogrammes which leverage the economicdynamicsofremittances,migrantinvestmentsandmigrantphilanthropy.

The study is part of the project “Strengthening thedialogue and cooperation between the EuropeanUnion (EU) and Latin America and the Caribbean(LAC)toestablishmanagementmodelsonmigrationand development policies”, implemented by theInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)inclosecoordination with its partner the International andIbero American Foundation for Administration andPublicPolicy (FIIAPP)andfinancedby theEuropeanunion.






MRS N°51 - Vulnerability to Environmental Stress: Household Livelihoods, Assets and Mobility in the Mekong Delta, Viet Nam2014/72pages/EnglishISBN978-92-9068-702-3/ISSN1607-338XAvailableforPDFdownload

Climate change negotiations have put migration,displacement and planned relocation as a direct orindirect result of climate change in the spotlight.TheCancunAgreement in2010called forenhancedunderstanding of human mobility and climatechange, and, more recently, the IntergovernmentalPanel on Climate Change 2014 assessment reportacknowledged migration as an effective adaptationstrategyinresponsetobothextremeweathereventsand longer-term climate change. Despite increasedawareness,moreempiricalevidenceandcasestudiesare called for better understanding and to informpolicymakingonhumanmobilityandclimatechange.

This study explores vulnerability and householdresponsemeasuresinthecontextsofenvironmentalstressintheMekongDeltaofVietNam.Displacementestimates are often based on broad assumptionsderivedfrommacro-scalegeographicaldata,viewingindividuals’vulnerabilitytohazardsthroughthelensof their physical proximity to hazard-prone areas.Given that household assets shape responses toopportunities and threats, this report examines keyhousehold assets which determine the householdvulnerability,livelihoodoutcomesandthosecriticalformobilitydecision-makinginthefaceofenvironmentalchange.

The report also provides analysis of governmentrelocation programmes targeting householdssusceptible to hazards and draws attention to themostasset-poor,whoareoftentrappedandtheleastable to both adapt to stressors in- situ, or migrateelsewhere.

IOM Outlook on Migration, Environment and Climate Change2014/144pagesEnglishAvailableforPDFdownload

IOMOutlookonMigration,EnvironmentandClimateChangeaimstobringtogetherinoneeasy-to-accessreference document the knowledge accrued by theInternationalOrganizationforMigration(IOM)andtopresent IOM’s role, understanding and approach toenvironmentalmigration.

This referencepublicationbuildson IOM’sexpertiseon the topic at the policy, research, internationalmigrationlaw,advocacyandoperationallevels.

IOMOutlookonMigration,EnvironmentandClimateChange:

•Takes stock of IOM’s action and institutionalapproachonthetopic;

•GivesvisibilitytotheworkoftheOrganizationonthetopicandservesasaknowledge-sharingtoolforthiswork;and

•Providesinsightsintothestateoftheknowledge,legal debates, and links between environmentalmigration and other policy areas such asadaptation,development,humanitarianresponse,humanrights,disasterriskreductionandsecurity.

The publication targets a broad external audience,including but not limited to policymakers,practitioners, researchers, international agencies,privatesector,donors,studentsandthinktanks.

http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=2_3&products_id=1435



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2013Annual ReviewInternational Organization for MigrationDEPARTMENT OF MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Migration Health Division

17 Route des Morillons, 1211 Geneva 19, SwitzerlandTel: + 41 22 717 91 11 • Fax: + 41 22 798 61 50

E-mail: [email protected]

Established in 1951, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is the principal intergovernmental organization in the field of migration.

IOM is dedicated to promoting humane and oderly migration for the benefit of all. It does so by providing services and advice to governments and migrants. IOM’s mandate is to help ensure the oderly and humane management of migration; to promote international cooperation on migration issues; to aid in the search for pratical solutions to migration problems; and to provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in need, be they refugees, displaced persons or other uprooted people. The IOM Constitution gives explicit recognition of the link between migration and economic, social and cultural development as well as respect for the right of freedom of movement of persons.

IOM works in the four broad areas of migration management: migration and development; facilitating migration; regulating migration; and addressing forced migration. Cross-cutting activities include: the promotion of international migration law, policy debate and guidance, protection of migrants’ rights, migration health and the gender dimension of migration.

IOM works closely with governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental partners.

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Migration in UgandaA RAPID COUNTRY PROFILE 2013

Migration in UgandaA RAPID COUNTRY PROFILE 2013

Migration in U

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TRY PROFILE 2013

International Organization for Migration Plot 6A Bukoto Crescent, Kampala, UgandaTel: +256 312 236 622; +256 312 261 179

E-mail: [email protected]: http://uganda.iom.int/

Migration HealthAnnual Review 2013

Needs Assessment inNigerian Education Sector

Health and humantrafficking in the GreaterMekong SubregionFindingsfromasurveyofmen,womenandchildreninThailand,CambodiaandVietNam

In African watersThetraffickingofCambodianfishersinSouthAfrica

Migration in UgandaARapidCountryProfile2013

Rapid Assessment of the Existing Data Collection Structures in the Field of Migration in Latin America and some Countries of the Caribbean

Forthcoming Publications


MPP Readers’ Survey

Migration Policy Practice (MPP) was launched three years ago and theeditorswouldnowliketo invitereaderstospareacoupleofminutestoparticipateinashortreaders’satisfactionsurvey.

Thepurposeof this survey,whichcanbe takenanonymously, is tohelpusidentifyourreaders’profiles,theinstitutionstheyrepresentandtheirprimaryinterestsinourjournal.Thesurvey’sresponseswillcontribute,inparticular,toadjustingandimproving,asappropriate,MPP’scontentandstyle,andthusthereader’sexperience.

Shouldyouwishtoparticipateinthissurvey,pleaseclick here.

Thankyou.

https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/J3M7PS5