Initial Inventory North Rhine-Westphalia/GermanyDeliverable 1.1

for“Research and Civil Society Dialogue towards a low-carbon society”

“R&Dialogue”Wolfgang Fischer, Andrea Fischer-Hotzel, Diana Schumann, Olga Schenk

The information and analyses presented in this report are opinions of the authors and do not reflect the views of Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH.

Contact: Andrea Fischer-Hotzel (M.A., Dr. des.)Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbHInstitute of Energy and Climate ResearchSystems Analysis and Technology Innovation (IEK-STE)52425 JülichTel.: 02461 61-3583Fax: 02461 61-2540Email: a.fischer-hotzel@fz-juelich.de

20 November 2012

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“Initial Inventory” Questionnaire

Reflecting the starting point of the low carbon dialogue

Introductory notes

This questionnaire has been developed to help us gather the information needed for the Initial Inventory (Deliverable 1.1). The Initial Inventory is an internal document meant to provide an overview of the situation concerning Low Carbon Technologies in the 10 countries involved in the project.

It is a tool for us to understand where we are and what we start from, which is essential for preparing the dialogue.

It will also be useful in the future, to look back and see where any changes might have occurred.

Please consider that the Initial Inventory does not aim to be exhaustive, rather to identify what is relevant and should be addressed.

You will find two types of questions:

- Questions to help collection of existing official data

- Questions on a range of issues, which require a more creative and subjective input on your part

Please feel free to include any additional information that you consider important.

Where appropriate, especially in part 1, 2 and 3, in order to avoid duplication of work you can refer to already existing documents such as Bellona’s report on Renewable energy policies or other similar reports and update them as relevant.

When answering questions don’t forget to take into account:

- The specific technologies that we have committed to in the project :

o a. CCS

o b. Solar (both PV and Thermal)

o c. Wind

o d. Biomass

o e. High voltage lines

o f. (Geothermal, optional)

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- other technologies that might be relevant for the LC dialogue in your country such as Hydropower, energy efficiency, nuclear…The low carbon energy dialogue is in essence a holistic dialogue, we can’t avoid to consider all aspects of energy production.

Important: If you are not the only partner for your country, you should coordinate the compilation of the questionnaire together with the other partners. It is a good opportunity to start working together.

Acronyms:

LCT = Low Carbon Technologies

CSOs = Civil Society Organization

Bellona REP = Bellona report on Renewable Energy Policies

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1. Official or public reference documents on Low Carbon Technologies in your country

1.1 Legislation: e.g. are there specific laws to enable the development of low carbon technologies? What is the existing legislation (national and regional if applicable), incl. incentives?Germany has developed a long-term energy strategy that stretches until 2050. The cornerstones of German energy policy are formulated in three documents. The German government’s Energy Concept 2010 of September 2010 outlines a long-term strategy of the transformation of the energy system towards a system that is dominated by renewable energy generation. The Energy Concept defines ambitious climate change mitigation targets and elaborates on the individual fields of action (renewables, efficiency, nuclear, infrastructure, energy research, etc.) that need to be addressed in order to achieve the targets set. It includes about 120 measures to achieve these targets.

The Energy Package (six laws and one ordinance) of June 2011 declares and schedules the nuclear phase-out, confirms the climate change protection targets and introduces measures to speed up the development of renewable energies. The Energy Package consists of:

Act to Restructure the Legal Framework for the Promotion of Electricity Generation from Renewable Energy Sources (Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Rechtsrahmens für die Förderung der Stromerzeugung aus erneuerbaren Energien, EEG), including the 2011 firsthand report on the Renewable Energy Sources Act

Act on Measures to Accelerate the Expansion of the Electricity Grid (Gesetz über Maßnahmen zur Beschleunigung des Ausbaus der Elektrizitätsnetze, NABEG)

Act to Restructure Provisions of the Energy Industry Act (Gesetz zur Neuregelung energiewirtschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften, EnWGÄndG)

Act Amending the Act to Establish a Special Energy and Climate Fund (Gesetz zur Änderung des Gesetzes zur Errichtung eines Sondervermögens “Energie- und Klimafonds”, EKFG-ÄndG)

Fourth Ordinance amending the Ordinance on the Award of Public-Sector Contracts

13th Act to Amend the Atomic Energy Act (13. Gesetz zur Änderung des Atomgesetzes, AtomG)

Act Strengthening Climate-Friendly Measures in Towns and Municipalities (Gesetz zur Stärkung der klimagerechten Entwicklung in den Städten und Gemeinden)

the Energy Savings Ordinance (Energieeinsparverordnung) [BMWi, 2012a, 7]

The 6th Energy Research Program of July 2011 outlines energy research priorities and focuses on the support of the R&D in the fields of energy efficiency and renewables.

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Germany has developed federal goals for 2050 which find more or less general acceptance in politics and society:

- CO2-emission reduction by 80-95% (compared to 1990 level),- 60% of primary energy supply from renewables,- Energy efficiency improvement by 2% every year.

Germany has also set intermediate targets for the electricity sector:

- 35% renewables by 2020,- 50% renewables by 2030,- 65% renewables by 2040 and 80% (or more) renewables by 2050.

Support of renewables, especially in the electricity sector, has a long and (partly) cross-party history. In 1989 a ‘100 MW’ wind program and a ‘1000 Roofs’ solar program were initiated at the federal level to strengthen the industrial base. In 1990 the Conservative/Liberal government, supported by hydropower producers and developing wind and solar interests, initiated the first nation-wide feed-in law supporting renewable sources of electricity (Strom-Einspeisegesetz, StrEG). Utilities had to connect generators of renewable electricity to the grid and buy their electricity at a set rate. However, when connected renewables had increased from 55 MW in 1990 to over 1 GW in 1995, large utilities increasingly demanded lower feed-in rates. Strong public opposition (metal workers, farmers, environmental and church groups) developed. In 1998 the Social Democrat/Green Party came to power. It implemented a ‘100,000 roofs solar program’ and in 2000 replaced the StrEG with the Renewable Energy Sources Act (RESA, in German EEG). Renewable energy now has grid priority, grid operators are obliged to buy all re-newable electricity at a set (compared to the StrEG very high) price, guaranteed usually for about 20 years; all this is paid for by the end users through a premium on their energy bills (ex-cept some energy intensive industries).

After the Conservative/Liberal government came to power again in 2009 it continued the policy of the predecessor government in general (although the guaranteed feed-in tariff was partially reduced). Renewable pressure groups have strong influence at all levels of politics and society and even within the two parties. The Conservative/Liberal government’s energy concept (2010/11) states that: ‘Germany should become one of the most energy efficient and environ-mentally friendly economies of the world’. In addition, ‘with the energy concept the federal government describes the way into the renewable energy era’. RESA has led to a strong increase of the renewables share in the German electricity supply but has also driven up electricity prices (2011 about 5 c/kwh). Therefore, discussion is starting on how to reform the RESA (cf. [Bosman, 2012]).

Germany is a federal state. Therefore, federal states (Länder) pursue their own energy policies and targets, which follow their regional structures of interests in an uncoordinated way. States in the North are developing subsidized wind energy, whereas in Southern parts the PV development is particularly encouraged. Since phased out nuclear reactors are located in the South the Länder concerned are facing energy shortage and therefore increasingly depend on wind energy from the Northern States, there is a growing debate about a changing correlation of economic power: Länder in the South are buying wind energy, thereby transferring wealth to northern States – a redistribution of income which faces opposition in the south. Therefore, these southern States are intensifying the development of renewable electricity, which

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contributes to oversupply and leads to a more severe strain on the electricity grid.

Germany has a CCS law since 2012 (implementing the EU-directive) which is generally perceived as a research & development law at best; all CCS-demonstration projects failed due to political/societal resistance in potential carbon storage areas and partly for economic reasons. The current federal legislation effectively allows the Bundesländer to veto CCS on their respective territories, and apparently no Land (including NRW) intends to allow it. So in the course of the CCS legislation, the potential operator RWE has shelved plans for a CCS demo plant at Hürth (NRW) and Vattenfall did so for another one at Jänschwalde (Brandenburg).

In NRW, energy policy is a matter of the Ministry for Economic Affairs, Energy, Industrial Af-fairs, Mid-Size Companies, Crafts and Trades, while climate protection and thus the reduction of CO2 emission is a responsibility of the Ministry for Climate Protection, Environment, Agri-culture, Conservation and Consumer Affairs. North Rhine-Westphalia is currently preparing its own climate protection legislation, currently undergoing parliamentary scrutiny at committee stage (Gesetz zur Förderung des Klimaschutzes in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Klimaschutzgesetz NRW)). A first attempt had been made in the previous term but failed due to early elections.

The Climate Protection Bill contains the following points:- CO2-emmission reduction by 25% by 2020 and 80% by 2050 compared to the level of 1990- Provision of an institutional framework for drawing up, implementing and evaluating concrete measures. Concrete measures will be developed in a “Climate Protection Plan”, the first of which will be presented in 2013 (see below).- Scientific monitoring of climate protection and climate adaption measures- Establishment of a Climate Protection Council of five members, leading figures from all parts of society to monitor and evaluate climate protection and climate adaption measures- Particular focus on regional development planning

The Climate Protection Plan (Klimaschutzplan) will be a roadmap for climate protection policy containing strategies and specific measures for climate protection and adaption to climate change. It is drawn up in a two-step participatory procedure: initially on a rather low level with six working groups consisting of stakeholders and experts from academia, civil service, econ-omy and civil society; in a second step the process will be opened up for local authorities, firms and citizens via public discussions. Results are expected for autumn 2013 (cf. http://www.kli-maschutz.nrw.de/).

Initial Climate Protection Program (KlimaschutzStartProgramm): The KlimaschutzStartPro-gramm is a preliminary climate protection program, the individual measures of which are to be implemented or initiated by the end of December 2012. It gives an idea of what the climate pro-tection plan may look like. It consists of various measures for municipalities, consumers and businesses on the one hand and support and funding for various LCTs on the other plus a self-commitment of the NRW administration to be climate neutral by 2030.

- Municipalities: support to draw up their own local climate protection package (staff training, advice and mediation, software tools), including establishing a ‘climate networker’ for every administrative district in NRW (five) to act as contact person for all relevant actors on the ground, i.e. local au-

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thorities, businesses and r&d organizations and to help them develop and implement concrete projects. provisions for poor local authorities to enable them to invest in climate protection de-spite budget limitations and restrictions.

- individual consumers: low-income households: support of energy consultancy by the NRW consumer advice center in cooperation with the Catholic welfare organization Caritas to avoid “energy poverty”, pilot projects and study to support and subsidize energy efficient household appliances. All households: publicity campaign of the NRW consumer advice center to promote an energy efficient lifestyle (building refurbishment, use of renewable energies, correct heating and airing, choosing a ‘green’ electricity provider).

- Businesses: Loans of the NRW development bank (NRW.bank) for energy efficient and resource effi-cient technologies. Support of businesses from the NRW Energy Agency for setting up energy management systems.

- energy technology in its broadest sense, i.e. energy efficient building refurbishment, combined heat and power, wind and grid and storage-related matters:

Energy efficient building refurbishment: subsidizing of refurbishment particularly of council housing so that rents do not rise plus support of refurbishment of owner-occupied houses below a certain annual income; subsidies for newly built passive houses especially for council housing so that rents do not rise by more than 30 cents per square meter Combined heat and power as a way to contribute to energy efficiency: setting up a pro-gram to increase the share of CHP up to at least 25% by extending and improving grids and power connectors and by subsidizing research and development activities

- Wind (no new initiative, instead reference to the already existing Wind Energy Decree (Windenergieerlass) from 2011):

Support of repowering New facilities in wooded areas Grids and storage: establishment of an online based ‘research institute’ in cooperation with various universities and the Wuppertal Institute and stronger focus on these issues at the Energy Agency

In addition, the NRW 2011 Wind Energy Decree commits the Land to increase the share of wind energy in electricity generation from currently 3% to 15% by 2020 by repowering and installing new plants.Also, the NRW Government runs a ‘cluster program’ to establish and manage networks of businesses, r&d institutions, investors and academic institutions in order to develop and promote innovation. Of particular relevance for LCT are the clusters

- ‘energy industry’ (Energiewirtschaft, http://www.energieregion.nrw.de), - ‘energy research’ (Energieforschung, http://www.cef.nrw.de/),- ‘eco technologies’ (Umwelttechnologien, http://www.umweltcluster-nrw.de/)

Finally, the NRW Ministry for Economic Affairs two more programs to support and subsidize energy technology and energy efficiency:1. ‘Aktionsprogramm 2000plus’ offers grants for local authorities, companies and R&D in-stitutions to develop and test innovative energy concepts.2. ‘Programm proges’ offers grants for companies to develop and test innovative energy technologies.

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Do the various legislation and regulations complement each other or are there conflicting goals that create barriers to deployment?

There is an intensive debate in Germany about the Renewable Energy Sources Act, a centerpiece of renewable energy policy: is its feed-in tariff scheme compatible with the European GHG trading system (EU ETS), or does the EEG prevent market incentives necessary for a viable and cost-effective introduction of renewable energies? A controversial debate about “reforming” the EEG is taking place, also with respect to the high cost of EEG (electricity price increases through EEG apportionment for most consumers) (critical e.g. [Frondel et al., 2010] [Häder, 2010]).

NRW is developing its energy policy with particular reference to federal and thus European goals [Landesregierung des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2012, 12]. However, as a heavily industrialized region it tends to orient itself in the lower limits of national and European roadmaps [MKULNV NRW, 2]. Thus, NRW intends to reduce CO2 emission by 25% in 2020 and 80% in 2050. While there is no obviously conflicting legislation in NRW, some experts (e.g. [Bettzüge et al., 2012]) argue that CO2 reduction measures taken unilaterally by one region of the EU will not contribute to the overall reduction of CO2 emissions in the EU as whole due to rebound and shifting effects. Instead, they would simply lower the price of emission allowances in the EU ETS.

1.2 Surveys on public perception of LCTRecent surveys, links and main outcomesOnce a year, Research Center Juelich carries out a representative survey of the German public regarding the acceptance of energy technology (=panel survey). The last panel wave was performed in December 2011/January 2012 and was tied in with a survey collaboratively carried out by Research Centre Juelich and Wuppertal Institute in 2009.The main topics of the recent survey were the awareness of the transformation of the energy system in Germany (“Energiewende”), attitudes regarding conventional and renewable energies and the awareness, knowledge and attitudes regarding CCS and shale gas. What is the widespread perceptions/knowledge of (different) LCTs in public opinion? Is knowledge about specific technologies more widespread than about others? Which ones?In Germany, the support of renewable energies is generally high (cf. Fig. 1). However, the support of biomass is visibly lower than the support of solar, wind and hydroelectric energy. Over time, the support of biomass has clearly decreased, whereas the support of solar energy has done so slightly. The support of wind and hydroelectric energy has remained stable.Nuclear energy is strongly rejected by the German public. In the light of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster the disapproval of nuclear energy has visibly increased so that 69 % of the German public were against nuclear energy in 2011/12.The awareness of CCS in Germany has perceptibly increased during the last two years. Whereas in 2009 38 % of the German public had heard about CCS, in 2011/12 57 % of the German public had [Schumann et al., 2012]. The proportion of the public who had heard quite a

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bit about CCS increased by 5.5 percentage points from 9.7 % (2009) to 15.2 % (2011/12).

Attitudes towards energy sources in Germany

Data sources: WI/IEK-STE survey 2009 (n=1017); IEK-STE survey 2011/12 (n=1000) IEK-STE 2010.

The knowledge of CCS in Germany was measured by the WI/IEK-STE Survey 2009 and IEK-STE survey 2011/12 by asking the respondents “‘Carbon capture and sequestration’ or ‘carbon capture and storage’ can reduce which of the following environmental concerns?”. The concerns presented to the respondents were: a) toxic waste, b) ozone depletion, c) CO2 emissions, d) acid rain, e) smog and f) water pollution. The predefined answers were “can reduce”, “does not reduce” and “don’t know”, cf. [Schumann et al., 2012].The responses to this question, which were only analysed for the respondents who had previously stated in the survey that they had heard about CCS, showed that a majority knew that CCS can contribute to reducing CO2 emissions (cf. Fig. 2). The proportion of the respondents who knew that increased by seven percentage points in 2011/12 compared to 2009.However, even if the share of the public who knows a bit more about CCS has increased over time, so has the spreading of misconceptions (cf. Fig. 2). In 2011/12 the proportion of respondents who incorrectly thought that CCS could reduce toxic waste was 35 %, in 2009 this proportion was 26 %. In 2011/12 also the share of respondents who incorrectly stated that CCS could reduce ozone depletion or water pollution was higher compared to 2009. Moreover, in both surveys more than half of the respondents incorrectly believed that CCS could reduce acid rain or smog. These results suggest that lay persons cannot really differentiate between different

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environmental concerns because they do not know very much about them.

Knowledge about CCS in Germany 2009 & 2011/12 (respondents who had heard about CCS)

Toxic waste

Ozone depletion

CO2 emissions

Acid rain

Smog

Water pollution

Toxic waste

Ozone depletion

CO2 emissions

Acid rain

Smog

Water pollution20

0920

11/1

2

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

26%

52%

56%

50%

55%

32%

35%

63%

63%

51%

54%

40%

64%

35%

32%

35%

38%

56%

41%

19%

15%

25%

27%

39%

10%

13%

11%

15%

8%

13%

24%

18%

22%

24%

19%

21%

Can reduce Does not reduce Don't know

Source: After [Schumann et al., 2012].On average, CCS is neutrally evaluated by the German public (cf. Tab. 1). However, the proportion of the public who is generally in favor of CCS has slightly increased over the past two years whereas the proportion of the public who is in favor of a CCS demo plant has decreased. Accordingly, the proportion of the public who is opposed to a CCS demo plant has increased.In addition, the results of the WI/IEK-STE survey of 2009 showed clear regional differences with respect to the attitudes of the public regarding CCS. The public in Schleswig-Holstein, the region in which potential CO2 disposal sites exist, tend to be more negative about CCS than the public in the Rhineland or in the rest of Germany: in 2009, more than the half of the respondents in Schleswig-Holstein said that they would not use CCS in order to address global warming. In the Rhineland 42 % were against using CCS and in the Rest of Germany 37 %. [Schumann et al., 2010]. These results suggest that if potential disposal sites for CO2 exist in a region and if a debate about the safety of these sites is under way [Fischer et al., 2010, Hake et al., 2012] this can negatively influence the opinion of the local public about CCS.

Attitudes of the German public regarding CCS

CCS CCS demo plant

2009 2011/12 2009 2011/12

Opposed 37,7 % 34,4 % 28,5 % 35,1 %

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Neutral 23,5 % 24,4% 26,0 % 22,5 %

In favor 38,8 % 41,2 % 45,5 % 42,4 %

Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %

Mean* 3,99 4,06 4,37 4,06

Standard deviation* 1,93 1,92 1,99 2,00

Source: After [Schumann et al., 2012]; *Scale from 1 (=strongly opposed) to 7 (=strongly in favour)Both for LCT in general and for CCS in particular attitudes of the NRW public may significantly deviate from those of the German public due to the specific industrial and economic situation here. There is no data available for NRW.

1.3 Forward-looking documents describing future evolution of LCTs The German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi) commissioned the study "Energy Technologies 2050 - Priorities for Research and Development" in summer 2008. The study aims to identify new accents in already existing R&D topics and new R&D topics from the perspective of public funding. The study made a substantial contribution to directing research policy and setting priorities for non-nuclear energy research in the coming years. It prepared the ground for the new energy research programme and was carried out by a consortium of research institutes and industrial companies. The topics of energy efficiency in industry, commerce, trade, services and households, renewable energy sources, energy storage, fossil-based energy transformation, electrical grids, hydrogen, stationary fuel cells and the biogas are being given priority in the project. New propulsion systems in the transport sector are excluded, but their repercussions for the supply system are being integrated, for example, the infrastructure for electrical mobility or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. Nuclear fusion and fission are not part of the research project [Wietschel et al., 2010]. The study is the one of the most important technology related reference works.

Government roadmaps/scenarios

Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, Germany`s new energy policy. Heading towards 2050 with secure, affordable and environmentally sound energy, April 2012; http://bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/germanys-new-energy-policy,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf

Federal ministry for the Environment, nature Conservation and nuclear Safety, Renewable energy sources in figures, 2011, http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/broschuere_ee_zahlen_en_bf.pdf

Federal ministries, Strategy of the German Government on the use of off-shore wind energy, January 2012, http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/offshore.pdf

Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit, National Biomass Action Plan for Germany, 2009 http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/

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broschuere_biomasseaktionsplan_en_bf.pdf

There are more roadmaps, e.g. from biomass, in particular the National Biomass Action Plan for Germany (http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/english/renewable_energy/downloads/doc/44591.php).

Other publications: http://www.bmu.de/english/transformation_of_the_energy_system/downloads/publ/48808.phphttp://www.bmu.de/english/climate/downloads/doc/40589.phphttp://www.bmu.de/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/energiekonzept_bundesregierung_en.pdf

NRW:http://www.umwelt.nrw.de/klima/pdf/ee_nrw.pdf

http://www.klimaschutz.nrw.de/klimaschutzplan-im-dialog/der-klimaschutzplan/

There are also academic reports/scenarios, reports/scenarios from trade associations, trade unions and reports/scenarios from environmental NGOs.As mentioned, there are many scenarios describing potential energy futures of Germany and the processor the speed of decarbonisation. As nuclear energy will be phased out in about ten years and the future of CCS is dim, their focus lies on energy efficiency, thermal insulation (zero or even positive energy building, doubling the building renovation rate from 1% to 2%) and in particular on renewable energies. Among the different categories of scenarios (business-as-usual and scenarios with variations of baseline or reference scenarios) there is a third category of scenarios prescribing measures that will lead to CO2 cuts of 70 to more than 80 % by 2050, which is also the goal of the Federal Government as laid down in its new Energy Concept of June 2011.

IEK-STE has analyzed different long-term scenarios for Germany. Characteristics of the scenarios are summarized in the following table:

Study Scenario scope Scenarios Horizon

ENREPIV Energy system DE 1. Reference scenario2. Oil price variant

2030

SZEN2007 Energy system DE 1. Coalition agreement (KV)2. Renewable energies (EE)3. Longer service lifetimes of nuclear power plants (KKW)

2020

EET2007 EU energy systemIndividual countries

1. Reference scenarioPRIMES UPDATE 2007

2030

PolIV Sectoral analysis + integration with energy system model DE

1. No-measures scenario (OMS)2. With-measures scenario (MMS)3. With-further-measures scenario (MWMS)

2030

PRIMES2008 EU energy system Total of 9 scenarios:1. Baseline scenario (BL)2. EC proposal without RES trading (RSAT)3. EC proposal with RES trading (NSAT)4. High oil & gas prices baseline scenario (HOG-BL)Others: RSAT-CDM, NSAT-CDM, CES, CES-

2030

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CDM, HOG-CESESSO2008 Energy system DE 1. Nuclear power until 2020 & no CCS

2. Nuclear power until 2030 & CCS from 20212020

EWI2008 Electricity sector DE+ macroeconomic im-pact analysis

1. Implementation of the EU’s climate policytargets for 20202. Cost-effective GHG emission reduction tar-gets3. Variant of 2, with auctioning of ETS certifi-cates4. More ambitious targets and nuclear power phase-out

2030

BMU2008 Partial models + trend extrapolation + expert opinions

6 scenarios:Lead scenario + efficiency scenarios E1–E3 + shortfall scenarios D, D2

2050

ShellPKW Transport of passengers DEBasis: demographic, economic and technical development

1. Socioeconomic lead scenario2. Trend scenario: “Automobile Adapta-tion”3. Alternative scenario: “Auto-Mobility in Transition”

2030

BMU2009 Partial models + trend extrapolation + expert opinions

1. Lead Scenario 2009: update of the BMU Lead Study 2008

2050

STE2009 Energy system DE 1. Reference: BAU2. CA: -77 % CO2 by 2050, with CCS3. CB: -77 % CO2 by 2050, without CCS4. CC: -77 % CO2 by 2050, nuclear plant life-times of 60 years

2050

ÖKO2009 Partial models D for fi-nal consumption sectors + EU27 power plant model

1. Reference scenario (with/without CCS)2. Innovation scenario, with the target of 95 % CO2 reduction (with/without CCS)

2050

ESSO2009 No data.Natural-gas specific

1. Forecast for natural gas 2030

PolV Sectoral modelsIntegration with energy system model DE (IKARUS)

1. With-measures scenario (MMS)2. Structural change scenario (SCS) with additional measures/requirements

2030

FfE2009 Extrapolation DE of use-ful energy (detailed) to primary energy

1. Reference scenario (SZ1)2. Higher technical efficiency (SZ2)3. Environmentally conscious behaviour (SZ3) (2 + reduction of comfort level, reduction of demand)

2050

IWES2009 Electricity model, elec-tricity market model

1. BEE scenario “Power Supply 2020” 2020

IER2009 Sectoral modelsEnergy system modelMacroeconomyElectricity market model

1. Reference scenario with phase-out of nuclear power after lifetimes of 40/60 years2. 6 sensitivity analyses economy, oil price, climate protection, population

2030, outlook to 2050

ShellLKW Goods transport DE 1. Trend scenario2. Alternative scenario with lower con-sumption and alternative fuels

2030

FVEE2010 Extrapolation of sectoral trends

1. 100 % renewables scenario 2050

UBA2010 Electricity model + addi-tional modules for wind, photovoltaics, storage, load management

100 % renewables in 2050:1. “Regions Network scenario”2. “International Large Scale scenario” with international exchange of electricity

2050

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3. “Local Energy Autarky scenario”: de-centralized power supply without imports

EET2009 EU energy system 1. Baseline scenario with current energy and climate policy2. Reference scenario with EU targets (2009/28/EC, 2009/406/EC)

2030

SZEN2010 End sector modelsElectricity modelEnergy system DEMacroeconomy

1. Reference scenario with nuclear en-ergy phaseout2. Variants with nuclear power extension (+4, +12, +20, +28)

2050

BMU2010 Electricity model DE 1. Baseline Scenario 2010 A: Nuclear power until 2022, 33 % electromobility by 20502. Baseline Scenario 2010 B: Nuclear power until 2022, 66 % electromobility by 20503. Baseline Scenario 2010 C: as in 2010 A, but nuclear power + 12 y4. Scenario B 100%-S/H2: 2010 B + 100 % electricity from renewables by 2050

2050

SRU2011 Electricity model DE All models are calculated for an electricity de-mand of (a) 500 TWh and (b) 700 TWh1. self sufficiency2. net self-sufficiency, exchange with DK/NO3. up to 15 % net import from DK/NO4. up to 15 % net import from the Eu-rope–North Africa region

2050

Source: T. Kronenberg, D. Martinsen, T. Pesch, M. Sander, J.-Fr. Hake, W. Kuckshinrichs,Energy Scenarios for Germany: An Assessment from a Sustainability Perspective, Energy Policy, in review.The paper (T. Kronenberg et al.) assesses and compares the selection of scenarios. The range of results described in these scenarios is considerable. Certain trends – for example a significant increase in the importance of renewable energies, and a substantial improvement in energy efficiency – feature in all scenarios, albeit to a different extent. However, the expected economic development of the gross domestic product, which grows much faster in some scenarios than in others, and the emission cuts achieved by 2030 or 2050 differ markedly in the scenarios. One reason for these differences is divergent objectives. The authors conclude that future studies should aspire to greater transparency in terms of the assumed objectives and the methods and data used.For a North Rhine Westphalia scenario see [Zeiss et al., 2011], Klimaschutz NRW 2020+ (2050), Wuppertal Institut, http://www.wupperinst.org/uploads/tx_wiprojekt/NRW2020plus_Endbericht.pdf.

2. Progress and ambitions

2.1 Is the transition to LC energy progressing as expected, with reference to target objectives?

How far is your country from the emission reduction targets defined in the official documents?

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On the federal level, targets for electricity production will be reached (production REN) but electricity consumption is still increasing. Thermal insulation rate & efficiency development are behind targets. Electric car targets are likely to be missed. In general, with the measures that have been implemented in Germany so far the overall target (GHG reduction in 2020 of 40%) will not be achieved (cf.[Hansen & Matthes, 2010]). Fig 1-3: the dark pillars reflect the actual figures based on the BMWi statistics, light pillars present the calculated figures based on the targets set by the German government.

For NRW there is no data available that could serve as a basis for well-founded projections.

How far from the EU Roadmap targets?

Germany has chance to exceed the targets for 2020 (reducing emissions to 20% below 1990 levels).

Figure: Targets for the primary energy consumption (total, PJ): - 20 % until 2020 and - 50% until 2050, base level 2008

Source: Hake, Schenk, calculated on the basis of [BMWi, 2012b] IEK-STE 2012

Figure: Targets for the GHG-emissions (total, CDE): - 40% until 2020, - 55 % until 2030, - 70 % until 2040, - 80%-95 % until 2050, base level 1990

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Source: Hake, Schenk, calculated on the basis of [BMWi, 2012b] IEK-STE 2012

Figure: Targets for the gross electricity consumption (TWh): -10 % until 2020 and - 25 % until 2050, base year 2008. Share RE: 35 % until 2020, 50 % until 2030, 65 % until 2040, 80 % until 2050

Source: Hake, Schenk 2012, calculated on the basis of [BMWi, 2012b] IEK-STE 2012

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Quelle: Schenk, own calculation IEK-STE 2012

2.2 What changes have already occurred? Unexpected, costly increase of renewable energy production in electricity sector (in particular PV.

2.3 What still remains to be done?

Are current policies working well in addressing this gap?

Debate about how to close the gap to 2020 target (-40% GHG) is ongoing. There is no well-founded judgment possible for NRW.

What are the barriers? Is the lack (quality and or quantity) of social dialogue part of the problem?

Yes, in particular with respect to grid development and energy storage but discussions how to improve communication/participation are underway. Other obstacles are the slow insulation of buildings, inadequate efficiency increases and mobility or the debate about a competition between "plate and fuel tank".

In NRW (as elsewhere, too), there is also some debate about “energy poverty”, i.e. the socioeconomic impact of rising energy costs especially for low-income households, cf. e.g. http://www.caritas-nrw.de/wai1/showcontent.asp?ThemaID=1093. However, in general there is no well-founded judgment possible for NRW. Ideally, the conditions necessary for successful

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social dialogue can be assessed better on the basis of the stakeholder interviews.

What kind of initiatives are being taken to overcome the barriers?

In discussion, among them a tightening of insolation standards (which could be counterproductive because increasing costs further reduce investment decisions).

In NRW, the NRW Energy Agency, acting on behalf of the NRW government, provides information, consultancy services and even mediation services for local authorities, citizens and companies in order to reduce conflict rooting in energy technologies and concrete, local projects.

With regard to ‘energy poverty’, the government’s Initial Climate Protection Plan sets up a cooperation of the government, the NRW consumer organization and the Catholic welfare organization Caritas to prevent electricity cut-offs of low-income households by a variety of communication and consultancy strategies.

Emerging limits to LCTs implementation/use: e.g. issues of reliability (see Portugal wind/coal dilemma), lack of sites (see saturation of onshore wind locations in Spain or denseness of plants in the Netherlands), etc.

The situation in Germany is differentiated. On the one hand, the further development of renewables in the electricity sector (in particular offshore wind) depends on grid development, investment, acceptance – everywhere we face problems, cf. 2.4. On the other hand, the rapid, expensive build-up of renewables in electricity fuels a debate about delaying the growth of “green electricity”, in particular PV. There is also some controversial debate about wind energy (in forests, nature parks), i.e. a debate between proponents of the energy systems transformation and nature conservationists – a controversy that splits sometimes the environmental NGOs. There is also a controversial debate about the increasing risk of “black-outs” due to nuclear phase out and the increasing share of intermitting renewables. A further broad consensus exists on the need to build more electricity storage facilities (research & development of new batteries, compressed air storage, pumped storage plants) – but particular local resistance to pumped storage plants. The points mentioned apply to NRW as well.

2.4 Is the transition to LCTs often discussed at public level or it is remote to people?

At the moment the debate about energy transformation and LCT has a focus on electricity and, less intense but latent and potentially virulent on housing/insulation (Energy Saving Ordinance for New Buildings, ENEV). Traffic/mobility (electric car hype is declining) and industries are less at the center of attention.

A large majority of citizens support the energy transformation policy, in particular renewable energy, and oppose nuclear, coal and, as far as the technology is known, also CCS. PV has up to now no acceptance problems, but discussion about electricity price increase due to PV is beginning. At some places local opposition against wind energy projects, including repowering, is a factor (impeding or retarding the realization of some projects). There is broad agreement that grid development is necessary. As the Federal Network Agency states, “Speed of grid development determines the timing of transformation of energy system.” But there is some debate about how much development is necessary (how many thousand miles) and how to

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implement grid development (how to mobilize capital, assure acceptance) – in particular strong local opposition.

The NRW Ministry for Economic Affairs (Wirtschaftsbericht 2012) deplores an undifferentiated support of certain technologies such as underground cables (as alternative to overhead power lines) or gas-fired power plants as opposed to (also modern, flexible) coal power plants. This, however, seems to refer mainly to local initiatives. Public awareness of NRW energy policy seems to be rather low; federal policies (RESA, biofuels) tend to get much more attention.

Particularly controversial are two planned coal power plants that may be necessary to compensate for the nuclear phase-out, Datteln and Lünen. The plans are currently under judicial review.

2.5 Are there any important alternative CO2 mitigation options being considered and supported in your country?

Besides renewables, including – disputed – biofuels, the main focus is on energy efficiency and energy savings (insulation, efficient gadgets etc.); some limited and mostly local debate about new mobility concepts: In September 2012 the Federal Government decided on a “bicycle strategy” for Germany to be implemented at the local level.

In NRW, apart from renewables, the focus lies on energy efficiency and resource efficiency: combined heat and power, insulation, and to some extent coal mine methane (CMM)/abandoned mine methane.

2.6 Do LCTs policies in your country include both centralized and decentralized (local, individual) options?

Yes, up to now most PV and wind is decentralized (owned mostly by private persons and small associations/cooperatives), but offshore wind energy development needs high investment which only big business can provide. Biogas is more or less local.

Applies to NRW as well. However, offshore wind energy does not play any role here.

3. Economy

Please note that there is only little data available for NRW.

3.1 Based on official documents, what are the expected effects of the implementation of low carbon technologies on the economy in your country?

The restructuring of energy markets is considered to result in the development of new technologies, new export opportunities and the jobs growth [BMWi, 2012b, 14f]. However, there is a debate ongoing whether these effects will actually emerge. There are many studies arguing that the net-employment-effect of renewables is zero at best.

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For NRW, no reliable projections are available. It is generally assumed that the number of environment and climate related jobs will increase but, as for Germany as a whole, the net-effect is uncertain [Fischedick et al., 2011, 28].

According to the BMWi statistics, the energy prices, the electricity prices and the energy cost burden have risen in the recent years [BMWi, 2012b, 10ff]. The transformation of energy system is considered to be not “free of charge”. The Federal government counts with an additional investment of €550 billion until 2050. The phase-out of nuclear energy is considered to lead to the growth of the electricity prices, especially for power-intensive industries. Thus, the federal Government considers compensatory payments to the power-intensive industry, e.g. via the Energy and Climate Fund. The implementation of the compensatory payments depends on the appropriate EU legislation.

Fuel and electricity prices in NRW will develop accordingly – the tax components of the prices are determined on the federal level.

Development of costs for the provision of primary energy in Germany

Source: BMWi 2012

Germany currently imports 88 % of its gas needs and 98 % of its oil needs [BMWi, 2012b, 6]. Energy savings are considered to drive down German imports of fossil fuels (Ebd.). But most scenarios demonstrate that a renewable energy electricity supply needs net electricity import.

3.2 Has the economic crisis affected type and quantity of investments in research on LCT? What is the trend since 2008?

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Germany (as other OECD-countries) spent most on energy R&D (net) in the late 1970/early 1980 (peaking in 1982), on average about twice the money spent since 1990s. Based on IEA data (RD&D statistics 2011), the energy R&D budget increased in 2008-10. But due to methodological differences R&D figures differ. Table 1 is based on figures from Ministry of Economic Affairs. The following data are from http://de.statista.com: Federal government investment (Mio. EUR, current)

1991 705

1995 427

2000 416

2005 419

2006 408

2007 420

2008 491

Federal spending on energy research in accordance with the sectors

Sectors 1991 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

- Coal and fossil fuels 65.9 17.0 17.0 14.2 13.6 7.7 10.5 10.4 12.2 15.8 29.5

- Renewables 194.6 155.6 160.8 155.9 190.4 192.3 171.7 209.4 199.7 211.1 265.1

- Nuclear energy research 283.1 140.2 106.6 100.2 94.8 87.5 87.7 84.0 84.1 82.8 84.8

- Closure of nuclear facilities 46.2 8.0 9.0 8.7 8.9 4.3 4.7 3.8 4.0 4.0 6.8

- Fusion 116.1 106.1 122.6 109.6 86.3 112.9 110.6 108.9 107.8 105.7 104.9

Total (in Mio Euro, real 2000)

705.9 426.9 416.0 388.6 394.0 404.7 385.2 416.5 407.8 419.4 491.1

Source: [BMWi, 2012b]

However, there is also private investment in energy research Germany (Mio. EUR, current):

1991 503

1995 256

2000 190

2005 16621

2006 140

2007 221

2008 227

2009 222

Source: http://de.statista.com.

NRW spending on non-nuclear energy research according to sectors in Mio €

Sectors 2006 2008 2009 2010

Energy savings 4.0 6.4 0.5 1.8

PV 1.1 3.5 0.2 2.3

Wind 0.02 0 0.5 0.6

Biomass 0.02 1.7 0.2 0.2

Geothermal 0.08 0.04 0.1 4.2

Renewable energies general 1.6 6.3 5.5 5.0

Fuel cells/hydrogen 6.2 5.1 6.0 7.8

Power plant technology* 2.2 2.3 1.3 1.8

CO2 storage 0.01 - 0 0

Energy systems/modeling 0.1 1.3 6.8 5.5

Energy research general 2.0 4.0 0.5 1.2

E-mobility/energy storage/grids

- 0.9 1.1 1.5

Total** 17.5 31.5 22.7 31.8

Sources: [Schneider, 2008, Jessen, 2010, Jessen, Jessen], own adaptions, *Includes CCS technology, **deviations due to roundings

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3.3 What has been the rate of deployment of LCTs (both capacity and generation)?

Generation (GWh) and installed capacity (MW) of sites generating electricity from renewable sources

1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Hydro

GWh 15,580 20,747 24,867 19,576 20,042 21,169 20,446 19,036 20,956 19,500

MW 3,429 3,595 3,538 4,115 4,083 4,169 4,138 4,151 4,395 4,401

Wind power

GWh 71 1,500 7,550 27,229 30,710 39,713 40,574 38,639 37,793 46,500

MW 55 1,121 6,097 18,390 20,579 22,194 23,826 25,703 27,191 29,075

Biomass

GWh 221 665 2,893 10,978 14,841 19,760 22,872 25,989 29,085 31,920

MW 80 209 451 1,803 2,450 3,257 3,783 4,327 4,814 5,279

Biogenic share of waste*)

GWh 1,213 1,348 1,844 3,047 3,844 4,521 4,659 4,352 4,781 5,000

MW 499 525 585 1,210 1,250 1,330 1,440 1,550 1,650 1,700

Photovoltaics

GWh 1 11 64 1,282 2,220 3,075 4,420 6,583 11,683 19,000

MWp 1 8 76 2,056 2,899 4,170 6,120 9,914 17,320 24,820

Geothermics

GWh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 17.6 18.8 27.7 18.8

MW 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 3.2 3.2 7.5 7.5 7.5

Total in GWh

17,086 24,271 37,218 62,112 71,657 88,238 92,989 94,618 104,326 121,939

Source: [BMWi, 2012b]

Generation (GWh) and installed capacity (MW) of sites generating electricity from renewable

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resources in NRW

2005 2009 2010

Hydro

GWh 500 500 600

MW 440 450 440

Wind

GWh 2,800 4,100 3,900

MW 2,220 2,830 2,920

Biomass (without waste, landfall gas, sewage gas

GWh 1,000 2,600 2,900

MW 170 330 370

Photovoltaics

GWh 100 700 1,200

MW 220 1,100 2,000

Waste

GWh (biogenic share of waste)

1,000 1,400 1,400

MW (unspecified) 380 430 430

Other renewables)

GWh - - -

MW 40 40 40

Coal mine methane (estimated)

GWh 1,100 900 800

MW 180 200 200

Source: MKULNV NRW 2011, own adaption

3.4 Is there in your country any specific idea or plan on how to address cost issues related to the transition to LCT?

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Not yet, but due to increasing electricity prices a debate to adapt further or even abolish RESA/EEG is underway. There is also a debate about “energy poverty” in some segments of society due to rising electricity prices. Increasing regional added value through financial involvement (investment) in renewables by locals could partly compensate some financial burden of energy transformation for some regions (but could increase burden for other regions/city population).

In NRW, there is no specific idea or plan. For ‘social costs’, i.e. increasing electricity prices, see above. Another debate is emerging: Due to a foreseeable gap in “conventional” electricity production a capacity market design is discussed, finding support both from ecological NGOs (WWF) and coal importing industries (VDKi).

3.5 How much is your country dependent on imported energy/resources to produce energy?

Most scenarios indicate that Germany will become a net-importer of electricity in a “renewable energy system”. A further increase of natural gas importance is also expected for the next decades (one reason is a growing demand for balancing the electricity supply in view of intermitting renewables), but due to the building insulation policy and new heat supply systems (thermal solar, geothermal energy and heat pumps) the use of methane for heating will decrease markedly in the long run.

For NRW, a study from early 2011 argues that the Land is likely to remain a net-exporter of electricity [Zeiss et al., 2011, 63] but only under the condition that existing power plants would be modernized. The modernization of existing power plants was part of the previous conservative-liberal government’s climate protection plan [MWEIMH, 2008]. However, under the current red-green coalition government (first elected in 2010, re-elected in 2012) power plant policy has become uncertain.

The following information is taken from a personal communication with the head of division for power plant and network technology at the NRW Ministry for Economic Affairs, Mr. Bekemeier, from 18 October 2012 (references to official documents added):

Currently, the decisions for two coal plants are under judicial review (Datteln, Lünen) and three plants (Hamm D and E, Duisburg Walsum) are completed but cannot go on line due to technical problems (components made of ‘T24’ steel). A gas-fired plant in Hürth and a waste-fired plant in Wuppertal are expected to go on line within the next two years, and another gas plant is planned in Cologne (Köln-Niehl) but the investment decision is pending [Bundesnetzagentur, 2012].

As the Ministry for Economy points out, investors currently hesitate to make definite investment decisions. They officially operate with three scenarios for the next ten years: a reference scenario that assumes a high share of renewables but also of gas, a ‘coal/lignite scenario’ that assumes a rising share of coal and lignite and an ‘eco scenario’ that assumes a disproportionally rising share of renewables. The latter one is apparently considered unrealistic by the operators. The modernization and construction of power plants largely depends on which scenario is most likely to become reality.

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In short, projections about NRW’s future as a net exporter of electricity are not possible for the time being, and grid and power plant operators seem to be skeptical towards the feasibility and/or desirability of renewables.

4. Innovation and solutions

4.1 Are you aware of particularly innovative ideas or plans on how to implement LCT?

Many local energy cooperatives are developing, investing local money into (subsidized) wind/PV. But we do not know particular innovative initiatives. On the contrary, there have been complaints that subsidizing renewables slows down the innovation process (as it is the case in the German PV industry which spents less than 2 % of wholesale revenue for R&D).

For NRW, there are the government initiatives described above (1.1) that support various projects on the ground – from R&D to practical applications (e.g., a geothermal heating system for a school building in Bochum, etc.), as well as awards and competitions.

The Energy Agency draws attention e.g. to the following projects:

Citizens’ wind park Wewelsburg

Akademie Mt. Cenis Herne, roof with 1MW photovoltaics installation

Carbon capture demo plant (without storage facilities) at Niederaußem/Bergheim

H2-Herten: hydrogen from wind energy electrolysis

Architectonically appealing industrial building with PV surface at Duisburg

Prüfzentrum für Solarsysteme, Köln, the world’s most modern testing facility for pv installations

PV-Gebäudeintegration mit Dünnschichtmodulen, Moers, Germany’s largest slanting roof thin-film PV installation

A particularly innovative procedure to produce PV cells developed at Juelich Research Centre

An IT-based pilot scheme for grid development at Aachen (smart metering etc.) (Smart Watts)

PV and wind installations on a former coal storage facilies at Gelsenkirchen and Oberscholven

‘solar estates’ at Gelsenkirchen Schaffrath and Cologne Ossendorf (housing estates with PV installations)

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PV installation at Cologne Bonn Airport Cargo Centers

The world’s largest on-shore testing facility for wind installations at Grevenbroich

In addition, the federal Ministry for Environmental Affairs (BMU) runs a project to support regions to switch to renewable energies (100%-Erneuerbare-Energieregion). While in NRW there are relatively few regions taking part in this program (compared to other parts of Germany), the region of Steinfurt is considered particularly active and innovative (personal communication with Beate Fischer, network communications consultant at the 100-ee project).

It seems promising to invite representatives of these projects (owners, operators, promoters) in the dialogue to serve as examples of successful LCT projects.

4.2 What are the solutions commonly proposed for the decarbonisation of:Habitat: insulation (Energy Saving Ordinance, ENEV), zero or even plus energy houses in the whole building stock in 2050. (also in NRW)Industry: almost carbon free electricity supply in 2050, efficiency increase. (also in NRW)Transports: cut energy consumption in the transport sector by around 10% by 2020 and around 40% by 2050; electro mobility concept Federal Government: in 2020 at least one million electric cars (250,000 of which in NRW), in 2030 six million (both targets seem to be unrealistic).Agriculture: Use of biomass for energetic purposes based on the European Union’s Renewable Energies Directive with its sustainability criteria for both the production and the energetic use of biomass.

4.3 What, if any, technical problems are limiting the diffusion of LCTWith regard to onshore wind, Germany is increasingly facing the lack of the suitable sites [Bellona, 2012, 12]. This is being addressed by financial incentives for repowering of old wind turbines to new, more efficient installations. A particular challenge is the development of the overhead power grid, both for on- and offshore-LCT (in particular wind, but also PV) – lack of investment, low social acceptance); further challenges: investment in electricity distribution grid (often owned by local public authorities with low capital stock); reduced stability of the grid due to oversupply of wind/PV electricity and lack of backup electricity production facilities due to low energy prices at the European Energy Exchange (applies to NRW as well).

5. Exchange and dialogue

5.1 R&Dialogue is a mutual learning action

What kind of content would you like to propose to the other participants? Technical topics you would propose yourself/through other institutes?

In NRW, renewables and grid development. CCS should at least initially not be put at the

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forefront since stakeholders may consider it obsolete and irrelevant (see above).

What would you like to learn from them?

Too early to decide - but of course only useful things, generally success stories & failures, we can learn both from and success.While the idea of learning from societal actors in order to be able to do socially relevant and socially accepted research is appealing, we should not forget that most research institutions (including IEK-STE) depend on external funding (public or private) and are thus able to develop an independent research agenda only to the extent that sponsors support it.

5.2 Dialogue initiatives:Important stations of the formal "energy dialogue" in the federal German Parliament

1979-83 Federal Parliamentary Enquete Commission (Commission of inquiry) “Future Nuclear Policy” ended without a consensus: The majority of the commissioners came to the conclusion that the use of nuclear energy would not be necessary if the power demand were reduced and alternative energy was developed. A minority opposed that view.

1987 – 1994 Federal Parliamentary Enquete Commission “Precaution for the protection of the terrestrial atmosphere”: The debate in the commission was about the future of the energy system. While the Commission found a broad agreement about the GHG reduction targets, again different concepts of energy policy became evident.

1998–2002 Federal Parliamentary Enquete Commission “Sustainable energy supply under the conditions of globalisation and liberalization”: The final report in July 2002 found no consensus. CDU / CSU and the FDP delivered a minority vote. The dissent referred to different aspects of the energy industry, in particular the future use of the nuclear power.

Important stations of the "energy dialogue" in the federal German Government Broad Energy consensus talks in 1993: In view of a strong opposition against nuclear

energy the government tried to reach a broader consensus between parties, industry, trade unions and CSOs. The talks finally brought no result due to opposing views of nuclear power.

Limited Energy consensus talks in 1995 between Conservative/Liberal government and social democrats. Talks failed due to different positions with respect to permanent disposal of nuclear waste and the transport of spent nuclear fuel.

Energy consensus talks in 1999/2000 (Social Democrats/Green coalition government): debate forum for political actors, business representatives and CSOs initiated by the then Federal Minister for Economic Affairs Müller in collaboration with Rolf Breuer, chief executive officer of the Deutsche Bank and chairman of the board of trustees of the ‘Forum für Zukunftsenergien’ (Forum of Future Energies), in June 1999. Its aim was to formulate basic common energy policy guidelines. The issue of nuclear energy was ignored in the dialogue. Even though the dialogue did produce „guidelines of energy policy“, a consensus with environmental CSOs could not be reached in some points (e. g. the future of lignite). Consensus was reached that the future energy policy should be the orientation towards sustainability but the concept remained abstract. Agreement was reached that the energy mix would have to be changed, but not on how fast this should happen and how the new mix should look like. The environmental CSOs urged for a

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"speedy change". Industry and trade unions only wanted a "gradual" change. Energy summits 2006/7: conservative/social democrat government in search for a

comprehensive overall energy concept. Central subjects were the security of the energy supply, investments in a sustainable electricity supply, competitive energy prices, research, energy efficiency and renewable energies. Participants were representatives of the Federal Government, the energy industry incl. the renewable energy industry, the industrial and private energy consumer organizations, trade unions, energy researchers and the environmental CSOs. The goals of climate and energy policy proved to be particularly controversial, and participants confined themselves to present their well-known positions. However, consensus could be reached with regard to the following topics: the necessity of an increase of the share of renewables and the need to increase energy efficiency and savings. Based on the results of the Energy Summit the Federal Government adopted an ‘Integrated Climate and Energy Program’ (IKEP) in 2007.

Other activities: Nationwide - see below for electricity; many at local level (no overview available); one interesting information & dialogue between the public and ExxonMobil in some regions about fracking/shale gas – but up until now rather unsuccessful: the positions are still irreconcilable (http://dialog-erdgasundfrac.de/). In addition, Shell organizes annual stakeholder conferences on energy policy, the ‘Shell Energie-Dialog’: http://www.shell.de/home/content/deu/aboutshell/our_commitment/energy_dialogue/. In NRW, the Energy Agency (Energieagentur) offers information and mediation services with regard to energy technologies for local authorities, citizens and investors: http://www.energiedialog.nrw.de/?page_id=19Note also that on the ground, participation is part of every planning approval procedure and strategic environmental impact assessment.

Are there government-led consultation processes of relevance to LCTs in your country (local, regional or national)?

The Bundesnetzagentur (Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, Telecommunications, Post and Railway) regularly holds consultations with regard to energy policy. The most recent one was about the Electricity Network Development Plan 2012, which sets out development measures for the next 20 years. It addressed ‘interested parties’ as well as individual citizens and is now being analyzed. See here for the accompanying press release: http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2012/120906PublicDialogueGridExpansion.html.

Are any of these expected in the next two years?More activities like the consultation process at local level. + see above. In addition, within the next year a law on the process of finding a permanent repository for nuclear waste is expected to be passed. It will include a number of participatory procedures that may attract much public attention and considerably heat up any energy dialogue (simply because of an overlap of stakeholders). However, it seems unlikely that any of these procedures will be initiated within the duration of the R&Dialogue project. In NRW, drawing up the ‘Climate Protection Plan’ over the next twelve or so months will include public participation at some stage, see above (1.1).

Are there any specific dialogue initiatives between scientists and the CSOs in your country?

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As far as we know: not systematically, but there is some accompanying research of DBFZ in “bioregions”. In NRW, as far as we know – no. However, Wuppertal Insitute was involved in the ‘Low Carbon Societies Network’, an FP7 project pursuing an interactive approach to developing energy scenarios. This project did include CSOs as stakeholders.

Are there successful dialogue initiatives that have taken place in your country, what has made them successful?

(see below)

Are there unsuccessful dialogue initiatives that have taken place in your country? Why were they unsuccessful?

There are many processes at the local level (grid development, pumped storage power plants) but systematic evaluation of success/failure are unknow to us. Big infrastructure projects often legally require citizens’ participation, and some of them have stopped or are now under judicial revision (e.g., the Datteln power plant). This, however, are consultation exercises rather than true dialogues. It must also be noted that in consultation procedures, success is a matter of definition – investors consider the realization of their project a success, environmental organizations often its prevention.

5.3 Concerns: what kind of concerns find public expression with regard to the low carbon technologies?

Who are the main proponents of these concerns?

Acceptance, based on local initiatives; cost (in particular electricity) – concerns among others from social organisations; some sectors of industry (cost, competitiveness), distribution of costs between federal states and among social groups within society. Are there in your country open conflict situations? Both at the national and federal level: In particular against further costly PV-expansion (different actors), but also among the wind energy community (latent between on- and offshore wind, the latter one building block of German REN electricity strategy. Some (public and scientific) resistance against biofuels in petrol (E 10). Resistance against pump storages in some areas, e.g. NRW (Eifel region). Necessary grid development is a particular challenge.

For NRW, due to the high number of stakeholders and their highly differentiated interests when it comes to details of energy policy only some tendencies can be outlined here: Environmental NGOs generally support all forms of renewables but also raise environmental and occasionally social concerns (wind – species and habitat protection, solar – land consumption, biomass – social and ecological problems associated with single-crop farming, efficiency). Only Germanwatch supports CCS as last resort, all others oppose it as dangerous and inefficient with regard to CO2 emmissions reduction – it is seen as a pretext for power plant operators to build even more fossil power plants. They all support grid development but have different definitions of it. The Bund der Deutschen Industrie (BDI, umbrella organization of the German industry) officially supports most renewables but does not have a clear position on biomass. However, it puts a heavy emphasis on CCS and nuclear.

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Responses from the industry to the NRW Climate Protection Plan also show that businesses fear the loss of competitiveness when climate protection goals become legally binding.1

Trade associations promote their respective energy technology. Employers federations, trade unions and consumer/welfare organizations represent the interests of their members or clients, i.e. low costs for businesses and private households, respectively. The trade unions, however, endorse the NRW Climate Protection Plan (http://nrw.dgb.de/themen/++co++c7030d82-45b1-11e1-6f6d-00188b4dc422 as do the NRW Consumer Advice Center and Caritas. A detailed stakeholder analysis for NRW is under way but needs more time.

When there is conflict about a technology, what are the different overall goals of proponents and opponents of the particular LCTs?

Debate is only so much about usefulness of PV (even if there are actors who doubt that PV is sensible in a country with low solar intensity (more than 50% PV in the world is in Germany), but about cost and the incentive instrument EEG which “fuels” the “explosion of PV”. Therefore, wind energy supporter are opposing further PV, fearing lack of acceptance for energy transformation. For NRW, see above (previous point).

Why are the different stakeholders motivated (or not motivated) towards the implementation of LCT?PV stakeholders defend their economic interest (very good return on the capital employed). In NRW, in general, there are organizations that represent the interests of their individual members or clients (trade associations, trade unions, employers federations, welfare organizations, consumer organizations), and organizations pursuing more abstract, pre-defined goals based on their ideas of the ‘common good’ (environmental NGOs, “philantrophical” NGOs).

5.4 What could be the role for R&Dialogue in your country?Contributing to a common understanding of limits/opportunities of the “Energiewende” at the regional (Länder) level.

6. Stakeholders

General remark: To analyse all relevant stakeholders and their interests/strategies/options is an extensive research program – we can only make some hints yet.

6.1 Please identify the relevant stakeholders for each of the mentioned national LCTs and when available give their views on them.

Well established and grassroot CSOs (environmental NGOs, civic movements – local, regional and country-wide):

1 http://www.process.vogel.de/management_und_it/recht_steuern_finanzen/articles/346187/31

Almost all NGOs in a narrower sense are “green” organizations; but there is some conflict between some NGOs about the role environmental protection should play: How to balance environmental protection and “Energiewende”? – should power grids or new on-/offshore wind farms be developed at the expense of environmental protection, should wind farms be allowed in conservation areas? Even about the (global) role of CCS there is some difference.

Consumers are represented by consumer organizations that have some influence with regard to costs. They give advice to consumers, i.e. in the field of housing insulation materials or heating systems. Also cities have influence within their concepts of energy transformation.

Environmental NGOs operating in/potentially relevant for NRW:

Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz NRW (BUND, German section of Friends of the Earth, Land section of national organization, conservation) Landesgemeinschaft Naturschutz und Umwelt NRW (LNU, conservation) Naturschutzbund Deutschland NRW (NABU, NRW section of national organization, conservation) Germanwatch (no regional groups in NRW/no NRW section, energy systems transformation) Greenpeace (no NRW section, operates in local groups, energy systems transformation) Klimaallianz Deutschland (no specific NRW section; umbrella organization of 110 NGOs of various religious and ideological backgrounds with a more or less obvious interest in climate protection issues; may be useful to advertise the Dialogue among stakeholders in a wider sense. Regional Klimaallianz NRW related to NABU.)

Apart from LNU, all NGOs operate on the federal level as well. BUND, LNU and NABU run a joint office in NRW, the Landesbüro der Naturschutzverbände NRW.

Philantrophical NGOs and foundations promoting LCTs or the transformation of the energy system operating in/potentially relevant for NRW:

Projektorganisation Regionale Ölpflanzennutzung (P.R.O. Mönchengladbach, local initiative to promote biomass, not very active) VRD Stiftung für Erneuerbare Energien (particular focus on solar) FÖS Forum ökologisch-soziale Marktwirtschaft (Green Budget Germany; focus on political, economic and social implications of climate protection policies) Stiftung Mercator (general philanthropical foundation with a focus (among others) on climate protection)

Other NGOs protecting individual stakeholders’ interests:

NRW Consumer Advice Center (cost issues for private households) Caritas (Catholic Welfare Organization, ‘energy poverty’)

Research and Development Organisations (public research such as universities and independent research organizations):

Academic organizations in NRW:

Aachen University (RWTH Aachen; various technologies)32

Aachen University of Applied Sciences, Department of Civil Engineering, Institut NOWUM Energy (biomass), Solar Institute Jülich (solar) Bochum University of Applied Sciences (various technologies) Bochum University of Applied Sciences ‘Agricola’ (various technologies) Cologne University of Applied Sciences (Institut für Landmaschinentechnik und Regenerative Energien – Institute for agricultural engines technology and renewable energies; focus on various technologies) Dortmund University of Applied Sciences (various technologies) Düsseldorf University of Applied Sciences, Center for Innovative Energy Systems (sponsored by the electricity provider EnBW, various technologies) FernUniversität in Hagen, Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Sciences, Chair of Electrical Power Engineering, Chair of Components of Electrical Engineering (various technologies) Gelsenkirchen University of Applied Sciences (various technologies) Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf (various technologies) Münster University of Applied Sciences (various institutes, various technologies) Ruhr-Universität Bochum (various technologies) Ruhr West University of Applied Sciences (various technologies) Südwestfalen University of Applied Sciences (various institutes, various technologies) Technische Universität Dortmund (grids) University of Cologne (various technologies) University of Duisburg Essen (grids, biomass)

Independent Research Organizations operating in/potentially relevant for NRW:

Cologne Institute for Economic Research Forschungszentrum Jülich, Institute of Energy and Climate Research (various technologies) (associated organizations: German Research School, JARA-Jülich Aachen Research Alliance) German Aerospace Center (DLR; various technologies) Institut Dezentrale Energietechnologien (implements the 100% renewable energy regions program of the Federal Ministry for the Environment) Institut für Energie- und Umwelttechnik e.V. (CCS) Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Essen (RWI, energy systems transformation)

Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy (various technologies; associated organization: Low Carbon Societies Network)

Government (e.g. local, national, regional, independent agencies, but also Federal States):

In the process of project development we will identify some. In general, municipalities and regional governments are actively involved in the “Energiewende”.They do have a strong interest to keep the added value for energy within their systems. Consumers do invest, i.e. in form of energy co-operatives. Municipalities invest to keep the costs stable. The most important NRW organizations are:

Energy Agency North Rhine Westphalia: agency operating on behalf of the Government of North Rhine Westphalia. The Energy Agency has already signaled interest with a first meeting scheduled for early December. In the case of the successful cooperation it will act as a

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broker vis-à-vis the relevant authorities (Ministry for Climate Change, Ministry for Economic Affairs, Government of NRW) NRW technology clusters: The NRW Government seeks to promote innovation and technology by pursuing a ‘cluster policy’, i.e. by initiating clusters of business and r&d organizations in certain fields of technologies. The clusters are coordinated by ‘cluster managers’, who are either government representatives or private consultants. For R&Dialogue the relevant clusters would be: Eco technologies Energy research Energy industry Regional ‘climate networkers’, contact persons on the ground for local actors to help them implement the NRW Government’s preliminary climate protection measures (see above point 1.1)

German Advisory Council on the Environment German Council on sustainable development

Industry and trade associations, trade unions:

The Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB), as its member unions, supports the energy transformation, but underlines the need to protect jobs also in the “traditional” energy sector.

Landesvereinigung der Unternehmensverbände Nordrhein-Westfalen e.V. (unternehmer nrw): umbrella organization of regional trade associations, professional associations and employers‘ federations (focus on competitiveness and job security) Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund NRW (DGB NRW): umbrella organization of NRW trade unions (members of particular interest for the Dialogue: IG Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt, IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie, IG Metall; focus on competitiveness and job security) Landesgruppe NRW des Bundesverbands der Energy und Wasserwirtschaft Verband Kommunaler Unternehmen

And see ‘LCT industry companies‘ for technology specific trade associations

Religious organizations:

Roman Catholic Church (German Bishops Conference) supports energy transformation and sustainable development and has an own energy savings/efficiency concept for churches & parish buildings (http://www.dbk.de/en/home/). Same hold true for overall Evangelical Church in Germany (http://www.ekd.de/english/index.html) and its 23 member churches. In both churches there is a very critical debate about “food to fuel”, in particular with respect to global impects. Information about the Muslim communities are not available, because they have no regional/national organization. Jewish community is very small as other faith organizations.

Catholic Church in NRW: Working Group on Ecological Questions of the German Bishops’ Conference. The Catholic Church sees energy technology from the perspective of sustainability (ecological, intergenerational) and social justice (‘energy poverty’). There is a

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positive attitude towards energy efficiency, renewables and grid development but some skepticism towards biomass with its potentially negative ecological and social implications (clearing of rain forests, the well-known risks of single-crop farming, ‘food or fuel’). CCS is seen as a bridge technology at the most; conflicting goals with other forms of renewables (geothermal) are identified; it is called for more public information and participation. [Arbeitsgruppe für ökologische Fragen der Kommission für gesellschaftliche und soziale Fragen der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, 2011] Protestant Church in NRW: Evangelische Kirche von Westfalen, Institute for Church and Society, Department of Environment. As described above: generally positive attitude towards energy systems transformation but skeptical towards biomass. No obvious position on CCS. http://www.kircheundgesellschaft.de/nachhaltige-entwicklung/energie-und-klima/ As on the federal level, Muslim and Jewish are very decentralized and very small

LCT industry companies

The German Renewable Energy Federation BEE and its member organizations are today very influential actors in energy policy and may even influence, together with NGOs, policy sometimes more effectively than the 4 big electricity producers. But also “traditional” companies, in particular mechanical engineering industries, are supporting the Energiewende, expecting broader/new markets for their most efficient machineries.

There are about 170 energy production and energy technology companies operating in NRW (plus many more if all individual producers of biomass are considered). For this reason we suggest to at least initially only consider trade associations:

Fachverband Biogas e.V./German Biogas Association (biomass) IWR Internationales Wirtschaftsforum Erneuerbare Energien (renewables) Landesverband Erneuerbare Energien NRW (renewables) VIK Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft e.V. (power plant technology, probably CCS) VGB powertech e.V. (various) Bundesverband Windenergie, Landesbüro NRW (wind) Bundesverband Solarwirtschaft e.V. (solar) Bundesverband Deutsche Pflanzenzüchter e.V. (biomass) Bundesverband Bioenergie e.V. (biomass) Plus maybe, even though the technologies are not explicitly included in the Dialogue: Geothermische Vereinigung (geothermal), Arbeitsgemeinschaft Wasserkraftwerke NRW e.V. (hydro), Interessengemeinschaft Wassernutzung NRW e.V. (hydro)

However, it may also be necessary and useful to invite the big electricity producers and grid operators as individual companies: Amprion (grid operator) E.On, RWE (power plant operators)

Investors and funding bodies

There is a debate to open the electricity grid for private institutional investors (e.g. life insurance companies): In times of low interest rates they could be interested in investing in a regulated sector (grid) with a guaranteed rate of interest (today a return of about 9 per cent on

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capital invested). Actors in NRW include: Gothaer Allgemeine Versicherung AG, Kreissparkasse Heinsberg, Wirtschaftsförderung Dortmund, NRW.bank (NRW development bank). This list is certainly not exhaustive but information is hard to obtain.

Media

Most media are supporting the energy transformation or are even propagators in general, but also take up the negative aspects of energy transformation (probably more than in the past). But due to the electricity price increase they take up the “energy poverty” discussion which could develop as an obstacle for the further development of REN in the electricity sector. For NRW

Regional newspapers: Westfälische Allgemeine Zeitung (Essen), Rheinische Post (Düsseldorf), Westfalen Post (Hagen), Kölner Rundschau (Cologne), Westfälische Nachrichten (Münster), and others Public TV station: Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR). Renewables and grid development. (http://www.wdr.de/wissen/wdr_wissen/themen/natur_umwelt/dossier_energie/index.php5) Public Radio station: Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR)

Others

Public-private initiatives in NRW at local level:

AGIT mbH, Aachen (various technologies) BioTec Rhein-Erft e.V. (biomass) Kreis Recklinghausen WiN Emscher Lippe GmbH (various technologies) Kreis Steinfurt Agenda 21-Büro (biomass, 100%-ee-Region)

Regional or local initiatives:

ZebiO Oberberg (various technologies) Haus der Technik e.V., Essen (various technologies, information and further education) Kraftwerkschule e.V. (educational institution for power plant technology)

6.2 kind of contribute each of these stakeholders to the dialogue?

Each of the stakeholders has its own competences and limits – their integration/participation depends on the dialogue process we will develop. Therefore it is too early to answer this question.

Due to the high number of individual actors in NRW the list above includes mainly trade associations and umbrella organizations. It may be assumed that they combine both technological and communications expertise but it has to be seen in practice whether and to what degree this assumption is correct. Ideally, the stakeholder interviews will give us more information and insight.

In addition, there seem to be close connections between political actors (‘decision makers’) and the LTC industry via the NRW technology clusters and the Energy Agency. Here, too, we still need to find out in practice how well the clusters operate. In any case, politics, industry and

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research seem to be more closely interlinked with each another than each with CSOs.

In terms of technology, grid development/high voltage power lines and CCS do not feature prominently in the r&d and product portfolio of research organizations and businesses. Research organizations often deal with them as part of their electrical engineering, mechanical engineering and energy management focusses. Companies produce power plant components or power plant membranes rather than ‘CCS technology’.

6.3 Can you imagine a common point of interest for all the stakeholders in your country?

Question is whether the low carbon society is really an agreed target or only lip service – may be we have to develop a common reference point. May be one critical issue is “cost” of energy transformation.

In NRW, common points of interest may be the feasibility and cost issues of the ‘Energiewende’ as envisaged by the federal Government as well as its NRW implementation in the form of the upcoming ‘Climate Protection Act’. Note that due to the current legal situation and the lack of willingness to invest in fossil fuel power stations as outlined above it may be challenging to establish CCS as a topic of the dialogue.

6.4 With regard to consolidated interests of the stakeholders, what sectors of society are more resistant to the changes made necessary by the Low Carbon transition?

What are the interest groups that need to be taken into account?

Depends on the dialogue process we will develop. Therefore it is too early to answer this question.

Wide (cross-cutting) sections of the society: consumers, producers, employees, employers, environmental activists.

6.5 Can you identify possible “ambassadors” for the project?

Open. There are, however, too many divergent interests; there is currently no stakeholder who would be accepted as impartial/not one-sided.

Representative of Energy Agency (has already signaled interest).{NZZ, 2012 #1975}

Selected publications

ARBEITSGRUPPE FÜR ÖKOLOGISCHE FRAGEN DER KOMMISSION FÜR GESELLSCHAFTLICHE UND SOZIALE FRAGEN DER DEUTSCHEN BISCHOFSKONFERENZ (2011) Der Schöpfung verpflichtet. Anregungen für einen nachhaltigen Umgang mit Energie. Ein Expertentext zu den ethischen Grundlagen einer nachhaltigen Energieversorgung. Bonn, Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz.BELLONA (2012) Renewable energy policies in Europe. A mapping of existing and planned support schemes for renewable energy development in 31 European countries.BETTZÜGE, M. O., FRONDEL, M., HÖFFLER, F. & SCHMIDT, C. M. (2012) Gemeinsame

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Stellungnahme des EWI und RWI zum Klimaschutzgesetz NRW.BMWI (2012a) Germany’s new energy policy. Heading towards 2050 with secure, affordable and environmentally sound energy.BMWI (2012b) Zahlen und Fakten. Energiedaten. Nationale und Internationale Entwicklung. Preprint, September 6, 2012, http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiedaten/gesamtausgabe.html. BOSMAN, R. (2012) Germany's Energiewende: Redefining the Rules of the Energy Game. The Hague, Clingendael Institute.BUNDESNETZAGENTUR (2012) Veröffentlichung Zu- und Rückbau - Stand: 12.09.2012.FISCHEDICK, M., BEST, B., LUHMANN, H.-J., VALLENTIN, D., BORBONUS, S., FRIEGE, J. & SAMADI, S. (2011) Chancen durch Klimaschutz. Positive ökonomische Implikationen einer ehrgeizigen Klimaschutzpolitik für Schlüsselbranchen in NRW. Wuppertal, Wuppertal Institut.FISCHER, W., HAKE, J.-F., KUCKSHINRICHS, W. & SCHENK, O. (2010) Carbon Capture and Storage – Politische und gesellschaftliche Positionen in Deutschland. Technologiefolgenabschätzung - Theorie und Praxis, 19:3, 38-45. FRONDEL, M., RITTER, N., SCHMIDT, C. M. & VANCE, C. (2010) Economic impacts from the promotion of renewable energy technologies: The German experience. Energy Policy, 38:8, 4048-4056. doi: DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2010.03.029HÄDER, M. (2010) Klimaschutzpolitik in Deutschland – eine ökonomische Konsistenzanalyse der Rahmenbedingungen für den Strommarkt. Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, 34:1, 11-19. HAKE, J.-F., FISCHER, W., HAVLOVÁ, V., SCHUMANN, D., STREIMKIENE, D. & VOJTĚCHOVÁ, H. (2012) Public Perception. In TOTH, F. & BARKATULLAH, N. (Eds.) Techno-economic Comparison of Ultimate Disposal Facilities for Carbon Dioxide and Radioactive Waste (In Press).HANSEN, P. & MATTHES, F. C. (Eds.) (2010) Politikszenarien V – auf dem Weg zum Strukturwandel, Treibhausgas-Emissionsszenarien bis zum Jahr 2030, Jülich, Forschungszentrum Jülich.JESSEN, C. Förderung der nichtnuklearen Energieforschung durch die Bundesländer 2009. Jülich, Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, Projektträger Jülich (PtJ).JESSEN, C. Förderung der nichtnuklearen Energieforschung durch die Bundesländer im Jahre 2010. Jülich, Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH. Projektträger Jülich (PtJ).JESSEN, C. (2010) Förderung der nichtnuklearen Energieforschung durch die Bundesländer (2008). Jülich, Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, Projektträger Jülich (PtJ ERG).LANDESREGIERUNG DES LANDES NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN (2012) Gesetzentwurf der Landesregierung. Gesetz zur Förderung des Klimaschutzes in Nordrhein-Westfalen. 16/127. 16. Wahlperiode ed.MKULNV NRW FAQs zum Entwurf für ein Gesetz zur Förderung des Klimaschutzes in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Klimaschutzgesetz NRW). http://www.klimaschutz.nrw.de/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/FAQ_Klimaschutzgesetz.pdf.MWEIMH (2008) Pressemitteilung. 05.05.2008: Landesregierung nimmt Verhandlungen zur Kraftwerkserneuerung auf / Ersatz von Altanlagen wichtigster Beitrag des Landes zum Klimaschutz / Nordrhein-Westfalen wird Schrittmacher bei CO2-Einsparungen / 81 Millionen t pro Jahr. http://www.mwme.nrw.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/Archiv_MWME/200805/080505_1/index.php. 18.10.2012: 2012.SCHNEIDER, R. (2008) Förderung der nichtnuklearen Energieforschung durch die Bundesländer (2006), Forschungszentrum Jülich GmbH, Projektträger Jülich (PTJ ERG).

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SCHUMANN, D., FISCHER, W. & HAKE, J. F. (2012) Akzeptanz der Transformation des Energiesystems in der Bevölkerung. Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 62:6, 29-33. SCHUMANN, D., PIETZNER, K. & ESKEN, A. (2010) Umwelt, Energiequellen und CCS: Regionale Unterschiede und Veränderungen von Einstellungen der deutschen Bevölkerung. Energiewirtschaftliche Tagesfragen, 60:5, 52-56. WIETSCHEL, M., ARENS, M., RENS, M., DÖTSCH, C., HERKEL, S., KREWITT, W., MARKEWITZ, P., MÖST, D. & SCHEUFEN, M. (Eds.) (2010) Energietechnologien 2050 - Schwerpunkte für Forschung und Entwicklung - Politikbericht., Karlsruhe, Fraunhofer Verlag.ZEISS, C., et al. (2011) Klimaschutz NRW 2020+ (2050). Handlungsoptionen und Handlungsnotwendigkeiten. Wuppertal, Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie GmbH.

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